

THEORETICAL-METHODOLOGICAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE YEREVAN SCHOOL FOR ARGUMENTATION

Abstract

The Yerevan School for Argumentation (YSA) perhaps is the most brilliant manifestation of Armenian philosophical thought. Moreover, it is one of the remarkable results of the centuries-old Armenian philosophical culture that has gained world recognition. In the 18th (Brighton 1988; see: Brutian, G., 1988) and 19th (Moscow, 1993) World Congresses of Philosophy organized by the Federation of International Societies for Philosophy, Academician Georg Brutian, the founder and head of the YSA, was entrusted with organizing and chairing Round tables on the discussion of the modern theory of argumentation organized within the framework of these conferences.

Brutian's fundamental publications served as the basis for the directions of the School. They put forward principles concerning the definition of argumentation, the structure of argumentation, the language of argumentation, the role of logic, and means of persuasion in the structure of argumentation, the rules of political argumentation, etc.

The goal of the present work is to analyze and generalize the theoretical-methodological and conceptual results and approaches developed in the YSA, to examine their role in the system of modern philosophical and logical theorems, as well as in the modern theories of argumentation, to present the frame of argumentation discourse and its methodological analysis developed in the School, to review the questions of the theory of meta-argumentation, to analyze the history and theoretical-methodological bases of formation and institutionalization of the YSA in the context of the developments of the world philosophical thought and the aspect of its contribution to world scientific thought, to suggest a general conception of scientific achievements of the School by a comparative analysis concerning other international centres.

Keywords: Georg Brutian, Yerevan School for Argumentation, reasoning, definition of argumentation, the structure of argumentation, forms of argumentation, logic of argumentation, argumentative discourse, language of argumentation, meta-argumentation.

“With great satisfaction, I must mention that the Yerevan School for Argumentation got a wide international acknowledgement”.

Viktor Hambartzumian (1990) – President of National
Academy of Sciences of Armenia in 1947-1993

Introduction

The research on argumentation topics passed on to a new stage of development after World War II. Schools and centres of argumentation were founded particularly at the universities in Pennsylvania (USA), Brussels, Ghent (Belgium),

Amsterdam (the Netherlands), Turku (Finland), Leipzig, Hamburg, Saarbrücken, Tübingen (Germany). In addition, many journals and books were published, and conferences and congresses were organized on these issues.

YSA was founded in the early 1970s at Yerevan State University within the Chair of Philoso-

phy and Logic. In 1969 Georg Brutian joined the editorial board of the journal “Philosophy and Rhetoric”, edited by Professor Henry Johnstone (Pennsylvania University, USA). Yerevan School for Argumentation was not yet a formal institution. Its main tasks were theoretical seminars on argumentation for professors and students of Yerevan State University and other higher education institutions. In 1984 a conference was organized in Yerevan with the participation of a large number of foreign authors, the texts of the best reports of which were published two years later in the collection of scientific articles “Philosophical problems of argumentation” (Brutian, G. & Narsky, I., 1986).

In 1991, the International Institute for Argumentation was founded in Yerevan. Georg Brutian was elected as the founder-president, and the vice-presidents were internationally well-known philosophers Donald Davidson (USA), Frans van Eemeren from the University of Amsterdam (the Netherlands), who is the founder-President of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation and one of the most significant theorists of argumentation and communication of our time¹, and Juhani Pietarinen - the head of the Department of Practical Philosophy at University of Turku (Finland). This institute has played an essential role in the international activity of the Yerevan School for Argumentation. The institute moved to Amsterdam in 2004, the president of which became Professor Frans van Eemeren.

The scientific research works, conducted during 50 years within the frame of YSA, are valuable both from the viewpoint of development of the philosophical issues of Armenology and communication. The procedure of formation and institutionalization of YSA was analyzed in the context of theoretical heritage formed during the

development of Armenian philosophical thought and the context of the development of world philosophical thought and from the viewpoint of significant achievements in these processes.

General Characteristics of Argumentation

“Homo Sapiens is not only homo philosophicus but also - homo argumenticus” – liked to emphasize Georg Brutian since from the time of the Athenian democracy to the present days, the destinies of people in their social life were decided and solved by way of argumentation. In our era of globalization and the assertion of international law, argumentation and political ideology are also beginning to play an increasingly important role in the people’s destinies.

