


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# WISDOM



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## EDITORS' FOREWORD

Khachatur Abovian Armenian State Pedagogical University and the Editorial Board of the journal WISDOM present to the scientific community the current 10<sup>th</sup> issue – the first volume of 2018.

1(10), 2018 issue of the journal announces its fifth anniversary. The first issue of the journal was published in 2013.

Moreover, we are delighted to announce the publication of the current issue of WISDOM after the recent three important achievements. In April 2018, WISDOM was accepted for inclusion in Scopus scientific database. Together with such qualitative indicators as the inclusion of scientifically sound articles, large international academic and professional audience, consistency of the articles with the scope and aims of the journal the Scopus Content Selection & Advisory Board experts among the merits of the journal have also mentioned its clear aims and scope.

On May 15, 2018 WISDOM was selected for coverage in Clarivate Analytics (Web of Science) products and services and will be indexed and abstracted in Emerging Sources Citation Index.

On May 30, 2018, WISDOM was also involved in the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ) that indexes and provides access to high quality, peer-reviewed scientific journals.

Thus, it is obvious that WISDOM is consistent to its policy to be accessible to the scientific community and represented on international electronic platforms. We cannot but mention that WISDOM is included in the list of the scientific journals recognized by the Higher Attestation Commission of the Republic of Armenia. The periodical is registered also in 14 other International Scientometric Databases: *Scientific Index-*

*ing Services (SIS), Journal Impact Factor (JIF), Eurasian Scientific Journal Index (ESJI), Scientific Journal Impact Factor (SJIF), International Scientific Indexing (ISI), European Reference Index for the Humanities and Social Sciences (ERIH PLUS), Advanced Scientific Index (ASI), eLIBRARY, EBSCO, CYBERLENINKA, CROSS-REF, PHILPAPERS, WORLDCAT and Google Scholar.*

1(10), 2018 issue of WISDOM includes 11 articles referring to the issues that the main rubrics of the journal cover: Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Metaphilosophy, Argumentation, Social, Political Philosophy, and History of Philosophy. The authors of the articles represent prestigious universities and academic institutions. The geography of WISDOM's authors is apparently expanding. The Editorial Board of the journal, among the authors of WISDOM, welcomes Professor Tao Lin – the Head of Philosophy Department at Southwest University (China), Professor Tang Haijun and Professor Li Zhang, the young lecturer Lan Zhang from the same Department and lecturer of Sichuan International Studies University (China) Zou Mingzhuo.

This issue also comprises one of the number of unpublished researches of late famous American-Armenian Philosopher Haig Khatchadourian. We are grateful to his daughter Sonia Khatchadourian for cooperation.

In the section “In Memoriam” we have referred to late Professor Vladimir Branskij – a philosopher from St. Petersburg, the collaboration with whom had old and strong traditions among Armenian philosophical community.

This issue does not contain “Chair of Young Scientist” section. The Editorial Board of

WISDOM stays loyal to the approach of scientific-publishing activities adopted by the founder of the journal, academician Georg Brutian, and from the very day of its foundation gives importance to its tendency to become a platform for young scientists' growth through articles by MA and PhD students in the section "Chair of Young Scientist". Therefore, in the current jubilee edition, this note is especially important as the Editorial Board of the journal have decided to publish in 2018 a supplement, that will include the best articles summarizing the results of young scientists' research.

The positive feedbacks, observations and achievements on the already published issues of the journal are the evidence of the importance

and value of the articles published.

The Editorial Board extends the sincerest gratitude to all the authors, reviewers, professional critics and assessors of the papers involved. We extend our special appreciation to the Authorities of Khachatur Abovian Armenian State Pedagogical University for the consistent support in publishing the journal.

Given the significance of the underlying principle of pluralism over scientific issues and freedom of speech, we should remind that the authors carry primary responsibility for the viewpoints introduced in their articles which may not always coincide with those of the Editorial Board.

EPISTEMOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE,  
METAPHILOSOPHY, ARGUMENTATION

## ON THE DIALOGUE OF AESTHETICS AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

### Abstract

After the alleged ‘ends’ of metaphysics, of history, and of art, aesthetics reorganises the field of its enquiry. While retaining the question of the meaning of art for the human as the background justification of its theorising, aesthetics meets philosophical anthropology and enlarges its field. Philosophical anthropology explains that the instability of the human condition demands culture as the artificial stabilisation of the human world as well as of the human *in* the world. Expressivity, artificiality, and the aesthetic are interweaved with the meaning of the human world. In this context, pictures have priority over concepts and justify art as the eminent pictorial form of meaning. Since the human lives in nature and culture, the stabilisation of its open world is possible through creation of spatial correlates and of objects as well. Thus, aesthetics does need to expand enquiry beyond the discourse on art, so that it includes the issues concerning the aesthetic character of the human world and its spatial correlates. While Wolfgang Iser and Richard Shusterman argue for a revision of aesthetics, Joseph Margolis and Helmuth Plessner support the stronger dialogue between philosophical anthropology and aesthetics in different ways. Further, Arnold Berleant explores aesthetics of human space.

*Keywords:* aesthetics, philosophical anthropology, aesthetics of spatiality, Wolfgang Iser, Richard Shusterman, Helmuth Plessner, Joseph Margolis, Arnold Berleant.

After the alleged ‘ends’ of metaphysics, of history, and of art, aesthetics reorganises the field of its enquiry. It moderates their radical expression through interpretations that renew theorising on the question of art towards new forms of aesthetic creativity. Without historicist or normative demands, when considering art and the field of the aesthetic, aesthetics retains the question of the meaning of art for the human as the background justification of its status as a philosophical discipline. With reference to this question, aesthetics meets philosophical anthro-

pology and can receive from the latter impulses sustaining its enlarged theorising.

Recent theories of aesthetics, while weakening the discourse of the end of art, perform a moderate shift towards issues and problems, which one could consider as anthropological ones. Thus, they stress that aesthetics is primarily of theory of senses, of perception, and of sensuous intuition as far as these constitute the significant approach to the world and to works of art. In this respect, these constitute the real way of the conscious human body towards aesthetic



values and bear a primordial value for human existence.

The aforementioned theories liberate aesthetics from the burden of aesthetic historicism and of aesthetic essentialism as well. In some cases, the emphasis on sensation and perception is connected with the claim of revising *aesthetics* towards *aisthetics*, namely to a stronger theory of sensation and perception, which sets out that the latter offer the primordial access to reality. In this respect, starting from vital character of sensation and perception, Wolfgang Iser criticises modern aesthetics as philosophy of art. He argues that *aisthetics* is a theory of that part of reality, which is accessible only to sensation and perception (Iser, 1993, p.150; Iser, 2012, p. 13). Thus, Iser proposes *anaesthetics* as the complementary dimension of aesthetics'.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to explain what the term 'anthropological' could mean. First of all, this term points to a philosophical anthropology that came forward as a special sort of theorising and as a philosophical discipline through the works mainly of Max Scheler, of Helmuth Plessner, and of Arnold Gehlen that explore the question of the human by focussing on the issues of the living human body and of the relation of human to world. (Krüger & Lindemann 2001; Fischer 2008). Further, they consider the relationship of nature and culture as possessing a systematic priority towards the relationship of culture and history. Subsequently, other philosophical theories, like these of new phenomenology or classical pragmatism, could be considered as theories within anthropological perspective if not as theories of philosophical anthropology themselves, even though they avoid these designations. After all, the classics of philosophical anthropology have taken into account pragma-

tism, especially John Dewey's philosophy, while Scheler and Plessner had been members of phenomenological circles among Husserl's pupils and adherents in those times.

Thus, the moderate shift of contemporary pragmatist aesthetics to more or less anthropological questions has favourable presuppositions in the works of the classics of pragmatism. Even though in a distance from a comprehensive philosophical anthropology, Richard Shusterman's somaesthetics explores the significance which special activities, forms of training, or techniques of the human living body have for the positive feeling of life. In this way, Shusterman stresses bodily consciousness against intellectualist burdening that underestimates the primordial significance of human living body for the well-being of humans (Shusterman, 2000; Shusterman, 2008; Shusterman, 2012).

A totally different kind of dialogue of philosophical anthropology and aesthetics comes forth in Joseph Margolis' proposal for a philosophical anthropology that learns from art (Margolis, 2009). Aesthetics as philosophy of art offers to philosophical anthropology the conception of artificiality and of historicity. On the one hand, the human is artificial by nature, since it becomes the human as natural living being needs culture and language in order to be really the human. On the other hand, this 'hybrid' being, as Margolis characterises the human, becomes historicised. Therefore, the human perception changes in the course of history through culture. In this context, the varieties of the works of art as well as the intentional character of artistic creation indicate the complex of artificiality and historicity, of enculturation and acquaintance of language.

Thus, there are open complementarities among aesthetics and philosophical anthropolo-

gy. Nevertheless, the convergence between philosophical anthropology and aesthetics does not mean some overlapping of these theories. On the contrary, Margolis retains their openness by developing a broader context concerning philosophy and the arts. It is of interest for the dialogue between pertaining theories that Margolis refers Plessner's philosophical anthropology, while stressing the inevitable relation of aesthetics to philosophical anthropology. Therefore, he mentions Plessner's 'ingenious' theories and endorses Plessner's argument of the artificiality of the human and of human world (Margolis, 2009, pp. 26-27). In fact, there are common points of consideration in Margolis' and in Plessner's philosophical anthropology. Both understand philosophical anthropology as a kind of theorising, which explores the human condition through philosophical categories and, in doing so, it avoids naturalistic reductionism. Their significant works open new worlds of theorising. The main difference of their theories is obvious. While Margolis takes the conception of artificiality from art, Plessner explains it through the differentiation of the forms of the organic. While Margolis uses artificiality as a category from the very beginning of his theory, Plessner considers the artificiality of the human and of the human world as an 'essential law' at the end of his philosophical anthropology. Altogether, artificiality is realised in the unity of difference between nature and culture. However, the dialogue between Margolis' and Plessner's theories can be inspiring and productive for aesthetics and philosophy of art as well.

Regarding artificiality and historicity, we may mention the typical stability of the human and of human world, which is linked to the relative stability of natural world. Margolis and Plessner would admit that the human as the em-

bodied person as well as the human world are not only artificial but they also bear a typical yet elementary stability because they cannot escape the natural world and be only culture or only history. Nevertheless, this aspect leads to the question whether culture can recognise the relationship of humanity and nature and protect nature as the natural world of the human. Thus, aesthetics and philosophical anthropology can elucidate that the field of the aesthetic is broader than the everyday human life.

Plessner does not content himself with ascertaining the difference between the natural and the human in his philosophical anthropology. On the contrary, Plessner explores the specific characteristic of the human through a continuous differentiation of the relationship of organic forms to their surrounding field. In fact, he sets out a conception of nature and of life, which rejects the exclusively epistemological consideration of nature in terms of the sciences of nature. He emphasises the primordial relationship of the human to the nature and, depending on meaning, considers the lived experience of nature as prior to the scientific experience established through the sciences of nature. For him nature is the variety of primordial appearance, to which the human is not alien, since it is a living being.

In this respect, Plessner's early work on the unity of the senses manifests his attempt to explore nature as the 'nature-world' of the human, which includes the human as 'body and living body' (*Körperleib*) (Plessner, 1981<sup>a</sup>). In this context, senses are no instruments, but their modalities are bridges between the human 'body-living body' (*Körperleib*) and spirit, namely between the natural world and the spirit indicating the creation of meaning and the understanding of meaning (Plessner, 1981<sup>a</sup>, pp. 278, 300). In this

regard Plessner sets out a conception of hermeneutic philosophy of nature, which leads to his anthropological conception of nature (Apostolopoulou, 1988). It is worth mentioning that Plessner understands this early theoretical account as *aesthesiology of spirit*, but he characterises it later as *anthropology of the senses*. As regards aesthetics, aesthesiology should be the basis for aesthetics as a philosophy of art. Plessner is right that aesthetics needs a theory of sensation and perception. Altogether, he does not set out a theory aesthetics, but he deals later with problems of art mainly from the view of his philosophical anthropology. Thus, he explores an account of ‘anthropology of music’ or of ‘anthropology of the actor’ (Plessner, 1981<sup>c</sup>, pp. 184–189, 399–417). Even though Plessner’s hermeneutic philosophy of nature is close to the starting point of the aesthetics of nature, Plessner himself turns to an anthropological theory.

In his philosophical anthropology, Plessner emphasises that he avoids anthropocentrism by explaining that the human coexists with other living natural beings on earth. Nature belongs to the home of the human, but it is not *the home* of the human. Obviously, Plessner takes a step back historicity. Nevertheless, his purpose is to avoid the one-sided concentration of the definition of the human in the field of history (Plessner, 1981<sup>b</sup>). On the one hand, he does not intend to ‘define’ the human, namely to describe the substance of the human in terms of essentialism. On the other hand, he describes the human not simply as the conscious living body, but he emphasises the ‘I’ and the person. Therefore, the significant argument of the living body or of the conscious body, or of the self-conscious body we find in contemporary aesthetics includes a critical dynamic. However, it could perhaps be an abstraction from the view of Plessner’s philo-

sophical anthropology, because it does not bring to the fore the full description of the human, which Plessner sets out. Plessner’s philosophical anthropology has an aesthetic dimension. For, it considers nature as appearance with qualities accessible to sensation, perception, and lived experience. Further, it introduces the distinction between spatiality and space, which receives a full meaning, while considering the human world. In addition, artificiality points to the interrelation of nature and art as τέχνη (techne).

Plessner starts from the description of the organism. He uses the category of ‘positionality’, which indicates the difference between the body as a thing (‘Körper’) and the living body (‘Leib’) (Plessner, 1981<sup>b</sup>, pp. 296, 393). Positionality is space seen from inside. While the body as a thing exists within its limits, the living body goes beyond its limits and vindicates its place within the life-field. In the latter case, there is a centre within the living body, which can determine the relation to life-field for the purpose for surviving. An organism is both, namely thing and living body, but the living body has the priority in considering the specific character of the organism as life subject. Further, the organism realises life within and beyond its limits, since it exists within the circle of the concrete life. The relation of the organism to space is differentiated. Positionality means the power of the subject of life towards space. The organism as body-thing exists in space. The living body is related to space, but it establishes its relation, because of its condition of life. In this respect, Plessner distinguishes between spatiality (‘Raumhaft’) and space (‘Raum’) (Plessner, 1981<sup>b</sup>, pp. 181, 326).

As Plessner explains, the animal has a self, it lives in the here and now, and it has consciousness, but does not have the lived experience of its own self or of its life-field. Life and conscious-

ness achieve their highest level in the human. The distinctive category of the human condition is the 'eccentric positionality' and is connected with the consciousness of 'I' (Plessner, 1981<sup>b</sup>, p. 360). For, the 'I' takes a position towards the mentioned centre of the life subject, it is conscious of itself; it takes a distance from the self to the mentioned centre. At the same time, the 'I' conceives himself/ herself as a member of the shared world of persons. The relation to life field becomes the relation to world, to the inside world of feelings and dispositions, to the outside world of things, to the shared world of persons. Because of eccentric positionality, the human has to create its own world. It needs culture and norms, work, and continuous reorganisation of the space in which it can live and lives. The human as the human and the human world are artificial by nature (Plessner, 1981<sup>b</sup>, p. 383). Even though Plessner does not use the term, we may consider artificiality in its original meaning as *ποίησις* (poiesis), as creation of world, as artificial and artistic.

Altogether, the human creates and changes its world according to the understanding of spatiality and space from the viewpoint of life. Expressivity, artificiality, and the aesthetic are interweaved with the meaning of the human world. In this context, pictures have priority over concepts and justify art as the eminent pictorial form of meaning. Since the human lives in nature and culture, the stabilisation of its open world is possible through the creation of spatial correlates and of objects as well. Nevertheless, the meaning of the open human world receives its reality from the self-understanding and the world-understanding of the human. In this aspect, aesthetics does need to expand enquiry beyond the discourse on art, so that it includes issues concerning the aesthetic character of the human world and its spa-

tial correlates, as they appear in everyday life and in different cultures.

Taking into account Plessner's distinction between spatiality and space, we have a starting point for the aesthetics of spatiality. It could be the frame for the aesthetic research of created spaces and on created space relations that indicate a complex relevance for the way humans understand their life world. Moreover, Plessner's philosophical anthropology contributes to a topology of human life in nature and in second nature, namely in culture. Without ignoring the differences, we may point to the Arnold Berleant's aesthetics of environment as another theoretical account of topology of human life, which argues for the revision of that kind of understanding the human, which does not refer to nature (Berleant, 1995; Apostolopoulou, 2004; Gkogkas, 2007).

The result of this research is that the dialogue between aesthetics and philosophical anthropology enriches both disciplines. The relation between such theoretical approaches is founded on significant questions that transcend the limits of particular disciplines. Since philosophy deals with the question of how humans are to understand themselves and their world, how humans ought and can live as humans, this dialogue will continue in new forms that also concern the arts and the aesthetic. In addition, the consideration of arts and the aesthetic enriches the question of the human and of the human world.

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## HOW MUCH IS AN IMAGE WORTH?

## Abstract

The paper discusses the problem of “competition” between the image and the articulated language/text. The problem as such is historical and it reflects the change between the language based communication (including the radio era) and the mainly image based communication. Opposing to those who equate the image construction in the information and communication *technology* with the impoverishment of meanings and necessity and ability of logical/rational discourse, the arguments of these two positions are analysed. The paper mentions the difference between representation, image and idea, analyses some arguments related to the logical articulation of words in texts, and to the specific imagistic manner of communication, and concludes that the text and image are complimentary, and that their worth depends on the *meanings* they transmit and the *quality* of meanings/values they transmit. In this respect, *the diminishing of preoccupations, of ability and time for logical articulation of the reference to the world means the decline of man*. At the same time, the theory highlighted in the paper does not counter the “bad” image to the “good” text (and certainly, nor vice versa), but the *measure* in their use according to the scale of goals and means which people must have.

*Keywords:* image, representation, articulated language, text, logic, virtual, IT, video games, literacy/illiteracy.

1. *In Lieu* of Introduction

So, how much is an image worth? An image is worth a lot. It is worth infinitely: for all of us – and the model of this regard is given by our thought about a visually impaired person, about the *extreme* state of man having the severest physical disability in relation to the feeling of life – the *direct* reception of the *images* of reality is the ideal and necessary condition for happiness. And I am not referring here to the fact that this latter concept reflects subjective states, therefore that it is possible for a visually impaired person to be happy also in the absence of sight, but to the mutual complementation of da-

ta provided by the sense organs and the definition of human sensibility depending on the *degree of mutual complementation* of his sense organs. Berkeley had long proven that sight is “epistemologically” superior to the other sense organs because it provides the profoundest data on reality (colours, nuances, shades and lights, distance, space beyond the perceptible limit by touching (Berkeley, 1733, pp. 9-60) and also because it equips man with the first language: that in which the reproduction sign of reality is reality itself<sup>1</sup>. Just like all languages, including

<sup>1</sup> Language is a set of signs for the designation and knowledge of reality, and the familiarity – through communication – with a sound/sound compounds

the natural one, the language of sight can be educated and developed, but the ideas generated with the help of the language of touch and the language of sight – so as a result of perceiving the world through touching or seeing – are never common, they are completely different even if they refer to the same objects<sup>2</sup>. For this reason, senses are not mutually substitutable for a

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for one aspect or another of reality has taken place (and takes place in the learning of human language by young children) in connection with focusing sight on one aspect or the other and with *pointing out* to those to whom the aspect of reality/the discovery of this aspect is communicated: “here”/the aspect *is pointed out*. Once the natural/articulated language was acquired, the *gesture* of showing, of directing the sight of others disappeared, but the primordial character of seeing reality has been translated into the further use of the verb *to see* with the meaning *to understand*.

Rousseau emphasized that the sound language appeared because touching (others to communicate something) and feeling are limited to presence and the presence of objects, namely at “arm's length”, and also that sight as a means of communication is limited to the radius of such sight in a certain space; for this reason, voice – which is addressed to the ear and to a person located farther, and which refers to things seen – became a more effective means of communication than gesture, and the premise of communication was, of course, need: but it was not the need to share knowledge, but the need to manifest different passions (love, hatred, pity, wrath) (see Rousseau, 1781/1856, pp. 495, 497).

And, interestingly, because of the affects, the first words had not been words for literal descriptions, but figurative ones. Rousseau's example (p. 498) was that of a man who, because he was afraid of other people he met, called them giants, and only then he coined the word that included himself and the others, as *men/people*.

The articulated character of language has developed from the unarticulated language, that of onomatopoeia, and that is why Cratylus, Plato's character, who claimed that terms have an intrinsic truth which is not dependent on the will/conventions of people, is not altogether untrue (p. 499, Rousseau).<sup>2</sup> (Berkeley, 1708, fragm. 95, 99): “but the proper objects of vision make a new set of ideas, perfectly distinct and different from the former, and which can in no sort make themselves perceived by touch... the connexion there is between the several ideas of sight and touch, he will be able, by the perception he has of the situation of visible things in respect of one another, to make a sudden and true estimate of the situation of outward, tangible things corresponding to them. And thus it is he shall per-

normal person and sight is the most important sense and the most painful to be replaced in case of any malfunctions.

But how much are words, oral or written articulated language worth? *Just as much*<sup>3</sup>, it is worth infinitely. Because, being connected to sight, to the direct experience of the existence of the phenomenon, man interprets with the help of language whatever he sees, namely he transforms the copy of the phenomenon, as it is perceived through sight, into *logos*, into understanding<sup>4</sup>. In other words, the competition between images and oral language, between images and text had never become a philosophical topic – since philosophy deals with human beings holistically, in an integrative manner – unless the change starting with the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century would have occurred, *change which promoted the primacy of visual communication/communication through images over written language*. But because it occurred, and although conjectural, the issue must be deciphered with the help of instruments which investigate beyond the disclosure of the relevant conjecture. The purpose of this article is precisely to contribute to this deciphering.

On the other hand, the reply to the question in the title – how much is an image worth? – is

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ceive by sight the situation of external objects which do not properly fall under that sense.”

<sup>3</sup> For this “just as much”, see Aristotle who considered the language as a sign of the things which are unseen/are not *present* when people want to show them even with words: symbols of things. And writing is, in this respect, not so much a sign of language – leaving aside the written transcription of written words – but also a sign of things.

<sup>4</sup> (Plato, “Cratylus”, 399a): “The name ‘man’ (ἄνθρωπος) indicates that the other animals do not examine, or consider, or look up at (ἀναθρεῖ) any of the things that they see, but man has no sooner seen—that is, ὄρωπε—than he looks up at and considers that which he has seen. Therefore of all the animals man alone is rightly called man (ἄνθρωπος), because he looks up at (ἀναθρεῖ) what he has seen (ὄρωπε).”

not a difficult one, and the article assumes this reply: the value of an image depends on its *contents* and, in broader terms, on the *message* delivered. In the wake of the Kantian constructivism, one can claim that an image is not neutral, a mere copy of the empirical or imagined reality, realized by technical means, (an image is not thus the “victory of sophisticated technique over the traditional natural livelihood and over the traditional natural communication”) but that it is filled with the *extra-technical intentions* of its creators, or more precisely of those controlling the image generation process (in broader terms, the communication process). The use of images – or of any other means of communication – is connected to these initial intentions, because such use is the result of goals and target oriented intentions of those who are at the origin of *input*. The *decline of the logical and cultural abilities* of the cohorts of television viewers watching endless and incredibly low quality television shows is not to be blamed, first of all, on those television viewers, but: i) on their general education *conditions* which they do not control and ii) on the *decision-makers* controlling the broadcasted images and the education conditions in general. Those who deplore the audience of these shows and blame the cohorts of television viewers who are passively watching them are moral Pharisees and *intellectually incapable of linking the input to the output*.

## 2. The Image Suggested by *Belles-Lettres* versus Articulated *Discourse*

Evidencing the descriptive, therefore suggestive, power of *belles-lettres*/fictional literature compared to that of information transmitted by journalists and politicians and also compared to that of the mushy moral theory,

Marx sided with the first alternative<sup>5</sup>. It is the first from a historical and informational point of view too. But what are the grounds of such a position? And, on the other hand, isn't there a common ground between fictional literature and social information and messages?

The *representation* of phenomena, namely the connection of various aspects perceived as a coherent ensemble which reflects those phenomena, in fact *identifies* them in the overwhelming sea of the world. If we want a synonym – and we always want one, because otherwise the explanation is almost impossible to realize – then we define the representation as *image* or *meaning* of the phenomenon. But of course, people do not stop at identifying isolated phenomena, but because they always want to understand the world presented to them, they *connect* these phenomena, *i.e.* their representations, and thus they get an *idea* of things.

In colloquial terms, some people are tempted to assimilate representations to ideas. In fact, they mutually correspond to one another. Nevertheless, *ideas are not mere representations*, because they are already structured at the level of logic or of the mental mechanism of logic. For this reason, the representation is situated between the moment of observation and the moment of logic (Moscovici, 2000, pp. 208-231): *i.e.*, it is a mental *reproduction* of phenomena, and because representations are articulated, a word corresponds to each representation. As we know, the words already represent small theories for people, namely certain simple knowledge concerning the respective phenome-

<sup>5</sup> Marx (1854): “The present splendid brotherhood of fiction-writers in England, whose graphic and eloquent pages have issued to the world more political and social truths than have been uttered by all the professional politicians, publicists and moralists put together.”



non. Nevertheless, again, *words as such are not yet theories*: namely, they are not *concepts transmitting a complex meaning* which people are aware of and which reflect the *generality*, *i.e.* the general nature of certain connections between things or aspects which help the understanding of corresponding words and phenomena. (The *theory* is, in this case, a coherent and plausible notion – irrespective if it includes only hypotheses or if it is formulated in a controversial/eristic manner – therefore a coherent and plausible connection between ideas about phenomena and which outlines a general perspective, thus also a highlight of causality and consequences.) Only concepts benefit from this nature of “being theory”.

In simpler terms, words are *names*<sup>6</sup>, verbal identifications of phenomena, while *concepts* are more than names; they are those *theories of things*<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>6</sup> Let us remember Plato, “Cratylus”; and Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Zeta/VII, 1029b, 1030a; 1031b, 1032a; 1034b; 1035a; 1037b; Aristotle, “Categories”, 1a, 1b; and especially “De interpretatione”, I, 16a, 16b.

<sup>7</sup> Therefore, the *concept* is *necessary* in the sense that it *means* something about things, *i.e.* it is not *arbitrary* as a *name/a designation*, according to (Deleuze, 1969, p. 26). Philosophical analysis does not split hairs, it *distinguishes* however between the fact that articulated language *designates* – and there it is, we see and we shall see how important it is to know the name of things, if we don't know them we cannot refer to things and we remain at the level of the unexpressed and beyond expression – and, at the same time, reveals *meanings* of what it designates, namely the *implication* that the name given to one thing *refers to that thing* and, therefore that the name assigned to a thing involves in itself the universal and the general, *i.e.* the theory, in my view/wording.

“The cherry tree blossomed” is a sentence in which we can notice:

- a) *the name* (cherry tree, blossomed), therefore the consciousness that language assumes the existence of the speaking *subject* in relation to an *object*,
- b) *the personal manifestation* (myself or anyone else, including the impersonal “people say that”/“it is said that”), namely the speaking man's presence in the act of language,

If we think, for example, about our argumentation/our judgments – which is/are always *propositional*, this is the only manifestation of the logical connection of things – then we understand better: in our argumentation we connect different empirically noticeable things; these things as such do not represent arguments, but only our inference in relation to them; *arguments pertain to the already logical registry of the mind*; on the contrary, observed empirical phenomena are “seen”/felt with the help of representations or through images corresponding to such phenomena and which are specific systems

- c) *the meaning* of the sentence (that *the sentence* and *the names used* refer to possible *things*, precisely because in the background, therefore in the consciousness, we know that there exist cherry trees, trees, which are life forms and which, therefore, feed and multiply etc.), (and the meaning is the *condition* of truth (Deleuze, 1969, p. 25), because it refers precisely to the *name* which designates things, namely the association of the words “cherry tree” and “blossomed” is not absurd),
- d) and *the sense* (which refers to the unitary intention of the sentence (to its *expressed*, Deleuze, p. 33), and to the fact that *the things* designated by the sentence can exist as declared in that respective sentence. *The sense is, therefore, always of the sentence*, and not of the term (which has a meaning), namely *it connects the sentence and the things it refers to* (things which we imply behind words, that is precisely the reason why we use them in that sentence).

What is the reason of this long footnote? It is that to understand that if man does not practice his articulated language, he: a) no longer has sufficient words to designate things, b) uses words also by copying messages received from anywhere, namely *he does not discern the meanings of words*/he is unaware of the meaning of words, c) he does not distinguish between the paternity of messages and mixes and assimilates various sources, in the sense that he may assume something absurd/harmful, d) he does not understand the connection between messages and things, seeming irrelevant to him if he claims anything/assumes any statement. And if we take into consideration that any sentence describes an event/is an event (Deleuze, 1969, p. 34), the poverty of articulated language makes man unable to discern events and he is unresponsive towards them.

For this reason, *practicing articulated language also means practicing logic and critical spirit*: towards sentences and towards things.

of synapses configuring more or less coherent information units; these information units are expressed through words, concepts and judgments which use the above-mentioned bricks (words and concepts).

The shift from representations to ideas and concepts is the natural consequence of the fact that people want to understand not only isolated phenomena, but their actual existence in the world: and this actual existence is always a *set of connections*. Of course, once ideas are known, representations acquire a larger meaning, but yet again, *ideas are an interpretation of representations* and the acquisition of deeper, more general meanings, beyond the mere reproduction of existence/beyond experience.

Furthermore: if representations/mental images/ideas<sup>8</sup> are awoken by *judgments* of things, and the more complicated these judgments (spoken or written) because they entail *n* intermediary judgments – consequently, the more complex the theory (complex meaning) transmitted through judgments – then the more complicated the judgments, the more difficult things seem to us and the more difficult to coagulate representations or our ideas in relation to them. Once again: because theory /judgments consider complex and always rather indirect connections between things.

As a result, it is obvious that images of empirical phenomena which are better understood thanks to their particular nature (and precisely *individual* circumstances are described by *belles-lettres*, and precisely this simplicity of the individual allows for aesthetic and moral emotion) are more suggestive than theories which are always general in terms; because theories

are, above all, even generalizations made by people after *n* representations of the circumstances inciting their interest. Representations concerning the phenomena described in novels thus function as clearer and more suggestive *images*, which epitomize the representations and theories made by people about things in a simpler and more striking way. Of course not any image produced by fictional literature is kept as important in the collective memory: in other words, not any image which the receiver knows for sure is fiction is generating a theory, a concept about those respective phenomena. Because – and I must mention – and, of course, leaving aside the theories of artistic images as such, of their creation and power of significance, people are interested in the real life, namely they make (first of all) notions/theories of *real phenomena*, and not of the representations in their minds in connection to these phenomena.

But these representations are so important – in the sense that they mediate between real life and the theories people make about life – that their control became, and even more so in late modernity, one of the most efficient weapons for the control/domination of people by people.

Anyway, images must be significant, must have *substance* – as a result, also having a strong individualizing trend and also a *modeling* trend, i.e., openness towards a generalizing ability of the human cognition – in order to generate theories about the world, meanings about “how things work”.

Just as in the same manner images must be *credible, plausible*: if they are not – as is the case of representations and theories transmitted by many politicians, or as is the case of fictions in which circumstances are improbable and

<sup>8</sup> The difference between representation and idea is not important in this case.

solutions are always brought about by *deus ex machina* – then these images are not remembered as a basis of worldviews. They are entertainment of waste of time, namely noise, informational ballast which ultimately represents a pollution of people's minds having inherently negative consequences.

### 3. Image versus Words

The contraposition of insipid political discourse to memorable pages in the written literature seems to have been specific to the industrial revolution of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and to the humanist trust in the power of the written word to bring about into modernity the millions of working people necessary for this revolution; and, at the same time, to *domesticate* them: *as if* all the readers are/were friends in a *literary society* (Sloterdijk, 2009); and although domestication is a metaphor for domination relations, it was connected, since the oldest times, to the self-domestication of the species, to the development of sedentary manners of life, shelters/homes which allowed the constitution of *theory*, namely of the contemplation of the world through the windows behind which people felt safe enough to theorize (Sloterdijk, 2009, p. 21); namely, only *domestication as dressage*, and not as *taming*, as humanization, was the process in relation to which thinkers remained silent and which idealists thought it would be annulled through the reading of “right books” to which process they transferred the power of people to think on their existence; but the enrolment in a literary society, the reading, are not sufficient for people to think about the dressage and oppose it: people behind reading, those who choose it must be pointed out in order for the *discourse* (which people will read) to *highlight the difference between domes-*

*tication and dressage/“submitting”* (Sloterdijk, 2009, p. 26) *of the subjects so that they be docile continuators of the dressage*; and of course, without the “empowering knowledge”, i.e. without cultural instruments – among which the writing-reading ability is fundamental – people irremediably remain dominated and subjected.

And there it is, the development of industrial modernity – let us not forget, the concept of *modernity* does not refer to a neutral timeframe, but to the capitalist level of social relations – led, first of all not due to taming, but due to (consumerist) dressage, to finding a more efficient means than reading: the image. *A picture is worth a thousand words*<sup>9</sup> reminds us of the comment – since 1911, 1913 and, in connection with the war propaganda, 1918 – made by American advertisement experts regarding the fact that for persuasion an image is worth more than a text. The praising of images more than the text continued after the First World War<sup>10</sup>, after an already glorious practice of photography and, of course, during the adolescent enthusiasm of the silent film.

And today, after several decades of neoliberal offensive – in the pursuit of buyers to allow the resuming, if not the expansion, of profit generating production and the ensuring of new debtors for the banks which granted them loans – the ads/commercials, already named only *advertising*, flood every inch of the public space and every second of the individual time dedicated to information and culture: on the Internet, ads are delivered to private email accounts, are found on the page of every infor-

<sup>9</sup> See: *A Picture...* Retrieved October 12, 2017 from: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A\\_picture\\_is\\_worth\\_a\\_thousand\\_words](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_picture_is_worth_a_thousand_words).

<sup>10</sup> See: *The History of a Picture's Worth*. Retrieved May 17, 2018 from: <http://www2.cs.uregina.ca/~hepting/research/web/words/history.html>.

mation article together with films and information concerning cultural events.

Leaving economic interest aside, why are static ads or TV commercials considered to be worth more than a text/1000 words? Because the image of commercials – accompanied maybe by a few words, but most of the times without any words at all – is “more suggestive” *now* for the population systematically alienated from written culture and aligned to an *orality* that does not represent in any way a synthesis of historical moments of *orality* and *written culture*, therefore it is not and it does not attest a superior cultural level after those mentioned, but on the contrary a reduction/ simplification/ infantilization of people, by stimulating their consumption desires *hic et nunc*. Even speeches – especially those of politicians, which fill in the gaps between images provided for entertainment purposes – are rapidly floating around, people are (possibly) listening to them but they do not have time to judge them profoundly because the television provides new and new speeches, issues never analyzed, followed and resolved, and entertainment, only entertainment (Postman, 2005). And the words used – in speeches, in films, in articles, in TV commercials – are few, simplistic (slogans, clichés), incorrectly expressed and used: they just *show*, describe, declare, but – obviously – they do not analyze. Hence, words must not be idealized either: they can transmit – in speeches or in a written text – absolutely illogical perspectives, and not only from the standpoint of a savant attitude about the world; and thus illogicality is the form of truly harmful messages.

Messages from the images generate, of course, states of mind, emotional reactions: exactly what the people ordering the images envisage. But these messages, less and less mani-

festated in an articulated manner, generate less and less *meanings/significances*. Because these meanings are always brought about by *articulated language* and by its *logical* manifestation; moreover, even because the *meaning of an image is manifested in an articulated manner in a person's mind* – and of course, in the interpersonal dialogue – and the bombardment with images and the depletion of the offer of words and analysis leads to the poverty of the bundle of words and of the analytical capacity to connect them, people find themselves in a situation in which *they have and they can express fewer and fewer meanings*<sup>11</sup>. But the human *logos* is, before anything else, a representation of the *logos* of the world, is it not? This was the explanation provided since antiquity. Thus, the poverty of meanings means the inability to represent the world. What does this situation look like? And are we still surprised that there are manifestations for legalizing drugs?<sup>12</sup>

And nevertheless: an image – and especially to the extent and in the form in which it *reproduces* – helps the increase of information which people has, the increase of their perspective on existence and, accordingly, the increase of their cultural level. Not only images oppose the written text and the logical ability to com-

<sup>11</sup> Someone said that the ideal of the scientific precision would consist just in this simplification. Certainly, this opinion is, let say, eccentric. On the contrary, the ideal of scientific precision consists in having the clear and elegant form of the answers to – thus, the meanings of – the problems put in a precise manner; so not in simplifying the meanings related to those problems, but in disclosing those meanings. The fragmentary character of science has nothing to do with the impoverishing of the public/political supply of information and meanings.

<sup>12</sup> *Hanfparade in Berlin Auch Nichtkiffer demonstrieren für Legalisierung von Cannabis*, 13.08.2016. Retrieved May 08, 2018 from: <http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/panorama/20--hanfparade-in-berlin-auch-nichtkiffer-demonstrieren-fuer-legalisierung-von-cannabis-24552910>.

municate. But as we arrived to understand the equal importance of text and image reproduced *n* times and infiltrating every house and every human brain, as we must pay attention to not *blame* the image or the text for the current configuration of people. Simply, the historical opportunity of the “mechanical reproduction” (Benjamin, 1936) of man's creative manifestations, thus the opportunity created at the level of technique, is used *more capitalisto* and hijacked/misapplied.

