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REVIEW OF THE MONOGRAPH: KOLOSOV I. V. THE HISTORY OF LEGAL CONSEQUENTIALISM: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LAW

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Abstract: This article presents a review of the monograph “The History of Legal Consequentialism: The Effectiveness of Law”.

I. V. Kolosov’s monograph is a comprehensive study of the use of the principle of utility and other principles aimed at achieving a certain effect, i.e., doctrines that are based on the fact that legally significant actions are approved or disapproved depending on their potential to achieve a result. The subject of this monograph is specific ideas about the effective implementation of legal activities within the framework of these doctrines, including in the context of lawmaking and law enforcement, which determines its practical significance.

I. V. Kolosov’s monograph is valuable for modern legal science from the point of view of its systematic, scientific, and representative analysis of scientific sources. The scientific significance of the monograph is expressed in conclusions, generalisations and proposals.

I. V. Kolosov’s research organically combines both a theoretical analysis of the content of legal doctrines of various time periods, from the standpoint of general philosophical, axiological, historical, general and comparative legal aspects, and practical conclusions and proposals regarding the possibilities of legal activities, taking into account the theoretical framework of legal consequentialism.

Keywords: consequentialism, legal consequentialism, effectiveness of law, utilitarianism, legal utilitarianism, utility, utility principle, common good.

Introduction

Even before the Hammurabi code of laws was carved on the “cornerstone” in ancient Mesopotamia (Babylonia) more than four thousand years ago, people had already been subject, either by mutual agreement or under the threat of coercion, to norms allowing them to regulate social and economic activities. The need for law arose either almost simultaneously with the emergence of the state or a little later as a result of the development of political structures. The need for law
increased as tribes, clans and other communities developed from small tight-knit groups to more complex and diverse societies with more multifaceted and comprehensive activities and structures. Effective rules and norms were needed to regulate, streamline and control increasingly complicated processes.

The effectiveness of legal regulation is a cross-cutting problem of the entire history of law and state. The entire history is, among other things, the evolution of the self-organisation of humanity and man, the history of the emergence, development and interaction of different types and forms of regulation of public life giving certain social results.

Indeed, the problems of the significance of law, its role in public life, the main areas and forms of influence on society and its individual spheres have long been discussed in the social sciences, including the legal sphere, and raised in legal practice.

In the current conditions, when the objectives of legal regulation are aimed at expressing and coordinating social interests contributing to the harmonious and free development of social relations, the concepts of the effectiveness of law and other elements of the legal system should be changed accordingly. It would be wrong to interpret the effectiveness of a norm as a correlation between the result of its action and the legal and non-legal (economic, political, ideological, etc.) goals prescribed to it.

The same can be formulated in the traditional categories of the correlation between goal and result. The only thing is that it should not be about economic, political, ideological and other goals that are external to law, but about an immanent legal goal consisting in coordinating social interests on the basis of a law-forming interest and thus ensuring the maximum possible universal measure of freedom for the development of a relevant sphere of public life, while the freedom of individuals and the “common good” must be harmonised in such a way that personal freedom does not violate the “common good”\(^1\) (p. 131).

In this regard, it appears that Kolosov’s monograph makes a significant contribution to the theoretical elaboration and evaluation of ideas about the concepts of consequentialism, not only within the framework of generalizing the conclusions contained in the analyzed concepts, but also because of measuring the effectiveness of law and its norms by contributing to strengthening the legal foundations of state and public life, to the formation and development of elements of freedom, harmony, justice in social relations, as well as by contributing to the exercise of human and civil rights and freedoms.

Analysis of the Content of Kolosov’s Monograph

The formal existence of laws in itself, no matter how sufficiently their text is formulated, no matter how they are really written in such a way that rights and freedoms would follow from their content, in no way can lead to their intended positive consequences. For this reason, the effectiveness of law is so important.

In many developing countries, laws remain unenforced or are enforced selectively, and sometimes are simply impossible to enforce. Laws themselves can also be used as a means of perpetuating insecurity, stagnation, inequality and injustice. At that, laws can serve a variety of interests, including ensuring the prosperity of not the entire society, but only of individuals as a result of the transformation of social relations. Therefore, law is both a product of social and power relations and a kind of tool for challenging and changing these relations.

