# WISDOM

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# EDITORS' FOREWORD

Khachatur Abovian Armenian State Pedagogical University and the Editorial Board of the journal WISDOM are honoured to deliver to the scientific community our 2(11) issue of 2018. This issue, as well as the previous 1(10), 2018 issue, have been compiled marking our fifth anniversary: the first issue of the journal was published in 2013.

2(11), 2018 issue of WISDOM includes 10 articles referring to the issues that the main rubrics of the journal cover: Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Metaphilosophy, Argumentation, Social and Political Philosophy, History of Philosophy, and Chair of Young Scientist. The authors of papers represent renowned universities and academic institutions.

Taking into consideration the positive feedbacks and interest of the readers of WISDOM in late philosopher Haig Khatchadourian's scientific researches, the Editorial Board of the journal decided to include a paper, from the unpublished researches compilation, titled *Time and Change*. This time, again we are grateful to the Academician's daughter Sonia Khatchadourian for cooperation.

In the section "In Memoriam", we refer to the member of the Editorial Board of the journal Wisdom, late Professor Peter Kemp.

WISDOM is consistent to its policy to be accessible for the scientific community and on the respective international electronic platforms. For this reason, since July 1, 2018, the manuscript submission assumes the respective submission fee. The Submission fee is charged to cover the scientific and technical reviewing costs. The editorial board of the journal is sure that this circumstance might be an additional guarantee for providing a relevant level of manuscripts increasing the adequate sense of responsibility. The submission fee covers one submission and is non-refundable.

Every manuscript submitted proceeds through rigorous review process. The members of the journal reviewer's bank are committed to objective and fair double-blind peer reviews and they will necessarily evaluate manuscripts in line with COPE politics, Publication ethics and Plagiarism Policy as well as the Open Access Policy.

From now on, for submitting a manuscript, it is necessary to sign in first and then to complete the payment procedure.

The positive feedbacks, observations and achievements on the already published issues of the journal are the evidence of the importance and value of the articles published so far. The Editorial Board extends the sincerest gratitude to all the authors, reviewers, professional critics and assessors of the papers involved. We extend our special appreciation to Khachatur Abovian Armenian State Pedagogical University's Administration for consistent support in publishing the periodical.

Given the significance of the underlying principle of pluralism over scientific issues and freedom of speech, we should remind that the authors carry primary responsibility for the viewpoints introduced in their papers which may not always coincide with those of the Editorial Board.

# EPISTEMOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, METAPHILOSOPHY, ARGUMENTATION

*Ana BAZAC*

# TWO PAGES FROM THE CULTURE OF THE DOUBLE SPEECH
# AND OF TACIT SUPPOSITIONS

## Abstract

The power relations – at the time of Erasmus and Mandeville, and also in the present – make the critique of the status quo to be very difficult. An answer to this situation was and is the complex of the *double speech* and *tacit* political *suppositions*. The paper suggests some similarities between the texts of the above-mentioned thinkers and, on the other hand, the present mainstream political jargon, by emphasising the differences rather: it is noteworthy that Mandeville and Erasmus had a strong, while indirect through their humoristic use of the double speech, critique of the state of things described by them.

The conclusions developed here concern the tacit suppositions *in the political discourse and how the two items are perennial within the modern culture.*

*Keywords*: double speech, tacit suppositions, Erasmus, Mandeville, present political discourse.

### Precautions

First of all, my paper uses two expressions which have different senses in linguistics and in philosophy. To say it frankly, even though in linguistics they correspond in a quite clear manner to the intentions of thoughts behind the speeches, and are marked within the frame of grammar and rhetoric, so although without the description of the *forms* which can be grasped and understood we could not pervade into the depth of the human mind, just philosophy is which does question the *content* of the linguistic (and not only linguistic) manifestations. Philosophy was first, even if linguistics describes that which is obviously first of all. But I want not incite a superfluous quarrel: was he not, Lazar Şăineanu, quite long before the Western raising of the idea of interdisciplinary approach, one of the firsts who stressed that philology would be philosophy (Eliade, 1898, p. 408)[1]?

The first expression is *double speech*. For my intention is *to discuss about the political significance of some early philosophical discourses of the modernity – as mirror of the present political jargon*, I do not focus on the technical linguistic aspects of dialogues, for example on the difference between the actual words spoken, as direct speech, mentioned inwards the indirect "neutral" narrative, or the incidental proposition. For me, double speech means the expression of *two different intentions of a single speaker*; the intentions correspond to different worldviews, and the expression as

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[1] Citing Lazăr Şăineanu, *Istoria filologiei române*, 1895 [History of the Romanian philology]: "philology is understood in the German sense as the science of all the manifestations of the thinking of a certain people".

such aims to mystify the real beliefs of the speaker. If in linguistic analysis, as I dare to say I understood, we are witnessing the coexistence of the same intentions to clarify the expressions of the facts, through both the direct and indirect speech, in politics – as philosophy has from long ago insisted – there are opposite intentions. There is also another distinction. The linguistic expression of the double speech emphasises two temporal (and special) moments: the one of the speakers cited by the narrator, and the one of the narrative (narrator) itself. While in politics, there is only one temporal moment: in the slogans the speaker waves within his/her discourse, and in the intentions grasped by the listeners despite all the sophisticated means to cover them; as we all know, "there would not be possible to lie all the people twice/many times". Or would it? Are the real intentions of the speaker really grasped by the listeners? Well, and even though this is not the place to elaborate on this topic – see the savage criminalisation of "fake news" just by those who do not want their intentions be understood by the broad masses, i.e. to understand alternative views towards those of the ruling strata – the listeners are intuiting at least some real intentions: as it is *statistically* proven.

The other expression is *tacit suppositions*. This time, there is a similarity between linguistics and politics. As there are common sense views on languages – which linguists in all theirs variants unveil – there are tacit suppositions in politics. Let me not continue with linguistic *connaissances livresques*. But to say that if in linguistics a common sense supposition is within the pattern of Monsieur Jourdain, the one of the acquisition of the language following the model of the experience of children – as it was shown in the psycholinguistic approach (Karlsson, 2007) – in politics the most important and gene-

ral tacit supposition is that of the *emperor* (*who*) *has no clothes*, as Hans Christian Andersen formulated it.

The third notion mentioned by the title of this paper is *culture*. I certainly shall not plunge into the traps of the definitions and cultural mentalities surrounding this concept. I simply put – and this is my, now explicit presupposition – that a society where the common beliefs, even though mostly tacit, are *deduced* from the supposition of the *inherent* subordination toward a "political class" which has no clothes is a society whose political culture is deeply *alienated*. With the entire cultural creation in sciences and arts, in institutions and organisations, in labour, entertainment and conduct of sentiments, the political culture of the above-mentioned tacit supposition strongly influences the whole life of people: there is no real autonomy of culture since people feel alienated and their alienation without any hope of mastering and surpassing alienation and its social causes. Thus the characteristic of culture I wanted to stress on is the one imprinted by the *politics based on the tacit supposition of the "inherent" political double speech*.

I shall now briefly discuss a premise of the specific model of critique of the power relations as it was constituted in Erasmus' and Mandeville's famous works.

The Warning of the Clown

For disenchanting the *power* relations, one has to note their difference from the relations of *authority*: while these one consist in recognition of the *competence* people have in their social functions – within the 'technical' division of the social labour, thus the authority being a "technical" measurement – the *power* is relation of

domination and submission. The idea that power and authority would be equivalent – thus that the powerful would be inherently "technically" competent, i.e. ruling and administrating with the best consequences for the biggest number of population and for present and future – is only the result of the power relations, and was and is constituted *in their frame*, thus imposed by the ruling strata. And by saying that "there is certainly a technical, but also a political competence" – considering the latter as *presence* in the ruling, political and economic, circles and *ability* to manoeuvre so as to keep the personal and group power, while in the same time emitting specious discourses – these circles of power once more prove the difference between ("technical") authority and political power/power of domination in favour of restrictive interests.

Generated by historical conditions of rarity and weak means of production, power has developed as a holding of these means and of the means to impose this holding. These second means were, from the beginning, material and spiritual: the physical force and the weapons, the knowledge, the ideologies of domination. These ideologies have created the force of the authority of domination: the *strong beliefs of the eternity, normality and functionality of the power relations and their holders*.

It's no wonder that the critique of this *status quo* was so difficult that it represented mere exceptions. But as nobody was ever asked for when one imposed his/her submission, with the rise of modern relationships thinkers began to question this state of things: *the extraordinary aspect was not the fact of the rebellion, but just of the submission of the many* (de La Boétie, 1987).

In this context, the European Middle Age witnessed the apparition of a person whose function allowed him – there were only males – to criticise the establishment and the lords, without punitive consequences. He was the *Clown* or the *Madman*. *His strategy was to legitimise and at the same time annul the weight of his critical speech with the characterisation of insanity*. In this way, the intention of critique and the fact to submit reality to the requirements of reason, so to the truth, constituted the core of the discourse of the Madman. But even though this discourse was constructed in a figurative sense, it was heard in the proper sense by those who were not "the emperor without clothes"; while "the emperor" heard the form of the intention of critique as a joking manner to humour him, to submit to him: au fond, he was so powerful that some flying words could not destroy his cocoon of comfort.

The double speech of the Madman was just the coexistence of the two messages he emitted: the one of submission to the lord, through jokes and exercises of admiration; the other of critique. The coexistence as such of these types of discourses emphasised the contempt behind the jokes, transforming these into a figurative manner of the manifestation of scorn, while the critical discourse could suggest the proper sense of rebel courage discovered by the human reason.

The state of things described by Andersen's story, *The Emperor's New Clothes* (1837) emphasised that the double speech was not the specifics of some special people, but of the society as a whole. People expressed what they did not believe, while believing what they could not say. Only sometimes and someones dared to infringe the unspoken rule of the social behaviour: the *Child* from the tale is a beautiful and optimistic form of the old Madman. The culture of double speech was thus strongly related to the *tacit supposition of the necessary ambiguous social behaviour, slyness and exteriority to*

*the moral principles, just for the sake of the short existence and non-suffering.*

This situation was so dramatic that even the thinkers were determined to create within the pattern of the double speech.

Examples and Directions

Erasmus of Rotterdam wrote his *The Praise of Folly* (*Stultitiae Laus*, 1509) just in the manner of a discourse of the Madman. In the very Renaissance where the modern spirit manifested through the need to change at least by alleviating the manners, this need could not happen. Thus *Folly*, or *Madness*, was that who criticised the princes and kings, the priests, the companions, the flattery and corruption, the war and cruelty, the irrational manner of living (Erasmus, 1511). In front of all of them, not reason could preserve the human felicity, but "folly": "Let him that will compare the benefits they receive by me". "Folly is the only thing that keeps youth", and happiness: on the contrary, the search of the reasons of facts made people the possibly unhappier. In any case, this was the conclusion for those who governed: "Who, being a fool himself, may the better know how to command or obey fools". But for all, it would have been better to ignore, and to hope: so, just reason made all to feel being unhappier than they might think about themselves before, unhappier animals not reconciling with their own destiny.

Erasmus has aimed just to evocating, in the *indirect* manner of the standpoint of Folly, this irrationality, against which Descartes, over more than one hundred years, was to be to write in a *direct* speech his guidebook of a rational method.

The speech of Erasmus was *double*: the reasonable moderate author (Erasmus) could not but "wonder" about the very facts Folly put into light. At the same time, Folly was the one who represented the humanist, critical and reformist side of Erasmus. At another level, if only Folly could think to reject so many usual habits – so to change them (*she was Folly*), this meant that it was a sign of insanity to live in so irrational structures which required so irrational behaviours: *she was wiser* than those who covered the reality in the shadow of the tacit suppositions of conformism. From a standpoint, to be opportunistic meant to be integrated within the specific social (ir)rationality; from another, to be opportunistic meant only to fortify the irrationality within which one was to no more could live.

The other thinker mentioned here is Bernard of Mandeville. As usually is known, he stressed the interdependence – within the division of labour and occupations in the modernising society – of vices and virtues (of Mandeville, 1705)[2]: "Thus Vices nursed Ingenuity", "*Bare Virtue can't make Nations live", "yet live in Ease Without great Vices, is a vain Eutopia seated in the Brain"*. But even though the main message was the inherence of the subordination towards the powerful and the pattern of a society where "whilst Luxury/ Employ'd a Million of the Poor" – since the needs of people could no more be satisfied with the Acorns presumably eaten in the Golden Age (of Mandeville, 1705)[3], and the development of means to live in a more human and happier way was dependent just on the cultural needs which were social and socially generated (of Mandeville, 1705)[4] – the

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[2]  "Thus every Part was full of Vice,/ Yet the whole Mass a Paradice".
[3]  "They, that would revive/ A Golden Age, must be as free,/ For Acorns, as for Honesty".
[4]  "Millions endeavouring to supply/ Each other's Lust and Vanity".

realisation as such of this message was the result of a harsh social critique.

This critique was a mixture between the position of a rationalist intellectual – so even though rationalist, part of a privileged class which thought that the opposition between the physical and the intellectual labour would be eternally specific to the "human nature" and thus which was not confident in the popular classses – and an optimistic liberal. *Rationalism* imposed to respond to those who opposed to the funerals of the idealistic bourgeois revolution through the "glorious revolution" of 1688, and who signalled the continuity of the social polarisation (which meant and means poverty and suffering). *Liberalism* demanded to found this continuity within the pattern of the "human nature" and the organic interdependence of the rich and the poor "for the sake of the whole", where nevertheless the voice of the latter was ignored. There is a difference between the liberal belief at the time of Cromwell – when the main objective being the taking of the political power, the economical problems could be veiled under the idea of the postponement and resolution in the victorious future – and the liberal conviction expressed by Mandeville, after the "glorious revolution", when the former idealism could but be substituted by the need to support the *status quo*.

But Mandeville's *critique* – mostly, of the hypocrisy covering the real facts – was also a response to the rationalist tradition of the modern standpoint. There were "Sharpers, Parasites, Pimps, Players, Pick-Pockets, Coiners, Quacks, Sooth-Sayers", lawyers and physicians who used their position to acquire more means for a happy life. There were so many frauds (of Mandeville, 1705)[5] that one of the most important preoccupations of the new bourgeois rule in England be-

came just the limitation of the power of the bureaucratic strata. Certainly, it was about capitalism "in a country" – if I can use the tern coined by Trotsky concerned "socialism in a single country" – on the expense and domination of other countries, but what was important was the *model* thought to be the best, so useful to generalise it: "Fraud, Luxury, and Pride must live/ Whilst we the Benefits receive".

Where is here the double speech? It is in the *coexistence of critique and the legitimating of the "really existing capitalism" within the same direct discourse.* There are no different supposed speakers – as in Erasmus – but only one, who does not know what to do with the social antagonisms: he criticises, and he resigns himself. But in Mandeville, as in Erasmus, one can hear two voices, irrespective of their bearers.

In both Erasmus and Mandeville we can observe the conscience of the presence of the categories without rights, except to shut up in the shadow of the "folly". Both Erasmus and Mandeville reflect the adversity towards the imperative of social conformism. And both of them stress the commandment of *carpe diem*: it's so sweet to know, to forget, to taste the everyday pleasure, to wait the life passing, to savour the own uniqueness, to illusion! What else to do?

The two representatives of the beginning of the modern thinking constitute *inter alia* a *model* of the double speech of the intellectuals. Not they were guilty of the later development of this model: there are the historical conditions – first of all, the level of the productive forces – as well as the personal will to win the comfortable opportunist behaviour, which have to be questioned. But indeed the intellectual prestige of the two great thinkers had only strengthened the *model of double speech as normal reaction*

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5    "But who can all their Frauds repeat!"

*of politicians and common people in front of the power relations*.

Finally here, the *humoresque manner* to cover the need to say the truth, so to speak in the proper sense of the word – common to intellectuals and ordinary people – was, and is, the sign and form of the manifestation of the instinct of conservation. This instinct demands to use the figurative sense of the word, thus to hide oneself behind some abstract personages who could never be hurt.

### The "epigones"

I want to conclusion here only by mentioning that the double speech of the present political jargon no longer presents any heroic appearance. *There are no sincere tendencies of social critique*: if Erasmus and Mandeville deeply thought that the social problem is so important that they must follow the purpose of explaining it, if not to also alleviate it, if they (although moderate thinkers with mostly a liberal perspective) openly[6] criticised the state of things, in the present political discourses the selfish interest to keep one's political position and to fight for power is so evident, the impression of falsehood when the pity and philanthropy are scattered through openly shameful corrupt practices, that the result is demagogue discourses full of promises and big words as 'democracy' and 'the people', and not at all real care for the others in the concrete meaning of this last word as *everyone and all the human beings*.

There is no in present a classical double speech as sign of *multiplication of the self-taking place at the same time*: in the explicit form of the speech of the rebellion, of the social

critique, and in the explicit form of social obedience. No, the present political double speech expresses rather *one* explicit discourse – a double, sheer nonsense about the most important problem: how democracy is "of the people, by the people and for the people" (Abraham Lincoln), but having behind it the implicit murmur of the voice everyone can hear: "Oh, I am so bored of all of these" –. Erasmus and Mandeville expressed two kinds of convictions. In the present political speech is only one.

I think that if we speak about the double speech of the present *political jargon* (Dauzat 1929, p. 21)[7], we have in mind the two intentions expressed: the one for voters, the political public, and the other for the *pares*.

In the present political discourses, there is only one voice, and not two, which insists on the rights of the powerful as exceeding just the democratic values which were put as the basis of the modern social consensus. The only political voice supports restrictive interests: it waves the democratic values, but it expresses the right to infringe them – and without punishment –, it considers in a pharisaic manner that everyone in the people has to sacrifice himself /herself, but someones being excepted, it insists on the concentration of the political voice as being representative of the public voices. And it is not about an explicit totalitarian regime: only that the present multi-party system converges toward the single respectable neo-liberal *pensée unique*. The old liberal illusion of the necessity and possibility to fight for the right of the political enemy to express his/her opinion[8] tends to be forgotten and

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6   They did that open critique even though they used the technique of double speech.

7   As means of „cohesion of closed groups, a reaction against the external agents and if necessary a body of protection".

8   "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it", (Tallentyre, 1906, p. 199).

surpassed: the powerful have more power than ever and, at the same time, they are facing their crisis. This is the reason of the principle of double standards applied to the public discourse: freedom for the dominant ideological speech, non-freedom for the critical speech (Kumarasamy & Grant, 2018). The "legitimated violence" and the strong manipulation are the counter-models of the rational political speech: indeed, "if you can't convince them, confuse them" (Truman, "Quotes").

The result of this type of political discourse is the decay of democracy: because of the lies behind and within the political discourses, people no longer trust either in the "political class" or in the democratic institutions and organisations as such. It will be an extinction rooted in apathy, indifference and – to not forget the real world processes – hunger and malnutrition. But maybe just this is what is more efficient for the owners of the power, is it? Once more, the double speech of Erasmus and Mandeville opened up an optimistic and, I have to underline, open path to the political discourse. *The present double speech closes it.*

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# TIME AND CHANGE[*]

## I

Elsewhere[1] I attempted a very partial analysis of the ordinary concept of time, and the logical relation between time and change, and motion. Here I shall attempt a more extended analysis of (1) that concept – arrived at by abstraction from the ordinary uses of 'time,' including the uses of 'the past', 'the present$_2$', 'a minute$_2$', 'an hour', etc.; (2) *concept of the passage of time*, (*PS*), including the concepts *past*, *present*, *future*, etc., and those of seconds, minutes, hours, days, etc. And (3) the much more refined and enriched and in some ways modified concept of "*real time*" ultimately based on the ordinary concept of time.

The concepts *past*, *present, future* are logical components of the overall concept of time1, and demarcate parts of time-1's passage, so long as matter and/or energy exist; for example, in some actual universe, even if such a universe lacked all intelligence, such as human life; hence if no living thing knew about, or experienced, the distinction – and the difference between – "past", "present" and "future".

The general concept of time – in contrast to its sub-concept of time's passage – is *not a metric concept.* Otherwise it would have made sense to ask: "How many centuries, millennia, or aeons-long is time?"[2]. But physicists and cosmo-

logists speak perfectly sensibly of (a) time in relation to the existence of the universe, when they maintain that time came into existence when the universe came into existence; that is, that time began or came into existence (at least) during the quantum fluctuations in a vacuum, at (possibly) $^{-43}$ Planck time, hence before the Big Bang itself; hence that at least 16.5 billion years have passed since time began. But note that the idea of the *length of time* does not apply to the concepts of the *past, the present,* and the *future* themselves. In other words, *time* is not a self-reflexive concept; if we treat it as self-reflexive, we would have a vicious infinite regress on our hands.

Time is presupposed in a*ny change of any kind* since the latter presupposes the passage of time, and the latter presupposes time. More simply stated, "*X* is changing" presupposes "*X* is in time$_1$"[3]. The same is true of an event or happening. But note that we do not speak of an event or happening itself as changing; nor do we say that change occurs (or can occur) in an event or occurrence. But I think that an event *may* be a change in the ordinary meaning of 'change'. Some occurrences or happenings other than events may also change in something or other, or a change of something into something else. As stated earlier, past, present and future are objective realities in the universe, independent of us; a causal result of the quantum fluctuations that,

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[1]    See (Khatchadourian, 1961).
[2]    But if (real)time had a beginning – if it began with the very beginning of the universe, e.g., with the quantum

fluctuations that is commonly believed by scientists to have given rise to the Big Bang, then that question would make sense.

[3]    Contrast 'the past', 'the present', 'the future'.

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according to recent speculations, that caused the Big Bang while the *measurements* of the passage of time are a human invention. This leads to the question whether the passage of time, hence time itself, would cease to be if at some future point all changes or physical processes in the universe were to stop or cease, to come to an end. I think the answer is No: that time would continue to pass; though I believe that any existing sentient beings in the universe would then lose all sense of time, and so, of the passage of time.

In contrast to the foregoing, philosophers generally use 'change' in a broad sense as a generic label for all events, occurrences, etc., as well as to things we ordinarily call changes. For convenience I shall follow general philosophical usage in this paper, except where ordinary usage is more appropriate.

An entity's existence in time is not any sort of change in it or in any other entity. A change occurs at some rate or other; but the concept of the rate of change is inapplicable to anything enduring in time. Objects*,* events and occurrences change in the ordinary meaning of 'change', in quality, amount, intensity, etc., at some temporal rate or other. Similarly, with events, occurrences, etc. Consequently, the existence of anything in time is also an event, occurrence or happening in the ordinary meaning of these words.

Note that, at any given moment it makes no sense to ask: "How long is the past?" but that it makes sense to ask *how much longer time now is* than it was five, ten or twenty hours, etc., since the passing of those hours, etc. For example, it makes no sense to say: "The past is now, on August 1, 2015, two years longer than it was on August 1, 2013"[4]. Consequently the fact that we

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[4] This should not be confused with e.g. the fact that we meaningfully speak of some particular occurrence or period, such as, in the latter's case, the

cannot significantly say, e.g., "the past is now, on August 1, 2015, is two years longer (or older, except metaphorically) than it was on August 1, 2013", appears to show that, as it is ordinarily conceived, we cannot meaningfully speak of the *past* itself (and so, time itself) as having *had a beginning*. This conclusion can also be reached as follows. If it had any meaning, the sentence, "How long is the past at this moment?". (*S*), would mean: "How many seconds, minutes, hours, etc. have elapsed since the past began (hence, by implication, since time began)? Hence if, as appears to be the case, sentence *S* is meaningless, *S'* too is meaningless.

II

The Past, the Present, the Future

*A. The Past*

In speaking of the past, we refer to a certain constantly lengthening hence variable stretch of time-1, measured relative to the present and the future. It embraces all moments, minutes, hours, etc. that have passed. Correlatively it refers to the constantly increasing, variable set of things that once existed but are no more. In saying that it is a constantly lengthening stretch of time-1 I do not mean or imply that it literally makes sense, at a given moment, to ask: "How *long* is the past$_2$?". Again, it literally makes no sense to ask how much longer it is at this moment than it was five, ten or twenty hours, etc. ago, given the passage of these hours, etc. For example it literally makes no sense to say: September 11, 2015 is *two years longer* than it was on July 11, 2015" though it clearly makes sense to speak of say "The Christian Era" as being today, on September 11, 2015,

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Christian era, as being, on August 1, 2015, *two years longer* than it was on August 1, 2013.

two years longer than it was on September, 2013[5]. The conclusion that it makes no sense to speak of "September 11, 2015 as two years longer than it was on September 11, 2013," can also be reached as follows: If it has a meaning at all, the sentence, "*How long is the past* at this moment?" would also have a meaning. But the idea of *the past* as having a beginning makes no sense, and so the question: "How long is the past now?" is meaningless hence lacks a meaningful answer.

The correct conclusion to draw from the preceding is I think that a *category mistake* is committed if we apply either (a) the concept of a beginning, or (b) the concept of absence of a beginning to the past[6]. (a) and (b) are shown by the fact that though we think of the past as a constantly lengthening period of time, what we mean is quite different from what we mean when we think of the *present* as a *constantly changing stretch of time*. Clearly the present can be literally said to be a stretch of time – a stretch of time since, as William James pointing out, the present is not a "knife-edge". As present, it exists while the past does not exist, or no longer exists. At any given moment in the present, the past ceases

to exist. (Is 'exist' the right word to apply to the past?) What does not exist cannot possibly have a beginning or not have a beginning: to speak in that way would be to use words without meaning. As a consequence, it makes no sense to speak of the past as having, at a given present or past moment, a certain length; and the like[7]. But existing things such as objects, persons, events, etc., so long as they exist, can be said to exist for a certain length of $time_1$.

The discussion so far has left us with the following basic question: What are we to understand by "The past is a certain constantly lengthening stretch of time?". In light of our earlier discussion about the nature of past time, etc., I think the answer is that (a) the past consists of those moments of $time_2$ – or minutes, hours, etc. – that have passed, ceased to exist (hence were once present moments, minute, etc.); and that (b) the number of these moments, etc. is continually increasing.

### B. The Present & the Future

Turning to the $present_2$, 'the $present_2$' refers to a certain variable, constantly "shifting" – not lengthening or shortening – stretch of time. And by 'shifting' I mean that what we call "the present" at different moments varies with what exists at that $minute_2$, hour, etc.

'The $future_2$' too refers to a certain constantly "shifting", not lengthening or shortening, stretch of time. But the sense in which the future "shifts", is clearly different from the sense in which the present" "shifts". Indeed, the phrase

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[5] Clearly, this "beginning," if it makes sense to speak of time-1 or the past in this way (but see above) cannot be a beginning in the usual sense, i.e., in time, but a beginning "relative to" a timeless eternity, whatever that may mean. This can also be seen as follows: Let us suppose that the $past_2$ did have a beginning. Then $time_2$ too had a beginning – just one $moment_2$ before the $past_2$ began. For as soon as the first $moment_2$ passed the $past_2$ began! That is clearly meaningless, or absurd.

[6] This is quite different from saying that the concept of $time_1$ ceases to apply to the singularity called the Big Bang, which is maintained by Albert Einstein and cosmologists such as Hawking and Grünbaum among others. In Hawking's cosmology, the concept of "real time" (as opposed to "imaginary time" ($time_1$ in my terminology) stops applying to the universe's beginning.

[7] The same applies, *mutatis mutandis,* to the $future_2$, since by definition, it does not yet exist.

In *Mysteries of Modern Physics: Time*, his Course Guidebook to the DVDs of his lectures in The Great Courses, The Teaching Company, 2012, Prof. Sean Carroll of California Institute of Technology provides nice comparisons between the past and the future in "How Is the Past Different from the Future?", pp. 24ff.

'constantly shifting stretch of time' is figurative since the future, by definition, does not yet exist, has not yet come to pass. What I have in mind is that some things that are in the future at any given moment constantly come into existence;[8] and correlatively, that minutes$_2$, hours$_2$, days, etc. that at a given moment had not yet existed, constantly pass into existence, become present minutes, hours, etc. Compare with the uses of 'the past', 'the present', 'the future'. The latter expressions do not refer to anything that can be said to be constantly lengthening, or shifting, in any sense of these words.

(1) Unlike existing things, the past itself does not recede into anything, e.g., the more remote past$_2$. The statement "An existing thing $E$ has receded into the past" (P) presupposes, hence does not have the same meaning as, "The moment$_2$, 'hour' etc. in which $E$ existed has ceased to be". This illustrates the significant point that some temporal statements about things are not synonymous with or translatable into statements about (a) moments of time, minutes, hours, etc., (b) the past, present, or future, or (c) time itself (time$_1$ or time, depending on the particular object-statement). Thus "The present year (2015) is receding into the past"[9] is different in meaning from (i) "All objects, persons, etc. that exist this year, in 2015, are receding into the past". Nor is it the same as (ii) "Some objects, persons, events, etc. that, at midnight, December 31, 2014, were in existence, have ceased to exist", or (iii) "Some objects, etc. that were in existence at midnight,

December 31, 2014 have ceased to exist". And so on. However, "The present year (2015) is receding into the past" entails (ii); and (iii) – hence (ii) – logically presupposes it.

As I mentioned earlier the past does not recede into anything;[10] but we do say: "As the years pass, 2014 – last year – will recede further and further in the past, become more and more past". It would therefore seem that the past is *not made up of past years*, hence of (past) minutes hours, days, etc., – which is clearly false. To see this, we need to note the distinction between (a) the date, 2014, and, (b) the 364 days of which the year 2014 was composed. The word 'year' in '2015' is used in both senses: in (i) the sense of a certain date, a certain 'point' in time relative to other 'points' in time, in a particular year that comes to be then ceases to be; and (ii) in the sense of a certain length of time, i.e. a year. The year 2015 that recedes into the past is the year, and so is the 364 days of which that year consists and is gradually receding into the past.

(2) In its *nature or as such*, the ordinary concept of time[11] has no reference itself whatever to, is totally independent of, any and all of the entities, processes, etc., that exist or takes place in time, beginning perhaps with the quantum fluctuations that many physicists/cosmologists believe somehow gave rise to the Big Bang. That is reflected, for example, in Isaac Newton's definition of "absolute" time: "Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself and from its own nature flows equally without regard to anything external, and by another name is called dura-

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[8] Note that we do not, at least not usually, speak of objects and persons as lying or being in the future, except perhaps in a figurative sense. More naturally, we speak of an unborn child's birth, a wedding, a graduation, or some other event or change as lying in the future.

[9] We do not say that the present$_2$ itself is receding into the past or has ceased to exist. Hence 'the present moment$_2$', is not always interchangeable with 'the present$_2$'.

[10] Clearly this is also true, though *in another sense of the past$_1$*. For the concept of passage, hence of receding makes no sense in relation to 'the past$_2$'.

[11] In some respects what corresponds to time$_2$ while in other respects, I think, what corresponds to time$_1$. Note Newton's definition or description above.

tion…"[12] Compare and contrast this with the ordinary concept of time. It is clear that if nothing whatever existed, nothing could be said to exist *for* an hour, a day, etc., and nothing could be said to exist *for* an hour (to happen), a day, etc., and nothing could be said to *take* an hour (to happen). Further, if nothing existed – which means among other things, that no sentient beings had existed to utilise certain happenings to demarcate "the present" and so, together with other data. "The past" and "the future" – the concepts of past, present, and future – as well as those of past, present and future – would not have had any actual application. In short, the concept of time as a whole would have no possible application; since these concepts are essential parts of the general concept of time. But as I wrote in "On Time," "we…cannot [ordinarily] say, on the basis of the ordinary meaning of 'time' [or the concept of time] whether or not there may or would be time if the universe had not existed at all" (Khatchadourian, 1961, p. 464). To assert or to deny that time could and would exist if no universe (including God) did exist, would be to apply temporal expressions to a "state of affairs" to which they are not, in the ordinary concept of time, intended to apply; with respect to which ordinary language is silent[13]. Contrast this with the state of affairs in which the universe, as we know it, is conceived as having ceased to exist (Khatchadourian, 1961, pp. 464f., 466).

Further, time is not a kind of entity. To show that, we would need to examine much more closely than can do here the ordinary uses of 'time'. I might just mention two possible indications that time in its ordinary conception is not some kind of entity. The first is that passage of time, a fortiori time itself, is not causally efficacious. One thing is clear. Time, as ordinarily conceived is not and cannot be a *physical* entity.