#### 4. Image and Idea

The representation as simple image/meaning of isolated things is followed by the *idea/theory*: which is a connection and interpretation of several representations, with the *function of being tested in the social dialogue, that is to say, to be authenticated*. Because even the mere representation or image and theory have a *symbol* function, of *model* in relation to which phenomena is compared. But *a symbol is verifiable only to the extent it is articulated*, narrated in inner language or out loud, namely only to the extent it is compared to other symbols and real phenomena. And this means that a striking and touching literary text, or the images of a film/or the film in its entirety do not disclose truths and are not assumed as life models unless the literary text and the film – as “symbols” – are *judged* by people (rapidly, with their inner voice, so we are not referring here to literary criticism), for that reason synthesized in an articulated, logical, coherent manner.

Furthermore, people, of course, get an idea about the world after they read a book or see a film. But they confront their *ideas/theories* in

society, on a daily basis with real social problems and phenomena, and obviously with other people's theories. During this confrontation – inherently articulated – people mutually *correct* their theories/perspectives, because some theories prove to be insufficient or untrue, while others, those authenticated by practice, do emerge as true and more efficient.

Briefly, it is not representations or images that “battle each other”, but theories, ideas: people *confront* theories, not images. The simplest messages of political speeches – and even if the propagandistic arsenal also includes suggestive images, caricatures, slogans – are theories, they transmit *ideas*, not images.

Probably the place where images are stronger than ideas is the slice of *behavior*. Children see a certain food related habit at their parents – for example, to add salt to the food on their plate, or to mix certain ingredients etc. – and they acquire this model and will apply it, the habit enters the subconscious. Nevertheless, behavior is the result of social interactions, then of social education. At one point children/people confront their own model with the theories regarding the respective phenomenon: namely at that point there is a fight between a habit, determined by an image, and theory. It is not necessarily sure that theory will conquer the mere image, namely that it will change behavior: but if people understand that theory is true, even if its message is not assumed, then it is clear for them that *theory is the true one*, while the image is in fact only habit.

Hence, theory nevertheless conquers: in the *ontological* registry, where *the value of an image is high only if integrated into rational theories*; while an image can conquer only in the *phenomenal* registry.

### 5. *Image and Articulated Discourse*

For this reason – we reply to the second question asked in chapter 2. – what is common both for the most beautiful pages of *belles-lettres* and for the most vulgar political speeches is the fact that what they transmit are messages/bundles of *meanings* and *senses* connected and coherently created through *articulated language*: in the form of text or oral speeches<sup>13</sup>. Only this articulated language transmits “representations”, *i.e.* mental *reproductions* of a certain understanding of real phenomena: people use as synonyms images and representations to underline the role of *copying* (image is a copy, isn't it?) reality.

Actually, our knowledge is not a mere copy or image of things, and consciousness is not a mere photography camera, it's about meanings which shape even images, it's about creating meanings through *the internal dialogue of consciousness* regarding the thing on which it focuses at one point or another and its “background”. And because ideas are also things and because the internal dialogue of consciousness already operates with *n* other images and ideas, all always provided within society, there also results both the *social* character of the object of consciousness (this object is not a mere copy) and the *active* character, of constructing the object by the consciousness (the consciousness is always the *consciousness of something* and there always exists the *consciousness of the act* as such (I think that.../I am aware that...));

As a result, people don't know copies. They know *ideas/theories* about things, namely certain ideas/theories which seem plausi-

ble/true to them in their space-time framework. People don't know images, they *refer* to images in their articulated theories. *Images are suggestive only if one assigns them meaning*, and this means that only if they are integrated into ideas/theories.

### 6. *Image and Language*

Knowledge/ideas/theories are formed in the mind with the help of language, and they are transmitted just in the same way. Natural language has created, as it is known, the symbolic (mathematical and logical) languages as well, in which signs have a clear meaning – just like in the natural language – and which can be transmitted coherently even autonomously (see the demonstration of a mathematical problem), but which is interpreted and connected to other theories or aspects from mathematics or symbolic logic also with the help of natural language. A sequence of formulas in a theory is sufficient for mathematicians to have a clear image of the respective theory, but essential for them is precisely this theory, namely the meanings they discover and fix through the respective formulas. For them it is important that symbols allow for a “purification” of reality, a revealing of the special essence of reality they aim for, a cutting of this ontological layer of reality which they could not achieve only with the help of natural language. Symbolic language with its rules corresponds to this layer, namely it basically renders in an articulated manner the way in which this layer is understood. Only metaphorically can this layer be named “mathematical image”: in reality it is a theory or, more precisely, an unfinished set of theories.

However, besides this parenthesis about a symbolism which some people associate only to

<sup>13</sup> See for the complexity of *orality* – and for the “mental landscape” in an age emphasized by orality (Darnton, 2010).

image, although it is clear that it's still language, the discussion on the value of image cannot be reduced only to phenomenal comparisons – which occur under the same circumstances in which the discovery of cinematography occurred and especially of television and IT which broadcast visual images – about the offensive of non-verbal communication or of parsimonious communication with articulated language<sup>14</sup>, but it refers to the substantiation or the profound causality of the differences between the *role* of image and *that* of articulated language.

Opposed to those who praise the supremacy of image in many moments of current communication and consider it a *technical, objective and inevitable* change – which means, in this case, independent from social relations and from people's control over it – so, change to which people only have to adapt and to integrate enthusiastically, the thesis proposed in this article is that on the contrary, *the supremacy of image over articulated discourse*, namely over theory and the theoretical capacity of human beings, is: a) a recession/rebound in the constitution and development of the human specificity and b) the manifestation of power relations, namely of dominance-submission relations.

We must not confuse (just as Nadin, 1997 does), or judge uniformly the *image* as predominant means of entertainment and communication (photographs sent via social networks and received on mobile phones and tablets, the endless viewing of televised images, video games and commercials) with the *means* of creation and dissemination of such image, with IT

(which, however, does not create and disseminate only images, but also text and oral discourse). Because essentially and not conjecturally, the *contents* of image and text and oral discourse is not dependent on technical means, but on the *decisions* of the people controlling the education processes and social communication, as well as the dominance-submission structure of social relations: illogical messages, incentives for aggression, for the *deletion of the critical capacity* of people and for the *rarefaction of the criteria* for distinguishing between evil and good, for assuming those “anti-causal value judgements” to which Konrad Lorenz refers when analyzing the disinhibition of the preservation instinct of the life of the species (the inhibition mechanism of the aggressive instinct having a moral responsibility) (Lorenz, 2002), these are all generated not by IT, but by the *decision-makers* using it.

The arguments for the above-mentioned thesis refer to the human ontology. Only *articulated language examines the behavior of man in a critical manner in terms of logic*, namely in terms of *criteria* and *principles* which means that man is the one who knows to separate good from evil and choose good. Of course language can transmit false meanings and significances – just like writing; but just like image, I add – however the solution is not its removal and replacement with images. The manner in which oral articulated language and written language is manifested is similar.

If people can infer *n* things concerning images, in order to follow these inferences/for they to be a source of significances and a guidebook for people, they *must express them in an articulated manner*: otherwise, images fly as fast as words compared to writing; yet this articulated form of expression – which de-

<sup>14</sup> See Twitter, a short message communication network with a limit of 140 words. But communication networks as such – besides Internet – are meant, by definition, to communicate articulated information as less as possible, but rather visual images/addresses for (photographs, clips, videos, online games, films).

scribes and judges meanings revealed by images, which selects meanings in this way and which fights to give them the most adequate expressive verbal form to people's intuition – is achieved by “one's own toil” (Plato, 1925, 275a). And if we understand that even writing may be silent (namely not provides answers to people) just like a painting that always shows the same thing (Plato, 1925, 275d), then we realize one more time that, even though there are similarities between image and language, there is also the essential difference of the *logos* manifested only through word, only through the unfolded and articulated logic of the natural language: consequently, if language can be represented by images, images must ultimately be expressed by language in order to be *vectors of meaning*. Because images can “avoid literal truth” and they are “malleable”, but under no circumstance can they being described as representing reality better<sup>15</sup> and as defining subjects better. Indeed, they are not simply illustrations of texts, so we must acknowledge not only the *complimentary* character of articulated language and of image<sup>16</sup>, but also their limitations<sup>17</sup> and especially the *inability of an image to articulate meanings reproduced in an articulated manner*. And this conclusion enables us to mention also *special* languages (of different sciences or programming languages) as transmitting *diminished* meanings and, ultimately,

only with the help of natural language: even if, for example, programming languages are based on reduced ambiguity, while natural language contains ambiguous words, metaphors and many other figures of speech.

Images can be more accessible, but their above-mentioned inability makes this accessibility to come to *positive fruitfulness only together with the development of language by each user of images*. Only articulated language allows the identification of nuances, the capacity to express what man sees and envisages, the capacity to understand and express paradoxes (Deleuze, 1969, pp. 11, 16): and thus, to interpret them.

### 7. Image and Writing

Writing has been an administrative instrument, as it is well known: the collection of tributes had to be accounted for and, in order to accomplish this function, leaders needed scribes. Commerce also needed the memory of writing, and the domain required the simplification of signs, as we know from the Phoenicians. Writing rationalizes, makes potential discrepancies in speech disappear: because speech transmits emotions (Rousseau, 1856, p. 502), while writing transmits information; written language “loses thus from its force, but gains in clarity” (Rousseau, 1856, p. 503). Writing became, obviously, a means of cultural memory, but the importance of writing emerged when it had to be read and understood by as many people as possible (not only be leaders, traders and scribes). In this respect, writing was connected to the civilization and the knowledge of law: accordingly, connected to a technical knowledge and this was not necessary only for some. The Greek *polis* was the place where writing

<sup>15</sup> Undoubtedly, mathematical reality is better described by symbols, equations, formulas: but all these form, let us not forget, also a language.

<sup>16</sup> For example, the fact that modern medicine can no longer develop without imaging and without learning from images.

<sup>17</sup> Images can render what text cannot, and also the reverse is equally valid. Images can indeed render the *invisible* for the space of experience described with the help of natural language, but text can render meanings and significances that encompass and transcend *n* worlds of experiences through a programming language or through images.



and reading was generalized amongst *citizens*: in order for them to be able to understand the norms of social relations. That is why Plato compared oral discourse and writing to the wise ploughman who “bears in mind the rules of agriculture”: writing is always the sign that people also understand what they are writing and, inherently, that they write true things (they don’t “write on water”) through the “dialectic art” of analysis, because only these true things are truly known (Plato, 1925, 276b, 276c, 276d, 277b-c). (The others are forgotten and are only noise).

However, let us remember the ideas from *Phaedrus* about writing, in light of the already old, but so important analysis of Derrida (1972), precisely because they meet those which under-value the text. As mentioned above, dialogue rejects only the bad writing, not the good one which is made of “knowledge of the just and the good and beautiful ... (and) defend themselves by arguments” (Plato, 1925, 276c). Good writing is the one which does not replace argumentation with “myths” explained only to please (because such an explanation of myths is easy compared to the attempt to decipher new issues such as the process of knowledge and expression of the self) (Plato, 1925, 229c-230a).

Writing acts like a *pharmakon*, like a drug, but the drug can be a medicine/remedy as well as a poison, so that, writing – as well as speech (Plato, 1967, 459a and b; 501d and e; but let us remember Aesop’s fable on language) – may also be used in a *contradictory* manner: those who write only by copying ideas are alleged connoisseurs, and those who read these things and do not think about it as if hypnotized are mere imitators that mimic knowledge. If writing is repetition without knowledge, it is a denial of the rational essence of man; because indeed writing and basically speech as well (both of

them constituting *logos*) are based on the *understanding* supervising them, the logic of discourse in the mind which simply renders Being as such (the ancient pattern of human *logos* corresponding to the cosmic one appears once more). Therefore, ultimately, Plato opposes to the writing as drug/poison not orality, but the *idea*, truth, law, *episteme*, dialectic, philosophy (Derrida, 1972, pp. 331-332).

At a first glance, unlike Plato, Rousseau seems to have considered writing generally as inferior to speech, because writing transmits accuracy, it does not respond to the heart, but to the mind, hence it gives a uniform to feelings, to intentions. The spoken word (Rousseau, 1856, pp. 499, 501) is even “annoying”. Such a “representative” (Derrida, 1967, p. 207) writing impoverishes human language, because it is a translation of the natural expression of/a translation of thought into words. All these, writing and speaking, are “signs or images” (Rousseau, 1856, p. 513). On the other hand, however, the basis – just like in the case of a melody or a painting – is represented by the *meanings* transmitted: a melody does not transmit only sensations pleasant to the ear, neither does painting impress only by a pleasant combination of color, they transmit moral perspectives (“moral effects with moral causes”) and the “drawing” (Rousseau, 1856, p. 513), the sketch, the *idea*. Moreover, the transmission of sounds always involves movement, the change of life, while painting only renders it, “it is dead” (Rousseau, 1856, p. 518), so that not only the perfection of articulated language connected to argumentation processes, to philosophy and rhetoric led to the decrease in importance of music in ancient Greece<sup>18</sup>, but as the moral sens-

<sup>18</sup> Rousseau, 1856, p. 518: “as soon and Greece was full of sophists and philosophers, there were no more famous poets or musicians”.

es have decreased and continue to diminish because people are interested in persuading and not responding to real emotions/emotional issues, melody has become a mere ingenious combination of sounds (separating itself from word – AB, namely from the auditory signs transmitting emotions – and not a transmitter of moral effects) (Rousseau, 1856, p. 521) as did spoken language. It seems that “our languages are worth more in writing than spoken” (Rousseau, 1856, p. 512). As a result, also in Rousseau's case, the evaluation of writing compared to spoken language analyzes the moral meanings transmitted or not by one or the other<sup>19</sup>.

The reified form of language as writing was named “literacy” by Mihai Nadin. And the transfer to the predominance of image created and transmitted by information technology – as a transfer to the civilization of *illiteracy*. The meaning of this latter word is extremely metaphorical: precisely in order to support the thesis of the predominance of image nowadays and the positive capitalization of this predominance.

The author's arguments are: i) images have heuristic dimensions, while “literacy lacks” (Nadin, 1997, pp. 147-8) such dimensions, ii) images (transmitted through the new IT media) are more practical than texts and correspond to the need of speed and efficiency of today's society, iii) and they also allow for greater connectivity (instantaneous; in real time) between people and between people and reality. This makes them citizens of the world communication network/networks and able to overcome, in such manner, the elitism imposed by language and literacy (Nadin, 1997, p. 358). As a result, the

demonstration briefly refers to the *social ambivalence* of image (the fact that messages transmitted through images can also consolidate elitism, and that images are different in terms of accessibility and that they can exacerbate alienation) and “of course” it excludes the field of social, political and economic causes of this ambivalence.

I would counter the above thesis only the idea that as language and writing gradually democratized according to the social processes of leadership and labor<sup>20</sup>, therefore as writing and culture in general were the battlefield between the dominant elitism and the democratization tendencies, so the image is a space of social struggles. To consider otherwise means simply subscribing to the techno-optimism *à la* Toffler etc.

Text is the basis of *long cycles* of use – and these cycles also include *the time for reflection and for connecting things* – while images sustain *short cycles*, in which the fast replacement if images is connected to an *ephemeral* and *perishable* character which can do harm if deemed constitutive values of the behavior *pattern*, then if they are disconnected from the logical and moral judgments concerning things. *It all depends – both writing and image – on how we use them*: unread books are, indeed, dead, but people have always constantly written and read something else. Replacing books/analytic texts with Wikipedia and popular pages on the Internet does not necessarily mean progress, except of course in terms of accessibility: because it also depends on *what* pages we chose and *how much* and *what* we read from such pages and *how we think* about

<sup>19</sup> Also see Derrida, 1967, p. 203: “The word that Rousseau raised above writing is the word as it should be, or rather, as *it should* have been”.

<sup>20</sup> See for example, the generalization of writing through the citizens of classical Athens, (Marrou, 1948, 1981): primary school as a rule already in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> century B.C. and equally for boys and girls.

them and with their help, and also, it depends on how we express all these.

In the attempt of an ontological deciphering, a superficial declaration counters the text which *conceals* to the image which *reveals*. However: i) an image *can* also conceal, namely it can conceal the *causes* and *consequences* of the situation translated into images, and without understanding these – which is done only discursively – image loses its relevance, its power to reveal reality; in this respect, image is like an *opinion* opposed to *science/substantiated knowledge* (in Plato and Aristotle); ii) on the other hand, why *can* the text conceal? Because, of course: it is difficult to render the meanings and intentions. And also because of an ideological cause: the individual perspective – achieved from a position of experiences, of the influences suffered and of one's own creation, but which is situated, consciously or not, depending on social ruptures – tends to abstract from complexity, to reduce it, to exclude it from the field of consciousness and the one of articulated language, to cover aspects of reality which are interconnected with those described by a text. Only *critical* and “all the way” critical positions exceed unilateral views. And text conceals because it is always, just like an image, *a slice* of reality: but a good text is never considered to cover/mask/conceal, precisely because its value consist in its capacity to render such a *slice* of reality (logically, with arguments, in relation to other slices etc.).

Probably what gives text the highest value compared to image is *the truth*. Only text – more than oral language marked by immediate reaction, inherently fragmented and characterized by ephemeral – evidences truth about things: truth is not, in a good text, absolute and definitive, of course, but it is *proved by a long*

*series of arguments*; consequently, we are talking about the truth depending on the analysis made with respect to that slice of reality. Only truth – or what seems plausible, true, but this is not relevant here – is the *knowledge* on which the understanding of the world is built. *Image transmits truth only if supported by, and integrated into language and text.*

And if today the dominant message is propagandistic so that receivers accept the relation of submission and not question it – except in a superficial and fragmented sense which too arrives to the inevitability of the *status quo* –, and society is controlled precisely through the supremacy of image and by becoming a society of the spectacle, as Guy Debord remarked since 1967 (see also Bazac, 2017), the cause is not the development of image technologies, but *the internal logic of late modernity*. The harmfulness of the predominance of image consists precisely in *the human pattern* it creates in this late modernity: the pattern of a man who must *not* know, but who must receive images with simple meanings, with as less text/articulated language as possible, and thus, “be happy”.

#### 8. In Lieu of Conclusions: While the Era of Image is Celebrated, the Society of Knowledge and Learning is Supported

The first idea resulting from this article is the *complimentary* character of text and image, because these two entities are themselves not only interdependent but also interconnected: in its turn, image narrates and text makes us see, illustrates. What is truly important is that this ontology is not refuted by the simplifying and dividing practice.

Then, image, as well as text and also as oral

language, is worth as much as many *meanings* it transmits and as what *quality* of meanings it transmits. The perspective of this article is not of lamentation in front of the current mass culture and the one-dimensionality of the human pattern imprinted nowadays, but that of discussing the *causes* and of interpreting the *concepts* in relation to this discussion. The conclusion of this analysis is indeed the classical one: *the diminishing of preoccupations, of the ability and time for logical articulation of the reference to the world means the decline of man*. To live only by viewing, creating and receiving images, by wanting to consume as many images as possible and only to be entertained, by “not being bothered”<sup>21</sup> with what is *outside* images, with what is “too” complex and to cram it into the category of mystery for which the solution is the extramundane being means, basically, the disappearance of man.

Image becomes autonomous in relation to text – as well as, initially, text became autonomous in relation to image and just as well as all aspects of reality may also be studied separately – but, ultimately, nothing replaces articulated language and writing.

The predominance of image over logical language means the accenting of the *relative* character of knowledge, not in the sense of understanding their historical determination (because, indeed, knowledge is relative from this point of view of historical and social conditioning), but in the moral sense of the attitude towards values, losing the moral *criteria*. And knowledge deemed to be so relative is no longer an instrument used for understanding: emoticons are sufficient in this respect.

The predominance of image over oral or

written discourse – I used the concept of *discourse*, instead of *communication* – means that we no longer consider reality as being real, but only as a *series of images*. As a result, people are no longer shuddering when faced with the *reality* of wars and violence: they no longer react, but *they look at other images*. Yes, image must not justify itself, it is sufficient to itself: man can see the horrors of war, but the *refusal* of horror – and the decisive refusal – although it can start from the feeling generated by the image of war, is based on articulated language: the only one which analyzes, demonstrates, gives arguments, contrasts with other arguments, establishes, gives reason to things. And if man fails to control – also because of a weak discursive experience – the argumentative potentiality of discourse, he cannot oppose the horror of which he is convinced, and becomes a passive receiver of the decisions proposing horrors.

*If images incline the balance in the economy of signs, people will simplify the meanings transmitted by messages and will be accustomed to responding to images with images, and to simplified meanings with simplified meanings.*

The popularity of *video games* is owed (Nadin) to the fact that even children understand them. But what do they understand from such games? And in this case, *first of all*, we should not forget that video games are “a simulation for pleasure, with a coherent and well-tuned imaginary world” (Triclot, 2011, p. 5), an “instrumented experience” (Triclot, 2011, p. 6), a “potential space in which a fraction of reality is subject to a magic control, which maintains the object in a suspended state, not entirely my creation, nor a mere external event” (Triclot, 2011, p. 11), and which limits human experience to *war/aggression, mimicry, the power of the arbi-*

<sup>21</sup> *To not be bothered* has become a slogan internalized as a result of the bombardment made by the social media organized around consumption.

rary and *dizziness/disorientation*. In this space, *confusion* between reality and imaginary<sup>22</sup> goes hand in hand with the *simplification* of human reactions: in order to fulfill the requirements of the game program.

Secondly, the focus on the virtual world – because real life is too difficult to bear – annuls the elements of attention precisely from *the human's presence in real social relations and in relation to the real social and natural environment*: the characteristic of this type of presence, lacked of attentive scrutiny, is *superficiality*. The behavior pattern in a video game is the surf one, of valorizing discontinuity by jumping and bouncing off in order to achieve the goals of the program, and as a result, in the real world everything seems to be too cumbersome, too slow, impossible and so long that – of course, *not only* because of the predilection for the virtual world of video games – it can no longer be *understood and actively addressed*. In this shift of attention from real to virtual one can speak of *attention deficit* whose consequences are dramatic (Gallagher, 2009; Cantwell, 1996). So that, not even the interactivity<sup>23</sup> of games and of the presence in the virtual space is able to cancel the *precariousness* of meanings which the player is capable of and which he may transmit: if, once again, life in images weighs more than the life in the rational articulation of the world.

Thought *reduced* to the mental processing of an image means the drastic *diminishing* of the ability to reason and of its instruments, first of all of words. The predominance of image in the relations with others decreases the *autonomy* of thought over the self: such thought de-

pends on the image of the others about the image transmitted to them about oneself.

However, once again, judging an image and its predominance nowadays must not be disconnected from judging the *entire ensemble of social relations, processes and phenomena*; just as, the beneficial use of image – the development of man's power to act precisely with the help of imagery – must be highlighted from the perspective of a holistic *critique*: which, according to the quoted example (Zick Varul), deconstructs the place of the visual in today's society starting precisely from the positive valences of image.

For this reason, not only that we must not counter the “bad” image to the “good” text – such contraposition being just as simplistic as its adverse stand promoting the “good and revolutionary” image against the “old-fashioned” text – but we must apply here the former ancient Delphic principle of *measure: nothing in excess!* Namely we must understand the danger of *the too much* – together with the danger of *the too little* –, the importance of *prioritization* in the scale of goals and means which people must have, and of the adequacy of means to goals according to the consequences of both.

Therefore, the solution suggested in this article is not a techno-phobic one, of return to the puritan world of the dominance of text and in which such phenomenon would also take place by class-related dominance. On the contrary, if we consider the responsibility for the facts and consequences of people's actions, then *all types of ignorance, that related to text and also that related to image are to be rejected*: but also the *conditions* which support this ignorance.

<sup>22</sup> See the most recent form of such confusion: the Pokemon Go game.

<sup>23</sup> Interactivity is more or less Nadin's only argument to praise the predominance of image over articulated language.

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## STARTING-POINTS IN PHILOSOPHY\*

The question of the so-called starting-point of philosophy has exercised many minds since the beginning of philosophical thinking. Even those philosophers who have not written about it have of course had to take something or other as a starting-point in their own philosophy. Still, not many philosophers have been clear as to *what sort* of starting-point they were thinking of, advocating or employing as a point of departure. For one thing, they often did not distinguish factual and normative starting-points: where a philosopher simply happened to start, and where he or she should start, respectively (cf. Hahn, 1958).

From a methodological standpoint, the latter is obviously more the important of the two, and has the more important consequences for philosophy, in relation to its nature and aims. It is in this more important sense that I shall consider the question of the so-called starting-points of philosophy.

The question we want to raise and attempt to answer therefore is: “What should be the starting-point of philosophy or what is the ‘proper’ starting-point of philosophy?” But the question raises a number of other questions. First of all, what should we understand by a “starting-point,” leaving aside for the moment the distinction between a normative and a factual starting-point? Shall we say that Descartes’ starting-point was his (alleged) skepticism regarding everything he had believed to

be true, at the time he ostensibly wanted to launch upon philosophical inquiry? Or shall we say that his starting-point was “really” the *Cogito ergo sum*? Or shall we go even further back than his supposed “universal doubt” and say that his starting-point was “more really” or “more truly” those beliefs that had been taught or had been unconsciously acquired, and with which he gradually or suddenly became dissatisfied? Clearly each of these can, in some sense, be considered Descartes’ “starting-point.” We might say, for example, that the first was his negative or critical starting-point, while the second was his positive starting-point; that the first was his starting-point in the sense that it was the point at which he began to clear the ground for his constructive views, and that the second was the “starting-point” of his positive pronouncements about reality. We can state the matter differently by saying that the first was the starting-point of Descartes’ philosophizing, the latter, of his philosophy. What then about the third presumed “starting-point”? That might be called his pre-critical “starting-point.” These distinctions would leave some people dissatisfied; and I think for a number of good reasons. Some may very well begin by objecting to the last-mentioned “starting-point.” They would say that the beliefs Descartes temporarily repudiated when he launched his so-called methodological skepticism cannot be considered a starting-point. And they would go on to explain in what sense their objection is justified; in what way that was not *the*, or even, *a* starting-point

\* This article was written by late Haig Khatchadourian in October 31, 2015.



in Descartes' thought. I am not here concerned with whether the objection would be valid. I am concerned with one important point which this and our illustration as a whole brings out; namely that it does not make sense to speak of this or that as an actual (or as a normative) starting-point unless one specifies *in what sense or respect, in relation to what*, one's starting-point is a starting-point. But the dissatisfaction with the above distinctions may arise from a different source. It might be pointed out that when we speak of something as a starting-point, we should distinguish a starting-point in the sense of (a) certain "data" we start with or from, and one in the sense of (b) a certain method of investigation we utilize at the start, or in the general pursuit of our philosophical inquiries. In addition, that under (a) we should distinguish *three* sorts of starting-points: (i) certain questions or problems we start with; (ii) certain facts in the sense of actually existing objects or states of affairs, linguistic habits, and the like; and (iii) certain propositions believed to be true. If we make these distinctions we shall find that, in the case of our historical example, the first-starting-point falls under (b) if the "universal doubt" is considered as a philosophical method of doubt, and not as a purely psychological process of doubting. The second "starting-point," by contrast, then falls under (a) (iii). Or, if we think of the starting-point as the fact or alleged fact that I (Descartes in the actual example) *think* and therefore the fact or alleged fact that I (Descartes) *exist*, rather than as the proposition "I think therefore I exist," our starting-point will fall under (a) (ii).

The preceding does not exhaust all possible senses of 'starting-point.' Even in the case of a normative starting-point, a temporal distinction is necessary. To say that in doing phi-

losophy we should start with or from this or that thing – a given method, certain empirical facts, a given proposition or set of propositions, a given problem – means that we should start with or from it chronologically.

In the case of a normative starting-point in our sense (b) above, the temporal and logical starting-points of philosophical inquiry coincide. A starting-point in the sense of a method of inquiry enables us to discover evidence for the truth of philosophical propositions we arrive at through its employment. It would also help us to arrive at evidence for or against philosophical propositions entertained by other philosophers; or propositions we ourselves entertained before we employed the method. In regard to a starting-point of type (a) above, the same would be true in the case of (a) (ii) and (a) (iii), but not of (a) (i). This, I think, is clear in the case of (a) (ii). As to (a)(iii) the propositions we start with or from would furnish us with evidence for or against certain other propositions provided they themselves are considered to be true – as Descartes believes the proposition "I think therefore I am" to be true. But that supposition is already involved in its being considered as a starting-point; though, I need not add, others may deny their truth and reject them as a proper starting-point.

The thesis I wish to affirm – a familiar thesis in contemporary philosophy – is, following the Later Wittgenstein, that the proper-starting point of philosophy is language, and the analysis of language. What I precisely mean in terms of the foregoing distinctions may be stated under the following heads:

1. That language is the proper starting-point of philosophical *inquiry* in our sense (a) of 'starting-point'; that is, that language is the "datum" with and from which we

have to begin the activity of doing philosophy. By that I mean that actual usage (ordinary usage in the case of ordinary language, and technical usage in the case of technical languages) constitutes the original raw material of philosophical inquiry.

2. That the *analysis* of language, both ordinary and technical, constitutes the first proper method of philosophical inquiry.
3. That, as a consequence of (1), language as datum is the logical, proper starting-point of philosophical inquiry; and as a result of (1) and (2) the *nature* of language insofar as it is known to us, furnishes the logically first (kind of) criterion of truth or falsity of the results that may be arrived at through its analysis.

Each of the preceding three assertions raises some important as well as some less important issues. And at least some of the former issues must be dealt with if a plausible case is to be made for our assertions. Thus, it will be said, first of all, that those assertions require support; and second, that the elaboration of this support is *logically prior* to the analysis of language as the “starting-point” of philosophical inquiry. *The real starting-point is the justification of these so-called starting-points themselves!*

That the views propounded here require support I fully agree; and I may point out that the analysis of the uses of the term ‘philosophy’, as it has been employed in the history of philosophy, would provide part of this justification. Part of the justification must also come from a study of the actual practice of philosophers, past and present, as philosophers. And that is not a matter of linguistic analysis. Indeed, some account of the nature of philosophy

is necessary if our discussion of starting-points is to make sense. For instance, it is obvious that the nature of an inquiry’s starting-point in sense (b) depends on the nature of the inquiry and its aims. It is true that one and the same method may be capable of serving different ends; but one general sort of method suits one sort of inquiry, and another general sort of method another. Thus, the conceptual analysis of ordinary language, however exhaustive or profound, cannot furnish, say, scientific knowledge of the physical world. Similarly, the nature of a starting-point of philosophy in the sense of initial data or raw material depends on the nature and aims of philosophy.

But if the starting-points of philosophy have to be determined in light of the nature and aim of philosophy, is not the specification of the latter logically prior to the former; and in that sense at least, if not also temporally, the proper starting-point of doing philosophy? That it is a curious and rather disturbing fact that after more than two millennia of philosophy the very nature and aims of philosophy – let alone the proper method or methods of philosophical inquiry – are still a matter of debate and controversy. This frequently makes it desirable for philosophers to *temporally start* with a conception of philosophy and its functions arrived at through an empirical analysis of what other philosophers say about philosophy, and, more importantly, practice as philosophers. True, many philosophers do not actually begin with such an inquiry; they plunge into the business of raising and attempting to answer specific issues; and as long as they have a clear idea of what they are trying to do as philosophers, that is perfectly in order. What is imperative is that the philosopher needs to have a clear idea of what he or she is trying to

do as a philosopher, and of the ways in which that is like or unlike what other philosophers have professor or practiced. Otherwise, he or she is in danger of using improper tools.

A major, if not the most important reason why a considerable number of contemporary philosophers reject the traditional method(s) of doing philosophy and, so, the conclusions they reach is their changed or changing conception of the nature and functions of philosophy. A main example is the jettisoning of metaphysics, the *bette noire* of much present philosophy, due in good measure in my view, to the great advances in physical sciences and cosmology in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries. Indeed, since the rise of modern science in Galileo, Newton and beyond, the relation between philosophy and science have been continually changing, with much that was traditionally considered to be part of philosophy being taken over by the sciences. A recent example is the appropriation of speech-act theory, which originated in John Searle's combining J. L. Austin's Wittgenstein-inspired *How To Do Things With Words* with the later Wittgenstein conception of a practice, by the empirical science of linguistics. Another recent example are the questions and controversies, in contemporary physics and cosmology, of the so-called "strong anthropic principle," first formulated by the cosmologist B. Carter in "Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic Principle in Cosmology," which recasts the traditional teleological argument for God's example in terms of the current scientific theorizing concerning the origin and nature of the universe (see Khatchadourian, 1955). In the continually changing relationship between philosophy and science, various originally philosophical issues have now become empirical, thus more exact

scientific questions, and, at the same time, philosophers of science and even philosophers or religion are drawing on contemporary scientific knowledge and theorizing to answer certain erstwhile philosophical questions. The ongoing interplay between philosophy and science, science and philosophy, have so far had, and should continue to have in the coming years, a continually-evolving healthy relationship between philosophical analysis and scientific inquiry, with philosophy critically reacting to and appropriating the theoretically and empirically well-grounded results of the various sciences, to their mutual benefit.

Where so much depends on a philosopher's conception of philosophy, it is necessary that he or she start with a clear understanding or conception of it. I do not mean that the use of a given method, or of certain questions, facts, or propositions as starting-points, necessarily presupposes or "implies one particular view of the nature and objectives of philosophy. A given starting-point, in any of the senses of this term distinguished, may be compatible with a number of more or less different conceptions of philosophy and its objectives. This is of considerable importance, as will become clearer later on. Yet, in practice, it is better to be as clear as one possibly can – and imperative to have some idea – about what one wants to do and where he or she wishes to go, before he or she actually starts on his or her way.

There is an important sense in which one can have what philosophy can, properly speaking, be and achieve – as against what one may conceive it actually to be – only by practicing what, in the history of philosophy as a whole, has been more often than not considered as philosophy. In that sense, it is necessary to start with asserted questions that are or were tradi-

tionally considered to be philosophical in nature, and to attempt to see what one can do with them; and whether they can be answered at all.<sup>1</sup> The careful study of the attempts of other philosophers to answer these questions is also enlightening. A considerable number of contemporary philosophers are doing these things in attempting to define or redefine philosophy and its function. The present writer's views here concerning the forms and methods of inquiry proper to philosophy are mainly the result of his reflections on the nature of the utterances of philosophers and their philosophical practices.<sup>2</sup>

Now the analysis of the past and present technical philosophical uses of 'philosophy' (the ordinary, non-technical uses are of secondary importance here) is in line with the present author's view that language constitutes the proper starting-point of philosophical inquiry in sense (a) of this 'proper starting-point of philosophy.' However, since the analysis of the extant body of writings generally considered as philosophical in nature can likewise be claimed as a proper *substantive* starting-point of philo-

sophical inquiry in the same sense (a), we must qualify our earlier three theses. For in our proposed analysis of these writings we are not solely or even primarily concerned with the language in which they are couched but chiefly with the nature of the questions they deal with, the methods actually utilized to deal with these questions, and the results arrived at. Therefore, we should now add that *language and its analysis are indeed our proper-starting-points, but only with respect to the investigation of specific philosophical questions, and of specific terms and concepts that may be or are of philosophical significance.* That is, that they are the proper starting-points of philosophy as against metaphilosophy. That will, in an obvious sense, also take care of our *third* way of discovering the nature of philosophy; i.e., through different attempts to resolve assorted philosophical problems. This view of the proper starting-point of philosophical investigation of specific problems requires support in terms of an account of the nature and objectives of philosophy.

Two points need now to be made in connection with our statement about the analysis of the corpus of philosophical writings, and the attempt to resolve assorted philosophical problems so as to discover the exact nature of philosophy. First, I am well aware that under the impetus and inspiration of the movement called "Linguistic Analysis," the works of an increasing number of philosophers in the past have been subjected to semantic analysis, and this tendency has been to interpret – or rather, to re-interpret – their utterances in purely semantic terms, as purely semantic pronouncements rather than as true or false statements

<sup>1</sup> One example: Whether, given our limited scientific knowledge of the nature of consciousness and its relation to the brain and the body as a whole, any credible conceptual-empirical evidence exists for individual survival after death.