In the same way, the history of human thought has shown that argumentation has always accompanied human beings. Two questions arise. First: whether human beings realize that they are using arguments, and second: whether the knowledge of argumentation is reflected in scientific research, and when the issues of argumentation became a particular theory or science.

Discussing the research devoted to logic, philosophy, language, law, rhetoric, and related sciences from the viewpoint of current argumentation theories becomes obvious the presence of the categorical apparatus of argumentation, the components of argumentation, and the argumentative laws of their connection. The analytical research of Aristotle and the works written under their influence can be proved. The same can be observed in Armenian philosophy as well.

Armenia has ancient and strong traditions in the field of argumentation study. In the welcome speech of the International Conference held in Turku (Finland), the President of the organizing committee, academician Juhani Pietarinen (1992), said: “One of the most notable among the scholars was David the Invincible, an Armenian Aristotelian philosopher of 5th century, who was famous for his skill of argumentation. The Yere-

¹ President ILIAS, Jiangsu University; Honorary Director Jiangsu University Centre for Argumentation Studies (JUCAS); Professor Jiangsu University; Director International Institute of Pragma-Dialectics, Zhejiang University; Adjunct Professor Leiden University, Zhejiang University, and Sun Yatsen University; Professor Emeritus Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric University of Amsterdam.

van School for Argumentation has thus long and honourable tradition” (p. 2). During the same conference, G. Brutian (1992b) has a report, where outlined the main problems and investigative perspectives of argumentation.

Given its enormous range of functioning, argumentation is one of the few concepts of logic that have a high degree of ambiguity. The range of interpretation of the meaning and essence of the argument, in addition to its primary meaning as an instrument of substantiation and demonstration of the truth of one of the discussing sides, extends to that extreme area of its meaning as the bio-evolutionary approach to the formation and development of scientific paradigms of scientific argumentation (Toulmin, 1972). As another unusual field of argumentation, one can point to the problem of modelling the ability of argumentation in artificial intelligence systems for a modern computerized world (Dung, Kowalski, & Toni, 2006, pp. 114-159).

The shades and meanings of the term argument lead to a different interpretation of its essence and purpose. Nevertheless, Rene Descartes’s remark, expressed in the *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, is still topical to improve the state of affairs in philosophical science: “If philosophers always agreed in the meaning of words, almost all their controversies would cease”.

Georg Brutian (1992a) suggested the following definition: “Argumentation is a method of reasoning in the course of which the proponent puts forth a statement in the implementation of which he is interested and wants to interest the opponent, proves the truth of this statement, convinces the opponent of the truth and expediency of the adoption of this statement and strives for the opponent to become his adherent in the discussed issue and an accomplice in the implementation of the plan contained in it” (p. 15).

Proof writes G. Brutian is the logical basis of argumentation. At the same time, argumentation, along with the proof is also required a persuasive impact. “...Proof is the main and mandatory ele-

ment of successful argumentation. The existence of proof is necessary but not a sufficient condition for the implementation of argumentation. Here, persuasion needs to be added to the proof” (Brutian, G., 1984, p. 5).

The vastness and some descriptiveness of this definition are determined by its all-encompassing nature. Such a broad understanding of the argumentation is quite common (Toulmin, 1958; Grennan, 1984). Suppose we confine ourselves to the field of scientific argumentation. The definition will be more concise: “Scientific argumentation is a reasoning that aims to justify or prove the truth of the assertion under discussion” (Djidjian, 1984). In theoretical sciences, however, we are talking about evidence, but in empirical sciences, we are forced to confine ourselves to the task of justifying the proposed position. In proving theoretical reasoning, the forms of the necessary inferences are used, and as the premises, the principles (the most general laws) of this scientific theory are used. When, in order to demonstrate the truth of the thesis, the argumentator is forced to turn to the help of incomplete induction or analogy, we are already dealing with the operation of justification.

To the proposed definition of scientific argumentation, the “narrow” interpretation of the argumentation of the well-known Russian philosopher and logician Georgi Ruzavin (1997) is very close: “Argumentation in a narrower sense of this term differs from the demonstration (or proof), first, by the fact that it applies to substantiate their statements informal ways of reasoning, the conclusions of which are not reliably true, but only probable. Secondly, the very process of searching for and substantiating the truth occurs in the argumentation, not in the monologue mode, but in a dialogue that can take the form of a dispute, discussion, controversy” (Chapter 8.1).