Finally, the foregoing facts (or what appear to me to be facts) about the ordinary concept of time provide additional evidence that the passage of time cannot be a form of change; since a change that cannot possibly lead to or result in further change would be an extremely odd kind of change. The same is true of a change that we cannot meaningfully say has – or does not have a beginning!

(3) The foregoing (2) indicates that the ordinary concept of time is not identical with the absolutist conception of time; though the contrary is, I think, commonly believed by philosophers. But there are some similarities between the two, which are worth noting.

(a) Time is not any kind of *relation* between events, or between event, objects, living organisms, and other kinds of things that as we ordinarily say exist or occur. Indeed, not only is "time$_1$" not a kind of relation on the ordinary conception of "relation" (see Khatchadourian, 1964): temporal expressions such as 'before,' 'after' and 'simultaneous with' do not designate any relation(s) in any ordinary meaning of 'relation'. Consequently, to speak of the passing moments of time, or of seconds, minutes, etc. as related to one another insofar as they succeed one another, is to use the word 'relation' in a non-ordinary way.

(b) Related to (a) above is the fact that on both conceptions of time, temporal concepts are logically independent of the concept of change. Indeed, both concepts imply that

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[12] *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, p. 6. Quoted from (Nagel, 1961). But here Newton confuses the concept of time as a whole and the concept of the passage of time it includes.

[13] Contemporary physicists/cosmologists believe that time began with the universe's coming to be: in the case of some, that time-zero started before Planck time -43.

the existence of time a logical condition of the very possibility of change in the universe[14].

On the other hand, if we consider time$_1$ to be an *a priori* logical construct – that is, if it is not some sort of "objective reality" – time$_1$ would clearly not have "existed" if we did not exist; and that if we cease to exist, time$_1$ would likewise cease to "exist". But on the absolutist conception time is an objective feature of reality itself, not a logical construct. Hence it would, or could, exist whether or not we ever existed, and would, or could, continue to exist when we are wiped off the face of the earth. (The same, mutatis mutandis, applies to possible humanoids inhabiting other planets in the universe. It would be interesting to speculate that such beings may perhaps have very different temporal concepts from ours to organize their experiences. Or would that be impossible? In other words, is *some* conception of time, bearing a fairly close similarity to the ordinary, the absolutist, the relativity or the relational conception of time, inescapable if we (or possible humanoids) are to make sense of our (or their) experience[15]?

A third similarity is that on the ordinary conception, time literally passes regularly, not sometimes "slowly" and sometimes "quickly". Or more precisely – since in the ordinary concept time's slowness or quickness are literally only applicable to the entities, events, etc., that exist *in time* at any given moment, hours, day, year, etc., not to time itself, any one moment of time is as long or as short as any other moment[16].

III

Time; Some Current Cosmological Conceptions/Speculations[17]

(1)(a) Einstein's conception of time in his theory of General Relativity: conjoining time with space in a four-dimensional continuum of space-time; and, the relativity hence variability of the passage of time depending on the observer's space-time position and velocity in the universe. That conjoining of space and time in space-time in a variably curved universe may have, as far as, as a layman, I can see, does not affect any fundamental changes in, does not modify, the ordinary concept of time itself; though I may be quite wrong and it in fact does effect an important, perhaps, profound, modification or change in the ordinary concept.

(b) Einstein's theory radically changes the concept of the passage of time ordinarily thought of as constant, not sometimes passing faster and sometimes slower, independent of where in the universe and the velocity with which he or she is moving the observer happens to be in the universe. On his theory, the passage of time slow down as the velocity of the observer increases, making the passage of time relative to the ob-

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[14] However, if change did not exist, we presumably could not have formed temporal concepts and structured our experiences in terms of time. (See (Khatchadourian, 1961), *passim.*)

[15] Immanuel Kant's "subjective" view on this general subject is familiar. But does, or would, empirical evidence support Kant's view? That, and the above, are some fundamental questions a philosophy of time must come to grips with. But this is not the place even to begin to try to answer any of them.

See (Khatchadourian, 1961) *passim*, for a critique of Henri Bergson's claim about the existence of a variable "subjective time" – a kind of time distinct form "objective time," varying with our inner experiences. Note the following common imaginative, metaphorical way of speaking of time's passage, quoted from Ivan Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons*: "Time, it is well known, sometimes flies like a bird, sometimes crawls like a worm; but man is wont to be particularly happen when he does not even notice whether it passes quickly or slowly." (translated by Constance Garnett. The Modern Library, N.Y., [n.d.], p. 103.)

[16] See (Taylor, 1963, Chapter 6, pp. 70-83). The Puzzles are in pp. 74-83.

[17] As opposed to mathematical "abstract time".

server's position and speed. A contemporary example would be the lapse of time in the case of astronauts flying to the international space station, or for the astronauts stationed there.

The conjoining of space and time in space-time in a variably curved universe may have brought about an important, even fundamental, change in the ordinary concept of time itself.

*I. The Arrow of Time*

The text that accompanies the DVD lecture series entitled *Mysteries of Modern Physics: Time,* Sean Carroll of California Institute of Technology states the following:

- "We actually define the past versus the future using the arrow of time" (Carroll, 2012, p. 27). Carroll, S.

- And importantly: "Time could exist in a universe without an arrow, and time is not the arrow itself. *The arrow is a feature of the stuff of the universe*… Things… evolve in certain ways always in the same direction, from the past to the future." And, "*The arrow of time is the arrow of stuff evolving in time. … It is not time that we need to understand but matter. It is the motion of particles and objects in the universe*"[18] (Carroll, 2012, p. 28).

**Question**: Why and precisely how does the arrow of time, hence the passage of time depends on entropy? (So, if there was no change in entropy in the universe, time would have "stood still", hence would have ceased to exist?)

*II. The Second Law of Thermodynamics*

"…The feature of matter that changes with time is called entropy. The feature of the universe…is that the increase of entropy is associated with the passage of time".

"The second law of thermodynamics – entropy of the universe increases – underlies all the ways in which the past is different from the future". "…[T]he fact that entropy increases is the reason you remember the past and not the future." "We usually find that when the entropy decreases in one small system, it is because the universe was increasing in entropy greatly in the universe" (Carroll, 2012, p. 28).

"But we're saying that the fact that entropy increases is the reason you remember the past and not the future" (Carroll, 2012, p. 28).

And, "The second law … says that there is an irreversibility – a direction – of time. Entropy increases in one direction and decreases as we go to the past" (Carroll, "Time", p. 31). Carroll adds that the [previous] statement of it is actually only an approximation. "It is not absolutely impossible for entropy to decrease spontaneously; it is, however, extremely unlikely". "The second law is a meta-law; it refers to how different kinds of laws of physics can possibly work" (Carroll, 2012, p. 31). Further, "…entropy measures disorderliness. … [A]nother way to think about entropy is as a measure of the uselessness of a certain amount of energy" (Carroll, 2012, p. 34).

"Energy is conserved, but it can change forms. If you have energy in a low entropy form, you can do useful work with it. … If you convert that energy into a high-entropy form, it becomes useless. … Fuel is a low-entropy concentration of energy" (Carroll, 2012, p. 35).

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[18] My italics.

### III. Time's Arrow[19]

In "Time's Arrow" Carroll notes, inter alia, the following general points about Time's Arrow: "The... very strong arrow of time" the universe has, "which is reflected in the life cycle of stars and planets". And: "Besides physical and biological change, there are some features of the arrow of time that seem ingrained or logically necessary." That includes "...the idea that the cause will always precede an effect. ..." And: "A universe without the arrow of time... would not have progress or differentiation from the past to the future" (Carroll, 2012, pp. 24-26).

### IV. Irreversibility of Time's Arrow

- "Something happens in one direction, and it is easy to make it happen, but it does not happen in the other direction, or if it does, it is because we put effort into it. ... They go in the direction of time".

- "That difference between going from the past to the future is consistent throughout the universe as far as we know. This is... a feature of the way the universe works" (Carroll, 2012, pp. 24-26).

### Re Time in Stephen Hawking and Penrose:

1. The entropy of the universe must be progressively increasing while the universe undergoes a "Big Crunch", gradually returning to a new singularity, if Hawking is right that the Big Crunch would not result in a reversal of time's arrow.

2. Re Penrose's *Cycles of Time*. If a new cycle of time begins with every new cycle of the universe resulting not, as in the original cycle from [the] Big Bang from the white energy escaping from black holes (Hawking), then the entropy in each cycle must, like our present "time cycle," start with the lowest possible entropy and continually increase as the cycle evolves, for the arrow of time to continually increase from the past to the present and future; i.e., for it not to be reversed in any Cycle.

But how is it that the entropy will not gradually decrease, as according to Hawking, the Great Crunch begins and continues until a new universe starts from a new Big Bang? For the entropy of the mass and energy in the universe in the Big Crunch *would seem to become gradually less.*

### Stephen Hawking on Time's Arrow;

The importance of time's arrow always pointing from the past to the future, never reversing direction, is well illustrated in Stephen Hawking's speculations concerning the "Big Crunch" in his book *Black Holes and Baby Universes and other Essays* (Hawking, 1994, pp. 146ff). For instance he writes:

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[19] Throughout this section 'time' refers to what scientists/cosmologists call "real time" to distinguish it from "imaginary time", Hawking describes as "a well-defined mathematical concept" (see Hawking, 2009, p. 87). And, "The singularity theorems of classical general relativity showed that the universe must have a beginning, and that this beginning must be described in terms of quantum theory. This in turn led to the idea that the universe could be finite in imaginary time, but without boundaries or singularities. … This might suggest that the so-called imaginary time is really the fundamental time, and that what we call real time is something we create just in our minds. In real time, the universe has a beginning and an end at singularities that form a boundary to space-time and at which the laws of physics break down. But in imaginary time, there are no singularities or boundaries. So maybe what we call imaginary time is really more basic, and what we call real time is just an idea that we invent to help us describe what we think the universe is like. … Which is real, "real" or "imaginary" time? It is simply a matter of which is a more useful description" (Hawking, 2009, p. 91).

One would expect the gravitational attraction between different galaxies to be [in future] slowing down the rate of expansion. If the density of the universe is greater than a certain critical value, gravitational attraction will eventually stop the expansion and make the universe start to contract again. The universe would collapse to a big crunch. This would be rather like the big bang that began the universe. The big crunch would be what is called a singularity, a state of infinite density at which the laws of physics would break down. This means that even if there were events after the big crunch, what happened at them could not be predicted (Hawking, 1994, p 146).

"If [the density of the universe] is greater [than the critical value]. *The universe will recollapse and time itself will come to an end at the big bang crunch[20]* (Hawking, 1994, p 147). And about the idea of "time-travel" he writes: "What seems to happen is that the effects of the uncertainty principle would cause there to be a large amount of radiation if one travelled into the past [i.e. if the arrow of time were reversed]. This radiation would either warp space-time so much that it would not be possible to go back in time, or it would cause space-time to come to an end in a singularity like the big bang and the big crunch" (Hawking, 1994, p 154).

Hawking does not directly answer the question whether the arrow of time would be reversed during the big crunch. But the answer I believe would be "no," since the entropy of the universe during the big crunch would presumably not decrease or may perhaps even continue to increase.

*V. Roger Penrose on Entropy[21]*

In the 1879s Ludwig Boltzmann gave us "a more applicable definition of entropy than that given earlier by Rudolf Clausius. In Boltzmann's definition, "heat is…thermal energy – the random motions of atoms. … Boltzmann realized that arrangements of atoms are macroscopically indistinguishable, and… that entropy is simply a way of counting the number of arrangements of atoms inside a certain system". "In other words, the reason entropy increases, according to Boltzmann, is simply that there are more way to be high entropy than to be low entropy. That is a rigorous definition that corresponds to our intuitive feeling that entropy measures disorderliness" (Penrose, 2012, p. 36)[22].

"When entropy is low, the macroscopic configuration is very precisely arranged. There are only a few such configurations that look the same. When entropy is high, the configuration is spread out. There are many different ways to arrange the atoms, and all of them look alike". "Boltzmann's definition of entropy is one that makes the arrow of time go. Once we understand it, we can ask why entropy was so low in the early universe" (Penrose, 2012, p. 36)[23].

Penrose devotes Part I, sections 1.1-1.5 to entropy: "The relentless march of randomness", (Section 1.1); section 1.2 to "Entropy, as state counting", 1.3 largely to Boltzmann's definition of entropy; 1.4 to the "robustness of the concept of entropy"; and 1.5 to "The inexorable increase of entropy into the future"; and 1.6 to "Why is the past different?". For instance, in 1.4 he pro-

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[20]  My italics.

[21]  See (Penrose, 2012, pp. 11ff).
[22]  Here refer to Penrose's more rigorous definition of entropy in *Cycles of Time*.
[23]  Later we will consider the question "why entropy was so low in the early universe".

vides a more precise definition of entropy than Boltzmann's definition[24].

The reason(s) why the past is different from the future, Penrose says is that, argues against the idea that there is no mystery for our experience of the passage of time as "dependent upon an increasing entropy as part of what constitutes our conscious feeling of the passage of time; so whatever time-direction we believe to be the 'future' must be that in which entropy increases. He argues that "this argument misses the crucial point that the very usefulness of the notion of entropy depends upon our universe being enormously far from thermal equilibrium, so that coarse-graining regions that are far smaller than $R_{max}$ are involved in our common experience. In addition to this, the very fact that entropy is either uniformly increasing or uniformly decreasing depends upon the actuality of one or the other end (but not both ends) of the evolution curve in phase space being constrained to a very tiny coarse-graining region, and this is the case of only a very minute fraction of possible universe histories. It is the very tininess of the coarse-graining region 'B that our evolution curve appears to have encountered that needs explaining, and this issue is completely untouched by the aforementioned argument" (Penrose, 2012, p. 3).

## VI. Why is the Past Different?

"The answer to that question [he writes], "though hardly a 'physical explanation' – is simply that such 'past-teleology' is common experience, whereas 'future teleology' is just something that we never seem to encounter… It is…observational fact that the Second Law holds good. In the universe we know, the dynamical laws appear not to be guided in any way to a future goal and can be regarded as being completely unconcerned with coarse-graining regions; whereas such 'guidance' of the evolution curve in past directions is utterly commonplace. …such 'teleology' is perfectly acceptable if we are looking towards the past, but it is not a feature of our experience that it apply towards the future" (Penrose, 2012, p. 51).

And …The very origin of our universe was represented in phase space by a course-graining region of quite exceptional tininess, so that the initial state of the universe was one of particularly small entropy. … The Big Bang - had, for some reason, an extraordinarily tiny entropy… So, the key issue is indeed the specialness of the Big Bang, and the extraordinary minuteness of the initial course-graining region 'B that represents the nature of this special initial state" (Penrose, 2012, p. 51).

(2) According to contemporary physics and cosmology,[25] *real time* (which is contrasted with mathematical, *imaginary time*) began with the quantum fluctuations that some contemporary scientists believe resulted in the Big Bang. Given that over 15 billion years have so far elapsed since the beginning of real time.

Concerning the ultimate origin of the universe before the Big Bang, hence about the beginning to real time, "three current speculations" (Trefil, 1985, p. 238) consist in (a) *The Geometrical Approach,* propounded by Francois Englert

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[24] Using natural logarithms, he writes "Boltzmann's entropy formula as: S =k logV, where log V = 2.302585… xlog$_{10}$V" (Penrose, 2012, p. 30).

Later Penrose adds about entropy: "…we may well take the view that the Second Law is proceeding according to its normal practice, where the entropy continues to increase—but we must be careful about what 'entropy' notion we are referring to here. This entropy refers to all the degrees of freedom, including that of all the material that has fallen into the [black] holes" (Penrose, 2012, p. 188).

[25] Who? E.g. is this Hawking's or Penrose's view? And what about the cosmological theories of the origin of the universe?

and Raoul Brout", (b) *The Multi-Dimensional Approach*, and (c) *The Dynamical Theories*. These speculations speculate about the time before $^{-43}$ Planck time, which is "the earliest instant that present theories can address" (Trefil, 1985, p. 240). These speculations "have one thing in common: they all agree that somewhere around the Planck time something radically different happened, and that *the concept of time zero has no more meaning for the universe...* (Trefil, 1985, p. 240)[26]

The geometrical picture provides a "picture in which the universe was an ordinary vacuum at a time long before … the start of the Big Bang … [T]he vacuum is inherently unstable … If a small bit of matter should appear … its effect would be to make the grid expand slightly". "The positive energy need to create the bit of intrusive matter is balanced by negative energy stored in the expanding grid, so that there is no violation of the [second law] of the conservation of energy involved in this sort of event" (Trefil, 1985, p. 240). "… Once the grid starts to expand at any point, more matter is created". And "so on", "until the universe reaches the proportions it had at the Planck time" (Trefil, 1985, p. 241). "As in the case in most of the other theories… the geometrical case regards the initial bit of mass as the product of a random fluctuation of the type often seen in subatomic systems. It triggers the instability of the grid". "The potential for growth [until it grows] "into the present universe. The potential for growth is inherent in the dynamics of the vacuum" (Trefil, 1985, p. 243).

The third, Dynamical theories, Edward Tryon (and others) speculate that "A particle in empty space, provided that the opposing particles annihilate each other in a time so short that

the violation of energy conservation implicit in the process cannot be detected. Particle-antiparticle pairs pop into existence here and there but disappear quickly" (Trefil, 1985, pp. 241-242). "In this [Edward Tryon] picture, the universe came into existence as a fluctuation in the quantum mechanics vacuum – a notion that leads to a view of creation in which the entire universe is simply an accident" (Trefil, 1985, p. 242).

"A more modern version" is described by David Schramm:

> In this scheme of things, if we could see the universe before the Planck time, we would find the elemental foam *extending into the infinite past*. As in the vacuum fluctuation picture, the universe began when enough "bubbles" happened by chance, to come together. Unlike the fluctuation picture, however, in this scheme the Big Bang actually started at the Planck time. *There is no time zero and hence no singularity* (Trefil, 1985, p. 242)[27].

Trefil comments about the three types of speculations thus:

> Implicit in all of our discussion of what may have happened before the Planck time is a very singular idea. It holds that the laws we can discover in our laboratories here and now have governed not only the universe since the beginning, but governed the moment of creation as well…. We are saying that the very existence of the universe is an inevitable result of the laws of physics (Trefil, 1985, p. 243).

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[26]  My italics.

[27]  My italics. The idea that at the Big Bang the laws of physics break down, hence a singularity, comes from Einstein's General Theory of Relativity.

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*VII. Additional Questions or Issues Regarding real Time in Relation to Certain of (a) Hawking's, and (b) Penrose's Cosmological Theories.*

*Real vs. Imaginary time.*

1. **Re Carroll**: Why and precisely how does the *passage of time* depend on entropy? The answer must be that as entropy increases, time passes, time's arrow flies from the past to the future. What do Carroll and/or Penrose say about it – *if anything? If, for some known or unknown reason there were no change in the universe's entropy, time, according to Carroll, would stop, cease to exist.*

2. **Re Penrose**: If a new cycle of time begins with every new Cycle of the universe and results not, as in the original Cycle from the Big Bang but from while energy is escaping from black holes (Hawking), then the entropy in each Cycle must start – like our present Time Cycle – with the lowest possible entropy and continually increase as the Cycle evolves, for the arrow of time to continually point from the past toward the future; i.e., for it not to be reversed in every Cycle.

It is clear that the first Cycle of time could only have come from a Big Bang and could not have come about from a white hole. Only subsequent "big bangs" could come from already existing black holes – which implies that the succeeding Cycles can only come from *already existing universes or "baby universes"* (to borrow the phrase from Hawking) left over from a previous, incomplete Cycle – i.e., a Crunch that occurred only partially and not completely, i.e., not going all the way to the very beginning of the universe.

A further problem concerning *Penrose's view of an aeon preceding the Big Bang of our aeon.* Presumably, such an aeon could only arise from a previous Big Bang of our aeon, not from a White Hole (the evaporation from a huge black hole) since, presumably, no black holes would exist without the existence of galaxies with black holes at their centers, hence a massive black hole could not have originated the previous aeon.

- As long as matter and/or energy exist in the universe, there would be time.
- Since the arrow of time always points from the past toward the future, determined by the universe's increasing entropy, the arrow will always point in the same direction.
- The ordinary uses of 'time' vs. the scientific concept of "real time".
- If nothing existed instead of a universe, there would have been no time (or space), since complete nonexistence of matter or energy would have meant the total absence of entropy, zero entropy. With the presumed quantum fluctuations – if these were actually the beginning of something existing – there would have been some incredibly low entropy (which is what Carroll states about the beginning of the universe) hence time – and its arrow – pointing from the lowest entropy to the progressively increasing entropy as the universe evolves, the arrow of time will continue to move in the same direction, from past to future, just as we know.

*Why and precisely how does the passage of the arrow of time depend on entropy? So, if there were no change at all in entropy in the universe time would stand still, hence would cease to exist?*

## IV
## Time and Change

It may be recalled that two of the claims I made before are: (1) that the passage of time is not a form of change, and, correspondingly, (2) that the being or "enduring" of entities, events, occurrences, etc., in time is not a form of change, undergone by them. In this section I shall endeavour to show how a considerable number of confusions, puzzles or paradoxes that would result from one's supposing that the opposite of (1) and (2) is true. To that end, I shall consider the puzzles or paradoxes with which Richard Taylor, in "Time and Becoming" (Taylor, 1963), is confronted with maintaining that the passage of time is a form of change. The discussion should add to what I said about time and temporal passage and illustrate a number of the points I made.

Taylor starts his consideration of "temporal passage and becoming" inauspiciously by supposing, as I said, that the passage of time is a form of change (Taylor, 1963, p. 70). He is misled by the fact that we use the term 'passage' (also 'passing') in speaking of time, and using 'drawing nearer', 'becoming present', and 'receding', in speaking of things that endure in time. He writes:

> The one thing about time that has
> always been the greatest stumbling
> block to comparing it with space… is
> its *passage* or *flow*[28] or, what amounts

to the same thing,[29] the characteristic all things seem to have of continuously *moving* through time. Thus we speak of future things as drawing nearer, of then becoming present and, having passed into the present, of receding endlessly into an ever-growing past. Such expressions as these imply that something is moving, though they do not imply that anything is moving in space, in the usual way things move. In fact, a thing needs only to have a place in time in order to be moving in the manner suggested; for concerning any object that ever exists in time we can say that, until it exists, it draws closer to existing[30]; that while it exists it becomes older; and after it ceases to exist it recedes ever farther into the past (Taylor, 1963, p. 74)[31].

And later:

> It [the passage of things through time]
> is aptly called pure becoming because
> any other kind of change or becoming
> that anything might undergo presupposes this kind of change, whereas
> this pure becoming presupposes
> no other change at all
> (Taylor, 1963, p. 76)[32].

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[28] Note the metaphorical 'flow' Taylor adds, in line with a long poetic tradition, reinforcing his error about the passage of time.

[29] Taylor is implying, without any semantic evidence, that time "would not exist" (or that, perhaps, that it would not make sense to speak of the passage of time and hence of time itself) in the absence of things that endure in it. Compare in (Khatchadourian, 1961).

[30] This last sentence is fraught with strange metaphysical presuppositions, which can be seen e.g., by asking how something that does not yet exist can "draw closer" to anything, including existing; except in the obvious ordinary sense that the time or date of its coming into existence is drawing nearer with the passage of time. This is independent of the question whether whatever will come into existence is causally determined to come into existence.

[31] Italics in original, except for 'moving,' which is my italics.

[32] Italics in original.

It is not at all surprising that the passage of time or the existence of objects, events, etc., in time, thought of in this way, has "always profoundly bewildered philosophers, because it seems to be loaded with absurdities as soon as one begins thinking about it" (Taylor, 1963, p. 74-75). Strangely but not uncharacteristically however, philosophers, Taylor included, have failed to draw from this fact the obvious conclusion that the generation of these absurdities is really a reductio ad absurdum showing in no uncertain terms the existence of a serious error – in this case a category mistake[33] – in at least one of the premises of this inference: the premise that the passage of time, or the enduring of things in time, is a form of change ("becoming"). If this had been detected, philosophers would not have had to resort to the Draconian measures to which, Taylor points out, some have been forced to resort: the denial of the reality of the passage of time, hence the reality of time itself (whatever that may mean, or whatever it may have meant in each particular case)[34].

I should emphasize that to maintain that the concept of change cannot be meaningfully applied either to time in general or specifically to the passage of time, is not to deny that time passes, and certainly not to deny that time is in some sense "real". I say this because Taylor writes: "Confronted with such considerations as these [the paradoxes of "pure becoming"] it is tempting to dismiss pure becoming or temporal passage of things is an illusion, to say that nothing ever really does change in this sense" (Taylor,

1963, p. 78). Taylor here and everywhere else in his article supposes that it is *proper* to say that "The passage of time is a form of change", or "There is pure becoming", hence that these statements are *true or false.* (Of course, he believes that it is true.) Consequently, he believes that to deny "pure becoming" is tantamount to denying that anything exists in time, or that time passes. And according to him, that would amount to "denying the datum with which we [Taylor] began". He continues: "Moreover, in case the idea of the passage or flow of time is essential to the very conception of time itself, as it may well be, then to deny that there is any such passage would amount to denying that time is real, or that anything is even in time at all" (Taylor, 1963, p. 79).

What I do deny is not the 'reality' of time or its passage; and I fully agree with Taylor that to deny the passage of time is to deny the 'reality' of time in some sense of 'reality' or other. That follows from what I said earlier about the relation between the uses of 'time' and the passage of time. Taylor's view and what he says about the passage of time, etc., show that he thinks 'passage' and 'flow' have the same *kind* of use or meaning,[35] in this context, as in relation to things (objects) that move in space, or things (liquids) that flow; and so on. For example he says: "…A thing needs only to have a place in time in order to be moving in the manner suggested; for concerning any object that ever exists in time we can say that, until it exists, it draws closer and closer to existing; that while it exists it becomes older; and after it ceases to exist it recedes ever farther into the past" (Taylor, 1963, p. 74). Perhaps his earlier emphasis on the similarities between space and time (see Taylor,

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[33] Cf. (Ryle, 1945) and (Khatchadourian, 1967, chapter 8).

[34] Cf. (Taylor, 1963, p. 75). However, I do not think that Taylor is right in holding that the idea "that time itself is unreal, and that the passage of things through time is an illusion, has been almost characteristic of metaphysics ever since [some of the earliest metaphysical speculations of the Greeks]" (Taylor, 1963, p. 75).

[35] I do not say: "same meaning or use" because Taylor does point out that the passage in question here is not passage in space.

1963, p. 70-74) is a factor in his assimilation of 'passage,' 'flow,' 'recede,' and the like in their everyday uses, in relation to objects moving in space. Taylor mentions several strange consequences of the view he advocates. (1) The first of these is that:

> Even things which have ceased to exist, and others which will exist in the future but do not exist yet, undergo a relational kind of change which is simply a corollary of pure becoming or passage through time. That is, we can speak of Diogenes' cup as receding even farther into the past. It is more remote from us in time today than it was yesterday, and this is a relational change which it is undergoing. Similarly, the birth of my first grandchild, assuming there will be one, is something that is drawing closer and this is a relational change that something which will, but does not yet exist, is already undergoing[36]
> (Taylor, 1963, p. 77).

*Two comments are in order.*

(1) Diogenes' cup, which does not exist anymore, cannot in any literal sense recede, and so recede farther, into the past. Similarly, mutatis mutandis, the "birth of my first grandchild" cannot be "*drawing closer*". This is true whether or not the passage of time is a form of change, or a relational form of change; and whether or not "receding" and "drawing slower" in the present context should be interpreted as a form of change. What is ordinarily meant by saying that Diogenes' cup is receding farther into the past is, as we saw before, (a) that the dates on which it existed have passed, and (i) that these dates are receding father into the past, (b) itself

means (i') that an ever-increasing number of moments$_2$, hours$_2$, etc., have been succeeding the minutes, days, etc., in which it existed. The same sort of explication is possible, mutatis mutandis, with respect to the statement that the birth of my first grandchild is drawing closer.

In light of (1) above it is seen that only the duration ("enduring") of existing or present$_2$ things, *while they exist$_2$*, can at best be meaningfully said to be a form of change[37]. Yet even that will not do, for the same basic reasons I gave earlier, and those I shall give under (2) – (5) in this section, against the view that the passage of time is a form of change. For only if the latter is a form of change can the duration of existing things in time$_1$ be a form of change; the change which I for instance am supposed to undergo qua "enduring" in (present$_1$) time can only be the change in which the passage of time allegedly consists. (Here one may ask how the latter, not being causally efficacious, can produce any change in me.)

(2) Taylor states the second basic puzzle as follows:

> It seems, moreover, that times themselves undergo both kinds of

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[36] Italics in original.

[37] Note that the *passage of time$_2$* is logically an ultimate, unanalysable concept which we logically end up with whenever we talk about the existence of objects, persons, events, etc. - of things that exist in time. That is a part of the "fact" that the concept of time$_1$ and the concept of time$_2$ form part of the logically basic conceptual framework of ordinary English, French, German and perhaps many other, if not all ordinary languages.

With respect to Taylor's view that Diogenes' non-existent cup is undergoing a *relational* kind of change, I might point out that in my (Khatchadourian, 1973). I argued that the succession of moments$_2$, etc. does not involve a relation between moments $t_1$ and $t_2$ – a moment ($t_2$) that is succeeding or has succeeded another moment $t_1$. Hence the puzzle as to how an "existing" moment ($t_2$) can be related to something that no longer exists ($t_1$), and to something that does not yet exist ($t_3$) – the moment that will immediately follow $t_2$ – does not arise.

change just described. Any actual time, like any actual being, undergoes the same pure becoming or passage as the latter, and any nonactual past or future time undergoes the same relational change characteristic of non-actual past or future beings. Thus I can say of today, which is an actual time, that it is passing, elapsing, its end drawing closer, that it is becoming older (Taylor, 1963, p. 77).

If we recognize that the passage of $time_2$ is not a kind or form of change the foregoing difficulties do not arise. For (a) the utterly strange if not preposterous idea that "any nonactual past or future time [which does not exist] undergoes the same relational change characteristic of non-actual past or future beings" will not arise; just as I pointed out under (1) above, the idea of non-existent beings or things undergoing a "relational change" will not arise. Similarly with the difficulty that "It is exceedingly odd, then [in view of the fact that "all ordinary changes, or instances of things gaining or losing properties, presuppose time"] to suppose that times themselves should ever be thought of as changing, unless one is willing to assume a mysterious kind of metaphysical "time" against whose background the ordinary time intervals into which we are born and grow older can themselves come into being and age" (Taylor, 1963, p. 78)[38].

Taylor might have added that, on pain of having to posit an endless array of "metaphysical times", the "mysterious metaphysical time" to which he refers in the preceding quotation must be considered either (i) as not passing,[39] or

(ii) as a time whose passage is not and cannot be a form of change. Since on the ordinary conception of time (also, the other conceptions that have been formulated in Western thought at least, such as the Newtonian and the Relativity conceptions) it is self-contradictory to think of $time_{(2)}$ as not passing, we can see how in this conception, '$time_1$' cannot refer to any kind of entity or thing, in which moments of $time_2$ are supposed to *pass*. For the ordinary concept of the passage of moments of time does not logically necessitate the supposition that "$time_1$" is something in which this passage takes place – for the simple reason that the passage is not a form of change. Time is not something, in which moments of $time_2$ pass, metaphorically not unlike a river-bed in which flows a body of water composed of innumerable drops. In this way the ordinary concept of time avoids the difficulties that plague the conception of the passage of $time_2$ conceived of as a form of change, hence the conception of $time_1$ as some kind of entity, some kind of "receptacle" (which, however, does *not* undergo any kind or form of change, including the form of "change" the passage of moments of time is, on this view, supposed to be). Taylor fails to see these things because, once again, he misconstrues what we mean in speaking of the passage of time (Taylor, 1963, p. 78). Likewise he misconstrues "receding into the past" as some kind of process, happening or event. That is precisely involved in his thinking of, e.g., "today" or "tomorrow", in passing, as itself undergoing change.