<sup>2</sup> There is of course a fairly extensive body of questions or problems that past philosophers have considered as philosophical in nature. That is less true at present. It is notorious that the 20<sup>th</sup> century logical positivists rejected as pseudo-problems a large number of traditional questions as nonsensical. Other 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophers, e.g., the Oxford School, have re-interpreted and dealt with them in a novel way. There is certainly much more agreement in the history of philosophy on questions and problems than on the answers to them. Again, there has been, on the whole, more agreement or less disagreement on questions than on the methods of dealing with them. Hence despite the important problems traditionally considered as problems have a strong claim to being taken as the starting-point of philosophical inquiry in sense (a) (i).

about the world (see White, 1955).<sup>3</sup> From the standpoint of the history of philosophy, I consider that as illegitimate, if and when it is asserted or implied that past philosophers actually intended their works to be simply and solely collections of semantic utterances. Such a view would distort the intentions of these philosophers and what they thought they were saying or doing. It would be a dramatic example of reading meaning into their works; or turning back the clock and attributing to them a conception of philosophy they did not hold, or did not hold in the thoroughgoing form their interpreters sometimes attribute to them. It is, I think, undeniable that many if not all philosophers in the past considered as part of philosophy the analysis of ordinary concepts such as *knowledge, courage, virtue, mind, matter, free, determined*. Also, that they did attempt the analysis of these and numerous other concepts. But they certainly did not think that this constituted the whole of philosophy, or that their analyses were purely and solely analyses of (ordinary) language; that they were not at the same time making discoveries about the “facts” in the world, adding to our knowledge of the world – the “nature of the world,” the “nature of reality,” as they usually put it. The situation would be quite different if we consider the contemporary philosophers’ analysis of the view of a Berkeley, a Plato or an Aristotle simply as a *re-interpretation* of them in the sense of being a conception of what they (putatively) are really about; what the interpreter thinks they must be if they are to be considered philosophical in nature. Whether any particular re-interpretation of past philosophy or of phi-

losophy as a whole, it is certainly theoretically possible that philosophy is different, perhaps quite different, from what it was, or even is now, thought to be. Thus, there is a real need for the discovery of what philosophy is and can be through the actual attempts of philosophers to do philosophy. Putting it more strongly and justly, what really matters in the last analysis is the degree or extent to which philosophy *can* attain those objectives it has traditionally professed; not what philosophers, past and present, optimistically or pessimistically thought or think it capable or incapable of achieving. That, by the nature of the case, must logically and temporally follow on the required investigation and is not, in either sense, prior to it. Here again I am advocating the use of the general method of semantic analysis as a starting-point. To arrive at a satisfactory view of philosophy itself and not only for the investigation of particular philosophical issues in their own right, we need, among other things, to start by investigating these specific issues with the help of the method of conceptual, semantic analysis. A fortiori, since I am claiming logical and temporal priority for conceptual analysis (starting-point in sense (b)) as applies to specific issues (our starting-point in sense (a) (i)), *only with respect to philosophy and not also to metaphilosophy*, the foregoing does not conflict with our position. I might add that the attempt to answer a given philosophical question, whether as a means or as an end, requires the analysis of the key concepts involved, hence the analysis of the particular meaning(s) of the key expressions in the question. Where these expressions and concepts occur in ordinary discourse (and in the case of philosophy, many of them do), the proper starting-point in the sense of the primary datum, is in my view ordinary language itself. In

<sup>3</sup> Also compare (and contrast) that to the discussion and evaluation of David Hume’s theory of personal identity, and other essays.

addition, the starting-point in sense (b) is the method I am referring to as semantic or conceptual analysis.<sup>4</sup>

The reader may cry out that she cannot see the value of all this talk about starting-points. She may protest that this talk about different sorts of starting-points is more confusing than enlightening. She may feel that philosophical inquiry is not only being placed in a straitjacket by maintaining that ordinary language – or anything else for that matter – is the proper starting-point precisely to the type of abstract sweeping pronouncements to which philosophers have been traditionally prone, and from which contemporary philosophers are trying to free philosophy. And why should there be a single starting-point for all philosophical inquiry, in *any* of the senses of ‘starting-point’ distinguished? Would we not, in maintaining that, be committing something like the “fallacy of essentialism” if not that fallacy itself?

It is admitted that rigidity is a real danger and must be carefully avoided. The attempt to clarify issues by means of logical distinctions may defeat its purpose by going too far, by turning into a logical game of hair-splitting. At the same time, the making of clear distinctions – whenever the particular subject-matter permits it – is essential if philosophy is not to be – and in some ways to remain – a set of vague and confused practices and a set of vague and confused statements. Additionally, the drawing of proper distinctions here is of considerable utility. For what a philosopher takes as his

“primary datum or data,” and the method with which she starts, will have an important bearing on the kind of results she will reach. The history of philosophy shows that it makes quite a difference whether we start with, say, ordinary language and the analysis of ordinary concepts, facts drawn from the natural sciences, or the “common sense” beliefs of the “man in the street” about cabbages and kings.<sup>5</sup> It also shows that a considerable number of the errors and confusions of past philosophy are due to the employment of the wrong sort of phenomena as primary data, or the wrong method or methods: a method or methods inappropriate to philosophy, or one(s) that, though appropriate for it, can only be properly used after some other method has done its share. And that, I am maintaining, partly stems from an inadequate or misguided conception of philosophy and what it

<sup>4</sup> In *Philosophical Analysis: A Critical Study in Method* (Khatchadourian, 1967) (later published by Wiley) is attempted to show that even when a given philosophical issue or statement is couched in technical language, and even where it cannot be rendered in ordinary nontechnical language – for instance, “Are a priori synthetic judgments possible?” – the safest if not the only road to them passes through the thoroughfare of ordinary language.

<sup>5</sup> One question concerning the “correspondence,” if any, between the “commonsense view of the world” – if such a thing exists – and ordinary language. To the extent that they may be “correspondence” between the two, determines the precise nature of and the reasons for the “correspondence.” For example, when we say that physical objects continue to exist when not perceived, is that “true” by virtue of the way we ordinarily use the expression ‘physical object,’ as that anything that would disappear when nobody perceives it cannot be (called) a physical object? If the answer is “yes,” is the reason that ordinary language itself, the way we talk, a *reflection and product* of our commonsense view of the world: in this case what we call objects? If that is true, the fundamental question becomes: “Why is the commonsense view of the world, for example, what it is, and what *evidence* we have or can have in its support?” Further, why is it that we are so terribly reluctant to give up or even to modify it even a little? Or do we modify and even abandon commonsense beliefs? The answer is clearly yes with respect to, for example, the earth and the universe as a whole; e.g., the long discarded belief that the earth is flat, that it is stationary, that the sun and the planets revolve round the earth, or that the universe came into existence (following Old Testament genealogy) some four thousand years ago. All these early “commonsense beliefs” were abandoned under the influence of science. So after all, what is a “commonsense belief”?

can or cannot do. Modern science is fortunate in these respects, and provides an interesting difference between it and philosophy. But science was not always immune to the sort of danger or error I am speaking about, as the history of astrology and alchemy for instance shows.

It might add that what many contemporary philosophers consider as a revolution in philosophy has resulted precisely from the way in which those associated with or inspired by it have differed from many past philosophers in their use of philosophical methods, and in what they take as the data of philosophy. They have also differed from it in other respects as well; but the points I mentioned are certainly part of the difference.

With respect to the question of whether different types of philosophical questions or different branches of philosophy require different starting-points, my position is as follows: what I said about ordinary language and its analysis is meant to apply to any and all philosophical issues in value theory in general; e.g., in ethics and aesthetics, in semantics and the philosophy of language, epistemology and ontology, and to the philosophy of religion.<sup>6</sup> The disciplines to which it does not apply are (1) formal logic and the philosophy of logic (logical theory), (2) philosophy of science, social, political and economic theory, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of education: in short, in branches of philosophy in which the object of philosophical inquiry does not itself fall within philosophy as historically understood and delimited, or as restricted, extended or re-mapped in contemporary philosophy.

<sup>6</sup> For the crucial role played by contemporary physics and cosmology in various recent discussions concerning, for example, the origin and nature of the universe see *The New Design Argument and God* (Khatchadourian, 2016).

(1) It is clear I think that the construction and manipulation of purely formal, un-interpreted logical calculi can be undertaken without appeal to ordinary (“natural”) language; and certainly without starting with ordinary language and its conceptual analysis. But the application of formal logic to everyday pieces of reasoning does require an understanding of the nature of relevant ordinary concepts. Similarly, the elaboration of a logical theory that, among other things, attempts to determine the exact nature of logic and its relation to (a) science, (b) to philosophical inquiry and to (c) ordinary discourse, requires no appeal to ordinary language and to analyses of it, whether as a starting-point or no, as far as (a) is concerned. On the other hand, it is necessary to appeal to them in relation to (c). For without some knowledge of the nature and articulation of ordinary discourse in all its bewildering complexity, it becomes impossible to discern the relation of formal calculi to it. Finally, if it is true that philosophical inquiry respecting specific issues and concepts should properly start with the analysis of ordinary language, some analytical knowledge of it is necessary for a correct and adequate understanding of the relation of logic to philosophical inquiry. But an understanding of the method of semantic analysis is not arrived at by any semantic analysis of that method; though the nature of ordinary language is discoverable through the conceptual, semantic analysis of ordinary language. It does not follow from this – and it is also not true – that ordinary language and its analysis constituted the, or even, a – the proper starting-point of any attempt to trace the relation of formal logic to philosophical inquiry, using ‘philosophical inquiry’ as against ‘metaphilosophical inquiry.’ For the tracing of the relation of logic to philosophical inquiry lies in

meta-logic and meta-philosophy. The analysis of ordinary language is therefore necessary but not sufficient for it. We also need an analysis of formal logic itself: and that is not semantic analysis for the simple reason that formal logic is not ordinary language in any ordinary, unextended sense of ‘ordinary language.’ The situation is different with respect to so-called “informal logic,” the logic of ordinary language. There the logical structure of ordinary language<sup>7</sup> itself is the object of inquiry; and that is discoverable only by an analysis of ordinary language. So, an understanding of “informal logic” needs to start off if not also end up with the analysis of ordinary language.

The situation is similar in the case of the branches of philosophy enumerated under (2) earlier. Since the subject-matter of inquiry is each case something other than either philosophy or ordinary language, though ordinary language is part of that subject-matter in some instances, the latter cannot be necessarily taken as the proper or even as an actual starting-point in sense (b). Nevertheless, for a complete understanding of some of these disciplines, semantic analysis is possible and useful, nay indispensable. But it would be arbitrary to maintain that such analysis must be taken as the *starting-point*. There is a language of religion, a language of politics, a language of economics, and, similarly, of law. Insofar as that is so semantic analysis is perfectly applicable to them. But the language of politics or econom-

ics or law is by no means the whole of political *science*, of the *science* of economics, and so on. In addition, there exist the political, economic, or legal practices of individuals and groups, that form part of the subject-matter of economic, political or legal philosophy. In the case of religion, too, we have the various practices in Wittgenstein’s sense that form part of the subject-matter of the philosophy of religion.

Finally, the analysis of language, both ordinary and technical, forms without doubt an important part of any thorough attempt to understand the activities we call learning and teaching: of linguistic communication in general. But the kind of analysis relevant to them is mainly if not wholly scientific analysis: psychological, sociological, philological, and the like. In addition, it seems to me that the analysis of language, whether scientific or philosophical, does not form part of the Philosophy of Education. Semantic analysis of applicable, however, to the language Education as a discipline itself employs. But since that language is becoming increasingly technical, its analysis falls outside the scope of ordinary language analysis.

Semantic, conceptual analysis is applicable to the language of mathematics. But that language is almost wholly technical, and so lies almost completely outside the scope of ordinary language.

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<sup>7</sup> The logical structure of ordinary language must be distinguished from the grammatical structure, e.g., of sentences the particular language, elaborated by grammarians. During the time I myself taught English grammar, I found that sentence-analysis in English grammar textbooks is not always in line with the logical analysis. In other words, one cannot teach English grammar using logical analysis of sentences. Whether that is also true of other languages I do not know.



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ON THE COMPLEX EMOTION:  
 BE PHYSIOLOGICAL, COGNITIVE OR SITUATED?\*

Abstract

The topic emotion in traditional philosophy is discussed fragmentarily. And in recent years, there are two important approaches to analyze emotions, namely neo-Jamesianism and cognitive theory of emotion. Neo-Jamesians identify emotions with states of bodily arousal, which is determined by the nerve and occurs because of the feelings of bodily changes. And the cognitivists identify emotions with representations of evaluative judgments, which is regarded as propositional content accepted or affirmed by their subjects. Besides, the situated theory suggests we should expand our attention to the cultural and social environment in which emotions are moulded.

*Keywords:* emotion; cognition.

Humankind has been tirelessly seeking for the certain knowledge about the world, society and human being by itself since classical period. In ancient Greece, philosophers put forward different hypotheses in which the world is made of something, such as Thales' water, Anaximander's apeiron, Anaximenes' air, Heraclitus' fire, Democritus' atom, Pythagoras' numbers. Different from those predecessors, Aristotle focuses on human thinking modes, such as propositions, judgments and ratiocination, tries to summarize the rules of deduction and form a universal model in order to provide reliable tools for certain knowledge. Anyways, Ontological introspection did not resolve the debate and not supply the reliability of knowledge until early modern period.

Francis Bacon resorts to the experimental methods and induction to seek for the general rules from individual fact, by which he believes that man can acquire universal knowledge. In order to resolve the ontological debate, Descartes attempts to find the only solid foundation of the existence of the world by transferring the focus from *what is the world* to *how do we know the world*, as a result, he brings an epistemological turn which urges seeking for the knowledge outwards. In the early of last century, the philosophers began to analyze language in order to clarify the ambiguity of daily language and resolve the philosophical questions, by which some new methodologies for knowledge emerged. In recent years, mind as thinking structure of language has become a new hot topic. Then some other topics related to mind, such as cognition and emotion, are increasingly in the spotlight.

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Plato writes in *Theaetetus* that philosophy begins with the Wonder; Aristotle also asserts the same in *Metaphysics*. Wonder is an emotion; thinking about the essence of the world and pursuing certain knowledge, both are original task of philosophy. The two sages have been keenly aware of the stimulating effects of emotion on cognitive activities. So, what an emotion is, how emotion functions in activities of cognition and the relationship between emotion and cognition, etc., many questions need to be discussed.

### Emotion in Traditional Philosophy

The philosophical discussion on emotion can be traced back to Plato's division of the soul into three parts: reason, passion and desire. In Plato's view, the part of the soul for thinking and inference is reason, the part for perceiving anger is passion, and the turbulent and irrational part for perceiving love, hungry and thirst is desire, which is accompanied by satisfaction and happiness (Plato, 2003, p. 418). Those three parts of the soul correspond to the three virtues of wisdom, bravery, and temperance. The soul can be in harmony if reason is to maintain wisdom, passion is to achieve bravery and desire is to be tempered, and a person with that harmonious soul owns the virtue of justice and then can become a righteous person. In Aristotle's encyclopedic writing, there are also certain chapters to discuss emotions. In his *Rhetoric*, he defines emotion as that emotions include all moods that make people change their mind, make judgments and then give them distress or pleasure (Aristotle, 2005, p. 107). He argues that there are only two kind of the feeling of an emotion: pleasure or distress. Pleasure comes from innermost desires. The way to obtain the sense of pleasure comes from feelings about the present,

memories of the past and expectations of the future. The Stoicism discusses emotions from a negative perspective, and talk about various types of good or evil motives, desires and tendencies in the term *impulse*. The various impulses constitute different beliefs, and emotions, which are divided into four types: desire, worry, happiness and pain (other types of emotions, such as jealousy, regret and mourning, etc., are only their subsets), are the components of impulses (Graver, 2007).

Descartes believes that emotions which include feeling, perception, desires and beliefs, are produced by animal soul. Emotion is not only the feeling of the body, but also the experience of the soul. He thinks that there are six major passions: *surprise, love, hatred, desire, happiness and sadness*, and that other passions belong to those six passions (Descartes, 2015). Spinoza treats emotion as one of the forms of thought, and there are three basic emotions: happiness, pain and desire, and other emotions are combined or derived from those three types (Spinoza, 1997). Hume regards emotion as one of the three basic roles of human nature and argues that the main motive force of human mind comes from happiness or pain, and that emotions fundamentally are derived from the body's happiness and pain, which produce desires and will and then make mind has prone or offensive activities. Hume further discusses from emotions to morality, and thinks that emotion is the true essence of human social existence and morality (Hume, 2015). Under the influence of Hume, Kant also divide human nature into three aspects: cognitive ability, emotional ability, and orectic ability. Kant believes that basic emotions has two types: the happy emotion and the unpleasant emotion, which origin from the pleasant or painful feelings of the body, and which

respectively contain two types: perceptual and intellectual emotions, in which the perceptual emotion is expressed through the body or imagination and intellectual emotion is achieved through the manifested concept or idea (Kant, 2005).

Some of above arguments of emotions agree with that, to some extent, emotion has cognitive ability. The argument that emotion has cognitive ability can be traced back to those of Aristotle and the Stoicism. Aristotle points out that emotions can make people change their opinions and make different judgments. He thinks there are three indispensable conditions for triggering certain emotion: the first is the mood before the occurrence of certain emotions, the second is the object that an emotion refers to, and the third is the cause of an emotion (Aristotle, 2005). Aristotle's definition of the condition of triggering an emotion, which is early version of intentional analysis of the content of an emotion, is quite insightful. The Stoicism regards emotion as a mixture of various types of good or evil motives, desires, tendencies, or beliefs, whose intentional object has certain qualities of good or evil, or is composed of beliefs lacking certain knowledge. The Stoicism's emotion theory has a strong cognitive colour, we can find that the stoicism treats emotions as the types of judgments and considers that each emotion is essentially a judgment about the current or potential state of affairs. Seneca and Chrysippus, for example, believe that emotion is a judgment about the world and about the state of man in the world. In their opinion, the world in which people lived has been out of their control and out of their expectation. Through emotions, they could intensify their actual feelings and expectation to the world and be released spiritually. But it is very difficult to finally get rid of the tragic situa-

tions; emotions can only provisionally delay misfortune and setbacks. Therefore, emotions are just judgments with false concept. In the view of the Stoicism, emotions are generated with purpose and they have propositional contents which always expresses certain objects carries a certain kind of affirmation or belittling of value. So emotions have a corresponding effect on behavior. The Stoicism discusses some of the judgments that constitute some emotions, such as anger in moral judgments, the fragility of love, and anxiety about the feel of self-centered security (Graver, 2007). Spinoza is considered to be a modern version of the Stoicism. He tends to think that emotion has cognitive function and regards emotion as a form of thought that makes us painful and frustrated (this is similar to the Stoicism); The nature of mind consists of the correct idea and the incorrect idea (Spinoza also called the clear concept and the confusing concept), the correct concept, which is associated with active emotions, leads to the initiative of mind. And incorrect ideas induce the passiveness of mind, which is associated with the passive emotion (Spinoza, 1997, pp. 104-105). Most emotions, which are based on incorrect idea and bring people pain, depression and weakness, are passive reactions to the world's expectations. Active emotions are based on correct concept, show the true nature and enhance people's power of understanding.

#### Is Emotion Physiological or Cognitive?

In the past 40 years, emotion has increasingly been discussed with the study on mind and cognition. Because of the different understanding about the nature of emotion, the relationship between emotion and cognition, and the role of emotion in cognitive activities, most

of the researchers stand on two major perspectives on emotion, which are neo-Jamesianism and cognitive theories of emotion.

Neo-Jamesians are strongly influenced by Darwin and William James, therefore accept Darwin's evolutionism and William James' assertion that emotions are the state of physical arousal and, to some extent, the opinion of the emotional commonality between man and animal. The research aim of Neo-Jamesianism is mainly the origins of emotions and it is supported by some neuroscientists and psychologists. Neo-Jamesianism appropriately explains the debates whether animals and infants have emotions, but there are some theoretical contradictions in it. At first, neo-Jamesians regard each emotion as the feeling or reaction when a series of specific behaviors and physical changes occur, so emotion would be unconscious, but it is seemingly impossible that one can unconsciously feel the physical changes. Secondly, intentionality is generally considered as the core element of an emotion which always refers to an object, neo-Jamesians actually does not deny the intentionality of emotion, different from their predecessor William James in this respect, but they potentially deny the intentionality of emotion because they think of emotion as only the by-product of bodily change. In addition, as far as the intentionality of emotion, an emotion always refers to an external object rather than physical state while the object of the feeling of physical changes refers to the physical state, so how can we identify an emotion with the feeling of physical change?

The cognitive theories of emotion are opposite with neo-Jamesianism. The theories, here we are talking about, are not from a unified school but a group with a broader class of similar cognitive emotion theories, which include

those from Nico Frijda, Richard Lazarus in psychology, Robert Solomon, Mathar Nussbaum, Peter Goldie, Ronald De Sousa, Patricia Green-span, Michael Stocker in philosophy, and some other scholars in different fields. The cognitive theories of emotion inherit and develop Aristotle's and stoicism's view that emotion may be a judgment, and some standpoints even origin from Wittgenstein and existentialism. The cognitivists agree that emotions are rational and that there is an evaluative judgment or appraisive belief in each emotion, in other words, emotions are the cognitive state with some propositional contents. The occurrence of an emotion means one accepts some belief with specific propositional contents, even, confirms a decision or makes a choice. Thus, for the subject, emotions are controllable.

Emotions are also the intentional state of the mind. In the cognitive emotion theories, the intentionality of an emotion plays an important role, it means that an emotion is always refers to something in the world and each emotion is always the emotion involves something specific, and that the physiological feeling without intentional content is meaningless. Therefore, the cognitivists do not discuss the feelings merely related to physical change and remove the feelings from emotions. Correspondingly, emotions are outward-facing and there are always some outward signs or physical appearances with an emotion, which are externally perceptible.

The cognitive emotion theories inquire into the property and meaning of emotions. In the theories, the pattern of the occurrence of emotions is different with that of neo-Jamesianism. One encounters the outside stimuli, which trigger certain beliefs or judgments, and then an emotion happens, after that, the corresponding external physical signs and facial expression,

which even company with action, appear. For example, when someone encounters a Komodo dragon, at first he realizes that it is dangerous, and then he feels the emotion *fear* with the trembling in his legs, finally he runs away.

Although the members of cognitive camp do not have same academic interest, the researchers who are labeled as cognitivists nearly all agree that the appraisive judgment, by whose content the intentionality of an emotion is explained and the meaning of an emotion is understood well, is the basic necessary element of an emotion; the cognitivists try to explain the intentional content of an emotion with generalized, succinct and universal judgments. The trigger of an emotion, whose process includes the subject of an emotion, the intentional object, the intentional content and the situation the subject is faced with, finally should be attributed to the appraisive judgments.

Now let us focus on the emotion *sympathy*. For example, Wang's neighbour has a car accident and he is seriously injured; Wang thinks that the undeserved misfortune should not fall on his neighbour. In this case, the referred object is the neighbour who has suffered the car accident and is injured, and the content of the proposition is that:

- A. a kind man should be blessed.
- B. the neighbour is a kind man.
- C. the neighbour should be blessed / the neighbour should not be given the misfortune.

After Wang comes to the conclusion in his mind with the abovementioned syllogism, the emotion *sympathy* occurs. Here, we may discuss more. How does the subject come to the conclusion whether someone deserves misfortune or not? It depends on how much knowledge of the person who suffers misfortune the

subject has and also depends on the social and cultural environment in which an emotion is generated. In this case, the unfortunate neighbour is a kind person, so Wang is very easy to believe that his neighbour does not deserve the misfortune and then realizes the emotion *sympathy*. Suppose the neighbour would be an evil person and get along bad with Wangs, then Wang would have the emotion *gloating* rather than *sympathy*. Suppose the kind neighbour suffers the undeserved misfortune, but it would happen during war time and there would be many persons died every day. In this case, would Wang still has the same judgments so that he would feel the emotion sympathy for his pitiful neighbour while he and other persons would experience their friends, relatives even family members died? In addition, the important factor namely the subject should take into consideration. If different subjects feel the same emotion, are there the same bases and reasons with those judgments which trigger the same emotion? That is debatable. Anyway, even though different subjects feel a same emotion, the contents of their appraisive judgments in an emotion may be completely different. In the same way, encountering a same event in different situations, the caused emotion may be different. In general, though the cognitivists put forward their own arguments, they have the same standpoint that there are appraisive judgments as basic element with each emotion.

In accordance with to which extent the cognitive theories stand for the basic view that emotion is cognitive, the camp is regarded as two subset which are those with strong cognitive perspective (such as Robert Solomon, Martha Nussbaum, etc.) and those with weak cognitive perspective (such as Peter Goldie, Ronald De Sousa, Michael Stocker, Patricia Greenspan,

etc.) Robert Solomon developed the cognitive theory of emotion, in which he thinks that emotions are rational and emotions involve cognitive activity controlled by the subject or based on the choice of the subject (Solomon, 1993, pp. 125-131, pp. 309-310); He earlier argues the idea that emotions are evaluative judgments (Solomon, 1988). Martha Nussbaum analyzes a series of the structures of emotions (such as sympathy, love and anger). She believes that emotions are not repulsive forces and not purely spiritual impulses, but include intentionality, evaluation and beliefs which are the core element of emotions as cognitive contents and can cause the changes of emotions (Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 19-88). Richard Lazarus pays attention to emotions and stress, and their relationship with cognition; he classifies the moral appraisals in the different emotions as five core related themes: anger, fear, sadness, disgust, and happiness, with which the function of emotions and their eliciting conditions can be analyzed (Lazarus, 1991). Peter Goldie believes that the operating mechanism of emotion is over-rationalized; he places emotions in the context of consciousness, feeling and imagination, discusses the role of culture and evolution in the development of the capabilities of human emotions (Goldie, 2002). Patricia Greenspan discusses emotion and practical reason, argues that emotions provide an essential basis for choices and behaviors. She does not oppose the view from evolutionism, thinks that the self-reaction of emotion and the ability of human being accurately distinguishing different emotions are based on evolutionary development. She also thinks that emotions can express evaluative judgments with the contents and attitude of propositions (Greenspan, 1993). Jon Elster explains emotions with rational choice theory, and

reveals that cognition, choice and rationality are weakened by the natural material process that forms the basis of emotions and desires (Elster, 2012). Ronald De Sousa also pays attention to the rationality of emotion and the cognitive component of emotions. He thinks that emotion is a kind of perception and plays a key role in beliefs, desires and decisions (De Sousa, 1990). Michael Stocker studies emotions from the perspective of ethics, moral psychology and psychoanalysis. He places emotions at the center of identity, life and value, and emphasizes the importance of social and emotional context for solving ethical dilemmas and conflicts (Stocker & Hegeman, 1996).

Cognitive theories of emotion persuasively demonstrate the cognitive ability of human's emotions, but there are still some questions with emotions needing further discussion. Firstly, the capacity of emotions of animals and infants is not resolved well in cognitive theories. As their arguments, each emotion contains corresponding evaluative judgments as its contents of intentionality. That means making appraisive judgments requires the ability of mind, but the possibility that animals can make appraisive judgments has been excluded in according to the requirement of the content of intentionality of emotions in the cognitive theories (The Stoicism and Descartes directly deny that animals have the ability of mind), therefore animals do not have the ability of emotions. As similar as animals' deficiency, infants do not have self-awareness nor the abilities of linguistic and thinking yet, so they can't make evaluative judgments in infancy. Reasonably, we can infer that infants do not have the ability of emotions. But these conclusions are not consistent with our daily experience; anyway, neo-Jamesianism's explanation about this topic is

more rational.

The second query is that sometimes an emotion is triggered without sufficient or corresponding appraisive judgments as the contents of an emotion. Why does it happen? Let us go back to the case of encountering a Komodo dragon, now the Komodo dragon is locked in a firm building with thick concrete ceiling, walls and one transparent anti-collision glass curtain wall only in the front side for observing. When the visitors look at the monster face-to-face across the glass curtain wall, they believe (or judge) that they are absolutely safe and there is no any danger. Logically, the emotion *fear* should not be triggered in terms of the cognitive view that the contents of evaluative judgments are the triggering causes for an emotion. But disappointedly, most of the visitors still feel the emotion *fear*.

In order to remedy the above problems, some cognitivists try to relax the criterion of the content of intentionality in an emotion and accept perception without judgments or belief as the basic causing factor of an emotion. That is indeed tricky, because perception also involves cognitive activities while it does not contain the contents with judgments or belief, which are not necessary nor inevitable. After that theoretical adjustment, the ability of emotions of animals and infants is explained well. Whether the change can resolve the query that an emotion is triggered without sufficient or corresponding appraisive judgments as the contents of an emotion? However, it is a little doubtful, because perception has only limited cognitive functions and relatively narrow cognitive scope, for example, perception cannot reach to those cognitive activities involved judgments, deduction or thinking, etc., and the perceived contents are often too insufficient to trigger an emotion. It is

inadvisable if one insists that the emotional effects of perception are completely equivalent to those of emotions caused by appraisive judgments, because that means we impose the contents of judgments on perception. In the example of Komodo dragon, It is not impossible that on the one hand a visitor makes the conclusion with the judgment (or believes) that he is absolutely safe when he look at the gigantic lizard across the thick anti-collision glass curtain wall, on the other hand he would *perceive* the view that the monster is dangerous and then experience the emotion *fear*, because one can perceive the shape, the location and the distance of the lizard, but he cannot *perceive* that the monster is dangerous; if he has already realized the danger of the gigantic lizard, actually he has reached to the cognitive level with judgments and reasoning and has made a conclusion. Anyway, it is back to the starting point of the problem, the replacement of evaluative judgment with perception has not been fully successful.

In addition, the cognitivists neglect another question: Do the evaluative judgments as the contents of an emotion occur because of the emotion by itself, or are they thoroughly another cognitive activity in company with an emotion? If the evaluative judgments are only the result of other cognitive activities in accompany with an emotion, then it is difficult to explain that emotions have cognitive function. And if the judgments are generated directly because of emotions by themselves, then that may result in the debate of human *is* and *ought* (factual proposition and value proposition); we could ask, whether or how does the actual state of the involved object lead to the evaluative judgments when a person faces an object? If the involved object has never existed in the world before, and humankind has no any



knowledge about it, how can the person infer the evaluative judgments as the contents of emotions merely from its existence of the newcomer? What we discussed just now is related to the foundation of the cognitive emotion theories, but the cognitivists have not demonstrated about that theme further.

In recent years, other scholars, such as Andrea Scarantino and Paul Griffiths, propose the situated theory of emotion. They argue that emotions, which are triggered by the appraisive judgments as cognitive contents, have biological and genetic basis, and that social culture also plays an important role in the formation and development of emotions. And they suggest that we should expand the study of emotions to more fields, besides the research of neural network and conceptual thought, we should especially concern ourselves with the social and cultural environments in which emotions are moulded (Griffiths & Scarantino, 2008). Being situated shows the interaction between emotion and cognitive activities. The theory is a good complement to explain the cognitive ability of emotion.

### Conclusion

The discussion about the cognitive ability of emotion in traditional philosophy is fragmentary, there are only a few of terms and rough analysis. Neo-Jamesianism thinks physiological conditions determine emotions, and denies that emotion has cognitive ability. The cognitive theories of emotion advocate that emotion origins from evaluative judgment which is the result of cognitive activity. It is laudable that cognitivists support rationality of emotion and the ability of cognition of emotion. And the theories can meet most of the daily emotional experi-

ence. But cognitive theories cannot well explain the capacities of emotions of all animals and infants. Also, sometimes the evaluative judgment in an emotion is not related to the trigger of an emotion. I agree with their assertion that emotion has cognitive ability, and also think simultaneously that the basic framework of an emotion is physiological and genetic but the content of an emotion is cognitive.

From the ontological angle, we can find that experiencing is the most essential activity of human beings, cognition as the unfolded understanding and emotion as the fulfillment of attitude to action are just different ways of experiencing. One person is always interacting with the nature, other persons and the self, which together provide a complex context in an interwoven way, so he always experiences everything around him or in him and even he becomes a part of being situated. He is constantly in cognitive activities, certain emotional state, and different actions. Understanding with cognition, appearing with emotion and acting with action, they function together in the context of the embedded interaction between the nature, society and self.

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## BIDIRECTIONAL INTERACTION: PREREQUISITE KNOWLEDGE AND QUANTUM THEORY

### Abstract

The generation of any kind of theory cannot be separated from its specific social background, and it will certainly be marked by the era. Social factors restrict the existence and development of scientific theory and these factors do not directly affect scientific theory. Their influence on the production and development of scientific theory is realized through the intermediary of prerequisite knowledge. This paper aims to analyze the two-way interaction between knowledge of premises and quantum theory in the process of development of quantum theory from “classical” to “semi-classical” to “Non-Classical”. Therefore, it points out how to break the shackles of the original “premise knowledge” in a timely and conscious manner, and how to construct its exploration of scientific work with the most appropriate background knowledge.

*Keywords:* premise knowledge, quantum mechanics, scientific dynamics, bidirectional Interaction.

The essence and core of the study of philosophy of science is scientific dynamics, and its process takes place and is constrained by the specific sociocultural context. In any reasonable sense, the premise knowledge is the background of a preset belief. Although scholars have different interpretations of premise knowledge, from the perspective of epistemology, scholars are basically consistent with the essence of premise knowledge.

### 1. The Analysis of Premise Knowledge and its Structure

The core of the premise knowledge structure is the world outlook, and the scientific revolution is essentially the transformation or

change of world outlook.

#### 1.1. Ontological Level

Under the Marxist scientific dynamics program, the major changes in the history of science are also regarded as fundamental changes in the view of nature. Proceeding from historical materialism, it must be the society that decides the change of world outlook.

After the industrial revolution, the development of productivity requires understanding the microscopic structure of matter. Understanding the microscopic structure of atoms exposed people to a completely new world, shaking the emotional foundation of the traditional world picture, and forcing people to look

at the objective world in a new way. The mechanical view of nature since Newton has been broken. Absolute space-time, indivisible material minimum units, constant quality, Laplacian mechanical determinism have all been fatally challenged. Relative, hierarchical, and statistical concepts have become the basis of the new concept of nature.

### 1.2. Epistemological Level

The epistemology of the new era tends to be based on rationalism and is supplemented by intuitive epiphany. On the one hand, the construction and experimental design of the hypothesis are guided by a clear concept; On the other hand, this idea is closely related to the researcher's intuitive choice of natural ontological picture.

For such cutting-edge scientific research cases as quantum theory, we need to pay attention to the following issues:

First, knowledge of premises is a “mixture”.

On the one hand, it is not a so-called “theory” in terms of the internal structure and composition of premise knowledge. Because, in a large number of scientific experimental cases, these premise knowledge can hardly be consistent with each other; On the other hand, knowledge of premises is not the scientific whole that has been provided. As a background of presupposition belief, premise knowledge plays a specific and limited role in a series of assumptions, the implementation of scientific activities, and scientific interpretation of scientific research.

Second, knowledge of premises is by no means “anything”. Admittedly, there is often room for debate about the relevance of certain background elements, but “the background be-

lief is by no means loaded with some kind of arbitrary theme,” and it is definitely not “anything at all”. On the contrary, in most cases of scientific background, there is a lack of choice and few alternatives.

### 1.3. Axiology Level

The scientific community of society is always in a certain socio-economic and political relationship, and the values of society inevitably limit the perspective of these communities and their members.

In the summer of 1918, German physicists, like the rest of the German public, still confidently expected Germany to win the war, and the public praised their achievements. Thanks to Germany's advanced industrial technology and the economic and military power that industry guarantees, their value is supreme and even arrogant in the public eye. However, at the end of 1918, Germany's completely unexpected military failure and industrial collapse brought about a major change in public attitudes and even a campaign against industrial idols.

Scientists find themselves facing a dramatic scale of public value. With the end of the war and the arrival of peace orders, the belief of the rational world has been shaken, and people are looking for ways to help themselves in an irrational world order. Endorsement of irrationality and mysticism has become the main ideological feature after the war. This new trend of thought is mainly emphasizing living bodies rather than machinery. The concept of value, goal, and purpose replaces the mechanical causality law. In this way, a general sense of crisis has formed in the German academic community. This is a crisis of morality and culture, a crisis of science and learning. Human free will,

self-desire, and psychological desire have become the primary starting point. This kind of value orientation inevitably leads to the rejection of mechanical determinism and metaphysical causality. In short, these external influences lead physicists naturally to “non-causal” quantum mechanics.

## 2. The Development of Quantum Theory and its Relationship with Prerequisite Knowledge

We can roughly divide the establishment process of quantum theory into three stages: The first stage is the proposal of quantum concepts and their application in solving certain specific problems, approximately from Planck proposing quantum concepts to Bohr establishing an atomic model; In the second stage, on the basis of classical theory, quantum concepts are introduced, microscopic physical models are constructed, and on the basis of this model, semi-classical theories are established. This process is approximately from Bohr's proposed atomic model to De Broglie's proposed material wave concept. Before, in the third stage, quantum mechanics was established and perfected in mathematical form and physical interpretation, from about 1923 to 1927. We can call the first stage “classic stage”, the second stage as semi-classical stage, and the third stage as “Non-Classical stage”.

### 2.1. Classic Stage

The development of physics has roughly gone through three major stages. That is, ancient physics, classical physics and modern physics. From one stage to another, major revolutionary changes have taken place. The basic

characteristics of ancient physics are intuition and speculation. The basic form is a description of phenomena and empirical nature. It is basically subordinate to speculative natural philosophy. Classical physics has three pillars, namely classical mechanics, classical thermodynamics (including statistical physics) and classical electromagnetic theory. The classical mechanics – laid down by Galileo and Newton – began with the negation of Aristotle's mechanical point of view. It is the first mature scientific theory system established by modern natural sciences. It is also the general theoretical concept and scientific method concept of modern natural sciences. Classical thermodynamics and statistical physics introduced the concept of irreversibility and statistical concepts into physics, while classical electromagnetic theory further aroused the concept of field. However, their theoretical basis is still the general concept of classical mechanics. Therefore, when analyzing the basic assumptions and basic characteristics of classical physics, we naturally take classical mechanics as a sample.

### *First, the Basic Characteristics of Classical Mechanics*

We can summarize the basic features contained in classical mechanics as follows: the simple assumption of the world; The invariable assumption of the nature of matter; Mechanic characteristics; The universal assumption of the law of mechanics; Basic law deterministic characteristics; Decisive assumptions of time and space; The separation and intuitive reflection of human and nature; The cognitive methods are mainly analytical and experiential; The absolute objectivity of scientific theory. These

basic assumptions of classical mechanics reflect the level of development and general concepts of scientific understanding in that era, and basically represent the basic characteristics of the entire classical physics. This basic feature has a profound influence on the development of modern physics (only quantum theory is discussed here).

*Second, Planck Proposed the “Energy Quantum Hypothesis”*

The “quantum concept” was the beginning of the scientific revolution in the last century. However, Planck himself was not a conscious revolutionary. When he began this work, he did not intend to break through the classical theory. Even after the quantum concept was proposed for a long time, Planck himself did not fully realize the significance of this discovery, but only regarded the quantum concept as a computational expediency.