At first glance, it may seem that the definition proposed by G. Ruzavin significantly differs from the above definition of scientific argumentation. After all, he talks about “informal ways of reasoning”. In the above definition of scientific

reasoning, they indicate specifically incomplete induction and analogy. However, the difference here is only a terminological one, for apart from inferences on incomplete induction and analogy, there are no other means of informal reasoning and cannot be. Precisely because of the “weakness” of inferences by incomplete induction and analogy, disputes, discussions, and polemics arise around the discussed thesis.

These two examples convince us of the legitimacy of distinguishing between the broad and narrow meaning of the concept of argumentation. The previous definition of *scientific argumentation* is the narrowest sense of the concept of argumentation. It includes only logical components - truth, deduction (necessary inferences), incomplete induction, and analogy. Suppose now we include another characteristic psychological term, conviction, in the structure of the argument. In that case, the most comprehensive meaning of the argument will appear before us, the well-known author of which was the author of the “New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation”, the founder of the Belgian School for Argumentation Chaim Perelman (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971).

According to Perelman’s concept, stated in the above monograph and his other works, the subject of the argumentation theory is the study of a technique of dispute and debate that makes it possible to convince an opponent. The specificity of this concept (which in one form or another is reflected in many of Perelman’s works) lies in the fact that primary attention is paid to the problem of persuasion. The conclusion of Perelman that argumentation is essentially a branch of psychology is minor. He concludes that since the purpose of an argument is to create conviction in the recipient and because the argument studies the mechanisms of creating this belief, the modern argumentation theory is nothing more than a new form of rhetoric.

Such an approach to argumentation, according to Brutian’s interpretation, has its reasons. The fact that Perelman, a professor of logic at

Brussel’s Free University, neglects the role of logic in argumentation Brutian explained by the following way: In the 50s-60s of the 20th century, many researchers studied the whole science of logic regarding mathematical or symbolic logic. Professor Perelman lectured at the Faculty of Law of the university mentioned above and, comparing the structure of the argument with the nature of formal, mathematical logic, concluded that the latter cannot solve the problems that arise in discussing issues of socio-political significance. That is why he concluded that argumentation could be considered outside of the connection with logic. The epistemological roots of this concept are seen in the fact that it was customary to reduce logical science to mathematical logic alone in those years. Meanwhile, modern logical science encompasses a multitude of logical systems, each of which has its role and its significance in the cognitive process, and the question of which of the logical sciences is applicable in one or another discussion, in one or another argumentation, depends on the nature of the subject area to which this argument applies.

Let us return to our question about the definition of the concept of argumentation. G. Ruzavin (1997), along with the above “narrow” interpretation of the argumentation, also suggests the following “broad” definition: “Under the argument in the broad sense of the word, as noted above, they understand the rationale way of persuading people through proposing, justification and critical evaluation of statements, hypotheses, assumptions and opinions with the appropriate arguments. Such a belief is called rational precisely because it relies on arguments coming from the mind, and not on feelings, emotions and other arguments” (Chapter 8.1). It would seem that the task of definition here is considerably complicated because of the connection of such popular cognitive tools as “proposing, justification and critical evaluation of hypotheses.” Nevertheless, in reality, the means of rationally forming convictions noted by G. Ruzavin are essential, but only concrete forms of rational ways of

convincing.

On the other hand, Ruzavin's rational argumentation, avoiding the use of extra-rational means and factors such as emotions, feelings, and other extra-rational values, tells us about the existence of a whole layer of extra-rational argumentation. In all probability, just these means are actively used in the brainwashing of ordinary citizens, particularly in colour revolutions that arise by a slight motion of a magic wand from nowhere and by the tsunami wave embracing the masses without any visible external financing interference.

The Dutch investigators of the process of argumentation focus attention on the aspect of verbal communication. According to the definition of argument given in the Netherlands school, "argumentation is a social, intellectual, speech act that is intended to serve the affirmation or overturning of an opinion consisting of a multitude statement and aimed at obtaining consent from the audience". Let us compare this definition with the above definitions of reasoning. It is easy to see that the Dutch school only considers the narrow aspect of the argumentative discourse as a speech act aimed at assessing opinions. At the same time, the logical core of the argumentative discourse – the proof component and rational justification – remains out of consideration.