(3) A further problem in Taylor's view we are considering stems from a fact I have pointed out, namely, that the notion of rate of change is inapplicable to the passage of time, hence to the

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38  Cf. (Khatchadourian, 1961, p. 464).
39  This time that is not passing cannot, however, be $time_1$ or anything like $time_1$ (see above); and the arbitrari-

ness of positing a time that is so unlike what we call the ($time_1$ or $time_2$) is, I think, quite evident.

enduring of things in time. Interestingly, Taylor recognizes this, for he writes: "…The continual recession of things past, and the advance upon us of things future, is a strange kind of passage for the reason that *no rate of passage* can possibly be assigned to it without making nonsense" (Taylor, 1963, p. 78)[40]. This difficulty too is eliminated once the passage of time, or the enduring of things in time, is not supposed to be a form of change.

(4) Taylor rightly points out that "… it is… quite odd to think of events as themselves changing" (Taylor, 1963, p. 78). The reason is that the notion of change is inapplicable to an event, which is something that occurs, just as a change is something that occurs. Thus, it is meaningless to speak of change (or of a change), or of an event, as itself changing *or not changing.* A change begins and comes to an end; but beginning and coming to an end are not themselves change of any kind; they are not a change in anything or into anything: while all change, in the ordinary uses of 'change,' is of the one or the other sort[41]. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, of events. The upshot is that it would be utterly confused to speak of an event's being in time as a form of change. Yet Taylor persists in thinking that that view is apparently inescapable, since "… events are in time and have an endless recession into the past, like anything else" (Taylor, 1963, p. 78).

(5) Finally, Taylor points out that:

> Pure becoming is not only an unobservable change but is compatible with, and in fact entailed by, any change whatever that is observed. If, for instance, we see

that something, such as a leaf, is green and then becomes red, or red and then becomes green, we must conclude that it also becomes older, for nothing can become anything at all without becoming either older in the process. The conception of something's becoming older, then, is a purely a priori notion, a consequence of its simply being in time (Taylor, 1963, p. 78).

If "pure becoming" – the passage of time – is unobservable, in the sense of being unobservable in principle, which is what Taylor appears to imply – it would certainly constitute a further difficulty for Taylor's view. For a "change" that is unobservable in principle must be a very odd kind of change. To deal adequately with this point, however, one must first determine whether, and in what sense, the passage of time is or is not observable in principle, irrespective of any theories we may have regarding the nature of this passage. And that would require much more space that we have. Still, I might mention that *if* it can be shown that the passage of time would be unobservable in principle if we suppose that it is a form of change *that* would provide further grounds for maintaining that the passage of time is *not* a form of change. For there is, most assuredly, an ordinary sense in which we speak, at different times or in different situations, of having a "sense of the passage of time", and of "losing all sense of the passage of time". And we distinguish this "sense of (the passage of) time" from our purely conceptual or intellectual knowledge that time is constantly passing. On the other hand, there is a serious question as to whether there is such a thing as awareness of the passage of time *as something distinct from awareness of change*. In any case, if there is an "awareness of

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[40]  My italics.
[41]  I am not, of course, talking about the sort of change that we call "change of mind" or "change of heart," etc.

the passage of time", we are I think on fairly safe ground in supposing that we are aware of the passage of time, whatever that may mean, only *through* our awareness or observation of change in the broad sense[42].

Taylor attempts to overcome the foregoing difficulties without abandoning his original "datum" that the passage of time is a form of change. If we agree that the passage of time is not a form of change, we would expect that his attempt will inevitably fail. And that is precisely what happens on Taylor's own admission. For after several pages of closely reasoned analysis, Taylor ends up the chapter with the following admission: "We seem justified in concluding, then, that the pure becoming of the world and of time [translate this into: "the enduring of things in time and the passage of time] is no myth or illusion, *however obscure it may be to our reason,* and that this *strange notion* cannot be purged from our understanding of the temporal aspect of things without destroying our very understanding of those things, as being in time" (Taylor, 1963, p. 83)[43].

Taylor attempts to resolve the difficulties as follows: "What is needed", he writes, "… is some way of expressing statements embodying the idea of pure becoming, in such a way as to get rid of this idea altogether without thereby destroying the idea of time as well. This is actually attempted by substituting changeless dates for changing *now*s and *then*s, or substituting changeless temporal relations, such as earlier and later, for changing ones, such as past and future" (Taylor, 1963, p. 79). But as he points

out on the same page, "whenever we reformulate any statement [that embodies the idea of temporal passage] so as to expurgate from it the idea of pure becoming, we are able to understand it only in the light of some *other* proposition that embodies the passage of time" (Taylor, 1963, p. 78)[44]. He considers four such propositions that embody the idea of "pure becoming" in them. Although I do not concur in every case with the reasons he gives why some or all of the reformulations he attempts are not equivalent to the original assertions – and if space permitted – it would have been useful to consider these reasons[45].

I agree that such attempts are bound to fail, if we understand by "pure becoming" what we ordinarily call the passage of time. For in light of our analysis of the everyday uses of 'time', 'time' and other temporal expression, it is seen that to "expurgate" the idea of temporal passage is to eliminate the idea of $time_2$, from which the former idea is logically inseparable. Stated positively, it is impossible to eliminate the concept of the passage of $time_2$ by substituting either (a) "changeless dates for changing nows and thens", or (b) "changeless temporal relations, such as earlier and later, for changing ones, such as past and future".

Let us begin with (a). A date is changeless. The ideas of change and temporal passage do not apply to it. It is always what it is. For example, 2015 can never change into some other date, e.g.,

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[42] A careful examination of the nature of our sense of temporal passage, including the circumstances or the way(s) in which we have it, should give us a much better conceptual understanding of the passage of $time_2$ than we now have.

[43] My italics.

[44] My italics.

[45] To give just one example, he wrongly says that "…it ["now"] must … be understood either as something that is changing, or else something in relation to which everything is changing" (Taylor, 1963, p. 81); though he is right in concluding that "it must, in short, be understood as a concept of pure becoming", i.e., a concept involving the concept of passage. What we should say instead is that it is either something that is passing – $now_2$ – or something in relation to which everything in the present is passing – $now_1$

2016. Nor does it make sense to say that (the date$_1$) 2015 has come into existence on a certain day and will end on a certain other day. A *date* can and does pass. For instance, we say: "The date (month, year, decade, etc.) of my wife's and my 15$^{th}$ wedding anniversary has passed". Indeed, the concept of a date presupposes the concept of the passage of time$_2$ Therefore only if one could reformulate statements involving the idea of temporal passage, without change or loss of meaning, into statements having reference to dates$_1$ but not (or not also) dates$_2$, can the temporal passage be successfully expurgated. But that is impossible. The concept of temporal passage directly involves the concept of date (and, also, indirectly a date). As I pointed out, the concept of time$_2$, hence the concept of temporal passage is *presupposed* by the concept of a date$_2$.

Thus, though the concept of a date also presupposes the concept of a date, we cannot possibly translate statements involving dates$_2$ into equivalent statements involving dates$_1$ but not temporal passage; any more than we can translate statements involving time in general into equivalent statements involving the concept of time$_1$ alone (without involving the concept of temporal passage).

Essentially the same logical state of affairs obtains with respect to the attempt to reformulate statements involving the concept of temporal passage into statements involving the concept of intervals of time (intervals) that widen with the passage of time; as opposed to fixed intervals (intervals$_1$) that obtain between fixed dates$_1$ (e.g., as in "He travelled between 2014 and 2005"). We cannot reformulate, for example, "*X* is receding ever farther into the past" as, say, "*X* existed from July 1 through July 26, 2005" (Taylor, 1963, p. 81). The interval$_1$ between July 1 and July 26, 2005 is a fixed period

that does not undergo change. It is composed of a certain number of weeks$_1$, days$_1$, etc., each of which is a fixed unit of time.

The time interval$_1$ between a certain event, *A*, that took place on July 1, 2015 and an event *B*, that took place on July 25, 2015, does not itself pass; only July 1 and July 25, 2015 pass, recede into the past. (At the moment I am writing they have both receded into the past.) But even a time interval$_2$ is not said to pass; though if it is an interval$_2$ between some past event and the present (at time *t*), it constantly widens or increases, because the present$_2$ (at time *t*) itself passes into, become, the past[46]. But a *fair amount of time*$_2$ did pass between the dates$_2$ separated by the interval$_1$, i.e., here between July 1 and July 25. Unless time$_2$ continued to pass after July 25, 2015 would never have come, and no interval between the two would have existed. (This is different from the *false* statement that, unless events continued to take place after July 1, 2015, that date would not possibly have come to pass.)

(b) Turning to (b), it can again be readily shown that 'earlier' and 'later' too cannot do the desired job. A sentence considered by Taylor, namely, "Y is receding ever farther into the past" (1), shows this. He rightly points out that this statement cannot be identified with "Y is *earlier* or *anterior* to some particular time [say 1960]" (Taylor, 1963, p. 82)[47] [(2)]. As he says, (2) is:

> True of all times whatever, including
> those which are not receding into the
> past – namely, of all future times. We
> must identify the time to which Y is an-
> terior, either as being the present time,
> or some time itself anterior to the pre-
> sent time, or some time itself anterior

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[46]  Contrast Taylor, (Taylor, 1963, p. 81).
[47]  Italics in original.

to the present, and the hopelessness of this is quite obvious. The time one would be thus calling "the present time" either has not always been present, but became such – in which case, though Y has indeed always been anterior to it, it is a time which undergoes the same pure becoming as Y[48] – or that if in some sense "the present" time *has* always been the present time, and hence never became such[49], then plainly Y has not always been anterior to it, but *became* such[50] (Taylor, 1963, p. 82).

But suppose we discover sentences involving the concept of temporal passage translatable without loss into sentences involving the concepts of earlier and later: would they show that the concept of temporal passage can be successfully expurgated? In light of our earlier analysis the answer is a definite "No". 'Earlier' and 'later' have a single sort of use, not corresponding specifically to 'time$_1$,' etc., or to 'time,' etc. They merely indicate a certain temporal sequence or order. Yet precisely because they indicate that, they logically presuppose the concept of time$_2$ and the passage of time. For unless time passes nothing can exist or occur earlier or later than anything else (*in time*). For instance, these ideas cannot arise in relation to eternity; e.g., we cannot meaningfully speak (though theologians and philosophers are constantly tempted to speak) of one of God's states or actions as being before or after another state or action, etc. (Cf., mutatis mutandis, numbers.) Similarly with moments of time, hours, days, etc. Thus, even if e.g., "Y is receding ever farther into the past" were translatable into something like "Y is earlier than such and such a time (e.g., the present, or some

past date)", the translation could not avoid the notion of temporal passage.

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[48] That is, our present$_2$.
[49] That is, our present$_2$.
[50] Italics in original.

SOCIAL, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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# THE PROBLEMS OF HUMAN DIGNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
# IN THE CONTEXT OF BIOETHICS

## Abstract

The article presents an analysis of the principles of human dignity and human rights from the viewpoint of bioethics, describes the development and modifications of the concepts of "human dignity" and "human rights" in different historical stages. The authors offer detailed observation of these principles in order to have a complete and true perception of this problem and realise the role and value of these principles in the contemporary world and human relationships. For the implementation of abovementioned purposes, the paper deals with different international documents and declarations: the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, the Declaration of Geneva, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the WMA Declaration of Lisbon on the rights of the patient and the Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine.

*Keywords*: human dignity, human rights, informed consent, medical experiments, ethics, bioethics.

In social, political, philosophical, moral and legal thoughts the principles of human dignity and human rights are "eternal problems". These principles have a great scientific, philosophical, social, practical and theoretical significance in all development stages of history and civilisations. Human dignity acts as an integral part of the existence and development of a person and has a dynamic character. The development and progress of society and culture is impossible without full-fledged human personality with a sense of self-worth, dignity, freedom and rights. The society`s and state`s task is to ensure human dignity and human rights and emphasise the significance of these principles.

There are several concepts of human dignity. Each era has its interpretation of principles of human dignity and human rights. In Ancient Greek philosophy, especially of Aristotle and the Stoics, dignity was associated with freedom, strong will and the ability to control himself/herself. Stoics consider that the supreme good for a man is happiness, but as in the universe everything happens by the will of the destiny, including human actions, person cannot enjoy his/her life. In this sense, a person is not born for enjoyment. Life is full of afflictions and disasters, and man should always be ready to face them. Only the wise man can overcome the different difficulties of life. According to Stoics, the wise man is characterized by four virtues: bravery, justice, moderation and intelligence. Human

beings possess the capacity for reason and self-consciousness. For a human being, self-preservation is not merely a matter of preserving the body but, more importantly, of preserving the mind, as our identity is strongly associated with our sense of self-consciousness and our capacity to think (Robertson, 2010, pp. 80-81). As everything in the world is predetermined, human beings must consciously obey that need by limiting their freedom. In this sense, the highest form of freedom is facing the challenges of life. If everything is predetermined and nothing can be changed, then the highest human freedom and dignity must be conditioned by a strong will.

The modern concept of human dignity begins to form in the period of Renaissance and ends in the Age of Enlightenment. Dignity is one of the main characteristics of a person or things with their intrinsic values corresponding to their purpose. If in the previous centuries, especially in the Middle Ages, human dignity is considered to be an achievement and predetermined by the creation of human beings in the image of God, the new European perceptions perceive dignity as a human characteristic. In philosophical and political thoughts of Modern times, the idea of human dignity is closely associated with the concept of human rights. In modern philosophy, dignity is interpreted not as a human being whom God created but mainly with the following terms: rationality, freedom of judgment, right to choice, practical self-determination, creativity, personal autonomy. Recognition of human dignity as an individual implies respect to basic human rights, confidentiality and identity.

In different philosophical ideas, the principles of human dignity and human rights were presented as the basic characteristic of individual freedom. Italian Renaissance philosopher Giovanni Pico della Mirandola thought that freedom

and dignity are important preconditions for each person`s own creation. Man is in the centre of the universe and must form himself/herself as a "free specialist". The type, place and role of human beings in the space hierarchy should be exclusively conditioned be his/her own free and responsible choice. In the book of "Oration on the Dignity of a Man" he mentioned that God has not determined the place and the role of human beings in the space hierarchy and wrote: "We have given you, oh Adam, no visage proper to yourself, nor any endowment properly your own, in order that whatever place, whatever form, whatever gifts you may, with premeditation, select, these same you may have and possess through your judgment and decision. The nature of all other creatures is defined and restricted within laws which We have laid down; you, by contrast, impeded by no such restrictions, may, by your own free will, to whose custody We have assigned you, trace for yourself the lineaments of your own nature" (Pico della Mirandola, 1956, p. 7).

18th century (the Age of Enlightenment) German philosopher Immanuel Kant considered that human dignity and morality are related to human free actions. Moral persons are free in their actions. According to I. Kant the principles of morality cannot be derived from experience, morality is self-sufficient (autonomous), it does not depend on empirical reality, religion and other external factors and acts only by its own laws. The laws of morality, like laws of science, have universal and necessary character. True moral actions are not caused by any factor but are done for the sake of universal moral law. Moral laws have universal importance and are mandatory for all persons. The practical principles of ethics I. Kant divided into two groups: maxims and laws. He defines maxim as a subjective principle of

willingness, which is important only for the individual but the law has a universal meaning and is mandatory for everybody. This law I. Kant calls "Imperative", which is the basic idea of I. Kant`s ethics He differentiates two types of Imperative: Hypothetical and Categorical. Hypothetical Imperative depends on external conditions and subjective motives; Categorical Imperative is objective, and the basis of it is the respect for universal moral law. Moral law (Categorical Imperative) requires that everybody should act only according to that maxim, whereby he/she can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. According to I. Kant, the moral law is possible only in the case if there is an absolute value or purpose, such as an individual. In this sense, a Categorical Imperative requires to treat a person as a purpose and not as a means. The main feature of individual is ethical autonomy, which is the basis of human dignity. It helps a person to maintain his/her dignity and this is the true motive of practical reason, the real moral law. Respect for the moral law is, therefore, the only and the undoubted moral motive, and this feeling is directed to no object, except on the ground of this law (Kant, 2004, pp. 70-85).

The principles of human dignity and human rights are the basic principles of different international documents and declaration.

In Article 3 (Human dignity and Human rights) of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights[1] the principle of respect for human dignity directly proclaimed as a principle of doctors and researchers actions. The article claims.

- Human dignity, human rights and funda-

mental freedoms are to be fully respected.

- The interests and welfare of the individual should have priority over the sole interest of science or society (The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 2009, p. 91).

This principle is detailed and developed mainly in Articles 4 to 15 of the declaration.

The formulation of the principle of human dignity in the Universal Declaration on Bioethics has a mutual connection with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. According to the first article of this declaration: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood" (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2015, p. 4)[2].

In the Article 1 of the Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine mentioned: "Parties to this Convention shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect to their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine" (Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine, 1997, p. 2).

According to the first article of the European Convention on Human Rights (Obligation to respect Human Rights): "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention" (European Convention on Human Rights, 2010, p. 6).

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[1] The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in October 19, 2005.

[2] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights remains as urgent nowadays. It was proclaimed in 1948 and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. The Declaration is a normative document that, for the first time, represented the human rights, dignity and freedoms to which all human beings equal in dignity and rights.

The principle of human dignity is also closely related to the biomedical practice and research.

- All people are equal in dignity, regardless of gender, age, social status or nationality.
- The recognition of human dignity presupposes real respect for his right to care for the inviolability of his frequent life, protection from unreasonable intrusions and respect for his public space.

Specifically, the problem of privacy is treated in the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, Article 9 (Privacy and confidentiality), which proclaimed: "The privacy of the persons concerned and the confidentiality of their personal information should be respected to the greatest extent possible, such information should not be used or disclosed for purposes other than those for which it was collected or consented to consistent with international law, in particular, international human rights law" (The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 2009, p. 165).

- The interests of the individual should be highly regarded in the interests of science and society. People should not become victims of scientific discoveries, as happened in many countries, for example, mass distractions in Japan at the end of World War II, except for the imminent dangers threatening society, such as mass epidemics.

This is a critical issue: it must be stated in the law:

- Who has the right to decide to harm people for saving other people and societies?
- The decision-making of these procedure control over decision making.

In the context of ethical norms, this issue

implies to treat other people as a means and not as a purpose. A person is constantly involved in a relationship with other people, social groups and organizations in which he/she can be perceived as a means. At the same time he/she can treat others as a means. Here the problem is "What is the accessibility limit to treat people as a means?"

- The concept of human dignity is fundamental and it cannot be identified with human functional characteristics such as ability of decisions making or independently acting. This statement is treated in the Article 5 of Declaration (Autonomy and individual responsibility): "The autonomy of persons to make decisions, while taking responsibility for those decisions and respecting the autonomy of others, is to be respected. For persons who are not capable of exercising autonomy, special measures are to be taken to protect their rights and interests" (The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 2009, p. 111).

In medical practice recognition of human dignity as per his/her death criteria, is essential.

- Surely, in different cultures, in different religious human dignity can be interpreted in different ways. It is interpreted in various ways in different types of societies (traditional or conservative, contemporary, democratic and totalitarian). Both the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights are interpreted human dignity and human rights as a privilege values.

This statement is treated in the Article 12 of Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (Equality, justice and equity): "The importance of cultural diver-

sity and pluralism should be given due regarded. However, such considerations are not to be invoked to infringe upon human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms nor upon the principles set out in this Declaration, not to limit their scope" (The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 2009, p. 199).

- A person has the right to be respected by others for his/her own dignity which means that everyone must respect the right of the dignity of others and supposes not to harm, not to obligate others your opinion or not to treat others as a means and not as a purpose.

The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights is a generalized normative document that represents the basic principles concerning the moral side of biomedical researches and practice. The political possibilities of such an international document, as this declaration, were used precisely to clearly articulate the rights of a person-patient or "study subjects" in biomedical researches and practice. The declaration summarizes not only active researches and development in the field of bioethics but also continues and develops the work that the famous Nuremberg Code (1947) began. After World War II the Nuremberg Tribunal discovered the horrible and inhuman medical experimentations on war prisoners of Nazi Germany by Nazi physicians. After these incidents, the Nuremberg Code was formed. The basic principles of Nuremberg Code are informed consent of human subjects that participate in the experiments, scientific and humanitarian validity of the medical experimentations, the possible risk from the participation of the human subject in the medical experimentations and the potential

benefits of it, protecting the health, well-being and human dignity of the study subjects, etc. Physician or researcher must inform the human subject about purpose, nature, duration, results as well as possible risks of experimentations. The human subject has the right to refuse or accept experimentations after getting information (The Nuremberg Code, 1947).

The Nuremberg Code is the first international complete set of rules about experiments conducted on people. The atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis more than half a century ago may be the most prominent human rights abuses in the global consciousness; nonetheless torture and other inhumane act still widely carried out today. Torture is practised in over 150 countries and has even been seen as a necessary evil in the global "war and terror" (Michael Grodin and George Annas, 2007, p. 650). The tragic experience of the mid-20th century, associated with biomedical researches and forced participation of people, has become a very effective impetus for ethical rethinking about the role of scientists in the life of society, about their civil and moral responsibility for the consequences of scientific research and development. The Nuremberg Code was formed during Nuremberg trials on Nazi Germany doctors (1946-1947).

On April 17, 1947, Dr Leo Alexander submitted to the Counsel for War Crimes six points defining legitimate medical research. These six points were adopted by the trial verdict and added an extra four. The ten points constituted the "Nuremberg Code". In 1949 Leo Alexander published the article "Medical science under dictatorship" in The New England Journal of Medicine, where he mentioned that a large part of these medical experiments on war prisoners of Nazi Germany was devoted to the science of destroying and preventing life, for which he formed the

word "ktenology", the science of killing (Leo Alexander, 1949, p. 41).

The aim of the Nuremberg Code is to preserve the world from the religious, political and cultural wars and torture, which are inevitable in the contemporary globalized and continuously changing the world. Only the acceptance of the principles of the Nuremberg Code can face the various challenges of the 21st century, which is growing and becoming uncontrollable.

The ideas of the Nuremberg Code were developed in the Declaration of Geneva adopted by the 2nd General Assembly of the World Medical Association in September 1948, which proclaimed the modernized version of the Hippocratic Oath. In Declaration of Geneva, the most important principles are.

- Service of humanity;
- respect the autonomy and dignity of the patient;
- maintain the utmost respect for human life; (Declaration of Geneva, 1948).

The main ideas of the Declaration of Geneva were developed in the WMA Declaration of Helsinki ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects adopted by the 18th World Medical Association General Assembly in June 1964. According to this Declaration, it is the duty of the physician to promote and safeguard the health, well-being and rights of patients, including those who are involved in medical research. The physician's knowledge and conscience are dedicated to the fulfilment of this duty (Declaration of Helsinki, 1964).

The adoption of the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Geneva is urgent nowadays, especially in the context of Guatemala experiments. In 1946-1948 the United States conducted experiments in Guatemala on people-patients of psychiatric clinics, prisoners, soldiers without

their informed consent. The main purpose of these experiments is to test penicillin for the treatment of sexually transmitted diseases (STD). Nearly 700 men were forcibly and secretly infected with the viruses of these diseases, and not all of them were treated with penicillin.

At the same time in the United States is created a Commission to study experience of medical research which the US is conducting abroad, to develop a mechanism that excludes the violation of ethical standards in such studies.

After a scholarly publication disclosed the existence of records of these experiments in 2010, the Presidential Commission for the study of Bioethical Issues (the Commission) conducted a detailed investigation of the events surrounding and including the experiments. In the report, "Ethically Impossible:" STD Research in Guatemala from 1946 to 1948, provides a detailed description and ethical evaluation of these studies (A Study Guide to "Ethically Impossible" STD Research in Guatemala from 1946 to 1948, 2012, p. 1).

It is very important that the indignation provokes not the fact of experiments, but how these experiments have been carried out, secretly, without informing "the study subject" about experiments, without informed consent, with the explicit threat of their health, without the need to carry out experiments especially on those people.

The problems of human dignity and human rights are closely connected to the problem of informed consent (one of the main problems of bioethics). Respect for dignity is manifested in recognition of the right of the patient or the "study-subject" to have full awareness of the intended treatment. According to the Article 6 (Consent) of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights: "Any preventive, di-

agnostic and therapeutic medical intervention is only to be carried out with the prior, free and informed consent of the person concerned, based on adequate information. The consent should where appropriate, be express and may be withdrawn by the person concerned at any time and for any reason without disadvantage or prejudice" (The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 2009, p. 122).

The issues of human dignity and human rights deserve special attention in the case of persons without the capacity to consent. According to the Article 7 (Persons without capacity to consent) of above-mentioned declaration: "In accordance with domestic law, special protection is to be given to persons who do not have the capacity to consent: authorization for research and medical practice should be obtained in accordance with the best interest of the person concerned should be involved to the greatest extent possible in the decision-making process of consent, as well as that of withdrawing consent" (The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 2009, p. 139).

With regard to the problems of informed consent, human dignity and human rights, such questions often arise: How to behave in extreme situations? For example, when there is no time to get informed consent from the patient or in the case of patients without the capacity to consent, as well as in more serious situations, for instance, in the case of dying patients and palliative care, vegetative patients and finally, the specific situations are embryo and fetus. There is no common public opinion on these issues. It is obvious that the philosophical and ethical interpretation of their status and careful and caring attitude toward embryo and fetus is necessary.

According to the WMA Declaration of Lisbon on the rights of the patient[3] the patient has the right to medical care of good quality care, right to freedom of choice. The patient has the right to accept or refuse appropriate medical treatment after getting information. He/she has the right of information. The doctor must fully inform the patient about his/her disease, about the methods of treatment, about the results of treatment and the possible risks of treatment (Declaration of Lisbon on the rights of the patient, 1981).

The problems of informed consent, human dignity and human rights are also treated in Article 13 of Human Rights and Biomedicine (Information and consent). The article claims.

- The persons being asked to participate in a research project shall be given adequate information in a comprehensible form. This information shall be documented.

- The information shall cover the purpose, the overall plan and the possible risks and benefits of the research project, and include the opinion of the ethics committee. Before being asked to consent to participate in a research project, the persons concerned shall be specifically informed, according to the nature and purpose of the research (Human Rights and Biomedicine, Article 13, p. 54-55).

Thus, the study of the principles of human dignity and human rights acquired theoretical and practical importance. The development of bioethics and the adoption of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights are considered to be important stages of above-mentioned processes, reflecting essential changes not

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3   World Medical Association Declaration of Lisbon on the rights on patient adopted by the 34th World Medical Assembly, Lisbon, Portugal, September/October, 1981.

only in the medical-biological but also in ethical thinking. Due to the bioethical discussions philosophical and moral perception of the concepts of human dignity, human rights and informed consent are changed and summarized. Thanks to the concept of informed consent, understanding the concept of respect for human beings implies immediate attention of someone else`s position in every critical situation. In the context of bioethics, the informed consent implies the patient`s attitude towards the treatment or the participant`s attitude towards the scientific experiments in which he/she should participate.

Acceptance of an informed consent assures recognition of someone else`s dignity. Here we have a perceived perception of moral relationships: in ethical thoughts, an emphasis is transferred from the active person to the recipients; it means that in this case, the subject of ethical study is not the person, but the interpersonal relationship. Similar innovations are typical of other types of applied ethics also. In all cases, the significance of ethical research is disclosed and summarized, part of which is declarations. However, the fact is that some scientists and researchers do not follow the main principles of abovementioned declarations and conventions and continue their different medical and scientific experimentations. The proof is that though in 1947 the Nuremberg Code and in 1964 the Declaration of Helsinki were adopted, on June 16, 1966 Henry Beecher from Harvard Medical School published the article: "Ethics and Clinical Research" in the British New Journal of Medicine, which concentrated the society attention to the fact that numerous scientific and medical experimentations were taking place on human beings without taking into consideration the human subjects` informed consent. Our conclusion is that it is necessary to develop such methods

by which it will be possible to widely spread the content of the above-mentioned declarations and conventions and more strictly follow the process of their application and preservation.

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# YOUNG PROFESSIONALS' LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION ISSUES IN ARMENIA: A CASE STUDY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ALUMNI OF ARMENIAN STATE PEDAGOGICAL UNIVERSITY

## Abstract

The article is devoted to the analysis of university and labour market relationship. In addition to economic analysis, studying the involvement process of young people in the labour market is essential to identifying the link between higher education institutions (HEIs) and the labour market in order to assess and implement appropriate policies. This case study was conducted to discover the integration process of the classes of 2014, from three faculties of Armenian State Pedagogical University, in Armenia's labour market. The research reveals the demand for these professions in the labour market and the pace of finding jobs. The article discusses the factors that hinder or contribute to the process of integration of young specialists in the labour market, as well as, the advantages and disadvantages of HEIs from young professionals' perspective. Methodological recommendations and guidelines on the organisation of higher education following the labour market requirements are offered in the discussion section. It is significant to develop mechanisms for promoting employers' involvement in management offices and faculties of HEIs, to develop and fix legal norms, to improve the methodological principles and plans regarding the organisation of the practicum practices. It is proposed to expand the functions and role of career centres created in HEIs in order to establish the university's activity by the labour market requirements and to assist graduates in the labour market as well as provide continuous professional development programs and training for the teaching staff.

*Keywords:* labour market, demand, HEI alumni, employment, unemployment, improving higher education.

Predictions in the field of the labour market and university relations, issues of short-term and long-term projects are the significant challenges of professional education management in the modern world which adopted the liberal economic system. In this regard, the United Nations Development program sponsors various policy development and reform programs. Since 1994, studies have been undertaken by the European Union's Education Foundation in the area of harmonising the relationship between the vocational education and labour market. The goal is

to reform education policy by adjusting it to economic developments and changes in the labour market[1]. Economic analysis of labour market, ongoing monitoring and studies on the involvement of young professionals in the labour market are significant for revising the previous planning traditions of economic sectors, regarding HEI-labor market relations regarding assessment and policy implementation. Thus, this study was conducted to reveal the current issues and relations between the labour market and one of the HEIs in Armenia.

## Method

The research was conducted in the Armenian State Pedagogical University (ASPU) named after Khachatur Abovian among young professionals who graduated in the academic year 2013-2014. The sample of the research was formed in a multilevel manner based on the principles of the root, stratification and proportional representation. One faculty from each of the following categories was chosen: social sciences, quantitative sciences and pedagogical education. The faculties of Philology (Armenian language and literature); Mathematics, Physics and Informatics, and Primary Education were selected through random sampling. Then, 206 undergraduate and graduate alumni were randomly selected for the research. A structured interview was conducted by phone from May 20 to June 30, 2018.

## Results
### ASPU Graduates in Armenian Labour Market

Four years after graduating from the university, 66.5%[2] of those surveyed have some income-generating jobs in the labour market. Apropos, as for 2005, a study was conducted by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Armenia and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Armenia, according to which the total employment percentage of graduates in 2002 was 59.5% (National Policy for Professional Education: Concept Paper, 2005, p. 25).

According to the survey results, male participants were more successful in the labour market than the females, even if they served in the army for two years.

In 2018, as of May-June (4 years after graduation), 100% of the male graduates of 2014 had jobs, whereas only the 64.4% of females had jobs. The 17.5% of females were still in the process of finding jobs (see *Chart 1*). The unemployed 18.1% of the female respondents considered themselves as voluntarily unemployed. It is worth mentioning that 13.9% of them were housewives.

[1] See for example: *Rynki truda i vozmozhnosti trudoustroistva. Tendentsii i problem v Armenii, Azerbaidzhane, Belarusi, Gruzii, Respubliki Moldova i Ukraine* (Labor Markets and Employment Opportunities. Trends and Challenges in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, in Russian). ETF, Luxembourg, 2011. Retrieved October 28, 2018 form: https://www.etf.europa.eu/sites/default/files/m/1499603357207EFFC125798F004A2EBE_Labour%20markets%20%26%20employabilityRU.pdf; https://www.etf.europa.eu/en

[2] According to the research conducted by the RA Statistical Committee, in 2017, the employment rate for the ages of 25-29 was 53.4%. See *Hayastani Hanrapetut'yan social-tnteskan vitwaky' 2018 t'vakani hunvar-martin* (The Social-Economical Situation of the Republic of Armenia January-March, 2018, in Armenian). Retrieved October 15, 2018 form: https://www.armstat.am/file/article/sv_03_18a_141.pdf; https://www.armstat.am/am/?nid=82&id=2029, p. 102.

