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EDITORS' FOREWORD

The editorial staff of the journal WISDOM presents its 31st issue to the scientific community. The issue includes publications dedicated to the philosophical issues of social philosophy, philosophy of culture, and law. It is welcome that the issue also includes the Chair of Young Scientist, which is presented by three promising young authors.

The interest and positive feedback on the articles of our Journal within the scientific community, their mentions and references in other scientific publications, testify to their value and

positively motivate our authors. The Editorial Board extends the sincerest gratitude to all the authors, reviewers, professional critics, and assessors of the papers involved.

Given the significance of the underlying principle of pluralism over scientific issues and freedom of speech, we should remember that the authors carry primary responsibility for the viewpoints introduced in their papers, which may not necessarily coincide with those of the Editorial Board.

Editorial Board

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF STEREOTYPING

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Abstract: Globalization, the process of increased interconnectedness among countries, in other words, unification and uniformity of cultures, lifestyles, and customs globally has become the core aim and modus operandi of today's societies, by and large. Globalization is in different areas including culture. Although the globalizing machine imposes general standards and expectations while aiming at dismissing local beliefs, habits and rituals, and ethnic cultures, at times it still has not been able to annihilate traditional as well as national values and dogmas because of which cultural stereotypes emerge, regularly.

Nonetheless, stereotyping is not a new concept in human history. The goal of this article is to shed light on the origin and history of stereotyping throughout various periods and disciplines of human history while raising awareness about the urgency of safeguarding ethnic and local customs through stereotyping, amid globalizations.

Keywords: stereotyping, stereotypes, history, era, culture, human societies.

Introduction

We will discuss culture, cultural generalization, and the difference between cultural generalization and stereotyping. Culture is considered a universal aspect of human societies, and no society exists without its own set of shared values, beliefs, practices, and behaviors that form its culture. Shared values and behaviors may lead to the formation of cultural generalizations, but they must not be considered or lead to stereotyping.

Let's begin our discussion by explaining culture in general. The APA Dictionary of Psychology describes culture as "values, beliefs, language, rituals, traditions, and other behaviors

that are passed from one generation to another within any social group" (American Psychological Association, n.d.). Thus, cultural groups could include groups based on shared identities such as ethnicity, gender, age, socioeconomic class, education, etc.

Being aware of and understanding the patterns of the cultures to which one belongs provides the basis for understanding other cultures. Nonetheless, while learning about other cultures we tend to generalize and categorize members of the same group as having similar characteristics. Cultural generalizations, however, must not be confused with stereotypes. Cultural generalization is a statement about a group of people and involves categorizing members of the same

group as having similar characteristics. Generalizations are flexible and allow for the integration of new cultural information. They are a type of hypothesis, or guess, of what we expect to encounter when we interact with a certain culture (Bennett, 2013).

A cultural generalization, however, may become a stereotype if it is definitively applied to individual members of a group. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, the stereotype in social science means; “a fixed, oversimplified, and often biased belief about a group of people. Stereotypes are typically rationally unsupported generalizations, and, once a person becomes accustomed to stereotypical thinking, he or she may not be able to see individuals for who they are. Stereotypes can legitimize hostility against a whole social group. In addition, because stereotypes are ingrained in the culture, people begin learning stereotypes during childhood, they tend to signal which social groups are presumably appropriate targets for relieving individual frustration” (Britannica, 2024).

Social psychologists believe that stereotyping is a by-product of normal cognitive processes that help us to order, simplify, and hence better understand the complex world around us. A stereotype is therefore simply an association of attributes with a certain group of people (Yamamoto & Glaveanu, 2012).

Stereotypes are learned and can be taught or reinforced by people through many different social influences, including but not limited to friends and family, neighbors, teachers, peer groups, as well as larger societal structures.

Literature Review

The term stereotype comes from the French adjective: *stéréotype*. *Stéré* – correlates to *Stere* in English; meaning “solid.” (Marriam-Webster, n.d.).

Oxford English Dictionary defines a stereotype as a widely held but fixed and oversimplified image or idea of a particular type of person or thing (Oxford English Dictionary, 2024).

Marriam Webster, Inc. describes stereotype as “a standardized mental picture that represents an oversimplified opinion, a prejudiced attitude, or an unconsidered judgment about someone or something” (Marriam-Webster, n.d.).

But before there were stereotypes about people, stereotypes were made of metal and found in printers’ shops. During the late 18th century, an ever-increasing demand for printed material was met with innovation: the stereotype was a kind of printing plate that could be one of many. The process of creating a stereotype began with the original kind of plate, which was then used as a base to create a mold made of a mat or papier-mâché. The mold was strong enough to be used for casting multiple stereotypes from hot metal. The solid, hardwearing stereotypes could then be used over and over to print multiple pages (Marriam-Webster, n.d.).

Outside of printing, it should be noted that the actual term was used as early as 1824 to refer to formalized behavior, and by the early part of the twentieth century it was regularly used to refer to rigid, repetitive, often rhythmic behavior patterns (Schneider, 2005). It was in 1922 that “stereotype” was first used in the modern psychological sense by American political reporter and commentator Walter Lippmann (Mann, 2016). Lippmann viewed stereotypes as general cognitive structures, and he used the term to explain errors and biases in our conceptions of the world (Schneider, 2005).

In his 1922 book “Public Opinion”, Lippmann asked and answered an important question: can people achieve a basic understanding of political affairs given their limited exposure and knowledge of the necessary information? His answer was that no, we cannot because people do not always process information correctly or completely. Lippman stated that we proceed information with preconceived notions and allow evidence and assessments we are surrounded with to represent complex ideas. Lippmann identified that humans do not approach information as a blank slate. Instead, we focus on a particular and sometimes singular trait in an individual and fill in the rest of our mental picture of that person. In other words, Lippman suggested that to avoid information overload, people are forced to summarize and be selective and to use generalizations to form notions and understandings of groups rather than of individuals – that is, to rely on stereotypes (Lippmann, 1922).

Once delving into the history of stereotyping we discover that stereotyping has had extensive and lengthy roots throughout the human jour-

ney.

One of the most common stereotypes about the human past times is during the “Prehistoric” hunter-gatherer era when men did the hunting while women did the gathering. That gendered division of labor would have provided the meat and plant foods people needed to survive.

Stereotyping has had its presence during the “Ancient History” era. There is a large indication that slavery, the most ancient form of stereotyping, was established by the time the first civilizations emerged. During the ancient historical period in Egypt, kings held a unique position in Egyptian society. Kings were considered somewhere in between human and divine. They were believed to have been chosen by the gods themselves to serve as their mediators on earth.

Classifying people seems to have existed even in ancient Greece. Social class divisions were considerably definite and distinct. In the Roman Empire, the primary social classes were patricians (upper class, wealthy landowners, and nobility), plebeians (common people, including farmers, craftsmen, and traders), and slaves. More so, within the Roman social structure, there was the equestrian class which consisted of wealthy businessmen and former cavalrymen, often considered a middle ground between patricians and plebeians (Mark, 2019). Socrates, a Greek philosopher and founder of Western philosophy suggested that women are generally weaker than men in terms of physical strength and intellectual capacity (Collette, 2018). Aristotle defended slavery stating that to be just, social norms must reflect what is natural. There are people in any society who cannot deliberate and are suited for slavery, Aristotle said (Lowe, 2019).

In “Spartacus”, one of Hollywood’s well-known critical and commercial success movies, we see that the most unpleasant work of the Roman republics is done by slaves.

In ancient Mesopotamia, where Abraham, the father of many nations and religions, including Judaism, Christianity, and Islam lived, people were often identified and stereotyped based on their tribal affiliations, such as the Israelites, Canaanites, or Egyptians. Nomadic herders could have faced stereotypes from settled agricultural communities, who saw nomads as uncivilized or untrustworthy. The patriarchal society of Abraham’s time often stereotyped women

into specific roles, like Sarah, Abraham’s wife, who was expected to produce an heir.

Moses’ early life, before he was chosen by God, was marked by several significant events which by today’s standards can be deemed stereotypical conduct and beliefs. At the time, the Pharaoh’s stereotyped belief and prediction had made him fearful of Hebrews and had ordered the killing of newborn Hebrew boys because he feared that the Israelites would become too numerous and take over Egypt. Fearful of his son’s fate, Moses’ mother thought of a way to save her newborn son, put her baby in a basket and hid the basket in the Nile River. Pharaoh’s daughter discovered the basket and raised Moses in Pharaoh’s palace where slaves carried out the harshest labor duties. One day, Moses saw an Egyptian beating an Israelite slave. It is noteworthy that during the time of the Pharaohs, slaves were considered property and were viewed as commodities to be bought and sold, with their human qualities often disregarded and their primary purpose being to serve as labor for their masters. Unable to bear this cruelty and inequitable treatment Moses killed the Egyptian taskmaster and returned to his people to lead them out of slavery.

During Jesus’ time, the Romans controlled Jerusalem and the surrounding areas. The Romans put their own governors in charge of ruling the people. Each governor had to make sure that the Jewish people of Palestine obeyed Roman laws. Jewish people were obligated to pay Romans taxes, the revenues of which were used to fund the pagan worship of the Romans instead of the Jewish temples indicating the superiority of the Roman Gods. Social class distinctions were quite sharp at that time, as well. There was the wealthy upper class consisting of aristocratic families, high priests, and landowners, a large peasant class of farmers and laborers such as fishermen, stone masters, and carpenters, and a marginalized poor class including orphans, widows, the disabled, and social outcasts like prostitutes (Jenkins, 2023).

A thriving community of Jewish tribes existed in pre-Islamic Arabia. Some Arab women in Yathrib/Medina believing that Jewish people were more intelligent than Arabs are said to have vowed to make their child a Jew if the child survived since they considered the Jews to be people “of knowledge and the book” (Lumen

Learning, 2019.

The “Middle Ages” continues to have defined gender roles, significant religious conflicts, cruel social class divisions, and discrimination which by today’s standards would have been considered extreme stereotyping. During the medieval years, men were brave knights in shining armor and conquerors; women were beautiful princesses longing to be rescued and conquered. Men were active, martial, warriors, and violent; women were passive, domestic, and social. During the medieval years, cruel and brutal social class divisions also existed where kings, royals, the clergy, and knights were considered the upper class, the middle class was composed of merchants, skilled artisans, and lower clergy, and the lower class was made up of primary peasants and agricultural labors. The lower class constituted most of the population and were forced to face the harshest living conditions.

“The Crusaders” were a series of strictly religious wars initiated by the Roman Catholic Church where European Christian armies attempted to not only recover the city of Jerusalem from Islamic rule but also to subjugate the populations of the world and spread new empires.

During this period, we witness the stereotypical treatment of medieval Jews, including their legalized murder by the state based on community rumors and lies as racial acts. Moreover, we can see Medieval racial thinking in art and sculptures, in maps, in saints’ lives, in the state legislature, church laws, social institutions, popular beliefs, economic practices, religious treatises, many kinds of literature, and more (Bale, 2006). “Even fellow Christians could be racialized: Gerald of Wales justified England’s invasion of Ireland in the twelfth century by depicting the Irish as a subhuman, savage, and bestial race—a racializing strategy in England’s colonial rule of Ireland that echoed from the medieval through the early Modern period” (Heng, n.d.).

The Medieval period was also a period of thriving international slavery. Caucasian slave women in Al-Andalus (Islamic Spain) gave birth to heirs for Muslim rulers so that for generations, the Caliphs of Córdoba were blond-haired, blue-eyed men (Heng, n.d.) as having a naturally light complexion was stereotypically

considered as more beautiful.

There is a considerable amount of historical work that explores stereotypes in what is known as the “Early Modern” period, from about 1500 to about 1800.

Although religions in general teach us a set of practices to live by, such as being fair and kind to others, however, stereotypes have been part of human religious history, too.

In November 1640, the English poet and politician Sir Benjamin Rudyerd declared, “Under the name of a Puritan all our religion is branded,” highlighting the overwhelming stereotypical belief of religious or sectarian superiority and the impact of the Puritan that began to gain popularity by 1603, the end of Queen Elizabeth I’s reign. The Puritans were members of a religious reform movement known as Puritanism that emerged within the Church of England in the late 16th century and sought to free the Church of England from Roman Catholic practices, stating that the Church of England had not been fully reformed and should become more Protestant (Knights, 2014).

Stereotypes were widespread in the “Early Modern” period and were hardly limited to the sphere of domestic religious politics. There were stereotypical representations of the poor, the foreigner, the monopolist, the woman. In the Age of Enlightenment, post-Reformation religious stereotypes served as interrogative tools for representing non-Christian “others”. Stereotyping could be found in almost every sphere of life in the early modern period—in politics, religion, the market, and even in the area of learning (Lake & Yamamoto, 2019).

Stereotypes were often depicted in art, literature, and theater of the time, reinforcing these perceptions within society. Social hierarchies contributed to the creation and continuation of stereotypes, with dominant groups often portraying marginalized groups negatively. As Shakespeare demonstrated in “The Merchant of Venice,” the English imparted well-known contemporary prejudices and stereotypes on those of African descent based solely on their dark complexion. Similarly, the domineering presence of Shylock in “The Merchant of Venice” reinforces the historical oppression of the Jews through their storied turbulent relationship with Christians. (Radford, 2004)

Other examples of early modern stereotypes

are: “The Greedy Jew” where Jews were frequently stereotyped as obsessed with money and power, “The Savage Native” where indigenous people were often portrayed as uncivilized and barbaric, “The Lazy Peasant” where peasants were commonly depicted as lazy and unintelligent, “The Hysterical Woman” where women were often stereotyped as emotionally unstable and prone to hysteria.

Sadly, man’s hatred and stereotypical discrimination towards his human species continued well into its “Modern” history in many different shapes and orders. The lawful institution of slavery consisting of primarily Africans and African Americans was established in the United States of America from its founding days during the Modern period of our history.

During the United States’ pre-Civil War South in the 1830s, lynching was a common occurrence of extrajudicial killings. During the 19th and 20th centuries, lynchings were violent public performances that white people used to intimidate and control Black people, particularly in the South. Lynchings typically involved images of Black men and women hanging from trees, but they involved other extreme brutality, such as torture, mutilation, decapitation, and desecration. Some victims were burned alive. White mobs often used dubious criminal accusations to justify lynchings, for example, sexual misconduct against white women by a black man or charges of fabricated rape. These allegations were used to enforce segregation and promote stereotypes of Black men as violent, hypersexual aggressors. Many victims of lynchings were murdered without being accused of any crime. They were killed for violating social customs or racial expectations, such as speaking to white people with less respect than what white people believed they deserved (Dray, 2003).