Comparing the various schools of argumentation, and while emphasizing first and foremost the positive that exists in them, the famous Russian philosopher A. Alekseev comes to the conclusion that there is a synthetic approach to argumentation, presented in the works of G. Bruttian (1978a, 1978b, 1979, 1983, 1984, 1987, 1991), where it has balanced all the above-discussed aspects of argumentation (Alekseev 1991).

Logic of Argumentation:
Proof and Justification

The most "mass" form of justification is the justification of the validity of a separate state-

ment (the *thesis* of argumentation). It can be carried out either by a direct comparison of the statement (judgment, thought) with reality (immediate justification, or direct "proof") or indirectly, through other judgments. The mediated validation of an assertion is its logical deduction from judgments basis, the truth of which is taken to be reliably established. In turn, logical inferences divide into necessary (deductive conclusions and complete induction) and probable (incomplete induction and analogy) inferences.

Justification, using only the form of the necessary logical sequence, is proof. (Here, we follow the proof theory developed by Aristotle in *Analytics*). If the premises of the proof are true, then the *thesis* of argumentation (the thesis of proof) is also actual. In other words, rigorous logical proof guarantees the same degree of reliability, the truthfulness of the justified thesis as the initial premises of the proof has.

Unlike strict deductive proof, the inductive inference, even with proper premises, gives only a probable conclusion, which has only a certain degree of probability of its truth. With inductive reasoning, the truth of the premises does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion.

The rationale using the forms of inductive reasoning in literature is often denoted as inductive proof. From the above analysis, it follows that the expression inductive proof is to be considered incorrect. In extending the concept of proof to inductive methods of justification, we should talk about the proof by incomplete induction or even about the proof by analogy. However, the fact that the analogy does not prove is a capital truth.

It can be shown that argumentation in the field of scientific knowledge is primarily of a rational nature. For argumentation in art, religion, politics, it is characteristic of resorting to extra-logical means of persuasion, such as emotional impact, appealing to national and social traditions, intimidation by divine punishment or political repression, etc.

Of course, what has been said does not mean

that if we go beyond science, say, in politics, there is no room for logic in argumentation. We have already emphasized the idea that logical reasoning is the necessary attribute of argumentation. This characteristic applies to all kinds of arguments, to arguments in all spheres of social consciousness. Therefore, the question can only concern the combination of logical and extra-logical components.

As was emphasized above, justification (proof) is an essential logical element of argumentation. At the same time, the same argument can be convincing for one audience but unconvincing for another. For example, a correct and detailed proof that a solar eclipse should occur at the time T will be pretty convincing for specialists, but not very convincing for senior high school students (because of the incomplete availability of appropriate mathematical calculations) and ultimately inconclusive for an illiterate person (because of the complete inaccessibility of the presentation).

Conversely, a popular argumentation of some idea can persuade the general public, but this argument can be regarded as insufficient, inconclusive, or even incorrect by specialists in this field. Let us recall, for example, the odious idea of a well-known scientist-metallurgist about the removal of the electrification of the human body. He proposed, for this purpose, to apply a grounded copper plate for the night to the body of a person. This and similar recommendations aroused widespread interest among the readers, while specialists could not talk about them without irony and sarcasm.

Here is another example of the different persuasive forces of the same argument. Consider the following argument:

According to legend, the Cretan Epimenides declared: "All Cretans are liars".

1. Suppose that Epimenides told the truth. Then all Cretans are liars; Epimenides, as a Cretan, is also a liar, and therefore what he says is a lie.
2. Suppose that Epimenides lied. Then, accord-

ing to the content of Epimenides' words, it should be inferred that Cretans are not liars. Consequently, Epimenides is also not a liar, and therefore, what he said is true.

Many readers, and even some authors of works on logic, believe that we are dealing here with an insoluble contradiction, a paradox: from the assumption of the assertion's truth, we necessarily conclude its falsity and vice versa.

However, it is not difficult to point to an elementary logical error in the above-reasoned argument for a specialist logic and even for a reasonably strictly thinking person. Indeed, in (2), from the assumption that Epimenides lied, it follows that *some* Cretans are not liars, and from this particular conclusion, it does not follow that Epimenides is not a liar.

The need for different methods of persuasion for different audiences has been mentioned already by Aristotle. In the third chapter of the second book of *Metaphysics*, he writes: "Some do not perceive the taught if it is set out mathematically, others - if they are not given examples, others require that the testimony of the poet be quoted".