Employment and Unemployment Rates of 206 Graduates (class of 2014) of ASPU, as of May-June, 2018



Employment and unemployment rates are different according to the studied professions. The employment rate of the participants from the Faculty of Mathematics, Physics and Informatics (72.7%) was higher than the rate of the respondents from the Initial Education (67.1%) and the Philology (58.6%) faculties (see *Chart 2*).

Employment and Unemployment Rates Amongst ASPU's Three Faculty Graduates (N=206)

*What are the reasons behind the unem-
ployment of 33.5% of the respondents 4 years
after graduating from ASPU?*

The 24.8% of the participants (73.9% of
those unemployed) explained that they were un-
employed because of family and personal rea-
sons. It is worth mentioning that such response
was received entirely from the female partici-
pants.

The 4.4% of the respondents (13% of those
unemployed) couldn't find jobs compatible with
their professional qualifications. This number is
comprised of 5.2% of graduates of Philology and
7.3% of the Primary Education faculties. Mean-
while, none of the graduates of the Mathematics,
Physics and Informatics faculty agreed to this
reason.

The 1.5% of the respondents said they were
unemployed because of the conditions and the
respective compensation offered in the labour
market. This reason was given by 4.3% of the
unemployed respondents (see *Chart 3*).

*Chart 3.*

Main Reasons for Unemployment Mentioned by the Participants



According to the research results, 63.6%
of the participants had a stable and permanent
job. The jobs of 2.9% respondents were un-
stable and temporary.

Not all respondents' employment corre-
sponds to the profession they received at the
university. 50.5% of the participants had oc-
cupations that completely (30.6%) or some-
what (19.9%) corresponded to their educa-
tional qualifications. However, 16% of young
professionals had jobs that were somewhat
(5.3%) and ultimately (10.7%) irrelevant to
their educational qualifications (see *Chart 4*).

### The Compatibility of the Participants' Education and Employment



The 74.5% of the interviewed alumni worked in state institutions, whereas the 21.1% worked in private sectors. Only 4.4% of the respondents had their own business (see *Chart 5*).

### The Integration of 206 ASPU Graduates (class of 2014) in the Labor Market: Public vs Private Sectors



Most of the employment is accounted for educational and scientific institutions (70.1%). The 59.1% was state-owned, and the 11.0% was privately owned preschools, schools, secondary specialized educational institutions, universities, etc. The 11.6% of the participants were integrated into the trade (5.8%) and various private service-providing institutions (5.8%). The 4.4% of the respondents had jobs in finance-related fields. Next, 3.6% were employed in local, regional and public administration bodies and another 3.6% in cultural institutions. The rest of the

respondents were employed in industry, agricul-
ture, health, armed forces and law enforcement

agencies (see *Chart 6*).

*Chart 6.*

The Participants' Employment Division Based on Economic Sectors



- Science and Education - 70.1%
- Services - 5.8%
- Trade - 5.80%
- Finance - 4.4%
- Local, Regional, and Public Administration - 3.6%
- Culture - 3.6%
- Industry - 2.2%
- Agriculture - 0.7%
- Armed Forces -0.7%
- Law Enforcing Agencies - 0.7%
- Health - 0.7%

*How long did it take the participants to find
their jobs?*

The average time spent on finding a job
amongst participants who had stable employ-
ment was 5.4 months. The respondents that

graduated from the Philology faculty spent 9.3
months, Primary Education faculty alumni spent
4.9 months, and the Mathematics, Physics and
Informatics former student spent about 3.1
months on finding a job (see *Chart 7*).

The Stable Employment Dynamics of Class of 2014 Until the 1st Half of 2018



*What factors affected on the participants' choice of their jobs?*

The analysis of the answers to this question shows that processes and relationships in this field are characterised by weak, institutional, and spontaneous description (see *Chart 8*).

The Role of Various Factors in Finding a Stable and Permanent Job



The results of the study confirm that employment rates and opportunities in the labour market are directly proportional to the academic achievement indicators of young professionals

and the level of knowledge. It is important to state that 61.8% of graduates with average academic standing had jobs. The 45.1% had jobs if those corresponded to their specialisation received at the university. The correlation between graduates with high academic standing was 78.7%, and for the graduates who worked in the higher education field, the rate was 63.9%.

### Attractive and Concerning Aspects of Labor Market

The results of the study prove that the main concerns that the target-group young professionals have concerned the labour market as of low compensation. The 66.4 % of the respondents believed that the job payments are insufficient for buying an apartment, furniture, and car. However, the 43.1 % thought that the payment rates are unsatisfactory even for basic family expenses. The 29.9% of the participants considered their salaries entirely or mostly satisfactory. Based on the interview results, the average amount of salary that the young professionals get is 97.992 AMD. Moreover, male participants happened to earn more (143.333 AMD) than the female participants (94.533 AMD). There are also some differences between the salaries of young professionals working in Yerevan and other towns or rural areas (see *Chart 9*).

*Chart 9.*

Average Monthly Salary of the Participants in Yerevan and Other Regions (AMD)



The 72.3% respondents found the opportunity of self-expression and mental satisfaction to be the most attractive aspects of their employment. Other attractive factors were revealed to be the respect and reputation (70.1%).[1]

Then come the interest of the work

(63.5%)[2], the opportunities provided for the use of professional skills and knowledge (62.0%), the creative approach and the possibilities of implementing their initiatives (61.3%), free time, (48.9%).

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[1] The satisfaction index from the viewpoint of reputation and respect in the surrounding is more visible among the philologists – 73,5 % in comparison with the specialists of Primary Education faculty – 70.9 % and the graduates of the faculty of Mathematics, Physics and Informatics – 66,7 %.

[2] The work is more attractive in terms of engaging in professional activities for the graduates of the faculty of Mathematics, Physics and Informatics 70,8 % in comparison with the specialists of Primary Education faculty - 67,3 % and philologists - 47,1 %.

*The University Knowledge and the Process of Professors' Professional Development from the Graduates' Perspective*

The 55.3% of respondents consider the knowledge gained in the university sufficient to become a full-fledged professional and to find a job[3]. The 32.0% of the respondents consider the knowledge gained considerably sufficient for the labour market requirements. The degree of satisfaction with the knowledge gained at the university is somewhat more noticeable amongst the graduates of Philology and Primary Education faculties.

What are the weak aspects of the knowledge gained at the university from the point of view of the labour market requirements and omissions that, according to respondents, negatively affects the university education process?

Among the disadvantages, 26.2% of the respondents mentioned the lack of practice and too much focus on theoretical knowledge. Next, 14.1% of the former students thought that the taught knowledge is outdated. Lastly, 8.3% of the participants commented that the nature of educational-industrial practicum is incomplete.

The 6.8% of the respondents had a more self-critical approach and found that not all students have a strong desire and discipline to work on becoming full-fledged specialists. Only 3.9% of those interviewed stated that the existing technical and organisational issues hinder the educational process.

The graduates were asked to evaluate the process of preparing a specialist with the example of their faculty where 1 point stood for very bad and 5 points for excellent. Overall, the respondents assessed the process fairly high. The average score was calculated to be 4.0 point[4].

However, as previously reported by other researchers, while evaluating their professional education process and their knowledge and abilities, the young professionals are somewhat more generous than the employers who assess the theoretical and practical capacities of young professionals who have been employed relatively modest (see National Policy for Professional Education: Concept Paper, 2005, p. 72).

*Conclusion*

The results of the previous surveys and their comparative analysis allow us to notice that the rates and opportunities for employment in the labour market are increasingly conditioned by the academic achievements and knowledge of young professionals. Instead, the role of friends' advice and family recommendations regarding employment choice is decreasing.

There is a constant problem of progressive harmonisation of university education and workplace requirements, and continuously updating the issues of education norms. In this regard, it is

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[3] According to the results of the survey conducted in 2005 by the UNDP Experts Group within the graduates of 25 universities 54,8 % of respondents responded positively to this question, the received knowledge has considered partially satisfactory 28,6 %, not satisfactory 16,6 %. See *National Policy for Professional Education: Concept Paper*. Yerevan, 2005, p. 38. Retrieved October 12, 2018 form: http://un.am/up/library/National%20Policy_ProfEduc_eng.pdf.

[4] According to the results of the survey the University Process of Preparing Specialists by the Example of their Own Faculty conducted in 2005 by the UNDP Experts Group within the graduates of 25 universities by 42 specializations the similar average statistical score was obtained 3,998 point. National Policy for Professional Education: Concept Paper. Yerevan, 2005, p. 38-39. Retrieved October 12, 2018 form: http://un.am/up/library/National%20Policy_ProfEduc_eng.pdf.

essential to establish legal mechanisms to ensure that the stakeholders are involved in university management systems. It will give a wide range of opportunities to take into account employers' needs in organising trainings, curricula and syllabi matching the young professionals' prospective employment. The significant involvement of employers in the management and faculty councils will also have a positive impact on the improvement of the law-making practices and their role.

Perhaps, it is also necessary to reform the methodological principles and plans for the organisation of production (outsourcing), which is an essential component of vocational education, by appointing advisor-managers and direct supervisors as well as analysing reflection reports submitted by learners.

In order to develop the relationship between universities and the labour market and promote the graduates in the labour market, it is necessary to expand the functions and role of career centres established in HEIs. Throughout these developments it is significant to consider the following:

➢ studying the target offers and demands of the labour market, maintaining communication with graduates of the university with the use of new informational technologies, coordinating and analysing graduates' professional biography and career;

➢ presenting reports on the management and development of educational programs;

➢ developing a database of student and faculty alumni;

➢ supplying university graduates with fresh information on labour market demand, such as invitations on a regular basis;

➢ organising professional development programs and trainings for graduates.

One of the most important means of raising the level of education and contemporary content is the formation of a stable tradition and system of professional development of the teaching staff. There is still no difference in the labour market between the Bachelor's and Master's graduation certificates and diplomas. The exception is the admission for postgraduate studies only.

Perhaps it would be right to be consistent and legislatively fix the list of all positions (first of all for budgetary workers: leading professionals, senior or senior positions, etc.), which require a master's degree. Notably, it is advisable to legislate mandatory occupation of certain positions (to optimize the master's degree during the announced vacancy announcements with certain years of professional work experience).

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# EDUCATION IN THE "BENDING" OF THE MODERN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

Abstract

The article formulates and justifies the idea that the problem of education is a timeless and universal social problem, on the solution of which depends on such things as the spiritual and moral health of a nation, the degree of its intellectual development, the limits of disclosing its creative potential, and through all this the stability of the state. The transition to an information society (the knowledge society) is reduced to the abandonment of the centuries-old tradition of the "culture of knowledge", which destroys the existential foundations of the person who produces and consumes this knowledge. To overcome these destructive trends for modern societies, it is expedient to revive the goals of the educational system determined by the national culture, the most important of which is the education of man as a spiritual and political being.

*Keywords:* information society, models of modern education, principles of state education, the human dimension of education, spiritual values of the nation, anthropological crisis, intellectual consumerism.

Introduction

The problem of education is considered as one of the most important issues of our time, which allows us to study it outside the framework of specific scientific disciplines (political, social and economic sciences) - in a cultural and civilizational vein.

The article highlights essential issues in the field of modern philosophy and methodology of science, such as education-politics, education-economics, education-social relations, education-science (knowledge), scientific education, educational policy.

The research peruses the following objectives:

1. Identifying and analyzing paradoxes of the modern education system, as a manifestation of the paradoxes of the modern culture.
2. Analysis and evaluation of the idea of knowledge as a condition of economic growth.
3. Determination of ways and means to overcome the paradoxes of modern education and culture systems.

*... there is a powerful intellectual tradition of thinking about education and politics in their unity ... This tradition is diverse, but the common feature of many important texts that are being created so far is that education is viewed as part of large-scale political, often utopian, projects that construct "the best" ... of society. Today, the situation is similar (education remains largely an integral part of the neo-liberal political agen-*

*da), and another in the sense that the modern "utopia" in comparison with the preceding ... is deprived of ethical justifications. Both education and neo-liberal policies have been relegated to the role of accomplices in the hegemony of economic rationality. Education is positioned as a servant of the global economy, especially the economy of knowledge. At the national level and politically this means that education supports a very specific "policy of de-politicization" (Szkudlarek, 2013, p. 1).*

T. Shkudlyarek's assessment of modern educational policy, deduced in the epigraph of this article (Szkudlarek, 2013, p. 1), is one of the brightest illustrations of the paradoxes of the beginning of the third millennium observed in the modern education system and all modern culture. These paradoxes are reflections of the "mutations" that are taking place in the modern social space, which, under the condition of their further spread, can in the near future produce serious mechanisms of civilization order with the prospect of the emergence of "post-human beings".

The deepest reason for the appearance of these paradoxes is the one observed at the beginning of the thirteenth century. The demarche of the neoliberal doctrine, the core of which is the idea that the state (the national state) not only doesn't stimulate the modern market (the global market) but, on the contrary, is a factor hindering its effective functioning. Such a frankly anti-statist trend, which became a marker of the modern world order, was constantly fueled (and continues to feed) by different versions of the information society (knowledge society) and the newfangled models of so-called civic education. As a result, the traditional "education-policy" semantic field was replaced by the "education-economy" scheme, for the "servicing" of which a whole series of terms were invented (for example, "academic capitalism", "market pedagogy", "educational market", scientific knowledge as "financial goods", "academic manager").

With the goal of "legitimizing" this scheme, the idea of the need for reforming science and "scientific" education was formulated, because knowledge (scientific knowledge) was given the status of the main economic locomotive of social development. As a result, education becomes "a critical factor in the development of local and global markets; its ontological grounds and epistemic culture focus on economic incentives and are transformed under the influence of external doctrinal attitudes. Thus, the cognitive attitude of the educational type is modified in the mainstream of monetary trends, excluding the values of scientific production of truth. However, the latter is an indispensable condition for the creation of scientific innovations, underlying the processes of technological knowledge. Thus, the dominant contradiction of the modern era is emerging. It confronts the economic strategies of society with ontological and epistemic conditions for the reliability of these strategies, i.e. the contradiction between the total commodification of knowledge and the cultural-existential status of creative thought, which creates this knowledge. The development of this contradiction leads to the deconstruction of the ontological and epistemic bases of education. Hence the problem of arranging modern education, capable of overcoming the despair of a society "working on knowledge" (Karpov, 2015, p. 9). Essentially, the "culture of knowledge" that has been accumulated by mankind for centuries is being dismantled, which results in the destruction of the existential foundations (cultural and worldview foundations of life) that produce this knowledge. And this, in turn, drastically changes not only the

very essence of the cognitive process but also the attitude towards it. The modern educational policy "destroys the being of the educational entity, which contains the truth about what exists, but at the same time, it is destroyed by this truth, which it cannot change. And in this confrontation, the disciple becomes a formal unit, a body devoid of thinking and a rush to the truth" (Karpov, 2015, p. 13).

To overcome the "educational and cultural" paradoxes of modernity, first of all, it is necessary to restore the status of a person as a spiritual and political entity, that is, to comprehend the true nature of man, which is possible only through consideration of the phenomenon of man in the historical perspective.

Contrary to the opinion of many modern researchers who call the state an abstraction or a historically transitory phenomenon, the entire cultural history of mankind, as well as contemporary political events, show that life in a state is a deep need of man as a spiritual being.

Aristotle argued that the state is the highest form of organization of human society and the ultimate goal of human development: "Since ... Every state is a kind of communication; any communication is organized for the sake of some good (any activity means the prospective good). Then, all communications tend ... to this or that good and more than others and the highest of all goods tends the communication which is the most important of all and embraces all other communications strives. This communication is called a state or a political communication" (Aristotle, 1984[b], p. 376). According to Aristotle, the state is the result of the natural process of completing the development of "primary communications", in which the "nature" of people's communication is manifested: "... we call the nature of each object ... its state, which is obtained at the

completion of its development. Moreover, the higher completion consists in the accomplishment of the ultimate goal, and the self-sufficient existence turns out to be both an end and a supreme existence... the state belongs to that which exists by nature ... a man by nature is a political being and one who because of his nature, and not because of accidental circumstances, lives outside the state - either an underdeveloped in the moral sense of being or a superman ..." (Aristotle, 1984[b], p. 378).

The etatism developed in the ancient political consciousness (the unconditional recognition of the state and society's priority over individualism) can be clearly traced, at least, to Hegel, who stated that a negative attitude toward the state and publicly acknowledged could rightfully be called not "freedom of thought" but "freedom of emptiness", which only through the destruction of something "feels itself existing; it believes, it is striving for some positive state, for example, for universal equality or universal religious life, but in fact it does not want the positive reality of this state, because such reality will immediately establish some order, some Isolation of both institutions and individuals. It is precisely from the destruction of this isolation and objective certainty that the self-consciousness of this negative freedom arises" (Hegel, 1990, pp. 70-71).

The anti – etatism in the political consciousness begins to develop actively in the Modern Times with the ideas of democracy and civil society and with the principles of individualism and anarchy connected with these ideas. This line marked a departure from the recognition of the need for organic unity of the general and individual, society and man, the state and the citizen. This line finds its fullest expression in modern utopias, emphasizing the priorities of an individ-

ual with his rights and freedoms, which, in essence, is evidence of the destruction of the spiritual and moral foundations of the social life of a single individual.

The state is a way of realising a deep (natural) human need for the realisation of a standard (universal) principle, which is the organic integrity of worldview orientations and meaningful orientations, with which history begins (the history of nations).

Strictly speaking, sociality (civilisation) is a product of the attribute property of a person which is spirituality. Objectified in the universals of culture (which expresses a unique system of social imperatives and transforms society into an ethos of the spirit), whose content is the higher meanings and goals of human life, spirituality is a dominant factor in integrating people into national communities. A mechanism that inscribes a person into by nature a national culture is the education system. It provides the cultural homogeneity necessary for the life of the nation. Therefore, the education system must be defined as the most critical institution of national culture, the basis for the formation and preservation of the nation and the nation state.

This reality was deeply realized in ancient times both in the East and in the West. The social life of the Oriental peoples - the Chinese, Indians, and Japanese - was determined by the Teacher-Student system, which serves as a means of preserving and developing the cultural tradition that assures the continuity of epochs and generations and the inviolability of the state structure. The education of public feelings was the basis of the national life of the ancient Greeks and Romans and the precondition for their legal capacity (Mirumyan, 2003, pp. 233-234).

Plato called politics a genuine science, that is, the science of Good - the "limit", the reason for everything correct and beautiful", necessary for the education and upbringing of citizens and the management of the development of the human community (Plato, 1994[a], p. 517; Plato, 1994[b], p. 311). Defining the good (the highest good) as a goal, to which everything strives, Aristotle, in turn, believed that the comprehension of the good that determines the way of life of people is in the conduct of the science about the state (politics). It is politics which determines "what sciences are needed in the state and to what extent everyone should study... And since the science of the state uses the rest of the sciences as means and, also, legislatively determines what actions should be taken or which ones to abstain from, then its purpose includes the goals of other sciences, and, consequently, this goal will be the highest good for people... Even if for one person the good is the same as for the state, it seems more important and fuller after all the welfare of the state, its achievement and preservation. It is desirable..., of course, and [goods] of one person, but the goods of the people and the state is more beautiful and divine" (Aristotle, 1984[a], p. 55).

The ideas and principles of state education/upbringing formulated by ancient thinkers had a noticeable influence on the political and philosophical views of European thinkers up to the twentieth century.

In this regard, special attention deserves the German system of university education. An invaluable contribution in its development was made by the representative of the German classical philosophy J.G. Fichte. Having set himself the goal of the spiritual revival of the German nation, he developed a system of science teaching, which represents a project for the development of German society through the assimilation, development and dissemination of theoretical

knowledge. According to Fichte's plan, university education is the most important way to ensure a high level of theoretical (scientific-philosophical) thinking and its spread in society. Only with the help of such an educational system the German nation will be capable of spiritual creativity and self-awareness (Fichte, 1993[a], p. 636; Fichte, 1993[b], p. 556). The traditions of European University formed by Fichte in the twentieth century were continued by the German existentialist philosopher K. Jaspers, Professor of Heidelberg, and then of the University of Basel. The thinker called the university the centre of spiritual education of the people, and therefore it should represent for the state "the highest interest in its domestic policy". Jaspers explained his position by the fact that education provides the "ethnic future of the people" (Jaspers, 2000, p. 15).

Peter the Great was the first to create large scientific and educational center in Russia - the Academy (1747-1803), which included a university and a grammar school. The Moscow (1755) and Kazan (1758) universities were established in the middle of the XVIII century. Public education was the most important part of the state policy of the Russian state, and the evidence of this was the creation in 1802 of the Ministry of Education. Moreover, an efficient and advanced educational system based on the principle of universal education was formed in Russia in the late XIX-early XX centuries.

The following pattern can be revealed in the history of civilisation: the formation of nations and national cultures is accompanied by their political maturation, which finds its completion in the creation of a national state. In this triune process, a colossal role was played by the School (the system of education and upbringing), the mechanism for transferring to the subsequent generations the cultural experience of

the nation, and through it the preservation and strengthening of national statehood. Therefore the following expression widespread in the 19th century is not accidental: "the French-Prussian war (1867-1871) was won by a German teacher".

However, the same history confirmed for the Armenian people another - an "exceptional" pattern. The Armenian system of national education is a unique cultural phenomenon designed to carry out an ethno-protective function in the absence of national statehood (from the fall of the Armenian kingdom in 428 to the Armenian Genocide in 1915). The life of the Armenian nation for many centuries was realized in the forms of a highly developed culture created by it. In the history of Armenian nation three periods of a particularly powerful upswing are distinguished: the transition from Antiquity to the Middle Ages, called the Golden Age or the Age of Enlightenment (5th century), a period of developed feudalism, called Silver Century (IX-XV centuries) and the period of the Armenian Renaissance (the end of the XVIII-XX centuries).

The first period is associated with two powerful factors of the spiritual life of the nation - the adoption of Christianity (301) and the creation of a national script (405) (Mirumyan, 2011, p. 85). The resultant powerful spiritual and intellectual movement is comparable according to the Europeans (Karl Ritter) with the development in Europe of the 15th century of sciences and arts. This movement was reduced to the construction of a unique spiritual model of national existence, which became a powerful tool for the nation's self-defence throughout the subsequent centuries of the existence of the Armenian people as a Christian people. The internal logic of the national culture of the 5th century is reproduced in the educational system, which is the main mech-

anism for the Armenian people to enter the national and cultural traditions. Formed as a result of the creation of the national script, the National School was called upon together with the Armenian Apostolic Church, to ensure the identity of the Armenian nation. Thereby it contributed to the realization of the need to create (or rather, recreate) the national statehood in the historical perspective. National feelings, self-awareness and self-knowledge of the nation are the basis of its political aspirations, which, in turn, depend on the degree of its education and upbringing (Mirumyan, 2016, pp. 55-56).

The golden age of the Armenian culture predetermined the boundaries of the cultural cosmos of the nation, the features and the vector of the development of the national culture.

The silver age of Armenian culture is marked by the appearance in Armenia and in the Armenian Cilicia of numerous universities (about 15), where students received general and special education on the sections relevant to medieval scholarship departments. The totality of the disciplines studied at universities reflected the system of medieval scholarship.

The internal logic of the Armenian culture is reproduced in these large educational centres: "In the XIV century this relay takes the Tatev School in Syunik. The central point of its program is the ideological struggle against the scholasticism of the West that has spread in Armenia along with the movement of the Uniates (supporters of the unification of the Roman and Armenian churches). The opposition to the western religious (ideological) expansion carried out by the representatives of the Tatev school through the Apology of the Armenian Church, and the defence of its dogmatics was essentially aimed at upholding Armenia's national interests and preserving the identity and national character of its

culture" (Mirumyan, 2016, pp. 306-307).

The period of the National Revival is characterized by a new wave of national enlightenment, which is the main means of assimilation and translation of the spiritual values of the nation. The program of a nationwide revival of the founder of the Armenian Order in Venice (1700) MkhitarSebastatsiwas to contribute to the nation's perception of its spiritual essence. It determines the specificity of the nation's existence and the possibility of its existence in history. The trends outlined by the Mkhitarianians were embodied in the XIX century, which is considered to be the second century of the Armenian Enlightenment. Armenian spiritual culture also in this century functioned as a spiritual unification of the nation. The successful implementation of this is evidenced by the fact that schools began to function in Armenia in this period (there were about 800 secondary schools, including women schools by 1870 in Western Armenia). Tens of thousands of books and about two thousand periodicals were published; dozens of theatres and theatre groups and printing houses were operating. The ideological core of the national education program of this period was the conviction of the Armenian spiritual elite in the idea that national education should be aimed at preserving and strengthening the national sentiment, otherwise the very essence of the Enlightenment changes. To revive and preserve the national sentiment, national enlightenment should be "harmonized" with the fundamental principles of national existence. This involves studying the history of the Christian religion and the Armenian Apostolic Church, the history of the Armenian people and the Armenian language in the National School. Given the fact that at that time Western Armenia (its "Turkish" part) was the scene of a clash of various ideologies (liberalism, the Cath-

olic paradigm and Protestantism), it is hardly possible to overestimate the importance of the spiritual and moral opposition of the nation to the ideologies threatening its self-preservation. This opposition was expressed in the upsurge of national culture.

It is obvious that the education system of any nation predetermines the prospects of its historical (civil) development, as well as ways and means of resolving the problems that are ripening in the national community. Therefore, knowledge acts as a stimulant of the whole system of education. In the context of what has been said, the question arises: is the idea of a knowledge-based society, which became a symbol of the modern era, an initial premise for comprehending many realities of modernity and the cause of serious transformations of modern civilisation - is "modern" enough?

History testifies that knowledge is a component of any culture, not only modern. Knowledge is a form of existence of culture and a way of existence of a person in it. Knowledge, in fact, is what ensures the interconnection of science and education, which is possible only in their historical development: "The initial element of understanding the connection between science and education is knowledge - the most important public property that determines the thinking level of the era and forms the basis of the spiritual "inheritance" of society. Knowledge doesn't form a simple sum of individual facts, but a complex integrated system that embodies opportunities, outcomes, prospects for knowledge and transformation of the world. It is comparable to the most global factors of society's existence" (Slutsky, 1980, p. 61).

Historically, science arose by an emerging social institution - the education system. At the same time, science is a form of existence of

ready knowledge, which in turn is a means of carrying out cognitive activity to acquire new knowledge. Education, however, operates already ready-made knowledge. It is called upon to fulfil the functions of both teaching (the transfer and assimilation of knowledge, experience, skills) and education (the formation of a moral personality with a civic attitude and values), through which, in fact, the social nature of education is manifested. The historically determined process of mutual influence and interaction between science and education reveals both the "educational nature" of science and the "scientific nature" of education.

In the era of antiquity education was carried out within the framework of science. In the schools of Ancient Greece the functions of producing new scientific knowledge and education (the Academy of Plato and Aristotle's Lyceum) were simultaneously realized. In the first centuries of the Roman Empire "scientific education developed to its extreme height; it becomes increasingly common property and with the Latin language had spread across European provinces" (Schmidt, 1877, p. 419). The epoch of the Church Fathers was marked by the appearance of numerous philosophical, rhetorical, and law schools (Rome, Athens, Constantinople). In Alexandria, which was the centre of ancient science and education, attempts were made to "reconcile" Greek science and Christian doctrine (Philo of Alexandria).

In the Middle Ages education was predominantly theological and was carried out both in primary and secondary educational institutions and in higher educational institutions (madrassas, higher secular schools, universities - first they were Islamist, from the 12th century also European). Medieval universities were both a storehouse of knowledge and centres of educa-

tion and science.

The noted tendency is also manifested in the Armenian spiritual culture. The creation of the national writing system (405) intensified the process of dissemination of education and the emergence of rich scientific literature. Schools and monasteries founded throughout Armenia involved different layers of Armenian society in the area of spiritual life, giving rise to a powerful cultural movement. The translation of the Bible (435), which recorded a very high level of the Armenian language, acquired special significance in the educational and scientific activities. Thanks to the translation of the Bible, the Armenian language became one of the literary languages of the time. The translation of the Bible had a great influence on the Armenian written literature (theological and philosophical treatises, historiography). The first ascetics of Armenian writing translated numerous monuments of ancient literature, which represented at that time all sections of the widely-spread classification of Christian Science and writing. Another line of development of ancient Armenian science was Graecophiling, whose representatives sought to bring to the Armenian culture the achievements of ancient science and philosophy. The translation activity of Graecophilswas carried out in accordance with the classification of sciences developed in the ancient world and adopted in the medieval education system.

Among the emerged major scientific and educational centres in Armenia and Armenian Cilicia (IX-XV centuries), the most famous were Gladzor (1291-1340) and Tatev (1390-1435). The set of studied disciplines, as already noted, reflected system of medieval education: ancient and medieval philosophy, theology, history, "seven free arts" - trivium (grammar, rhetoric, dialectics) and quadrium (arithmetic, geometry,

cosmography, music theory), "practical arts" - medicine, law, theory of calendar, pedagogue. There was a necessary literature in Armenian in all Armenian universities: both translated and original works of Armenian scientists and thinkers of past centuries were studied. Graduates were awarded academic degrees and titles – "vardapet" (doctor of theology) and "imastaser" (philosopher, sophist).

The program of the national revival of the Armenians by MekhitarSebastatsi included the main directions of the spiritual development of the nation:

- Update of the Armenian language;
- Conductions of scientific research mainly in the field of classical philology, historiography, cartography, ethnography, philosophy, ethics, theology;
- Publication of the works of ancient Armenian thinkers and scientists;
- Translation of scientific and philosophical works of European authors;
- Educational activities carried out in various cities and regions of many countries (Transylvania, Hungary, Italy, France, Iran, Georgia, Crimea, Constantinople, etc.).

But the largest scientific and educational centre of the Mkhitaryans is the Academy (theological seminary) founded in September 1700 on the island of St. Lazarus (Venice).

Born in the bosom of Protestant ideology, the idea of European scientific education presupposed empirical studies of the laws created by God nature. The classical system of scientific education was theoretically substantiated by thinkers of the XVIII-XX centuries, beginning, at least, with I. Kant.

It is obvious that the idea of scientific education is an integral part of the centuries-old cultural tradition of the peoples of the world and

therefore it is advisable today to talk only about the modern version of science and scientific education.

Culture is a constantly developing and enriching result of the creation of generations of a certain nation, in which the spiritual nature of this people is expressed, objectified in the system of knowledge created and produced by it. In each developed national culture the emphasis is placed (and this is specified by the conditions of national existence) on a certain type of knowledge, which determines the objectives of the educational system. At the same time a spiritual and moral component present in all forms of culture of a particular nation. It also determines the meaningful attitudes and view of this nation for its present and future. The system of education is aimed at understanding the nature of the creator and bearer of this culture. Because of this it initially contains a spiritual-moral dimension. The spiritual needs of the nation expressed in the original national culture contribute to the self-awareness of the individual and the creation of higher and absolute values (Mirumyan, 2014, p. 39).

Modernity has transformed the centuries-old cultural tradition. The entry of mankind into the knowledge society was marked by the fact that science ceased to act as a form of production of a true, universally valid, holistic knowledge of the world and man in it, thanks to which science for centuries had high cultural value. Modern society began to worship the cult of "useful", i.e. it is knowledge which has purely technological importance. In this way, the historically developed relationship between the fundamental and applied sciences was violated. Formation of the paradigm of functionalism acquired a scientific and theoretical status and laid the foundation for the computer era. It promoted the study of self-

organizing systems (biological, social, technical).

The emergence and development of information approaches and information technologies highlighted the problem of transdisciplinarity.

In modern science - technology science - there is a close combination of fundamental and applied levels of knowledge, which negates the importance of the theoretical level (scientific knowledge). This is manifested, mainly, in the rapid multiplication of empirical data, which is not enough systematized, and often isn't theoretically meaningful.

Market logic defines the "vital activity" of the whole system of production and consumption of modern scientific knowledge: "Science is experiencing a situation when the colossal multiplication of knowledge (mostly of an empirical nature) and the erosion of its fundamental principles leads to a rapid multiplication of problems over which we lose control, and thereby strategic perspective of our activities. This creates a feeling of ubiquitous uncertainty, the loss of solid ground under the feet, the scope for scepticism and relativism ... Such is the back side of the knowledge society, symbolizing the impasse of our consumer civilization" (Plato, 1994, p. 11).