Planck's discovery process can be divided into two stages: Before October 19, 1900, Planck first defined the electromagnetic entropy on the basis of thermodynamics and electromagnetism, and deduced the consistent results with W. Wien's, but when he found that the Wien formula did not meet the experimental results, he took the two limit formulas  $\lambda T \rightarrow 0$  and  $\lambda T \rightarrow \infty$ . In order to eliminate the emission results, the mathematical interpolation method is used to find a new formula that is exactly in line with the experiment.

The new formula introduced by Planck seems to indicate that the oscillator can only contain discrete energy Quanta; but this result is so different from anything known in classical physics, Planck found it incredible because

of the deep-rooted classical view of nature. The only way out is to assume that when the material absorbs and emits radiation, the energy does not continuously change, but jumps at an integer multiple of a certain value. In the jump change, this inseparable minimum energy unit is called an energy quantum, with a value of  $h\nu$  ( $\nu$  is the frequency of the oscillator;  $h$ , as a quantum of action, is a universal constant).

This is the quantum hypothesis. It broke the long-held concept of “nature without jumping” and proclaimed the birth of quantum theory. The growth of the quantum hypothesis was not smooth, and the physics community responded coldly. They only recognized the Planck formula but opposed the Planck hypothesis. J. W. S. Rayleigh, H. A. Lorentz and other famous physicists at the time almost did not admit it. Even Planck himself felt that he was too bold.

Planck did not intend to break the classical theory, but only used the concept of “quantum” as a computational expediency. He believes that this is a helpless action that has been forced by the facts. In fact, he spent more than ten years in vain trying to pull his hypothesis back to the track of classical theory. The spark of quantum theory, although fortunately ignited by Planck, was almost extinguished by his own hands.

*Third, the Mutual Mapping of Quantum Concepts and German Reality*

Why did Planck regress after he proposed the epoch-making concept of energy quantum?

The deep reason lies in the fact that the quantum world and the real world in Weimar period constitute a kind of symbiotic mutual

appearance, or a mirror metaphorical relationship. According to classical physics, energy radiation is continuous and it propagates like a water wave. Therefore, Planck can only think that matter must absorb or release energy one by one; Outside of matter, energy propagation still conforms to Maxwell's electromagnetic theory, and it also travels continuously like a water wave (see Maxwell, 1855). This is essentially a compromise to classical theory. It is an incomplete quantum theory. And this compromise is actually a remnant of authority.

It can be said that Planck's radiation law is still a semi-empirical law. Only according to the Wien formula and the Rayley-Kings formula, according to the empirical curve of the experiment, the interpolation method "comes together". Since Planck has long been influenced by classical physics in concept, and is convinced of classical physics, he always uses classical physics as the standard in an attempt to incorporate quantum H into classical physics. It can be seen that although a new concept has emerged under the impetus of facts, it is only possible to break the shackles of premise knowledge and break through traditional ideas and grow up. It is only possible through the scientific ideological revolution ("paradigm shift").

## 2.2. Semi-Classical Stage

The first to apply quantum concepts to other problems was Einstein. His theory of light quantum successfully explained the phenomenon of photoelectric effects and brought the ancient problem of "the struggle of the nature of light" into a new stage, that is, the theory of "wave-particle duality of light". It gives people a further understanding of the nature of

light: light sometimes shows volatility, sometimes shows particle nature, and it is neither a classical particle nor a classical wave. It was Einstein's work that enabled quantum theory to develop in the first ten years.

In the summer of 1912, Boergrass wrote a memorandum discussing the structure of atoms and molecules, setting the electrons in the atom to move on the ring around the core, but he felt that classical mechanics could not determine the size of the ring and the cycle of electronic motion. In 1913 Bohr wrote the classic atomic structure paper. The main contribution of this paper is to propose quantization conditions and frequency formulas. And his principle of correspondence had a major influence on the development of later quantum theory. It is believed that the various studies that led to quantum mechanics between 1919 and 1925 can be regarded as a series of guesses guided by the corresponding principles.

## 2.3. Non-Classical Stage

### *First, the Material Wave of De Broglie*

Bohr's theory is based on the combination of classical mechanics of electronic motion and quantum conditions that are imposed on classical motion only in order to define the discrete States of the system. De Broglie started from Einstein's special theory of relativity. After thinking of particles as waves, he naturally explained the quantization conditions in the Bohr atomic model with the concept of standing waves that can be understood by classical theory. Each fixed state of the atom is equivalent to a kind of Debuluoyibo. In this way, the contradictions within Bohr's theory are eliminated. As a result, quantum conditions are associated with

wave-particle duality, and quantum conditions have always been an external factor in classical electrodynamics and are now an intrinsic and inevitable attribute. The concept of material waves pointed out by De Broglie was not based on any experimental basis at that time. It was completely derived from existing theories and rigorous and concise mathematical and logical reasoning. This is one of the main features of the new quantum theory, the scientific discovery of the quantum mechanics phase, which is different from the old quantum theory.

### *Second, Schrodinger Equation*

E. Schrodinger was inspired by De Broglie's original ideas. De Broglie describes microscopic particles with material waves, but has not yet used a wave function to establish a wave equation that represents the movement of microscopic particles. Therefore, Schrodinger tried to use the wave function to establish such an equation and make the quantization conditions in Bohr's theory a natural result of the solution of this equation. He started from the de Broglie formula, used W. R. Hamilton's classic wave equation and finally came to a wave equation reflecting the law of motion of three-dimensional free particles in 1926, the famous Schrodinger equation. The position of Schrodinger's equation in quantum mechanics, like Niudunfangcheng in classical mechanics and Maxwell's equation in classical electrodynamics reflects the basic laws of the movement of microscopic objects (see Maxwell, 1855). Before Schrodinger established the wave equation, Heisenberg set aside the concept of "orbit" in classical physics, started with considerable measurements, and established matrix mechanics with the help of Born and Jordan (see Heisenberg, 1985). Later,

after Dirac's improvement, it became a theoretical system with complete concept and logical consistency. This is a further departure from the classical theory, and it is also the most complete deviation. In March 1926, Schrodinger discovered that these two theories are mathematically equivalent. Since then, the two major theories have been collectively referred to as quantum mechanics.

### Conclusion

From the development of "classic" – "semi-classic" – "non-classic", we can see that before the quantum theory was proposed, people were in contact with the daily world. Various rational formalistic and sacred ideas about the "mysterious" world have been produced. It contains some vague intermediary but successful pre-control method. With the transformation of these driving methods and gradually becoming an exploratory method, the scientific tradition (quantum theory) that has been promoted and developed by these driving methods will emerge in the theory of competition and become a winner. However, this kind of premise knowledge is not completely determined, nor is it necessarily moving toward irreconcilability and relativism. Instead, it needs to construct its interpretation of scientific exploration work with the most appropriate background knowledge.

In summary, it is not difficult to find that "premise knowledge" is often expressed in a potential way as some normative binding principles, forming a thinking trend. Therefore, it is important and valuable how to break the shackles of the original "premise knowledge" in a timely and conscious manner and become a self-conscious revolutionary.



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SOCIAL, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

A NEW LINE OF RESEARCH:  
SYNERGETIC PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGY OF PERSONALITY

## Abstract

The research of the synergetic philosophy of history leads to a fundamentally new approach to the study of personality and rational understanding of the meaning of life. The heuristic role in the history synergetic philosophy is argued in the structuring of a new human philosophy in the context of the self-organization of man and mankind. It is this aspect that is specific to the synergetic philosophy of man.

*Keywords:* synergetic philosophy of history, meaning of life, ideal, value, fashion, personality, ideological society, consumer society, super attractor.

## Introduction

There are a number of studies in the theory of self-organizing systems both in the sphere of inanimate, animate nature and in a social sphere. The contribution of Professor M. S. Kagan occupies an important place in this area (1995).

In 1999 Saint-Petersburg State University saw the synergetic philosophy of history which was managed by Professor Branskij V. P. and which offered a new approach to self-organization (organization) in comparison with a traditional approach. This problem area is greatly contributed by the following scientists: H. Haken<sup>1</sup>, K. Maitser<sup>2</sup>, R. Robertson<sup>3</sup>, T. L. Fried-

man<sup>4</sup>. The development of the social synergetic is highly influenced also by the following scientists: G. G. Malinetskiy and, S. P. Kurdyumov<sup>5</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> See Haken, H. (1977). *Synergetics*. Stuttgart; Haken, H. (1983). *Advanced Synergetics*. Berlin; Haken, H., Kelso, J. A. S., & Bunz, H. H. (1985). A Theoretical Model of Phase Transitions in Human Hand Movements. *Biological Cybernetics*. 51; Haken, H. (1987). *Erfolgsgeheimnisse der Natur*. 4.

Aufl. Stuttgart; Haken, H. (1988). *Information and Self-organization*. Berlin; Haken, H. (1991). *Synergetic Computers and Cognition*. Berlin; Haken H., & Haken-Krell M. (1992). *Erfolgsgeheimnisse der Wamehmung*. Stuttgart; Haken, H. (1996). *Principles of Brain Functioning. A Synergetic Approach to Brain Activity, Behavior and Cognition*. Berlin.

<sup>2</sup> See Maitser, K. (2015). *Issleduya slozhnost': ot iskusstvennoy zhizni i iskusstvennogo intellekta k kiberfizicheskim sistemam* (Studying the Complexity: from an Artificial Life and an Artificial Intelligence to Cyberphysical Systems, in Russian). *Filosofiya nauki i tekhniki*, 20(2), 85–105. Ausburg.

<sup>3</sup> See Robertson, R. (1996). *Globalization. Social Theory and Global Culture*. London.

<sup>4</sup> See Friedman, T. L. (2000). *Understanding Globalization. The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. N.Y.

<sup>5</sup> See Malinetskiy, G. G., & Kurdyumov S. P. (2001). *Nelineynaya dinamika i problemy prognozy* (Non-linear Dynamics and Problems of Forecast, in Russian). *Vestnik RAN*, 71(3).

Ye. N. Knyazeva<sup>6</sup>, A. P. Nazaretyan<sup>7</sup>, V. V. Vasilkova<sup>8</sup>, V. P. Branskij and M. S. Kagan<sup>9</sup>, I. Prigozhin and I. Stengers<sup>10</sup>, G. Khaken<sup>11</sup>.

This approach is implemented in three aspects of understanding the notion of self-organization: ontological; gnoseological (epistemological) and axiological (that has not been considered so far).

This theory critically analyzes the traditional understanding and development of history. The notions of truth and ideal are central in development process. No highly scientific definition of an ideology as an overall theory of ideal is given.

### Methodological Framework

The general theory of self-organization for another reality (object, subject, subject-object) is the ground for the new methodology to study all types of these realities which differ from the traditional neo-positivist and post positivist methods of research.

<sup>6</sup> See Knyazeva, Ye. N., & Kurdyumov S. P. (2002). *Osnovaniya sinergetiki* (Grounds of Synergetics, in Russian). Moscow: Aleteyya.

<sup>7</sup> See Nazaretyan, A. P. (2001). *Tsivilizatsionnye krizisy v kontekste universalnoy istorii. Sinergetika, psikhologiya i futurologiya* (Civilized Crises in the Context of Universal History. Synergetics, Psychology and Futurology, in Russian). Moscow: PerSE.

<sup>8</sup> See Vasilkova, V. V. (2002). *Poryadok i khaos v razvitiy sotsial'nykh sistem. Sinergetika i teoriya sotsial'noy organizatsii* (Order and Chaos in Development of Social Systems. Synergetics and Theory of Social Organization, in Russian). Saint Petersburg: Lan.

<sup>9</sup> See Branskij, V. P., & Kagan, M. S. (1998). *Sinergetika i kul'turologiya* (Synergetics and Culture Studies, in Russian). Saint Petersburg: SPbGU.

<sup>10</sup> See Prigozhin, I., & Stengers, I. (1996). *Poryadok iz khaosa* (Order from Chaos, in Russian). Moscow: Progress.

<sup>11</sup> See Khaken, G. (2003). *Tainy prirody. Sinergetika: uchenie i vzaimodeystvie* (Secrets of Nature. Synergetics: Theory and Interaction, in Russian). Moscow-Izhevsk: In-t kompyuternykh issledovaniy.

### Results

- The notion of a global attractor (super attractor) which defines the meaning of life in comparison with the approaches of Camus and Chardin is introduced.
- A new conception of the meaning of life which can result in secularization of the problem is given.
- Understanding of life as a value in itself is supported by the arguments, and the statement about the fact that a synergetic approach to a human's essence is in understanding a human being as an ideological animal is justified.
- The statement about the fact that the value activity is based on the value targets is justified, and the synergetic theory of values which is grounded on the synergetic theory of ideology is the key to understand the value production.

The purpose of the present research is to study how the synergetic philosophy of history (SPH) (Branskij & Pozharskii, 2009) leads to a significantly new insight into the nature of personality. Another focus of attention of this paper is the traditional but hopelessly controversial issue with no rational solution – *the reason of individual human existence* (“the meaning of life”). The heuristic role of SPH in constructing a new philosophy of personality is explained by the link between the self-organization of the person and the self-organization of the humanity. The synergetic philosophy of personality (in comparison with the traditional philosophical anthropology) takes this link into account.

### Discussion

The authors differentiate an absolute ideal

(universal) from a relative ideal (particular human one) with a universal ideal being developed in their struggle. This process is potential and infinite in nature.

A hypothesis of a fundamental analogy between a relative truth and a development of the absolute truth (universal ideal) in the course of struggle of a relative ideal (particular human one) is put forward. This problem was carefully studied by Saint-Petersburg School of Social Synergetics, while no other scientists touched this issue so far.

### 1. The Problem of the “Meaning of Life” in the Context of the World History

Our task is, first of all, to refine the formulation of the issue, as the SPH concept requires, rather than to give an overview of its different interpretations. Here we should make four statements.

1. It is impossible to solve the problem of the meaning of life with the help of *metaphors*, no matter how expressively emotional they would seem to be. For example, a philosopher asserts that the purpose of human existence lies in “standing in the clearing of being” (Heidegger), although he expresses his own attitude to a problem with no rational solution. Nevertheless, from the scientific point of view the problem solution and the emotional attitude to it are quite different matters.
2. Most of the authors dealing with this issue reject the metaphorical approach and try to solve the problem with rational means (with clearly formulated concepts), and come to the following conclusion: in principle, the problem of the meaning of life cannot be solved within a coherent scien-

tific worldview; it can get a rational solution only when transferred from scientific to extra-scientific (religious) worldview. This type of reasoning can best be illustrated by the famous paper “Smyslzhizni” (“The meaning of life”) by S. L. Frank, a Russian philosopher (Frank, 1990, pp. 144-149). The key idea is formulated as follows. The life of a person within *natural* (material) reality is completely *meaningless* (“empirical meaninglessness of life”)<sup>12</sup>. But it can acquire a meaning (and a very deep one) with the postulation of the existence of *supernatural* (non-material, ideal, transcendental) reality, ministering to which defines “the meaning of life”. The key idea is that life of a human being within *natural* (material) reality is completely *meaningless* (“empirical meaningless of life”). But it can acquire meaning (and a very deep one), if one states the existence of *supernatural* (non-material, ideal, transcendent) reality which is defined as “the meaning of life”.

3. The specified difficulties have resulted in the secularization of the problem of the meaning of life: the problem solution is seen in serving the *progressive* development of the “natural reality”. At that, “progress” refers to such an irreversible qualitative change in social reality, where it changes “for the better” (the amount of material

<sup>12</sup> Together with the issue of the meaning of life, one can raise the question concerning the forms of its seeming *meaninglessness*. The history of the world culture has the following examples: (1) serving the absurd (Camus, 1990); (2) word play (Baudrillard, 2006) — the exchange of simulacra, that is, in simple words, idle talk; (3) spiritual suicide — forsaking any activity that keeps the connection of a person to the society (from ordinary hermitage to asceticism, from life in a cave to life in a coffin) and the last but not the least (4) physical suicide.

and “spiritual” wealth is gradually increasing, therefore people’s life conditions and their material and “spiritual” selves are improving). This classical concept of progress and the development of the idea of progress are described in the best way in the fundamental work “Progress: History of the idea” by R. Nisbet, an American sociologist (Nisbet, 1980).

It is easy to see that from the SPH viewpoint the “progressive” approach to the “meaning of life” problem has the following significant advantages in comparison with the two previous approaches (which can tentatively be named “personalistic” and “theological”). Unlike the personalistic approach, the idea of progress connects the meaning of individual life problem with the meaning of history problem. The idea of progress as the key to solve the problem of the meaning life assumes that it is completely *meaningless* to try to solve the problem of individual meaning of life *beyond the meaning of social history*.

4. The difficulties induced by all the above approaches gave the ground for the wide distribution and popularity of an old idea that one should not look for the meaning of individual life *outside* this life, since life is an *inherent value* (the Epicurus - LaMettrie line). So, the meaning of life is in life itself. Virtually, it means choosing such an activity that gives maximum pleasures with minimum sufferings. While the motto of the progressive approach to the problem is “Leave your trace in history”, then the epicurean (hedonistic) approach brings about another credo: “Live unnoticed and vanish without a trace”. If serving the supernatural reality or social progress is directed to-

wards the past and future, the hedonistic approach - towards the present only (“philosophy of everyday routine”).

## 2. Human Nature. Concept of an Ideological Animal

Let us now look at how the issue of human *existence* is connected with the issue of human *self*. In the light of what has been said above, the following is obvious: from the SPH viewpoint, these issues are interconnected and therefore the question about the “priority” of one of them has no sense (unlike what the philosophy of existentialism claims). The originality of the synergetic approach to human self lies in the fact that a man is an *ideological* animal. This means that a man is such animal, whose final motive of behavior (his, so to say, strategic target) is some *ideal*, and the final result is the implementation of this ideal, i.e. some *value*<sup>13</sup>.

Since the ideal is connected with such concepts as “belief” and “sacrifice”, it can suppress any instincts inherent to a healthy man as any healthy animal. If the ideal recedes into the background in its combat with instincts, the ideological animal turns into an instinctive animal, and thus loses his “human” nature (animalization of a person).

From the definition of the human being as an ideological animal, several very important corollaries follow. First of all, an ideological animal is inevitably an *axiological* animal since the procedure of implementing ideals (just what the synergetic theory of ideology states) results in the appearance of values. Let us emphasize

<sup>13</sup> In SPH value means *material embodiment of the pragmatic aspect of an ideal* (Branskij & Pozharskii, 2009, ch. I, § 2). A thing (for example, a picture), a person, a social institute, etc. can play the role of such an embodiment.

here that one should not mix up the concepts of “axiological” and “valuable”. A leopard, a fur seal or a bird of paradise are very valuable animals but this does not make them axiological, since they, having no ideals, produce not values but practical utilities. Often values are equated with “practical utility” (material objects, which meet some requirements). From the viewpoint of the synergetic theory of values (as a part of SPH), this should not be done, since the criterion of practical utility is a need, and the criterion of value is *ideal*. The need is not connected with the operation of *idealization*, and the ideal is the product of this operation. But such operation is inherent to human beings only. Due to this reason, practical utilities exist not only in society, but in nature, too; but values exist only in the society.

The second important corollary from the “ideological” approach to the essence of human being lies in the fact that all previous definitions of this essence are obtained automatically, as regular and necessary corollaries from this new definition. In the history of science and self-reflection of philosophy, language and labor have always been considered the fundamental parameters that characterize human essence. It is easy to understand that for the formation of even the most primitive ideal, not only the capability to reflect the external world (primary reflection), but also the capability to reflect the results of this primary reflection (secondary reflection or self-reflection) should be developed. Only in this case, it becomes possible to differentiate the truth and the ideal, and thus *separate the ideal from the truth*. To make this ideal *generally valuable* (inter-subjective, rather than only individual), a system of symbols is required designed for information exchange between different living creatures. And to move

on to the *realization* of this ideal, sophisticated labor is necessary aimed at production of not only goods, but also instruments of production.

Different systems of philosophical idealism have always emphasized the connection of human essence with the presence of “soul”. This term was used to designate the upper form of psyche, inherent to a man only and having a non-material character. From the viewpoint of scientific psychology, the soul of man is a *holistic* unity of different psychological components (perception, thinking, memory, imagination, etc.), which is *specific* for every given personality. The individual features of a personality show themselves in all its components and in the method of synthesis of these components. This holistic unity cannot exist without a material carrier. A no less *holistic* unity of brain cortex cells forming an intricate structure of the highest degree of complexity acts as such a carrier. As the holistic nature of brain psychological processes has, as its material carrier, the holistic nature of brain neural-physiological processes, one cannot identify psychological processes with physiological processes. The soul, showing its existence in the holistic nature of psychological processes, cannot be just identified with the holistic nature of physiological processes associated with its functioning: the holistic nature of physiological processes in a given brain is not a copy, but *a code* of the holistic nature of psychological processes; therefore, in case of identification of the *holistic* nature of psychological processes with the *holistic* nature of physiological processes, we equate information with information carrier, and this results in the so-called psycho-physiological paradox (absurd identification of two different objects)<sup>14</sup>. That is why

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<sup>14</sup> For example, if in our mind we imagine the Eiffel Tower and completely liken it with some configura-

the human “soul” seems to be some kind of volatile essence which, on the one hand, is likely to form a special non-material reality, and, on the other hand, it permanently eludes observation and, as any ultimately unobservable object, as though does not exist at all, except in the imagination of mystic-minded religious thinkers. So, human essence is closely connected with the presence of a higher form of psyche – human soul, which no other animal has. A deeper analysis of this concept shows that it has ambivalent (contradictory) nature. On the one hand, this concept includes some individual (original, unique) features of a personality. On the other hand, it reveals generally valuable (inter-subjective) nature of a personality (common features with other personalities). In practice, this nature shows itself in the fact that in the depth of the soul there is a “spirit” – a *generally valuable ideal* connecting this soul with other similar souls. Hence, the scientific understanding of such an overly mystified concept as “spirit” lies in its identification with the spiritual community of a variety of people with different souls. Contrary to the psyche of all other animals, the human psyche has a *spiritual* dimension, i.e. orientation (“intentionality” according to Husserl) to the realization of some ideal. Moreover, when the human psyche begins to lose this feature, a man becomes closer to ordinary animals. In short, in the soul of any true human being, like a nymph in a cocoon or a pearl in a shell, there is a certain “spirit”, which is not at all inconceivable or mysterious, since from the scientific point of view it represents none other than a social ideal. Its presence in the soul makes a man a socialized animal

(like ants and termites), but a socialized animal of quite another nature in comparison with ordinary animals, as the basis of the social environment, which a man forms, is an ideal rather than an instinct.

Now it becomes clear how insightful were the ancient philosophers (in particular, the Neo-Platonists), when they required to differentiate between “the soul” and “the spirit”.

Thus, the “ideological animal” concept is in fact an equivalent to the “spiritual animal” concept. In the latter, the conventional materialistic and idealistic approaches to human essence form a natural union, becoming free from the previous centuries-old antagonism. The outstanding difference of the “spiritual” animal from the ordinary (“spiritless”) animals lies in the fact that with soul (with “the spirit” “sleeping” in the inmost recesses of the soul) this animal acquires the *ability to think about the meaning of its existence*, which is completely alien to all other living creatures. It is clear from the above that (1) it is completely meaningless to oppose human existence to human essence, and moreover to discuss the issue on “primary” or “secondary” nature of either; (2) human essence (just like his existence) is revealed and completely disclosed only in his social *activity*. We can say nothing about the essence of an inactive personality; the same is about its existence (except that the latter in this case is no more than vegetation).

### 3. Axiological Activity of a Human Being and his Main Axiological Orientations<sup>15</sup>

Though the forms of activity in a developed society are immeasurably abundant, in

tion of macromolecules in the brain cells, then finally we liken the Eiffel Tower with this configuration.

<sup>15</sup> See Oganyan K. M., Branskij & Oganyan K. K., 2013; Oganyan K. M., 2015.



the context of the problem of the “meaning of life” all forms of activities can be grouped into three sets:

- *Production* of some values (reproductive or innovative creation). At that, one should distinguish between the production of utilitarian and spiritual values;
- *Consumption* of the produced valuables (in particular, consumer goods and everyday deeds);
- *Distribution* of values – material (delivery of valuables from manufacturer to consumer and back) or ideal (transfer of information on values from producer to consumer and back).

Hence, value distribution is a *communicative* activity which supposes *communication* between people. It is important to note that communication is meaningful only in case when it is connected with distribution (in one or another form) of some values – rational or emotional. Otherwise, communication turns into an idle talk depriving life of any meaning (“simulacrum” of life). The communicative activity has two forms. *Firstly*, this is propaganda of production of values, which supposes popularization of the ideals determining the formation of certain values. Such activity is usually called *campaign* in favor of the respective ideological aims (in case of religious aims such campaign is connected with such concepts as missionary activity, proselytism, etc.). *Secondly*, the communicative activity can have the form of propaganda of consumption of values. This is usually called advertising. If we talk about the propaganda of values which are products of our own creativity, then we deal with self-advertising.

Thus, if from the theoretical point of view the “life’s meaning” seems to be rather mysterious, in practice the problem is quite easily

solved: the “life’s meaning” of a common person is necessarily connected with the acquisition of *a value*; without it the life for such a person does not have and cannot have any meaning. Since the procedure of value acquisition can be of three types, the “life’s meaning” focuses on either the production (creation) of a value (what is typically called “creativity”), or its consumption (getting the maximum pleasure with minimum efforts), or its propaganda (campaign in favor of the production of a value and advertising in favor of its consumption). The communicative activity provides the interaction and link (including the feedback) between the creation of values and their consumption. Only providing the effective communication between the creator and the consumer, the results of the creative activity become *in demand* with a consumer.

Generally speaking “life’s meaning” for an active person is in such a combination of creation, distribution and consumption of values, where any counteraction against these values fails (this means that the creators of new values achieve complete *victory in self-fulfillment*, that is, not only in self-actualization, but also in self-assertion – public recognition of the new values).

However, one should not think that all active people hold to such a comprehensive approach to the “meaning of life”. In reality, there are significant differences among them regarding this issue. Some prefer to create values but do not attach importance to their distribution and consumption; some tend to consume values leaving their creation to others; the people of the third group are interested solely in the distribution of values and can be completely indifferent to the production and consumption of these values. Since the creation of values is a more diffi-

cult task than their distribution or consumption, in theory there can exist societies of two types: (1) with domination of value production (for our purposes let us call them “creative” or “*ideological*”); and (2) with domination of value consumption (they are typically called “welfare societies” or “*consumer societies*”). The level of life in the first type societies can be quite low, while for the societies of the second type it is very high. Such discrepancy in the level of life of the majority of population is explained by the necessity to save resources for value production and the absence of such necessity (all other conditions being equal) in case of value consumption.

#### 4. Regularities in Value Production and Ideological Self-Fluctuations. The Role of Ideal in Value Production<sup>16</sup>

The synergetic theory of values based on the synergetic theory of ideology is the key to understanding the production of values. This theory states that as the source of values serve ideals of various types, since a value orientation (value criterion), whose role is always played by the respective ideal, is required to create a value. Therefore, value creation (no matter whether a new or an old value) is the realization of a pragmatic aspect of some ideal. If we talk about the realization of an old value, we mean the realization of an archetype; and in this case creativity comes down to reproduction of old values. Here arises another question: what is the algorithm of the creative process of value creation in general? Can such an algorithm exist?

SPH claims that this algorithm can and

must exist, and it should be described by the theory of social selection. This theory states that the chaos created by the destruction of old values has the ability for self-organization resulting in creation of new values. The self-organization of an “axiological” chaos is facilitated by the so-called “creative baskets” forming within it through bifurcations, each representing a new possible bifurcation structure. A set of these “baskets” represents the *creative thesaurus* — a set of possible methods to structure a variety of “fragments” formed as a result of destruction and break-up of old values. An active creative personality takes the role of a *creative detector*, who chooses one of the baskets, and the ideal which determines the choice of this personality (looking for a truly new value in a variety of others) plays the role of a *creative selector*. If a group rather than a single person plays the role of detector, and the members of the group are guided by different (sometimes close and sometimes opposite) ideals, then the interaction (superposition) of these ideals plays the role of selector. We have considered a one-act creative process from the synergetic point of view — creation of a new value on the basis of existing resources. However, the global creative process consists of a variety of similar acts. From the viewpoint of the problem of the “meaning of life”, the main threat on the way of the creator is the danger to return to old values and endlessly repeat this process (the cycle of social transformations described by Balzac in his philosophical epilogue to the “The Human Comedy” series of novels). Life loses its meaning, if the creation of a *new* value is impossible either in the nearest future or in the long term.

The situation of the “squirrel wheel” (or, taking the words from the Bible, “*vanitas vanitatum*”) is complicated by the fact that this

<sup>16</sup> See Oganyan K. M., Branskij & Oganyan K. K., 2014, №1 (12), pp. 7-13; 2014, №2-3 (13), pp. 11-20; Oganyan K. M., 2011, pp. 107-112.

“wheel” is not rotating smoothly: it becomes stochastic in character due to many occasional modifications of values (axiological fluctuations). The circle of values is, so to say, distorted by fluctuations. What is valuable for some happens to be anti-values for others. In short, the cycle of values is saturated with axiological fluctuations, and these are auto-fluctuations, since they are not caused by some external (to the society) reasons. It is easy to notice that from the SPH viewpoint, the observed axiological auto-fluctuations are based on the directly non-observable *ideological auto-fluctuations*. The pursuit of the anarchist ideal (the cult of absolute freedom without any restrictions, ignoring the existence of a natural limit to any innovations) causes the reverse reaction in the form of the pursuit of the totalitarian ideal (the cult of absolute order excluding the possibility of free choice in solving any questions). The understanding of the one-sidedness of each trend results in searching for harmony that is the balance between these antitheses. The need for such harmony, which lies in the basis of any mature democracy, determines the content of the liberal ideal. This ideal is explained *ontologically* only in SPH: the unity of freedom and responsibility, rights and duties must come from the objective unity of social chaos and social order as attributes of social reality.

However, the balance between the pursuit of order and pursuit of chaos in many cases happens to be unstable, and the ideological auto-fluctuations are continued near the point of liberal balance. And again, distortions occur either towards the weakening of chaos and strengthening the order (right-center liberalism), or order weakening and chaos strengthening (left-center liberalism).

This picture of ideological auto-fluctuations (which are typical for any developed society) would be incomplete if we did not mention a very important feature of any social ideal – its connection with such philosophical concepts as *belief and sacrifice*. The synergetic theory of ideology states that ideological auto-fluctuations are connected with confrontations of various beliefs (both religious and secular), with conflicts emerging during the attempts to implement their respective ideals and make competition sacrifices on the altar of each faith (including property, job, freedom, health and even life). The real history inevitably leads to the *polarization* of values on the basis of the *struggle (conflict)* of ideals. This very *struggle* fills the social life (as it was repeatedly mentioned in the history of philosophy from Heraclitus to Marx<sup>17</sup>) with exceptionally *significant meaning*: on the one hand, it gives a very dramatic character to history and deprives it of any boredom, but on the other hand, it loads history with violence and tragedies, thus giving a bitter (sometimes ominous) taste.

In the course of this *struggle* all ideals are sooner or later destroyed (the same idea was expressed by Hegel, Spengler, Jaspers, Berdyaev and others). This destruction is accompanied with great losses and brutality. The supporters of any ruined ideal take its destruction as the greatest tragedy depriving their life of any meaning. On the contrary, the opponents to the ruined ideal feel deeply satisfied and triumphant. Since this happens only in a short run, and in the long term the same fate awaits their own ideals, their triumph comes to an end. Everyone begins to perceive the triumph of an ideal

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<sup>17</sup> Here we can just mention the famous answer of Marx to his daughter's questionnaire. His answer to the question “Your idea of happiness”, as is known, was “Fight”.

together with its future tragedy and gradually understand that the ideal is a double-edged sword.

Thus, the *ideological* society absorbed with the creation of new values and ideological *struggle* is involved into an ideological (“spiritual”) crisis. There comes tiredness from the confrontation of values and ideological *struggle*. All values are subjected to painful and cruel evaluation, reevaluation, and partial or even complete devaluation. The competition of sacrificial offerings in the name of the triumph of various ideals ultimately results in acute deficit of utilitarian values. The ideological boom finally finishes with a consumer riot (compare the state of various countries and peoples after large-scale wars and revolutions). People appear to be half-hungry, half-naked and with a half-roof over their heads.

##### 5. Regularities in Consumption of Values and Consumer Auto-Fluctuations. The Role of Fashion in Consumption of Values<sup>18</sup>

When the society reaches this state, the problem of biological survival arises: in this situation the majority of population does not think any more about ideals (as the proverb goes, “beggars cannot be choosers”). The described spiritual crisis makes the ideological society reconsider the definition of the meaning of life. Now the “meaning of life” is seen not in the production of some value intended for serving a particular ideal, but rather in simple *survival*. But it means that the “meaning of life” of a human being comes down to the “meaning of life” of an animal with the only difference that a human being realizes this meaning, but an animal does not.

It is widely known that the “meaning of life” of an individual is self-preservation, which supposes the presence of the instincts of a fear of death (thanatos) and family continuation (libido) – the reproductive instinct (self-continuation in future generations).

The reduction of “the meaning of life” to biological survival means a U-turn in solution of the existential problem: “the meaning of life” is now seen not in serving the ideal of life, but “*in life itself as life is an inherent value*” (the Epicurus – La Mettrie line). From the viewpoint of this philosophical aim, the meaning of life is not in the revolt (riot) against natural and societal rules (what is required by ideals with their ideology of transformation), but in such a way of following these rules that allows obtaining *maximum pleasures with minimum efforts* or *maximum pleasures with minimum sufferings*, with the use of ready values within the existing stereotype of the routine behavior. In simple words, “life’s meaning” comes down to achieving the maximum possible pleasure under these conditions, as there is nothing beyond this life. We should live in the present day, and not think about the future following the principle expressed by Goethe through Faust: “Beautiful moment, do not pass away!” (philosophy of everyday life). One should go with the tide but not against the tide; avoid any actions which can cause any difficulties with sacrifices and hardships. And the creation of new values and rejection of the developed stereotype of everyday behavior inevitably require such sacrifices and hardships (suffice it to recall the so-called torments of creation and torments of recognition).

So, as a result of the deep spiritual crisis experienced by the ideological society with its ideology of transformation and cult of ideal, there originates a tendency to the *de-ideologi-*

<sup>18</sup> See Oganyan K. M., 2011, pp. 107-112; Oganyan K. M., Saakyan, Pokrovskaya & Bakhshyan, 2012.

zation of social life at a particular stage of ideological auto-fluctuations. It is expressed in the global transition from transformation ideology to conformism ideology, from the ideology of reality *transformation* to the ideology of *adaptation* to this reality. In practice it is expressed in two scenarios: *rejection of ideals; transition from creating new values to the consumption of available values*.

Thus, there is a tendency towards transformation of ideological society into *consumption* society (“welfare society”). The rejection of ideals and struggle for “the bright future”, which are proclaimed by this society as a dangerous heritage of totalitarianism, can be interpreted as the only “ideal” for this society being the rejection of all ideals (Castells, 2000; Berlin, 2002 and others). According to SPH, the rejection of ideals is equivalent to the refusal of creating new values (and creativity as such). Hence the rejection of ideals must lead the consumer society to the replacement of the creativity cult for the consumption cult (which justifies its name).

The deep reason for transition from the creative to consumption society is the problem of new valuables *being in demand*.

Thus, the problem of “the meaning of life” can be solved in “the opposite way”: find its solution in the consumption of values rather than in the creation of them. This solution of the existential problem seems to be more attractive than the first one for many people – it is easier and simpler to consume than to create.

Fashion plays the same role of selector in consumption as ideal plays in value production. In the global (general) sense, fashion can be defined as a generalized image of the desired “consumer goods basket” which (under other equal conditions) guarantees maximum pleas-

ures with minimum efforts (in particular, sufferings). Thus, fashion is the selector which corresponds to the philosophical standard of life as an inherent value (the Epicurus - La Mettrie line) (Volodin, 2003, pp.259-303).

These features of fashion make its main function in the social life understandable: *fashion determines the style and taste in value consumption* in the same way as ideal determines the style and taste in value production.

Seeing higher “meaning of life” in *consumption of utilitarian values* results in what is usually called the *cult of routine life* (the cult of “everyday life” in contrast to the cult of the past or future). This philosophy<sup>19</sup> likens life to a sentimental pop song (“the song of a minute”). The cult of everyday life in the consumption society shows itself mainly in the following forms:

- the cult of ready-made goods (food and drink, clothes, interior and exterior, furniture, hygiene, transportation, communication, etc.);
- the cult of everyday activities (mainly, rest and entertainment: domestic and international tourism, games of different types, TV series, TV talk-shows, sex, dances, etc.).

In the cult of everyday things, a special place is taken by the cult of clothes (salons of high fashion – *haute couture*) and in the cult of entertainment – by the cult of various games, which are permanently developing due to the upgrading of old and creation of new games (computer games, etc.). As the system of more and more complicated and expensive games

<sup>19</sup> This philosophy is sometimes called the “philosophy of petty bourgeoisie” (“philosophy of a modern philistine”). The so-called consumption cynicism is connected with it – the belief in the hypocritical nature of any talks about the priority of spiritual values, “such ideas only come from losers in the consumption sphere”.

acquires the system of empathy to game participants (the development of fan institute), the cult of game in a developed consumer society becomes similar to a ritual accompanying different ideals in ideological societies. So, fashion tries to imitate ideal in rituals as well and to fill the *spiritual emptiness which occurs in the society when ideals are denied* (Oganyan K. M. & Branskij, 2015, pp. 385-391; Oganyan K. M., 2010, pp. 42-50).