Types of persuasion, as well as justification, it is expedient to subdivide according to its correlation to forms of public consciousness: persuasion in the field of politics and ideology, persuasion in the field of art, persuasion in the field of scientific knowledge, etc. Undoubtedly, in the social aspect, the most significant is conviction, directly or indirectly realized in the activities of individuals, collectives, parties, the masses.

Persuasion, as a rule, begins with the justification of truth, purposefulness, the necessity of the thesis, the call, a program of action. The most significant point of persuasion is explaining the essence of the thesis and its justification, and here the most effective is the illustrative example, an analogy. Finally, the emotional impact of artistic impressing lines and images, appealing to the authority of sacred persons for the audience, or the deepest social feelings of the hearer (patriotism, national pride, etc.) significantly contrib-

utes to the formation of conviction. At the same time, in different situations, in different epochs, the ratio of logical and persuasive components could be different, up to the point that there can only be one of them.

Correlating the categories of “argument” and “conviction” in terms of the existence of the moment of justification, one can emphasize the following: justification in argumentation is a necessary component; in conviction - it is desirable. In general, in the broadest sense of the word, “argumentation” and “conviction” are closely intertwined: argumentation tends to be a conviction. Persuasion, in turn, needs to be argued.

Let us turn to the analysis of the role of refutation in the structure of argumentation. Pointing in his definition of the argument that a consistent refutation of possible counterarguments is also included in the composition of the argument, Georg Brutian (1979) explained that “evidence in argumentation is primary and primary in the sense that evidence presupposes all arguments against cash and potentially possible refutations and counterarguments, says that in the process of argumentation it is not necessary to directly have a moment of refutation” (p. 33).

It is not difficult to show that the strict logical proof of a thesis implicitly contains a refutation of all opposing statements. Therefore, deductive proof of the thesis makes it unnecessary to appeal to opposing statements’ refutation directly. However, in all those cases where the deductive (necessary) proof of the thesis is not attained, resorting to refuting opposing points of view is an essential and effective means of argumentation.

Forms of Argumentation

The most common form of argumentation is a *dialogue* (Greek: *Διάλογος* – “conversation”). This term is predominantly used in those cases of argumentation when the latter is conducted on non-scientific issues. The term dialogue usually means that two argumentators (or two interested

“camps”) met to find out shared positions on an issue of importance to them.

The term discussion, on the whole, is a dialogue of two sides concerning scientific or political topics. In the case of a scientific discussion, the goal of the disputation is to achieve an accurate representation of the scientific problem under discussion.

In argumentation theory, the concept *audience* is designated not only by the collective listening to one or another speaker but also by the reading public or group of listeners that should in some way be persuaded.

Argumentation effectiveness is primarily determined by the composition of the audience, its preparedness, and its ability to evaluate the arguments given for justification. When discussing practical questions of public life, one can confine himself to well-known arguments and considerations, which can be judged from listeners’ direct life experience and common sense.

Continuing the coverage of the forms of argumentation, it is natural to consider the discussion as a kind of dialogue and polemic, as a type of debate. It is easy to see that the discussion is used primarily in scientific and political life and in the related fields of culture and education. In many areas of public life, especially in politics, discussions are organized to achieve compromise solutions, and this function is an essential factor in ensuring the stability of society’s life. Naturally, when in various forums, the discussion unfolds between participants who occupy radically opposing positions, it develops, as a rule, into an irreconcilable and bitter *polemic*.

As members of society, scientists are characterized by good education, restraint, and high culture of behaviour. Therefore, scientific discussions are distinguished by an atmosphere of mutual respect, even if it is a question of representatives of incompatible, opposing scientific schools. With all the mutual benevolence of the atmosphere of scientific discussions, in contrast to political discussions, it is impossible to achieve compromises and agreements on the

truth of a scientific idea or conception. Truth, it is one. Of the many hypothetical solutions to the problem under consideration, only one is true. Therefore, the possibility of a compromise between alternative approaches and conceptions is excluded.

Elements of the Argumentative Discourse

In the theory of argumentation, much attention is paid to the elements of argumentative discourse. According to G. Brutian's conception, the structure and elements of the argumentation follow from the very definition of argumentation. It would be more accurate to say this for those acquainted with the finished result of the study. For those who investigate the process of argumentative discourse, the definition of *argumentation* is the result of analysis and generalization of elements, structure, and other components and aspects of logical discourse.