Based on the above, the effectiveness of law is crucial in the regulation of social relations and therefore the subject of Kolosov’s monograph connected with the reference to the classical and modern legal doctrines of the consequentialists is highly relevant. In this regard, Kolosov’s monograph deserves special attention.

The undoubted advantage of Kolosov’s monograph is the breadth of the doctrines covered in it, namely the prerequisites for the emergence of consequentialism in the ancient world and in the early modern age are considered, classical legal utilitarianism is analyzed in detail, including a separate paragraph devoted to the practical aspects of the doctrines of J. Bentham and J. S. Mill, legal ideas about achieving results and using the principle of utility in the Russian philoso-
The monograph consists of four chapters that are divided into eleven paragraphs, as well as of a special chapter on the review of scientific literature.

In the first chapter of the monograph devoted to the prerequisites for legal consequentialism in the pre-Bentham legal doctrines, the author shows that the works of philosophers somehow reflect consequentialist ideas associated with the use of the principle of utility in state legal administration and the understanding of the moral significance of actions in the light of their results.

For example, I. V. Kolosov reveals the beginnings of consequentialism in the Arthashastra, an ancient Indian monument of legal thought, and notes the expediency of using the principle of utility as a criterion for evaluating legally significant actions (pp. 24-25). Among ancient Chinese thinkers, he singles out the philosopher Mozi, who not only laid the foundations of state consequentialism, but also “anticipated the basic principle of utilitarianism – utility maximisation” (p. 27). As convincingly shown in Kolosov’s monograph, a number of ideas expressing the principle of utility were formulated in the political and legal doctrines of ancient Greek philosophers. Considering that such ideas are found in the doctrines formulated by Aristotle, Socrates and Plato, the author pays special attention to the eudaemonism of Democritus and Epicurus (pp. 30-34).

Analysing the consequentialist ideas expressed in the philosophical and legal doctrines of the early modern period, the author notes a certain commonality of Spinoza’s views and the principle of utility maximisation (p. 37), justifies the ideas expressed in the doctrine of T. Hobbes that, in modern terms, can be attributed to rule consequentialism (pp. 38-39), emphasises a number of common points in Montesquieu’s philosophy of crime and punishment and J. Bentham’s utilitarian approach to the analysis of this problem (pp. 41-43), as well as reveals a number of elements of rule consequentialism in the doctrines of A. Smith, D. Hume, H. Spencer, C. Beccaria, J. Locke, C. Helvétius (pp. 39-59).

“In fact, early utilitarianism developed before J. Bentham and proceeded from the need to achieve happiness and reduce suffering. The achievement of these goals should correlate with legal regulation. At that, early utilitarians proceeded from the need to maintain a balance between the interests of each person in achieving their own personal happiness and the common good. Classical legal utilitarianism reiterated some of the ideas of the early utilitarians” (p. 59). In this regard, the monograph has a pronounced author’s line and contains a critical analysis of the views of various thinkers regarding the use of the principle of achieving results within the framework of legal activities, from ancient philosophers, sources of Ancient India, Ancient China, to the theorists of the 18th century.

The paragraph dedicated to the axiological aspect of classical legal utilitarianism is of interest from the point of view of the development of ideas about the value aspect of legal consequentialism. In the paragraph, the author of the monograph convincingly makes the case that the value principle of utilitarianism about ensuring the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, which determines the comparison of the usefulness of subjects of law, can lead to the fact that when legally significant decisions are made, interests, benefits, utility, common good are on one side of the scale, while equality, justice and legality are on the other. Ultimately, this logic comes to anti-legal and unacceptable conclusions that if it is more profitable not to comply with the law and make unfair decisions, law should give way to the principles of expediency. However, I. V. Kolosov argues against this non-legal approach: “making decisions that contradict the general principles of law and justice will eventually lead to a weakening of the protective function of law, since individual cases of non-compliance with the law entail a general decrease in the level of legality, which means that guarantees of public safety and stability are weakened. As a result, the maximisation (according to this version of utilitarianism) of utility in the short term by making an illegal and unfair decision ... can lead to a decrease in this public utility in the long term due to disenfranchisement and arbitrariness” (p. 201).