The ideal of “welfare society” (closely connected with the ideal of “worldwide consumption”), which was the core of the communistic ideal in the nineteenth century, and which the communists promised to implement in the twentieth century but failed for a number of reasons, has been implemented in the countries of the Golden Billion by socialists and new capitalists. A modern supermarket has become a peculiar symbol of the consumer society (“the temple of worldwide consumption”). However, the seeming triumph of the consumer society ideology (the ideology of denial of ideals) has appeared to be the Pyrrhic victory: even unlimited consumption of unlimited variety of utilitarian values cannot solve the existential problem due to the crucial difference between people as “spiritual” animals from the other (“spiritless”) animals. This is connected with the fact that even the most intensive consumption of various utilitarian valuables cannot completely fill the spiritual emptiness developing when ideals are denied.

Now it is important to see whether the similar tendency to self-denial exists in the consumer society and leads to its transformation into a new ideological society.

The point is that the widely known *self-fluctuations of fashion* are the analogue of the ideological self-fluctuations. To this or that ex-

tent, they can be observed in all spheres of everyday life (from fashionable dishes and beverages to the sophisticated forms of cloth design, exterior and interior design of residential houses, vehicles, recreational and entertainment facilities, etc.). At the same time, fashion appears to be more changeable than ideals, while its changes can be even more extravagant and unpredictable. There exist epochs with the fashion for erotica in different spheres of social life. But this very fashion can be replaced with the fashion for mysticism. And some time later the fashion for paradoxical combination of mysticism and erotica can appear (for example, in the epoch of the European decadency at the turn of the nineteenth-twentieth centuries). Naked human body as well as carefully covered body may become fashionable. Physical development of a person as well as mainly spiritual development of a person can come into fashion too. The nineteenth century was characterized by the fashion for praises to scientific technological progress, while in the twentieth century it became fashionable to criticize this progress. The list of such examples can be continued endlessly.

Since the philosophical basis for the consumer society is the thesis about the “inherent value” of life, which is followed with the principle of hedonism (“life’s meaning” lies in pursuing maximum pleasures with minimum efforts or sufferings), the changes in fashion are ultimately connected with the impetuous rush for pleasures with no sufferings<sup>20</sup>. The global experience shows that the increase of pleasures for a particular person can occur in two directions – intensive (increase of one’s *own* pleas-

<sup>20</sup> Therefore, serving the ideal is connected with alternative hedonism through the asceticism principle (being ready to receive minimum pleasures with maximum sufferings).

ures) and extensive (helping increase *other* people's pleasures, not only for one's own sake).

Thus, it is evident that the problem of the "meaning of life" is irresolvable in egoistic hedonism. The attempts to solve the problem in this direction show only intellectual and philosophical narrow-mindedness of those who become a slave to their own emotional turmoil and try to solve the existential problem in such a naive childish way. The consumers of the utilitarian values with a more developed mind and wider worldview sooner or later understand the narrowness of the egoistic hedonism and turn to altruistic hedonism – applying the principle "maximum pleasures with minimum sufferings" to other closest people (relatives, friends, acquaintances, etc.), but not just to their own personality. The progress in this direction leads to a consistent growth in the number of people deserving to feel your empathy and compassion, until this number becomes global, covering all people in the world (humanistic hedonism or just humanism). Now the higher pleasure for oneself is to bring pleasure and save *the others from sufferings*. Life not for oneself, but for the other and for the sake of the other – this is the greatest discovery which sooner or later some inhabitants of the "consumer society" make when attempting to solve the existential problem.

Here charity, social technologies (the system of supporting the socially vulnerable groups) and patronage come into fashion. However, when the fashion fluctuations and pursuit of fashion reach this stage, it becomes clear that the problem cannot be solved without transformations in the consumer society, without certain economic and political reforms. And here appears a fashion which is the most dan-

gerous for the consumer society – the fashion for ideal<sup>21</sup>. And again we have the picture similar to the one developed at the end of the period of ideological society. Just like the ideological boom was accompanied with a consumer revolt (for example, Petrograd in March 1917), now the *consumer* boom finishes with an *ideological* revolt (for example, Paris in May 1968). The average citizen is at a loss and completely puzzled. Why are the streets of the gigantic megapolis choked with utilitarian values filled again with barricades and demolitions, and tens of thousands of people are marching holding the portraits of the world known revolutionary Che Guevara, whose image has a romantic aura, and all these actions are accompanied with the nostalgic sounds of the well-forgotten "Internationale"? A law-abiding inhabitant of the consumer society believes this society to be solely "adequate" (and "right"), and any ideology-driven society to be surely "inadequate" (and "wrong").

The fashion for ideal, which spontaneously appeared in the process of self-organization of the consumer society, should help significantly in this process. The consumer cynicism comes to an end with the spread of this fashion. And the sources of this fashion are very serious and deep. The point is that it is not a simple task, as it may seem at first sight, to find the "meaning of life" in taking care about another person and in helping him. This solution of the existential problem could be simple, if interests of different people completely matched. However, in reality humankind consists of different social strata with

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<sup>21</sup> The formation of this fashion at the dawn of the consumer society is a natural product of self-organization of this society, just like the formation of fashion for denying ideals at the dawn of the ideological society is a natural product of self-organization of the ideological society.

different and even opposite interests. What is good for one person can be evil for others, and vice versa. This means that by bringing maximum pleasures with minimum sufferings to one person we can simultaneously guarantee minimum pleasures with maximum sufferings for another person. It is necessary to find the compromise between the interests of these people to avoid the confrontation of the hedonistic attitudes in them. And here some transformations in the social reality programmed by some ideal are required. Thus, the fashion for ideal arising in the epoch of crisis of the consumer society is not an ephemeral psychological fad, but has a serious objective basis.

Let us summarize. The meaning of life is connected with the activity aimed at creation, distribution, and consumption of some values. Without the concept of “value”, the concept of the “meaning life” is meaningless. But since values can be various and even alternative to each other, their creation, distribution, and consumption are connected with the existence of *opposing* (mutually excluding) tendencies. Therefore, the creation of a value supposes both implementing a certain ideal and overcoming the opposition to this ideal from an alternative ideal. Similarly, the consumption of a value is connected with the opposition to consumption of an alternative value. The conflict of opposing tendencies is also typical for value distribution – the distribution of any value impedes the spread of its opposing counter-value.

#### Conclusion

The final result of the research is the movement of both an individual and a society to both a local and a global attractor. In this sense, Prigozhin et al., the representatives of the dissi-

pative structure theory, together with the representatives of fractal theory (Mandelbrot, et. al.) laid the foundation in the development of this movement.

Thus, due to the fight (collision, not just coexistence) of opposite axiological tendencies, life acquires wider and deeper meaning – to achieve the *victory* in this fight of one trend over another, rather than just participation in the fight of opposing tendencies. Life temporarily loses its meaning when the participant of the conflict loses. And it again acquires meaning thanks to the desire for revenge. This is perfectly understood by any gambler, sportsman, or soldier. Only a scholastic out of touch with reality can fall into despair at the seemingly irresolvable problem of the “meaning of life”. Although the alternation of victories and defeats make them relative, it still raises the question of achieving *absolute victory*, excluding alternatives.

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## DAWKINS' UNREBUTTABLE REFUTATION

## Abstract

In the whole fourth chapter of *The God Delusion* Richard Dawkins in a long and complicated argumentation attempts to prove that God's existence is improbable and we have no reason to believe in Him. In my paper I am going to examine the basic structure of his train of thought first so that I present the detailed reconstruction of the single steps later on. Having scrutinized the reconstructed reasoning in the last section I am going to show that his main argument for atheism is unsuccessful.

*Keywords:* atheism, creationism, belief, probability, design, Darwinism, God, Dawkins.

## 1. Introduction

Richard Dawkins in the fourth chapter of the *God Delusion* presents an “unrebuttable refutation” to convert religious people to atheism. In the second part of my study (II) I show up the basic structure of Dawkins' argumentation and split his train of thought into four arguments building upon each other as follows. (1) “the ultimate Boeing 747 gambit” which argues that God as the allegedly explanatory being for terrestrial life is improbable; (2) the assumption of God as a designer leads to infinite regress; (3) the awareness of the fact that a theory implying such regress is untenable; in the end (4) presenting Darwinism as a more successful alternative to solve those problems that ultimately justify the acceptance of God-hypothesis according to some thinkers. In the third part of my study (III) I give the detailed reconstruction of this four-step argumentation. In the fourth part (IV) I offer a critical examination of the reasoning following the single steps backwards. The paper

ends with a short conclusion (V). Thus, first, in contrast to step four (4), I point out that although Dawkins claims that Darwinism holds out to offer an explanation for the phenomena of lifeless things better than design theory, it has not given that explanation yet; consequently, it cannot be regarded as real alternative for the explanation of the whole universe. Dawkins is certainly right in what he states in the third step (3). His atheist project, though, does not win anything with it since through scrutinizing the second step (2) of his reasoning I show that it is neither the traditional variants of theism or the argument for design that imply infinite regress, but the way how Dawkins reconstructs their point of view. Dawkins does not differentiate between terrestrial and other possible entities, thus between explanations concerning them. After the greater part of the atheist reasoning has proved to be untenable, I examine the first step (1) which seemingly stands on its own too. This argument is based on the thesis that *the designer of complex things has to be even more*

*complex*. Thus, the reasoning ultimately relies on the generalization of the abilities of terrestrial designers and the characteristics of these designers' plans. This generalization is justified, though, only if we assume from the start that only *one kind* of intelligence can exist which is able to design. Dawkins here commits the same error which made the second step a case of *petitio principii*. Finally my conclusion is that Dawkins' refutation can indeed be refuted.

## 2. The Basic Structure of the Argument

The aim of *The God Delusion* is admittedly to convert its readers from religion (Dawkins, 2006, p. 116). Dawkins employs rather variable means to achieve this aim; nevertheless, he seems primarily to rely on the power of arguments. I am going to prove that his main argument for atheism is unsuccessful. This can only be confirmed by the careful investigation of what explicit and hidden premises of the argument are. If there are hidden premises, such a work is always difficult, and in the case of Dawkins we need to make considerable effort indeed, since the structure of his argumentation can only be revealed really hard.<sup>1</sup>

The argument can be found in the voluminous fourth chapter of the book (Dawkins, 2006, pp. 111-159) entitled *Why There Almost Certainly Is No God?* The section is preceded by a brief introduction at the end of the third chapter in which Dawkins claims that “[t]he

whole argument turns on the familiar question ‘Who made God?’” (Dawkins, 2006, p. 109). As concluding the chapter and summarizing the train of thought there is a repetition in six points, out of which only the third point speaks explicitly about God in such a way that it reemphasizes the question of God's origin. After that Dawkins says “[i]f the argument of this chapter is accepted, the factual premise of religion – the God Hypothesis – is untenable. God almost certainly does not exist. This is the main conclusion of the book so far” (Dawkins, 2006, p. 158). It seems that reconstructing the argument we have to take the fact into consideration that the author has been led to his conclusion only by winding up the whole chapter rich in topics. Furthermore, the question concerning the infinite regress of who created the Creator also has role in the argumentation. This is important to be emphasized given that these factors may at first sight seem not to play any part in the argument. The chapter's first short subsection entitled *The Ultimate Boeing 747* which does not deal either with the problem of God's origin or other topics of the chapter, seems to support an atheist conclusion on its own. Moreover, the author adds that “my name for the statistical demonstration that God almost certainly does not exist is the Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit” (Dawkins, 2006, p. 113). We could nearly think that Dawkins unconsciously expounds two independent arguments; though the fact makes us alert that he speaks about “the infinite regress of the Ultimate Boeing 747” on page 141. Thus the reasoning of the forth chapter seems to be cohesive in the author's intention. Therefore such an interpretation of Dawkins' reasoning is needed in which, on the one hand, the “gambit” has an important role so as to name the whole argumentation; on the other

<sup>1</sup> Often it is mentioned that the argument is so obscure. E.g. “This rambling pastiche is poorly structured, making it quite difficult to follow its basic argument” (McGrath & McGrath, 2007, p. 27).

Some of the researchers considers the exposition of the argument confusing and ambiguous so much so it is necessary to reconstruct three potential interpretation of the main argument. Cf. Anglberger, Feldbacher & Gugerell, 2010, p. 182 and p. 196.

hand, the infinite regress and the chapter's other topics also add to the assertion of the atheist conclusion.

There is also a consideration which supports that the argument does not terminate in the gambit in Dawkins' intention. Not only at the beginning of the chapter, but also in the summarizing repetition we can find reference to an argument for God which proves God's existence on the basis of that the world seems to be designed. According to Dawkins, "it's easily today's most popular argument offered in favour of the existence of God" (Dawkins, 2006, p. 113). He also believes until this argument is not refuted, it stands in the way of atheism. The third chapter of the book which aims to refute arguments for God that are formulated in history so far, takes this argument in account, and claims that its refutation lies in Darwin's results so Dawkins "shall return to the argument from design in Chapter 4" (Dawkins, 2006, p. 79). Another section, though, considers the argument from design and its explaining Darwinist theory to be the central topic of Chapter 4, entitled *Why There Almost Certainly is no God?* (Dawkins, 2006, p. 73). The preface also emphasizes the argument from design and the Darwinist theory (Dawkins, 2006, p. 2). I suppose that in Dawkins' intention the answer for the question *Why there almost certainly is no God?* has to refute the argument from design as well and it has to refer to Darwin. However, the gambit alone does not fulfill either of them.

After all, this train of thought can be regarded quite complicated. The reconstruction has to consist of at least the four following elements. The gambit, the problem of regress, the refutation of design, and the reference to the evolution all have to be part of the reconstruction. Whoever would like to reject Dawkins'

argument without using these elements for the reconstruction, Dawkins would easily say that the refutation is wrongheaded, since his reasoning was something else. No one from the analyzers and critics of *The God delusion* whom I have known presented Dawkins's argument as a complete reasoning in which all of these parts had the suitable role. In this paper I attempt to do this.

My own reconstruction is broadly the following. The first step (1) shows with the help of the Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit that if one correctly grasps the argument from design (or more exactly its one special variety, the creationist intelligent design theory), she should surprisingly arrive to the conclusion that God's existence as the explanation for life is improbable. The second and third step focuses on the intelligent design theory itself, and (2) shows that since God is improbable, its assumption leads to infinite regress within the frames of the theory. Furthermore it (3) draws attention to the fact that infinite regress makes the theory untenable, thus we can easily reject it altogether with the God Hypothesis. The last step (4) is the recognition that this theory can be rejected just because there is a more successful theory. Darwinism is able to solve the problem that was the main reason for creationist for supposing God's existence.<sup>2</sup> These steps underlie the conclusion that

<sup>2</sup> According to Glass in the fourth chapter of *The God Delusion* Dawkins uses two sort of argument: one which corresponds with Hume's argument that was presented by Philo in *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* and another which refers to Darwin. In Glass' interpretation these two arguments are incompatible with each other. On the first hand the first three points of my reconstruction together could be corresponded to the Humean argument, on the other hand we can regard the fourth one as a soft version of the Darwinian argument supposed by Glass and which in this form could be compatible with the Humean argument. Cf. Glass, 2012, pp. 33-34.

God is improbable and there is no reason for assuming that He does exist. And this means that it is very probable that God does not exist.

### 3. The Reconstruction of the Argument in Details

(1) The first step hence is the recognition of God's improbability. The "gambit" leads us to this recognition, which can be unfolded from two quotations. According to the first: "the probability of life originating on Earth is no greater than the chance that a hurricane, sweeping through a scrapyard, would have the luck to assemble a Boeing 747" (Dawkins, 2006, p. 113). Creationists – Dawkins' direct opponents – agree with this, therefore, they attribute life to God's designing activity. Notwithstanding that "however statistically improbable the entity you seek to explain by invoking a designer, the designer himself has got to be at least as improbable. God is the Ultimate Boeing 747" (Dawkins, 2006, p. 114).

It is apparent that a good opportunity straightaway presents itself for the atheist conclusion; God is so improbable that he almost certainly does not exist. This interpretation, however, cannot account for all the elements we have to regard as its components. In order to let these play a part later on, I reconstruct the train of thought hidden in the above two quotations with the following logical structure.

P1 Living creatures are improbable.

P2 Improbable things need explanation.

P3 Improbable things can be explained by a designer.

P4 The designer of improbable things has to be at least as improbable as the things that he designed.

C1 The alleged designer of living creatures

(God) is improbable.

Comments to the premises:

P1 – Creatures are improbable owing to their high complexity. The more components something consists of, the less the chance is that its components assemble just in the same way and not in another one as they factually assemble.

P2 – Everybody seems to agree with this premise who is unsatisfied with sheer facts.

P3 – This is one of the principles of intelligent design theory supported by the following simple argument. Since nothing can be explained by chance, complex beings cannot be explained other than as works of a designer. Dawkins as the opponent of this theory of course regards P3 premise false; moreover, he would be really interested in refuting it, therefore – it seems – he could not draw any conclusion from it. The fact that he does use it makes me infer that his argument is actually a form of *reduction ad absurdum*. *Reduction ad absurdum* refutes a premise or theory by proving that it leads to untenable conclusion. First he accepts certain premises then he examines what conclusion can be drawn from them: if something false or absurd is drawn, then one of the premises has to be false as well.

It seemingly excludes the above explanation of Dawkins' argument that in his opinion C1 is not false, moreover it is one of the principles of his whole atheist reasoning, therefore he cannot render P3 suspect either. It seems that P3 has to be true in order to be able to support the atheist conclusion. But if it is true, it is no purpose of thinking on the basis of C1 that the designer's existence is improbable, we do have to postulate God on the basis of P3. The problem does not arise, though, when we regard C1 just a transitional conclusion of a

longer process of deduction and we expect the appearance of a result unsatisfying from the point of P3 only at the end of the process.

P4 – This is Dawkins' own premise. Even though he does not elaborate or justify it in details, it fits to his overall train of thought perfectly. Having examined P1 it has already been obvious that there is direct proportion between a being's complexity and its improbability.<sup>3</sup> If we accept the unuttered premise – let us say P5 – that *the designer of a complex being has to be even more complex*, then we have supported P4, since this even more complex designer certainly becomes more improbable.<sup>4</sup> At least one of Dawkins' clearest claims is that God is complex. For instance once he says that “however little we know about God, the one thing we can be sure of is that he would have to be very very complex and presumably irreducibly so!” (Dawkins, 2006, p. 125). Elsewhere the complexity and improbability of God appears together “How do they cope with the argument that any God capable of designing a universe, carefully and foresightfully tuned to lead to our evolution, must be a supremely complex and improbable entity” (Dawkins, 2006, p. 147).

C1 seems to be really drawn from the above premises (and further trivial hidden premises), even though I have not elaborated on all the details of the process of deduction.

(2) The second step is the demonstration that intelligent design theory (and according to Dawkins all theism that regard life as the creation of God) leads to infinite regress. Having

<sup>3</sup> For the Dawkinsian concept of probability, see: Anglberger, Feldbacher & Gugerell, 2010, pp. 186-188; and Glass, 2012, pp. 51-56.

<sup>4</sup> Wielenberg explains the “substantive and crucial” P4 in this way as well (Wielenberg, 2009, p. 114). However he points out that “a weakness of his [Dawkins'] argument is that he doesn't provide much support for this crucial premise” (Wielenberg, 2009, p. 117).

accepted the foregoing reasoning we can easily make sure of the truth of this claim. According to the above C1 conclusion God is improbable; therefore He himself needs explanation as well under P2. So we must begin a new process of deduction using the already familiar premises.

C1 God is improbable.

P2 Improbable things need explanation.

P3 Improbable things can be explained by a designer.

P4 The designer of improbable things has to be at least as improbable as the things that he designed.

C2 The alleged designer of God (God2) is improbable.

It is obvious that God2 due to his improbability again needs explanation, at the end of which we would be led to God3, for whose sake we should assume God4 and so on forth. Consequently, the acceptance of P1-P4 premises leads to infinite regress. If God were a necessary being, as traditional theology claims and not improbable “hypothesis”, we would not need to offer explanation for his existence (Cf. Wielenberg, 2009, p. 118; Ganssle, 2008, p. 44; Plantinga, 2007, p. 3). The “gambit”, however, has proved that He is improbable, moreover P2 needs explanation for his existence, though P3 can only accept the design as an explanation, it is inevitable that according to P4 at the conclusion we get to an entity at least as improbable as God.

That raises the question why we cannot stop at the regress as traditional thinkers did by supposing a designer who was not designed. And if we stop, the creationist could suggest not stopping by God2 or later, but right by God. Nevertheless if God was not designed, how does He come into existence? He cannot exist by chance, since chance is not an explanation

for anything either for Dawkins or for the creationists. If we do not wish to explain the existence of the improbable designer further, however, no matter what traditional thinkers did, we will become unfaithful to our P2 premise, and it “is a total abdication of the responsibility to find an explanation. It is a dreadful exhibition of self-indulgent, thought-denying skyhookery” (Dawkins, 2006, p. 155).

(3) Dawkins in order to be able to examine P3, the thesis of the intelligent design theory, he accepted it to be true, but it turned out to lead to nowhere. We vainly rely on this theory because it does not fulfill what it promised; it does not offer an explanation. This fact is sufficient enough to reject it. The explanation would require a certain point from which the explicandum could be deduced. If we find this point, however, only in the infinity, since we cannot trace the chain of reasoning back there, the theory does not offer firm basis, does not provide an explanation. We have no reason to accept such an explanation. Although its theses cannot be regarded false, we have no reason either to accept them to be true; in this case there is no reason to believe that God designed the world. In Dawkins’ manner we can say that God might exist, but it is no point in believing in him on the basis of a theory leading to infinite regress.

(4) According to the foregoing reasoning it seems that we have to reject not only chance but also God as designer as the explanation for the high complexity of the world. Yet there has always been need for explanation, and we have been aware for ages that this need seems to authorize much. At the background of certain traditional God arguments the idea appears that there has to be an ultimate explanation for worldly phenomena (such as movement), and this fact authorizes us to suppose something (the

unmoved mover), which we otherwise would have no reason to suppose. So it was logical from the point of Dawkins that he completed his argument with a fourth step.<sup>5</sup> If we were not able to present an alternative explanation (instead of a designer) for the complexity, the legitimate claim for explanation would make it understandable or at least pardonable if someone could still believe in the designer in the light of the first three steps. Argumentation against the existence of God cannot be finished until we do not provide an alternative explanation for the undeniably improbable existence of complexity found in the world which would make the assumption of a designer unnecessary.

Dawkins proposes the natural selection of Darwinist theory as the explanation for the high complexity of beings. Although he is aware of the fact that in the world there are such complexities for which there has been no Darwinist scientific explanation yet. How can we explain for example that the figures of different constants in natural laws relate to one another in such a way so that they enable the existence of the universe? The believer, even if he accepts that the complexity of beings can be explained by evolution, might be inclined to attribute the order of the universe to God’s designing activity, not having other alternative. Dawkins thus has to give plausible alternative explanation for all the allegedly designed phenomena in the world. This is not an easy task, since he himself thinks that “it comes from natural selection: the process which, as far as we know, is the only process ultimately capable of generating com-

<sup>5</sup> Sober remarks “Philosophers who believe that theories can’t be rejected until a better theory is developed to take its place often sympathize” with the concept that Darwin’s theory was the main strike against the design argument. Sober mentioned Dawkins as an example of such philosophers (Sober, 2004, p. 132).



plexity out of simplicity” (Dawkins, 2006, pp. 150-151). Consequently, he tries an argumentation in two steps. On the one hand, he expresses his conviction that scientific interpretation similar to biological evolution is possible to be found on other scientific fields as well. “Natural selection not only explains the whole of life; it also raises our consciousness to the power of science to explain how organized complexity can emerge from simple beginnings without any deliberate guidance. A full understanding of natural selection encourages us to move boldly into other fields” (Dawkins, 2006, p. 116). On the other hand, until the desired scientific results are produced on other fields, we can rely on the united power of the so-called multiverse hypothesis and the anthropic principle. This way we cannot explain, though, how our universe as the harmonious cooperation of many factors came into being and subsisted, but at least it can be verified without the existence of God that the existence of the universe despite all the pretences is reassuringly probable.

Thus we have “an unrebuttable refutation” (Dawkins, 2006, p. 157) as Dawkins calls his argument. We have arrived to the conclusion that God is improbable and we have no reason to believe in him. The strongest God argument has failed, because science has shown that the allegedly designed beings can be explained without God. – Why should we believe in him, then?

#### 4. Is the Argument Successful?

In the following I am going to show, that the argument is unsuccessful, so we do not have to accept its conclusion at all. Let us suppose for a moment that Dawkins is right, and it is almost improbable that God does not exist! This fact itself would not lead to conversion from religion,

either. Moreover, we could even have rational reason for religion, to which we could be persuaded by an argument similar to Pascal’s bet. No matter how small the probability that God exists and thus exists as Christian theology claims, we have to take this little chance very seriously when a so important matter is at stake whether I shall say yes to God or not. The situation is somewhat similar to when we think that everybody has the right to the presumption of innocence even despite reasonable suspicion. No matter how evidential arguments are taken contra someone, no matter how probable that he is guilty, the stake of prejudiciary is so great, namely the possible hurt of the person’s dignity that we cannot take risk. Whoever understands what ‘person’ means, will never say that the presumption of innocence could be an irrational attitude. Nevertheless, if the matter at stake is even greater, that is, infinitely great as in the case of God, then it is indeed rational to believe in it even if someone proves that the probability of God’s existence is infinitesimally small. Dawkins might be right when he thinks in his Pascal-critique (Dawkins, 2006, pp. 103-105) that reason in itself can never lead to God, and the relation, in which we can relate to him only via calculative reasoning, would mean nothing. Would it be proper, though, if we convert from God by listening only to the voice of reason as Dawkins expects us to do so working on our “conversion”? Would it be reasonable to doubt particularly having considered all of its own weight if reason itself cannot offer us to doubt, if at least reason can accept if there *is* God, then it has high value not to turn our back on God?

Atheism does not follow even from Dawkins’ conclusion thus. However, following the steps of the reconstructed reasoning backwards, it can be demonstrated that the conclusion itself

is unfounded.

(4) Even if we accept that biological evolution gives satisfactory evidence for the facts and *modi operandi* of high complexity, thus for improbable phenomena in the world, and even if we are convinced that science will by and by present similar results in its other fields too, we cannot consider it as to have happened already. From this perspective anthropic principle counts for little, since – even if we accept the multiverse hypothesis fitting to sci-fi literature<sup>6</sup> – it only shows that universe similar to ours is not at all improbable, although it does not explain how it came into existence and can subsist. But if we know only that one thing happened without knowing why and how it happened, for someone who would like to get answers to these questions in the absence of scientific explanation there is no other choice than to refer to a designer. Until we do not have a plausible scientific answer for example for the universe's complexity too, theories referring to God at least are not unnecessary, therefore the “God-hypothesis” itself is not unnecessary, either. Irrespectively of what we think of the belief which can be endangered by scientific progress, one thing is sure that future possible results can at present be neglected.

(2) If we take the third step for granted, namely we accept that each theory leading to regress can be rejected, at the second scrutiny it is worth examining whether intelligent design theory (as well as traditional forms of theism and the argument from design) really leads to regress or not. More precisely, it is being worth examining whether really intelligent design is responsible for the regress or not. Dawkins all

intents and purposes thinks so. On page 121 he claims that the key of the theory – the idea of design – leads to regress. Another reference locates even more precisely the spring of regress. The introductory words of Chapter 4 are the following: “God presents an infinite regress from which he cannot help us to escape” (Dawkins, 2006, p. 109). This will be apparent from the next quotation when we recall one of the main points of Dawkins’ Thomas Aquinas–critique: “they make the entirely unwarranted assumption that God himself is immune to the regress” (Dawkins, 2006, p. 77). When Dawkins learns that infinite regress is concluded from a set of premises, in which P3, the basic principle of intelligent design theory is also contained, he expects hardly other than the premise of intelligent design is responsible for the undesired result. And if it is so, that very premise has to be rejected as well as of course the theory representing it. Except that Dawkins expressed his opinion well before about God’s concept containing regress, we have no other reason to blame this premise. Dawkins here makes the logical error called *petitio principii*. He would like to deduce that the intelligent design theory contains regress; however, he draws this conclusion from what he has already assumed namely that the basic principle of the theory contains infinite regress. If he did not suppose that, he could look for the spring of regress in P4 instead, owing to which C1 and further conclusions result in improbable beings, rather than in P2 according to which what is improbable should be explained. I am going to deal with P4 later and we will see we have no reason to consider it to be true; moreover, it is very plausible that the unacceptable result of the inferential chain somehow relates to it. At least is P2 true? We have seen that Dawkins accuses all of “self-

<sup>6</sup> To the criticism of the anthropic principle and the argument referred to the multiverse theory see Plantinga, 2007, p. 4.

indulgency and thought-denying skyhookery” who are unwilling to give explanation for all the improbable things. For this, the creationist could rightly answer that just the one does have problems with his or her self-evaluation who thinks he can give explanation for everything, even for God. Until this debate is not settled, it is not clear whether P2 is acceptable or not. Even if P2 and P4, though, turned out to be correct, thus we should consider P3 to be the spring of regress that would not show either that the intelligent design theory would be false. Perhaps Dawkins gratuitously phrases P3 too sharply. Why could not creationists phrase their own argument different from that of Dawkins: *Improbable terrestrial things can be explained by a designer?* Thus regress would not appear. Dawkins himself seems to have encoded error into the intelligent design theory, because he was not able to make difference between terrestrial and other possible entities, thus among explanations referring to them. (Of course I have not proved that creationism is a true or at least plausible theory, I only showed that creationism has not been refuted by Dawkins).

(1) If someone accepts the above counter-argument, he or she can still hope that at least the very first step of the reasoning, namely the “gambit” is true. Putting aside the steps (2)-(4) which seemed to be faulty in the light of the above investigations, the “gambit” can be phrased simpler than above. Having wondered the miracle of life, the creationists have come up with the concept of God. We need to accept none of their theses in order to be able to examine by conceptual analysis what a designer should be like to explain the phenomena of life through him. According to the analysis he should exist with even smaller probability than life which should be explained. Such conceptual

analysis, though, would use the above P4 thesis (*The designer of improbable things has got to be at least as improbable*). So no matter how we reconstruct the logic of the “gambit”, its persuasive power stands on the truth of P4. However, there are good reasons to doubt in P4.

It has been apparent before that we can argue for P4 on the basis of P5 according to which *the designer of improbable things has to be at least as improbable as the things that he designed*. If we wish to regard God as the designer of complex things, we have to admit that he himself is complex as well.<sup>7</sup> However, traditional theology and philosophy definitely claims that God is simple.<sup>8</sup> This makes P5 susceptible.

We can rather argue for P5 mostly on the basis of the consideration that all the single particles of a designed thing have to be there on the level of both the plans and the planner. If, for example, all the windows of a building are planned, on the plan there cannot be seen fewer windows than in reality.<sup>9</sup> The different parts of the plan must suppose differences in the planner, too, at least different activities how he has drawn the single elements. Nevertheless, that reasoning proceeds from the abilities of terrestrial planners, from the characteristics of man-made plans, and it generalizes these. Whoever states that every planning activity has to fit the same laws as we can see either in the case of men or that of the natural world, in terms of some monism, arbitrarily projects the known

<sup>7</sup> The nature of the complexity in Dawkins' theory is not clear. Probably it is a physical one (Nagel, 2006, p. 26). However it is possible that “Dawkins means a complex mental structure – albeit a non-physical one” (Ganssle, 2008, p. 41).

<sup>8</sup> E.g. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I, q.3, a.7. On the question see Wielenberg, 2009, pp. 121-126. Plantinga points out “given the definition of complexity Dawkins himself proposes, God is not complex” (Plantinga, 2007, p. 3).

<sup>9</sup> To the criticism of the argument see Crean, 2007, pp. 14-17.

laws to the whole known and unknown reality (cf. Crean, 2007, p. 14). The argument foregrounding the gambit is thus logically false, since it assumes from the start what the gambit itself would like to show, indeed even more. Not only does it attempt to show that God is improbable, but also that he does not exist at all. If we suppose that nothing exists of which activity could be different from that of men, then evidently God cannot exist, either. However, we seek answers just to the question whether a power exists exceeding mankind and their possibilities.

Anyway, Dawkins does not arbitrarily project the validity only of the unspecified laws regulating the plans' making, but also the laws of biological evolution to all possible reality. "Any creative intelligence, of sufficient complexity to design anything, comes into existence only as the end product of an extended process of gradual evolution." (Dawkins, 2006, p. 31). If God existed, he should be a slowly evolved matter, or even biological reality. In the sense defined, though, God has no beginning and he is not material. Dawkins' conclusion comes natural: "God, in the sense defined, is a delusion; and, as later chapters will show, a pernicious delusion." (Dawkins, 2006, p. 31) This is even a stronger statement than saying he surely does not exist.

Consequently, P5 is supported by that default assumption that only one *kind* of intelligence can exist who is able to design. We do not need to accept this, even if we cannot show that other kind would really exist. We have to accept, then, neither P4 following from P5,<sup>10</sup> nor the "gambit" based on them, from which

Dawkins drew the conclusion of God's improbability.<sup>11</sup>

### Conclusion

The soundness of an argument depends on two factors. On the one hand, it depends on the correct inference; on the other hand, on the truth of those premises on which its conclusion is based. In Dawkins' atheist reasoning, however, we can find both severe logical faults and implausible premises *even if* we are able to reconstruct the assertions of *The God delusion* as parts of a single argument. We can consider it to be refuted.

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<sup>10</sup> McGrath & McGrath (2007) override P4 in another way: they doubt that it is necessary to regard improbable a thing which is complex. Cf. McGrath & McGrath, 2007, p. 28.

<sup>11</sup> Adding to this, if we reject or at least doubt in P4, it serves new basis for not to blame P3 for the infinite regress. The untenable conclusion might have appeared due to P4, too.

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## POLITICS, ETHICS, AND RELIGION

## Abstract

In this essay, I argue that religion is centrally important in the future of liberal democracy in the Western sense of the word. Without the values of religion, we may have to face the emergence of authoritarian and totalitarian forms of political existence. My starting point is the experience of the so-called post-Communist countries. The essence of this experience is that liberal democracy as a political form may lack genuine content if the society, in which it exists, is devoid of the fundamental human attitudes essential for sustaining such a democracy. This experience can be complemented by the experience we have in the European Union or in the United States today, because even in these organizations we witness clear signs of the loss of common values, which endangers the proper functioning of stable democratic systems. However, some form of religion – traditional or renewed – may help to revitalize the values and their subjective basis, the proper human attitudes to encounter the danger of the decline of contemporary liberal democracies.

*Keywords:* religion, ethics, politics, democracy, conservatism.

## Introduction

While the title of my essay seems to be very general, the bulk of what I want to say is simple. The point I emphasize is that without religion there is not only no survival for the liberal democracy in the Western sense of the word, but even worse, without some form of religion fundamental human values can get completely lost. Without such values the future of Western liberal democracy seems to be dim, that is to say we may expect to go through again a long process of authoritarian and totalitarian forms of political existence.

My starting point is the experience we have in our post-Communist situation. The essence of this experience, to make a long story short, is this that liberal democracy as a political

form may lack genuine content if the society, in which it exists, is deficient in the fundamental human attitudes essential for sustaining a liberal democracy. This experience can be complemented with the experience we have in the European Union today, or in the United States of America in its third period of trial, to use Robert Bellah's expression referring to 'the attainment of some kind of viable and coherent world order' (Bellah, 1967, p. 18). Especially after the popular decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union and after the surprising victory of a POTUS whom appears to differ from his predecessors in important ways, we may be able to say that neither the European Union nor the United States used the power of religion in a way which may have helped to strengthen some of the fundamental attitudes

contributing to a balanced understanding of the politics of self-identity.

In the present context, I consider religion not as a historical institution of some denomination, but rather as the most important and effective way of forming, sustaining, and improving basic human attitudes. By ‘basic human attitudes’ I mean the realization of humane ideals indispensable for individual and communal life under our present biological and psychological conditions. Such ideals are for instance the love of our neighbors, even our enemies, the respect for ourselves and for other people, the value of doing good rather than evil, or again the value of cooperation and common work to better human life. The reality of such ideals, that is their form in psychologically based and socially sustained attitudes, cannot be abolished without endangering our individual, social, and political existence.

It is certainly not beyond question that religion is the most important and the most effective way of determining basic human attitudes. It can be argued that religion, in many of its historical forms, has led to fanaticism, nationalism, cruel wars, or even to the total destruction of whole groups of people.<sup>1</sup> While one cannot doubt that there are such forms of historical religion, still I think that it can be successfully argued that such forms are peripheral to religion in its most important historical forms. Without attempting to give new definitions of religion, so much may be said here that religions fundamentally teach and realize a good number of the humane ideals I mentioned above. Just think of the principle of compassion in Buddhism, the awareness of law in Judaism, the imperative of

charity in Christianity, or the communal piety in Islam. It belongs to religion that it creates basic human attitudes in accordance with such ideals, that is to say attitudes deeply ingrained in individuals, social groups, or even in whole societies for a long period of time. It suffices to mention that the ideal of human rights, based on the dignity of human persons, cannot be conceived of without the basic teachings and practices of Christianity as they have been present in Western societies throughout the centuries.

It must be added, nevertheless, that there are forms of religiousness which are detrimental to a balanced and enlightened political existence. It seems that such forms are due to sectarian and peripheral groupings which attempt to enforce their limited views on their wider religious and non-religious communities. Fundamentalism and even terrorism, which sometimes refer to a religious background, are to be seen as the effect of such sectarian trends in religion and they are opposed to the historically evolved forms in which they appear. They are rather like radical political ideologies parasitizing more balanced philosophies. Radical efforts to destroy communities are due to these parasitizing tendencies and they do not belong to the core features of a given religious form.