The tendency indicated in modern science was reduced to the need based on economic conjuncture of educational system. And in this sense there is hardly a fundamental difference between the continuing to successfully "work" today classical liberal doctrine with its principles of political and economic individualism and the "philosophy of education" of the American neoconservatives of the 21st century. In the context of the first (neoliberal) doctrine "pedagogy of the market builds a "new morality", which forms an "exhausted creature" at the output (attenuated creature). These "creatures" are independent and rational individuals who are "the only generators

of their own desires and preferences and the best judges of their own interests. The choice is ... the key concept in the political articulation of these creatures ... it tears the fragile welfare discourse (while the state provides collective interests... and pursues a policy aimed at supporting all members of the civil society), and reaffirms the deeply rooted dogmas of the bourgeois Individualism..." (Ball, 2003, p. 32).

As for the "philosophy of education" of the American neoconservatives of the 21st century, it is characterized by the implementation of the principle of secession of the school from the state and the removal of the state from the education sphere, also by the involvement of business in education to adapt the training centers to the conditions of a competitive global economy. As a result the ideological component of educational standards determined by the market mentality has sharply increased. Modern educational standards are nothing but a manifestation of the crisis of modern culture, the most important reflection of which was the crisis of culture of thinking.

**Existing to date a large amount of research literature on the problem of the institute of modern education shows that there is still missing an integral, holistic and scientifically based concept of modern education. At the same time, there are some works (their number is constantly growing) of authors, in which the necessity of considering the system "science-education" outside the categories defining commodity-money relations is affirmed. This will be possible in case we identify, or rather, reconstruct in the context of the present day the essence of the scientific-cognitive and educational processes.**

It is obvious that the ongoing trend of "economizing" all spheres of human and social life is fraught with very negative consequences of a cultural and civil nature. Such an approach undermines the very foundations of culture itself. After all, the culture of the production of knowledge "prescribes as its main condition the human ability to create new knowledge, and in a broader horizon the special spiritual competence "cogito", which is capable of enlivening knowledge" (Karpov, 2012, p.86).

It is obvious that the modern information society has displaced two hypostases of education - as a temporary self-reproducing socio-cultural phenomenon and a certain social structure programmed by man and society. Meanwhile, the basis of education is the desire to know all things, which is inherent to the person and not determined by economic categories. The present and future of the Institute of Education need to be understood in a broad cultural context; otherwise this Institute will finally become a regular financial corporation.

Education is the basis of social/national life. It naturally should be transformed in parallel with the changing political and socio-economic strategies of the nation-state. However, because of the desire to innovate in education, the fact that the educational system should always be oriented towards the education of a person and the formation of a citizen shouldn't be ignored. The education system is the cultural core of the life of a person and society. It contains timeless values and centuries-old national traditions. Without this, education loses its essential characteristics and simply turns into a "market for educational services". This is fraught with the disappearance of fundamental human qualities (Rousseau, 1907, p. 33).

The modern system of education (the system of socially controlled production of knowledge) boils down to the intellectual degradation of mankind and deepening of the anthropologi-

cal crisis. The reason for this is seen in the trend of intellectual consumerism initiated by the system of modern education, skillfully veiled by the replacement of thinking with operational skills, and awareness with informativeness. Therefore, we should not talk about the crisis of the educational system, but about the crisis of man. Obviously, there is an urgent need to fundamentally rethink the goals and objectives of education. Its fundamental task should be to disclose in man his creative potential, the formation in him of a person capable of an intellectual effort.

To solve this problem, it is necessary to restore the status of those subjects in the curricula of higher education, the study of which contributes to the formation of a holistic vision of the world. First of all, we are talking about fundamental theoretical subjects in both areas of scientific knowledge (natural science and socio-humanitarian), as well as so-called "useless" subjects that do not directly work for specialization (philosophy, history, religion, art).Absence and insufficient attention to these subjects in the modern education system results in the release by universities of specialists who are practically devoid of personal, civil and spiritual-moral qualities. Meanwhile, there is a whole universe of spiritual and moral values that do not fit, and can't fit into the narrow scope of specialization and technological designs, as it is an expression of the deep essence of culture and civilization throughout the history of mankind. These values make up the core of that "useless" knowledge that is not in demand today in the modern consumer society. But the restoration of the status of this kind of knowledge can contribute to the survival of the national community, to overcome the economic crisis and to create innovations that are in demand in the modern social and political sit-

uation in all spheres of life. To do this, it is necessary to create or restore national models of civic education that can bring citizens of a particular state first of all to their own, rather than global civil culture and to the system of spiritual values of their nation. These values make up the core of that "useless" knowledge that is not in demand today in the modern consumer society. But the restoration of the status of this kind of knowledge can contribute to the survival of the national community, to overcome the economic crisis and to create innovations that are in demand in the modern social and political situation in all spheres of life. To do this, it is necessary to create or restore national models of civic education that can bring citizens of a particular state first of all to their own, rather than global civil culture and to the system of spiritual values of their nation.

General civilization choice demanded by the modern global political situation can be realized only based on such a spiritual foundation. This choice is capable of overcoming the threat of destruction of the biological species of Homosapiens, or at least the recession of mankind to a pre-civilized state, which is imminent over all mankind.

Conclusions

1. The idea of the scientific education is part of the centuries-old culture of the peoples of the world. Therefore, today it is advisable to talk only about the modern version of scientific education.
2. The economization of education undermines the cultural and civilizational bases of the being of modern man and society.
3. The modern education system leads to intel-

lectual degradation of man and to the deepening of anthropological crisis.

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# HISTORY AND MEMORY

Abstract

This paper discusses the issue of the relationship of history and memory. Memory becomes a topic in historical discourses as it deals with identity, especially when we speak of collective memory. The paper presents the history of the relationship of history and memory and suggests a thesis according to which the close interaction between these two concepts can solve the crisis of identity that has been most urgent in our days.

*Keywords*: history, memory, identity, collective memory, narrative, identity crisis.

The reference to the memory in historical discourses is usually perceived as a guarantee of the ontological justification of history since the representative of the past is the memory. Moreover, sometimes these two words appear as synonyms because memory is always the memory of the past, and the past is embodied only in the memory. The so-called legitimacy of the memory began with Herodotus when he had justified his *History* by saving the events from oblivion.

In recent times, memory has become a wider topic of discussion because it is closely linked to the identity problem, and the latter has been reinterpreted since the 20th century with the global mapping strategies. From this point of view, the memory problem loses its 'impartiality' because the issue gets underlined political tone; the problem of identity implies a political context, especially if it refers to national identity, to collective memory because history is the memory of a nation or any other community. And, consequently, there is a danger of imposing one's own (subjective) memory as history.

Moreover, the possibility of collective memory is often challenged. And if the issue came to the problem of the relationship between a narrative and an event, the political point of view refers to the ability to 'conquer' the memory. For instance, Susan Sontag argues that there is no collective memory, explaining that memory dies with every individual (see Sontag, 2003, p. 85). According to her, collective memory is not a process of recalling, but a set of conditions according to which some events of the past are more important and have taken place in a certain way. From here, it is noticeable that *collective memory* is bordering with *ideology*. And since the ideology in Western thought usually is associated with Nazism, chauvinism, racism and other similar concepts, so rebellions against collective memory become clear. If we add psychological considerations that memory is not passive and neutral, but the subject adjusts the past to himself through memory, then it becomes clear that the memory is 'politicized'.

After the discovery that memory was a 'weapon' in history, the contrast between history

and memory was noticed. One of the first to introduce this contrast and to start the current memory discourse was Maurice Halbawachs.

Through the works of Halbwachs, the idea of a social determination of memory goes like a red thread. At first glance, it may seem that memory is a faculty which could exist only in a person's body or brain, but at least, different remembrances of the same event can be organised within a group and transformed into impersonal or collective memory (see Halbwachs, 1980, p. 50). Moreover, collective memory is not a mechanical sum of individual memories, "it evolves according to its laws, and any individual remembrances that may penetrate are transformed within a totality having no personal consciousness" (Halbwachs, 1980, p. 51). In other words, not only collective memory exists in itself, but it also implies a personal memory because the latter is formed in a particular relationship with a community. Absolutely alone person would not have memory: the need for memory is of social bases. Though no individual memory can be embodied in another person, but every individual experiences the memories of other surrounding individuals, especially if they refer to the common reality for different individuals. As Aleida Assmann writes, "To be part of a collective group such as the nation one has to share and adopt the group's history, which exceeds the boundaries of one's individual lifespan" (Assmann, 2008, p. 52).

After justifying the existence of collective memory, Halbwachs develops the thesis of contradiction between collective memory and history. Preventing the possible reasoning based on his arguments, which would identify the memory and history, Halbwachs writes: "The collective memory is not the same as formal history, and 'historical memory' is a rather unfortunate expression because it connects two terms opposed in more than one aspect" (Halbwachs, 1980, p. 78). Certainly, history derives from collecting memory or memories, but according to Halbawachs, history is essentially regulated and presented with certain principles, which ultimately differs from all memory. As Halbwachs noticed, "General history starts only when tradition ends, and the social memory is fading or breaking up" (Halbwachs, 1980, p. 78). The justification of this thesis basically consists of two reasons. The first reason is the continuity of memory and the discontinuity of history; there is an impression that people, traditions, and relationships change radically in every historical period, whereas such changes are almost invisible within the living memory. From an epistemological point of view, this observation reminds a well-known narrativist thesis that nothing corresponds to the narratives in reality. The other reason is the limitation of memory and the universalistic ambitions of history; there is no universal memory, as collective memories are numerous, and history tends to be universal. Besides, essential and inessential properties are undistinguished in the memory, while history presents itself as a necessary and definite substance. On the one hand, this means that the event cannot become history as long as are alive the generations who have witnessed that event, because emotional experiences will not give a chance to present a linguistic narrative. But on the other hand, it means that from a historical point of view the legitimacy of memories will lead to political manipulations. This part of the problem has been touched upon in more detail by Pierre Nora, continuing the constructivist approach from Halbwachs, but, indeed, also proofreading it.

Nora is, first of all, well-known with the idea of *'lieux de mémoire'* (memory locations).

By *lieux de mémoire*, he certainly does not refer to the topographical locations, but rather so-called crystallized memory in the broadest sense: flag, calendar, archive, museum, library and so on. Moreover, "they are *lieux* in three senses of the word – material, symbolic, and functional" (Nora, 1989, p. 18-19). Nora begins with the idea of the difference between memory and history and adds that they are now radically opposed. "Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. … History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer. Memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present; history is a representation of the past", – writes Nora (Nora, 1989, p. 8). However, they are most significantly opposed at the level of their bearers: "there are as many memories as there are groups… History, on the other hand, belongs to everyone and to no one" (Nora, 1989, p. 9). (It should be noted that often the concept of seemingly neutrality of history becomes the subject of political discourse; history is, in any case, presented on behalf of a group and viewpoint, in fact, questioning the memories of others).

According to Nora, history-memory has been lost due to the breakdown between memory and history. Considering the contradictory tendency of language and experience, Nora notes that "we speak so much of memory because there is so little of it left" (Nora, 1989, p. 7). Memory diminishes because the nation is lost as the main bearer of the collective memory, yielding to the impersonal society. Essentially, it is due to the nationality that the memory aspiration maintains its virtue, "the memory-nation was thus the last incarnation of the unification of memory and history" (Nora, 1989, p. 11). The society which tends to ruin the very traditional,

no longer perceives memory as a prayer, believing only in *archives*. Memory is materialized (transforming into a location), the sacred cleans its tracks from the memory space, the archives devour life, history captures memory. And in this environment, talking about memory, therefore, you talk about history. All this happens because of the 'acceleration of history,' which destroys all historical metanarratives and, hence, the national identity. And in this case a historian has nothing else to do than to propose *lieux de mémoire* which seem to be aimed at eliminating the gap between memory and history. Nora who is a chairman of the international association *Freedom for History*, protests against the law deriving from the French constitution, that the President has the right to interfere with the solution of historical problems, as a result of which, in fact, the memory extends extensively from history. In this point, the political context of the problem of relationship between history and memory is discovered. Every historical and political subject, by ignoring others memories, tries to make a 'universal' history and impose it on the public.

However, such an aggressive campaign of history reveals the corresponding rebellion, as a number of questions remain unanswered. In other words, "mere contrasting of the memory and the history cannot introduce the immense range of the history in a comprehensive manner. To perceive the relationship between the memory and the history means somehow to reveal both their difference and contrast, and especially the prospects of comparative dialogue" (Hovhannisyan, 2014, p. 76). These prospects are thoroughly analyzed by Jan and Aleida Assmanns. Jan Assmann recognizing that memory is manifested in communication nevertheless describes Halbwachs's approach as an extreme one and sug-

gests to consider the problem not only from the logical point of view but also in the historical context (see Assmann, 1988). Historically, the relationship between memory and history can be presented in three stages: the identity between history and memory, the polarization between history and memory, and the interaction between history and memory (see, Assmann, 2008, p. 57).

For a long time, since Ancient Greece history, writing has merely meant to fix the memory. The goddess Mnemosyne was the mother of the all Muses which embodied the universal memory and thus the whole past from which the present is emerged both in material and poetic world. And it is no coincidence that the knowledge in Plato's philosophy was identical to recollection or memory. To be a historian in Greek culture means to remember people, to be poet means to remember the gods. And this was also the reason why the poet was more important than the historian there. In the early modern times, though, the Cartesian *cogito* was separated from memory and history and turned into a purely logical structure. Nevertheless, history and memory remained together, although in the shade. The polarization between history and memory began with the emergence of historism when the historical consciousness in Europe became more material in the form of faculties, chairs, and sciences. The historiography demanded rhetorical, stylistic, logical, and other methods that elevated it from the private and indefinite memory. And historical narratives had almost nothing in common with the memory. The latter both intellectually and psychologically was criticized either as a result of imagination (Breton), or an unconscious choice (Freud), or a hopeless shelter of the past.

Nevertheless, the polarisation between history and memory had to shrink. Otherwise the solution to some problems would have been postponed forever. This refers to the history in the postmodern condition and the possibility of thinking the identity, particularly traumatic identity. Lyotard has already shown that postmodern is an incredulity toward metanarratives (see Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiv) or the end of the Big Story. And, apparently, the memory is as much unreliable as the history. Moreover, in the series of postmodern deconstructions the history is inevitably ahead of the memory since the latter has individual bearers, is more subjective and vital.

An even more powerful incentive for the interaction between history and memory is the identity crisis, for the memory, obviously, is an essential element of what is now called collective identity. Generally, when we speak about identity, particularly about national identity, we should take into account two different principles: the first is ethnos, geographical location, language, traditions, etc., the second is the *national memory* which creates myths. In the contemporary world the former are either vanishing or ultimately unable to propose an operational program about national identity. The myths created by the collective memory are only able to convert the narratives of the past into 'icons' and to ensure the continuity of the collectivity.

Since the trauma usually has greater capability to ensure a collectivity, so the problem of the relationship between history and memory becomes more urgent in the context of the trauma. One may say that "for some scholars interested in memory as a metahistorical category, 'trauma' is the key to authentic forms of memory, and memories shaped by trauma are the most likely to subvert totalizing varieties of historicism" (Klein, 2000, p. 138); and the trauma memories are the most authentic. In publications dedicated to the trauma, the genocide has become the subject of many investigations, sure-

ly, in the form of Holocaust. By the way, Nora has even developed a conception of hierarchy of genocides where the Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide (Eghern) are contrasted (see Hovhannisyan, 2014). The memory passed through the Genocide tries to turn into a history that will bridge the past and the present, for the universal memory "is the quality of the male genius" (Weininger, 2005, p. 106). One of the best examples of making a history by witnesses and survivors is perhaps a French documentary film *Shoah* (1985) by Claude Lanzmann which lasts nine hours. From the standpoint of identity, the influence of the Genocide is the loss of own grounds, so the problem is the restoration of those grounds. And it is here the memory-history process tends to fill that decayed gap, it is here that memory and history are united; the memory wants more or less substantial reasoning, and history tries to extract vitality from memories.

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# THE SELF-ORGANIZATION LAW OF INTERSUBJECTIVE IDEALS: THE PROBLEM OF CHAOS, ORDER, FREEDOM AND LIABILITY RELATIONSHIP[*]

## Abstract

The relevance of the study is due to the need of theoretical and methodological interpretation of the relationship between freedom and responsibility, chaos and order in the frame of the synergetic philosophy of history (SPH) in implementing the law of self-organisation of intersubjective ideals under new social conditions.

*Keywords:* synergetic philosophy of history; the meaning of life; intersubjective ideal; social order; the creative role of chaos; ideological self-organization; harmony of responsibility (order) and freedom (chaos); change of social ideals; dramatic optimism; the principle of determination and rationality.

**The aim of the** article is to prove scientifically the **logical transition** from the global interaction of chaos and order in nature to their global interaction in society leading to overcoming the global conflict between human **freedom** and **responsibility** and achieving complete harmony between them through the law of self-organization of intersubjective ideals.

**The leading approach** to investigating this problem is applying the heuristic function of the synergetic philosophy of history to implement the law of self-organization of intersubjective ideals.

**The main results of the article**. A new interpretation of the concepts "synergetic philosophy of history", "self-organization of intersubjective ideals" suggesting the creation of fundamentally new values is given. Long rotation within the "golden" circle leads the participant of the world history beyond this circle and adds a global meaning (movement towards the super attractor, as a materialized spiritual value of the highest rank) to his activity. At the same time, the participant in this process perceives the "meaning of life", remaining within the framework of a consistent scientific worldview (not breaking off with the principles of determinism and rationality).

It is stated that the fluctuations between to-

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[*]   The article is the outcome of the scientific research on the issues and problems of synergetic philosophy of history and a logical continuation of the article (Branskij, Oganyan, K. M. & Oganyan, K. K., 2018) and the achievements of St. Petersburg Synergetic Scientific School guided by Professor V. Branskij (1930-2017).

talitarianism and anarchism are not unsystematic. Their objective and necessary result is the **harmonization** (in the average long-term perspective) of freedom and responsibility (caused by the balancing of social chaos and social order). The specific nature of the super attractor is to balance the creative role of both order and chaos.

It is also put forward that within the framework of the synergetic philosophy of history, the real essence of this limit is revealed: The SPH considers it to be a quantitative measure of **harmony** between chaos and order in the general philosophical sense of these concepts. Such a measure can be interpreted as a "golden mean" between chaos and order and an indicator leading to the achievement of this harmony.

The authors provide a detailed justification for the fact that it is the trade-off between freedom and responsibility that results in the **law of self-organisation of intersubjective ideals**. The consequence of this law is the stochastic fluctuations of the self-organizing system (humanity) between the craving for totalitarianism and the desire for deconstruction (modern anarchism); self-organization acting as a potential means of harmonization of an individual and society; philosophical significance of the ideological conflict between K. Marx (XIX century) and K. Popper (XX century.) on the possibility of long-term social predictions.

**Materials can be used** to develop new courses on the synergetic philosophy of history, social synergy, synergetic theory of values, synergetic theory of man, the theory of self-organization of intersubjective ideals.

## Introduction

The creative team members of St. Petersburg Synergetic Scientific School investigated various aspects associated with the synergetic philosophy of history and their results[1] initiated this article.

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[1] ***Methodological problems of the synergetic of globalization:*** Oganyan, K. M. (2007). Metodologicheskie problemi teorii globalizacii (Methodological Problems of the Synergetic Theory of Globalization, in Russian). *Social Sciences and Modern times, 2*; Oganyan, K. M. (2017). Methodological Analysis of the Scientific Research. *NOEMA, XVI,* 81-93; Oganyan, K. M., Branskij, V. P., Oganisyan, A. O., & Djidjian, R. Z. (2018). *Metodologicheskii analiz genesisa nauchnoi teorii: vidi estestvennonauchnogo znania i ikh vzaimosvaz'. Ocherki o Leningradskoi ontologicheskoi i Erevanskoi logiko-argumentacionnoi shkolax* (Methodological Analysis of the Genesis of a Scientific Theory: Types of Natural Science Knowledge and Their Relationship. Essays on the Leningrad Ontological and Yerevan Logical-Argumentative Schools, in Russian). SPb.: Publishing house of SPbGEU.
***The laws of production, consumption, preservation and development of values:*** Oganyan, K. M. (2013). Zakonomernosti potrebleniya cennostei i potrebitelskie avtokolebaniya. Roli modi v potreblenii cennostei (Regularities of Consumption of Values and Consumer Automation. The Role of Fashion in the Use of Values, in Russian). *Successes of Modern Natural Science, 2,* 107-112; Oganyan, K. M., Sahakyan, A. K., Pokrovskaya, N. N., Bakhshyan, A. Zh. (2013). *Cennostnye orientacii v trudovom povedenii i kross-kulturnoe issledovanie trudovoi migracii* (Value Orientations in Labor Behavior and Cross-Cultural Research of Labor Migration, in Russian). Yerevan: EDIT PRINT.
***The synergetic theory of ideals:*** Oganyan, K. M., Branskij, V. P. (2014). *Zakon relevantnosti i integracii idealov povedencheskix stereotipov* (The Relevance and Integration Law of Behavioral Stereotype Ideals, in Russian). Vestnik KRSU, *14*(6), 70-79.
***The problems of the controlled chaos:*** Pyzh, V. V. (2017). The Role of UNESCO in Protecting Sports Integrity and Preserving Sports Ideals. *Proceedings of the International Conference on Modern Research in Science and Technology, (pp. 596-607). Scientific public organization "Professional Science";* Pyzh, V. V. (2018). The Controlled Chaos Doctrine and Securi-

Let us consider the results provided by a new approach to the relationship between freedom and responsibility in the framework of the synergetic philosophy of history. The main problem in the philosophy of activity is how to harmonize its ***freedom with responsibility*** (see Oganyan, K. M., & Oganyan, K. K., 2017[a]; Oganyan, K. M., & Oganyan, K. K., 2017[b]). Generally, within the frame of philosophy, it is the coordination of activities between chaos (freedom of choice) and order (regulation of actions) when the creative role of order seems to be incompatible with the creative role of chaos.

The experience of world history shows that rigid rules imposed on any activity lead to totalitarianism, and liberation from any kind of restrictions (rules) - to deconstructionism (modern anarchism). As is known from history, the first one leads to strangulation of freedom, and the second- to its depreciation. Thus, without freedom of creativity, the creation of new values becomes impossible. Only an account for the law of self-organization of intersubjective ideals enables to get a clear answer to the question posed. The general recipe for choosing between craving for freedom and craving for order is to study the interaction of the main selection factors within a self-organizing system (thesaurus, detector and selector) (see Branskij, Oganyan K.M., & Pozharskiy, 2009). The philosophical significance of the law of self-organization of intersubjective ideals therefore is in the solution of Prigogine's paradox (Branskij, Oganyan K.M., & Pozharskiy, 2009, pp. 155-164) (an explanation of how the simultaneous movement of mankind to maximum freedom and maximum order (maximum

organization and responsibility) is possible. Hence, from the point of view of the synergetic philosophy of history (SPH), the cult of freedom is just as unacceptable as the one-sided cult of order. It is the law of self-organization of intersubjective ideals that shows how one can avoid permissiveness (complete arbitrary rule in human actions) within a strictly scientific outlook. At the same time, as soon as the thinker is trying to eliminate this arbitrariness within the unscientific (mystic) philosophy, he immediately encounters with the theodicy problem[2].

A rational compromise between freedom and responsibility (the "golden dream" of all civilized politicians) is based on the law of self-organization of intersubjective ideals[3]. This law is closely related to the problem of long-term social forecasting. As we know, K. Marx formulated the global law of the mankind development to the world proletariat dictatorship (see Marx, 1926; Marx, 1982), and K. Popper - a similar law of mankind's movement to the global civil society (Popper, 1993; Popper, 1992). The first concept absolutized the social order, and the second - social chaos. The first insisted on the existence of an objective social law that allows predicting a distant social future; the second - on the absence of such a law and impossibility of reliable predictions of the global social future. Both concepts encountered fundamental difficulties in their practical application. Neither attempts to achieve the world dictatorship of the proletariat (K. Marks, V. Lenin, etc.), nor at-

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ty of Modern Russia, in Russian). *Modern Periodicals in the Context of Communicative Processes. The Future of Eurasia (Media and Political Discourse), 3*(12), 38-52. (G. S. Melnik, B. Ya. Misonzhnikov, I. A. Scherbo, Eds.). SPb.: SPbSU.

[2]   Theodicy is the justification of God the Almighty for the world evil (see Branskij, Oganyan K.M., & Pozharskiy, 2009, pp. 265-272).

[3]   It is this law that, if we use the mythological language of R. Wagner in his operatic cycle "The Ring of the Nibelung", turns the Nibelungs ("children of the mist", that is, people with not yet formed ideology) into knights of the round table ("soldiers of the white swan," i.e. ideologically mature people).

tempts to build a global liberal civil society (Fukuyama, 2007) have been a decisive success[4].

By the beginning of the 21st century, it has become clear that the problem was not actually in absolutizing global social order (the highest social responsibility) or global social chaos (maximum social freedom), but in achieving harmony of both (the way of overcoming the so-called Prigozhin paradox - the simultaneous movement of mankind to both maximum responsibility and maximum freedom).

*The Main Consequences of Self-Organization Law of Intersubjective Ideals*

This law results in fundamental conflicts in human relationships and simultaneously creates the conditions for the resolution of these conflicts.

The main factor at work in such conflicts is the differentiation of human behavior into good and evil. From the SPH viewpoint, good is an act corresponding to an intersubjective ideal, and evil is an act incompatible with this ideal. Hence, the relativity of the difference between these concepts becomes obvious: if good is an act that corresponds to an ideal, then evil is an act corresponding to an anti-ideal (for example, killing a human being during military operations directed by well-intentioned patriotic motives or killing a person for the purpose of robbing him in peacetime). It is obvious that the division of actions into "good" and "evil" is connected with the splitting of the intersubjective ideal into an ideal and an anti-ideal. SPH views morality as a system of behaviour rules dictated by a specific intersubjective ideal. Therefore, the primary con-

cept here is not the system of moral norms, but the ideal that determines this system.

The self-organizing system fluctuations between good and evil lead in the long run to its balancing between totalitarianism (the cult of order and responsibility) and anarchism (the cult of chaos and freedom). The desire for totalitarianism or anarchism in the society is by no means an accidental phenomenon or the fruit of some irrational malicious intent: totalitarianism is the natural defensive reaction of the self-organizing system from anarchism, and the latter from totalitarianism. The moments of good and evil are present both in totalitarianism and in anarchism (therefore, any one-sided laudatory or one-sidedly negative assessments of both, from a scientific point of view, are not justified).

An equally remarkable consequence of the self-organization law of intersubjective ideals is the explanation of the erotic polarization of any developing society based on this law, i.e. dividing it into men and women. The direct cause of such polarization is the erotic polarization of any biogeocenosis (its division into males and females).

The reason for this process is the advantage that sexual reproduction of living beings has in comparison with the non-sexual one. It allows to solve an apparently impossible task: to combine the **creative** role of order (restrictions - taboos on erotic contacts) with the creative role of chaos (the removal of certain limitations, due to the possibility of expanding casual acquaintances - the so-called irrational love "if not from the first, then at least from the second glance"). Apparently, due to this prominent peculiarity of sexual reproduction, selection and superselection give it preference as compared with other forms of reproduction. The described resolution of the contradiction between chaos and order in sexual

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4    One-sided cult of order (law-abiding responsibility) leads to suffocation of freedom; one-sided cult of chaos ("freedom") - devaluation of freedom.

reproduction makes clear the fundamental nature of the opposition and interaction of male and female principles, both in nature and society.

**SPH is identified as follows**. Self-organization is in no way reduced to the philistine endless pursuit of utilitarian values[5]: it involves the creation of fundamentally new values (the embodiment of uniqueness). Graphically, this can be represented as the unfolding of the Wagnerian gold ring of Nibelung (absolute value symbol) into the "golden spiral", explored for the first time by Swiss mathematicians Bernoulli. The "golden" spiral, unlike many other spirals, is "logarithmic" and contains a singular point (called in mathematics "singularity", not of a local but of a global nature). Therefore, a long rotation within the "golden" circle sooner or later leads a participant of world history beyond this circle and gives its activity a global meaning (movement towards a super-attractor, as a materialized spiritual value of the highest rank). At the same time, the participant in this process acquires the "meaning of life", remaining within the framework of a consistent scientific worldview (not breaking with the principles of determinism and rationality) (see Branskij, 2014, p. 25).

Thus, the required compromise between freedom and responsibility yields the law of self-organization of intersubjective ideals. As a result of this law, as it already noted, is the stochastic fluctuations of the self-organising system (humanity) between the craving for totalitarianism and the urge for deconstruction (modern anarchism). Consequently, a scientific approach to the origin of totalitarianism and anarchism differs significantly from the naive political approach popular in the mass media of the 20th century. Totalitarianism does not arise by chance, as a result of some evil irrational intent - this is a **natural** reaction to anarchism; similarly anarchism is just a **natural** reaction to totalitarianism. But the fluctuations between totalitarianism and anarchism are not unsystematic (and therefore are not meaningless). Their objective and necessary result is **harmonization** (in the average long-term perspective) of freedom and responsibility (caused by the balancing of social chaos and social order). The specific nature of the super attractor is to balance the creative role of both order and chaos. That is why the move to the super-attractor leads to the already mentioned motto in human actions: "Fight and seek, find and do not give up!"[6].

As we have already seen, unlike Nietzsche, who at the end of the 19th century was one of the first to speak of "the death of the gods", Hegel used a very beautiful metaphor – "The Minerva's Owl starts its flight only with the onset of twilight". This image means something much more subtle and profound: intersubjective ideals never completely die, but "plunge into twilight" (fall into decay after unsuccessful attempts at their full realization, lose their former popularity; compare the fate of the Catholic ideal in Ger-

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[5] These values are of primary interest for an international inhabitant of all epochs and peoples who is ready to sacrifice for his satisfaction.

[6] The words of the English romantic poet A. Tennyson (XIX century), taken as an epitaph to the burial of the heroic English Antarctic explorer Captain R. Scott (the XX century) on the Antarctic coast.

Here the popular words of the famous hit come to mind: "Everything is illusory in this raging world; there is only an instant - and hold on to it, there is only an instant between the past and the future - it is that is called life!" From the scientific worldview, such "impressionistic" eschatology is opposed by synergistic eschatology (SPhH): the latter insists not on instantainity, but on sustainability (strength) of life, replacing the ephemeral instant between the past and the future by long-lasting harmony between them. Therefore, the words of the mentioned hit should be modified in the following way: "Everything is illusory in this raging world; take care and hold on tight. There is a precarious instant between the past and the future: it is that is called life!"

many in the middle of the 17<sup>th</sup> century and in France at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century; the Orthodox ideal in Russia in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century; the communist ideal in Russia at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, etc.). Hence, in view of the fundamental difference between truth and ideal, the triumph of the ideal also does not prove its truth, as well as its collapse - its falsity.

The historical significance of private-human ("relative") ideals is not in proving their "truth" or "falsity", but in verifying their greater or lesser availability as a means of transforming society under the given historical conditions. It is important not to confuse the ascertaining (factual) and key knowledge: private-human ("relative") ideals are **building material** for the formation and realization of the universal "absolute" ideal. The defenders of aggressive criticism of the absolute ideal should also moderate their polemical fervour, as well as the opponents of the absolute truth: if the complete collapse of absolute truth (as incontrovertible within its applicability) leads to world **incognizability**, then the complete collapse of the absolute ideal - to **meaninglessness** of human existence. Although absolute truth and absolute ideal should not be identified, but this does not mean that one can ignore the connection between them. From the SPH point of view, absolute truth is a means of realizing absolute ideal. Consequently: precisely because the absolute truth cannot be reached in the final historical period, the absolute ideal is not achievable that time.

**A brief overview of the SPhH general structure**. It is obvious that unlike many philosophical speculations on the "meaning of life", SPH has a very harmonious logic connected with the reconciliation of natural and humanitarian thinking (this logic should be called even "steel" rather than "iron"). In the era of aggressive attacks on the principles of determinism and rationality, such logic cannot but attract attention to itself. To understand the core of the matter of this logic, it is useful to discuss it shortly.