Comedic performances of “Blackness” by whites in exaggerated costumes and make-up, can be bridged to racial stereotyping. By distorting the features and culture of African Americans including their looks, language, dance, demeanor, and character white Americans were able to classify whiteness across class and geopolitical lines. The first musical shows were performed in the 1830s in New York by white performers with blackened faces who used burnt cork or shoe polish and torn clothing to

“resemble” blackness and imitated and mimicked enslaved Africans on Southern plantations. These performances portrayed Black people as lazy, ignorant, superstitious, hypersexual, thieves, and timid. Blackface and the codifying of blackness - language, movement, demeanor, and character continue to irradiate through mass media and in public performances today. In addition to the increased popularity of “black” Halloween costumes, colleges and universities across the country continue to battle against student and professor blackface performances (Smithsonian, n.d.).

In the modern era, during the First World War, the battlefields were not the only place where the battles took place. Mass media was another powerful battleground where authorities and societies formed pre-conceived images and ideas about other societies and states. Art, caricatures, and cartoons were widely used before, during, and after the Great War, and in all European countries, to picture a tyrannical or barbaric other. The fate awaiting the Ottoman Empire’s Christian communities was a common theme in the Western press (Puck Magazine, 1985).

The ultimate expression of hatred and violence against a group of people is genocide. In the history of mankind some of the worst and known genocides that have occurred due to religious, racial, and social group stereotypes have taken place in the ongoing era and are the Rwandan Massacre (Hutu discrimination against Tutsis, and ethnic discrimination), the Armenian Genocide (Armenians and Greek murdered because of their religion and ethnicity), The Holocaust (German white supremacy against Jews), the genocide committed by Stalin’s Communist regime in the Soviet Union (millions eradicated in the labor camps because of their political and or social beliefs), and the Indian American genocide. Indigenous people both north and south of America were displaced, died of disease, and were killed by Europeans through slavery, rape, and war because the settlers treated Native Americans with a belief in white superiority and supremacy.

As we have seen so far stereotyping is a pervasive and persistent human tendency that stems from a basic cognitive need to categorize, simplify, and process the complex world and continues to exist even in today’s globalized and

equal world.

Today, there are a substantial number of people who are still trapped in modern-day human slavery which is also called “human trafficking”. The United Nations defines human trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons by improper means (such as force, abduction, fraud, or coercion) for an improper purpose including forced labor or sexual exploitation (End Slavery, n.d.).

Human trafficking takes various forms. Human trafficking is when employees working in private homes are forced into working and/or wrongfully convinced that they have no option of leaving. Human trafficking is when women, men, or children are forced to work in the commercial sex industry and are held against their will by force. Even today, there are instances where human beings are forced to work under the threat of violence and for no pay. These slaves are treated as property and are used, abused, and misused. Sometimes, children become subject to forced labor, domestic servitude, or sex trafficking. When women and children are forced to marry another without their consent or against their will is also a form of human trafficking (End Slavery, n.d.). Slavery or human trafficking are clear results of social order differentiation and stereotypes where the weak, the needy, and the unprotected are exploited, and abused for personal or corporate goals and benefits.

Another sphere where stereotypes are still ongoing today is politics. Stereotyping in politics leads to polarization, prejudice, and discrimination against certain groups of people. More recent events influenced by stereotyping include the two major political upheavals of 2016: the British referendum on membership in the European Union, and the American presidential election that put Donald Trump, a real estate entrepreneur with no prior experience in politics into the White House. In both cases, competing groups stereotyped their opponents as unacceptable parties perpetrating great wrongs. A wide range of stereotypes was rallied to gain support and to attack opponents, stereotypes of immigrants, African Americans, incompetent bureaucrats, metropolitan elites, women, and autocrats (Lake & Yamamoto, 2019).

Healthcare is one of the most crucial services

in any society which helps safeguard individuals’ health and wellbeing and improve quality of life. Sadly, stereotyping in the healthcare industry is visible and ongoing even in the present day. Stereotypes in healthcare can result in inadequate medical treatment, misdiagnosis, and health disparities. Unconscious bias also known as implicit bias which according to the American Psychological Association (n.d.) is an unaware discrimination and bias against a certain group of people that can lead to differential treatment of patients based on various factors such as race, gender, weight, age, education, geographic location, language, income, and financial status. Partiality in healthcare and medical decision-making by healthcare professionals due to stereotypical biases can lead to overuse or underuse of care, which can be harmful to patients and the care they receive.

Furthermore, new stereotypes emerged because of COVID-19 in the global context. COVID-19 has become a threat to physical health and mental health. There have been reports to indicate that COVID-19 is closely related to stigma and discrimination. Daley et al. reported that Asian Americans were facing increasing challenges from different ethnic groups on social issues related to COVID-19 in the United States, and the increasing tendency to blame China for the pandemic was associated with stereotyping Asian people as more foreign (Zhang, Hu, Zhao, Wen, Dang, & Zawisza, 2023).

Social media and online activities are if not the most but a very crucial component of today’s human reality. Stereotypes have found their way to on-screen platforms and spread quickly online, reinforcing harmful biases and prejudices. Social media can promote and amplify stereotypes in many ways. Social media interactions can promote misleading beauty standards which can harm self-esteem, social media platforms can increase exposure to negative gender norms, which can harmfully impact an individual’s well-being, learning, and choices. Social media can stereotype luxury, wealth, comfort, and “fun” standards in general which can impair, damage, or hurt self-esteem causing self-doubt and self-harm in some stances.

We spend considerable time in our workplaces on our daily routines where we associate with our colleagues and bosses, perhaps unwill-

ingly or maybe without extra sweat and effort. Stereotyping though can happen in workplaces also in the form of unconscious or implicit biases on our daily basis. Employees make hundreds of decisions every day. Some of the most common types of implicit bias that occur in the workplace can be in the form of gender bias which happens when a person has a stereotypical belief about someone based solely on their gender. Traditionally, workplace gender bias works against female employees. Managers may overlook women for “tough” assignments. Biased managers for example may choose not to promote a new mother to a more demanding role because they fear the woman won’t have the necessary time or energy to handle both responsibilities. Of course, this type of bias can also affect male employees. Managers might overlook men for “soft” tasks and projects or refuse to give them parental leave to care for a new child. Biases based on appearances and looks happen when employees form conclusions or opinions about their employers based on their appearance. As a result, they may favor certain employees over others due to their looks rather than their skills, experience, or work performance.

Education is the process of acquiring or sharing knowledge, skills, experience, creativity, and intellectual maturity. Education is important because it can help people achieve their goals in life and improve their future well-being. It can also play a crucial role in shaping individuals and societies. Regrettably, stereotypes have found their way into education, too. Stereotypes in education can affect academic expectations, opportunities, and outcomes for students.

Research not only shows that stereotypes can impact a teacher’s behavior towards a student, but they can also impact a teacher’s assessment of a child’s abilities. In recent research on the stereotype that Asian students are better at mathematics than students of other ethnicities, it was found that when an Asian student performs poorly on a mathematics test (which is counter-stereotypical), Asian students were given substantially fewer points by teachers than European students who performed identically (Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000). That is, Asians faced backlash for failing to meet the higher expectations created by a stereotypical belief.

In education, there are other persistent be-

liefs that have negatively affected certain groups of people. One of these stereotypes is that males are better than females in the areas of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), whereas women are better than men in the areas of communication, such as reading comprehension and writing (Kurtz-Costes et al., 2014). Hence, there is an underrepresentation of women in the STEM fields but, not so ironically, the stereotype of men being inferior in the communication field does not harm males (Kurtz-Costes et al., 2014).

Today, the general public demands that their law enforcement and justice system protect them, to stand up against injustice and profiling. Nonetheless, stereotyping in law and justice also may lead to racial profiling, biased sentencing, and unequal treatment under the law. Stereotypes in the legal system have a negative impact on fairness and outcomes for both victims and the accused. Stereotypes affect people at all levels of the justice system, including judges, lawyers, and police officers. Stereotypes can affect their understanding and assessment of violent crimes, their views on witness credibility, and their impartiality. They can be affected by defendants’ characteristics, such as their race, attractiveness, and socioeconomic status. They can be influenced by defendants’ physical attributes, such as dark skin tone, tattoos, and facial untrustworthiness. Implicit (unconscious) racial stereotypes can influence police officers’ decisions, such as whether to stop a car, issue a warning, or make an arrest.

Immigration is considered beneficial to countries because it increases the size of the labor force and the economic output. Although immigrants can be a vital and vibrant addition to any country, they are a common scapegoat for politicians, law enforcement, and others who want to find solutions to their economic, criminal, racial, and social problems. Migrants and refugees face discrimination in many areas of life, such as housing, education, employment, healthcare, and labor because of various reasons such as language barrier, unfamiliarity with the new community and culture, lack of information about local social systems and services, laws and legal obligations, xenophobia, racism, nationality which affect the daily lives of immigrants and contribute to stereotyping.

A person with a disability is commonly

known to be someone who has a long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairment that limits their ability to participate in society on an equal basis with others. In current social settings, people with disabilities face stereotypes and discrimination constantly. People with disabilities in developing countries often are marginalized and live in extreme poverty. During humanitarian emergencies, people with disabilities are frequently left behind, with little or no say in the rebuilding of their lives and communities. (OHCHR, 1996-2024).

As we have inquired thus far, gender stereotypes have existed throughout human history and varied across cultures and time. Gender stereotypes are generalized ideas about the characteristics and roles that men and women should have or possess and are influenced by various factors. Gender stereotypes can be harmful and lead to discrimination, limiting people's expectations, abilities, and opportunities.

There has long been a division of labor based on gender, and it still exists both in advancing societies and in more socioeconomically advanced and complex societies (Wood & Eagly, 2012). In the domestic sphere, women have performed most of the routine domestic work and played the major caretaker role. In the workplace, women have tended to be employed in people-oriented, service occupations rather than things-oriented, competitive occupations, which have traditionally been occupied by men (Lippa et al., 2014). There is no question that a great deal of progress has been made toward gender equality, and this progress is particularly evident in the workplace. There also is no question that the goal of full gender equality has not yet been achieved, not in pay (AAUW, 2024) or position level. As a result, men are characterized as more practicable than women, taking charge and being in control, and women are characterized as more communal than men, being attuned to others and building relationships (Broverman et al., 1972; Eagly & Steffen, 1984).

Gender stereotypes are used not only to characterize others but also to characterize oneself (Bem, 1974). The process of self-stereotyping can influence people's identities to be consistent with learned or existent stereotypes. Stereotyped characteristics can thereby be internalized and become part of a person's gender identity, a major part of the self-concept (Wood

& Eagly, 2012). Young boys and girls learn about gender stereotypes from their immediate environment and the media, and they learn how to behave in gender-appropriate ways. These socialization experiences no doubt continue to have their influence later in life and, indeed, research has shown that men's and women's self-characterizations differ in ways that are stereotype-consistent (Bem, 1974).

Ageism is one of the last socially acceptable prejudices. Psychologists are working to change that. Ageism is defined as discrimination against older people because of negative and inaccurate stereotypes and it is so ingrained in our cultures that we often do not even notice. Most organizations now have diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) departments to tackle issues such as racism and gender bias (American Psychological Association, 2023).

While both social and cultural stereotypes involve generalized beliefs about a group of people, the key difference is that social stereotypes focus on broader social categories while cultural stereotypes are specifically tied to a particular ethnicity, nationality, or cultural group. On top of the social stereotypes stated above and despite technological advances and global commonality, continuous talks and efforts for cultural unification and homogeneity, political rivalries and divergence for power and ideology, battles and struggles for national preservation, cultural sustainability, regional individuality and national identity in the form of local, ethnic and national stereotypes continue to exist because culture is generational wealth. It is the collective knowledge of humankind and the foundation of each nation that has been inherited from generations.

Tajfel and Turner's (1986) social identity theory speculates that people derive part of their self-esteem from their group memberships. Moreover, an individual's identity development is rooted in a particular time and place (Erickson, 1968) and according to Eric Erickson's (1968) developmental theory, achieving a clearer sense of one's identity through an active process of self-examination (i.e., exploration) provides individuals with a greater sense of self-assurance and inner strength, and other psychosocial benefits.

Hence, we learn that although native Americans were subjected to forced displacement

from their lands by newcomers, they are still working vehemently to preserve their heritage by ensuring that laws protecting tribal culture are enforced and expanded. There are hundreds of tribes and indigenous people in India who have and employ their language and local customs. Tribes in India often face significant challenges in preserving their culture due to factors like displacement from their traditional lands because of development projects, assimilation into the dominant Hindu society, limited access to resources, and economic hardship, leading to a struggle to maintain their unique customs and identities. Tibetans were subjected to occupation and many human rights violations by the Chinese government only because the Chinese government viewed incorporating Tibet as important to consolidate its frontiers and address national defense concerns in its borders. In response Tibetan spiritual leader, Dalai Lama, worked to preserve Tibetan identity in many ways and publicized their plight on the world stage. The Israeli/Palestinian military and political conflict which has had its origins in the rise of Zionism in Europe and the consequent first arrival of Jewish settlers to Ottoman Palestine in 1882 is still ongoing because of land and self-determination within the territory of the former Palestine. Following Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity, Russia occupied Ukrainian lands and since then Ukrainians have been fighting Russian aggression aiming at preserving their national identity and land.

Conclusion

The existence of common stereotypes has infused cultures and affected individuals' perceptions and judgments throughout human history. I don't think we can deny that being raised in a specific social, cultural, and national context has an impact on the way we behave, observe, absorb, and interpret others in general and their behaviors per se. We implicitly put into practice some rules, we implicitly may practice cultural, and social stereotypes. Stereotypes continue to be a big problem in every society. Stereotyping puts labels on how a person should act or live according to their sex, race, personality, political views, religion, national identity, (dis)ability, and other facts. This could affect individuals

who like different things or do different activities or have unique cultural beliefs but feel ashamed of doing so because of stereotypes. Stereotypes can get in the way of people getting jobs, living healthy and prosperous lives, leading to social exclusion, and creating biased in-groups and out-groups.

On the other hand, we must bear in mind that some local, national, and ethnic stereotypes promote cultural security, sustainability, and continuity. Cultural preservation is important because it helps safeguard cultural identity in the face of globalization, modernization, and other forces that may threaten unique customs and ways of life.