The structural elements of argumentation are *logical* (as a means of proof and justification), *rhetorical* (as a means of persuasion), *evaluative* (as a means of preferring one of the theses among equivalent theses), *pragmatic* (as a means of achieving one's goal - a transformation of one's conviction into the assurance of the recipient in order to make him an accomplice in the realization of his plans), etc. The question arises: do all the elements of the argumentation have to manifest themselves compulsorily in every concrete act of argumentation? Georg Brutian answers this question in the following way. They can manifest themselves in one way or another, from an inconsiderable manifestation to full intensity. Furthermore, it depends on the subject area in which the argumentative discourse takes place. So, for example, the element of rhetoric as a way of persuasion to a greater extent manifests itself in public, political, judicial fields. At the same time, they hardly use argumentation in the field of formalized systems.

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tion is paid to the elements of argumentative discourse. According to G. Brutian's conception, the structure and elements of the argumentation follow from the very definition of argumentation.

However, this circumstance should underestimate the role of such factors in argumentation, as, say, truth or logic. Unlike other schools of argumentation, the concept of preliminary conditions of the argumentative process is put forward in the Yerevan school. According to G. Brutian, the argumentation can be acceptable, other things being equal if the following preconditions are met:

1. *A grammatical premise.* Any argument carried out in any language (written or verbally) must satisfy the rules of the given language grammar. If this requirement is violated, the argument becomes illiterate from the point of view of the normative grammar of the given language.
2. *The logical premise.* Since grammar is the logic of the language, and logic is the grammar of thought, then naturally, the following prerequisite or precondition of argumentative discourse should be considered in compliance with all the rules of logic, implementing all the requirements and laws of logical reasoning. Otherwise, the argumentative discourse will be considered illiterate from a logical point of view.
3. *An epistemological premise.* Both proponent and opponent are obligated to follow the truth and only the truth throughout the process of argumentation. Arguments that do not meet this requirement are distorted and therefore unacceptable. We also note that this premise of argumentation is closely connected with the previous, logical premise. We arrive at valid conclusions only if: a) the initial judgments of our discourse are true and b) we comply with all rules, all the requirements of laws logic.
4. *Ethical background.* The argumentator should well imagine the relationship between the permissible and the inadmissible in the pro-

cess of argumentation, decisively abandon the unacceptable methods, in particular, the use of threats, references to physical strength, etc., guided “not by an argument of force, but by force of argument. “By the way, this phrase became the motto of the Yerevan School for Argumentation.

It is noteworthy that H. Shakaryan believes that the argument is not so much a mental as a spiritual form of information exchange, that it is a *value rather than a logical-gnoseological* category. Nevertheless, the consideration of argumentation as a value-cultural phenomenon does not detract from its logical-gnoseological significance. On the contrary, it is concretized both in the cognitive and value orientations of the modern world.

In connection with the substantiation of the value-epistemological nature of philosophical knowledge and, in particular, of philosophical argumentation, H. Shakaryan suggests that in social phenomena, reflection acquires a dual nature – a reflection of some objective reality and a reflection of related interests, ideals and goals of specific social units. The principle of the duality of the nature of human reflection allows us to assert that the *axiological element* is not at all a specific negative factor (source of error) in both cognition and argumentation (Shakaryan, 1984, 1988).

One of the important but far from being developed problems of argumentation theory is the *problem of justification*. From the point of view of G. Brutian, “justification in the process of argumentation is a way of assessing the means and forms of argumentation discourse, of the defended thesis and the refutable antithesis, which makes it possible to establish the appropriateness of choosing a thesis among equally truthful statements” (Brutian, G., 1984, pp. 30-31; Brutian, G., 1992a, p. 103). A. Amirkhanyan and A. Atanesyan (2006) undertook the study of this problem. A. Amirkhanyan (1998) considers several concepts on the problems of justification and tries to explicate the concept of the substantiation

in terms of language and content.

Artur Atanesyan published a work entitled “The Hegelian conception of justification,” in which he analyzed the logical-philosophical aspect of the problem of explanation in the works of Hegel. This analysis, of course, can help understand the historical roots of the concept of justification for the explication of the exact concept of “substantiating” in the parameters of modern theories of argumentation. A. Atanesyan (2000) also works on the problem “Justification in political decisions,” which proves the practical importance of theoretical developments of the considered concept.

Prof. Ed. Markaryan (1988) devoted special attention to the art of substantiating the ideas put forward.