The most important conclusion the SPH comes to is the following: "the meaning of the world (social) history is revealed not by science but by ideology, but the vehicle it uses can only be understood with the help of science". Any attempts to understand this issue without science in advance doom the scientist to empty chatter and "commonplace" exchange of emotions. To avoid such a course of "discussion", one must compare the history of formation and attempts to implement different ideologies without any emotional prejudices (avoiding any biassed assessments). At the same time, under "ideology" one must understand ideology, i.e., a clear doctrine of **some kind of intersubjective** ("social" and not only individual) **ideal** that determines the behavior of a large human group (a strategic program of action of such a group is associated with a long historical perspective and aimed at preserving or changing the social system within which this group is).

The representatives of materialistic dialectics failed to observe the parallel between the development of knowledge directed towards absolute truth (as a result of the interaction of relative truths) and social activity towards the formation of the universal ("absolute") ideal (as a result of the interaction of relative ideals). In the twentieth century, these representatives did not find this parallel. However, if this parallel were to be found, everyone would be convinced that the communist ideal has no basis to claim the role of the universal ideal. Responsible party workers attributing absolute character to the communist ideal and mistakenly identifying the

absolute ideal with absolute truth[7], turned this ideal into something "divine" and began to consider any deviations from it as a state crime. Hence, it is clear what philosophical significance this global parallel has.

Thus, from the SPH point of view, it is impossible to confuse such concepts as "scientific ideology" and "scientific theory of ideology". The first is impossible in principle because ideology is not a doctrine of truth, but an ideal (ideology). And these are different concepts. Scientific ideology is as controversial as a "round square" or "roasted ice". On the contrary, the scientific theory of ideology (as an ideology) has a profound sense. The study of the history of different ideologies shows that all of them, depending on their attitude to hypothetical supernatural reality[8], can be divided into three classes: 1) polytheism (all kinds of paganism); 2) monotheism (all kinds of religious denominations - Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, etc.); 3) atheism (all kinds of variants of secular ideology). With all the difference, they have something in common: different interpretation of the concept of "ideal" (each interprets it as "holiness"). There are also various "intermediate" varieties, moreover as a result of self-organization of intersubjective ideals in the future, there may be ideological constructions of a much more complex nature, and very difficult for prediction.

Thus, from the SPH point of view, the meaning of history is implied in the notion of "moving to the superattractor". This process is conceived as spontaneous, not pursuing any purpose (i.e., the process of non-teleological character). This interaction accounts for rational meaning of a historical concept fate. The chain of participants in this process, who adhere to different (and even opposite) ideological aims, makes it clear how the combination of the most sublime romanticism with the most sober realism in one process becomes possible. A note: romanticism is usually associated with the content of the ideal, and realism - with the way it is realized.

Although many philosophers (G. Hegel, N. Berdyaev, K. Jaspers, and others) characterized human history as a "graveyard of ideals", nevertheless, in the long run, the amazing "vitality" of these strange creatures (their ability to "resurrection to new life") was obvious. Considering the proximity of such philosophical concepts as "ideal" and "god" identified by L. Feuerbach, some philosophers (for example, F. Nietzsche) described the destruction of ideals as the "death of gods".

It turns out that the confusion and the seeming unpredictability of social events, that hinders scientific understanding of the global course of social history, has a certain regularity that gives order to seemingly complete social chaos. As it had already been pointed out, from the SPH point of view, the secret of it lies in **the law of self-organization of intersubjective ideals**.

The law of self-organization of intersubjective ideals, expanding the ability of mankind to **control cosmic processes**, and, consequently, prevent dangerous cosmic catastrophes for it can make the future of mankind much more secure than it seems at the present level of our knowledge and technical capabilities. Even large-scale ideological differences in the ranks of

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7   "...from the historicall viewpoint, any ideology is conditional but, of course, the fact that any scientific ideology (in contrast, for example, to the religious one) corresponds to objective truth". See (Lenin, 1958).

8   In the history of philosophy and the history of science, "supernatural" reality is usually understood as an objective reality that exists outside space and time and is not subject to any laws.

the future mankind **on the methods of preventing cosmic catastrophes** dangerous for the very existence of mankind, can be successfully overcome within the framework of the law **of self-organization** of intersubjective ideals. A very important point is the self-organization of humanity in the face of a seemingly alien and hostile cosmos can be considered as a very resourceful *self-defense*.

From the above concept, it becomes clear that the most important discovery in the field of philosophical knowledge obtained by the SPH is in the so-called **eschatological paradox**: "if a person became immortal, his life would lose meaning". This paradox leads to the following practical recommendation: **the highest happiness** for a harmoniously developed personality is the **struggle** to achieve the highest spiritual values - absolute truth, absolute good and absolute beauty.

In the works by Branskij V. P. (see Branskij, 2017) the synergistic philosophy of history (SPH) is opposed to any historical pessimism, and gives way to the so-called **dramatic** optimism (not understating the difficulties of human existence, and not exaggerating them). Although this optimism honestly recognizes the importance of such philosophical concepts as sacrifice, but at the same time he is aware of the inseparability of SPH from such a philosophical concept as **heroic** humanism. The fact is that real (and not only imaginary) heroism is impossible without humanism, but civilized (highly developed, not naive, mature) humanism is impossible without heroism. However, the drama of human existence, in particular, lies in the fact that heroism and humanism in history often turn out to be in deep contradiction with each other. This contradiction is often ignored by the supporters of the so-called "abstract" humanism and "abstract"

heroism. Without taking into account the scientific theory of ideology as an ideology, this contradiction cannot be eliminated. But for its effective elimination it should not be hushed up (pretending that such a contradiction supposedly does not exist).

The conclusion is in the twentieth century due to the intensive development of scientific and technological progress (and cultural progress in general), gloomy predictions about the possible (in the near or distant future) death of human being, humanity and world culture were widespread (see Katsura, 2016). It is curious, however, that there is a happy ambiguity unnoticed by their defenders: the "death" of a human being, humanity and world culture can mean the transformation of a man into a superman, humanity into a super humanity, and culture into a super culture[9]. But the correct understanding and fair assessment of such a transformation at the modern level of our knowledge is impossible without a thorough study of the synergistic philosophy of history (SPH). As the general SPH logic puts it, self-organization law of the "ideological" animals community does not only exclude the possibility of their global self-destruction (in the literal sense), but also their destruction by new (as yet unknown to us) space factors (due to the potentially infinite ability of such a self-organizing system as humanity to the invention and improvement of new means of self-defense). Consequently, the salvation of humanity (even in a hostile space) is possible without abandoning

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[9]   Superman is the material embodiment of an absolute ideal of man; superhumanism - the material embodiment of the absolute ideal of humanity; and superculture is the material embodiment (the system of attractors) of the absolute ideal of culture (the system of absolute values, unlike all specific historical cultures, which were and are the systems of relative values).

such worldview principles as determinism and the principle of rationality.

The concept of "sustainability" of the global self-organization of the universe leads to far-reaching philosophical conclusions. As is known from the history of classical physics, the development of the latter led the physicist W. Thomson (Kelvin) to the concept of the "thermal death" of the Universe. He showed that in the case of a closed finite model of the Universe, such a fundamental law of classical physics as the second law of thermodynamics (according to which the entropy of the Universe should tend to the maximum) should lead to the conclusion that there is a natural tendency to stop all macroscopic processes in the Universe. He called this state "thermal death". But this tendency is valid only for the closed (non-interacting with unobserved residue) Universe. But having in view the materialistic ontological model of physical reality (which classical physics requires), we cannot admit the influence of any natural forces on the maximization of global entropy. But then the maximization of global entropy cannot be stopped and the "thermal death" of the material Universe becomes inevitable[10]. It is not difficult, however, to understand that the tendency of the global thermodynamic system to a state that we called "superattractor" should be called the "fourth principle of thermodynamics". This state (in contrast to the three standard "principles" in classical thermodynamics) can only be inherent in **open** systems (and, therefore, is beyond the scope of ordinary classical thermodynamics). It should be the result of stabilizing its oscillations

(between increasing and decreasing), but not of maximizing the entropy. This means that in the long run, each increase in entropy provokes an equal decrease, and decrease - an equal increase. As a result of such oscillations, complete harmony between chaos and order is gradually achieved. Under the assumptions made, such harmony does not depend on whether the cosmological model is finite or infinite. In the case of an infinite system, despite the lack of interaction with the environment, the openness of the system, apparently, is provided by its ability to self-interaction (interaction with itself).

Hence, from the foregoing is clear that considering the movement to the super attractor as the fourth law of thermodynamics takes the researcher not only beyond inanimate nature (the laws of physics in the proper sense), but also beyond living nature (laws of biology): we find ourselves within the scope of social laws (social reality, i.e., culture in the widest sense). Indeed, in this case, self-organization includes not only the self-organization of cosmic matter, but also the field of any human knowledge and desires. **Here we meet with the law of self-organization of intersubjective ideals [we find ourselves in the interaction area of self-organization of matter and "spirit" (the stream of rational and emotional information)].** That is why the discussion of the movement to the super attractor inevitably leads a researcher, to a new philosophy of history (SPH), which equally evaluates the activity of a historical object and a historical subject. At the same time, any one-sided exaggeration of the role of material and ideal factors is excluded (any bias towards objective or subjective factors in the social process). Actually speaking, self-organization is harmonization of these factors (which is in the very concept of self-organization). The idea of self-

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[10] In this case, the system's "thermal death" can be avoided only in one of two ways: 1) by "dropping" excess entropy into the external environment; or 2) by converting this excess into additional negentropy inside the system, compensating for the excess entropy.

organization is based on the interaction of material and ideal factors. Therefore, the primacy of one of them (characteristic of classical historical materialism) is deliberately excluded.

The scientific significance of the synergetic philosophy of history becomes obvious when solving the twentieth century historical mystery, which was first clearly described by one of the leading experts on criticism of the communist ideology Z. Brzezinski. In his fundamental anti-communist work "The Great Failure", he wrote in 1989: "Communism will remain in people's memory first of all, as the most unusual political and intellectual delusion of the twentieth century" (Brzezinski, 1989, p. 13). If the communist ideal is just a "delusion", its phenomenal success in such dissimilar countries like Russia and China remains incomprehensible, where the mentioned ideal has taken root in human minds for more than 70 years? The Bzezinski enigma described in the SPH framework has a strictly scientific explanation without any deviations from the principles of determinism and rationality. **To find an explanation of the charismatic effect of spreading a new ideal, we must rely on the concept of self-organization of social reality associated with it - the law of self-organization of intersubjective ideals.** This law assumes the dual (contradictory) nature of ideological self-organization. We are talking about this interaction of opposing ideals, which combines their collision (rivalry, opposition, competition) with their cooperation (solidarity, cooperation, assistance). For this reason, competing ideals can both interfere with each other's realization and help (synergistic effect). To properly understand the final results of a new ideal, one must take into account its relation to the old ideal (its interaction with the old ideal). Different old ideals can have different effects on new ideals. If the

requirements of the new ideals coincide with some essential requirements of the old ones, the success in spreading new ideals in a society (charismatic effect based on the synergistic effect) will be guaranteed.

The old ideals seem **to smooth favorable ideological way**[11] for the perception of new ideals. It is this role that the Orthodox ideal played in Russia with its image of Moscow as the third Rome (Berdyaev, 1990), which to some extent coincided with the Bolsheviks' preaching of the world revolution (freeing all classes from capitalist exploitation).

Similarly, in China, the Confucian ideal played a similar role considering the world state as a "big family", disburdening the oppressed colonial peoples from the imperialist exploitation (Mao Zedong, 2007). Huge popularity of such a foreign Western "plant" as a communist ideal in such countries as Russia and China in the twentieth century from the SPH viewpoint is easily explained by the powerful objective social base in the form of a multimillion-strong peasantry in these countries with its acute need to solve the agrarian problem tormenting it: "Every plowman must have his own field" (Sun Yat-sen). The thirst of this stratum for global liberation from all

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[11]  Although the Marxism founders had high hopes for the success of the communist ideal in such developed capitalist countries as Western Europe and the USA, this ideal drew wide support in a completely different geographic region (Russia and China). As is clear from the foregoing, this is explained by the fact that the success of a new ideal requires a corresponding ideological ground prepared by the old ideal. Such a ground could have been prepared by the ideal that focused in the worldview not on the individual, but on the collective. Therefore, both the Western liberal ideal and Eastern Buddhism and Hinduism were not suitable enough to serve the social function that the advocates of collective solidarity (Orthodoxy and Confucianism) took up. It is curious that the religious status of the Orthodox ideal and the semi-atheistic Confucian did not materially manifest itself in the influence of these ideals on the communist ideal.

forms of economic and political, national and colonial, class and racial oppression has been embodied in Lenin's idea of an alliance of the proletariat and peasantry ("industrial and agricultural workers of all countries, unite!" –the global call for the liberation of man from all forms of its exploitation by another man based on the destruction of private ownership of tools and means of production by a new type of state - the worldwide "dictatorship of the proletariat").

## Conclusion

Although the communist ideal in its original Marxist version required a harmony of responsibility (order) and freedom (chaos), but gradually during attempts to implement it, it was modified in the style of one-sided craving for totalitarianism (cult of order). Gradually, this brainchild of refined intellectuals (Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, and etc.) began to turn towards the priority of responsibility to freedom, human duties to rights, etc. This did not happen by chance: the social basis of such an evolution was the duality (inconsistency) of that union of workers and peasants, which was the basis of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia.

The ideology of refined intellectuals could not help but differ from the ideology of poorly educated workers and peasants. The threat of a gradual abandonment of harmony of responsibility and freedom, and absolutisation of responsibility (and, thus, the cult of human duties compared to his rights) led to the victory of one of the most consistent totalitarian regimes in the history of mankind (Stalinism). A defense reaction from such a turn of events was an alternative movement to the so-called modern deconstructivism, with his wide use of the latest scientific and technological progress (new technologies, new

energy sources, computerization, etc.) for rampant modern anarchism. But a natural balance between totalitarianism and anarchism (the Prigozhin paradox) results, ultimately, in a *super atractor*. The latter is the consequence of overcoming Prigozhin's paradox and the potentially endless search for a way out of the global crisis. The super attractor is the pointer to the location of this exit. Thus, the movement to the super attractor means not the "thermal death" of the Universe and the achievement of the maximum entropy, but the achievement of a certain similarity to the "earthly paradise" (figuratively speaking, the magic crystal of such paradise), which implies the achievement of the minimum of entropy. That is why the synergetic philosophy of history can, in principle, create the intellectual atmosphere of the so-called dramatic optimism.

So, from the SPH point of view, the meaning of history is the move to superattractor, i.e. search for a social structure capable of achieving complete harmony between chaos and order (freedom and responsibility). Two opposing global trends of global social development counterbalance each other, avoiding the immersion of humanity both in absolute totalitarianism and absolute anarchism. *The self-regulation* of a global social system called "humanity" seems to be balancing between these extremes (Branskij, Pozharsky, 2012).

An important consequence of this balancing is the balancing of society between the cult of production of values (the so-called "ideological" or "creative" society) and the cult of their consumption (the so-called "spiritless" or "consumer" society). A metaphorical way to describe these trends is the ancient story about the famous ancient philosopher Socrates (V in. BC) and his grumpy spouse Xantippa. The latter, according to legend, doused her great spouse with dirty wa-

ter during his profound philosophical quest. Such an image is a good illustration of the priority that the international world-wide historical man in the street for many centuries has given to the consumption of values as opposed to their production. The conclusion is any scientific theory of values cannot fail to take into account the deep connection between production, distribution and consumption of values, and the fundamental value of ideology as an intersubjective (social) criterion of value.

At the present stage of development of science and philosophy, such a behavior of humanity can only be regarded as a symbol of the modern antisynergic world view, preferring to harmonize chaos and order (freedom and responsibility) with their irresponsible absolutisation (the struggle between systemic and chaotic ("clip") consciousness and thinking in modern literature). The point should be stressed, that both systemic and "clip" thinking (and their relationship) cannot be learned without systemic thinking, while systemic thinking with the help of "clip" thinking is completely beyond the grasp of the human mind.

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# PHILOSOPHIES OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR RESEARCH:
## META-ANALYTIC REVIEW

Abstract

This essay addresses critical and cohesive research philosophies regarding social theory in an effort to increase awareness thereof social changes as well as considers the features of social behaviour through the prism of various methodological approaches. Using logical and comparative methods, the author analyzes the adequacy of the theoretical and philosophical foundations of the concept of social action for the modern situation. The circumstances that contribute to the structuring of social actions, as well as the relationship of social changes with the foundations of solidarity in different societies with their civilizational specifics, are determined. The author considers the implementation of the concrete fait accompli as the only possible variant under certain conditions from the whole range of potential prospects. Such revision of the theory of social action as well as the analyses of philosophical grounds of research approaches confirm the necessity of indispensable use the civilizational approach in additional to applied existing research tools to studying the local specifics. The research results redirects to non-universalized solutions of any social problems and to diversification in planning of development scenarios for different societies.

*Keywords:* variant, civilization, interaction, non-linearity, social behaviour, social action, structure, sub-methods, transformation.

Introduction

The main factor that determines the changes in modern social life is the development of techniques and technologies. The new type of development based on accelerating change of the subject environment surrounding the person is established. In turn, the active renewal of second nature in which human takes life proceedings leads to accelerating the transformation of social relations. The asynchrony of such processes, the nonlinearity of their passage, the difficulties in predicting, and the dissimilarity of the results of seemingly identical processes, draw the attention of researchers to the basics of implementing theories to test them and confirm the effectiveness of the methodological tools used for analysis. A prerequisite for the development of science is the regular study of the content of explanatory models to establish the validity of accumulated knowledge, operational reflection and the introduction of theoretical innovations. The resolution of specific problems depends on the underlying assumptions, the semantics of the concepts and the logical-methodological norms of the methodology used. It would seem that the postulate of the poly-variance of the socio-historical process and the existence of the phenomenon of

civilization are proved by the practice of life (the objective existence of diverse forms of social entities) and are established in science (Huntington, 1996). However, it is the subject of active discussions in scientific society in the course of public controversy on the ways of institutional restructuring of the societies that historically emerged and functions on a communitarian basis to make them subsidiarian type, ignoring the immanent properties of self-development and self-adjustment of social systems. Revision of the principles of the image of reality under the influence of new facts always involves an appeal to the philosophical ideas. This equally applies to both the natural sciences and the social sciences. In an attempt to explain the multivariate nature of social behaviour under similar circumstances, the diversity of behavioural stereotypes, we turn to the consideration of social action as such in the light of various methodological approaches.

## Objectives

The following meta-theoretical analysis is aimed at establishing the degree of correspondence of the conceptual possibilities of existing theories to the realities of the surrounding world, since the use of inadequate scientific bases of implemented reform programs leads to disruption of the stability of social systems. The problem is related to the activation of information flows in the modern social dynamics and the growing role of the innovation factor, embracing traditions that violate the stability of systems and actualizing the issues of adapting societies to continuous changes in social reality, coupled with the opportunities for managing social development mechanisms, and consists in resolving the contradiction between the growing need for modernization of existing in the state of a sys-

temic crisis of societies and the lack of an adequate explanatory theory along with the certain methodology, which allows to work out the scenarios of not a catastrophic way out of a crisis situation. The object of research are the methodological approaches existing in social science as principal research orientations and ways of determining the object of study. Of particular interest are the heuristic possibilities of such theoretical constructs of both linear and civilizational patterns, regarding the ability of the latter to serve as an adequate research tool in the study of social systems and the interpretation of the changes occurring in them. The paradigmatic validity of a specific methodological approach is considered through the prism of the social behaviour.

## Methods

In our study, we do not set the task of retrospectively retelling the works of M. Weber and T. Parsons (Weber, 1922/1978; Parsons, 1937/1966). However, during the use of our methodological implications and the presentation of our material, we will refer to the model proposed by these scientists. The research was carried out with the involvement of the principle of socio-historical determinism expressing the universal interconnection and interdependence of social phenomena and the idea of the co-evolutionary nature of the social order of each particular society correlating with the tradition of Path Dependence with the incremental nature of social changes and the institutional stability of societies. In the course of the critical analysis of research methods of linear orientation, a comparative comparison of the heuristic and descriptive possibilities of the civilizational approach (from the point of view of the interpretation of the homeostasis of the system, the

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preservation of its integrity, the existence of cognitive and behavioral stereotypes) is used in conjunction with the discourse of synergetic (regarding the transition at the points of bifurcation, self-regulation of society and an axiological choice of a certain type of social action) as the basic methods of research, abstract-analytical and comparative methods are applied.

## Results and Discussion

### Research Philosophies: Postulates, Methods, Sub-Methods

The theoretical basis of the subject of social science is most clearly expressed in the principle of methodological individualism: "All social phenomena, and especially the functioning of all social institutions, should always be must be understood as resulting from the decisions, actions, attitudes, etc. of human individuals" (Popper, 1971, p. 98). This leads to exploring a multiplicity of free individuals as the driving force of the socio-historical process and the consideration of society as a joint activity of people capable of creating the necessary conditions for their existence with their efforts. As society develops, interpersonal communication increasingly became into the view of researchers. They started to study the social structure: the existence of classes, strata and groups, the connection between them. Under these conditions, a new adequate method was required to represent society as social integrity. This role played by the dialectic, which did not eliminate other used methods. Thus, within the dialectic, the monism applied. Therefore, instead of the individual, the society became an object of research. This resulted in the basis of socio-centrism. Representatives of monism believed

that at every level of the social structure can be found the main backbone factor that affects all other conditions (i.e., parts of the system are in subordinate dependence). Moreover, at this level, it was no longer a multiplicity of individuals, but the multitude of social objects: nations (Vico, 1725/2002), cultures (Spengler, 1918/2018), civilizations (Toynbee, 1987), ethnicities and super-ethnicities (Gumilyov, 2015), classes (Marx, 1867; 1884/2013), races (Le Bon, 1902/ 1974; Gobineau, 1853-55/1983), etc. They stood out for various reasons: the relationship to the means of production (classes), the dominant religion or type of mentality (civilization), the biological characteristics of individuals (race), etc.

Within the scope of these studies, the highest value acquired the binary sub-method of dialectics, which created a new trend in research. The simplified antagonistic opposition of K. Marx is well known. A. Toynbee believed that the cause of death of any civilisation is a conflict between creative minority and the uncreative majority (Toynbee, 1987). S. Huntington represents a future as a clash of Western (Christian) and Eastern (Muslim) civilisations (Huntington, 1996). Thus, the separation of society into two distinct and opposite parts led to the fact that the socio-historical process often simplified to the binary nature and role of the individual discarded. This understanding of the social structure ignored many important actions and events that do not fit that approach.

An imagination about the subject changed while using another sub-method – dynamic. The use of this method allowed considering the development of human society as a past evolving in time. "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under the circumstances chosen by

themselves, but under the circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past" (Marx, 1852/2005, p. 3). This approach enables to identify accumulated problems, outline the prospects for their solution. It is determined as an integral unity of phenomena and entities.

Moreover, the study of the structure of the socio-historical process shows that it is expedient to distinguish three levels; an action, a combined action-events, a complex of events. Thus, there is movement from the abstract to the concrete. Moreover, the vertical relationship at all levels finds expression in a complex of events. The changes in the structure of action lead to a change of events, and then changing their structure. Such a relationship gives grounds to speak about the impossibility of spontaneity and marginality of social action.

*Social Action Structuring*
*Circumstances*

Every social action preceded by social contacts, but unlike them, social action is a rather complex phenomenon. Any social action should include actor, the need for enhancing behaviour, the goal of action, action method, another actor, which directed the action, the result of action. The list of elements that compose an individual social action will be incomplete without considering the external environment of the actor or the situation itself, and in this connection, we should pay attention to the research within situational semantics. Any actor is not in isolation, as it surrounded by the material world and it acts in a specific defined culture and social sphere. That complex of material, social and cultural circumstances creates a situation, which gives expression to the terms and to the means

of action. The terms of the action are those elements of the environment that the actor cannot change, and the means are the elements that the actor has control over. The actor makes social activities and takes into account the existing situation as social actions are conscious by definition. We note that the situation is beyond the scope of social action through the orientation of the subject. In this regard, we must distinguish between the estimated and the motivational orientation of the subject, which means each actor, must assess their environment and with the help of motivation adjusts the purpose and methods to improve social action. However, when one individual is trying to consciously work on another individual, even the absence of the social environment does not relieve them of the need to take into account cultural norms of their previous social experience. The past is an integral part of the present and the future manifested and exists in them in an implicit form. The individual does not so much think himself, as actualizes the experience of past generations, cites their social experience of thinking (Moscovici, 1985). The specifics of the sociocultural environment set the algorithms and the vector of the process of sociocultural dynamics, determines the mentality, the life position and stereotypes of behaviour, ensures the connection of times and the continuity of generations. Moreover, this specificity determines various forms of borrowing and adapting innovations to local conditions, their essential content, their further use in public practice, as well as the motivation for transformation (Poghosyan, 2009).

Social action, unlike reflexive, impulsive actions, never occurs instantaneously, i.e. it fully utilizes time parameter. Moreover, in the minds of the subject of the activity should be strong enough impulse for sustainable activity.

Such incitement to commit acts usually called motivation – a combination of factors, mechanisms and processes to ensure the emergence of motivation to achieve the goals of the subject, in other words, the motivation – is a force that pushes the subject to perform certain actions. Thus, social action mechanism contains the motivation and the action itself. In the context of our study, the priority is the fact that any social action starts with the needs of the subject, gives them a certain direction. The need for social change can be determined as such requirement too. Need relates subject and object of external social environment, enhancing well-defined motifs. Motives for each subject, as well as its concrete social attitudes, give a unique identity to social action. Mechanism of social actions carried out within a specific contact.

Moreover, this contact takes place not only in space and in time, but also terms of value relations. This, in our opinion, explains the socio-cultural uniqueness of various societies and the opposite trend to globalization – the struggle to preserve the uniqueness of national cultures in the conditions of standardizing of lifestyles. Clearly, that while it is making social action, each subject is under the effects of other subjects, i.e. there is an exchange of actions or social interaction. The social interaction means a system of interdependent social actions related to cyclic causal dependence, in which the actions of one subject are both a cause and a consequence of the response of other objects. This means that every social action called prior social action and it is also a cause of subsequent action; it is the system works of deterministic and nondeterministic aspects. As a result, social activities – these are links in an unbroken chain, which called inter-

action. Human interaction with complex open systems takes place in a way that human action itself is not external, but it is included in the system, each time modifying its field of possible statuses. Included in the interaction, people are not dealing with hard objects and properties but with a multiplicity of opportunities. In addition, it is important to note that every time there is a problem of choosing a certain direction of development from many possible ways of evolution of the system. This choice is rather difficult to calculate and it is irreversible. Irreversibility of embodied an informed choice, and the irreversibility of social progress is one of the basic laws of the world socio-historical process. Throughout history, many times, there were lengthy periods of stagnation and difficult zigzags in development, both in the local and regional scale. Different societies because of natural disasters and social catastrophes sometimes thrown far backwards economically, politically and culturally. Nevertheless, for all the complexity, unevenness and dialectical contradictions occurred steady ascent of humankind from the lower forms of social organization to the highest. Although in each case the outcome of the clash of opposing forces of progress and reaction in advance is not a foregone conclusion with the fatal inevitability nevertheless victory of progressive forces, usually proves to be more robust, while the victory of reactionary forces – temporal and transient. This fact gives the irreversibility of social progress. Consequently, the socio-historical process represented as a subordinated, multilevel system of social actions, events, and their combination, which at this stage of the analysis is unchanged and frozen. An examination of the dynamics of such a system in translational motion gives reason to talk about multi-variant process.

*Polyvariancy of Social Behavior*

Following the logic of the hypotheses proposed by H. Poincare, the social change could go linear and non-linear ways. This turns the science to the study of linear and non-linear paths of development of society, makes necessary to research the social events, actions, institutions and systems of multidimensionality and multi-variant of their developments. In traditional science, the term "variant" means the modification, variation, one of the possible combinations, revealing the process at the level of phenomena, which has the status of reality and finding expression in the observability, detection and causality. Variant presented as objectively existing trend of social development, which is rooted in the material conditions of society, containing the possibility of a certain historical actions. The history of human society itself can be considered as an opportunity to realize the social life, and therefore – as an alternative to non-existence of humanity. Any variety of societies from this point of view considered as variants under this alternative. In such a context a variant appears not just as one of the possible combinations or as an alternative, not as a possibility of any other developments, but – as an essential category, which is based on structured activities and events. The real and the alternative variants are the opposites by definition. The real variant has to understood as an empirically observed and clamp reality. The alternative variant considered a potential reality, non-empirical. Of course, we can do analysis of only a fait accompli, the only possible and accomplished. Thus, the idea of non-linearity and choice making in social activities includes multivariance, a selection of alternative path of evolution and irreversibility (Harrison & Huntington, 2001). However, a simplified understanding of

the materialism and determination of social development essentially leaves no room for subjective factor. The absolutizing of principle of the primacy of social being and considering the social consciousness as secondary and its extrapolation equally both to tenets of historical materialism and to ideologies of classical modernization theory, has the effect of impairing the role of creative consciousness, moral principles, interests and spiritual needs of people. Man appears as a vanishingly small element in a series of numerous abstract categories such as class, the economic base, superstructure, society of post-Modernity, ethnographic material, etc.

With this approach, Weber's pressure-related goal-oriented rationality loses cognitive significance. The nature of rationality lies not only in rationality, but also in that, it is poorly consistent with the meaning of human life. The common meaning of life for all people is their satisfaction with own existence, which they call happiness. Satisfaction with life does not depend on the content of activities and even on its social evaluation. Such satisfaction ignores the rationality factor and is the limit of human activity. Human choice especially actualized in times of great historical transformations. Moreover, it must take into account in the study of social and historical processes. The ontologically designed and historically formatted unique sociocultural component becomes the dominant in the decision making at the bifurcation points (Poghosyan, 2018). The liberal paradigm demonstrates its effectiveness only within modern Western civilization, but not in China, Russia and the Muslim world or in Africa. For example, in wild nature, a group of predators always organizes itself in a rigidly vertical hierarchy, which based on physical power, because that is the essence of individuals of that group. The essence and social

organization of creatively oriented beings of nature (bees or ants) is completely different. Similarly, different types of personality predetermined the creation of different types of post-Soviet countries in 90th, and in the conditions of distortion of cultural and historical realities during periods of bifurcation (with functional disturbances of own system' immanent social institutions) self-organization can takes both linear and pathological forms: the Baltic countries – parliamentary democracies with a non-self-sufficient economy, the Central Asia – the medieval khanates, Ukraine – the criminal oligarchy, Russia – kleptocratic crony capitalism. "Not paying attention to the way culture influences social behavior is usually a mistake" (Triandis, 1994, p. 169). Different type of civilizations creates the certain personality types as well as value orientations, world views and lifestyles (Chen et al., 2016; Chen, Ng, Buchtel, Guan, Deng, & Bond, 2017). Different types of cultures format different cognitive and behavioural stereotypes and creates unique algorithms of solutions of any social problem.

## Conclusion

Problematic nature of modern social knowledge dictates the need to perceive it not as the sum of the universal truths, suitable for all occasions, but rather as a creative search for answers to philosophical questions and questions of personal existence. This approach can be implementted the principle of humaneness, by overcoming the psychology of dependence and by assimilation of the modern style of thinking which emanates from recognition of multi-variant social structure and plural cultures of the peoples of the world, the priority of man and his values. It is necessary to abandon generalizing,

unifying and totalizing theories in general, and in particular – from attempts to globalize the universalizing of social behavior on the basis of the explanatory possibilities of the American psychological school in sociology (symbolic interactionism, theories of social exchange, etc.), perfectly designed to analyze and completely describe the psycho-type and cognitive and behavioral stereotypes of representatives of one particular civilizational type, but not effective to description behavior and social choices of representatives of other cultures in different regions of planet. Thus, the logic of our analysis of social behavior, structure of social action, the relation between of social change and the principles of solidarity and confidence of the various types of societies, specific diversity of the studied objects direct the researchers of the modern social transformations to the comparative study of certain unique civilizations and their dynamics.