Cultural preservation ensures the survival of cultural heritage for future generations. It gives the members of a specific group a feeling of connection and oneness which is crucial to an individual's psychological wellbeing.

In today's world, globalization has taken hold of our entire existence. Globalization is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it allows even the smallest countries and nations to flourish economically and culturally, on the other hand, it creates a phenomenon of consolidation of expectations, of demands, and of the perceptions of other nations, race, and sexual orientations.

To combat stereotyping in today's world, it's essential to promote diversity and inclusion, encourage empathy, challenge biases, support education and critical thinking, adopt and inspire open-mindedness and curiosity, and engage in respectful dialogue and relationships.

Combating a two-edged sword can be both risky and difficult. It must become the goal of every scholar and ultimately every system and governance to find a way to promote tolerance within societies and implement impartiality and fairness towards all forms, shapes, colors, and beliefs of human beings while respecting individual and cultural-ethnic-racial differences and variations.

As we consider the tremendous challenges facing our planet, ongoing struggles for social, racial, and environmental justice, and the pursuit of peace globally, we should also consider more closely the wisdom traditions and ethnic traditions that have endured the turbulence of history.

As a final point let's remember, "Everyone

wants to be seen. Everyone wants to be heard. Everyone wants to be recognized as the person that they are and not a stereotype or an image.” Loretta Lynch, United States Attorney General.

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PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SOCIAL NEUROTICISM, ANXIETY, AND SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING

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Abstract: The problem of social neuroticism is one of the key problems that unites a wide variety of psychological phenomena. Social neuroticism is interconnected with both personal traits and social processes. Often, the phenomenon of social neuroticism is interpreted as a high level of anxiety, a tendency to reduce adaptability and stress resistance, as well as instability and disharmony in social behavior. The phenomenon of social neuroticism is closely related to subjective well-being assessments and is characterized by distortions and negative shades in perceptions of well-being. Over the past century, psychologists, philosophers, and other researchers in the field of anthropology have paid increasing attention to the social manifestations of neuroticism. Not only the importance of the social factors of neuroticism is emphasized, but also the existential significance of this phenomenon, which is becoming more and more characteristic of the subjective well-being perceptions of modern man. To understand the multifaceted manifestations and characterizations of social neuroticism, it is necessary to consider the phenomenon from the perspective of the development of philosophical thought, to uncover both the personal-psychological and external-social factors that form the basis of a person's vital activity, which shape the social perceptions and meanings of neuroticism.

Keywords: social neuroticism, anxiety, subjective well-being, frustration, adaptation, emotionality.

Introduction

Neuroticism is one of the individual psychological characteristics of a person. This phenomenon implies both innate properties and those acquired during a person's life, which in turn determine the main direction of activity.

Neuroticism is a personality trait that is often characterized by emotional instability, high anxiety, low self-esteem, and sometimes autonomic disorders (Khodayarifard & Fatemi, 2013; Quan et al., 2024; Wiebe et al., 2018).

In a broader sense, neuroticism is understood as the inability to regulate one's negative emo-

tions. In turn, negative emotions can arise in cases where people believe that they are not coping with the achievement of their intended goals. Basically, neuroticism is associated with increased emotionality of the individual, which can be stimulated by both individual and social prerequisites (Turiano et al., 2020; Weiss & Deary, 2019; Widiger & Oltmanns, 2017). To characterize the social component of neuroticism, we will present modern trends in the definition of neuroticism.

Elliot and Thrash (2002) found that neuroticism, negative emotionality, and behavioral inhibition are manifested in a phenomenon called by the authors “avoidance temperament”. Also, some studies have found that in many cases, there is a positive dynamic in the development of neuroticism in stress reactions, in many life situations when a person can suffer failure or disappointment (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Khan et al., 2021; Li et al., 2023; Maffini & Pham, 2016). Since neuroticism is an indicator of emotional stability, the main empirical components of neuroticism are often indicated by excitability and emotionality. Neuroticism is also closely related to the level of lability, for the diagnosis of which various methods are used.

The method of H. J. Eysenck and S. B. G. Eysenck (1969) diagnoses neuroticism, along with extroversion and introversion, as one of the personality indicators, which determines the level of emotional stability of the individual. Emotional stability is observed, as a rule, in the presence of low neuroticism scores. As an indicator of emotional stability, neuroticism is responsible for the degree of formation of organized behavior of the individual in various stressful situations. In other words, a low degree of neuroticism is accompanied by problem-free adaptation to external, social conditions and the absence of a high level of anxiety and tension. With increased results, neuroticism will be expressed in such indicators as: low degree of adaptation, anxiety, absent-mindedness, nervousness, rapid mood swings, and so on. A little later, G. Eysenck found out that the level of neuroticism, as a social component, directly affects the emergence of habits. With increased emotionality, a person will be more inclined to form some habits.

The nature and causes of the formation of

neuroticism have been studied by many specialists in the field of psychology. As a cause of the development of neuroticism, Z. Freud identified the limitations of natural human desires, such as sexual and aggressive instincts, which contribute to the satisfaction and discharge of the psyche (Freud, 1927). This position became the basis for the philosophical understanding of neuroticism as an individual psychological phenomenon that manifests itself under the pressure of social norms and attitudes. The definition of neuroticism, in essence, expresses a comprehensive understanding of the mental health of an individual, which is a kind of symbiosis of internal individual and external social processes of personality formation. Thus, the suppression of natural human drives, according to Freud, can be caused by the influence of education, social pressure and condemnation. A person can feel internal discomfort for a long time, which can be hidden under the external appearance of well-being. A person begins to feel dissatisfaction with himself, a subjective perception of unhappiness arises. A negative emotional attitude gradually also affects the relationship of the individual with others. It is no coincidence that Freud attributed the phenomenon of neuroticism to obsessive religiosity, which became widespread in the form of the term “individual religiosity” - a kind of symbiosis of intra- and extra-personal needs and fears. From this point of view, the modern understanding of social neuroticism borders on the definition of a feeling of extreme dependence (Otto, 1937) and anxiety. The religious interpretation of neuroticism has become an expression of the frustration of any need of the individual.

Z. Freud's (1927) position was soon developed in various theoretical and philosophical approaches. A. Adler (2012) expressed the opinion that the suppression of social needs of the individual is a prerequisite for the development of neuroticism. However, the author considered social limitations of needs on a par with the limitations of biological needs. One of the examples of the suppression of social needs, Adler called the limitation of the need for dominance, which can be expressed not only at the communicative and adaptive levels, but also at the individual-psychological level, expressed in an inferiority complex and low self-esteem. Along with the development of an inferiority

complex, there is a need for self-expression and self-realization, which is accompanied by pronounced vulnerability, aggressiveness and a low assessment of subjective well-being, which ultimately increases the level of neuroticism. The social component of the phenomenon of neuroticism was emphasized by F. Perls (1942/1992), who identified social conditions that limit the individual as the main factor in the development of neuroticism, which are norms and stereotypes of behavior in conjunction with the suppression of one's desires and needs. These negative social factors, according to the author, can lead to a negative transformation of the emotional life of the individual and the assessment of well-being.

The social side of neuroticism from the point of view of social restrictions was also studied by K. Horney (1950). The author noted that social stereotypes of behavior, according to which women are the most vulnerable in modern society, suppress their self-esteem and force them to act according to the regulations and social norms, where the main rights and freedoms are reserved for men. As a result of "limited" socialization, negative emotional states, mood swings, and low assessment of subjective well-being can often be diagnosed among women. These stress factors, as a rule, lead to an increase in the level of neuroticism, expressed in a low level of professional activity, difficulties in family communication, low self-esteem, low degree of subjective wellbeing, etc..

Social Neuroticism and Anxiety

As already mentioned above, philosophical and theoretical interpretations of neuroticism come down to certain formulations of personality anxiety. Neuroticism in many psychological studies is defined as a permanent personality state, characterized by a stable tendency to experience negative emotions: fear and anxiety. Many philosophers have also compared personality neuroticism to anxiety. Viktor Frankl (1959) saw the relationship between neuroticism and anxiety in the following way, saying that phobias and obsessive-compulsive neuroses are partly due to attempts to avoid a situation that causes anxiety.

Philosophers who analyzed topics such as

anxiety and neuroticism usually did not seek to create abstract systems; they were more interested in the existential conflicts and crises that accompany human life. In modern studies, there is also a tendency to consider the neuroticism of a person against the background of anxiety and to evaluate these two phenomena as interconnected in a single existential context.

Jean-Paul Sartre (1957) drew attention to anxiety as a permanent state characteristic of human existence. Anxiety is caused by the need for choice, the lack of justification, and responsibility. As Sartre noted, the feeling of anxiety can free us from boredom, can sharpen our perception, it creates tension on which human existence is based. The presence of anxiety in a person's feelings shows that the person is alive continues the struggle to find solutions in difficult situations. Sartre identified the absence of anxiety with the end of the person's self-expression, when the person no longer copes with the difficult situation in any way. Among the negative psychological phenomena resulting from the absence of anxiety, the posthumous emphasized nervous tension, disorders, depression, etc.

Anxiety, from a philosophical point of view, appears when a person realizes the existential danger of existence. This, as we will see, is similar to Kierkegaard's (1992) idea that anxiety is "the fear of nothingness." Philosophical interpretations of anxiety generally boil down to attempts to make sense of life. Usually, the threat of the meaninglessness of life is perceived as a threat to the Self (Goldstein, 1971). But when a person accepts this anxiety the challenge, when he sees the threat of the meaninglessness of existence and resists this threat, he feels his own I more strongly. This sharpens the perception of the person, which is directed towards himself, towards his own being, which is different from the world of non-existence or the world of objects. And if anxiety arises during the person's resistance to the threat of meaninglessness, then social neuroticism appears as a result of this resistance, which manifests itself through frustration in the meaning of life and a negative transformation of the I-concept.

In the works of Benedict Spinoza (2002), we see that it is possible to overcome fear through reason. Spinoza considered fear to be a purely subjective matter, an expression of a person's

mental state or attitude. He contrasts fear with hope; according to his thought, both phenomena characterize a person in doubt. Fear is a “uncertain torment” associated with the thought that something unpleasant will happen to us, while hope is a “uncertain pleasure” associated with the thought that our desire will be fulfilled. He argues that fear cannot exist without hope and vice versa.

Sometimes Spinoza comes very close to the problem of anxiety, for example, when he contrasts fear with hope. The simultaneous presence of a feeling of fear and hope, which persists in a person for a certain time, is one of the aspects of the psychic conflict that many psychologists characterize as anxiety.

S. Kierkegaard is one of the largest representatives of the irrationalist trend that developed in 19th-century philosophy. Kierkegaard, like Freud, realized the need to distinguish between fear and anxiety, finding that fear is a reaction to a specific danger, while anxiety is to an unknown and unspecified danger.

S. Kierkegaard believed that anxiety is our “best teacher”. He believed that anxiety arises when new opportunities appear for a person.

In Kierkegaard’s central idea presented is the relationship between anxiety and freedom. Kierkegaard is convinced that “anxiety can always be understood only in its connection with human freedom.” He notes that anxiety is the state of a person who has come face to face with his freedom. He even claims that anxiety is “the possibility of freedom.” Every time a person imagines possibilities, anxiety arises at the same time. And anxiety inevitably arises in situations where it is necessary to confront the external world. It is in this sense that many authors began to distinguish between anxiety and neuroticism. The first concept is interpreted in the context of Kierkegaard’s concept of confrontation, and neuroticism, on the contrary, with the absence of confrontation. According to Kierkegaard (1992), anxiety is always accompanied by a feeling of guilt, since both are associated with the realization of possibilities and the higher the creative potential of a person, the more capable he is of feeling anxiety and guilt. Neuroticism, on the contrary, is accompanied by a stable psychological state of the person, which is characterized by a decrease or weakening of the

ability to cope, realize opportunities, and creative potential. In other words, although the concept of neuroticism perhaps includes a psychological assessment of anxiety, negative feelings, nevertheless, the psychological foundations of the emergence of neuroticism and anxiety are different. The key point of this difference is explained by the degree of a person’s resistance to the external world, challenges, and threats. The weaker a person’s resistance to the external challenges of life, the more and more social neuroticism is expressed, and anxiety ceases to be a guiding factor in the realization of life’s “possibilities” and is manifested only in the stably expressed neurotic personal qualities of a person (Hanifah & Nugraha, 2022).

Heidegger, speaking about the anxieties of a person, also distinguishes some aspects of anxiety, calling them fear and horror in the interpretation of the latter concept, emphasizing the function of overcoming life’s difficulties and obstacles. For both Heidegger and existentialists, the experience of anxiety not only frees a person from immobile conformism but also reveals his essence as a person responsible for existence, capable of decisive action.

Social Neuroticism and Subjective Wellbeing

Philosophical definitions of life situations that entail negative emotional states have gradually moved into the field of psychology, which studies the psychological health of the individual. The scientific interests of psychologists and psychotherapists, which previously focused on certain mental phenomena, have gradually begun to transform into more comprehensive theoretical approaches. And, accordingly, psychological science has been enriched with intra- and interdisciplinary complex studies (Alexandrova & Fabian, 2022; Lauinger, 2021; Sirgy, 2018). Psychological phenomena of neuroticism and anxiety have begun to be studied in the context of psychological well-being and health of people. The growth of scientific interest in this issue increased in the second half of the 20th century. Certain psychological criteria of health were developed. This subsequently led to the emergence of a number of studies of various aspects of psychological health, and in particular, psychological well-being.

The theoretical and philosophical basis for defining the phenomenon of psychological well-being was laid by the American psychologist N. Bradburn (1965). He defined this phenomenon as a balance between two sets of emotions accumulated throughout life, positive and negative. For such a definition of psychological wellbeing, in some way, the philosophical understanding of anxiety as a driving force for self-realization of the individual served as the basis. The dual interpretation of this phenomenon allowed understanding psychological well-being from the point of view of a comprehensive, positive, and negative study of emotions. Further understanding of the phenomenon of psychological well-being was facilitated by the works of W. Tov and E. Diener (2007), who introduced the concept of “subjective wellbeing”. Subjective wellbeing, according to the author, consists of three main components: satisfaction, a set of pleasant emotions (pleasant affect), and a set of unpleasant emotions (unpleasant affect). Despite the similarity of interpretations of the structure of psychological well-being and the structure of subjective well-being, W. Tov and E. Diener still do not consider them as direct analogues. He believes that subjective well-being is only a component of psychological well-being, noting that additional characteristics need to be introduced to describe the latter. Another author who contributed to the study of psychological well-being was the American researcher C. Ryff (1989). Based on the research of N. Bradburn, she developed her structure of well-being. C. Ryff identified six main components of psychological wellbeing: self-acceptance, positive relationships with others, autonomy, environmental management, purpose in life, and personal growth.