By ‘conservatism’ I mean an understanding of liberal democracy which respects and sustains not only basic humane ideals in an abstract sense but also their attitude-like realization in individuals, social groups, and in whole societies for a long period of time. Conservatism is an understanding and practice of politics in its various ways, which aims at strengthening such ideals and their realization in attitudes. It is by conservatism in this sense that the tradition of liberal democracy as a political system is essentially guaranteed. In other words, conserva-

<sup>1</sup> I detail the relationship between the Holocaust and religiously colored ideologies in Mezei 2013, especially Ch. 1.

tism is based on an ethical understanding of politics, in which ‘ethics’ refers not only to a theory but also to a practice, a practice maintained by institutions such that the realization of these ideals may become possible. Conservatism relies on well-formed ethical systems as traditionally proven means of sustaining such ideals and effecting their realization. And since such ethical systems, in their most developed forms, are present in religion, thus conservatism in the present sense supports religion. This is not to say that conservatism cannot be conceived without religion; but it certainly cannot be conceived without a well-developed system of ethical ideas and without some institution of procedures of realizing such ideas. Conservatism of other kinds, such as ‘neo-conservatism’ still maintain the image of having a well formed ethical system with some links to religious ideas (see Kirk, 1957; Molnar, 1960; Kristol, 1995).

#### Evil and Human Attitudes

Let me start my argument with some points we find in John Kekes’s groundbreaking book *Facing Evil*.<sup>2</sup> Evil, in Kekes’s initial definition, is ‘undeserved harm.’ The secular problem of evil, in his understanding, is an approach to the problem of evil which does not accept the religious answer as relevant. The religious answer consists in that the scheme of things in the world is fundamentally good. According to Kekes’s understanding of the secular problem of evil, the religious answer cannot be rationally maintained. We need a properly secular way to solve the problem of evil, that is to say a rational-philosophical way. By philos-

ophy, we are able to develop individual and social morality against prevalent evil, in particular character morality that is a habit on the basis of which we are able to do what is good.<sup>3</sup>

Kekes distinguishes between two kinds of reaction to evil: soft and hard. The soft reaction to evil consists in a reluctance to allow evil actions to count as evidence for their agents’ being evil. The hard reaction to evil is that agents, even if their actions are unchosen, must be held responsible and seen as ‘evil’ in an appropriate sense. Kekes defends the hard reaction to evil and argues that the source of many evil acts is bad character. A bad character has developed a bad habit which compels its subjects to act badly. Human freedom has only a limited role here, because, as we can say, pathological liars do not freely choose their lies each time. There is a pathological character behind this phenomenon which must be psychosomatically cured. Similarly, in the background of a lot of evil actions there are bad characters that must be morally cured. The means of this cure is rational argument in individual and social forms.

When I refer to human attitudes, I refer to the typical contents of what Kekes calls a character. I think that a human character is made up of attitudes, good or bad, which are interrelated in a number of ways. Evil is not only a consequence of particular human actions, but a consequence of human attitudes which aim at causing undeserved harm in various situations. It is not merely the well-formed structure of attitudes that we find at the source of human actions, but also the concrete attitude itself. For instance, businesspersons who try to gain the highest possible profit for an otherwise base product are not only generally directed by their characters as to gain unde-

<sup>2</sup> Kekes expounded the problem in a different fashion in Kekes, 2005; however, from the philosophical point of view I find Kekes, 1990 more forceful.

<sup>3</sup> By using the expression ‘habit’ Kekes offers a version of the Aristotelian notion of ἕξις, habitus.



served profit, but also by their concrete attitudes by means of which they decide to proceed in a certain way in a given situation. While they have only a limited responsibility for the character they have – although still a good amount of responsibility – they have a more concrete responsibility for the concrete attitude in the framework of which they decide to proceed in a certain way.

The relevance of the subject matter of human attitudes for our present topic can easily be seen. The political realm is a well-formed structure of human actions and interactions, and if such actions are based on attitudes, and only more generally on characters, then the realm of the political is also based on relevant attitudes. Ethics aims at developing, changing, improving, or influencing characters, but this cannot be realized without developing, changing, improving, or influencing attitudes. On the other hand, actions as networks of certain kinds – private or public, individual or social, basic or more sophisticated – require concrete attitudes to be carried out. If we understand marriage as a unified network of concrete actions of various types, then we also recognize that such actions cannot be carried out without required attitudes, and marriage cannot be practiced in the proper way without the right attitude necessary for this kind of basic social behavior.<sup>4</sup>

Political ethics is about, most essentially, the right attitudes we need in our political coexistence. Political education, traditions, schooling are about the development, improvement, influ-

encing or changing such attitudes. If it is the restricting of individual or social evil that is at stake in shaping the right form of politics, then the corresponding attitudes must be obviously changed. If one wishes to introduce liberal democracy into a country which does not have a well-formed tradition of practicing liberal democracy, then one has to do everything possible to create or help to develop the attitudes required by liberal democracy. If one fails to do that, then the formal existence of liberal democracy, without relevant contents, can become something like a caricature.

In what follows I would like to answer the following questions: What are the criteria of judging some human attitudes good, others bad, in the political realm? How can we influence the formation of such attitudes? Are ideologies the proper means of such formation? Does conservatism offer the right means? What is the role of religion in the formation of such attitudes?

### The Criteria of Attitudes

It would be the task of a general political theory to argue for the optimal political form of human beings.<sup>5</sup> Based on our knowledge of political realities of the past centuries, it seems beyond doubt that some form of democracy is what is reasonable to accept as the optimal political form. More particularly, liberal democracy, that is the democracy based on the rule of law, free elections and parliamentary procedures, on the recognition of human rights and fundamental freedoms, appears to be the most advantageous political system we presently have if and only if there is a formal and consen-

<sup>4</sup> For instance, marriage by definition involves – but may not entail – such practices as the sharing a common place of living, food and other physical resources, and certainly a form of sexual life with the possibility, although without the necessity, of procreation. Some of these practices may be actually missing from marriage but they cannot be missing in principle, sexuality included which can be properly realized only on the basis of the natural sexual difference.

<sup>5</sup> But see for instance the debate about authority in the essays edited by A. James McAdams, in McAdams 2007.

sual basis in such democracies. There is a good number of reasons for this view, reasons I cannot detail here; so much may be sufficient to mention that even in a democracy, as for instance Yves Simon has pointed out, some form of authority must be present, otherwise liberal democracy, or any kind of human cooperation, becomes practically impossible and dissolves in a chaos (Simon, 1980; Simon, 1993). The form of authority in a liberal democracy is prescribed by law and the results of parliamentary procedures; these however presuppose the existence of some form of authority, minimally the authority of the political as such, on the basis of which social coherence, cooperation, and the implementation of laws becomes possible.<sup>6</sup>

Authority is however not only external; external authority, such as the existence of some mechanism for the implementation of the results of the processes of political decision-making, is based on some fundamental features in human nature. These features are the attitudes I briefly discussed above, more particularly the attitude of accepting some form of authority in political coexistence. Authority is thus fundamentally internal, or attitude-based. Without the internal or atti-

tude-based authority, no form of external authority can be realized on the long run, as is shown by the perspicuous collapse of some rigidly authoritarian systems of recent history.<sup>7</sup>

The choice of the human attitude of accepting some form of authority, as opposed to an attitude of subverting any kind of authority, is already given in the fact that we coexist in political communities. Political communities, however, are to help the realization of good as opposed to evil in a number of ways, that is to say they are supposed to aim at what is traditionally termed the common good. The common good is basically an ethical conception in which the element of ‘good’ is not merely physical wellbeing or material satisfaction, but also moral wellbeing and moral satisfaction. Thus the very existence of a political community prescribes the general form of a moral pattern without which there is no properly functioning political coexistence (Simon, 1993).<sup>8</sup>

The criterion of human attitudes, in their general form, is then given in the very fact of political coexistence. There are certainly other conceptions of political coexistence, for instance the conception of a ruling person, class, race, or nation as opposed to the suppressed rest of a given society. On such a conception it may be argued that it is not the common good in the proper sense that is the aim of political coexistence, but rather the political power of the ruling group. History shows, however, that even in cases of political oppression it is some form of the common good – either ideologically or in reality – that serves as the cement of the politi-

<sup>6</sup> In Macarius Magnes’ *Apocriticus* we find the famous passage suggesting that ‘the Emperor Hadrian was a monarch, not because he existed alone, nor because he ruled over oxen and sheep (over which herdsmen or shepherds rule), but because he ruled over men who shared his race and possessed the same nature.’ (IV, XX) Applying this approach to liberal democracy we may say that such a democracy may be maintained only in the community of human beings. Human beings are persons with characteristic mental and physical properties. If these properties are missing or deficient to a certain extent, democracy cannot be maintained. Democracy can be maintained only among human persons possessing the fundamental properties of human persons, that is to say if and only if they are willing to respect other persons and themselves, implement and follow laws, and obey authority in their everyday and professional lives. A democracy cannot be established and maintained among ‘oxen and sheep’ (Macarius, 1919, p. 143).

<sup>7</sup> For the notion of authority based on natural law, see Simon, 1965.

<sup>8</sup> The origin of the notion of the common good is Aristotelian: ‘The common good is greater and more divine than the private good.’ See *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1094b; ‘ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θεϊότερον ἔθνηι καὶ πόλεσιν’.

cal community. The common good is based on the structure of attitudes of the participants of the community, that is on character the formation and sustaining of which is the vital interest of the community.

There is thus a distinction between attitudes that are favorable, and attitudes that are not, in a political community. And it is always the given form of the common good that serves as the criterion of good and bad attitudes, more generally of good and bad characters. The given form of common good of liberal democracy is undoubtedly the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, and the authoritative results of the processes of the political decision-making. More particularly, the criterion of human attitudes in liberal democracy is the contribution to the common good in question, that is to the material and moral wellbeing of the members of the political community and of the community itself.

#### The Formation of Attitudes

Facing the prevalent moral evil in human nature, the suggestions is often made that the optimal network of attitudes of the members of a political community can be guaranteed in a number of ways, but most fundamentally by forming such attitudes from early childhood. We can distinguish between the attitudes as ideal objectives in such a political community on the one hand, and the means of such a formation on the other hand. Ideal objectives are rarely realized in their full extent, still they must be defined and demonstrated in a number of ways, such as in a basic law, tacitly or explicitly accepted moral rules, and in many other cultural forms. The means of developing the right attitudes is not only the existence of a recognizable moral pattern

in social behavior, but also the process of formation in institutional education and spontaneous self-development.

Surely, the means of self-development is very important, yet it is far from being sufficient. Institutional educational systems are the very means by which children learn the right attitudes. On the other hand, educational institutions are far from being perfect, and the ideals they declare are often insufficiently realized. Moreover, in a liberal democracy there is the freedom of education, that is to say educational institutions may differ significantly in their understandings of the content of character formation. Parents who want to secure good education for their children often choose institutions, the explicit moral purposes they share, in order to reach the structure of attitudes they consider the most desirable. We would call parents irresponsible that leave the formation of their children to institution they do not know sufficiently, or to general society in which a variety of understandings prevail without a recognizable pattern of values.

In making the choice of the parents, however, traditions are very important; normally, parents would like to have in their children the attitudes they have inherited and consider reliable. The existence of traditions of attitudes signals the fact that there are factors in the formation of attitudes which go deeper than the existing institutions of a given society. Psychologically, the role of the parents in attitude formation is often decisive; the example of the father and the mother are typically crucial, consciously or unconsciously, for the children. The reason of this situation is not only that the human psyche is such that parents possess a certain authority in the eyes of their children, but also the fact that human nature is in need of a formation of attitudes deeper or more fundamental than what the social and polit-

ical institutions of a community can offer. Parents do not value their traditions just because these are their traditions, but because they are typically convinced that their traditions are expressions of a system of values vitally relevant for individual and political existence. They consider their attitudes as corresponding to values, that is to say to morally correct propositions concerning human existence. A given pattern of such morally correct propositions is considered a tradition; such a tradition has authority, not because of individual preference, but because of its value-character.

### The Role of Religion

The most effective ways to realize patterns of morally correct propositions have been, at least in known history, religions. I do not say that to be a religion is merely to be able to realize morally correct propositions. To say that would be reducing religion to an ethical machine. Such an understanding of religion would open the way to an interpretation according to which, as for instance Ninian Smart believes, Maoism can count to be a religion. It is not my task here to attempt to give a definition of religion; so much may be said nevertheless that the essence of religion is far from being just a pattern of morally correct propositions. Christianity, to take the most obvious example, is not only a morality, but also a doctrine, and not only a doctrine, but also a cult, and not only a cult, but a model of individual and collective salvation. While there are religions which do not possess an explicit doctrine of a personal God, as for instance Theravada Buddhism, still there is no religion which does not offer an explicit way of individual salvation. In political ideologies, such as Marxism-Leninism or Maoism, the in-

dividual is dissolved in the collective, and even if there is a notion of final fulfillment, an eschatological dimension in such ideologies, there is only a communal or collective fulfillment in history. Religions, at least in those that are called post-axial by Karl Jaspers (Jaspers, 1949), individual redemption or salvation have been the crucial point.

The emphasis on the individual, in Christianity on the dignity of human persons, is the most important trait of religion in matters of forming and developing human attitudes. The human person has an incomparable dignity, a doctrine without which the development of the modern and contemporary Western understanding of human rights, sovereignty, and freedom is unconceivable. Human persons, however, must be trained, formed, changed in order to be able to reach the optimal form of their human dignity. The process of formation cannot start with any particular process of schooling or learning, but with an a priori act, the act of baptism that makes the human person be actually able to realize his or her dignity. By recognizing the importance of such an act, Christianity points out that the process of formation of attitudes has its own a priori condition. Human nature is implicitly good, but explicitly bad, and to change this we need preemptive action.

The process of formation of attitudes is not merely a social or political process; it is not even merely psychological. It must touch upon the very core of human persons in accordance with the results to be reached. The objective is not only a properly functioning moral machine, but a genuine, fully developed human person. The attitudes a human person needs in order to function successfully in a political community are not ultimate elements of his or her personhood, but rather consequences of his or her be-

ing a dynamically developing human person. The success of religion in developing the attitudes a human person needs in political behavior is based on its understanding that human persons have a transcendent origin and a transcendent vocation. The right attitudes are based on the transcendent values of religion, not on historical circumstances; they are derivative of the transcendently based dignity of human persons.

### The Failure of Ideologies

Marxism-Leninism and similar ideologies have committed two principal mistakes in matters of the formation of human individuals. First, there is no real place in such ideologies for the individual as opposed to the collective. Marxism-Leninism and related ideologies may even be characterized as anti-individualist or collectivist, which in fact means that they attempted to shatter the really existing individual with all his or her dignity, morality, and genuine personality. Those who lived under Communist rule can easily confirm that one of the main purposes of such systems was indeed the destruction of human personhood in its genuine and ultimate individuality. Such ideologies can be considered successful to some extent, but the prize they paid for their success was enormous: they lost the very material they wanted to rule, they lost the human individuals with their moral attitudes deprived of which there is no functioning political community.

The other principal mistake is the flawed hope of these ideologies that it is possible to develop the necessary attitudes in human individuals just by schooling and ideological formation. In some cases, such ways of formation may have been effective to some extent. They

may have been effective in that they were able to produce individuals with no moral character whatsoever yet with a readiness to serve the political party in any possible way; they were able to produce individuals that have reinvented a vulgar pragmatism of the worst kind in order to reach their own material aims by any means after the authority of the Marxist-Leninist party collapsed. We meet a good number of such individuals in the political and economic forefront of the so-called post-Communist countries.

As a matter of fact, the formation and development of the right attitudes of human individuals cannot be based merely on the objective of creating such attitudes. Human persons are integral beings, that is to say they need a holistic view of themselves and the world in order to be able to function efficiently in particular ways under the umbrella of that world-view. Even more so, they do not only need any kind of a world-view but rather a genuine one which is not only a view of reality but, as it were, offer reality itself. Religion indeed proposes reality inasmuch as religion considers itself not merely a *view* of reality but reality *itself*. Political ideologies have attempted to imitate this specific feature of religion inasmuch as they declared themselves not merely world-views but, at the same time, the expressions of reality itself. This happens in Marxism-Leninism in which the ideology is seen as an expression of the most fundamental processes of reality understood in terms of historical economic development. But there is a difference between declaring something to be the case on the one hand, and to be indeed the case on the other hand. Religion declares something to be the case because – from the point of view of religion – this is in fact the case. Ideologies de-

clare something to be the case because they wish it to be the case by all possible means. In particular, Marxism-Leninism understands itself as an ideology, that is to say as doctrinal stratagem by which certain political aims can be reached. This understanding nevertheless excludes any interpretation that would consider such an ideology *true* in the proper sense of the word.<sup>9</sup>

### The Importance of Conservatism

I do not consider conservatism an ideology. Ideologies are collections of abstract ideas assembled in view of practical, mainly political, purposes; conservatism however is not such a scheme but, to use an Oakeshottian expression, a ‘disposition.’ Conservatism as a disposition is living in a tradition in which the attitudes are given by means of ‘intimation.’ Conservatism, according to Oakeshott, is ‘a flow of sympathy,’ and not a fixed and inflexible way of doing things. Conservatism, on this view, is not even an abstract moral scheme the principles of which must be known by heart and translated into practice by a series of separate actions of the will. On the contrary, conservatism is like our mother tongue that we do not learn by memorizing a list of words and grammatical rules. We grow into the actual capacity of speaking our native tongue in a way which is too complicated, and too much

organic, to learn in a linear process. We are able to become conscious of the grammar of our native tongue; but in speaking my mother tongue I do not care the rules; I just speak the language (Oakeshott, 1991).

Conservatism is a way of intimating fundamental human attitudes which are essential in taking part in political coexistence. The very imperative of being benevolent to fellow human beings, or the imperative of helping the needy in some way, or the imperative of the general cooperation for some common good are imperatives of a conservative kind, that is to say they are not just abstract rules but follow organically from our basic human pattern. If one does not have such attitudes, then one is not able to function socially or politically, and one is not able to develop the character one needs in facing moral evil in individuals and communities. The most fundamental imperative of fighting evil and advancing good cannot be learned; it is given in our personal human pattern. We are indeed free to dismiss this basic disposition or pattern and we see examples of such actions especially in ideologies and in exceptionally evil persons; but conservatism consists in a conscious recognition of this pattern.

It is on the basis of conservatism that we might learn ideologies. Ideologies believe that human attitudes are results of conservatism *as* an ideology, and not conservatism as a disposition. Ideologies imitate what they believe conservatism does in that ideologies invent ideals and human attitudes and attempt to realize them. This is just the opposite of the way conservatism works; and ideologies do not notice that it is on the basis of the life-world of a basic conservatism that they can have their ideals. Just as we can learn other languages on the basis of our mother tongue, so we may learn too ideologies

<sup>9</sup> Alvin Plantinga famously argued that by accepting the theory of naturalistic evolution, which excludes the possibility of a neutral point of view, it becomes implausible to attribute truth-value to propositions describing the same process. In a similar way, on the basis of Marxist historicism, it becomes implausible to attribute truth-value to propositions about the subject matter of the Marxian theory. This paradoxical situation results from the fact that a truth-value of any proposition presupposes an independent or neutral observer, a subject in the proper sense, but in the aforementioned theories it is unlikely that there are such observers.

and tend to believe that every language is learned in the way we learn our new languages. We forget that we can learn other languages *on the basis of* our natural possession of a mother tongue. Similarly, being attracted by various ideologies we easily forget our mother tongue in this respect, that is in what I term the natural conservatism of our fundamental human pattern.

My point is that the formation of human attitudes takes place, on the social and political level, on the basis of our fundamentally conservative nature. What may be successful in ideologies to some extent is due to the conservative core an ideology contains in itself. In order to improve the catastrophic social and political situation, Deng Hsiao Ping rediscovered some of the most important attitudes given in the Chinese traditions; these attitudes saved Communist China from a collapse. Russian Marxism-Leninism was however much more arbitrary; its refusal of the natural conservative pattern of human persons and society led in fact to one of the most spectacular collapses a world empire in known history. What they lacked was not simply an effective economic plan – they had plenty of fantastic plans – or other great ideas concerning education and culture, but the willingness to give place for conservatism at least in the simplest things of individual and societal life.

### Religion and Conservatism

Oakeshott's understanding of conservatism has some obvious defects, the most important of which, from my present point of view, is the neglect of the full scope of being a human person. Human persons do not merely exist in a flow of sympathy that is in the context of a given tradition. Human persons are indeed individuals, inef-

fable in themselves, whose existence is not exhausted by their belonging to a flow of traditions, customs, or morals. I naturally speak my mother tongue, as do other human beings, but I have *my own* understanding of things and of myself. There is a sphere of individual subjectivity which cannot be reduced to any objectivity, and there is a realm of human persons which cannot be dissolved in any collective tradition or ideology. The dignity of human persons is based precisely on their irreducible personhood; and this dimension of human persons is expressed, emphasized, maintained, and strengthened only in what we call religion.<sup>10</sup>

In religion, a human person does not only face evil, but most importantly he or she faces God. For religion, there is no more important thing in the world than precisely this engagement. And since God is not just another empirical person, but the very foundation, source and final aim of human persons, thus human persons engage their personhood in an unparalleled manner in this fundamental relationship characteristic of religion. It is by facing God that we are uniquely individuals, unique human persons; it is by facing God that we have the source and the strength of our human dignity; it is by facing God that we have the basis of the most fundamental human attitudes without which there is no genuine individual and social life.

If this is so, then conservatism is in need of

<sup>10</sup> Karol Wojtyła's understanding of the human person as a *dynamic unity* changes the traditional doctrine of hylemorphism in an important way. Instead of the human being as a compound of formal and material components, Wojtyła offers an understanding of a human being as an ultimate unity which 'may not be treated as only a means to an end, as an instrument, but must allow for the fact that he or she, too, has, or at least should have, distinct personal ends' (Wojtyła, 1998, p. 28). The origin of the concept of human persons can be found, in Wojtyła's analyses, in the phenomenological resources of our human experience.

religion as its own very foundation, source, cement, and fulfillment. Conservatism is related to ideology as our mother tongue is related to Esperanto. Religion, however, is related to conservatism as our own understanding of the words and sentences, indeed the very meaning of our mother tongue, is related to the fact that there are people that speak our mother tongue. Without a natural language, Ludwig Zamenhof would not have been able to develop the Esperanto language; without our own capacity of understanding of what is said in our mother tongue, there is no way to learn a mother tongue. This understanding may be called the language of the mind, the irreducible character of subjectivity or something of the same sort; we do have our own understanding as the very prerequisite of learning our mother tongue. We can learn our mother tongue, to put it differently, just because we are human persons.

Liberal democracy is a political system which is in need of conservatism; forces which strive to abolish conservatism in the sense I use it are abolishing the realm of attitudes essential for the survival of liberal democracy. With the abolishment of the required attitudes, the legitimacy of liberal democracy becomes unclear; and with the lack of clarity the lack of legitimacy may become a fact. As Richard Neuhaus points out, ‘As the crisis of legitimacy deepens, it will lead – not next year, maybe not in twenty years, but all too soon – to totalitarianism or to insurrection’ (Neuhaus, 1984, p. 259). That is why I emphasize the importance of religion for conservatism. Conservatism is vital for liberal democracy, and religion is vital for conservatism.

The most difficult question comes certainly at this point. What kind of religion can we think of? Which denomination? Shall we point out

the importance of civil religion of Rousseau or Robert Bellah? Or shall we follow the suggestions of present-day evangelical Christianity of the United States? The various proposals made, among others by José Casanova, Richard Neuhaus, or Robert Bellah, are signs that we have an important problem here. The reception of these proposals shows the difficulties of giving the proper answer. However, on the basis of conservatism religion cannot be an invention, an ideology, an *Ersatzreligion*. Religion has the dimensions of the past, the present, and the future, and these dimensions build a common structure. A religion in the conservative sense must have its verified roots in the past, its relevance in the present, and its openness to the future. Religion in his sense is indeed a dynamic flow which corresponds to the fundamental human pattern we find in conservatism too. Religion, thus, cannot be just rigid structure inherited from the past but a self-checking and self-renewing system of ideas, dispositions, a practices which is open to the surrounding world and to its future.<sup>11</sup>

In his encyclical letter, Pope Benedict XIV formulates the need of a religious renewal: ‘A self-critique of modernity is needed in dialogue with Christianity and its concept of hope. In this dialogue Christians too, in the context of their knowledge and experience, must learn anew in what their hope truly consists, what they have to offer to the world and what they cannot offer. Flowing into this self-critique of the modern age there also has to be a self-critique of modern Christianity, which must constantly renew its self-understanding setting out from its roots’ (*Spe salvi*, § 22). In our present context, the renewal of the self-understanding of Christianity

<sup>11</sup> As to the need of a renewal of Christian thinking, see Mezei, 2016.



offers us an exceptional case of a living religion, a religion which does not only automatically change throughout the ages but it becomes conscious of the need for a constant renewal. This feature of religion is indeed deeply consonant with the fundamentally integral meaning of conservatism; in this sense, an open conservatism – as I call this sort – appears to be the best way to form and maintain the basic human dispositions inevitable for the upholding and bettering our contemporary liberal democracies. However, such conservatism needs to be intrinsically based on religion.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> For more detail on a balanced understanding of religion, see my 2013 work (Mezei, 2013). A more detailed account is delineated in Mezei, 2017.

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## HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

## BYZANTINE MUSICAL THEORY (HARMONICS)\*

## Abstract

Harmonics was one of the four mathematical sciences in the Byzantine higher education curriculum, together with Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy (what was called *quadrivium* in the Latin West). Our knowledge of Byzantine harmonics is rather limited, as only two or three of the relevant treatises have been published in new editions. In this paper a systematic approach is attempted, while, at the same time, keeping distances from the well-studied practical aspect of Byzantine music, i.e. ecclesiastical music. Furthermore, the tradition of Greek musical theory (both Pythagorean and Aristoxenian), which the Byzantines developed further from a dual, both textual and educational, interest, presenting us at the same time with some original contributions.

*Keywords:* Byzantium, greek music, Harmonics, Quadrivium, pythagoreans, canonists, harmonists.

In recent years, a wealth of scholarly and layman's books have been written on Orthodox ecclesiastical music, its character, and history. There is intense interest in Orthodox church music in Greece and abroad, and thankfully our knowledge keeps expanding.

Yet when it comes to Byzantine musical theory, i.e. harmonics as a branch of science and philosophy in the Byzantine era, things are quite different. Here we are faced with a number of difficulties: although many critical editions, commentaries, and detailed hermeneutical works have been published on ancient Greek theoretical works on Music, the same cannot be said about the relevant Byzantine theoretical works. Several crucial scholarly issues remain unresolved; for instance: are there direct links between ancient

Greek harmonies (the kinds of octaves) and Byzantine musical scales (the system of the eight modes - *oktōēchos*), or does Byzantium represent a new starting point with eastern roots?

For a more systematic approach to this subject we would naturally need to draw a clear-cut distinction between music as it was practiced in Byzantium and Byzantine musical theory. Musical practice, the songs of the ancient world, of which we also know very little, was absorbed into Christian liturgical music and was overlaid by it, as with geological strata. Thus, by the time of Justinian (6<sup>th</sup> century AD), when Byzantine ecclesiastical hymnology had come into its own as a discrete art form, practiced by magnificent Christian melodists such as Romanos, ancient Greek music was long dead. A Neoplatonic commentator of Aristotle, Olympiodorus of Alexandria tellingly claimed in the 6<sup>th</sup> century that while enough ancient testimonies survive on the

\* In a short form published in *Mousikos Logos* (Μουσικός Λόγος), Athens 1 (2000) 4sq.

sciences of the ancients, such as arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, precious little is known about ancient melody; in this case, a Homeric verse aptly captures the situation: ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν (“but we hear only a rumor and know nothing” *Il.* 2.486). Olympiodorus further adds that he only has access to theoretical works on ancient music.

Thus we need to draw a fundamental distinction: we should not confuse the musical practices of the Orthodox Church, what we call Byzantine music, with Byzantine non-ecclesiastical (*thyrathen*) music theory, i.e. the science of harmonics. The latter preserves several elements of ancient musical theory and continues its scientific tradition.

Thus, we do not know much about Byzantine musical theory. Until recently, interest in this field was limited to special philological and exclusively musicological research. There are but a handful of works written from a theoretical and philosophical perspective. Byzantine works on the subject were of interest to modern scholars only insofar as they helped them decode musical notation, apply the tonal system, and study its historical development – i.e. as secondary sources for Byzantine ecclesiastical music.

Notwithstanding the lack of modern editions, however, of all Byzantine works on harmonics, and the absence of relevant treatises, it is certain that in this field we can detect an impressive continuity between ancient and later Greek musical theory. This thesis can now be supported more methodically on the basis of more recent assessments about specific musical theory works in the most recent of all the relevant studies (see Troelsgard, 1988). We should stress the fact that many manuscripts containing texts on harmonics are present throughout the

Byzantine era; this suggests an interest in copying, studying and employing texts of ancient musical theory as teaching material. Interest for teaching purposes eventually led to a dynamic and original reception and integration of ancient Greek musical theories in Byzantine teaching practices, and the composition of music textbooks; this is not confined to the field of harmonics as part of the *quadrivium* or *tetractys* of the mathematical sciences taught in Byzantine higher learning institutions: these texts were sometimes also put to use in the field of ecclesiastical music.

Thus harmonics, as taught in Christian Byzantium in the context of ‘general education’, or what we would describe as the *thyrathen* classicism of the Byzantines, allows us to follow how issues and scientific trends that emerged in Late Antiquity continued to occupy the thought of writers in the following centuries. As we shall see, Byzantine harmonics is also chiefly preoccupied with the tonal systems and their mathematical underpinnings, as it attempts to calculate their elements. By manner of introduction, what we need to underline again is that the subject of harmonics was cultivated solely in the higher schools of the empire and almost exclusively by the erudite philosophers who taught the relevant class on harmonics in the context of the *quadrivium*: arithmetic; geometry; harmonics; astronomy.

To describe the content of Byzantine musical theory we need to become acquainted with the ancient and late antique theoretical musical discussions and debates that continued during Byzantine times. One of the main currents in ancient Greek musical theory stems from the doctrines of Pythagoras, as expounded by Pythagorean philosophers throughout the ages. At its core lies the notion of numbers as the essence of

the universe. For the Pythagoreans, harmony results from a synthesis of opposites; this holds true both for the cosmos as a whole and the soul, as well as in the regular (albeit unequal) distribution of melodic intervals in the tonal system. This is the direction of the so-called Canonists. Examples of Canonist musicians and philosophers are Archytas (430-360 BC), the single most important exponent of the theory, and later Pythagoreans until the time of Ptolemy (108-168 AD) and the Neoplatonic philosophers. The other direction is that of the School of the Harmonists; they were supporters of Aristoxenus, the eminent 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC philosopher, who originated from Taras, but lived and taught in Athens. His work *Elements of Harmony* is extant, together with fragments from another one called *Elements of Rhythm*.

Following a rather long hiatus, from the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BC to the 1<sup>st</sup> century AD, Pythagorean musical theories (those of the Canonists) flourished again, thanks to the great mathematician and astronomer Claudius Ptolemy. Ptolemy dedicated much of his studies to musical theory. His work *Harmonics* represents a philosophy of music, a study of the proportional nature of tonal relations, a proportionality that is echoed in the human soul and heavenly bodies. Ptolemy's *Harmonics* has been described as Antiquity's most insightful and most comprehensive synthetic work. Ptolemy's rational, systematic treatment of harmonics is of equal value to his astronomical work. The direction of the Pythagoreans was also adopted by Neoplatonic philosophers, i.e. the continuators of Plotinus' (205-270 AD) thought: Porphyry wrote in the late 3<sup>rd</sup> century a *Commentary on Ptolemy* and discussed the logical distinctions between the quantity and the quality of tones; Iamblichus, active in the 4<sup>th</sup> century, dealt with symbolic numerology and was

influenced by eastern mysticism; and, finally, Proclus in the 5<sup>th</sup> century composed valuable commentaries on Plato and Euclid. In this direction, and for all the philosophers mentioned, but also for many more, the purpose of mathematics and music/harmonics is to elevate man from the material world of the bodies and transport him to the Domain of the Ideas (or Forms), a realm of absolute beauty and perfect harmony. Mathematics, and the related sciences, astronomy and harmonics, exert a purifying and edifying influence on the soul. More specifically, harmonics as a philosophical and scientific field is founded on the imitation of divine harmony.

Under such presuppositions and in its purely theoretical character, the study and cultivation of harmonics during this period engendered a certain disdain and neglect for everyday lay musical practices. On the contrary, the Church Fathers, having embraced the Greek understanding of music's nature as an imitation (*mimēsis*) of divine harmony and a tool for promoting psychic health, welcomed the use of music in divine worship as it allowed people to listen to and comprehend the message of the Holy Scriptures more clearly. Thus musical practices not belonging to Christian liturgy continued to be sidelined in the following centuries, although later there is evidence for the use of songs in the rituals and celebrations of the Byzantine imperial court and in popular festivities.

Throughout the Byzantine period, harmonics or musical theory was cultivated and taught as a mathematical science, which in turn belongs to the supreme science, philosophy. Its subject-matter is chiefly the mathematical relations between tonal intervals. After all, the incorporation of harmonics in the four subjects (the so-called *quadrivium*) taught in the higher learning schools of Byzantium deflects interest

away from music as artistic performance (musical act), refocusing it on the theoretical study of mathematical relations between sounds, harmonic calculations, and the relevant theoretical analyses. Therefore, music, as a science and a practice, was marginalized in education (both in terms of textbooks and teaching activity) and in the intellectual life throughout the Byzantine lands and throughout the western middle ages. To be precise, this was the case until the European Enlightenment, when new ideas led to the emergence of the view that music is a mimetic art and a creative activity. Around that time, musical theory as a branch of mathematics slowly began to disappear from the curricula of European higher schools.

A more systematic overview and more works on the position of musical theory in the context of Byzantine education are much needed now. Following the relocation of the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire to Constantinople, the city evolved into a great educational center, comparable to Hellenism's once famed centers of learning. In the time of Theodosius (425 AD), the Imperial University of Constantinople (*Pandidakterion*) had 30 chairs; among the courses taught we find Harmonics, always in conjunction with Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy. During the reign of Heraclius (610-641), in addition to theological sciences, this 'Ecumenical' school, as it was dubbed, also offered instruction on Greek sciences. These naturally included mathematics and harmonics. Two centuries later, we hear of the studies and the pursuits of the great dogmatist of the Eastern Orthodox Church, John of Damascus, who "was taught... mathematics, music, etc."

Higher learning experienced a phase great development following the establishment of University of the Palace Hall of Magnaura in

the time of Bardas (863). Leo the Mathematician, or Philosopher, taught there, while import educators such as Photius, Arethas, a.o. were active there. During this period, and with the support of an erudite emperor, Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, authorial output increased significantly and many ancient literature works were being copied, several of which were dedicated to the subject of harmonics. In 1970, E. Pöhlmann demonstrated that the work known as *Introduction to the Art of Music* by Bacchius Sennex is dedicated to Constantine VII, and not to Constantine I, as was earlier believed.

One of the earliest works on harmonics from the Byzantine era is by Monk Gregory Aneponymous *Syntagma eusynopton eis tas tessaras mathēmatikas epistēmas*, and was composed between 1008 and 1040. It was formerly ascribed to the great philosopher and polymath Michael Psellos, but nowadays we have at our disposal an excellent edition of this work by the great Danish historian of ancient mathematics J. Heiberg, *Anonymi Logica et Quadrivium cum scholiis antiquis*, (Copenhagen 1929).

It is important to note that in 1750 one of the pioneers of modern musicology R. Mizler (†1778), a German professor and publisher of a musicology periodical in Leipzig, attempted to publish Gregory's *Music* (harmonics) along with a German translation of the text. This is because Mizler, imbued with the rationalism of the great Christian Wolff, sought to find arguments that would allow him to promote music as a branch of mathematics (*musica more geometrico*) in university curricula. Thus Mizler singled out and highlighted the Prologue by that distant 11<sup>th</sup> century Byzantine author, where he claims that "the harmony of the cosmos is borne out in Music"; that "Harmonics are grounded on the fact that harmony is the synthesis of diverse tones in a

certain order”; and that the “purpose [of harmonics] is to study the constitution and the arithmetical relations between the symphonic intervals”.

Of course, today we know more about this early work of Byzantine musical theory, and that its treatment of harmonics follows, up to a point, Aristoxenus’ school (the Harmonists) and not that of Pythagoras (the Canonists); Mizler had failed to notice this. At any rate, the core of this work, i.e. its doctrine on the intervals, relies on the Pythagorean conception of arithmetical relations, as expounded by the brilliant mathematician Theon of Smyrna (1<sup>st</sup>-2<sup>nd</sup> century AD). In other words, at a critical point in the work, the Byzantine author switches from Aristoxenus’ summation of intervals from sharp elements to the Pythagorean calculation of the arithmetical relations between the tones, i.e. his analysis of harmonics unfolds simultaneously on two levels. Nonetheless, the core of the work is Pythagorean, and this feature characterizes all Byzantine literature on harmonics.

Certainly, scholarship in this area is lagging both in terms of the degree of acquaintance with the available material, and its proper evaluation. That is why contributions, such as the one mentioned above by Chr. Troelsgard, are extremely valuable. His study also confirms the mixed nature of Byzantine harmonics (Troelsgard, 1988, pp. 230-232); interestingly, he further notes that works on ecclesiastical music, such as that by Hagiopolites, the earliest (12<sup>th</sup> century) extant text of its kind (Hagiopolites, 1983), we find elements of ancient harmonics that are deemed useful in determining the appropriate level for teaching ecclesiastical music. Other extensive and systematic works on harmonics by Pachymeres and Nikephoros Bryennios can provide evidence on the features of musical practice (here of interest are the terms

‘music’, ‘chant’ and others, as well as the problems of employing string instruments in ecclesiastical musical practices).