Naturally, in the argumentation theory, the problem of truth and scientific knowledge occupies a significant place. The research by prof. A. Manasyan reveals the problems of truth in a new way as the sense of argument in the existing epistemological paradigms and the philosophical motives for knowledge in science. His approach in the aspect of motivating scientific argumentation is also original (Manasyan, 1984, pp. 83-85).

Academician H. Gevorgyan discussed the role of reasoning in science in his presentation at the International Symposium “Argumentation, Logic and Positions” (Ghent, Belgium, 1989). The analysis of the process of argumentation, dialogue, and discussion in science, as H. Gevorgyan notes in his report, clearly shows that scientific knowledge cannot be reduced to a complete canonized system of problems, laws, hypotheses, and theories but includes the relation of the cognizing subject to them: recognition and rejection, conviction, confidence, and faith, etc. However, the idea of the objectivity of scientific knowledge also demands its arguments. The usual approach to the process of argumentation, limited to an analysis of the relation of this process to logical inference and proof and logical analysis of the language, becomes at the same time insufficient. The report explores the internal means of objecti-

ifying knowledge that has evolved in science, thanks to which different approaches to the same problem, the results of observations and experiments, hypotheses, theories, and their various interpretations can be presented (communicated to the community of scientists, reconstructed and experienced by others, etc.) in such a way as to be perceived and understood by different actors, unequivocally identical. Thus, objectification becomes an indispensable condition and basis for communication in science.

Among the crucial problems of the argumentation theory, one should also indicate the problem of the language of argumentation. If the relationship between language and reasoning in one form or another was considered by different authors in different countries and mostly reported at international conferences on argumentation, the very problem of the language of argumentation probably attracted more attention from the representatives of the Yerevan School for Argumentation. For example, at the Second International Conference on Argumentation, the lecture was presented by G. Brutian in co-authorship with Professor H. Margaryan. As in the report mentioned above, and a number of his other works, he poses and solves such problems of language of argumentation as the linguistic aspect, conceptual aspect, translatability of the language of argumentation, etc. (Brutian, G. & Margaryan, H., 1991, pp. 546-551; Brutian, G., 2000).

Academician Ed. Atayan (1988), considered in line with these ideas the language of argumentation in work under the same title.

The original approach to examining the nature of the language of philosophy in the aspect of its argumentative apparatus and the specifics of the argument between the philosopher and the non-philosopher was shown by Professor Ed. Markaryan (1984, pp. 37-52, 1988, pp. 258-274).

Professor L. Brutian (1992) analyzes the linguistic aspects of argumentation in a broader perspective in the works “Implication and Implicacy in the Language of Argumentation” and “On the Question of Implicacy in the Language

of Argumentation” (pp. 1-10). Based on these studies, Brutian first proposed a typological classification of the argumentative discourse. Then, she introduces the types of explicit and partially explicit argumentative reasoning (Brutian, L., 1991, pp. 559-563).

The relationship between argumentation and language in a broader context was examined in M. Avagyan’s thesis “Argumentation and Language” (Avagyan, 2000) and in his two booklets (Avagyan, 1999a; b). Essentially, M. Avagyan was the first to address the problem of the style of argumentation on the broad background of language analysis and argumentation, identified by Georg Brutian at theoretical seminars on argumentation.

Hasmik H. Hovhannisyan (2006) touched upon the issue of the need to study the language of argumentation and its corresponding elements in order to form a general model of argumentation (pp. 113-123).

Prof. Suren Hovhannisyan introduced into the theory of argumentation the concept of the subject area of argumentation, by which the author understands the mental situation that develops in the process of communication when statements and their justifications as the first layer of argumentation conveyed by the argumentator are initially incomprehensible and unacceptable for the recipient. This kind of mental situation forces the argumentator to introduce additional explanations for the recipient (the second layer of the argumentation) in the system of substantiating the assertions put forward by him in order to make these assertions acceptable to the recipient. S. Hovhannisyan believes that acceptance (rejection) of the arguments of the argumentator and his system of justification is possible (not possible) if, in both respects, the mental fields, backgrounds, and ways of thinking coincide (in some respects). Both of these respects trust those sources of reasoning on which the argumentation of the argumentator is based.