Many researchers have noted the variable nature of subjective wellbeing, the level of which was determined not only by the degree of satisfaction with life or personal growth, but also by the degree of expression of social neuroticism and anxiety (Mallillin et al., 2021; Shanionov & Beskova, 2018; Sirgy, 2018). Many researchers have noted the variable nature of subjective wellbeing, the level of which was determined not only by the degree of satisfaction with life or personal growth, but also by the degree of expression of social neuroticism and anxiety (Hakobyan et al., 2022; Alexandrova & Fabian, 2022; Hakobyan et al., 2023). In other words,

subjective well-being was assessed from the standpoint of the individual's readiness to withstand and overcome life's difficulties, which is manifested in a decrease in the level of social neuroticism and anxiety.

Thus, neuroticism significantly affects the health of the individual and becomes a risk factor for personality maladjustment, as well as the formation of addictive or antisocial behavior.

Conclusion

Philosophical interpretations of social neuroticism, anxiety, and subjective well-being revealed certain tendencies in the definitions of these phenomena. The phenomenon of anxiety is understood in two ways: with positive and negative emotional direction.

- ✓ Anxiety is presented as:
 - a guiding factor in the realization of life's “possibilities”,
 - a reaction to an unknown and unspecified danger.
 - a “sense” of freedom.
- ✓ The phenomenon of social neuroticism is a relatively new concept. In philosophical and psychological studies of neuroticism, the following social components of the phenomenon under study can be distinguished, namely:
 - priority of external events in the formation or change of behavior,
 - overestimation of the significance of appearance,
 - low self-esteem,
 - low assessment of subjective wellbeing,
 - communication difficulties.
- ✓ Subjective wellbeing is
 - satisfaction,
 - sets of pleasant and unpleasant emotions,
 - degree of social neuroticism and anxiety.

Expressed individual psychological symptoms of neuroticism, such as increased anxiety, emotional instability, and decreased emotional intelligence, imply the use of psycho-correction methods to restore mental balance and improve the quality of life. In the course of psychotherapeutic work, it is necessary to pay attention to solving the problems of tension and regulating emotions. Corrective work is carried out with an

emphasis on the formation of a positive worldview and the development of an adequate response to environmental stimuli. In other words, the correction of an increased level of neuroticism involves emphasizing the social component of neuroticism and activating socially significant models of behavior and thinking in order to increase the adaptive capabilities of the human psyche.

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FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INFORMATION AND ITS ROLE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES

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Abstract: The information revolution has produced a new type of society, called the information society. Researchers of all persuasions emphasize the decisive role of information and knowledge in this society. Information has always played a significant role in social development, but only true information has contributed to social progress. The principal value of information is truth. Only true information allows human beings to comprehend objective reality and to make correct decisions. In the era of information conflicts and wars, information has become a powerful tool of manipulation and propaganda. If a society is not provided with true information and is unprepared to deal with the vast and ever-growing volume of information, it loses the ability to see and understand reality, finding itself instead in an illusory world.

Keywords: information, knowledge, information society, information conflict, information war, manipulation, propaganda.

The nuances of interpreting the concept of the “information society,” as found among various researchers, do not alter the general consensus regarding the role of information. All agree in characterizing the information society as a “society of the dominance of information and knowledge”. Daniel Bell, in his *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (1973), did not directly equate the post-industrial society with the “information society.” Nevertheless, he explicitly noted that the role and significance of knowledge depend on the level of informatization of society. Later, in his book *The Social Framework of the Information Society*, Bell described information as the strategic resource of post-industrial

society (Bell, 1986, pp. 330–342). By “information” he understood not merely a sum of facts and data, but rather new possibilities embodied in human beings: information becomes accessible to virtually every individual, not just to a privileged class. Like Bell, Alvin Toffler also regarded information as the principal productive resource of post-industrial society, emphasizing the importance of its processing and reproduction.

The development of information and telecommunication technologies has greatly influenced the processes of creating, transmitting, and disseminating information, but the role and impact of information are by no means limited to the technical sphere. Today,

every meaningful activity is built on informational interaction. The ever-expanding technical capabilities allow individuals not only to independently select sources of information but even to create them. Theoretically, an individual with a powerful computer connected to global information networks possesses immense opportunities to disseminate information and to influence public life. Modern man is not only a consumer of information but also a creator. Contemporary society is thus characterized as saturated with information and, at the same time, dependent upon it.

“Information” is one of the fundamental concepts of modern science. This is evidenced not only by the widespread use of the term across diverse fields of knowledge, but also by the efforts of many scholars - mathematicians, philosophers, sociologists, specialists in social informatics, and others - to develop the problem of information in a comprehensive manner. The term derives from the Latin *informatio* (notification, acquaintance) (*Armenian Soviet Encyclopedia*, 1978, Vol. 4). According to the Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary, information is communication or notification about the state of affairs, knowledge of something transmitted by people. It is also the reduction or elimination of uncertainty resulting from a message. It is manifested through the unity of its syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic characteristics, and in its reflection of the diversity of objects and processes in both living and non-living nature (*Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary*, 1983, p. 217).

Norbert Wiener, founder of cybernetics, offered a concise definition: “Information is the expression of content received from the external world during our adaptation to it.” Thus, the process of obtaining and using information is simultaneously the process of adapting to the contingencies of the environment and of carrying out our activity within it (Wiener, 1968, p. 55).

The mathematician Claude Shannon understood information as knowledge that reduces or eliminates uncertainty, and he characterized the quantity of information as a function of the probability of a message. He paid special attention to clarifying the problem of communication, stating that “the fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one

point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point (Shannon, 1963, pp. 243–332)”. The so-called entropic approach to the concept of information was developed by Léon Brillouin and Shannon. The term entropy derives from the Greek *en* (inside) and *trope* (turn, transformation). In the mathematical theory of information, entropy describes the measure of uncertainty in a situation (random variable). Thus, entropy and information characterize reality in terms of chaos and order: entropy is the measure of disorder, while information is the measure of order (Brillouin, 1960, p. 56; Shannon, 1963, p. 3).

Informational activity characterizes the capacity to carry out purposive activity (Korogodin, 1983, p. 56). Examining the semantic aspect of information, three layers may be distinguished. The upper layer corresponds to the usual sense of the term - answering the question, “What is the information about?” The middle layer shows that specific information unequivocally determines the acting subject (the operator). The meaning (semantics) of information is contained in its definiteness. This middle layer is real and tangible, while the upper and lower layers are somewhat blurred, not always evident and precise.

Information is also endowed with the property of repeatability, but identical concepts, facts, assumptions, and frameworks may be used differently in different contexts. This means the same information may serve different problem-solving purposes (Korsuntsev, 1997, p. 30). The axiological (value-based) interpretation of information emphasizes its “human” dimension, focusing on the concepts of “value” and “benefit.” According to Russian researcher A. Kharkevich, “Information has great value because it makes it possible to achieve a goal. The same information may have different value if applied to different purposes (Kharkevich, 1960, p. 54)”.

The value of information lies in its importance and necessity for performing actions and making decisions. The value of any information is conditioned by social practice; practice is the fundamental objective criterion of value. Value is objective, formed through concrete socio-historical processes and interactions. Information may hold different value for different consumers depending on factors such as novelty,

clarity of presentation, complexity of expression, and the intellectual preparedness of the recipient.

It is worth noting that usefulness is one of the primary attributes of information. Usefulness, in the philosophical sense, is subjectivized value - the expression of value in terms of a given individual's or group's interest. The value of information is closely related to its truthfulness, which becomes evident in the realization of its usefulness. One cannot understand what is happening in modern crisis-ridden society, where it is heading, or what challenges it faces, without grasping the trends in changes of values accepted by its members and the connection of those changes with the state of the economy, politics, and culture (Vashchekin et al., 2000, p. 165).

In the era of information conflicts and wars, states, political forces, oligarchic systems, individuals, and organizations often use information for manipulative and propagandistic purposes. It is no accident that political and oligarchic actors strive to control their own information resources.

Modern information technologies have not only enabled the rapid transmission, storage, and dissemination of information-making it accessible to all-but have also created the means to control public consciousness and influence people's thinking and psychology through information itself. In today's world, information has become a powerful weapon of manipulation. It provides extensive opportunities for manipulative influence on public awareness and behavior. Essentially, this concerns the deliberate transformation and distortion of public consciousness, as well as the disintegration and degradation of social behavior.

What is information policy based on manipulation today, if not a deviation from the principle of truth-telling in favor of propagandistic practices that systematically feed the public, especially television audiences, not with reliable facts but with partial, pre-constructed, or processed data-so-called pseudo-information-saturated with disinformation that exploits public trust?

Amid rising societal and internal tensions and escalating political conflict, various forces increasingly resort to different forms and techniques of informational manipulation. One of

the most widespread methods in modern information warfare is the tactic of organized information leaks, often based on illegal wiretapping. Figuratively speaking, an organized information leak is like a deliberately launched and precisely targeted informational projectile, intended to generate tension and instability within a specific social group, and to disorient ordinary citizens-preventing them from adequately understanding and assessing the reality of a given situation.

One of the common forms of manipulation is the so-called "White Propaganda." Practitioners of this technique typically follow the principle that truth belongs not to the one who speaks it, but to the one who speaks it first. Accordingly, modern manipulators seek to outpace their competitors while seemingly acknowledging sources and citing authors. Simultaneously, they deliberately omit certain portions of the information, failing to reveal who is circulating the data and for what purpose. By selectively presenting facts or only partially conveying the truth, they enable a distorted perception of reality. Intentional reduction of content volume, along with unjustified alterations or corrections, ensures the desired influence on public opinion.

Another form of manipulation-commonly referred to in both academic literature and political practice as "Gray Propaganda"-represents a more concealed version of propaganda, where either the source or topic is intentionally misrepresented or concealed, or the true purpose of the manipulation is hidden. When analyzing gray propaganda, it is important to differentiate between:

- the state of informational consciousness (as a conceptual structure shaped by disinformation, which influences informational orientation, goals, and plans), and
- the objective conditions of information dissemination, which include the overall environment of informatization in public life, as well as the security, interests, and value systems of states targeted by information attacks.

It can be cautiously stated that, in the face of today's disordered information flows, a significant portion of the public finds it increasingly difficult to distinguish clarity and coherence. Many citizens are unable to differentiate disin-

formation and outright lies from accurate and truthful information. The contemporary “apostles” of disinformation communicate only incorrect, misleading, or pre-distorted data (Petrenko & Mutina, 1978, pp. 25-30).

The core ambiguity lies in the fact that public and national consciousness often cannot determine what exactly constitutes manipulated or distorted information, whose interests it serves, and how credible or real the proposed solutions from various political and oligarchic circles truly are.

Among the various forms of public consciousness manipulation, particular attention should be paid to “Black Propaganda,” in which virtually everything is distorted: the source, the content, the true authors, and their intentions.

Truth is the fundamental value of information. Knowledge, in all eras, has been the driving force of social progress. Knowledge is information as well - but true information, the result of a complex cognitive process. Only true information allows human beings to know reality and to make correct decisions. Theoretical knowledge is verified, systematized, and valued by humanity; the same cannot be said of information as such. In the flood of information, people often become disoriented, falling victim to manipulation and propaganda.

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PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE

PHILOSOPHY OF KOMITAS VARDAPET'S ECOLOGICAL IDEAS

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Abstract: In the report, an attempt is made to reveal the philosophy of the ecological ideas of the 20th century musician Komitas Vardapet using the analytical and comparative method. In this work, the lectures, researches and articles given by him in France, Turkey, Russia and other countries served as research material. The study highlights the evolution of the research mind of a musician-spiritualist with a humanitarian worldview, who made the transition from the study of his native ethno-religious culture to the way of studying and developing the music of other regional ethno-religious communities and thus enriched the universal culture. In that context, the issues of ecological ideas, the study of the philosophy of healing music, and the organization of a harmonious dialogue between man and nature in the world over time are analyzed. From the presented point of view, Komitas Vardapet's rich musical heritage has not been studied yet.

Keywords: nature, health, music, ecology, harmony, endoecology, ideas, harmony, ethnicity, religion.

At present humanity and its biosphere are in a rather precarious position. According to the World Health Organization, 8.7 million people died due to air pollution in 2021 alone. Even the space between the Earth and the Moon is polluted by man. According to the UN, 284 million people used drugs in 2020.

For visionary philosophers, the priority is not only to clarify and study the nature of things but also to ensure that the best available scientific experience is applied. We therefore consider it necessary to study the spiritual heritage of humanist intellectuals from a philosophical point of view. The goal is to discover ideas of human communication and the human relationship with nature in order to form an universal algorithm for a healthy lifestyle.

One of the intellectuals who studied the relationship between man and nature in the last century was the priest, musician, folklorist Sghomon Sghomonian ordained as Komitas Vardapet.

Komitas Vardapet's philosophical ideas are determined by the peculiarities of the scientific and cultural atmosphere that prevailed in Armenia and in the world during his life. Komitas was born in the Ottoman Empire. Under the care of the Armenian Apostolic Church he received a theological education at the Gevorkian Seminary of St. Etchmiadzin and was awarded the title of *archimandrite*. In 1896 he left for Berlin to study at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Kaiser Friedrich Wilhelm University and at the Richard Schmidt Conservatory.

Returning to his homeland, Komitas made records of around four thousand songs of Armenians, Kurds, and other regional ethnic groups. Komitas Vardapet was a scholar of European and Armenian music, as well as Western philosophy. He thought it important to study music within the regional historical and cultural context, taking into account the composer's life experience.

His "Songs of the Holy Liturgy", "Armenian Church Music", "Armenian Church Melodies" and other studies are devoted to issues of sacred music (Komitas, 2005).

In addition to sacred music, Komitas made a significant contribution to the development of secular music. In his opinion, the people are both poets and musicians. Worthy of attention are "Armenian Village Music", "Armenian Church and Folk Songs" and other works. Komitas Vardapet does not create characters in the etude "Lori plow song in Vardablur village style" and does not develop subjective ideas around them (Komitas, 2007, pp. 92-130). He simply describes and interprets the song of farmers cultivating the field day and night, under sunlight and starlight. Komitas studies how a man working with a plow, through singing, enters into a hopeful dialogue with God, people, animals and the world.