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

*Romik KOCHARYAN*

# PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF DEFINITIONS OF HISTORY

## Abstract

This article suggests a complex unity of definitions of history which should serve for the elucidation of the essence and true adequacy of the science of history to its design. Our conception of history is based on the works of Father of Armenian's History Movses Khorenatsi (5th century). The science of history is interpreted following our conception of "hermeneutics of wisdom" developed on the basis of H.-G. Gadamer's "philosophical hermeneutics" which specificity I have already explicated as "hermeneutics of truth" in my monograph "Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics". In this article, the conceptual and methodological achievements of both these conceptions: "hermeneutics of truth" and – as its perfected implication – "hermeneutics of wisdom", important for philosophy of history that is understanding of nature of history are used. In formulating definitions of history is used the logical-methodological instrument of the prominent Medieval Armenian philosopher David the Invincible (5th – 6th centuries). The definitions of history are distributed into three main classes: separately by its subject of study, its fulfilment, and jointly – by its subject and fulfilment. The formulated set of definitions of history should serve for a deeper understanding of Movses Khorenatsi's heritage as well as for adequately revealing the truth of "being-of-history as such".

*Keywords:* history, philosophy of history, hermeneutical method, understanding, interpretation, definitions by the subject, definitions by the fulfillment.

## Introduction

The problem of definition has already been considered by the thinkers of ancient Greece, who, in particular, were interested in such a fundamental problem as the elements of the universe, and, accordingly, its definition (see Diels, 1952; Freeman, 1970). The subject of instructive discussions of the famous Socratic conversations were definitions of the concepts under discussion, a detailed account of which in Plato's dialogues served as the basis for extracting from them the Socratic method of cognition of truth - the doctrine of maieutics. One of the vertices of human thought is the Aristotelian theory of definition, which was universally recognized by many generations of philosophers, including the doctrine of the essence and types of definitions developed by the distinguished philosopher of Medieval Armenia David the Invincible (V-VI centuries).

The objective of this article is to review the definitions of history and suggest new definitions which in their unity could elucidate the sense and essential aspects of the science of history. The general guiding line of author's conception is the

principle that the mode of existence of an object should be its adequacy to its design. Accordingly, the true sense of the history of nations and the mankind, in general, is interpreted as the adequacy of their life, identity, and culture to their design.

The fascinating richness of human history has inspired many historians and writers to formulate a multifaceted set of appealing definitions and characteristics of history. Some of them are brilliant short aphorisms: "*The history of the world is the world`s court of justice*" (Friedrich von Schiller). "*The history of the world is but the biography of great men*" (Thomas Carlyle). Others bring to readers' attention paradoxical characteristics of history: "*Poetry is nearer to vital truth than history*" (Plato). "*History is the science of what never happens twice*" (Paul Valery). There are also authors demonstrating the moral approach to history: "*To remain ignorant of things that happened before you were born is to remain a child*" (Cicero). "*Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it*" (George Santayana). Some writers suggest radically optimistic or radically pessimistic interpretations of history: "*What experience and history teach is this – that people and governments never have learned anything from history or acted on the principles deduced from it*" (*Hegel*). "*History fades into fable; fact becomes clouded with doubt and controversy; the inscription moulders from the tablet; the statue falls from the pedestal. Columns, arches, pyramids, what are they but heaps of sand; and their epitaphs, but characters are written in the dust?*" (Washington Irving). "*The value of history, then, is that it teaches us what man has done and thus what man is*" (R. G. Collingwood).

There are many approaches concerning the

essence of history also among professional historians. One of the most popular traditional forms of history was an epic narrative glorifying the nation's heroes and kings. "History is a narration of the events which have happened among mankind, including an account of the rise and fall of nations, as well as of other great changes which have affected the political and social condition of the human race", wrote John J. Anderson by the end of 19th century (Anderson, 1876).

Some historians like to put emphasis on separate factors of history like *time* (Braudel, 1982), subjectivity of historical research (Carr, 1961), the role of human consciousness (Febvre, 1922), "disequilibrium" and "dysfunction" in social relations (Stone, 1996), history as a literary art, serving to transport readers back in time (Creighton, 1980), the role of Enlightenment in European history (Himmelfarb, 2005). Many modern researchers of the science of history put emphasis on events having a significant role in social-political developments (for instance, M. Weber, M. Bloch, H. J. Muller). The author of this article in his general approach follows the hermeneutic school of F. Schleiermacher, W. Dilthey, M. Heidegger, H.-G. Gadamer and P. Ricoeur (see Schleiermacher, 1998; Dilthey, 1996; Heidegger, 1962/1927; Gadamer, 2006/ 1975; Ricoeur, 1981).

Why is it necessary and preferable to define history? David the Invincible wrote: "… if a man wishes to conceive and think of something rightly, he must first know the nature of this thing – that is, its definition" (David the Invincible, 1983, p. 23). Because the definition is "a short statement which reveals the nature of the thing" (David the Invincible, 1983, p. 27). Thus any thought that sums up the contemplation over the true existence of "history" and discloses by short

formulation the nature of history is the definition of "history".

So what kind of order of inquiry is possible to disclose the nature of history? David the Invincible regarding all the existing things, including also "philosophy", "history" or any other science suggested the following succession of questions for their study: "Whether it exist?", "What is it?", "What sort of thing is it?", " What purpose does it exist for?" (David the Invincible, 1983, p. 3).

One more fundamental philosophical question has a principle importance for me – "How is its existence – the potential and the realization?" I mean, how is the mode of existence that is fundamentally inherent to this concrete entity (namely, history) and was the existence of that entity implemented by its calling and the truth of its own existence or, in this case, was the existence of this being implemented untruly?

All these queries we are going to examine keeping in mind the fundamental work "History of Armenians" of Father of Armenian's History Movses Khorenatsi. The conceptual and the methodological basis of the present investigation is the **"hermeneutics of truth"** and based on it and developed further by an author the conception of **"hermeneutics of wisdom"**. Accordingly, my investigation of the "History of Armenians" of Moses Khorenatsi is carried on in the horizon of the observable field of meanings, opened by the conception of the "hermeneutics of wisdom" and "hermeneutics of truth". In my monograph by critical consideration is understood and interpreted the meaning and counsel of wisdom that reveals the truth of Khorenatsi's historical-scientific conception and according to its implication – the truth of "being-of-history as such" (Khocharyan, 2016).

Dealing with Medieval Christian sources

one should take into account the specificity of religious life-mode and Christian scholarship of thinkers in regard to the entire essence of the being – "divine and human realities". The true revelation of the meanings that disclose the truth of the events of life and culture, can be realized by hermeneutical methodology – namely in the meaning-horizon of the conception of "hermeneutics of truth" according to its destiny and the very essence. In this regard it is essential to fix, that for the perpetration of the fullness of the aforesaid intention of the undertaken research it is necessary and preferable by the conception of the true destiny of hermeneutics and all the tradition of its historical being and, in particular, the possibilities of "the art of interpretation of the holy fathers" ("Sacred Hermeneutics") and modern philosophical hermeneutics – to understand and interpretively explicate not only the historical-scientific conception of Movses Khorenatsi, but also the truth and counsel of wisdom of the pure empirical historic content of his scientific conception.

The exegetics of the medieval holy fathers and the modern conceptions of the theoreticians of the "philosophical hermeneutics" created by mutual complementarity of their essential ideas the principle possibility to call for life the conceptions of "hermeneutics of truth" and "hermeneutics of wisdom". These conceptions explicate the truth of understanding and interpretation and by means of them – the very truth of divine and human realities, and also the truth of philosophy, theology, human and social sciences, medieval studies, in particular, and the history itself. In regard to the above mentioned fundamental specificity of the problematic of medieval studies, this conception of hermeneutics presents in itself a necessary and preferable openness, a potency of a developed rational theory of under-

standing and interpretation. **The hermeneutics, in general, and especially the "hermeneutics of truth" or the "hermeneutics of wisdom" have as their destiny, the foreseeing intention and execution (fulfilment) of its idea – to explicate the necessary and preferable mode of understanding and interpretation, and by this – the genuine meaning and counsel of wisdom disclosing the truth-of-being of all entity and just of culture itself.** With such self-understanding of his destiny, the hermeneutics and, particularly, "the hermeneutics of truth" (and based on it "the hermeneutics of wisdom") investigates all the phenomena, theories and specifically "history" from the **"inside"**.

The main issue of my aforementioned monograph (Khocharyan, 2016) is just the understanding and interpretation of historical-scientific conception of Movses Khorenatsi and according to this conception and its implications the revelation of "the-being-of-history as such" conducted by hermeneutical methodology. So we would like to point out that Movses Khorenatsi by presenting his historical conception and its necessary components in his fundamental work "History of Armenians" did not suggest them in the form of explicit and concentrated formulations but rather they are spread all over the pages of his historical work. *His theory of history and in essence his historical conception, partly explicitly and partly implicitly, are interwoven with the empiric history in his "History of Armenians".*

In my opinion, for each historian, philosopher, and wise reader it is essential to understand not only what is said in a given text concretely, but also what horizons of meanings are opened by the said and henceforth what is following from the said in regard of the theory of history and just in regard of the truth of history. The very goal and preferable task of this investigation is to understand in all the works of historians what is concretely said in the texts and/or by the texts and *by reconsidering their authors thoughts and bring the movement of thought to its completion – to the true sense of historical events, to the disclosing of their advice of wisdom, to embracing of the discovered wisdom of history.*

## Classic Definitions of History

Undertaking the review of definitions of history suggested during the development of historiology it is important to examine some significant examples. Actually, we'll limit us mainly by discussing two of them, the first of them from the Antic Greek historiology, the other from the modern time historians.

What is *the subject of history*, what is the field of study of historiology? I would like to start the analysis of this question by reiterating Aristotle's idea that historians speaks of things that have happened" (Aristotle, 2006, 145 1b-145 12b). Wherein, history predominantly speaks about the things "that are particular", in contrast to poetry, which "speaks more of things that are universal" (Aristotle, 2006, 145 1b-145 12b). And "what is particular is *what Alcibiades did* or *what was done to him* (bold by R. K.)" (Aristotle, 2006, 145 1b-145 12b). Thus, according to Aristotle, the subject of history is that what happened or took place in reality, that is events and human actions that nowadays belong to the past.

It should be additionally mentioned that in ancient Greek historiography the subject of history is presented by the events and happenings of life that are subject to fixation and disclosing through investigation. According to this Aristotelian characteristic, the subject of history principally involves in it all the events by the criterion

that they indeed had taken place and should not be neglected and must be understood and every event should get its truth by historical interpretation. Taking into account the above characteristics, the Aristotelian definition of history could be formulated as follows: ***history is a science that investigates all the past events of life and their causes.***

In regard of Khorenatsi conception of history C. Sargsyan has written the following: "Narrating history he had two basic principle points: the first – the wholeness of the information got from historical sources, the second – historic-logical theoretical view concerning the essence of history… History is a true and reliable reconstruction of the happenings and phenomena of the past" (Sargsyan, 2006, p. 18). As we see, this interpretation of the essence of history is very close to the Aristotelian above discussed position.

Deliberations on the understanding and definition of history as science were accomplished in modern times also. In this regard, special interest deserves the definition of history as a science in historical meditations of the prominent specialist in medieval history and just contemporary historian, supporter of the discussions of theoretical problems of history and innovator Marc Bloch. Endeavouring to formulate his understanding of history, M. Bloch first mentions the meaning of history in ancient Greek as "investigation" and deliberates: "The language preserves the name "history" for all the investigations of changes in the flow of time" (Bloch, 1992/1953, p. 17). In his formulation, a definition of history is already present, according to which ***history is a science that investigates temporal changes.*** Understanding history this way and using accordingly the term "history" in practice, the historical studies by different sciences of

their subjects principally could not be distinguished from the "histories of historians".

The histories of historians and modern investigations in the case of non-critical approach to the nature of history, in essence, by pure empiric questioning and fulfilment of the field of history, willingly-unwillingly are fulfilled and self-understood only as linear temporal "history of events and actions". As an answer to the principal question "What should be a history?" M. Bloch attempts to re-examine this traditional approach. He finds it necessary to return to the question of "revealing the nature of history" and by critical contemplation and correction attempts to re-understand and re-define the study subject of history and accordingly – the essence and nature of history. By correcting the study subject of history and by the consistent train of thoughts regarding the nature of history and understanding and interpreting its being as such M. Bloch asks: "What happens each time when the interference of history appears necessary and useful?" and answers immediately: "The humanness appears" (Bloch, 1992/1953, p. 17). Completing his conclusion, Bloch recalls the well-known idea that "the study subject of history is the man" and formulates it more correctly – "the study subject of history are men", since "to the science of diversity is more adequate not the singular but rather the plural" (Bloch, 1992/1953, p. 18). Really, history deals with human things, yet it is notable that this idea is not a formula that completely distinguishes history in the set of humanities and social sciences and discloses its nature or its truth as such, but it only points out the genus of the study subject of history. To reach a more definite and grounded disclosure of history, the prominent historian writes: "History wishes to see the people even behind the driest documents completely alienated from their creators" (Bloch,

1992/1953, p. 18), and, as tells Lucien Febvre, to see "not only one more man and never simply men, but human societies, organized groups" (Bloch, 1992/1953, p. 18). M. Bloch recalls also the idea of Jules Michelet, that history is the study of social man and then recalls also the words of Fustel de Coulanges "history is not a heap of facts of the past, but a science regarding human society" and then adds on the same page that "here the role of the individual in history is rather diminished: "man in society" and "societies" are two not equivalent notions" (Bloch, 1992/1953, p. 18).

## The Calling of History

By this kind of definitions, the being and nature of history is presented to the human spirit and thought by their definite quality, but is this quality of presentation of history the one in which history is presented by its calling and by the most preferable and complete truth of being?

By these definitions, the history or the nature of history and/or the being of history as such allow *simply to tell or retell and repeat related to various diverse problems also the untrue understanding and self-understanding of the happenings of life*. According to Movses Khorenatsi's conception, the calling of history and the meaning of the truth of its being is not only bringing to narration the happenings of the past and/or the present and thus making history identical or similar to already fulfilled or not yet fulfilled deeds of the untrue being. *The sense of the being of history does not suppose simply telling and retelling in different relations the untrue understanding and self-understanding of events and happenings of the human life in the past.*

We would like to mention also that Aristotelian definition of history does not take into ac-

count the principle moment of human choice. Human cognition and science can't include the entire wholeness of the world and in it – of events of human life. To these contemplations on the subject of history is also related Mark Bloch when he is asking "What is history?" and referring the well-known answer that "History is a science about the past", he writes: "Even the idea that the past could be the object of science is absurd. How it could be possible without preliminary selection to make phenomena a subject matter of cognition – only by a sole common feature that they are not contemporary to us?" (Bloch, 1992/1953, p. 16). Indeed, to become a subject of history it is far from being sufficient to be an event already fulfilled and belonging to the past (Kocharyan, 2016, pp. 527-529).

History is not a "heartless and soulless" mechanism but rather a human science about the realities of human life. In the human thoughts, words, deeds, and entire life, potentially and also in reality, always are present the *predisposition, content, and choice* – the inborn qualities of the cognitive human identity. And history by principle priority has the fulfilled and chosen vision of its subject. In "what should be said" of history contained in its lines and whole texts the historian puts into it love and vigour, feelings and thoughts, worry and search, examination and contemplation.

History is for man. *History discloses the truth of human motifs and actions for the goal of improving mankind's self-identity, life and culture*. It is not like an indifferent mechanism without consciousness, created and working on principles indifferent to human needs. The calling of history as a science is not a repetition of pure happenings of life, and the scientific nature of history – the revelation of the truth – does not define it in this way and degree.

The history has already in itself by a predominance principle a choosing approach to its subject. The historian has put into the all that should be told by the lines of history and the whole text and by that addressed to all study-lovers who strive for wisdom, virtue and good order his feelings of love and eager, emotions and thoughts, worry and search, examination and deliberation, in short – heart, soul, goodwill and kindness, and entire human life. Here we can mention the similar position of the prominent historian A. Gurevich who pointed out that history belongs to the file and ranks of moral sciences (Gurevich, 1990, p. 7).

### The Definition of History by its Subject and Fulfillment

Movses Khorenatsi's conception of history is essentially different from the Aristotelian understanding of the being of history as such and of its study subject. I have mentioned earlier in my monograph that according to Movses Khorenatsi's conception history *chooses* as necessary and preferable for examination and deliberation and considers deserving inclusion in its subject field not all the happenings and human deeds of the past and the given present, but only the significant ones (Kocharyan, 2016, p. 529). The great Armenian historian argues: "But let this be enough said on this subject. For if we were to try to introduce into our history all events from the building of the tower up to our own time, for your edification, when would we arrive at the narrative of the tales that are your particular desire, especially because the task that lies before us is long, and time for mortals is short and uncertain? But I shall begin to show you our own history – whence and how it developed" (Khorenats'i, 1978, p. 81). And on another page he

writes: "After these many things are related in this book. But we shall set out [only] what is necessary to our collection" (Khorenats'i, 1978, p. 88). According to Movses Khorenatsi, **the subject of history in general, and of Armenian history, in particular***, as it was revealed in my monograph**, are the significant events of human and also of Armenian national self-identity, life and culture* (Kocharyan, 2016, p. 530).

The historical conception of Movses Khorenatsi, in which the subject is presented as an all-embracing totality of all human realities having important significance in enhancing and supporting human identity, and culture, provides a splendid formulation of the definition of history by its subject: ***History is science studying significant events of human identity, life, and culture – with their causes.*** Accordingly, in Movses Khorenatsi historical conception, the definition of history should be as follows: ***History is science studying significant events of the becoming of human identity, life, and culture in the past and at present – with their causes.***

In the presented definitions of history are mentioned those specific features that bring history to existence, make it essential regarding the subject of history, yet not by its fulfilment. It should be pointed out also that definitions of all sciences or arts and, concretely of history, by their study subject are theoretical in principle and are aimed at the theoretical cognition of their subject. And the characteristic "significant" must be elucidated and strictly revealed. When the choice should be made "what" and "which" events should be involved into the study object of history, and in this regard, it is said that it should be *only significant events*, does not it require to query and to choose "what kind" of significance, it should be? It could be said that human identity, individual and societal life, and style of life, in

general, by their cultural formation comprise the all-embracing and dynamically extending study subject of history. Human identity and multi-content life could have different forms by their nature and degree, yet, not all events, even having certain cultural forms of expression, are chosen to be involved into the subject of history, but only the significant ones, first of all, presenting spiritual values. Taking into account this aspect of our investigation and including it in the definition of history, we get the following formulation.

According to Movses Khorenatsi, *history is science studying spiritually significant events of human identity, life, and formed by culture in the past and at present, including the essence of this spirituality.*

Indeed, human happenings could be multi-significant – culturally and educationally, socially and politically, in short, spiritually-culturally. What kind of significance have human realities that are included in Movses Khorenatsi's historical studies? These are *all those human realities that provide the possibility to understand the quality of national identity and life in the past and at the present, and not only in regard of their realization but also considering their potential perspectives.*

Human identity, individual and social life, in other words, all political, social, economic, military, juridical expressions of life experience, words and thoughts, deeds and structures determining the form of being of human identity and its coexistence with other identities, in essence, are products of human activity – creations or works of thought, soul and hands – just culture in the widest sense of it.

According to Movses Khorenatsi, Armenian history, and history, in general, is not a mere recreation and repetition of events and happenings in their own space and time. *History dis-*

*closes the truth of events of human identity, life and culture that express and fulfil their significance and/or sense and make possible the cognition and identification of their <u>power, causes and orderliness.</u>*

So what is the theoretical significance and fulfilment of history? It was said above that the theoretical and scientific aspects of the fulfillment of history are the revelation of truth. But how gets this universal scientific formula its concrete and specific expression just in the case of history? The investigation of history in the frame of Movses Khorenatsi's conception has the intention *to understand theoretically and disclose interpretively the truth and good in the happenings of the past and present life.*

As we can see, in the above formulations not only the notion of truth appears as theoretical but also the notion of *understanding*. In general, the notion of truth is considered a theoretical component while as practical components appear the good deeds. But as David the Invincible mentions, practical is present in theoretical and theoretical is present in practical, and the theoretical is of a higher priority in regard of practical: "in the first place theory, as this takes precedence over practice" (David the Invincible, 1983, p. 121). "… For theory comes first, since it is through theory and reason that one comes to practice – so that practice should not be without reason and cause" (David the Invincible, 1983, p. 141).

Indeed, the practical component (the good deeds) should be first theoretically understood and only then – realized in life. In historical science and also in all social sciences as a theoretical fulfilment -as the revelation of truth – is presented as a more extended problematic which also includes practical understanding and interpretative revelation of the good.

So the definition of history according to the subject and fulfilment is as follows:

The history is a science, which reveals the truth of human identity and significant "events and deeds" of human life - with their causes, and the counsels of wisdom expressing the possibility, necessity and preference for their good-ordering.

## The Care of History

In the entire fulfilment of history simultaneously with the general scientific and high-priority theoretical component – the revelation of truth – we would like to point out another practical component, which is also a general scientific component though not for every science. Which is it? It should be said that regarding every science, and especially of human and social sciences, together with the theoretical component there should also be mentioned the practical one – "*the care*". What does it mean – *care*? What is it aimed at? By the term "care" should it be understood *the care regarding the world of human presence.* It is important to mention that "care" is essentially significant not only in regard to humanities and social sciences but also in a degree in regard to natural history. What I'm going to say at first glance could seem strange. It would be right to think that *in the boundaries of possibility human immediate theoretical and practical presence and influence* all sciences have a horizon of their significance and possibility of application, necessity and even preferability in the problematics of the care concerning "life-world of human existence".

The above characteristic of the problem of "care" is not sufficient for its understanding, interpretively disclosing, and "seeing" by thoughts in a definitely expressed form, *as inherent to*

*history and belonging* to it. Which characteristics are important for the revelation of the essence of "care" in the mentioned frame for each significant science, and especially for humanities and social sciences and also already concerning history? These components of the scientific fulfilment which bring concretely to completion the fulfilment of history is *the possibility of good-orderly human coexistence and also the path pointing meanings, including the counsel of wisdom.*

*The disclosure of these components is the goal of every reader striving for understanding – for activities in his present and future life.* And what is the practical component and the significance and fulfilment of history compared to this general formula? According to Movses Khorenatsi's conception, history by the unity of theoretical and practical components of its fulfillment is always aimed to "reading-lover" persons. History by its theoretical component is directed to those who strive *to read and understand the truth and advice of wisdom*, while by its *practical* component history is for persons who *wish to realize the understood truth and good for their identity and life* in their present and future. Just this twofold unity intention is called to life by a historian-author. It can also be noted, that history is presented differently to the modes of human cognitive soul and openness of thought directed by the theoretical interest and practical care of human identity.

I would like to mention also the idea of "preferable reader" suggested and explained in my monograph above having the goal to create principally and give the possibility to direct and prepare all reading-lovers and study-lovers to become **a preferable reader** of the narration. The study-lover to wisdom is intended to conceive the horizon and the observable field of

meanings, where every essentially significant event and also the destiny, sense and **counsel of wisdom** has happened (Kocharyan, 2016).

"History" as such must be considered not only in all-embracing or dominating generality of its concrete realizations and, possibly, in its non-genuine (untrue) and therefore in its "inauthentic being", but also in regard to what it should be according to its true calling – **as an entity in its own adequate being,** and thus in its "genuine (true) being", i.e. an entity having its truth in its own being. In this perspective and just according to M. Heidegger's two-component division, history as such is considered in the conditional twofold unity of its being: "history as **an entity**" and "**the being** of history".

Let us note that generally for history the mode of telling historical events could be considered as an accidental feature, an *accidentia*. Because history can be woven orally or written by different forms of storytelling. Surely, in possibilities of linguistic expression the minimal one – telling by verbatim and direct meaning – is necessary for history but this feature is inherent in every speech and text and does not differentiate history from other texts and thus does not comprise and create history as such. Verbatim mode of telling history presents itself not as the specific feature of history but the general property of text-culture, since it is inherent principally to human mode of thinking, which is just narrative, and by this common base it is also inherent to history as a science. This way of reaching the wholeness by connections of parts is just historical as a kind of human speech, and by this general ground, it is inherent to history as a science.

History and Storytelling

According to Movses Khorenatsi, history as such principally exists only in the case when the "story-telling is realized". As it was disclosed in our monograph (Khocharyan, 2016), the preferable form of history in the conception of Father of Armenian's history is the **historiological historiography**. History in its research phase, yet not in oral or written mode, does not come to completion as such. In the process of examination of historic traces of culture, as of historical source, in its creative and yet psychological and mental phase, when the unknown becomes known, history is not expressed and presented to all mankind in its oral or written modes of existence. It means that the essential feature of the history, which expresses the generic feature of wise speech and text, may be mentioned with the notion of "science" and the notion of "logos" jointly too. So, **history is a science – an extended "word" ("discourse" or "script") revealing the truth and the counsel of wisdom of the signi-**

**ficant life's bygone: consistent events, deeds, and life-order as well as its significance along with the cause.**

History realizes its story-telling verbatim and also allegorically. And in this sense it should be noted, that not only the content of what is told but also the specificity of the form of telling also participate in the becoming of histories theoretical and practical fulfilment.

This way of reaching the wholeness by connections of parts is just historical as a kind of human speech, and by this general ground, it is inherent to history as a science.

But for the history of this kind in which there could be together with *verbatim* meaning also the *allegoric* meaning – from the becoming of direct happening to the spiritual, from the invisible to the visible, from the spiritual-corporeal reality to the genuinely spiritual and thus to the deeper truth expressing meaning and

for the disclosing of the advice of wisdom, certainly, it (*allegory*) can present itself together with *own specificity* also as *necessary and essential specificity* of such history. Consequently, the verbatim and allegoric form of story-telling is the necessary and essential feature of the creation of history as such, while the form of story-telling of various other histories – the ways of telling compared to the fixed in the general definition form, could be qualified as particular forms in the just outlined frame.

In essence, in the doctrine of Movses Khorenatsi history is defined and accordingly investigated as a **scholarly mode of narration**. It can be fixed, that in his historical-scientific conception history is the interconnection of various meanings and in them – counsels of wisdom, revealing the truth of significant bygones of the whole world and in it – human and also Armenian life, by understanding and interpretative explication in spoken and written modes directed to contemporaries and generations.

## The Twofold Unity of the Theoretical and the Practical

It was fixed above as the special feature of the presence of history as such, and now in regard of the definitions of history it should be recalled and restated that according to Movses Khorenatsi, *the being of history as such is the twofold unity of the theoretical and practical components of its fulfilment.* History as science strives for the self-reflection of its nature, for understanding its being as the twofold unity of the theoretical and practical. What is the possible and necessary ground of this kind division?

For the adequate understanding of the historical conception of Father of Armenian's History, and in particular, of its theoretical and

practical nature (as it was mentioned above) David the Invincible's philosophical system has fundamental and essential importance, which reflects the general content of the medieval Christian philosophy (David the Invincible, 1983). For deeper understanding of Movses Khorenatsi's historical and just of historical-philosophical conception, in my opinion, it is not only possible, but also necessary and preferable to realize David's philosophical conception and, in particular, the application of his understanding of theoretical and practical fulfilment of philosophy.

As it was mentioned above, in David's conception philosophy is divided into theoretical and practical components since by the theoretical are learned all the beings, and by the practical are directed our good deeds (David the Invincible, 1983, p. 121). And philosophy has been divided into theoretical and practical since "human soul poses two capacities – the theoretical and the animal" (David the Invincible 1983, p. 119). According to him, "the subject of the theoretical is all existence, with a view to knowing [it], while the subject of the practical is confined to human souls" (David the Invincible 1983, p. 119). The narratives of history being told in their connection to *wisdom* are addressed to humans and just perfect *the <u>cognitive and moral</u> capacities of the human spirit* and thus creating of the present and future identity and good-order of life of the "reading-lover" contemporaries and coming generations.

In Movses Khorenatsi's conception history according to its calling, in its scientific-theoretical and scientific-practical twofold-unity of being as such is grounded and implemented not only by cognitive and *theoretical interest*, as each scientific-theoretical history, but also by the *practical care* of spiritually enhancing and good-

ordered life-institution of human identity and life.

It is disclosed by our research also that history investigating its subject of study – the significant becoming of human life – understands and interpretively reveals the truth communicating meaning, and in it – the advice of wisdom – and thus creates the theoretical and practical fulfilment of history. *History is presented by its connectedness to wisdom as the twofold unity of the theoretical and empirical since just wisdom is both theoretical and empirical.* Thus, history by its connectedness to wisdom, with the significance of its intention-fulfilment – addressed to his "reading-loving" contemporaries and also to coming generations – is self-reflecting not only as *truth communicating, understanding theoretically and revealing interpretively*, but also *practically implementing*, by human capacity and also by scientifically defined share of participation in life.

Thus, in Movses Khorenatsi's historical conception, the theoretical and practical two-fold-unity of the fulfilment of history is that fundamental cause, by which is understood the basic feature of his theory of history – the theoretical and practical of *the being of history as such*. Keeping in mind this twofold meaning of the being of history, one can mention and fix explicitly the essential feature of the subject of history that defines its "which significance". This is an essential feature since by itself creates, brings into being the history with its whole essence – both with the theoretical and practical capacities and therefore provides the possibility to reveal the nature of history more fully and completely.

Now it is possible to unite the definitions of history by subject and by theoretical and practical fulfilment into one whole definition of

the science of history: According to Movses Khorenatsi's historical conception, *history generally and Armenian history concretely is a science which communicates the truth of the meaning of the overall events of the genesis and being of nations and concretely of Armenian nation, and therefore of the human and also of Armenian identity and of significant spiritual being, by their causes in the whirlpool of events of this world and this life, including the human and national identity and reviving wisdom, braveness and advice for deeds of all the virtue.*

Proximate and Remote Fulfillment

Father of Armenian's History telling in his work the significant events of Armenian life - and therefore of the Armenian Greats – about the identity and deeds of Haik, Aram, Tigran, Vagharshak and others, presents all these as the *proximate fulfilment* to the aspiration for the understanding of every "reading-lover". He points out as the valuable *remote fulfilment* of history "eminent in everything that pertains to mankind" (Khorenats'i, 1978, p. 114) – wisdom, braveness, and all the virtues and good-orderliness of life that are perfecting human identity and bring it closer to Godlikeness, *within the limits of human abilities.* Father of Armenian's History makes the **remote fulfilment** of history realizable by the *proximate fulfilment* of history, i. e. creates in the human identity love for virtues, goodness, homeland-building and life-enhancing deeds of Armenian predecessors and, conversely, creates denial and hatred to evil and disastrous deeds. In "Lementations" – the summing up a chapter of his work – he makes the most possible for human inner-world and life-mode to be capable for regret,

missing for all the goodness, return and aspiration for repentance, opening the way *to be self-cleaned in their identity and life-mode from evil and vanity.*

Movses Khorenatsi also writes that it is nice and spiritual joy for him – to tell about the virtues and homeland-building good-orderliness of wise and brave men of the Armenian Greats. And "how dear it would have been for me if the Savior had come at that time and redeemed me and if my entrance into the world had occurred in that time if I could delight in their rule and escape from the dangers of the present!" (Khorenats'i, 1978, p. 110).

Conclusion

According to the viewpoint established in scholarly publications, the being of history in the treatise of Movses Khorenatsi appears as "the science of history". Grounded upon the results of the implemented hermeneutical study of the historical conception of Movses Khorenatsi, as a preliminary conclusion of the investigation, the truth-of-being of history according to his conception and its implications are explicated as an entity, just its nature in its adequate presence. According to H.-G. Gadamer's conception of philosophical hermeneutics, the truth-of-being of an entity, principally intelligible to human understanding, is the uncovered or revealed being of entity, just its presence in human understanding. **The truth and the expressing it meaning and wisdom, available for human cognition, are present in understanding, and by understanding, they exist and are affirmed in their presence.** According to Movses Khorenatsi, **the presence of history is the presence of sense (meaning) and wisdom.** The presence of history and of the historical-scientific conception,

shaped and contained in it, is the **sense (meaning) and wisdom,** which create the human self-identity, life, and culture.

The **presence of his history and of interpreted in it "science of history" is disclosed just as the presence of wisdom, contained in "what should be narrated" and in "theory of history", and, as such, is disclosed as a principally preferable possibility of the being-of-history.** In the treatise of Movses Khorenatsi history is not only something, which "has been" in the past, but also – in virtue of its power to make wise and its spiritualizing significance – is "in its continuing being" for present and future. The **presence of history** is "the bygone occurring in its continuing being".