Now, we will very briefly provide an overview of Byzantine authorial output in the field of harmonics from the 11<sup>th</sup> century to the dissolution of the Byzantine Empire. Michael Psellos, the head (literally “chief”) of the school of Constantinople (*hypatos tōn philosophōn*) was also known for his part in the reorganization of the curriculum in the “University of Constantinople” after 1045. He also composed an *Introduction to Rhythmical Science* and other minor works on music; this reveals the important place music held in the teaching of one of Byzantium’s most prominent sages. In the lower grade of the new University, Grammar, Rhetoric and classical authors always formed part of the curriculum; the higher grade featured the *quadrivium* subjects and Philosophy (Logic and Natural Philosophy) and, depending on the course of study elected by the student, Jurisprudence or Medicine. An interesting detail reflecting these teaching practices is preserved in a work by the 12<sup>th</sup> century author Nicholas Messarites. He describes how, in the School of the Saint Apostles in Constantinople, pupils received instruction on hymns and chants “in the enclosure” (these were first grade students); higher grade students, however, who took classes “in the courtyard”, were taught harmonics. Thus it is once more clear that musical practice (hymns, songs) was separated from musical theory, which was taught in the context of “scientific” disciplines.

In the Palaeologan period (1261-1453), Byzantium’s last period of flourishing in arts and letters, the subject of harmonics was widely taught in the “University”, the Patriarchal Academy, and in other higher-learning schools; almost all of the erudite philosophers of these two



centuries composed textbooks on harmonics. The most important names of this period are: Nikephoros Blemmydes in Nicaea and Ephesus; George Acropolites in the Hagia Sophia School; Maximos Planoudes (1255-1310), who composed a very extensive and unfortunately not extant *Harmonics*, where the astute author sums up the entire ancient Greek musical tradition; John Pediasimos; and, above all, the renown George Pachymeres. Pachymeres' (1242-1310) *Quadrivium* has been thankfully published in a critical edition (Tannery, 1940). The section on Music (harmonics) covers some 100 pages and is supplemented by many illustrations.

From the 14<sup>th</sup> century onwards, Byzantine scholars become increasingly more interested in ancient Greek works, and chiefly in Aristoxenus, Ptolemy, and other later authors on music. A number of Byzantine commentaries on these works are composed. The lengthiest and most complete work on harmonics was produced, however, by Manuel Bryennios in *ca.* 1320<sup>1</sup>. Bryennios' work was preserved in a large number of manuscripts and in the late 15<sup>th</sup> century it became known in the West thanks to a Latin translation by Franchinus Gaffurius.

Another eminent philosopher and astronomer, Theodore Metochites (1260-1332) analytically defined the essence of harmonics; he had studied under Manuel Bryennios. As a Christian humanist, he pondered on the possible benefits to be had from the study of harmonics on one's worldview: he argues that harmonics can bring people closer to the miracle of the harmony of the heavenly spheres, and God's perfection and omnipotence.

In the final years of the Byzantine Empire,

the number of original works on harmonics and of the manuscripts containing earlier works suggests the subject continued to be studied extensively. In these years, contacts with the West multiply, and Byzantium begins to exert increasingly greater influence on the Latin-speaking world; this phenomenon will reach its apogee with the flight of scholars from Byzantine lands to Italy after the fall of Constantinople. The final testimony on Byzantine musical theory is a brief work by George Gemistos or Plethon, the great philosopher of Mystras (1360-1452), and is entitled *Some Chapters on Musical Theory*. His student, the scholarly cardinal Bessarion, kept interest in the science of harmonics alive, as revealed by the large number of the relevant manuscripts he bequeathed to the Biblioteca Marciana in Venice.

As a conclusion, we can claim that as a higher learning scientific discipline, musical theory/harmonics in Byzantium remained firmly oriented towards the Pythagorean music theoreticians, Ptolemy, Nicomachus of Gerasa, Theon and others, who remained the authorities in the field of harmonics; their status remained unchallenged. Beyond the main musical commonplaces (*topoi*), which throughout the Byzantine era constituted a shared patrimony in musical education (parallel to the theoretical and arithmetical orientation of Byzantine harmonics, with respect to relations between intervals), musical philosophers were also well versed into Aristoxenus' doctrines on melody and rhythm; thus, Byzantine musical theory was anything but monolithic. At any rate, practical music textbooks (the so-called *Papadikes*) apparently continue precisely this practical (acoustic) method of Aristoxenus' school, albeit with a different purpose and in another context. Finally, it should be under-

<sup>1</sup> This work has also received an important modern edition: *Manuël Bryenniu Harmonika: The harmonics of Manuel Bryennius* (ed) G. H. Jonker (Gronigen 1970).

lined that the contemporary scholarly research, comprehensive in its methods and goals, scholarly research needs to clarify a series of questions before we will be in a position to speak with some degree of certainty about the great contributions of the Byzantines also in the field of music.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The core of this article predates the brilliant chapter "Musik" (in vol. 2, pp. 181-218) by Christian Hanick in Herbert Hunger (Ed.) *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner: Philosophie, Rhetorik, Geschichtsschreibung* (Munich 1978). I would advise anyone with a keen interest in Byzantine music to use this as a starting point.

## “BOOK OF LAMENTATIONS” IN THE CONTEXT OF LEGAL-PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS\*

### Abstract

This article presents a methodological analysis of Grigor Narekatsi’s famous work “The book of lamentations” from the point of view of the theory and practice of judiciary science. The author offers a detailed study of Grigor Narekatsi’s conception of the main types of judicial trial. This article reveals the specificities of the description of the main participants of judicial trials – the judge, the prosecutor, the accused, and the defender in Narekatsi’s work “The book of lamentations”. Since Narekatsi’s work is dedicated to the trial of human souls, this article pays a good deal of attention to moral and religious aspects of the problems under discussion.

*Keywords:* Grigor Narekatsi, “The book of lamentations”, judiciary science, the trial of human souls.

“Narek”, undoubtedly is a unique and distinctive composition created by divine inspiration. No such literary work existed ever before, during or after Narekatsi’s lifetime, nor will anything of the kind ever be created.

For centuries the Book by Gregory of Narek was a subject for many comprehensive research projects. The theological, moral, and philosophical aspects of the Book were studied; efforts were made to reveal its poetic features, its connection to neoplatonism and so on. However, surprisingly, the book had never been researched by lawyers, regardless of the numerous legal terms, concepts, notions and formulations in it. In the Book there are such legal notions as law, right, judge, prosecutor, witness, attorney, investigator, investigation, trial, de-

fendant, accuser, criminal offender, police officer, jail, verdict, punishment and others. Such legal terms are used throughout the Book, and based on this fact we can argue that the Book also has a legal dimension, because the terms are not used as simple notions but are rather used in their philosophical, legal and practical meanings.

In the very first chapter of the Book, Gregory of Narek suggests two different trials. The first one is the trial initiated by Gregory of Narek, the second one is that of retribution, which will take place at the end of the world in Iosafat or Kedron valley.

In order to reveal the content and aims of the trial, initiated by Gregory of Narek, the following should be taken into consideration. The Lord himself wants people to come to trial in front of him. He tells about it through his prophet Isaiah: “And when ye spread forth

\* In a short form published in *Mousikos Logos* (Μουσικός Λόγος), Athens 1 (2000) 4sq.

your hands, I will hide mine eyes from you; yea, when ye make many prayers, I will not hear: your hands are full of blood!” (Isaiah 1,15)<sup>1</sup>”.

According to the Christian doctrine, human sins are subdivided into two types: original sins and actual sins. The original sin is inherited from the ancestor Adam, who voluntarily violated the commandment of the Lord and eventually gave in to the power of Satan. Christians are released from this sin by baptism in the name of Christ and purification by Holy Spirit. But, man is created in the image and likeness of God; he is a free and reasonable creature and can commit sins even after being baptized. Those sins are called actual and for washing of them the sacrament of penance was created. Penance is the key which opens the doors of God's mercy. Without penance and purification from actual sins salvation is impossible, perfection is impossible, and it is also impossible to merge with God in the end.

Active repentance and redemption of sins, as the aim of criminal punishment and as legal institutional notions, are currently prescribed by criminal procedure codes of all countries.

Gregory of Narek thinks that repentance and penance (penitence) should be equal to the gravity of the committed crime and sin. Otherwise, it may entail mental illness or lead to other negative consequences, affecting the morale and the psyche.

“Both unruly sin and deep regret  
plunge us into damnation,  
Being essentially similar even  
though from different sources”.  
(Prayer 10, A)<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> English text is quoted from The Holy Bible, Authorized King James Version.

<sup>2</sup> English text here and hereinafter is quoted from “Book of Prayers” translated by Thomas J. Samuelian.

The sacrament of penance has three elements two of which - repentance and confession - are the creating parts of sacrament and the third one - retribution - completes the integrity of the sacrament. The last one, in its turn, consists of prayer, lent and mercy. Although those elements are closely interconnected, and function as a whole, but repentance plays the most important role in the sacrament of penance, and is, as a rule, accompanied with tears. The Book by Gregory of Narek is absorbed with repentance and is soaked with tears of repentance.

How does Gregory of Narek initiate the trial of penance? He, placing the fruits of his wavering mind as savory sacrifices on the fire of his grieving soul to be delivered to God in the censer of his will (Prayer 1, A). Gregory of Narek thinks that this grieving mourns that he delivers to Heaven, is speaking liturgy and he hopes that the Lord will find this simple string of words acceptable and will not turn in disdain. He wants this unsolicited gift to reach God, this sacrifice of words from the deep mystery-filled chamber of his feelings, consumed in flames fueled by whatever grace he may have within him (Prayer I, A). This way he mournfully comes to a trial with God, in other words he appears in front of God for trial.

Gregory of Narek attaches particular importance to the bases which provide the successful course of the trial he initiated, that is - the penance trial. These bases are faith and hope. Gregory of Narek is hopeful that the sinner comes out in atonement, the villain leaves justified, the unclear is purified and the sinner with unredeemed sins is non-convicted, is liberated from the slavery of bliss and granted heavenly freedom. There is nothing more magnificent than the heart of a sinner who has rediscovered his sense from the darkness and re-

ceived the help of God, on the one hand the person bears and outward smile, on the other, he his grievous in his soul. This sinner, although encumbered with his renovated and absolute sins, is deeply drowned in the bottomless abyss of destruction, but keeps sacred relics in his mind and soul as a token of salvation. That is why the sinner bent under immense sadness, hopeless to find the anticipated good and deprived of the courage for virtue, can hope that he can again obtain the adornments, granted to him originally. Repentance and penance are created by God and are presented as signs of his almightiness in the Gospel.

God confirms repentance and penance as pleasant incense, and they are based on sincere faith and strong hope. The Savior took a token of faith before restoring light to the eyes of blind people (Prayer 11, A).

In order to develop a comprehensive understanding of the legal dimension of the Book by Gregory of Narek it is also necessary to touch upon the issue of retribution trial. One of the important parts of the Christian doctrine is eschatology, the theory of the end of world, the Second Coming, resurrection of mortals and Judgment Day.

Gregory of Narek sees all this with the eyes of his soul, hears the horrible sounds of the Judgment Day, compelling him to stand up and fight in a battle. Even in this earthly life he feels a deep and inherent anxiety and hosts of chaotic disturbances; pieces of evil and good advice clash and make him a prisoner of death. Gregory of Narek understands that if one does not repent for their sins and does not achieve absolution, then:

“Thus, the kingdom of God  
in a visible form has come  
already, charging me on truthful

testimony with wrongs graver  
than those of the Edomites,  
Philistines and other barbarians –  
wrongs that brought down  
the hand of God”.

(Prayer A, B)

And if, according to Gregory of Narek, his sufferings are not long lasting, the punishment for his sins will not have an end or boundaries. Fear, abyssal fall, inevitable alarm, endless shame and other punishments await him. It is obvious that Gregory of Narek used the term “Accuse” in a sense of bringing accusation in a trial.

Because on the Judgment Day the sinners and the righteous will receive retribution for their actions, Gregory of Narek calls the Judgment Day “Retribution trial”. Thus, the legal interpretation of the Book by Gregory of Narek will give a chance to reveal that there are images of both penance and retribution trials in the Book. Those images in the Book are often intermingled but the Book is mainly devoted to penance trial. The legal interpretation of the Book gives a chance to reveal the peculiarities of both penance and retribution trials in comparison with each other and the eternal judgment.

Gregory of Narek believes that God is beneficent, almighty, awe-inspiring, gracious, kind, a good Father, a charitable donor of mercy, whose very name heralds the good news of his grandeur, compassion and fatherly affection; he is gentle even toward the bitter and discontented. And the Son, who is like the Father, whose hand is strong like Father's, whose awesome reign is eternal like the Father's, whose exaltation, is shared with him in creation. So to the Holy Spirit of truth that flows from the Father without end, the perfect essence of existence and eternal being, is equal to the Father in all things, reigning with the Son in equal glory. Later, Gregory of

Narek in a small number of lines presents main provisions of the Symbol of Faith. He says:

“Three persons, one mystery,  
separate faces, unique and distinct,  
made one by their congruence and  
being of the same holy substance and  
nature, unconfused and undivided,  
one in will and one in action. One  
is not greater, one is not lesser, not  
even by an eyelash, and because of  
the unobscurable light of heavenly  
love revealed in our midst both  
have been glorified with a single  
crown of holiness from  
before the ages.”

(Prayer 13, A)

When describing God, Gregory of Narek uses both positive and negative definitions. God, on the one side, is inconceivable, immense, inaccessible, unknowable, indescribable, incomprehensible, inscrutable, beginningless, timeless, underived, endless, borderless, reasonless and so on, on the other hand, He is kind, merciful, gracious, fairly judging, careful, formidable, terrible, mighty, or He is the fair sun, a blessed ray, a radiant image, a longed craving, the joyfulness of kindness, a reassuring vision, a praised earthly ruler, an ambitious king, a confessional life and so on. In these different definitions of God there is an obvious contradiction. If God, for example, is inconceivable, unknowable, indescribable, how can we call Him kind, fairly judging, merciful, glorious and so on. These are seeming contradictions, and in order to understand this comprehensively, we should discuss the issues of influence and cognition of God.

It should be noted that negative definitions of God relate to the nature of God, while the positive ones relate to His influences. And when Gregory of Narek, affirmingly, states that God is kind, fair, merciful, charitable and so on, none of these definitions relates to the nature of God but to His influences, and when he, states by nega-

tion that God is non-proceeded, endless and so on, all these definitions relate to the substance of God. The definitions give us an understanding of what God is like as the Judge in the Book. Our powerless mind should not be misguided and consider God as a judge to be the same as a judge in the worldly sense. Although God is a judge in the Book, he is more than a judge.

In the penance trial, initiated by Gregory of Narek, an important role is given to the prosecutor, who acts as the accuser during this trial. In its modern sense, a prosecutor is a participant of the trial, who presents the criminal offence, committed by the defendant before the court and demands to apply the relevant type and measure of punishment.

In the penance trial Gregory of Narek himself plays the role of a prosecutor. He considers himself a severe prosecutor, who decorates his indictment by brief quotations from the speeches of prophets (Prayer 33, B). Moreover, he considers himself a prosecutor who has the necessary qualities inherently, at the bottom of his heart acting against himself. Gregory of Narek says:

“For the sake of the name of the majestic  
glory of your blessed Father, for  
the sake of the compassionate will  
of your Holy Spirit, Look with favor  
upon this relentless expression  
of contrition for my wrong doing,  
and the reproach I heap upon myself  
from the depth of my heart.”

(Prayer 57, B)

The central participant of the penance trial in the Book by Gregory of Narek is the defendant. It is notable that in the penance trial Gregory of Narek is not only a prosecutor, but also a defendant. As a prosecutor, he is ready to repeat self-reproach in the same imagery and in the same manner and the Lord will possibly consider these painful words of condemnation verdict

as a true confession. He writes:

“And now I continue to accuse my  
cursed soul, in different terms  
confessing all my undisclosed evil  
doings that perhaps the all-knowing  
might record in my favor these  
anguished words of penitence  
and contrition.”

(Prayer 22, A)

Gregory of Narek, representing both the prosecutor and the defender is fully determined to make everything publicly known, convict and condemn his essence. In this regard he says:

“And because I have risen against  
Myself with words like harsh  
Prosecutor and have even taken  
up the sword of righteous anger  
that cannot be sheathed, who  
among the earth-born will plead  
for me? I shall confess every  
scandalous detail. I shall submit  
my being to judgment. I shall  
beat down the army of destruction.  
I shall prosecute the marauders  
wounding me. I have sinned  
in everything and in all ways”.

(Prayer 22, D)

But it would be too primitive to consider only Gregory of Narek himself as the only defendant in the penance trial, depicted in the Book. The defendant is the human being as such, who embodies the collective image of humanity. It means that at penance trial the defendant is any human being, who ever lived, lives now, or will live in the future, after Gregory of Narek. For that reason readers see their own selves in the pages of the Book, and this is where the immense enchantment of the Book is hidden.

Along with the judge, prosecutor and defendant defenders are participants of the penance trial, too. Gregory of Narek considers Holy Mother of God as his main defender during the penance trial. He has special treatment towards

the Holy Virgin. He thinks of the Mother of God as an angel in bodily form, heavenly queen, pure as air, clean as light, clear as the image of the sun at its height, higher than the forbidden dwelling place of the holies, place of the blessed covenant, a breathing Eden, tree of immortality, guarded by a fiery sword, strengthened and protected by the exalted Father, prepared and purified by the Holy Spirit that rested upon him, adorned by the Son who dwelt in him as his tabernacle, only Son of the Father, and for his first born, and his Lord by creation, together with his unsoiled purity, spotless goodness, together with his immaculate holiness, guardian intercessor (Prayer 80, A).

At the penance trial angels, in particular the guardian angel, also act as defenders. Angels are virtuous, created good by the God - doer of good; they are ignorant of evil, established by God's command. They are mighty force at God's disposal; they are holy, pure, spotless, blessed, splendid, victorious and invincible, swift as a flash of the mind (Prayer 81, A).

These guardian angels serve us and plead for us, just as for the barren fig tree that did not give fruit for three years, an eternity encompassing past, present and future, for a long period it took root in the vineyard of this world, decorating with useless foliage, but gave no fruit, and this is the very image of wretched mankind.

At penance trial the mighty defenders of man are holy apostles, martyrs, holy hermit fathers. Holy apostles were ordained with the heavenly hand of God, anointed by the Holy Spirit. They are leaders of life, the first to be graced with this honor, the glorified choir, the spiritual rivers, the sublime evangelists, the illustrious princes, those with sparkling crowns, and those adorned in the untarnished, brilliant radiance of the strength of grace, those who have been made perfect with the oil of gladness

of lordly light (Prayer 82, A). Together with his disciples, Christ God on high, and the self-sacrifice of his chosen martyrs, who through mortification and torments of the flesh, and peril to life and limb and all manner of suffering, and who despite their earthly nature struggled against every element of material existence to win halos, transcending and reborn in spirit. They departed this world, as the prophets said, as true witnesses to the trials and tribulations of death. They comprehended the unequivocal good, unseen and hidden (Prayer 82).

If there are the court, trial, judge, prosecutor, defendant and defenders, there should also be the issue of trial and judicial inquiry. In order to complete our ideas about the penance trial, we should define the issue of the trial, something for which a man - a defendant is accused; also we should disclose the peculiarities of judicial inquiry.

If we try to characterize the issue of the penance trial as a whole, we can say that man - the defendant is accused in sinning before God. According to the Christian doctrine, sinning in the mind, by word and action is the violation of the commandments of God.

Gregory of Narek compares human sins with sands of the shore, but unlike the sand of the shore, which do not have birth and growth, human sins and crimes have birth and growth, there are so many of them, that they cannot be remembered. That is why he touches upon the lessons of sins. Human sins are countless, they are impossible to comprehend, one with its kith, the other with its kin, one with its defects, the other with its dangers, one with its thorns, the other with its roots, one with its stem, the other with its fruits, one with its limbs, the other with its branches, one with its shoots, the other with its joints, one with its claws, the other with its fin-

gers, one with its shakiness, the other with its sturdiness, one with its causes, the other with its effects, one with its imprint, the other with its traces, one with its shadow, the other with its darkness, one with its tactics, the other with its strategy, one with its guile, the other with its intent, one with its trajectory, the other with its size, one with its depth, the other with its baseness, one with its spark, the other with its passion, one with its goods, the other with its treasures, one with its pipes, the other with its fountain, one with its torrents, the other with its lightning, one with its flames, the other with its shame, one with its oils, the other with its abysses, one with its embers, the other with its dullness, one with its thunder, the other with its raindrops, one with its currents, the other with its floods and frost, one with its gates, the other with its roadways (Prayer 6, C).

The penance trial initiated by Gregory of Narek begins with the prosecutor's speech. Gregory of Narek appears in the Book as a skilled investigator who investigates, discovers all the bends of the human soul, and revealing human sins, even the hidden ones, then as a prosecutor, he accuses man before the God. Gregory of Narek, as a prosecutor, presents the reasons of the agents of death - the roots of the bitter fruit of the tree of damnation, hostile kin, intimate adversaries, traitorous sons, whom he describes in detail by name (Prayer 56, A). Those fruits are sinister heart, gossiping mouth, lustful eyes, wanton ears, murderous hands, weak kidneys, wayward feet, swaggering gait, crooked footprints, polluted breath, dark inclinations, dried innards, mushy mind, inconstant will, incorrigible depravity, wavering virtue, banished soul, dissipated legacy, and so on (Prayer 56, B). These are the multitude of seductive devices, which he allowed to deceive in a naive way, al-



lowed to prevail over him in his weakness, condemning himself willfully to death (Prayer 56, B).

As a prosecutor, Gregory of Narek dared to say what is unspeakable: he has boasted in his humiliation, he has exposed his secrets, disclosed what he had covered up, shown what he had hidden, spread what he had stored up, splattered the gall of his bitterness, divulged his collaboration with the evil one, squeezed his pus-filled wound, acknowledged the abyss of his sins, put on the mask of hypocrisy, lifted the veil from ugliness, stripped away the clothes from shamefulness, laid open his baseness, thrown up the dregs of death, revealed the abscessed wounds of his soul to the God. This is how Gregory of Narek brings the prosecutor into appearance before the judge (Prayer 65, A).

Gregory of Narek, as the defendant, joins the prosecutor, and he shall never stop judging his condemned self with anguished words, or stop reproaching him for his sins, like a wicked irredeemable and incorrigible being. For although he has slain some of his tormentors, he helped others to live and lost his soul, like a plant with bitter branches, he had blossomed with the odor of wrongful ways, with corrupting and fatal fruit, which he has made into the wine of destruction, the offspring of Canaan, the child of hell and paradise, the heir of Flades, the stuff of torment, ungrateful and disgraceful, ever sinful, one who embitters the sweetness of God's beneficence, an evil and bad servant, diligent in the baseness of corruption, conscientious in angering the Lord, ever active in satanic ventures, a daily cause of grief to his Maker, weak in his flight toward goodness, lazy in the blessing of fidelity, slow in observing his promises, fainthearted in the necessary and useful, and unfaithful and un-

grateful servant (Prayer 7, B).

Gregory of Narek is sure that punishments always should match the sins they are for, like mirror images, identical, parallel, emblematic of the wrong. As he does not tend the needs of his fellow man with warm charity, he freezes with fear at the first sign of danger. And since he did not check his willful pride, it is fair that he should be consumed with unbridled disgrace. And since he did not love the light of the good news, it is just that he should be condemned to grope in the darkness of ignorance and fog of perdition. And since he paid no heed to small faults, considering them harmless, it is fitting for him to be wounded by the stings of insects. And since he did not lend a helping hand to those in danger, it is proper for him to be cast into a pit of filth (Prayer 19, C).

Any trial and court, any judicial process ends with the verdict of the court. The penance trial is not an exception. The judge is merciful, he forgives the sinner, which sinning multiple times during the day, repenting, turns to him, even if the choice is made with his last breath, or in the very midst of sinning (Prayer 30, A). God is all-compassionate, doer of good, blessed, long-suffering, potent, beyond understanding, beyond words, incorruptible and uncreated, He is the beginning and cause of all goods. He is not the accuser, but the liberator, he is not the destroyer, but the rescuer, not the executioner, but the savior, not the scatter, but the gatherer, not the traitor, but the deliverer, He does not pull down, but lifts up, He does not knock down, but stands upright, He does not curse, but blesses, He does not take revenge, but gives grace, He does not torment, but comforts, He does not erase, but writes, He does not shake, but steadies, He does not trample, but consoles, He does not invent the causes of

death, but seeks the means to preserve life. He does not forget to help, He does not abandon the good, He does not withhold compassion, He does not bring sentence of death, but the legacy of life (Prayer 82, E).

The trial of retribution takes place on the initiative of God, regardless of the will, or to put in more accurate terms, against the will of certain people. From this point of view, the trial of retribution, in accordance with contemporary legal perceptions, is a type of the inquisition process.

Gregory of Narek depicts the judgment day in details. The trial for judgment is terrifying, the judge that cannot be bought or deceived, awful shame, fearsome rebuke, inescapable reprimand, unavoidable torment, terror that cannot be comforted, trembling that cannot be stilled, inconsolable weeping, incurable gnashing of teeth, irreparable disease, the curse of awesome divine word, the shutting down of compassion, cutting off of mercy await the sinner (Prayer 79, B).

But the most terrible part is the trial itself. When the guardian angel who is our companion for life, accuses us like a stern official. Here the concept of the “stern official” reflects not the function of care for, protection and guardianship of a human during his earthly life, rather than the protection of public order. The Heavenly King, sitting at the trial, listens to the accusation of the guardian angel, and justly reprimands the sinners, the king's servants rush about without delay inviting some to life and condemning others to shame, showing to some a cheerful face, to others appearing fearsome and horrifying. To some they shall offer a halo of glistening light, and to others mortal perdition.

Is Gregory of Narek afraid of punishment after the Judgment Day? Undoubtedly, but not as a servant, who is afraid of punishments provided by the master, but as a loving son who is afraid to disappoint his parents. Is he expecting merits, provided for a righteous man on the Judgment Day? Definitely he is, but not as a mercenary who is doing his paid job, but as a loving son who wants to be closer to his parents by his gifts. To awe with no fear, to expect with no anticipation, this is the spiritual predisposition of saints, and Gregory of Narek is a Saint, who prefers to be in hell with God, but not in paradise without God; although where ever God is, there his kingdom is.

His Book of Prayers contains considerable legal knowledge, and even in the 10th century he used concepts in his Book which received their classical definitions and reflection in contemporary legal science and law enforcement. But Gregory of Narek, first of all, is a Christian hermit, whose heart was full of faith, hope and love, and his main purpose was human perfection and goodness.

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SOME REMARKS ON THE FIRST BOOK OF ARISTOTLE'S *POLITICS*

## Abstract

This article is devoted to a sequential analysis of the first book of Aristotle's *Politics*. It suggests an interpretation of the classical problem of natural hierarchy of men as it described in the first book of the treatise. In this book, Aristotle examines seven commonly held definitions of a slave – four “natural” and three “conventional” ones – and then offers his own eighth definition, placed right in the middle between nature and convention. The article exclusively deals with the first book of *Politics* and avoids invoking other books of the treatise as well as other works of Aristotle because in classical political philosophy every statement is highly contextualized and could not be simply quoted in order to prove or disprove any point of view without preceding deep examination.

*Keywords:* Aristotle, politics, slavery, mastery, economics.

Aristotle's *Politics* is a treatise that seems try to show what a state is, what are its parts and then to describe an ideal state – a state which provides happiness for all its citizens as a whole and every citizen individually (1324a 5-8, 23-25, 1325a 7-10, 1329a 22-24)<sup>1</sup>. Thus, it seems that the first, introductory, book of *Politics* is devoted to the origins of social and private life, commonly named by Aristotle as “partnership” (κοινωνία), as well as to their peak – political authority.

The first book stands out both against the rest of this work and against other Aristotle's treatises. First of all, touching upon questions which had already been raised before him, Aristotle usually tries to describe or generalize opinions on these matters. Such works as, for example, *Physics*, *Big Ethics*, *Rhetoric* etc. begin in this manner. However, the ideas of other phi-

losophers about both the state and the ideal state are seeming to be discussed in the second book of *Politics*, not the first one. Secondly, the discussion of family, slavery and economics will no longer be raised after the first book, which is logical, for there is no point in discussing who a slave is if in the ideal state all slaves turn out to be the people who can be granted freedom (1328b 24-29 and 1330a 25-30, 31-33); nor is there any point in discussing the problems of economics or family if in the ideal state only happy people are by default considered citizens, which can be achieved only by excluding from citizens those who are unhappy by definition: children, women, disabled or poor people or manual workers (1328b 5-10, 1328b 33-1329a 2, 1335b 19-21). In the meantime, weapons are declared to be the guarantee of happiness for the majority of the rest, although the treatise says nothing on how to use them (1297b 1-2, 1328b 7-10, 1329a 16-18). Thus, the first book of *Poli-*

<sup>1</sup> All references to the *Politics* are in parentheses. Quotations are from Aristotle, 1959.

*tics* is separated from the rest of the work both by its subject matter and by its position; hence it is worth taking a closer look at it.

In the introduction Aristotle focuses on three properties of the state as such. The first one is that every state is partnership. The second one is that every state is formed with a view to some “good”. Yet in the first book this “good” is not the happiness of all citizens, but only self-sufficiency (Cf., 1252b 27-29, 1252b 35-1253a 1) (αὐτάρκεια) of the state; moreover, the word “happiness” (εὐδαιμονία) is not used in the first book at all. The third aspect is that this good is supposed (δοκέω) (1252a 3), i.e. not true. Indeed, it would be inappropriate to claim the necessity to search and create an ideal state if any state or any regime could reach its goal by default. However, if the state aims for self-sufficiency, then any political system, i.e. any existing regime, will reach it by default. In this sense there is no difference between various types of regimes, for all of them are equally good at reaching this goal. Perhaps, the thing is that the first book deals with the state as such and not with the ideal state, thus it does not impose overestimated standards on it, requiring every state system to be ideal, i.e. providing happiness.

Aristotle continues his research, speaking of the types that embody their imperative position in partnerships. The first two of them are political (governmental): “statesman” and “royal ruler”; the other two are private: “head of an estate” and “master”. At the same time, it seems that at least between the two of them (royal ruler and statesman) there is a difference, but, according to Aristotle, it is neither quantitative nor qualitative (1252a 7-16, 1288b 1-2). Since Aristotle next speaks of the two types of partnership that the state derives from (a conjugal partner-

ship, or the partnership of equals, and a master-slave partnership, or the partnership of unequals), these four types representing the masterful side of partnership seem to be divided into pairs: royal ruler–master, statesman–head of an estate. Indeed, a royal ruler treats his subjects like a master treats his slaves (1285b 29-33), and a statesman is in the same relationship with citizens as husband is with his wife (1259b 4-10). Thus, in order to better understand the concept of state partnership, Aristotle comes to study the two types of private partnerships.

### Slavery

Male-female partnership is necessary and natural and is meant for the sake of reproduction (1252a 26-31). Aristotle says nothing more about the first type of private partnership before proceeding to the second type, the description of a slavery problem. And it really *is* a problem, for it seems that a master-slave partnership, just like a male-female one, should be natural, dividing the parties to a partnership into two groups: masters and slaves. Yet the very first definition of a slave, given by Aristotle, is problematic. He says that a slave is by nature a ruled human being, the one who does not possess the intellect of his master and thus only capable of employing his body to labor (1252a 31-34). Aristotle then immediately has to declare that woman, who is generally thought to be inferior in intellect to man and predisposed to obedience and physical labor, cannot be a natural slave (1252a 34-1252b 1). The teleology principle cannot allow a woman to be predisposed to perform two roles, fulfilling two “natural” purposes at a time. And since it is obvious that women are meant for childbearing, and hence are predisposed to a conjugal partnership rather than that

of master and slave, Aristotle has to not only decline this definition, but, following the same rule, also completely remove women from any definition of “natural” slavery (Cf. 1260b 18-20).

The first definition of a “natural slave” is instantly followed by the second one: a slave is a barbarian (1252b 9. Cf. 1285a 19-22). To support this thesis, Aristotle quotes Euripides and Hesiod<sup>2</sup>. The only thing we know about barbarians from other parts of *Politics* is the only political characteristic given to them by Aristotle. Its point is that barbarians are people who either have not created the state yet (savages) or who live under monarchy (1285a 16-18, 1285b 23-25, 1295a 11-14, 1327b 23-29). However, this knowledge seems to be enough for Aristotle to contest the second definition of a “natural slave”. The philosopher says that the state derives from the family, but several families do not yet constitute the state, and when created, the state inevitably becomes monarchical (1252b 15-27, 1295a 11-14). Aristotle says that “it is owing to this that our cities were at first under royal sway and that foreign races are so still” (1252b 19-20). In other words, if the state is natural, then all peoples go through the following stages: family – several families – kingship (1295a 11-14, 1297b 25-26). And it means, that the Greeks also used to be barbarians<sup>3</sup>. But if a barbarian is a “natural slave”, then the Greeks used to be “natural slaves” and then stopped being them, having become “natural masters”. Which, of course, would

mean the impossible: not only did the Greeks manage to disavow their nature, but were also able to acquire a new one.

A couple of strange things arises here. Firstly, speaking of barbarians as “natural slaves”, Aristotle points out that they practice the only type of private partnership – a conjugal one. But for some reason he calls it a “partnership of female slave and male slave” (1252b 5-7). How can a notion of a master-slave partnership, which barbarians allegedly do not have by definition, be applied to a conjugal partnership, which, as has already been said, is the partnership of “equals”? Perhaps the matter is that a conjugal partnership is natural and takes place by necessity (*ἀνάγκη*) (1252a 26), and hence it cannot be part of a master’s life, which definitely assumes freedom from any needs or coercion.

Secondly, here Aristotle in his discussion about the state deriving from the family also underlines the unnaturalness, artificialness of civil authorities in particular and civilization as a whole (1275b 32-34)<sup>4</sup> and then dwells upon the birth of monarchy. According to Aristotle, monarchy is definitely the best form of government (1259b 14-17, 1284a 3-13, 1284b 25-34, 1332b 16-23) also because it is the only natural form of government (1285b 29-35)<sup>5</sup>. And, importantly, kingly rule does not derive from a master-slave partnership (See, for example (1279a 17-21) (which would be impossible in

<sup>2</sup> Of the twelve direct quotes, nine are mentioned in the first half of the book, dedicated to the problem of slavery, and only three are mentioned in the second half. Quotes that do not belong to poets are encountered only twice, both times their authors being notable statesmen.

<sup>3</sup> Aristotle does not believe in incremental progress, and thus the Greeks can lose the civilization that they created and become barbarians under the king again.

<sup>4</sup> It actually does not prevent the artificial civilization from deriving from natural barbarity. Thus, artificial trade, for example, directly derives from natural barter exchange. (See 1257a 1-6, 30-31).

<sup>5</sup> This argument is supported by the fact that monarchy is the only regime without two poles: its lower pole is a life-time strategy, which is not monarchy at all (See 1285a 3-10, 1287a 3-8). It is also supported by the fact that tyranny - as opposed to monarchy - can arise from other political regimes, and is most similar to democracy in terms of its origin and its modes of action (See 1284a 33-36, 1285a 29-33, 1286b 16-17, 1292a 15-20, 1310b 2-4).

case of “barbarians”), but directly from a conjugal partnership: “for every household is under the royal rule of its eldest member” (1252b 20-22, 1255b 18-19, 1259a 39-1259b 1, 10-11).

But we have to get back to the slavery problem. Having contested the first two “natural” definitions, Aristotle introduces a third one. What if a “natural slave” is not human at all, but a beast in a human disguise? This definition is discussed in the fragment dedicated to two types of persons capable of living outside of state partnership: “inferior man” (φᾶλλος ἄνθρωπος) and “superman” (κρείττων ἄνθρωπος) (1253a 4). Just like conjugal partnership, political partnership is natural, i.e. “necessary”, that is why those who do not belong to it are either bad people or supermen who have dedicated their lives not to politics, but to a superior, contemplative activity, for only such activity can lead to happiness (1324a 23-25, 1325b 16-21, 1328b 33-1329a 2, 1334a 20-23). In this sense, a person who has voluntarily refused to enter into conjugal partnership can be considered a superman, whereas the one who is not able to enter into such a partnership, is considered inferior. At the end of this argument Aristotle comes to speaking not about “inferior man” or “superman”, but about a “beast” (θηρίον) and a “god” (θεός). Indeed, people who live outside of political partnership (savages) do exist, but does it mean that they, like “talking livestock”, are “natural slaves”? To contest this argument, Aristotle also accepts a different point of view saying that all animals, both wild and domestic, exist only to serve men (1254b 10)<sup>6</sup>. Thus, if anyone were a “beast” in a human disguise, they would actually have to be “natural slaves”, i.e. would be bound to serve men. However, according to Aristotle, there are

two features that distinguish human beings from animals: speech and the ability to perceive moral values, such as justice and injustice, good and evil (1253a 14-18). Let us forget for a moment that there are no humans without speech (the exceptions only confirm the rule here, since a slave who cannot understand his master is as useful as an animal) (1259b 25-28). Let us also forget that all types of political and private partnerships (κοινωνία) imply some kind of equality, i.e. relationships between human beings. Even after getting rid of these arguments we will have to agree with Aristotle on the fact that state (“political partnership”) and law, an integral part of state (1253a 37-38), both rest on the notion of justice (which is also vital for other types of partnership) and that, consequently, a creature which has no idea about justice and which does not possess it, cannot enter into the partnership (1253a 35-38, 1260a 20-1260b 5). That is why political partnership (and all other types of partnership) includes only people and does not include inanimate objects and other creatures.