Komitas writes that a villager during his lifetime creates a song in accordance with his living conditions. "During a walk, the peasant's attention and consciousness are captured by those objects or phenomena that resemble and correspond to his inner world... When we hear how the sound of each word simultaneously expresses a thought, so a folk song immediately presents its idea or meaning before our soul's gaze, and we understand this meaning" (Komitas, 2007, p. 222). It is appropriate to recall the thoughts of the Roman philosopher and poet Lucretius about nature's influence on the soul:

"In what nature can things affect the soul?

Excite him, evoke a lot of emotions,

When matter has no feeling at all" (Lucretius, 1960, p. 62).

Komitas's characters are taken from the actuality of people who trust and glorify God and cooperate with nature. His ideas are born from observations of man's relationship with the universe. The logic of his essay is based on

facts. Komitas explores the ideas of a person living in harmony with nature.

In some of Komitas's works, his transition from general ecological ideas to more specific ones is noticeable: the field of physical and spiritual harmony of a person. In other words, the field of individual and social endoecology. Guided by the pan-musical concept of Romanticism, he tries to study the influence of music on human health.

In 1912, Komitas Vardapet gave a lecture in Constantinople on the influence of dance on a child. He considers dance one of the oldest fine arts, analyzing the development of dance and the harmony of life and the universe reflected through dance. "In every life, there is a dance. After-all, isn't the life of the whole universe already a dance?" (Komitas, 2007, p. 75). He focuses on the round dance from a group psychology point of view. Komitas mentions the importance of song and dance for energizing a person and training the body. He believes that until children develop a moral philosophy, it is necessary for their brain to be "beneficially influenced" through the vibrations of music. Komitas emphasizes the psychobiographical connection between sound as a physical phenomenon and a person. In the study "Armenian Village Dance" he discusses the qualities, directions, sizes, and characters of dance movements (Komitas, 2005, p. 284). He comes to the conclusion that Armenian dance does not arouse painful emotions.

Komitas's study "Healing with Music" is especially connected with the theme of humanitarian music as a phenomenon that strengthens and heals the soul (Komitas, 1915). Komitas notes that he is trying to elucidate how the sages of the ancient world healed the sick with the help of music and refers to the manuscript of the 13th century philosopher Hovhannes Yerznkatsi. Komitas highlights that according to the author of the manuscript, music impacts the psyche and the soul.

Komitas Vardapet divides music into "divine" (spiritual) and "human" (wordly) types. According to him, music classified as "divine" is used in churches "to bring sinful souls to repentance and to drive sinful thoughts to good". Komitas thinks that if music heals the soul, it can also heal the body.

He relates positively to the experience and

views of his predecessors. “The ancients tried and found it useful as medicine, so they decided and implemented that “singing is also necessary for the sick,” because, “just as drinking medicine” affects the disease, “so music acts” in listening to it”.

Komitas Vardapet tries to analyze the concept of the “old traditionalists”, probably the Pythagoreans, regarding healing through the influence of sound. There is no doubt that Komitas was well aware of the connection between music and **physiology**. In fact, Komitas studied the impact of a physical phenomenon, sound vibrations, on living intelligent matter. This is, in fact, an interesting theoretical experiment on human endoecological recreation.

Komitas is one of the intellectuals who developed humanitarian and philosophical thought, noticed, appreciated, and studied music from the point of view of ensuring ecological and endo-ecological harmony. Christian philosophy had a fundamental influence on the formation of Komitas’s worldview. In the works of Komitas, we do not find ideas that reflect ethno-religious phobias.

Komitas Vardapet recorded, studied, and developed the musical heritage of the peoples of the Middle East. Thus, he defended the idea of cultural freedom. Komitas tries to study and recognize people and ethnic societies through their songs and dances, as conditioned by the peculiarities of nature. Komitas shows affinity to the ideas of freedom and the equality of people and ethnic communities.

It is difficult to sufficiently appreciate the role of Komitas Vardapet’s humanitarian philosophy in the arena of healthy dialogue between civilizations, because music is a language understandable by all peoples and civilizations. The ideas of love and respect for nature, women, parents, and the younger generation are reflected in Komitas Vardapet’s poems “Busabarev”, “Cloud”, “Autumn”, “Affectionate Love”, “My Mother’s Lullaby”, “Prayer” and other poems (Komitas, 2004).

His works reflect the idea of the continuity of man’s self-improvement through the knowledge of himself. It can be said that the ideas of Komitas’s philosophy were born and inspired not with the peculiarities of Armenian philosophy but also under the influence of European Romanticism. As a result, an original

dialogue between Eastern and Western musical philosophies was born.

Thus, in summarizing the essay, we can conclude that Komitas Vardapet’s ideas can be divided into two groups:

- Harmony between man and nature.
- Knowledge of self and self-improvement.

There is no doubt that the core of Komitas’s philosophy is humanism; the greatest value in his worldview is a person living in harmony with nature and him or herself, which is meant to create the best conditions for the **development of life**. In other words, Komitas Vardapet has experience with grappling with a comprehensive rational understanding of the human existence. From the point of view of Romanticism, he distinguishes man as the highest value and nature as the greatest teacher. In the philosophy of Komitas, the connection between man and nature, the spirit of struggle and victory of the working man stands out, directing humanity and society towards the heroic, and universal, the divine.

Conclusion

In Komitas Vardapet’s research, a transition is noticeable from folklore songs and correlating facts to revealing the ecological content of the whole by presenting certain ideas. He tries to reveal the divine in human nature, because he believes in God and in the creative nature of man. In the course of his activities, Komitas sought to comprehend the issue of comprehensive harmony between man and the universe through music. Through the theoretical provisions of music, he tried to harmonize the activity of man as a historically developing whole with his cradle: the universe. In his works, intelligent living matter, man, and the nature of the earth appear as components of the cosmic system.

The philosophical ideas of Komitas go beyond the ethno-religious framework and turn into universal values that feed the universal concept of ethno-religious tolerance. Philosophy is a phenomenon that awakens the human mind and pushes it forward with sound logic, and the study of the spiritual heritage of Komitas Vardapet allows us to state that the

future of the individual, humanity, and all of nature is determined by the development of humanitarian philosophy.

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PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS

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Abstract: This article mainly serves to prove the thesis that the ideological framework of legal consciousness is the element that makes up the conceptual units, each of which represents an organic unity of various social and spiritual phenomena.

The subject of the research are ideas representing the essence of legal consciousness from the perspective of its organic connection to other forms of social awareness, therefore determining the multifunctional nature of right.

A direct consequence of the basic idea of the article, which claims that the basic conceptual units underlying the ideological framework of legal consciousness are not related to law in their essence (except for the idea of justice), is expressed in two methodologically significant thoughts: firstly, ideas make up the foundation for the critical evaluation of the technically axiological assumption that they embody the essence of legal awareness itself, and secondly, they declare the synthesising capacity of legal awareness which, in turn, manifests the comprehensive, and in modern society, genuinely universal nature of right in its reality.

The final result of the research is justification of the statement that the ideological framework of legal consciousness is made up of conceptual units which shape up and reproduce the organic connection of right and legal consciousness to other forms of social life and social consciousness.

Keywords: idea, concept, freedom, equality, rightfulness, law, justice, legal consciousness, conceptual unit, rights.

Introduction

The language of legal consciousness contains words that express the essence of everything that acquires legal meaning through them. This “essence of everything” comprises the basic conceptual units of legal consciousness.

The basis and condition for understanding the meaning of these notions is the concept of idea. Idea brings unity to the diversity of mean-

ings of the notions. This unity is not hidden in some special, general sense. The definite nature of the concept of idea manifests itself in the very thinking of the idea. Ideas, not concepts, make up the channels of contact between legal consciousness and reality. Notions make subjects “stand out” from reality, making them definite; conversely, ideas “embed” concepts into reality, making it possible to think of the latter as a single whole.

Philosophical complaints about the uncertainty of a special kind of such notions as culture, right, freedom, justice, etc., must have long ago disproved this way of formulating the cognitive task of understanding them; it is not worthwhile striving to bring each of these notions to an essential and, even more so, complete certainty. In relation to such notions, it is important, firstly, to establish the entire scope of meanings encompassed by them, secondly, to acknowledge these meanings as obvious, that is, developed to obviousness through continued description and “spiritual examination”, and thirdly, to think of these notions from the perspective of their instrumental usefulness within the broad scope of this capacity, that is, not only the capacity of explaining at least cultural elements, but also deriving both evident and prospective theoretical consequences.

Ideas are meaningless in the sense that they are not bound to any specific subjective or cultural sphere. They are valuable only as universal forms that open the space for endless individualisation of thought. The non-universality of their understanding unites society, and their importance lies not in them being an ideological repetend in the social consciousness, but in that they create the environment for the spiritual work of society. They are the condition for self-individualisation; as social legal consciousness discovers itself through individualisation and through finding one’s individual self as being part of these ideas. The idea of right differs from the notion of law in that its meaning is not in what constitutes the law, but an individual’s states. As long as it is captured by one’s consciousness, an idea continues to exist.

Ideas are most likely neither normative nor regulative, as they are found outside sensory experience. It is futile to operate with them as empirical quantities, as something that is reflected in reality. They are simply milestones, intentions, a conceptual background that may underlie many things that do not really correlate but on which one may see that essential something that once lost, the law would be unable to perform its function. Ideas are spiritual states that give rise to both the idea of the norm and the idea of regulation; they are the centers that pull together a variety of social life aspects.

The methodological basis for analysing the conceptual framework of legal consciousness is

critical approach. There is a strong tradition of thinking of right (and, therefore, legal consciousness) as based on the ideas of rightfulness, equality, law, freedom, justice, and other ideas of equal scope. By its nature, however, legal consciousness represents and accepts them in an exactly opposite manner (as if in a mirror image).

1. The Idea of Freedom

The concept of freedom embraces a variety of different meanings. Of the two most prominent ones, “the first interprets freedom as independence and the second as autonomy” (Descombes, 2011, p. 358). On its own, the notion of freedom is inoperable. It belongs to meanings that cannot be defined; it underlies contemplation but cannot serve as its subject.

G.W.F. Hegel (1990) relied upon the postulate that in its idea, right is the reality of freedom. Moreover, “right in general is something holy, because it is the embodiment of absolute conception and self-conscious freedom” (p. 90). As social freedom in its essence is a political concept (Malakhov, 2007, pp. 129-239), G.W.F. Hegel’s idea is specifically correct and productive as a political idea. It stands for a historical and cultural definiteness (particularity) of legal understanding, represents understanding subjective right (not in a legal sense), a subject’s rights, therefore settling the issue of legal understanding.

Since the bourgeois revolutions, people have been craving freedom, associating it with the most desirable way of functioning of all social institutions. However, having achieved that freedom, people began to realise that there are still many things it cannot explain. Freedom is idea that can be used to provide both independence and a whole world of opportunities, as well as to excuse permissiveness and libertinage, to justify or to excuse whatever one may do.

G.W.F. Hegel called a bourgeois “a slave without a master”. As a consequence of such understanding, the bourgeois idea of freedom materialises only as a negative type of freedom, liberation. At the same time, right is a coping mechanism. V.S. Nersesyants assumed that right was a universal and essential form of peo-

ple's freedom. At the same time the need for some form reduces its value, turning it into a conventional ideological "additive". Moreover, it remains unclear what the form should be: is it equality, or justice, something else, or all these together? They all form the foundation of right, but not its characteristics or properties; they are concepts that are external in relation to right. Freedom stands in the same line.

One man's freedom is another's dependence. Again, one man's freedom presupposes another's dependence, not freedom. Once everyone becomes an owner, ownership becomes fiction, and once everyone is free, all become equally dependent.

At the social level, freedom makes sense as an expression of something "supersocial". At the cultural level, freedom manifests itself not through the excessiveness of social relations, but through the reproduction of the symbolic nature of life. Here, freedom is associated not only with the social nature of relations and the dynamic development of situations; it only makes sense as a permanent and stable state. At the civilisation level, freedom does not exist as a given moment, but only reveals itself as an absolute, universal condition of that which is real.

Freedom is a consequence of the "supersocial" and of one's supernecessity to live as a human; it is one's ability to live in an environment of excessiveness and indefiniteness. These conditions obviously do not belong to the sphere of right. Supernecessity is randomness, voluntariness, but it is not freedom.

An axiom of bourgeois (and post-bourgeois) general theory of right states that one's freedom ends when the freedom of others begins, that is, the nature of right may be understood as a sphere of manifestation and materialisation of freedom. It is true that in the legal sense, freedom may only be achieved through a relation to the "other". The very thought of it emerges because this is freedom from the "other", for the "other", and regarding the "other". And such freedom becomes internally contradictory: it is intended to restrict the freedom of the "other" and is thus forced to limit itself. This poses the question of how well this approach expresses the true nature of right.

Right, however, is not in the freedom of the subject, even when it is restricted; it is in the

restrictions and borders, it is in the limits, etc., drawn by right. Right is related to freedom as to its object; it does not rely on freedom and is not a means of its materialisation.

If freedom is a choice, this is a universal property of every living creature. But if freedom is a human domain, then choice does not mean freedom, or choice is randomness. There is a colossal difference between choice and freedom of choice. The first is a collision of possibilities given the need to take only one of them, while the second is an unforced choice, that is, choice is a game, but it also means impossibility of choice when it is inevitable.

Lastly: The root of right and morals is not in freedom; if, as proposed by I. Kant, B.N. Chicherin, and many others, everything is explained through freedom, then freedom does not explain anything in right, but is a clear and absolute ideologeme. This is not what the primary logic of right is about; it is about preventing arbitrariness.

2. The Idea of Equality

Why is the problem of equality always considered not from the perspective of the individual, but from the perspective of someone (something) he stands before, such as the law, or... etc.? This "standing before something" makes an individual totally dependent, visually determined, even if this is dependence on some abstract position or condition. It is therefore necessary to attempt to see equality not as uniformity, impersonality, and especially not as identity, but as distinctiveness.

Equality is a sustainable existential state of an individual; it should not be confused with equality in a certain regard, property, function, etc. In the first case, equality is one of the underlying foundations of right, while in the second, it is nothing but a situational regulation tool.

Equality as such is meaningless; it exists as if by itself, as a sign in an equation that has the power of equalling any values and any states. It is not connected to any certain values, but especially to people.