In scientific knowledge and, namely, in the "science of history" there is a possibility to present explicitly the **counsel of wisdom.** In the ancient and especially in medieval historical science the fundamental and at the same time target-problem of the inner connection of **"wisdom" and "science"** was present in its peculiar understanding; subsequently, as a result of its more essential transformation, this problem has been completely forgotten and not considered and not formulated in the integral problematic of history as a problem of scientific investigation. **To narrate the wisdom, contained in bygones (or yores) of life, is the true calling of history that was originally inherent to it. The calling of <u>history</u> addressed to contemporaries and descendants is identical to the calling of <u>reading history</u> – to reach and comprehend the wisdom itself.**

In the treatise "History of the Armenians" of Movses Khorenatsi the being of history is revealed not as a mere **empiric history**, but – in virtue of its self-understanding – as **historiosophy**, thus being accepted in scholarly literature

predominantly in this surprisingly perfect quality of historical-scientific conception. According to his historical-scientific conception, the genuine **presence of history** is just **the symbolic presence of wisdom** contained in essential bygones of human identity, life, and culture, presented to the self-identity and life of every "reading-lover". **The genuine calling of the being of history and its participation in human life and by it – the truth and the very presence of the idea of history and its fulfillment should be understood and interpreted as the "presence of wisdom" embodied and contained in history, which is dedicated to the perfection of human self-identity, life-mode and culture of contemporaries and generations.**

According to Movses Khorenatsi, *Armenian history is spiritual science of the entire happenings of the significant becoming of life and of the revealing the truth of the advice of human deeds and just of the advice of wisdom, and in them or just by them the presence of the tender and caring control of the God, making it cognizable through critical understanding and interpretive disclosing, within the limits of human abilities.*

Thus Movses Khorenatsi's theory of history and historical-scientific conceptions are revealed as a **philosophizing "science of history"**.

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# CHAIR OF YOUNG SCIENTIST

*Karina K. OGANYAN*

# SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSES OF HEAD'S PERSONALITY INTEGRALITY MODEL: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Abstract

We developed the integral manager's personality theory, which is a three-component model of effective management. The model reveals the interdependence of management leader's style, his personality type and the organisational culture type. Sociological research was conducted with the aim of empirical verification and justification of the integral manager's personality theory.

The "ideal" leader should have such characteristics: to be active, innovate, to be able to unite the collective, and show flexibility in management, according to the results of university teachers' survey in St. Petersburg. The innovator (creative-transforming and productive type) possesses these parameters, according to Yu. M. Reznik's classification. Most of the interviewed leaders believe that they involve workers in the decision-making process and make a decision together with the team. These characteristics are reflected in the democratic management style, according to R. Likert's classification.

The most desirable leader for undergraduate students is the leader of an innovator who is able to quickly navigate the situation and make decisions, according to the results of the second sociological survey. The most effective interdependence for undergraduate students of KemSU and SPbGEU is: a passionate leader personality type, manage in the team style and developing the clan culture in the organization.

*Keywords*: the integral model of the leader's personality, the personality type, the type of organizational culture, the management style, leadership qualities, the family management type of the organization, the innovative and creative type of organization management, the person-oriented kind of organization management, the management decision-making, the "ideal" leader.

## Introduction

The conceptual analysis of the leader's personality integral theory development presupposes the consideration of not only the model elements of the effective management (such as the leader's personality, the organizational culture type and management style) but also the development of the leader's personality in the domestic sociological management concept, in particular, the leader's personality, his behavior and activities are considered in scientific literature: the role of the person's enneagram in the control system; value indicators and activity of the leader's personality; the leader's personality in the management system; elite-oriented individual's activity in the management system; the leader's personality and motivation of his activity; theoretical foundations of management type social regulation.

The problem of identifying the leadership optimal style was touched upon in domestic psychology (Zhuravlev, 2004).

The phenomenon of "organizational culture" has become the object of analysis among many foreign authors and researchers (Ansoff, 1989; Dessler, 2003; Shane, 2002), but I would especially like to single out the work of K. S. Cameron and R. E. Quinn "Diagnosis and a change in organizational culture", because it sets the vector in which direction to improve the manager's organizational culture for successful indicators and results of the organization (Kameron & Quinn, 2001).

In the domestic literature the concept of "organizational culture" began to be covered relatively recently in comparison with Western literature (Korotkov, 2002; Aleshina & Zagladova, 2016; Oganyan, K.M., 2013).

The problems of the management system within the organization are considered by M. V. Rubtsova (Rubtsova, 2007), social responsibility and professional future leaders' activity as a factor of effective management (Oganyan, K. M., Oganyan, K. K., 2017).

Analysis of this literature contributed to the realization of the need to create an author's leader's personality integral theory, through the development of a three-component model of effective management.

The importance of leadership is increasing in the modern world, along with the leadership of the organization. Various seminars and trainings are held, which aim to form and develop leadership skills among future leaders. However, in organizations, there are more and more employees who perform the leader's functions in the team, which can influence members of the collective along with a formal leader. Leaders can both interfere with the immediate leader, and

improve the "climate" in the organization (Oganyan, K. K., 2014).

The leader should rationally manage both the production and social components of the organization. Nevertheless, the presence of a leader is not an indicator of stability and success, an important aspect here is its quality characteristics. All these qualitative characteristics of the manager's activity are reflected in the management style and organizational culture type. It is these three components - the personality leader's type, the management style and the organizational culture type that are the basic components of the model for effective organization management implementing (Oganyan, K. K., 2015). This theoretical model was developed by us and for the first time is empirically verified and substantiated by conducted sociological researches at the universities of Sankt-Petersburg and regions (Oganyan, K. K., 2016). The table below presents the results of the relationship between the leader's personality type and the organizational culture type analysis (See *Table 1*).

## Discussion

Harmonious type of leader's personality in the organization will be formed by the clan culture - the support culture. Organization of delegation for employees, with high team cohesion, participation and realization of the goals set for the organization is assumed due to the consciousness, the leader's spiritual wealth, the knowledge, altruism, beauty, external activity value to him.

The leader passionate type develops of the organizational culture adhocratic type. For such leaders, innovative solutions ahead of time, with an adequate response to external conditions, the

emerging transformations that characterise the world of the 21ˢᵗ-century organisations, are key mechanisms for the organisation's success. Consequently, the leader will ensure a consistent and systematic formation of an innovative culture type in his organisation.

Relations between Leader Personality Type and Organization Culture Type

| Leader personality type | Organization culture type |
|---|---|
| Harmonious | Clan |
| Passionate | Adhocratic |
| An activist, an innovator, a player, a rationalist, a minister (according to Reznik Yu.M.) | Personality |

A leader who is characterized as an activist, innovator, player, minister and rationalist contributes to the formation of a personal culture in the organisation, the basis of the power system in which is the individual's strength, the ability to negotiate, professionalism — a high level of labour productivity, with a favourable socio-psychological climate characterised by the organisation, working with this culture's type.

We will show the three-component model of forming leaders for the organisation effective management, using the results of theoretical research the interaction between the leader's personality types, management styles and organisational culture types analysis (see *Table 2*).

There will be a clan culture's type, with the manifestation of high cohesion in the team, with devotion to the organisation and business by the leader who manages in the organisational style.

The knowledge, altruism, religion, beauty, external activity, society, power and system are the most important universal ideals for such a harmonious leader.

All the typologies listed in this I block were combined into a separate classification, which was called "Family management type of organisation". This name of this type was not without

reason, because all three of the above classifications carry the unity of the organisation members' goals, the general thinking and universal values that are laid down in the family from the very first day of the new person emergence.

The leader with a passionate personality type manages the most effective in innovative-analytical style by Kono. The leader of this type is an energetic innovator and at the same times a worthy organiser.

A number of managerial behaviour elements reflect in the form of firm dedication, innovation, energy, sensitivity to new information, ideas, a wealth of ideas, a variety of alternatives, the ability to make quick decisions and ensure worthy integration.

There is a manifestation of these elements for adhocratic culture; its primary goal is the acceleration of adaptability, providing a creative approach to business and flexibility, in situations characterised by ambiguity, uncertainty or overload of information.

All these typologies in the second block, we combined into a separate classification, which was called "Innovative-creative type of organisation management". This name was formulated on the basis of the key characteristics of the listed classifications, i.e. this is the predominance of

innovative thinking, creativity, initiative, both among of the organization members and the leader.

The democratic style will be characteristic of an organization with a culture type that is oriented toward a person (personal culture), because effective leaders in this organization will pay attention, primarily, to the human aspects of the problems facing the subordinates, building relationships based on mutual assistance.

The leader personality, a manager in a democratic style, can be qualified as an innovator, an activist, a minister, a player, a rationalist.

All of the listed typologies in the third block, we combined into a separate classification, which was called the "Personally-oriented type of organisation management". This classification has received this name, because it implies first of all an orientation toward the individual, that each member of the organisation has the right to vote, each is motivated by participation

in the adoption of important organisational issues, and relations in the organisation are formed exclusively on mutual assistance.

After carrying out the analysis of leader personality types, management styles and organisational culture types compatibility, several new types of organisation management were identified: Family, Innovative-creative and Person-oriented, which in future can serve as a tool for managers in creating effective management of the organization (see *Table 2*).

The result of using comparative analysis as a tool for researching effective organisation management is the developed three-component model for effective organisation management formation. It can become a basis for developing within the organisation a management system, creating an organisational culture and a favourable microclimate, as well as for the fruitful and high-quality functioning of the organisation.

*Table 2.*

Integrality Three-Component Model for the Effective Organization Management

| | | Models Components | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Leader personality type | Organization culture type | Management style |
| **Effective management type** | **Family type** | Harmonious according to A.F. Lazursky) | Clan (according to E. Quinn and S. Cameron) | Team (by R. Blake and J. Muton) |
| | **Innovative-creativity type** | Passionate (according to Heymans-Le Senn) | Adhocratic (according to E. Quinn and S. Cameron) | Innovative analytical (according to T. Kono) |
| | **Personality-oriented type** | Innovator, activist, minister, player, rationalist (according to Yu. M. Reznik) | Personal culture (according to G. Harrison) | Democratic (according to R. Likert) |

The problem of finding a favourable combination of the interdependence of the leader personality type and the management style for organisations has not been resolved to this day.

In this regard, we conducted sociological research aimed at solving this problem, and also to determine the possible impact of this combination on the head's leadership qualities formation

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of the organisation.

The purpose of the researches was to identify the existence of interdependence between the leader personality type and the management style in the organization by the example of 6 departments and 1 laboratory of 4 higher educational institutions:

- St. Petersburg State University (SPbSU) - the department of "Political and Social Processes Sociology" and the department of "Economic Sociology",
- St. Petersburg state economic university (SPbGEU) - the department of "Audit and Internal Control" and the department of "Labor Economics",
- Russian customs Academy (RTA) - the department of "Economics of Customs" and the department of "Foreign Language",
- Military space Academy A. F. Mozhaisky - the laboratory of "Civil Aviation and Space".

The tasks were set as follows:

1. Identify the leader personality type in each of the researched departments;
2. Establish a management style at each of the researched departments;
3. To determine what leadership qualities are possessed by departments and laboratory heads;
4. Analyse the result obtained and formulate a favourable combination of the interdependence between the leader personality type and the management style in the organisation;
5. To study how this combination of the manager personality type and the management style in the organisation influences the head's leadership qualities formation of the organisation.

The author used the questionnaire survey method in the researches. Two types of questionnaires were developed; one questionnaire is intended for interviewing teachers, the other for chairpersons. In total, 40 teachers of departments and laboratories and 6 heads of the above-mentioned departments and laboratories took part in the survey. According to gender, the interviewed teachers were distributed as follows: 26 women and 14 men. Interviewed leaders on gender were distributed as follows: 1 woman and 6 men. The curious fact was that only in the "Audit and Internal Control" department the head is a woman, in other departments and in the laboratory the leaders are men. The age group of teachers varies from 28 to 72 years, leaders - from 39 to 65 years.

Let's present some results of the sociological research. Analysing the answers received to the questions posed to the teachers and the department head, you can identify some of the features:

- Both the "ideal" and the direct supervisor for the majority of the interviewed teachers is one that involves employees in the decision-making process (listens to the opinion), the second position is occupied by the leader who motivates the employees through participation in the decision-making process (creativity and initiative are allowed ) (see *Table 3*).
- Most of the interviewed executives believe that they involve workers in the decision-making process and make a decision together with the team. In second place in terms of the answers number is the position "I allow my subordinates the maximum creative freedom and initiative, and in the future, I choose the best option myself". It is

curious that none of the department heads chose the answer "I make decisions spontaneously" (see *Table 4*).

➢ In most cases, the departments' heads opinion and the teachers' opinion on matters relating to "managerial decisions" came together. The disagreements were not revealed in any department.

The Degree of Subordinates' Participation in Decision-Making
(Teachers Questionnaire Survey, autumn 2016, 40 people).

| The criterion | The "ideal" leader | Your leader |
|---|---|---|
| The leader involves employees in the decision-making process (hears the opinion) | 17 respondents | 15 respondents |
| Employees are motivated by participation in the decision-making process (creativity and initiative are allowed) | 15 respondents | 11 respondents |
| Decisions are made in the interaction of different levels management process | 7 respondents | 7 respondents |
| The head solves all questions independently (one-man management) | 1 respondents | 7 respondents |

Adoption of Management Decisions
(Teachers Questionnaire Survey, autumn 2016, 40 people)

| Solutions | Number of replies |
|---|---|
| Involve employees in the decision-making process and make a decision together with the team | 6 |
| Allow your subordinates the maximum creative freedom and initiative, and in the future choose the best option yourself | 3 |
| Make decisions independently | 1 |
| Systematically generate a solution, based on the accumulated information | - |
| Take decisions spontaneously | - |

Teachers were offered 4 answers to the question: "What are the psychological characteristics of an" ideal "leader, and what does your supervisor have?":

• The leader is moderately active and knows how to rally all employees;

• The leader is harsh with people, in most cases his actions are commands and orders;

• The leader is an emotional innovator who knows how to make quick decisions and to rally the collective;

• The leader is a fighter for creativity in the institution so that the collective is friendly.

The lecturers' opinions of the department of "Audit and internal control" (SPbGEU) regarding the psychological characteristics of the "ideal" head were divided. Part of the team suggested that the leader should be an emotional innovator who must be able to make quick decisions and be able to rally the team, and the other part of the team gives preference to the "ideal" leader who will be a fighter for creativity in the institution

and will strive to ensure that the team was friendly. Evaluating the immediate department head, most teachers indicated that he was a fighter for creativity in the department and in the team.

Teachers of the "Labor Economics" department (SPbGEU) and the "Economic sociology" department (SPbSU) unanimously agreed that the "ideal" leader should, and their immediate leader is very active and knows how to rally all employees.

According to the teachers of the "Political and social processes sociology" department (SPbSU) and the "Economics of Customs" department (RTA), it was suggested that the "ideal" leader should be an emotional innovator who knows how to make quick decisions and rally the team, and direct heads of these departments in fact are moderately active and are able to rally all employees.

The "ideal" leader should be extremely active and be able to rally all employees, according to the teachers of the foreign languages department (RTA), and their immediate leader is harsh with people, in most cases, his actions are commands and orders.

Teachers of the "Civil Aviation and Space"

laboratory (A. F. Mozhaisky Military Space Academy) believe that the "ideal" leader should be an emotional innovator who can make quick decisions and rally the collective, but about their direct opinion leader of the respondents divided. Part of the team considered that the leader was very active and able to rally all employees, and part of the team said that the head of people is harsh and in most cases, his actions are commands and orders.

It is possible to reveal some features, analyzing the received answers to this question:

➢ the "ideal" leader for teachers is almost equally the leader who is extremely active and able to rally all employees and the one who is an emotional innovator who can make quick decisions and rally the collective;

➢ Not one respondent chose as an "ideal" leader "authoritarian" who would be harsh with people and in most cases his actions would be commands and orders. However, 6 respondents noted that their leader just had these undesirable features;

➢ Proximate leaders, according to most teachers, have activity and can rally the collective (see *Table 5*).

*Table 5.*

Manager Psychological Characteristics
(Teachers Questionnaire Survey, autumn 2016, 40 people)

| The criterion | The "ideal" leader | Your leader |
|---|---|---|
| The leader is moderately active and is able to rally all employees | 17 respondents | 22 respondents |
| The leader is an emotional innovator who knows how to make quick decisions and to rally the collective | 16 respondents | 8 respondents |
| The leader is a fighter for creativity in the institution so that the staff is friendly | 7 respondents | 4 respondents |
| The head is harsh with people, in most cases his actions are commands and orders | - | 6 respondents |

It was revealed, based on the survey's results, that the leader personality type:

➢ According to Lazursky's classification, not one of the surveyed leaders is fully characterized, because none of the leaders noted all of the above ideals from this classification. Therefore, none of the department heads can be called a "harmonious" leader. However, it was revealed that the most important universal ideal is "knowledge", in the opinion of all department heads.

➢ According to Heymans-Le Senn's classification, the "passionate" manager's personality type is an inherent only head department of "Audit and Internal Control" (SPbGEU). This is evidenced by his answers to the questions of the questionnaire, and the teachers' answers of this department. It is this leader that has such qualities as vigor, innovation, the ability to make a quick decision and ensure good integration.

➢ According to Yu. M. Reznik's classification, the leader's personality type - an innovator (creatively transforming and productive) is inherent of all the interviewed leaders except for the head of the "Political and Social Processes Sociology" department (SPbSU). Personality type a player (market type, prone to risk and deprivation) has not been identified by any manager.

It can be argued that the innovator (creative-transforming and productive type) is the optimal type of head personality for the departments of higher educational institutions according to the classification of Yu. M. Reznik, based on the revealed result This type can be characterized as introducing and implementing new, progressive ideas or techniques in some areas of the department or institution.

This survey also indicates that the management style:

The "Labor Economics" Department (SPbGEU), "Political and Social Processes Sociology" (SPbSU), "Economic Sociology" (SPbSU), "Economics of Customs" (RTA) and partly Laboratory of Civil Aviation and Space (A.F. Mozhaisky's military space academy) corresponded to the administrative grids of R. Blake and J. Mouton. Heads of these departments are characterized by the fact that they are very active, able to rally all employees, as well as involve them in the process of making major decisions aimed at achieving the organisation's goals.

The innovative and analytical management style, according to T. Kono's classification is partially characteristic of the "Foreign Language" (RTA) department, according to the head's opinion of this department, and for the laboratory of civil aviation and space (A.F. Mozhaisky's military space academy), according to the teachers' opinion of this department. The innovative-analytical management style inherent only 2 educational departments of 7.

Likert's management style is characteristic of all interrogated departments because it turned out that to some extent all managers are interested in the participation of subordinates in the organization activities and supported their friendly interaction in the team.

The democratic management style, according to the R. Likert's classification is the optimal management style for the of higher educational institutions departments. However, it was revealed that the team style (organizational man-

agement) by R. Blake and J. Muton was also partially suitable.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that the most suitable interdependence of the leader's personality type and management style for the higher educational institutions departments is the innovator (creatively transforming and productive type) according to the Yu. M. Reznik's classification in combination with the democratic management style in R. Likert's classification, analyzing the obtained data.

We found out that this combination of the leader's personality type and management style in an organisation does not directly affect the leadership qualities of an organisation leader.

However, to develop their leadership qualities, managers need to formed and develop self-organisation and engage in constant self-education.

It can be determined that linearly in a pure form none of the types is optimal and favourable for respondents, based on the "Integral three-component model of effective organisation management". A comfortable type of management organisation was the Family type in combination with the Innovative-creative type because departments' employees want to feel solidarity and friendly support in the organisation, to be one of the company's movements mechanisms while having the opportunity to create and show initiative. The respondents are waiting for novelty, progress, creativity and trusting, respectful attitude from the "ideal" leader or from the already existing (see Table 6).

*Table 6.*

Favourable Type of Organization Management

| | | Models components | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **Leaders personality type** | **Organisational culture type** | **Management style** |
| **Effective management organization type** | **Family type combination with innovation-creative type** | Passionate (according to Heymans-Le Senn) | Clan (according to E. Quinn and S. Cameron) | Command (according to R. Blake and J. Muton) |

Also, we carried out sociological researches to identify the interdependence of the components model for the effective management in St. Petersburg's social institutions, which showed the following results.

It is revealed that a passionate personality type, managing in an innovative analytical style, contributes to the greater effectiveness of the organisation's activities in sociological researches to identify the interdependence of the

management style and the manager personality type in social institutions. Such leaders are active, focused on innovative methods of work, encourage innovation in work, modern technologies and high productivity, successfully apply "brainstorming". These characteristics also have an innovative-analytical management style.

A modern leader needs to comply with some recommendations for the successful management of organization in modern society:

➢ create a favourable atmosphere in the workplace, so that each employee feels important and necessary;

➢ focus on the future goals and prospects of the organisation;

➢ be competent in all work matters;

➢ be able to take quick, yet well-considered decisions.

In addition to these recommendations, the manager in the management of the organisation relies on one or another management style, which was chosen by him initially or formed in the management process.

We plan to conduct further sociological researches that have allowed empirical verification and justification of the integral model effective organization management, not only by the example of educational institutions, but also by organizations of the economy real sector in the sphere of industry and production. This will allow comparing the results obtained in different spheres of managers' activity, expanding the model's implementation and empirical justification.

## Recommendations

The materials of the paper are useful for that science sociologist who deal with the theory and methodology of sociology management, as well as for the development of new courses and seminars in leadership, theory and practice of management, personality's sociology and philosophy.

## Acknowledgements

The main results of the paper come from the findings received within the monograph on the theme: "Social technologies for the formation of leadership qualities among future leaders in the university environment", which is the winner of the I International competition for the best scientific and educational publication "Academus" in the nomination "Social Sciences, Education and Pedagogy" (Moscow, 2016). The contest is organized by International Foundation of Development of Science and Education (IFDSE) in cooperation with the Infra-M group of companies.

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IN MEMORIAM

# PETER KEMP
## 1937 – 2018



On August 4, 2018, the World Philosophical Society[1] had a severe loss – prominent philosopher, theologian, Head of the Institute of Philosophy of Education next to the University of Aarhus (Denmark), Head of the International Federation of Philosophical Society (FISP) (2003-2008), President of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy (2008) Peter Kemp passed away. The prominent philosopher had many other titles and degrees[2] the mere enumeration of which would require a large volume. The present Memoriam aims to preset the Danish philoso-

pher from the viewpoint of his vast professional network and immediate cooperation with Armenian Philosophical Society. He was Academician Georg Brutian's good friend and colleague, Academician of the International Academy for Philosophy (2001); Foreign Member of the Armenian Philosophical Academy (2001); Foreign Member of the International Institute for Metaphilosophy, Transformational Logic and Argumentation next to Khachatur Abovian Armenian State Pedagogical University (2011-2015, presided by Academician Georg Brutian).

The cooperation of Khachatur Abovian Armenian State Pedagogical University with Professor Kemp was multifaceted. He was the member of Editorial board of the journal of the International Institute for Metaphilosophy, Transformational Logic and Argumentation *WISDOM* (2011-2015) and was actively engaged in the works of journal from the very day of its establishment. Professor Kemp's articles were regularly published in the journal. He was not only the member of Editorial Board but was also among the honourable top reviewers.

On April 16-17, 2012, in Yerevan, the International Conference *Practical and Theoretical Problems of the Development of Transforming Society (philosophical and psychological aspects)* was held. The Conference was organised by the International Institute for Metaphilosophy, Transformational Logic and Argumentation of Khachatur Abovian Armenian State Pedagogical University, the International Academy for Philosophy and the Armenian Philosophical Academy.

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1   See: https://www.fisp.org/.
2   See: "2008 président du XXIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie tenu à Seoul, Corée. Il a publié en français: Théorie de l'engagement, I-II, Paris, 1973; Éthique et Médecine, Tierce et INSERM, Paris 1987; L'irremplaçable, Une éthique de la technologie, 1997, Levinas, une introduction philosophique 1997, Sagesse pratique de Paul Ricœur, Huit études, Editions du Sandre, Paris, 2010, traducción en espagnol par Liszbeth Sagols Sales: Sabiduría práctica de Paul Ricoeur, Fontamara, México, D.F., 2011. Co-auteur de: Technologies et Sociétés, Galilée, Paris, 1980; Le discours bioéthique, Editions du Cerf, Paris, 2004, L'Éco-éthique de Tomonobu Imamichi, Editions du Sandre, Paris. En espagnol: La mundialización de la ética, Traducción Liszbeth Sagols Sales, Fontamara, Mexico, D.F., 2007. En anglais: Citizen of the World: The Cosmopolitan Ideal for the Twenty-First Century, Humanity Books, New York, 2011". https://www.fisp.org/peter-kemp

In the Plenary Session of the Conference, Peter Kemp presented a report entitled *Cosmo-* *politanism in Our Time.*







*Plenary Session of the Conference (from left to right): David Cooke (UK), Evangelos Moutsopoulos (Greece), former Minister of Education and Science of the Republic of Armenia Armen Ashotyan, Georg Brutian (Armenia), Peter Kemp (Denmark), Hans Köchler (Austria), former Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Tigran Sargsyan.*

*Plenary Session of the Conference. From left to right: former Minister of Education and Science of the Republic of Armenia Armen Ashotyan, former Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Tigran Sargsyan, Georg Brutian (Armenia), Peter Kemp (Denmark), Hans Köchler (Austria).*



*Co-Presidents of the International Academy for Philosophy: (from left to right)
Hans Köchler (Austria), Georg Brutian (Armenia), Evangelos Moutsopoulos (Greece).*

*Section 2. Problems of Transformational Society.*
*Co-Chairs: Robert Djidjian (Armenia), Peter Kemp (Denmark).*



*Peter Kemp lecturing*

As an ardent and concerned "World Citizen" or "Cosmopolite", Professor Kemp was alarming about the current global problems (financial globalization of democratic control over economy and technologies, national consciousness and global responsibility clash, resource consumption, pollution, hunger, epidemic, international crime, genocide, terrorism (including state-supported terrorism), struggle for world domination, etc.).

At the same time, the humanist philosopher forewarns that the "World Citizen" should not protest against the national citizen, and global thinking and way of acting should serve as a guard for "National Policy", for its personal and everyday functioning.

On April 18, 2012, Professor Peter Kemp also had a public lecture at Khachatur Abovian Armenian State Pedagogical University titled *Towards a Global Legal Order.* During the lecture, the Armenian audience was especially impressed by the humanistic ideas and the theory of humanistic laws that are, as he prioritized, an urgent necessity as "the world society is in the

same boat" and it should struggle for "the victory of the demand of logic, social debates and dialogues within politics and education".

Professor Kemp was also interested in the destiny and activity of educational institutions in the modern world. The latter, starting with elementary schools and higher education institutions are more exposed to political pressure, and the reason is to make them such governmental institutions that will "sell knowledge" and will boost the competitiveness of not only between educational institutions but also between nations. Such political transformation of education means that the aim of education and investigations are less referring to the formation of good life within the society and boosting the cultural and ethical formation of a human, and are mainly refers to the study of technical and scientific performance enhancement in order to broaden the production of material goods and make them competitiveness in the national and international markets. As a result, education becomes "less humanistic". Civilisation is no longer a matter of promoting the establishment and maintenance of peace in the global human community and throughout the world. Now the problem is how to oppose to such tendency of education to become non-humanistic, how to adapt to national and global competition. The Danish philosopher of education in this situation the politics should set the rules of ethics for "good life", the world order of world justice and national and supranational laws.



GUEST LECTURE

at the Armenian State Pedagogical University
afterKhachaturAbovyan
14:00 -15:00, Bigconference hall, second floor

YEREVAN, 18 APRIL 2012

Professor Emeritus of Philosophy
Director of Centre for Ethics and Law
President of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy – www.wcp2008.or.kr
Unity of Philosophy of Education, Department of Education,
University of Aarhus, Campus Emdrup,
Academician of the InternationalAcademy for Philosophy

PETER KEMP

(Denmark)
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TOWARDS A GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER

Abstract

To the extent that global commerce means that "we are all in the same boat", it may open our eyes to the truth that, without a will to live together, we are all lost and destroyed by the forces of things. It may teach us that we cannot survive without recognizing a certain global legal order to ensure the peace of the world. In so doing, commercial and economic life in our time may help open our eyes to the practical necessity of this order. But we also need imaginative forces so that the law can express a humanization that, in politics and education, may triumph over the logic of the market.

*In the Armenian Genocide
Museum-Institute (Yerevan, Armenia).*



*In Ararat Brandy Factory
(Yerevan, Armenia).*



*Conference Closing Celebration.*

The Editorial Board of the journal WIS-DOM expresses its deep sorrow and condolences to the relatives and family members of the renowned philosopher and is grateful for the fact that he had a significant role in the creation and establishment of the magazine. His colleagues from Khachatur Abovian Armenian State Pedagogical University will keep safe the bright memories about him.

Hasmik HOVHANNISYAN
(Dr.) Head of the Chair of Philosophy and Logic
named after Academician Georg Brutian
at Khachatur Abovian Armenian State Pedagogical University,
Editor-in-Chief of the journal *WISDOM*

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cent publications: "Sociocultural Determinism and Order Parameters", "Second Modernity of Europe: "Reflexive" Development", "Invariance of the Civilizational Matrix: the Culture Protection Function", "Self-Organization of the Social System: Basic Methodological Approaches", "Development Strategies of Modern Societies: Multi-Vector Trends" and "Institutional Reconstruction: Complete Alteration?".

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# ARMENIAN ENLIGHTENERS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY



Shahamir SHAHAMIRIAN
(1723, Esfahan, Iran - 1798, Chennai,
Madras Presidency, India),
a writer and philosopher, outstanding Armenian -
Indian social-political figure and an affluent
Armenian merchant in Madras, India.

Joseph EMIN
(1726 - 1809, Calcutta), a prominent figure
of the Armenian national liberation
movement, who travelled to various
European countries to secure support for the
liberation of Armenia from the Ottoman
Empire and Persia.

Movses BAGHRAMIAN
(18th century (birth and death dates –
unknown) Artsakh), Armenian liberation
movement leader, an active member of the
Madras cluster, one of the authors of the first
drafted constitution of Armenia, Enlightener.

The Armenian literary-political organisation "Madras cluster" was founded in the 1770s in Madras, India due to the promotion of Armenian national-liberation movement figure Joseph Emin. The cluster would support the ideology of the Armenian commercial bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectuals. They criticised tyranny and assumed the responsibility of developing the intended national constitutional premises. As for the liberation from the dictatorships of the Ottoman Empire and Persia, Armenia relied on the ideas inspired by the European Enlightenment, planning to establish a bourgeois republic (or at least, a constitutional monarchy) in liberated Armenia. The elimination of feudalism and the revival of the Nation with Russia's support were among the ideological priorities.

In order to disseminate the ideas of liberation among the Armenian people, familiarise the young with the history and culture of their Homeland and for publishing activities, in 1771 in Madras, Indian-Armenian millionaire Shahamir Shahamiryan founded the Armenian Printing House. The works of outstanding members of the cluster – Movses Baghramian, Shahamir Shahamirian, Hakob Shahamirian and others – were published there. Those publications were first to publicise the Armenian political philosophy and, later on, they were translated into Russian, Georgian, etc.

- Joseph Emin (1792) – "The Life and Adventures of Joseph Emin" (in English), London.
- Shahamir Shahamiryan (1773) – "Girk Anvanial Vorogait Parats" ("The Book titled the Snare of Glory") (Collection of State Governance Laws – a protot"ypical Constitution).
- Shahamir Shahamiryan (1783) – "Tetrak vor Kochi Nshavak" ("The Booklet of Aims").
- Moses Baghramian (1772) – "Tetrak vor Kochi Hordorak".
- "Armenian-Russian Alliance" draft agreement presented to the government of Russian in the 1780s.

The samples of the books published were sent to Catholicos Simeon of Echmiadzin, to Hovhannes Hasan-Jalalian of Gandzasar, to the King of Georgia Herakl II. Since the Armenian clergy, headed by Catholicos of All Armenians Simeon Yerevantsi, stood against the cluster, they collected and burned all the copies of "Nor Tetrak" and closed the Printing House. Nevertheless, the ideas of Armenian enlighteners gained ground, significantly influencing the development of the Armenian intellectual thought of the 19th century.

The Enlightenment and National Liberation ideas of the Madras cluster were predominantly of utopian nature as they could find no real bases in the Armenian reality of the time.