Starting with the analysis of legal doctrines of classical utilitarians where the author, although he focuses on the need to ensure the effectiveness of legal regulation, still does not allow the possibility of violating the law and justifying illegal and unfair laws for the sake of the principle

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of utility and the need to achieve a different significant result. This attracts the reader to such a well-known and eternal discussion between deontology and utilitarianism about what principles should guide the legislator and law enforcer. Also significant is the new view of the author of the monograph on this discussion, its comprehensive analysis, as well as the author’s conclusions, which, unlike the conclusions of many consequentialists, do not run counter to general legal principles.

Still in this chapter, I. V. Kolosov focuses on Bentham’s dichotomy between pleasure and pain as “two sovereign masters”, as well as his methodology of “moral arithmetic” (p. 66). With that, J. Bentham gives a very specific meaning to the concept of happiness. He theorises that happiness is the maximum of pleasure and the minimum of pain for each individual and generally for society as a group of separate individuals. The axiological origins of Bentham’s utilitarianism are rooted in the values of the Enlightenment based on the ideas of “the primacy of human reason, disagreement with the arbitrary dictatorship of the law and faith in progress” (p. 67). The value component of the legal position expressed by J. Bentham was greatly affected by the doctrines of T. Hobbes, according to which the state was considered as a means of reconciliation based on a social agreement of selfish interests to ensure natural rights as a condition for the implementation of private interests and consequently to achieve happiness for a greater number of people.

Another prominent utilitarian of the late modern period is J. S. Mill. Unlike J. Bentham, he did not seek to build a new utilitarian axiology of law, but wanted to develop a “common approach to ethics and law that proclaims the principle of utility as the primary one” (p. 69). At the same time, his understanding of utility in axiological terms was significantly different from J. Bentham’s quantitative hedonism because he attached great importance to the quality of pleasures (he placed intellectual and spiritual pleasures before physical ones), which he believed “should be reflected in such regulators of social relations as law and morality” (p. 77).

Analysing the influence that classical utilitarians had on legal practice, the author notes, first, their notable contribution to the humanisation of criminal punishment, which at that time was characterised by excessive cruelty. In this context, considerable attention is paid to the works of English philosopher and expert in moral philosophy H. Sidgwick, which consistently point out that in terms of the principle of utility and rational prudence, criminal punishment should not be aimed at achieving justice through inflicting equal suffering, but to prevent even greater evil. H. Sidgwick developed a theory of crime and punishment that was based on utilitarian principles. The theory hinges on the idea that in most cases, the most effective way of legal defence includes not punitive, but restorative measures, and that a milder type of legal intervention in social relations is preferable (pp. 122-123).

Within the framework of the relevant paragraph, the application of certain utilitarian ideas in the context of rule-making and law enforcement is analyzed, and the most general recommendations to lawyers following from consequentialism are also presented. “In its classical form, in the absence of an exact way to increase the overall social welfare... utilitarianism proceeds from the fact that in the absence of intervention by state authorities, social relations are ordered without state intervention... one of the possible options for regulating social relations, according to utilitarianism, is the least intervention in such relations, except in cases of the prevention of lawlessness, social instability and other factors that will clearly reduce the cumulative utility” (pp. 124-125). At that, the author’s opinion about the effectiveness of law in this context is based on the positions of a wide range of prominent foreign researchers, as well as on the analysis of primary sources. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the creation of new legal doctrine of consequentialism personally by the author, based on the results of the study would bring even more practical significance.

Of particular interest is the third chapter of the monograph, which is devoted to analysing the use of the principle of utility and “near-consequential” ideas in Russian philosophy of law in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, since this issue has not been previously covered in le-

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legal literature. I. V. Kolosov rightly notes that the arguments presented by a number of Russian enlighteners of the late 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries (I. P. Pnin, A. P. Kunitsyn, V. S. Filimonov, V. V. Popugaev et al.) consider the idea of utility in the context of the correlation of personal and common good in line with a natural-legal approach to the interpretation of the common good as a condition for the good of everyone.