When equality is seen in equivalence, it, in fact, stands for equal indifference, leading to spiritual disintegration. And if so, then equality

acquires an entirely independent existence, that is, there remains only equality in itself, that is, equality without any parties to it whatsoever.

In its conceptual core, equality is a political concept. Political consciousness has no individual state (form), while political relations, on the contrary, are always individualised. And just as in the legal perspective, everything is the other way around: legal consciousness is always also individual (otherwise, being only universal and communal, it makes no sense at all), and legal relations cannot be such due to their regulatory nature, such that the idea of equality does not always correlate with the concepts of legal consciousness.

Social life cannot be imagined as unstructured, socially, and functionally undifferentiated; similarly, actual relations that manifest their mechanisms of arranging such relations cannot be imagined as non-hierarchical.

Equality is more of an extremity, an ultimate state, and therefore its nature is rather conventional. Inequalities are the states and conditions that fill up the entire array of reality. Unlike equalities, inequalities have an extremely fractionary gradation of states, from normal and legal to illegal, unacceptable, and unfair. And only in its extreme condition may inequality coincide with injustice. In many other cases, it acts as one of the forms of the embodiment of justice.

Modern democratic society is one of mass existence. In the mass “neither the one nor the other exist any longer” (Baudrillard, 2023, p. 173). Therefore, achieving and maintaining legal (formal) equality typically does not entail any specific difficulty. However, by its nature, democracy is a mechanism of power in which not impersonal equality reigns, but the equality of citizens differentiated to singularity. A democratic society is essentially a way of personifying political relations, rather than formalising them, symbolising the obviousness (visibility) of the legal element. In other words, democratic elements of social organisation and legal elements of equality, including social equality, in modern society are related to each other in a sophisticated way.

Almost the entire philosophy of right is based on recognising formal equality and freedom as conditions for right. It is only legal right, however, that relies on formal equality; even

then, it stands on it as on a principle, an abstract condition. Formal equality is impersonal, and therefore it presumes the possibility of freedom, but only as possibility of individual legal existence that does not fit the formal foundations of right.

A. de Tocqueville (2000) wrote that freedom and equality are opposed to each other: any attempt to exercise equality will always mean a necessity for enforcement, and the reign of freedom always entails inequality. “Almost all the time, equality comes at the price of freedom”, said A. Bergson (2010, p.61), agreeing with Tocqueville. H. Kelsen (2023) came up with an interesting way of overcoming all doubts about applying the principle of equality to social life: he interpreted the principle of equality as a “postulate directed at the law-making body meaning equality under the law, not be confused with the principle of equality before the law, which is directed at the authorities applying the law to concrete cases” (p. 21). In other words, equality is not a characteristic of people’s relations and positions in society, but a principle of organising the activities of a certain part of authority bodies, which is more of an ideological rather than technical or organisational principle.

The idea of equality before the law should not be associated with the issues of democratisation of social life (including its legal form). In fact, it has quite animating roots in the religious sphere. In any case, it generally makes up the essence of, for example, canon law (Prodi, 2017, p. 170). This means that this principle transforms legal right into a canon, that is, into indisputable right, where competitiveness, agreement, etc., are nothing but illusions and games of the mind, but not manifestation of reason in right.

Becoming a legal principle for determining an individual’s position in society and in relations with other subjects, the idea of equality is complex and problematic in its practical implementation but, nevertheless, gets bound by the mechanisms and means that simplify it to its ultimate state. R. Caillois (2022), in particular, discusses this and notes, “Since they despair of winning in contests of agon, they resort to lotteries or any games of chance where even the least gifted, stupidest, and most handicapped, the unskilled and the indolent may be equal to

the most resourceful and perspicacious as a result of the miraculous blindness of this new type of justice” (p. 174).

3. The Idea of Fairness

Fairness replaces equality where the differentiation of individuals becomes significant. Fairness means the individualisation, situationalisation of the idea of equality, which is why it always conflicts with equality in legal right. When equality is primary, fairness is random; separated from justice, equality is voluntary and formal.

Fairness is not a mechanism or a problem-solving algorithm; neither is it a form of decision-making or action. It is a special spiritual state of an individual underlain by internal moral experience and prescribing the individual certain personal traits.

Clearly expressing the definition, interpretation of fairness, without resorting to pure formalism is extremely difficult, if not impossible. It is much easier to speak of unfairness, as there is an abundance of examples, unlike examples (or references) of achieved, properly exercised fairness. Nevertheless, as an axiological milestone, fairness becomes ultimately clear. It is commitment to a certain horizon that has a universal meaning for the entire human life.

Conscience, *consciousness*, *context*, *commotion*, *commiseration*, etc., are attributive expressions of *collaborativity*, *compatibility*, and *coincidence* of people in each other. Fairness is the collaborativity of right and intercompatibility of rights. Being fair, achieving fairness, takes *contacts*, *coincidence*, and *correlation*. Fairness is what one does in relation to another, something that matters not only for one, but both parties, but primarily and principally important to the one exercising fairness.

Unfairness is always a fulfilled act. For this reason, it is the field of exercising right, and thinking of unfairness is immanent and adequate to legal consciousness. Unfairness is something all legal problems are associated with. It is easy to express unfairness in a legal form. On the contrary, fairness is always a presumptive act that is impossible to formulate in a legal way. The notion of fairness is immanent to moral consciousness, and is thus not truly adequate in legal consciousness.

Fairness appears in a variety of guises associated with the abundance of rules for achieving and maintaining it. A. Smith (2022) even assumed that “the rules of justice (as fairness) are accurate to the highest degree and admit no exceptions or modifications but such as may be ascertained as accurately as the rules themselves and that generally flow from the very same principles as them” (p. 250). However, all attempts to derive a definition of fairness by generalising these rules are doomed to failure. The sense of the rules themselves is not in their effectiveness, but only lies in the very fact of their existence and acknowledgement (which is often forced). Fairness in the legal sense is rather understood as acting in accordance with the rules of justice.

G. Husserl claimed that “moral norms, unlike legal norms, in their essence are not related to the idea of justice which makes up the central principle of law and order” (Stovba, 2017, p. 127). Here, everything is as always: first, the essence of the term is modified yet again, then, modified to distortion, this essence becomes an attribute of right. Thus, the problem of levelling up the universalism of right is solved. Perhaps, the thought expressed by G. Husserl may be accepted only in the following sense: moral norms and legal norms are not related to the idea of fairness, and that is only because fairness does not bear any normative nature. Ascribing any sort of measure to fairness contradicts the essence of the very idea of it; associating fairness with any measure is a legal modification of the idea of fairness in which, however, the “spirit” of fairness cannot exist anymore.

Aristotle posited that fairness is a middle ground between extremities, namely damage and benefit, which can be achieved due to a court’s equal attitude to both parties in a conflict. In other words, he understands fairness as a measure. Given the syncretism of public consciousness of that time, the idea sounded convincing enough, and such an approach to understanding fairness has been successfully reproduced for many centuries after. However, as the forms of social consciousness have grown more differentiated and separated from one another, such an understanding of fairness has become inadequate.

Measure as a manifestation of a legal principle of formal equality makes fairness impossi-

ble. Measure must be simple and robust to be operable, to be real. However, if there is any measure required from fairness, then it is different: sophisticated and delicate, individualised (personalised). Demanding such measure, which is common for right, therefore means denying it. Right and fairness are different aspects of human life. Right cannot exist without measure, and morality cannot be measured.

Legal right transforms fairness into a product that can be consumed, explored, and acknowledged by humans. But only man alone can act fairly, for example, in the form of consent; one cannot be forced to be fair, one can only consent to it. This is why fairness is unthinkable without humility. But humility is alien to West European legal culture.

The evaluativity of fairness is nothing but its external form, its appearance; fairness is not reactive and not post factum; on the contrary, it is active, preceding a fact; it is “predestined” for it. It is not action, but attitude that demands fairness. And fairness, in turn, demands action.

Fairness is not a rational but an irrational phenomenon and act. More precisely, its foundations are of a sacralised nature. For these reasons, fairness is not vulnerable to criticism and is not subject to it; criticising it or for it is pointless. If it is resented in a certain act, it is not for some reason; it is just resented as such. This resentment is subjective. Consent to fairness is an act of humility.

V.M. Rozin (2016, p. 175) identifies three main contexts for the idea of fairness: fairness guaranteed by authority and law, fairness as understood by an individual, and fairness declared by society. Based on this differentiation, we can assume that in the first sense, fairness is associated with equality, while in the second, with conscience, and in the third, with reasonability.

“Treating identical deeds alike is the fundamental principle of fairness. This principle of equality, or principle of non-discrimination, is unanimous in many constitutions” (van Hoecke, 2012, p. 207). M. van Hoecke refers to this as universal fairness. It is clear that in communication theory, the meaning of fairness is narrowed to such a degree that it becomes a manifestation of equality (and vice versa). But whatever legal theorists may say about fairness, the average person thinks about it differently: for him, the said “identity of deed” must first be adapted to a

given individual, such that concrete decisions are not the same; here, the principle of equality feels inappropriate. Or it is fairness itself that is inappropriate, as they do not represent one and the same principle, but are opposites. Whether it be universal or particular fairness, in the legal sense, fairness bears any meaning only in a simplified, restricted form.

In *Corpus Juris Civilis*, fairness is defined as a “permanent and unchangeable will to give everyone their just deserts”. Many who try to understand the essence of fairness based on this formulation focus on the word “give”. Quite a number of theories of fairness are based on different variations of this expression. However, the core of fairness is not where and what its objective is, but what fairness is as such. And Justinian was convinced that fairness as such is permanent and unchangeable will. In this regard, we may say that fairness is the permanence of retribution-centered will. Will is an attribute of personality; therefore, fairness is a willful state of a personality and a form of its wholeness and consistency. Fairness comes to life not in the mind, not in conviction, not in equality, but in will. It is truth that requires will. Fairness is always individual and subjective.

Rightfulness and lawfulness can exist without any feelings that actualise the personality, the self (singularity) of a person. What distinguishes fairness from all other decisions, evaluations, measures, acts, and so on, is that fairness is always accompanied by feeling. At that, on one hand, this sensitivity is involuntary, while on the other, it manifests itself against a certain effort. Satisfaction in the event of fairness and dissatisfaction, remorse in the event of an encounter with unfairness are doubtless indicators of fairness.

4. The Idea of Law

Law is one of the basic conceptual units of social consciousness, and as such, it must be comprehended, first, in the ultimately broad sense, abstracted from all the diverse contexts. The form of the abstract that is adequate to understanding the phenomenon of law is thinking of law as of “a subject without predicates” (such as I, fairness, right, good, etc.). Law is an object of thought and comprehension as an instantaneous

act. As a process, the thinking (cognition) of law is only possible by referring to its properties. Some properties of law are attributive, while others are contributive. In the attributive aspect, law is an insuperable force (essential characteristic), an indisputable will, invulnerability to changes or modifications (subjective characteristic), a mechanism of right (functional characteristic), form of reason immanent to right (subjective characteristic), an end in itself, a supreme and universal value (axiological characteristic), and the holy and sacred element in the legal field (spiritual characteristic). All these generally manifest the law in its very essence, the law as right (their equivalence). In the contributive aspect, law is an unconditional requirement (imperative), a legal act (text), a principle, a rule, an order, etc. All these together manifest the law in its being, right as law, as the foundation of law.

In early, pre-state communities, right was the element that set reliable guidelines for behavior and understanding of what constituted a community. “The seeming permanence (of law – *authors’ note*) has been adopted from traditional myths that aim to prove that the future should be built upon a model of the present” (Rouland, 2000, p. 247). It is hardly capable of providing something different. Right was an expression of global law, the laws of the surrounding world. Laws structured the community, setting up the entire set of practical relations under it. This matrix has essentially survived to this day. However, right does not help understand life in a community anymore.

B.N. Chicherin (2011), claiming that “legal and moral law have the same sources” (p. 91), expresses the classical West European point of view that has been there since the bourgeois revolutions. This is a mixture of the idea of liberation and the exclusivity of a personality the liberation of which is the only thing that may be the subject matter. The root of legal and moral laws is the necessity to taboo certain acts through the efforts of society itself, not through any sacral notions.

H. Arendt (2014, p. 46) supposed that in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the law is considered to be a command. If this is true, it inevitably leads to the following. A command, that is, expression of will, is a voluntary and subjective act. If so, the law becomes the same: it can be

anything, whatever may take the form of the command. If right is built on this understanding of law, then it reveals itself as nothing but a form, that is, a set and a body of imperatives where the essential and random elements can hardly be distinguished from one another. However, the law of nature does not command; it simply is, it is a certainty to be followed not under command, but by nature. And since the notion of law is applied to prescriptions of right, this is what legal law should be like. Legal law, not mixed with command, is something that does not allow any exceptions and does not require any choice; it operates by virtue of its obviousness and equal applicability to anyone it may technically apply to. Law is the supreme rationale of reality, as it ascribes to reality the nature of a goal without separating the goal from reality or transforming it into something ideal. And indeed, the process of transforming law into arbitrary will is irreversible, and right relied upon such law has moved to the domain of ideology. Today, however, faith in the original purpose of law has faded, leaving only fear and rationale. Law has become an imperative that is underlaid by new ideas.

There is a difference between the law of necessity and the law of will (Isaev, 2021). If this is true, then, firstly, in this relationship, the first element plays the role of content and the second – of the form; the overcoming of the second by the first is the transition to the dominance of form. Secondly, it is important to know what kind of necessity is presented through the form of law and what kind of will has the capacity to determine that. It is essential to acknowledge that in true law, both are unlikely to be trivial, mundane, or ignoble, to serve the needs of the day, asocial and spiritless, or even simply practical.

Omnipresence, omnipotence, atemporality, and simplicity are the predicates of the law of nature; ideally, these should be its attributes. The same predicates may as well be applied to right (if right is nothing else other than the laws that fill it), and their modifications in the context of right will take the form of universality, compulsorism (categoricalness), permanence, and rationality.

In the legal sense, law is expressed power. The implication of law is the exercise of power. The question of restrictions on such exercise is

secondary; it is only a reflection of law from the point of view of it as of external shape. The primary question must be about adequate (not for the sake of acknowledgement, but for effectiveness) coercive measure.