S. Hovhannisyan analyzed the concept of “logical”, “out-logical”, “anti-logical”, and “alo-

gical” as well. He considers the mental operation on the effect on the recipient as argumentative if the logical means are used as the main means of such influence, and extra-logical means are also used as an auxiliary, amplifying agents but are not used the anti-logical and theological means. It justifies the position that in argumentation, the argumentator and the recipient set different goals. If the goal of the recipient is to achieve the truth, then the purpose of the argumentator is to convince the recipient to accept the statements that he claims, the truth of which he does not doubt, but which the recipient does not consider at the beginning of the argument to be such (Hovhannisyán, S., 1984, pp. 5-22; 1992).

The issue of the specifics of the argument in various ways of communication has been little studied and needs a comprehensive study. Works of Hovhannes O. Hovhannisyán are dedicated just to this field of argumentation. His research concerns problems of discussion and argumentation, analysis of their theoretical, logical-gnoseological, methodological. H. O. Hovhannisyán’s works also deal with practical questions like studying the features of socio-political dialogues, consent technologies, and ways to improve the effectiveness of these dialogues. In Hovhannes O. Hovhannisyán’s works, the theoretical heritage and valuable traditions in the study of the problems of the theory of the dispute, the system-forming achievements, and tendencies characteristic of different periods of development of philosophical thought are explored. The essence of the dispute is also revealed as one of the forms of mental communication, which is inherent in the disagreement and open confrontation of the parties on the issue under discussion. The relationship between discussion and argumentation is defined and justified as a relationship between the system and its fundamental element. The main principles and rules of successful argumentation and fruitful exchange of views on disputable issues are systematized. Gnoseological and methodological features of the discussion are analyzed. New ways of methodical application

of the discussion in various fields of intellectual activity are proposed. Features of socio-political dialogues, the technology of consent, and ways to improve the effectiveness of these dialogues are investigated (Hovhannisyán, H. O., 2015, 2019, 2020, 2021).

Robert Djidjian considers the specifics of the argument in various fields of knowledge. During the years Head of the chair of Philosophy at the Yerevan Medical University, he, in particular, created the direction “medical argumentation”. On the other hand, R. Djidjian tried to combine the argumentation machinery with the means of transformational logic created by academician G. Brutian and achieved certain successes in this field (Djidjian, 1984, 2016).

Academician E. Atayan considered the correlation of intuition, argumentation, and experiment as cognitive procedures. True intuition is, as it were, an advanced detachment or intelligence scout, exposing a certain position to the mind’s eye. Nevertheless, it has only a psychological force of persuasion, so long as the corresponding provision is not subjected to theoretical and experimental evidence (Atayan, 1988, pp. 306-307).

Hasmik H. Hovhannisyán, proposing the idea that the use of the term “meta” is applicable in the field of argumentation, presented her understanding of meta-argumentation, tried to solve the problem of the relationship between argumentation, meta-argumentation as a theory and meta-theory (Hovhannisyán, H. H., 2007, 2015). Later research has revealed the meta-theoretical difficulties (aporias) in the construction and interpretation of theories in the field of modern natural sciences and humanities (Hovhannisyán, H. H. & Djidjian, 2017).

Vahram Avagyan (2004) realized the interpretation of objectivity and truth from the argumentation theory point of view.

Ekaterina Hakobdjanyan (1991) nominated and analyzed the fiction argument in the system of philosophical reflection on argumentation, revealing the argumentative function of art and

the applying function of fiction argument.

In the first volume of her two-volume monograph “Argumentation issues in the context of the history of Armenian philosophical thought,” Hasmik Hovhannisyan (2005) studied the issues of argumentation in the context of the history of Armenian philosophical thought, in particular analyzing the theoretical heritage of David The Invincible (David Anghaght), Yeznik Koghbatsi, Grigor Tatevatsi (Gregory of Tatev).

Guided by the motto that the history of each theory can be adequately understood and valued from the current level of development of the theory, H. Hovhannisyan tried to create a model of her understanding of the modern theory of argumentation, which was based on domestic and foreign theorists works. Thus, argumentation has been considered a language of a particular scientific theory with its corresponding semantics (conceptual structure of argumentation) and syntax (means and methods of argumentation).

In the second monograph volume, Hasmik Hovhannisyan (2009) carried out a theoretical-methodological and epistemological analysis of the argumentation concepts proposed at the Yerevan School for Argumentation.

The activity of the YSA continues. New research and new concepts in the field of argumentation are developed and proposed by the School's young students, forming a new stage of the School's activity, the scientific results and achievements of which can be the subject of another research report.

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