Having contested the first three definitions of a slave (“natural slave”), for the first time Aristotle mentions that not all people agree with the existence of natural slavery, and that some people think that for one man to be another man's master is contrary to nature (1253b 21-22)<sup>7</sup>. But instead of speaking about conventional theories of slavery, Aristotle seems to give the first generalized definition of a slave as a man belonging to another man by his nature (1254a 14-15)<sup>8</sup>. The philosopher describes several examples of natural hierarchy: body–soul (1254b 4-5), male–

<sup>6</sup> Cf. with a less radical version of the same statement (1256b 15-22).

<sup>7</sup> The slavery's unnaturalness is supported by the fact that there is a possibility to completely get rid of it (See 1253b 37-1254a 1).

<sup>8</sup> Earlier he gives the same but slightly paraphrased definition of a slave as a “tool” (1254a 5-8).

female (1254b 13-14), man–beast (1254b 10-13). These examples state the supremacy of the reasonable nature. He whose body is more developed, i.e. more suitable for dull physical labor, will be the “natural slave” (1254b 16-19). Coming to this conclusion, Aristotle once again gives a generalized definition of a slave, underlining the relevance of the slave’s status regardless of its implementation (Cf. 1254a 14-15 with 1254b 20-21). Truly, the body can dominate the soul, the woman can dominate the man, the beast can compel the man (to flee, for example), but it will not anyhow change their natural status. A slave is always a slave, regardless of his legal status: either he is free, or a master, or a citizen, or a metic etc. Now, there are several problems with the definition of “natural slave” as a physically strong person. Firstly, a physically strong person can also turn out to be mentally strong, i.e. physical strength itself says nothing about natural predisposition to slavery. “Natural masters” can have both weak and strong bodies (1254b 32-34). Secondly, physical strength is part of bodily perfection, and this is the way people picture gods<sup>9</sup>. And physically perfect people are as superior to regular people, as the gods superior to themselves (1254b 34-36). But then we would have to state the impossible – that the gods are superslaves. Thirdly, nothing would stop physically strong people from making physically weak people their slaves (1255a 9-11). On the contrary, this state of affairs would quite correspond with the natural hierarchy of bodies. Next, says Aristotle, besides the hierarchy of bodies, there is the hierarchy of souls, which would be much more appropriate to use to define the “natural status” of masters and slaves (1254b 37-39). For

<sup>9</sup> Aristotle says nothing about moral supremacy of pictured gods over people, only about their physical supremacy.

the soul, as has already been said, is superior to the body in the natural hierarchy. However, the implementation of this approach to classify people would require the existence of a completed science of the soul<sup>10</sup>, as well as a developed institution of its application. In other words, this approach would assume that the first step to establish an ideal state would require its existence. Therefore, in spite of the abovementioned conclusion, Aristotle does not cease to delve into the problem of slavery.

The contestation of four concepts of natural slavery is followed by the contestation of three concepts of conventional slavery<sup>11</sup>, to which Aristotle pays much less attention. This is partly connected with the fact that all conventional concepts of slavery are relativistic. The problem with relativistic concepts is that, although they are perfect for describing or even explaining of what happens in partnership, they nevertheless do not establish anything: it is impossible to base a reliable order on their ground. Thus, “legal slavery”, usually the result of military conquest, is unacceptable, because in this case anyone, as a result of any chance, can become a slave (1255a 21-28). A yesterday’s winner can become a today’s loser; a yesterday’s slave, as a result of a successful revolt, can become a today’s master. Therefore, the same person can “legally”, i.e. in a just manner, change his position from master to slave and *vice versa*. Not to mention the fact that with such kind of concept of justice any successful revolt is considered just and “legal” (likewise, any unsuccessful revolt is considered unjust and “illegal”). But Aristotle even doubts if all the

<sup>10</sup> Which Aristotle tries to develop in the corresponding treatise.

<sup>11</sup> The mere existence of which questions the initial statement about the naturalness of master-slave partnership.



wars can be just (1255a 24-26, 1256b 23-26)<sup>12</sup>.

The same happens when nobility is considered as a reason for being a master. Either nobility is universal (then we should have universal theology and accept the existence of “ever-free” noble barbarians), or there are two types of nobility: true (Greek) and false (barbaric). But in this case it is not about inheritance of blood, but the inevitability of inheriting virtues, which is, of course, far from the truth (1255b 1-4).

Finally, Aristotle speaks about the existence (or the probability of the existence) of “slave’s science”. Slave’s science is the knowledge of how to carry out slave’s duties, and anyone can learn it. Hence it says nothing of who a slave is (1255b 22-30). Similarly, states Aristotle in contradiction to Socrates, knowledge does not constitute virtue and therefore says nothing of a master and a free man. At this point Aristotle declares the ending of the discussion on the slavery problem (1255b 39-40), confusing the reader. He will come back to it at the end of the first book, offering his own – and the last – way to resolve it (1259a 37-1260b 7). Thus we may assume that all this time Aristotle has been discussing common and popular philosophical ideas of slavery<sup>13</sup>, thus preparing necessary grounds to introduce his own decision.

In order to give his own definition of slavery, Aristotle, at the end of the first book, goes back to the beginning – to family (1259a 37-39). Here he openly says that both imperative positions in political partnership – a royal ruler and a statesman – derive from the family, whereby kingly rule derives from the authority of father

over children, and statesman’s authority derives from the authority of husband over wife. However, this argument seems rather strange. The authority of a statesman is characterized as the authority over equals, like a “temporary”, changeable authority (1259a 40-1259b 1), while kingly rule is the authority over unequals (1259b 1, 10-13). But how can the authority of husband over wife be like statesman’s authority, if, as Aristotle has already explained, men and women are not equal (1254b 13-14)? Besides, it is obvious that a woman will never be able to replace her husband in his authority; it is children who are really likely to “replace” their father, by becoming fathers themselves and thus gaining an equal legal status. Anyway, master-slave partnership does not give rise to any type of political partnership, and in this sense there is actually no difference between a statesman, a royal ruler and a head of an estate, as in any case the father of the family has both roles. But how then can a slave become part of state partnership or in that case any other partnership?<sup>14</sup> Aristotle gives a rather surprising answer to this question. A slave, being human (1259b 27-28), in the same way as any other human being, should possess virtue, which will enable him to enter into the partnership (including political partnership) and be a member of political community. In other words, Aristotle says that a slave is a virtuous human being (1259b 39-1260a 1). He must possess virtue, otherwise he is not only useless, but even harmful in any partnership (1260a 1-2). But what kind of virtue is this? Any partnership (especially a political one) requires only one virtue from its members – justice (1253a 34-38, 1259b 39-1260a 1, 1283a 37-41). I.e., a slave is a just

<sup>12</sup> Although certainly there can be just, i.e. legal, grounds for revolts (See 1302a 22-29).

<sup>13</sup> All concepts of “natural” slavery can be regarded as popular, because, when discussing them, Aristotle quotes poets, whereas when discussing conventional concepts, he repeatedly mentions some “other” or nameless “wise men”.

<sup>14</sup> We should not forget that Aristotle also names a conjugal partnership as a “slaves” partnership.

man<sup>15</sup>. But as it has already been said that all types of partnerships require justice from their members (and nothing more), anyone who enters into any of these types of partnership becomes a slave. At this point public legal hierarchy loses its sense. A legally free lawful master, a metic, a woman, a child etc. all become the same slaves as an actual legal slave. In the same sense we should understand Aristotle's words about different levels of the same virtue. Justice as law-obedience, as a relation to the law really gives different legal statuses to different categories of people (1260a 12-13). Thus, in a civilized society, a citizen (father and master) can take part in lawmaking. His male children can eventually acquire full civil rights, i.e. the rights to participate in lawmaking. His wife, although being a citizen, will never receive such a right, but is still bound to obey laws; slaves, not being citizens at all, are still bound to obey laws.

This definition of slavery is right in the middle between "natural slavery" and conventional slavery, as pursuit of justice or the virtue of justice, requiring to obey laws (written and unwritten), is natural, but the laws themselves (written and unwritten) are the result of convention. Now it is clear why Aristotle says that in the ideal state all (legal) slaves can be freed. It also explains the incompleteness and insufficiency of politics compared to a natural purpose of man. In this sense, politics cannot be the activity of genuinely free people – true masters. Moreover, slavery thus understood relieves us from the necessity to have a perfect science

<sup>15</sup> Aristotle credits a legal slave (after his master) with two virtues - moderation and justice (1259b 39-1260a 2). But answering the question whether there are people inferior to slaves (less virtuous), Aristotle says that, although such people do exist (craftsmen), of the two virtues even they only lack one – moderation. (They are "intemperate" and intemperance (ἀκολασία) is the opposite of moderation (σωφροσύνη)) (1260a 38).

about the soul, as well as the institution of its application in order to understand who is a slave and who is not. It is enough to see who obeys the law and who does not. Or, more precisely, to see who is just and who is not. That is because, as it seems now, only among unjust people and people who refused to enter into specified types of partnerships should we find those who are genuinely free – the true masters.

### Mastery

After we have learned the definition of a true slave, it seems inevitable that we should also find the entity of a true master. We are aware that a true master does not participate in any of the three types of partnership and does not possess a virtue of justice (as law-obedience). This is a definition of a "superman", already mentioned by Aristotle, who is able to live "outside of society". Indeed, Aristotle states that a "superman" or a "god" is the one who can live outside of the three types of partnership without obeying laws (that is, not to possess slave's virtue). Such person is "by nature citiless and also a lover of war", he lives by war (1253a 6, 31-33, 1255b 37-39). But how exactly does this person live? It is obvious that he is not deprived of interaction with other people, he is neither an outcast nor an ascetic, who is forced to survive rather than live, for otherwise how could he be happy? Freedom from the necessity to take part in the three types of partnership does not relieve him from the need for nutrition, shelter, sleep etc., i.e. things that a single person is not able to provide himself with, especially if he also claims to have leisure, an integral element of happiness (1338a 1-4).

In order to puzzle it out, Aristotle begins to study all types of life styles and activities

available for a man. There are two ways of making a living: exchange and production. Initially Aristotle divides production into three categories: cattle breeding, hunt (which, according to Aristotle, also includes manhunt) and agriculture (1256a 30-35), hunt having a crucial – middle – position between the two poles<sup>16</sup>. It is followed by a detailed list of activities where the pride of place goes to robbery (manhunt) (1256b 1-2). In this sense Aristotle declares “slave hunt” not only acceptable, but even just (1256b 23-26). It seems that the philosopher contradicts himself, saying that a master can show justice by hunting a slave. But in the new context all three notions (slave, master, justice) are no longer bound by a legal status. In other words, a true master can “hunt” true slaves, who can be, for example, full citizens rather than legal slaves. Moreover, since the definition of a true slave is closely connected with the definition of justice as lawfulness, true justice turns out to be its direct opposite (1328b 33-1329a2, 1284a 10-14). Hence, true justice contradicts any public order, and thus any regime, for every state gives rise to and maintains order (this may be another reason why the first book does not divide different regimes). Even tyranny, declaring the tyrant’s word as law, in this sense also gives rise to and maintains order, like any other regime (Xenophon, 1997, I, 2, 41-46).

Later Aristotle repeats his list, this time speaking about the ways of earning money, which are three: agriculture, exchange and agriculture joined with exchange; the philosopher reminds us that the best of them is in the middle (1258b 27-28). To prove it, Aristotle suggests comparing them by four criteria: value of luck,

chance of injuring the body, intensity of physical labor and necessity in virtue. Since of the three types of earning money two of them deal with agriculture, they have the highest value of luck, highest chance of injuring the body, highest intensity of physical labor and lowest necessity in virtue. That is why they are inferior to exchange. However, Aristotle also names several types of exchange: trade, usury and selling own physical labor (1258b 20-25); usury (previously called unjust) being in the center. In order to understand which of them is the best, we should once again apply the proposed method of classification (1258b 35-39). It turns out that of the three types of exchange “the most unworthy” one is selling own physical labor, as it is most connected with body injury. This type of exchange is also “the most servile”, as it requires the use of physical force. It also is the “most ignoble”, since it does not imply any virtue, for any animal is capable of serving with its body, but it is obvious that animals do not have virtues. Now “the most scientific” of them is usury, since chance, compared to trade or selling own physical labor, plays the least important role in it. Of the four criteria only one is positive, and the other three are negative. But these three negative criteria can easily be turned “upside down” to make them positive, thus finding out which type of exchange (and earning money) is the best. It is obvious that “the most worthy” and “the master’s” type of exchange is usury, since it is the least to use body and put it at risk. But what about virtue? It is clear that trade is far more connected with justice as lawfulness rather than usury, at least because the latter is often outlawed. But justice as lawfulness and true justice, as has already been said, not only differ, but are directly the opposite. That is why usury, unjust and “hated”, is

<sup>16</sup> The middle position has a great role in Aristotle philosophy (See, for example 1342b 14-15).

“the noblest” and thus the most suitable type of earning money for a true master (1258b 2-3).

Let us assume that a superman living in the society will inevitably be a criminal. But how is it possible to distinguish an ordinary criminal from a superman? And is it possible at all? To answer this question, it is the only time in the first book that Aristotle uses the method of historical example. He comes up with two stories about the same economic crime – securing a monopoly. This unique binary example instantly draws the reader’s attention, literally demanding comparison. Thus, it seems that there is no point in telling two stories on the same topic in a book where no other topic can boast of a historical example. The first story tells about Thales of Miletus, a philosopher who proved his wisdom (σοφία) by his actions. It is worth noting that for a few lines dedicated to this story, the word “wisdom”, which is not seen anywhere else in the first book, is expressly used twice, as well as the word “philosophy” is (1259a 8, 10, 16, 19). Thales, taking advantage of his scientific knowledge to forecast a large crop of olives, hired all the olive-presses at a low rent in his hometown and Chios, thus securing a monopoly and eventually raising oil production prices (1259a 9-19). The other story tells about a nameless Sicilian who borrowed money to buy up all the iron from the iron foundries of Syracuse, and when the dealers came, he started to sell it as a monopolist with a slightly raised price (1259a 23-31). However, when tyrant Dionysius learned about his monopoly, he banished him from the town, although allowing him to keep the earned money. Speaking of this man, Aristotle never mentions his wisdom nor does he say the word “philosophy”. So what is the difference between Thales, a “wise philosopher”, and an unwise nameless

Sicilian? Firstly, Thales predicted the demand, whereas the Sicilian knew about it. In other words, Thales was the only one to know about the abundance of olives, and in the second story everyone knew about the arrival of the dealers. Secondly, Thales hired olive-presses on his “small sum of money”, but he demanded the price “on what terms he liked” (1259 11-16). The Sicilian used borrowed money to buy iron, but he made a very small markup (1259a 23-28). Thirdly, Thales was not punished for his crime (or, more precisely, Aristotle does not say anything about what happened to Thales after his affair), while the Sicilian was caught and punished by authorities (and Aristotle does not conceal that fact). To sum up, Thales managed to “prove his wisdom” not by securing the monopoly (anyone can do it), but by, first of all, maximizing the profit compared to investments, and secondly, by avoiding punishment and escaping liability for a committed crime. This seems to be the way that Aristotle proposes to distinguish a true master from an ordinary criminal. Having committed a crime – but guided by pursuit of true justice – a superman reveals his nature by the scope of the crime (the amount of profit) and by subsequently escaping liability<sup>17</sup>. The second aspect makes the superman’s activity nearly invisible, in-existent or existent out of public sight, but it still remains antisocial, i.e. keeps being a truly just activity of a truly free master.

Together with the understanding of what true slaves and masters are, comes not only the comprehension of further content of the treatise, motivated by the creation of a society where a superman could live, prosper and be happy, but also the realization of the problem of politics as

<sup>17</sup> True virtue allows committing any crime (Plato, 1937, 331c).

such, which is that the ideal form of state – monarchy ruled by a superman – and the best form of state for a superman to fulfill his superhuman potential do not match. That is because in ideal monarchy a superman would be the one to rule (1332b 16-23), i.e. he would have to partake in political partnership<sup>18</sup> and to obey laws (1295a 7-17), thus denying his self and turning from a true master into a true slave<sup>19</sup>.

### Wealth

Aristotle does not specify any motives and, accordingly, types of crimes for a true master other than economic. It seems clear that a superman would not commit crimes in the heat of passion or motivated by the lust for power. He is interested in being in the society for as long as it is capable of ensuring his prosperous and well-off being or making his life full of leisure, which is an integral element of happiness. But why is happiness directly connected with leisure or consumption, and not with labor or work? An answer to this question, according to Aristotle, roots in nature itself. If nature created everything for the man's good, it is obvious that a superman, as the top of human hierarchy, should not be in need of labor at all, should not create anything: everything should be given to him for free, it should literally "grow on trees"

(1258a 23-24, 34-38). Only then will he be able to live the best life, suitable for his nature (1256b 6-7). But it does not necessarily mean that a superman does not need artificially created (or cultivated) objects. And if he does, then he needs labor, too (1253b 33-1254a 1). To solve this problem, Aristotle divides all human activity into action (*πρᾶξις*) and production (*ποίησις*) (1254a 1-2). The result of production is creation of objects; action assumes the use of objects. If nature created everything for the man's good, it is obvious that the man should be able to use all the goods that the nature provides him with, i.e. his life should only involve action (1254a 7). But the difficulty is that although nature created everything for the sake of man, it is clearly not enough for a prosperous and leisured life. Production must overcome this natural drawback. Thus, in pursuit of a "good" life, a man enters into a "bad" life: starts production, creates or cultivates some objects and exchanges them for other objects that he needs more (1257a 25-30). However, life full of creation and exchange of goods is far from its natural ideal. Here production comes to the aid for the second time: a simple (natural) barter transforms into a complex (artificial) barter – money exchange (1257a 30-31). And since money is the universal equivalent and object at the same time, then, although earning money is production, spending money (to get any other objects) is action. Therefore, having money means possessing all objects which are necessary for life, and hence, having money is the guarantee of being able to live actively in conformity with nature and, as a result, the guarantee of a good life. But since money is an unalienable attribute of society – a civilized society, to be precise, – and its role is the more significant, the more developed, or civilized, the society is, then action,

<sup>18</sup> Aristotle leaves aside the question about what kind of life deserves favor, political or non-political, considering it completely resolved (See 1324a 13-22).

<sup>19</sup> It can also be mentioned that, on the part of a superman, the problem of politics becomes even more complex, since his natural asociality *volens nolens* makes him an enemy of any public order, makes him hostile to any political regime. The closer a superman reaches his ideal, the more destructive his activity will be for the society he lives in. In particular, this is the reason why one of the most significant features of the best regime, according to Aristotle, is its stability (See 1319b 33-1320a 4).

in conformity with nature, becomes truly possible only in the most developed (i.e. productive) society. Moreover, this society should be as stable as humanly possible (1320a 4), strictly because money, being a universal equivalent not by nature, but by convention, loses its significance with every social shock<sup>20</sup> (change of political regime, war etc.) (1257b 10-14). Thus, only wealth can allow a person to live a good life (full of activities). Besides, this life will reflect natural hierarchy, as it will be founded on “bad” life (associated with production). This explains strong interest of a superman in one-time maximum enrichment with minimum investments, which is possible only by economic crime or usury as the best and the “noblest” method of automatic production of money out of money.

However, with the introduction of a universal equivalent, a new problem arises: the art of money making becomes the art of arts. As a result, this art, and not the goal of active life, starts to subdue human existence. Aristotle describes this problem as follows. Any art has limited resources to achieve its goal, which is not at all limited (1256b 34-37, 1257b 23-24). This is connected with the abstractness of the goal and the corporeality of resources (1257b 25-30): a cook does not need one hundred pots to cook, a surgeon does not need one hundred scalpels to operate, a father does not need one hundred beds to put his child to sleep etc. Furthermore, a man who would continuously collect the same object would very likely be declared mad. The feature of the art of money making is that its resources are unlimited, because they are abstract. Thus, a man who infinitely gets money is not only con-

sidered not mad, but instead, is commonly recognized as successful (for abstract money can always turn into objects) (1258a 1-2). Moreover, if money allows to live an active life that a man must aim for, it turns out that not only slaves, craftsmen and traders are involved in production, but also those who, at a first glance, are involved in action. Thus, people involved in the medical or pedagogic art or even the art of war are in fact involved in the art of money making (1258a 10-14). But money making is production, and since accumulating money is not limited by anything, involvement in it dedicates the whole life of a person to production rather than action. Pointing out this problem, Aristotle, however, does not propose a solution. The reason of this inaction is as follows. It is clear that only a god can totally avoid production. Even a superman in his best manifest has to deal with it at least once; all other people will form a hierarchy, the foundation of which consists of those who are mostly involved in production, i.e. the worst men – craftsmen<sup>21</sup>. But the art of money making turns everyone into craftsmen. The hierarchy collapses: only the top and the foundation remain. It seems that even in this aspect a gap between a superman and other men will inevitably emerge. But Aristotle does not mind it at all. For it is this state of affairs that gives the superman a chance to live actively through one-time maximum profitable unlawful enrichment.

Speaking of the first book of *Politics* now, we must admit that it plays a far more significant role than a simple introduction dedicated to the origins of politics. Explaining these origins, the first book sets a framework and a goal for the whole treatise; it poses and describes one of the aspects of the problem of politics; it answers

<sup>20</sup> This is another argument against the only natural regime - kingship - in favor of artificial, “civilized”, regimes.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. with a common definition of a slave as a “tool of action” (1254a 8).

the question about whom this ideal state is searched for. And it does so with a shocking honesty and logic, thus creating an impression that it should not explain what we will see in other books of *Politics*, but on the contrary, the content of the whole treatise in fact serves as a lengthy explanation to its introduction.

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IN MEMORIAM



## VLADIMIR BRANSKIJ

1930-2017

by Prof. Kadzhik OGANYAN



Vladimir Branskij is an outstanding philosopher, a representative of the St. Petersburg Ontological School, a teacher, founder of the scientific school - social synergetics, who left a huge scientific legacy in the field of philosophy of physics and social science. He studied and defended the Candidate's and Doctor's thesis and until the end of his life worked at the Faculty of Philosophy of Leningrad State University.

His work can be divided into several periods.

*The works of the first period were devoted to the philosophical problems of modern physics.* In the 60-80s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the philosophy of physics became that unique island of freedom, where one could develop practically any ideas without looking at communist party organs. Nothing of the kind existed in other spheres of substantial philosophical knowledge.

It was during this period that V. P. Branskij, one of the representatives of the Leningrad school in the field of the philosophy of science, created a cycle of three monographs: “The Phil-

osophical Importance of the Visibility Problem in Modern Physics” (Leningrad, 1962); “Philosophical Foundations of the Problem of the Synthesis of Relativistic and Quantum Principles” (Leningrad, 1973); “The Theory of Elementary Particles as an Object of Methodological Research” (Leningrad, 1989). These three monographs are interconnected and permeated with a single concept. The first monograph shows the influence that physics of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (relativistic and quantum physics) had on the development of world philosophy: the classical concept of the multiplicity of worlds (Democritus, D. Bruno, and others) developed and generalized in the concept of the multiplicity of worlds (ontological non-geocentrism).

Naturally, the question arose about the inverse influence of philosophy on physics, i.e. on the heuristic role of ontological non-geocentrism in the development of physics in the twentieth century. For this, it was required to investigate the general “mechanism” of the heuristic role of philosophical principles in the formation of a physical theory. This problem was solved in the second monograph. It revealed the dual (“dialectical”) nature of theoretical knowledge as a kind of synthesis of empirical and speculative knowledge (the irreducibility of the speculative component).

Simultaneously, Professor V. P. Branskij has shown that the heuristic function of philosophical principles is not deductive (as natural philosophers of all ages believed), but rather selective, and the selective function is by no means reduced to the regulative function about which

positivists wrote. At the same time, it became clear that one can't speak about the heuristic role of philosophical principles, if it is not clear beforehand how they differ from non-philosophical principles. Thus, the problem of the heuristic role of philosophy in the formation of scientific theory has been closely related to such a fundamental problem as the question of the nature of philosophical knowledge. This issue was examined in detail in a completely new plane (the transition from conventional research to meta-research and analysis of the relationship between meta-empirical, meta-speculative and meta-theoretical research).

We can see how the problems of the methodology of science were closely associated with philosophical problems in the works of the Leningrad School of Philosophy of Science (unlike of many domestic and Western colleagues). It is also very interesting that in the field of the so-called positive philosophy of science developed at Leningrad State University, the focus was not on the problem of demarcation of scientific and unscientific knowledge (as was the case in the neo-positivist and post-positivist philosophy of science), but rather the heuristic role of philosophical principles in the formation of a new fundamental scientific theory. It turned out that the latter problem is more substantial and deep and includes the first as one of its aspects. After the above works it became clear that the tendency to devaluation of scientific knowledge and scientific activity, characteristic of post-positivism, eventually underestimated the problem of the heuristic role of philosophical principles in the formation of a scientific theory.

The general solution of this problem in the second monograph of V. P. Branskij, naturally, posed the problem of practical use of this solu-

tion. Since the central problem of modern theoretical physics was and still is the problem of constructing a general theory of elementary particles, it became necessary to study the selective function of the principle of ontological non-geocentrism (PON) in the formation of the theory of elementary particles (TEC) for the practical use of new results obtained in the field of the philosophy of science at Leningrad State University. This problem was solved in the third monograph of this cycle. The result was extremely interesting and unexpected. The fact is that the main obstacle on the way to constructing a TEC is the absence in modern physics of a meaningful synthesis of relativistic and quantum principles. At present, there are two diametrically opposite approaches to the solution of this problem in the literature: the synthesis of the general theory of relativity and quantum field theory (the superfield approach is most clearly manifested in studies on quantum cosmology); synthesis of the special theory of relativity and non-relativistic quantum mechanics (most clearly manifested in research on the quantum theory of relativity).

The monograph "Theory of Elementary Particles as an Object of Methodological Research" fully demonstrated the practical significance of the philosophy of science developed by the Leningrad philosophers for constructing the most fundamental natural-scientific theory. In this monograph, research work in the field of the philosophy of physics merges with scientific research in the field of theoretical physics. Here, for the first time, a meaningful synthesis of the methodologies of Einstein and Bohr was carried out, and a detailed program for constructing the quantum relativity theory was developed with a detailed description of its explanatory and predictive functions. Thus, the heuristic function of the new philosophical principle (what is the

PON) is demonstrated not in words, but in actions. The methodology of the scientific research developed in this cycle of monographs received its generalization and completion in the collective monograph “The Dialectics of Knowledge” (edited by Prof. A. S. Carmin, L., 1988), in Chapter XX of this monograph, entitled “Scientific Research” (V. P. Branskij, V. V. Ilyin, K. M. Oganyan).

After the development of the problem of the philosophy of natural science, set out in the cycle of monographs by V. P. Branskij, the research was continued by the author in a number of articles. The most important of them were the following: (1) *The Heuristic Role of the Philosophy of Science in the Formation of the Theory of Elementary Particles* // Bulletin of St. Petersburg State University. St. Petersburg, 1993. Ser. 6. Issue. 2; (2) *Lessons of the Theory of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics and the Prospects for their Synthesis* // Herald of St. Petersburg State University. SPb., 1996. Ser. 6. Issue. 2. (The article was dedicated to the triple jubilee in 1995 - the 90<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the special theory of relativity, the 80<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the general theory of relativity and the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of quantum mechanics); (3) *The Principle of Beauty in the Theory of Elementary Particles* // Bulletin of St. Petersburg State University. SPb., 1999. Ser. 6. Issue. 3. (The article was devoted to the heuristic role of the axiological aspect of philosophy.); (4) *Synergetics and Cosmology (The Philosophical Foundations of the Cosmological Model of the Universe)* // Vestnik SPbGEU. SPb., 2014. Ser. 19. Iss. 4. (The article was devoted to the main philosophical problems of modern cosmology).

*The second period is the philosophy of social science and the synergetic theory of globalization.* As the history of science shows, at-

tempts to develop a methodology and philosophy of the humanities without taking into account the achievements of the methodology and philosophy of the natural sciences of the 20<sup>th</sup> century do not go beyond the mere journalism.

This was favored by the fact that in the early 90s were ripe all the prerequisites for the formation of a new scientific discipline known as social synergy (the general theory of social self-organization). This discipline was a natural intermediate between natural science and social science. Therefore it was not by chance that in the activities of some philosophers there had come a sharp turn from the philosophy of natural science to social synergetics. This rotation, of course, facilitated by the events of August 1991, because under the totalitarian regime of the free development of the social problems of synergy would be impossible. Said rotation is particularly apparent in the new series of three monographs by V. P. Branskij: “Art and Philosophy (The Role of Philosophy in the Formation and Perception of a Work of Art on the Example of the History of Painting)” (Kaliningrad, 1999); “Social Synergetics and the Theory of Nations” (St. Petersburg, 2000); and “Social Synergetics and Psychology (Self-Organization Theory of the Individual and Society)” (St. Petersburg, 2001). The works of this series are closely interrelated and form a unified conception, as we have seen in the first cycle. But there the role of the unifying conception belonged to ontological non-geocentrism, while here a similar role was played by the so-called synergistic historicism.

V. P. Branskij left a rich scientific and pedagogical school which successfully continues to develop scientific and pedagogical traditions, working in various universities in Russia and abroad.

V. P. Branskij, in addition to scientific and

pedagogical activity, was enthusiastic about intellectual and historical tourism. He had a rich collection of reproductions of paintings (the second best in St. Petersburg). V. P. Branskij was an obsessed traveler and a great lover of artistic photography, constantly maintained contacts with scientists from different countries. He was always marked by an active life position, which was reflected in various conferences, congresses, and forums.

I would like to mention some of my memories related to our cooperation. In 1981, by the recommendation of the head of the Philosophy Department of the Academy of Sciences of Armenian SSR Professor Suren Avetisyan, I was sent for graduate studies to the Department of Philosophy for Natural Sciences at the Leningrad State University to Professor V. I. Svidersky (the teacher of Prof. Suren Avetisyan and Prof. Vladimir Branskij).

After meeting Professor V. I. Svidersky, on his recommendation, I was sent to Professor V. P. Branskij (since Professor V. I. Svidersky believed that he was old and “let his students do the work”) with the aim of continuing research in the field of philosophy of physics. From that moment until the end of Professor V. P. Branskij’s life, we developed and created his synergetic school, the ideas of which were reflected in the courses on social synergetics for postgraduate students and undergraduates (in St. Petersburg Universities), as well as in numerous mono-

graphs, collective works, conferences, etc.

One of the notable examples was the visit of Professor V. P. Branskij to Yerevan together with Leningrad philosophers for the International Conference on the Philosophical Problems of Argumentation by Academician G. A. Brutian’s invitation (1986). This event was the basis for the cooperation of the two schools, in which my historical mission was predetermined.

Since that period, Armenian philosophers Eduard Markarian, Suren Hovhannisyan, Vartan Torosyan and others started active and constant visits to Prof. Branskij’s problematic seminars on materialistic dialectics.

In conclusion, I would like to note the special attitude of Professor V. P. Branskij to his students. Friendly attitude towards his students was combined with discipline, scientific ethics, respectful attitude towards the personality of graduate students (for example, in 1.5 years a graduate student defends a thesis or is expelled). Professor V. P. Branskij always followed the professional growth of his students and was proud of their achievements continuing the best traditions of his scientific and pedagogical school.

The life and work of V. P. Branskij is a vivid example of a scientist, citizen, teacher and organizer of science, who managed to create a philosophical school and maintain friendly relations with colleagues from all over the world.

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- Djidjian, R. Z. (2015). Understanding Capacity as the Principle Difficulty in Building Artificial Intellect. *Wisdom*, 4(1). Retrieved May 26, 2016 from: <http://www.wisdomperiodical.com/index.php/wisdom/article/view/115>
- Djidjian, R. Z. (2016). Paradoxes of Human Cognition. *Wisdom*, 7(2), 49-58. doi:10.24234/wisdom.v2i7.137

**GRAPHS AND DIAGRAMS**

If the manuscript contains non alphabetic characters (e.g. logical formulae, diagrams) then:

- the PDF version of the text should be attached for the demanded verification,
- all the images (diagrams, line drawings and photographic images) should be numbered sequentially with Arabic numerals and submitted in electronic form,
- photo images should be of high quality,
- all the images should be attached as separate files,
- diagrams, line drawings, charts should be submitted in EXCEL or EPS format.

**VARIOUS KIND OF MANUSCRIPT FORMATTING PECULIARITIES**

**Publication of Archive Materials and Translation Sources**

- Complete description of archive or publication material, according to which the translation has been made, should be comprised in the manuscript.
- A brief prologue under the title *Publication Prologue* may precede the publication (1-3 pages long, approximately 4000 characters). Long prologues are regarded articles and should be written under separate titles.
- If the publishing source contains references, they are presented as a part of a body text and are each numbered sequentially and precede the body text-source.
- Publisher or translator may present references about the publishing source at the end of a body text.
- Via the references one may present foreign word translations, explanations of abbreviations etc. contained in the text may be presented in the source text in square brackets.
- It is advisable to choose up to 40.000 character source for the publication materials in the periodical. In case of a large source, it is necessary to shorten (select) for preparing material for the periodical.
- Translations and archive sources should have enough comments and full introductions, otherwise they could not be consid-

ered scientific publications and could not be submitted for publication.

#### ***Essays of various symposiums and scientific events***

- Information about the symposium organizers, place and time should be included in the essay.
- The symposium members' name, surname, workplace and city (in brackets) should be mentioned, and in case of international symposiums, the name of the city is also included.
- Essays should not coincide with the symposium projects or their final documents.

#### ***Reviews and bibliographical essays***

- The length of a review should be from 5-10 pages (10.000-20.000 characters).
- Final information, name of a publication and number of pages of a studied book should be presented before the body text.
- References are not included in the review.

#### ***Argumentative notes, essays, records***

Materials that are written in a free style and are free of demands placed on scientific articles are accepted for publication. Such kind of works cannot be submitted in the reports about scientific works as scientific publication.

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Լրատվական գործունեություն իրականացնող՝ «Խաչատուր Աբովյանի անվան  
հայկական պետական մանկավարժական համալսարան» հիմնադրամ  
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Համարի թողարկման պատասխանատու՝

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
Statue of Mkhitar Gosh located in Gosh village in Tavush Province of Armenia in the territory of the monastery complex Goshavank founded by Mkhitar Gosh with the support of prince Ivaneh Zakaryan.



Bronze bust of Mkhitar Gosh in Yerevan by sculptor-architect Ghukse Chubaryan. The following quote by Gosh is carved on the monument: "Laws are for Humans – not humans are for laws".




The Statue of Mkhitar Gosh (Sculptor – Samvel Hakobyan) located near the Monument to the Armenian Alphabet in Aragatsotn Province, Aparan, Armenia.



"Datastanagirk" ("Court Book") is the Medieval Armenian Feudal Collection compiled by Mkhitar Gosh at the end of 12th century.



Religious, educational and cultural centre Goshavank – monastery complex founded by Mkhitar Gosh in 1188.



Author's manuscript, 1184.



The monument to Mkhitar Gosh is created in 1967 by sculptor Ghukas Chubaryan. It is located at the square near the Manuscript Deposit-Institute "Matenadaran". The monument is made of basalt, the height is 3.5 meters.



"Mkhitar Gosh" medal is awarded for prominent public and political activities, as well as for outstanding contribution to the spheres of diplomacy, jurisprudence, and political science.

Armenian philosopher, scholar, legislator, fabulist, priest, educator Mkhitar Gosh was born in the city of Gandzak approximately between 1120 and 1130. He was honoured by the following titles: "wise and gentle man", "proclaimed by doctrinal teaching", "Great Archimandrite (Vardapet)", "scholarly renowned and wise". He died in 1213. After his death, the monastery in Nor Getik (nowadays – Gosh, Tavush Province, Armenia) founded by him was named after him – Goshavank ("the monastery of Gosh").

He is the author of about ten works among which the most significant are the collection of "Fables" published in Venice in 1790 and later translated into French, Russian, Latin, Polish, and Georgian, as well as the Book of Law "Datastanagirk Book of Law of Mkhitar Gosh or Armenian Datastanagirk" written in 1184. "Datastanagirk" that became the main legislation, in its form is exclusive in the history of law, as it was created within a stateless society. "Datastanagirk" was a genuine landmark in the history of Armenian and international law. "Datastanagirk" consists of the Introduction and 251 articles. For the first time, it was used as a mandatory law code in Cilician Armenia, later also in Armenian communities in Poland, India, and Georgia.

In the 18th century, in Georgia the regulation of Mkhitar Gosh were used in the rules of King Vakhtang VI in a separate chapter entitled Armenian Law, and then to the Laws of the Russian Empire. More than 40 laws from "Datastanagirk" are preserved in "Matenadaran" manuscript deposit and research institute.

In Vanadzor there is an Armenian-Russian International University named after Mkhitar Gosh.

Due to the fables by Gosh, the Armenian literature of the 12th century was enriched with folk literature genre, namely, the fable – as a means of public speech aimed at praising virtues, mock deficiencies, foolishness and ignorance, and misleading the evil. The Collection includes 190 fables which are sorted in specific order and grouped up into three main sections: Morality, Mythical and Creative.



The silver coin issued by the Central Bank of the Republic of Armenia is dedicated to the 825th anniversary of Mkhitar Gosh's "Girk Datastani (Book of Law)".

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