J.G. Fichte believed that laws were derived not from practice, but from our own Self. Echoing his point of view, M.K. Mamardashvili (2016) specified that “The most that any philosophy may teach is that laws can only exist for free creatures” (p. 754). Only the law inside a human can make him free. Separating law from oneself and moving it out into the world, the human loses freedom, alienates from it. The modern human has lost the ability to live by his inner legal law.

Right is that which allows one to express their claims, insist on them, express their demands; right is the rationale for such claims. It stands behind norms, laws, customs, making up their content. This understanding of right is not equivalent to distinguishing right from law. This distinction points out the content of laws. Right, however, is a rationale of any law; the question becomes what right it is and who it belongs to. Acknowledgement of only a legal right as a right pulls the question of right and law to the domain of metaphysics and ideologisation.

The impersonalisation of right through laws is inextricably linked with the illusion of the sacralisation of right, as right moves to the dimension where it manifests itself as an unconditional judge. Without proper formalisation, the vanity and groundedness of right is obvious. Being a mechanism that operates in a definite domain and within a restriction to a given practical task, laws are the elements that make up right as a form.

Fully-featured law is a right that is equally superior to everything, including the state as an apparatus of authority. In the perfect scenario, to make up a harmonic structure, law must be superior to authority as well. However, since law is a form of authority, it is, therefore, authority itself. The opposite lays an equally true claim. Through laws, authority reforms its actions to the ontologisation of idea and transforms its power into imperatives.

Law depersonalises rule. When law is impersonated (for example, when represented by a monarch), this “person” is the only one who bears positive liability, while all the others

(subordinate to the law, that is, the will of its subject) bear negative liability. Depersonalised law extends positive liability to everyone, as if getting them involved in the actions of the sovereign; it makes everyone a sovereign. Nevertheless, this illusory sovereignty cannot be materialised, except for perhaps in a crime. Depersonalised law makes total equality of everyone before the law possible and ensures total liability of everyone, that is, the abstract readiness to be liable.

Regardless of whether the subject does or does not know a given law, the legal meaning of the liability principle remains unchanged, firstly, only when the law is sacralised, equally alienated from everyone and for everyone, when it is not a law made up by someone against someone else; secondly, only when negligence of the law is compensated with live legal consciousness, which is only possible if everything the given law says (or is supposed to presume) is reasonable, clear, and comprehensible. The subject matter here is law that regulates such relations, obligations, or prohibitions that are reasonable, clear, and binding even without an explicit law. “Right as a regulatory system determining how people should live in a society is protected by the law and state authorities” (Zakomlistov, 2003, p. 116). If this is so, then what is a set of laws? Can we consider it to be the right “standing for the protection of the regulatory system of right”? Certainly not. This is the way laws separated from right become non-legal rationale for right, that is, right cannot be deployed or function on its own basis. And if we acknowledge state authority to be the guardian of right as a regulatory system, then understanding the intrinsic value and significance of right itself becomes absolutely impossible; it would still be reduced to its auxiliary role. Laws dictate that right be reproduced; law is one form of right. As far as state authorities are concerned, they are supposed to ensure its exercise in social practice, providing the subjects of legally relevant activities with a proper environment and opportunities.

All contemplations on laws that stand guard over right and are separate from right itself make right impossible as such and turn everything upside down: laws are the right of the state, right is freedom from the law; right of society is independence from the state, right of

state is the dependence of society, etc.

The law, and along with it, right as a whole, is understood by many as an expression of fairness, objectivity, reasonability, humanism, etc. This is possible only if the law is not separated from the lawmaker and if the law is a spiritual state of the lawmaker and a form of spirituality in general. Separating law from the lawmaker (ontologisation of law), its impersonalisation, is a universal property of contemporary public law.

J.-J. Rousseau supposed that it was law that preceded fairness, not fairness that preceded law. Establishing an unambiguous connection like this seems wrong. On one hand, law is comprehended as expressing fairness towards something; fairness is a certain ideological rationale for law, and such a law is then designated as legal. On the other hand, exercising fairness without a solid rationale is impossible. However, it is obviously unstable in the sentiment of fairness as an expression of subjectivity. Law is much more robust; adhering to it is what fairness means in the legal sense of the word. Behind every fair judge is always a law, something that makes fairness objective, impartial, and undistorted by one's personal preferences and attitudes.

R. Alexy (2011) quotes the rationale of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which states, in particular: "Right and fairness are beyond the sphere of the lawmaker's discretion. Thinking that a constitutional lawmaker may regulate everything at his own discretion would mean returning to value-free legal positivism that has long been overcome by legal science" (p. 6). Along with that, staying within the framework of positivist understanding, in its essence, though not in its form, law-making is impossible to distinguish from rulemaking, and in such a situation, a lawmaker would perceive himself as a maker of both rules and justice. A lawmaker may make laws, but laws are only made provided that right and fairness already exist. The law is just a formulation and an imperativisation of right and fairness. Moreover, only provided that the current right is understood as the right of citizens, the body of regulations, rules, and requirements becomes just a means for its existence, not the subject of the citizens' activity; and this is the compulsory condition for the lawmaker to become also a

rule-maker and for justice to be exercised in the court of law.

5. The Idea of Justice

Justice is the being of right. It means that all the forms of manifestation and operation of right may and should be understood as forms of justice. Justice is a universal, comprehensive, adequate characteristic of right from the perspective of its functioning. Understanding right in its reality is understanding it as justice. Unlike all the ideas considered above characterising the conceptual framework of legal consciousness, the idea of justice is the only one that expresses right in its specificity compared to all other forms of social life and consciousness. All other ideas express right in its organic connection with other forms of social life and consciousness.

Justice must be recognised as the only aspect attributive only to right, being the trait that differentiates right from all the other forms of organisation of social life. This means that only justice can manifest the nature of right fully and directly, and in that regard, it is, first and foremost, the very being of right.

Right and morals discover an actual bond between them not in ideology, but in justice alone. The absence of justice (not to be confused with the purely contemplative possibility of the absence of the court and judicial authority) breaks the bond between right and morals. This break creates the vague idea of right as a minimum of morality, as well as such notions as moral justice.

Justice is exercised based on legal consciousness, which, by the way, judges and other lawyers often lack. On the one hand, it presents itself as a substantive solution to the issue only on the merits and in a particular situation, while on the other hand, justice always reproduces right. Justice is a dominating form of legitimisation of right. This is true for both law-making and a law-enforcing court.

Law does not admit exceptions, while exceptions are what right breeds on. Justice is acknowledgement of right in exceptions. G. Vico claimed that "it is not the domination of infallible laws, but, on the contrary, a deviation from rational jurisprudence that can only serve

as the foundation of humane and merciful justice, which does not settle for the form alone, but considers the trueness of facts” (Isaev, 2021, p. 228). The ability to judge the particular without reducing it to a rule of thumb is the nature of justice as a specific manifestation of Kant’s ability of judgement.

F.M. Dostoevsky (2022) wrote, “Judge people not by what they are, but by what they strive to become” (p. 177). In fact, this phrase shows the essential difference between justice and court: the court is limited to what it judges, it judges the fact, it is the triumph of law; justice sanctifies the desired (as the dues), creates the future; it is the triumph of fairness.

The established image of justice showing a blindfolded woman holding scales in one hand and a sword in the other likely represents the concept of justice only as separate from right. This is a symbol of the triumph of law, that is, the triumph of its subject, meaning authority. There is no such thing as “blind” or “blindfolded” fairness, and it is futile to seek it in court. This image should be considered not as a symbol of justice, but as a symbol of the concept of court, which is not properly associated with justice. This image or symbol claims that man is nothing compared to the law; he is just a reason for it to triumph.

Right represents a multitude of collisions of rights pacified by justice. Justice is subjective right; order is objective right. Justice is dynamic and conceptually saturated, while legal order is static and formal.

6. Secondary Elements of the Conceptual Framework of Legal Consciousness

1. Conscience as an unconditioned state or act. Is there anything like conscience in the legal domain, in legal consciousness, or, unlike morals, right is just a part of the conditioned domain? It appears that external reasons alone, whether existing in social life or in the human psyche, are not enough to explain any form of social life or consciousness, because something needs to exist to be conditioned.

You may persuade yourself in anything but not when it comes to fairness. Fairness is bound to conscience; conscience is a universal and natural sense of the fair.

Today, conscience is unthinkable as the “first judicial instance”. Moreover, an act of conscience makes no significance for justice primarily because it makes no external manifestations except for words, the secret of which is replaced with informativeness.

Conscience and conscientiousness seem to be words derived from the same root and are therefore expected to be close in meaning. However, the verbal framework of these terms is misleading, as conscientiousness does not stand for scrupulousness or bona fide, but is rather closer to honesty and responsibility.

2. Mercy as one of the forms of expression of fairness. Apart from fairness, mercy has lots of other forms of expression, including commiseration, pity, indulgence, self-affirmation, certainly love, and many others.

Mercy is only possible in the presence of commiseration. Achieving mercy means being ready to suffer. Mercy is conceived and perceived as redemption, liberation from suffering, but not acquiring actual freedom, that is, it is not gaining the possibility to be right.

Mercy is a form of patronage, expression of superiority, secret belief in one’s exceptionalism. This is a universal way of administering justice, a superlegal state of the source of mercy, and an important form of one’s right.

Mercy is commiseration, while mercifulness is about forgiveness, indulgence, and generosity. Mercy brings it all into the form of an act and does not remain only a spiritual state or a mindset. Mercy is a quality, while mercifulness is an act. Mercifulness is not something that is deserved or substantiated by any other means; it is self-sufficient. Mercifulness without mercy is pure arbitrariness; mercy without mercifulness is hypocrisy and complacency.

According to some ethicists, mercy has no measure. Indeed, everything that is real does have a measure, and if mercy is more than an idea, but also a way of action for the subject of right, then it also has a measure, which is not externally established, but present in each given case. However, what is substantial for any act of mercy is that it stands for an intentional excession of this measure; otherwise, it would have been nothing but fairness, and it is intentionally made insignificant. Here, measure presents itself as something unmeasurable, as it is sudden, worshipful, and random.

3. In the ideas of honour and dignity, legal consciousness sees an underlying concept of treating the individual as a legal creature, a concept of treating his rights. In their context, rationality, reasonability, relevance, authenticity, etc., of legal relations entailing their acknowledgement (enshrined in the regulatory framework of right) are supplemented with respect to people as parties to legal relations in the totality of their legally-relevant properties and expressions, employing trust as an effective means of self-regulation of legal life.

4. Honesty is a condition for fairness, trust is a condition for freedom, compulsoriness is a condition for law, and moderateness is a condition for equality. All these are subjective conditions. Merit is a condition for fairness, selfness is a condition for freedom, power is a condition for law, and functionality is a condition for equality. All these are objective conditions.

Conclusions

1. Right, freedom, fairness, etc., are the ideas that make up the framework of social thinking in almost any culture. Although usually perceived as natural and obvious, they are empty shapes filled with meaning by every culture and every historical epoch. And even though this meaning may or may not be agreed with, it is impossible not to accept it.

2. Freedom, justice, equality, and right are not legal concepts. Being ideas of a synthetic nature, they only make up the general context of the legal discourse as well as its common intellectual and spiritual mindset. It may create a conceptual bond between the considered similar ideas with the basic legal notions. Their conceptual bond is the following: freedom is an intact state, equality is a relationship, fairness is a property, and law is a rationale. This peculiar bond is a foundation for admitting basic legal ideas to be the ideas of freedom, equality, liberty, and law.

3. Of all the conceptual units making up the conceptual framework of legal consciousness that have been considered, justice is the only one that is purely legal, that is, the idea that completely expresses the nature of right itself in its reality and particularity. All other basic units characterise both right and legal consciousness

in their connection with other forms of social and spiritual life.

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CHAIR OF YOUNG SCIENTIST

MODELS OF CIVIL SOCIETY TRANSFORMATION IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: A SOCIAL-PHILOSOPHICAL REACTION

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Abstract: Civil society, as an institutional form of public life, has undergone a complex transformation, conditioned by socio-political and cultural and technological factors. In modern world, civil society models are characterized not only by process of establishing democracy or reforms, but also by dynamics of newly emerging social interactions. Article attempts to analyze various models of civil society transformation from a socio-philosophical perspective, based on modern theories, global trends and value transformations. Special attention is paid to Western liberal, neoconservative, as well as postmodern models, generalizing their internal logic and possible applicability. The aim of the article is to reveal the deep causal chains of civil society transformation, considering it as a socio-philosophical phenomenon.

Keywords: society, socio-philosophical analysis, model, democracy, values, postmodernity, institutions.

Introduction. Subject, Problems and Goals

The subject of this article is the models of transformation of civil society in the modern world from a socio-philosophical perspective. The study covers the value and institutional structures of the three main models (liberal, neoconservative, postmodern), as well as the possibilities of their complementarity in the context of global trends and modern challenges.

Issues

1. Determining Models

- How to define models of civil society that reflect not only legal, but also socio-cultural and ethical standards?
- Do classical, liberal or neoconservative

models address the challenges of a digitalized, globalized field?

2. How identify the complementarities or contrasts between “freedom”, “civic activism” and “value discipline” in each model?

3. Logic of hybridization and localization

- How is possible to build a socio-philosophical theoretical unit that will consolidate elements of models, responding to the approaches of digital activism, online groups and value pluralism (Simmons, 2018, pp. 112-130)?
- To what extent can common socio-cultural principles be disseminated through the combination of these models in a format that adapts to the specificities of dif-

ferent societies (linguistic-cultural, regional)?

Objectives

1. Conduct a theoretical analysis
 - Identify and compare the main value and institutional positions of the three models (liberal, neoconservative, postmodern) in the socio-philosophical discourse.
2. Assess how the ideas of “freedom”, “relationship with the state”, “legality” and “digital pluralism” are expressed in each model.
3. Model a hybrid comparison process
 - To develop the basis for a possible hybrid structure of social models, taking into account the challenges of globalization, digitalization and value pluralism (Krichli, 2015).
4. Propose socio-philosophical guidelines
 - To propose logic and principles that will help both develop theoretical frameworks and build sustainable, multi-layered civil society models in a practical environment (non-governmental organizations, civic initiatives, state-public system).

At the beginning of the 21st century, the idea of civil society is regaining relevance as a way of organizing social life and regulating society-state relations. If at the end of the last century it was seen as a pillar of democratization against authoritarianism and total state control, then in modern socio-philosophical discourse civil society is not only a mechanism of struggle, but also a field of value rearrangements, institutional restructuring and self-organization. In this regard, at the present stage, it is more necessary than ever to examine not only the ideological foundations of civil society, but also its specific models and the logic of its operation in the context of global and local processes.