Among the thinkers of the second half of the 19th century, the greatest attention is paid in the monograph by N. G. Chernyshevsky. The author relates his philosophical views to one of their versions of consequentialism and even partly utilitarianism. "N. G. Chernyshevsky," he writes, "comes to the conclusion that utility is a virtue, and the differences between pleasure, utility and good are only quantitative: utility is the superlative of pleasure, good is the superlative of utility" (p. 147). According to N. G. Chernyshevsky, the emergence of law and state is due to the fact that people desire to achieve the maximum utility with limited resources; therefore, the activities of the state and the laws adopted by it should ensure the maximisation of utility.

The final chapter of the monograph gives answers within the framework of modern concepts about what the general principles of maximizing results should be and how they can be implemented in practice. "Rule utilitarianism ultimately justifies the conclusion about the low role of the judicial process as such, since any arguments of the parties to the process and evidence are important solely for determining legal facts. Everything else should be determined by the court in full accordance with the legislator’s will, regardless of the specific circumstances of the case not considered by the legislator. For a representative of rule utilitarianism, the expediency of any action is not evaluated from the point of view of its utility, but only in terms of how much it corresponds to the rule of law, which, in turn, should proceed from the principle of utility" (p. 169).

Act utilitarianism, following the ideas of J. Bentham (as interpreted by J. Postema), "justifies the need to evaluate the usefulness of the result of a legally significant decision each time that decision is made. In fact, each life situation must be evaluated separately. This determines the mechanism of legal regulation, according to which the court should be given a fairly wide margin of appreciation, since it is the court that can evaluate each specific situation" (p. 168). As to what correlates to act utilitarianism, within the framework of analytical jurisprudence, H. L. A. Hart concludes that the normatively binding rules are not always accurate and as a result there is a "hard case" that is not clearly covered by the rules, and therefore the judge makes a decision at his own discretion.

Analysing non-utilitarian post-Bentham consequential legal ideas, I. V. Kolosov dwells on the discussion devoted to evaluation from the standpoint of consequentialism of the legal doctrine by I. Kant, in the course of which a number of authors (D. R. Cummiskey, R. M. Hare, etc.) point out some formal similarities between Kant’s ethical rationalism and utilitarianism in their pursuit of common utility, despite all the differences in the motives for action. Concluding his analysis of this discussion, I. V. Kolosov correctly concludes that in Kant’s deontological moral theory, the understanding of consequences is fundamentally different from the consequentialist interpretation of this category (p. 159). The considered context pays particular attention to marginalism as a doctrine that uses the limiting values of the utility function. Originating as an economic theory, marginalism turned out to be also vital in law. Thus, marginalism was well combined with the behaviourist foundations of classic American legal realism author O. Holmes’s theory, according to which “people respond to incentives by comparing marginal costs with marginal benefits” (p. 166).

As shown in I. V. Kolosov’s monograph, modern Western utilitarianism includes act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism, which differ in their fundamental premise: when making any legally significant decision, act utilitarianism proceeds from the need to evaluate the consequences of the decision in terms of the usefulness of its result, while rule utilitarianism prescribes to evaluate actions in terms of how much they comply with the rule (pp. 168-170). "Contemporary consequentialism defends maximization theories that are somewhat alternative to classical utilitarianism. On the one hand, representatives of the subjective theory of well-being, in particular R. M. Hare, justify the need to maximize desires and preferences. On the other, objective..."
theories of well-being reject hedonism and the need to maximize desires and preferences, offering instead a pluralistic concept of benefits” (p. 8).

Since the early 1980s, the development of non-utilitarian consequentialism in Western philosophical doctrines, including philosophical and legal ones, has been associated with the desire of a number of experts to respond to the largely fair criticism of utilitarianism while preserving the constructive potential of this approach. As noted in the monograph, the essence of this area is to focus the moral evaluation of actions on consequences and try to take into account values other than utility when evaluating such consequences (p. 179). However, in his analysis of non-utilitarian consequentialism, the author goes beyond the scope of his own definition when, in particular, he finds elements of this approach in the theory of J. Rawls, according to which, in order to achieve justice, relations should be organised in such a way that inequalities can be justified only if they provide “the greatest benefit to the least advantaged group” (p. 181). In our opinion, we should agree with this interpretation of J. Rawls’ theory. In this regard, we can also refer to an interesting justification of the “tendency of Kantianism to merge with utilitarianism” that R. Posner gave in one of his works, illustrating such a possibility in the case of J. Rawls’ moral philosophy.

From the point of view of modern values and the need to ensure the protection of fundamental human and civil rights and freedoms, analysis of modern consequential ideas about individual rights given in the chapter of the monographic research dedicated to Western consequentialism from the late 19th century to the present is significant. “Individual rights ... require protection ... on the grounds that they contribute to the achievement of certain desirable, generally useful goals (thus, as a result of the protection of private property rights, under certain circumstances, not only the interests of the owner will be ensured, but also a socially significant goal can be achieved, which is the effective allocation of resources) ... even if the right is regarded as an end, the end may still require justification. The justification may be based on legitimate interests, the achievement of which is facilitated by individual rights” (p. 182). The conclusions of non-consequentialism that nothing ever justifies the violation of rights, therefore their protection by force should be ensured if necessary, are incontrovertible.

In concluding the monograph and summing up the results of his research, I. V. Kolosov points out that consequentialism, with all its theoretical flaws associated with numerous consequentialist concepts of contradictions to the “principles of equality and justice, moral principles and other fundamental foundations”, precisely because of the wide variety of its positions often deviating from a rigid theoretical line, can be applied in legal practice, although it requires caution (p. 206).

As a result, it should be noted that I. V. Kolosov’s analysis of the application of the ideas of contemporary consequentialism in law made it even more possible to provide a systematic view of all legal consequentialism as a result of the synthesis. Legal consequentialism in Kolosov’s monograph is crystallized taking into account the ideas existing in modern society about what is proper, what is right, and about the social ideal precisely within the framework of the analysis of modern ideas.

A Comprehensive Evaluation of the Kolosov’s Monograph

Despite the fact that its object and subject is analysis of the already existing views of consequentialists, Kolosov’s monograph is an self-dependent study with a new approach to the use of “common good”, “effectiveness”, “utility”, “efficiency” and other categories in law. The author analyzes consequentialists’ views in sufficient depth, including whether implementation of their ideas will really lead to the maximization of utility or other significant results and whether the relevant decisions will not come into insoluble contradictions with freedom, equality and justice.

In view of the fact that Kolosov’s monograph is aimed at solving such important tasks for improving life – increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of law, the quality of existing legal regulation and law enforcement, the topic of this research by I. V. Kolosov is quite relevant. The most relevant both in the scientific and practical

sense is the author’s study of the modern legal views of the consequentialists. The topic of the monographic research is interesting and relevant primarily because it is insufficiently studied in modern legal science. Within the framework of both the philosophy of law and the history of the doctrines of law and state, very little attention is paid to the primary sources, i.e., the works of legal consequentialists.

Kolosov’s monograph is also relevant due to the need for a proper scientific understanding of the content, specifics and achievements of legal consequentialism as a generalizing characteristic for a set of concepts articulating the principle of achieving results as their basic criterion. Practically coming to the conclusion about the multidimensionality of the views of consequentialists, Kolosov’s monograph carries out a comprehensive analysis of the contemporary views and their possible application in jurisprudence. The study of issues related to the use of the principle of achieving results in legal activity is due not only to the needs of legal science, but also to the needs of legal practice, comprising the theoretical basis for creating such legal regulation in all branches of legislation that would provide a solution to immediate social and economic problems in the most effective way without contradicting the general legal principles of equality and justice.

The scientific conclusions and generalizations of the monograph are confirmed by the use of a set of cognition methods (private and general), as well as by the theoretical basis of the study. The undoubted advantage of the monograph is the author’s use of a significant number of contemporary works by authors of many countries.

Kolosov’s monograph is complex in terms of the analysis of the use of the approaches of consequential doctrines in evaluating the effectiveness of legal institutions. In this regard, this monograph is quite systematic research. The issues of the effectiveness of law in the modern world are becoming increasingly significant. Law should not just provide declarative norms, it should actually regulate social relations in such a way as to promote welfare, happiness, utility or any other factors and characteristics that are significant for society and its members determined by ethical doctrines. With this, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of theoretical understanding of the effectiveness of law.

In its current numerous versions united only by the idea of ethical evaluation of an action based on its result, the consequentialist approach to law allows us to consider the entire history of the philosophy of law from a specific point of view. I. V. Kolosov’s work demonstrates quite clearly the prolificacy and prospects of this approach. The author does not confine himself to merely analysing consequentialism in its classical (utilitarian) and postclassical versions, but goes so far as to outline the prerequisites for and the seedlings of this approach, delving into the very origins of philosophical and legal thought.

Achieving the effectiveness of legal institutions is unthinkable in the absence of formal equality. This is because the very essence of law, which is the principle of formal equality, is based on it. However, the ethics of consequentialism typically does not morally prohibit the achievement of a result not corresponding to general legal or deontological principles, thereby prima facie allowing immoral and/or selfish actions, contrary to the principles of goodness, equality and justice. As a result, freedom is violated, and the maximization of a result that is significant for one subject of law occurs to the detriment of the interests of other persons, which is unacceptable because the concept of freedom includes equality, and this, in turn, means that freedom is immanently linked to justice expressed through equality.

In view of this, one cannot argue with I. V. Kolosov’s conclusions. Actions by any means to maximise utility may not only be considered morally correct, but may also have harmful consequences for third parties or in the long run. If violated for the sake of maximizing utility, laws can lead to anarchy, disenfranchisement and arbitrariness (pp. 203-204).

Considering the above, it can be stated that Kolosov’s monograph makes an obvious contribution to the expansion of ideas about consequential legal thought within the framework of legal science. At that, the structure of the monograph is characterized by logical consistency and completeness, which provides a systematic transmission of information in a way that is accessible for cognitive perception. The results of Kolosov’s monograph allow us to clarify the understanding of how to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in law and how to make this law as effective as possible in improving everyone’s
life. The conclusions of the research have prospects for use in practice, specifically for improving the current legislation and law enforcement, for achieving universal prosperity to the fullest extent possible in a free and just society, as well as to increase the level of legal consciousness and legal culture.

Conclusion

Consequential ethics offers answers to questions about what the general principles for maximizing a result should be and how they can be implemented in practice, based on the fact that the result is the most important factor determining the moral component of an action. It is based on teleological logic, which evaluates the ethicality of a decision based on the consequences of that decision. Consequential ethics can still offer legal science and practice answers to questions about how to maximize the result in the construction of legal norms and their application, based on the fact that the result is the most important factor determining the moral component of an action. The legal concepts of consequentialism have influenced the development of private law, including the civil legislation of various countries. The trend of utilitarian and consequential determination of the development of law and legal science took place during the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century.

However, the application of consequential theories in legal practice must be approached with caution while ensuring strict compliance with general legal principles, including equality and justice. Indeed, some consequential theories will proceed from the need to achieve a result at any cost, including violating both the content of legal norms and the general principles of law. Breaking the law is more beneficial, and some consequentialists approve such delinquent behavior. And here, it is worth agreeing with the author’s conclusions that not every consequential theory should be welcomed in carrying out legal activities. Indeed, a law enforcer’s direct appeal to the principle of utility in the absence of a rule of law, its imperfection or bypassing the law, guided by an analysis of interests and not positive law, can often do more harm than good.

Thus, in view of the analysis, one can make the point that Kolosov’s monograph:

1) relies on a wide range of primary sources, most importantly, the works of both classical and modern representatives of legal consequentialism;
2) is based on a significant number of modern scientific works regarding the studied subject;
3) has a fundamental theoretical basis in the theory of law and state, in the philosophy and sociology of law;
4) has correctly set goals, objectives, subject of research and other scientific characteristics;
5) is based on methods that are generally relevant to the subject and serve to solve its tasks;
6) comprehensively analyses the prerequisites for the emergence of legal consequentialism;
7) gives a comprehensive overview of legal consequentialism and a sufficient analysis of its main areas;
8) contains a critical understanding of the ideas of consequentialism to improve legal regulation.

Based on the foregoing, the analysis of Kolosov’s monograph in the system of scientific literature devoted to legal consequentialism allows us to conclude that the research is independent and scientifically sound, that the conclusions are well-reasoned, convincing and reliable, and that it has a high theoretical and practical significance.