Various interpretations of civil society, from the ancient Greek polis to the modern images of NGOs and solidarity networks operating on the global stage, show that it is not only the result of political relations, but also an expression of worldview, public consciousness and cultural institutionalization. In theory, civil society unites those spheres where people act as independently acting subjects, not being coerced by state power, but often operating in a framework of mutual investment and interaction with it.

Previously, the liberal model of civil society

was dominant, interpreting it as a network of free individuals operating outside the state. However, in subsequent decades, a number of other approaches have emerged, including neo-Marxist, functionalist, and postmodern trends, which redefine the society-state symbiosis, the structure of social capital, and the role of the public sphere.

From this perspective, the contemporary philosophical task is to reinterpret what models operate in the field of civil society today, what are the prerequisites for their formation, their value content, and their functions, in the conditions of globalization, digitalization, and the hybridization of society.

This research is based on a joint system of socio-philosophical approaches, aiming to reveal the deep assumptions of civil society transformation models, their value foundations, and the logic of modern models. The methodological basis of the research was formed by the following main components:

1. Phenomenological approach:

Phenomenology has been applied at the level of “evidence” and “expression” of civil society phenomena, to analyze theoretical texts, civic sentiments, and public practices. The research phase used texts and analyses of Habermas’s preservation of public space, Putnam’s social capital, as well as civic identities operating in postmodern platforms. Phenomenological reading has helped to reveal the imaginary structural factors of “freedom,” “honesty,” and “identity” underlying models of civil society.

2. Comparative-analytical method.

The conceptual typology of models (liberal, neoconservative, postmodern) was subjected to comparative examination, highlighting the fundamental points of each (e.g., autonomy of law, value discipline, network multiplication) and the dialectical conversation arising from contrasting them with each other. The method allowed to clarify the model limitations and complementary possibilities by discussing the circumstance of conceptual “clash” (e.g., free vs. disciplined, universal vs. localized).

3. Hermeneutic interpretation:

Through hermeneutics, the textual heritage of classical and contemporary philosophical, political, and sociological authors on civil society was analyzed (Knöchelmann, 2024). Moreover, state and civil “philosophical-lexical” for-

mulations were observed, on the basis of which “public perceptions” and “meta-representations” were discussed, forming the strategic perspective of the research.

4. Discourse analysis:

Multipolar online and printed publications, official statements, and messages of social activism were analyzed within the framework of general socio-philosophical approaches (e.g., two-interpretation discourse, public debates, value deliberation). Discourse analysis helped to clarify how “legality” and “experimentation” are formed as social values and how they are included in various models.

5. Dialectical-humanitarian synthesis.


With this method, we obtained a general socio-philosophical context, where the separate features of each model had the possibility of

hybridization. The goal of dialectical synthesis was to find out where and how the contradictions “freedom-security”, “multiplication of identity-organization”, “local-global” intersect in the contemporary field.

6. Literature Selection and Rating Criteria:

The selection of sources for the article was shaped by three premises: (a) socio-philosophical concepts of classical and modern authors, (b) research on global experience (atypical and normative) of the last ten years; (c) localized Armenian and English articles from the magazine “Wisdom” and other authoritative digital literature platforms. The sources were carefully selected according to their scientific-archaeological equivalence, orientation to publicization, and analytical power of model analysis.

Evolution of the Concept of Civil Society



The understanding of civil society has evolved over time, moving from a theory of the “natural” status of society to complex mechanisms of institutionalization of the public sphere (Moyo, 2024, pp. 1-35). In ancient and Enlightenment philosophy, it was presented as a moral form of organization of society, a space for the manifestation of free will. In the theories of the social contract of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, civil society acted as an intermediate stage on the path of transition from the state of nature to statehood.

Since the second half of the 20th century, the

understanding of civil society has changed significantly. Its independence is expressed not only from the state, but also from the economy. Habermas’s theory of the public sphere, Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, as well as the analyses of Tocqueville, Putnam, Castells and others view civil society as a mechanism of public communication, accumulation of social capital and social control. These changes provide the basis for talking not about a single general model, but about a variety of transforming models.

Models of Civil Society Transformation

The formation and development of civil society are conditioned by numerous factors, from the nature of the political system to the system of cultural values (Arugay & Baquisal, 2024, p.

90). The processes of their transformation can be systematized by model distinctions, which reflect not only the diversity of theoretical understandings, but also practical approaches. Below we analyze the most widespread and proven models of global experience.




Figure 1 shows models of civil society transformation.

1. Liberal Model

The liberal model views civil society as a self-organizing sphere independent of the state, composed of voluntary organizations created by individuals and groups whose purpose is to protect their rights, participate in public affairs, and monitor state power. The principles of personal freedom, the rule of law, and social diversity underlie this model.

The liberal model was formed in Western Europe and North America within the framework of the development of democratic institutions (Prozorova, 2024, pp. 1683-1702). It expresses a picture of society in which civil society acts as an intermediary between the state and the individual, ensuring social balance and legal protection.

However, since the end of the 20th century and especially in the 21st century, under the influence of globalization, mass media, and new technologies, the liberal model has faced a number of challenges: the deepening of social hierarchies, the relativism of values, and a decline in citizen participation. All this leads to the need to redefine civil society.

The interpretation of globalization as supremacy, shows that globalization is not only scientific and technological progress (rational improvement of society), but also artistic and technical progress (“emotional” improvement

of the same society) (Oganyan et al., 2023, pp. 85-97).

In contrast to the liberal model, the neoconservative model emphasizes the connection of civil society with national, cultural, and religious traditions. Here, civil society is considered not as an independent structure from the state, but as a structure closely cooperating with the state, which is called upon to strengthen social order, preserve traditional values, and national identity.

The neoconservative model emphasizes the role of family, community, religious, and moral institutions as the main sources of stability in public life (Ward, 2025, pp. 1-18). This model was widely used, especially in the United States during the Reagan administration, as well as in a number of Eastern European countries during the stages of national identity redefinition.

The neoconservative model is often criticized for its one-sidedness, as it, while defending “traditional” values, sometimes tends to limit cultural diversity, the right to free choice, and the interests of minorities. However, it is a response to global challenges that threaten the unity and moral and psychological stability of society.

From a socio-philosophical perspective, this model is important for understanding the conservative side of civil society as a mechanism

for ensuring social order and institutional continuity. It reminds us that civil society is not only a manifestation of freedom, but also a space of responsibility and institutional discipline.

3. Postmodern Model

1. The postmodern model develops as a response to the limitations of both liberal and neoconservative understandings. In this model, civil society is viewed as a polycentric, networked structure, where the formation of individual and group identities is based on diverse affiliations, temporal connections, and cultural multiplicity (Schmidt, 2019, pp. 78–95).

The postmodern approach rejects the idea of a homogeneous, universal citizenship, emphasizing instead the importance of the voices of marginalized groups, the manifestations of diverse agency, and the emergence of new hybrid forms (Jopling et al., 2025, pp. 31-77). Here, civil society takes on a post-national, global character, encompassing not only traditional organizations but also movements, networked platforms, and digital public spaces.

This model, although often seen as an ex-

pression of a lack of stability, is important for understanding contemporary philosophical realities. It allows us to analyze how civil society responds to value pluralism, the information revolution, and the identity crisis.

In the postmodern model, a citizen ceases to be simply a legal subject and becomes an active participant operating on online platforms, who can simultaneously be a member of several movements, ideological fields, and network groups.


I. Comparative analysis of models and limits of applicability

The models presented above – liberal, neoconservative and postmodern – are different ways of conceptualizing civil society, reflecting different logics of social organization, participation in public life and value systems. Their comparative analysis allows us to reveal the deep motivations and possible limitations of civil society transformations.

Model	Relationship with the state	Core values	Advantages	Negative aspects
Liberal	Independence, critical control	Individual freedom, rule of law	Promotes participation, autonomy	Polarization of society, formal participation
Neoconservative	Collaboration and control	Traditions, order and responsibility	Institutional stability, value system	Limits diversity, risks of discrimination
Postmodern	Multi-layered, dynamic relationships	Diversity, networking, freedom of identity	Flexibility, inclusion of marginal voices	Lack of stability, weakening of content

2. None of these models fully describes the multi-layered reality of modern civil society. In the current phase, a hybridization of models is observed, when traditional structures are intertwined with new network forms, digital environments and personalized


approaches to activism. In this context, civil society is evolving into a multi-level platform of coexistence, where identities, interests and values are actively clashing and negotiating (Ciancio, 2024).



Challenges

In the modern world, civil society models are facing a number of challenges:

- Digitalization and the influence of social media, which are reshaping forms of participation and mechanisms of legitimacy.
- The strong role of the state and large corporations, which can lead to the marginalization of the civil sphere.
- Value pluralism and the post-truth regime, which complicate public debate and concerted action.
- The spread of political populism, which often introduces formality into civil society without content.



Conclusion

The process of transformation of civil society in the modern world is multifaceted and complex. From a socio-philosophical perspective, it expresses the deep tendencies of restructuring public life, identity formation, reinterpretation of participation, and value transformation.

The three main models considered in the article: liberal, neoconservative, and postmodern, interpret the role of civil society, its structure, and the relationship between the state, society, and the individual in different ways. Each of them represents a unique understanding of citizenship and public participation, a value foundation, and a mechanism of organization.

The liberal model focuses on individual rights and views civil society as a field of state control and the manifestation of free will. The neoconservative model emphasizes the need to maintain social order, tradition, and value stability. The postmodern model, in turn, presents the possibility of diversity, networking, and the inclusion of new identities.

The contrasts between these models, however, do not exclude their complementarity. Moreover, at the current stage, the hybrid development of civil society is more likely, when elements of different models are combined in response to global challenges, digitalization, cultural pluralism, and the complexity of public relations.

A socio-philosophical analysis of the transformation of civil society requires perceiving the civic sphere not only as an institutional system, but also as a socio-cultural space where public debates, reinterpretations of values, and identity formations take place. The meaning of being a citizen in the 21st century goes beyond legal definitions, acquiring civilizational, cultural, and ethical layers.

The bold and comparative analysis of each model (liberal, neoconservative, postmodern), as well as the application of a methodological framework (phenomenological, comparative-analytical, hermeneutic, discursive and dialectical), showed that the process of transformation

of civil society does not lend itself to any single theoretical explanation: it presents multi-layered, value-based and institutional radiations, which are both localized and globalized in nature.

The main subject, the socio-philosophical analysis of models of transformation of civil society, was fully covered: the comments revealed that the range of problems (the crisis of theoretical diversity, contradictions of assumptions, the logic of hybridization and localization) are real problems that exist both in the theoretical field and in the practical political-cultural context. However, the analysis carried out at the level of the mentioned problems showed that each model has unique formats of the relationship between the individual, society and the state, but no model taken separately fully describes the modern flexible, multidimensional civil field.

The application of the methodology (structural discovery of civic “identity” through a phenomenological perspective, description of dialectical contrasts of models through a comparative-analytical method, discovery of “meta-representations” of public values through hermeneutic and discursive readings, as well as demonstration of hybridization possibilities through a dialectical-humanitarian synthesis) provided the opportunity:

- to find out that the word “freedom” is not fully equivalent in all models: for example, in the liberal model, “freedom” is further concretized in the formats of legal freedom, while in the postmodern model it is redefined as individual pluralism.
- To prove that the idea of “relationship with the state” does not have a monolithic format: in the neoconservative model, it is viewed as a synergy with traditional institutions, while in the postmodern model, this relationship is on the simultaneous “global-local” border, when the state becomes not only a legislative, but also a coordinating (for example, on digital platforms) actor.

Pillars of the Hybrid Model

Pillar	Description
• Legal-Institutional	Constitutional rights, autonomy, NGO-state coordination
• Cultural-Value Based	Ethical traditions, community foundations, shared identity
• Digital-Networked	Online participation, flexible identity, global-local engagement

- As a result, at the level of philosophical assumptions and discourses, the need to develop a new hybrid theory around the oppositions of “legality-values”, “identity-organization”, and “global-digital” emerged.

Within the framework of the research objectives (theoretical analysis, elucidation of the dialectical breadth of assumptions, development of a hybridization model, proposal of socio-philosophical guidelines), the following main conclusion was reached:

- The liberal model includes the protection of individual rights and freedoms, but without a deep-rooted “value discipline”, it often leads to the polarization of society.
- The neoconservative model is important from the perspective of preserving social order and traditions, but it lacks the “experimental innovative logic” that requires the successive “accumulation of experience.”
- The postmodern model emphasizes the inclusion of multiple identities, but its “inherent institutional nature” requires new formats of sustainability.

Combining elements of the previous three models, especially considering the dynamics of digital platforms and the spillover to online


activism, a hybrid model can be proposed that includes:

- Liberal “legal autonomy”, which ensures individual freedoms and the protection of civil rights.
- Neoconservative “protection of values”, which is entrenched in local culture and traditions, creating a “joint platform of public values”.
- The possibilities of forming postmodern “network identities” that will enable the implementation of multi-layered, temporary, digital community processes.

This hybrid model has three main components:

- A legally governed institutional environment where the standards of individual and group rights are clarified.
- A cultural-value foundation, which is based on historical-cultural traditions and ethical discourse, through the reinterpretation of existing values and the creation of new value platforms.
- A digital-networked innovation function that allows citizens and individual initiators to participate in initiatives not only on local but also global platforms, serving as a new opportunity for self-expression.

Suggestions:



- Civic education programs to include theoretical and practical courses that reinforce the idea of “legal-ethical identity”.
- A toolkit that will combine traditional and digital methods, empowering the potential of individual activism while ensuring their ethical standards.
- Cooperation platforms between NGOs and state institutions, where “value discourses” are carried out, turning uncertainties into a process of creating a common vision.
- New formats of public discipline, forming cultural generalizations (inter-subjective) based on formal and informal public spaces, where not only the law, but also ethics and professional guarantees are regulating.

5. Limitations of the analysis and future research directions

The main limitation of the research is that the proposal of a hybrid model requires testing in different socio-political dimensions.

- Case studies are needed in different cultural and political environments to identify indicators of cultural “acceptability” and “adaptability.”
- The ever-changing speed of the digital-global factor creates new “information crises”, the speed requires constant phased analyses: new metrics and indica-

tors are required to assess the success of the hybrid model.

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THE MAIN ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF SOFT AND HARD SECURITY POLICIES

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Abstract: The article highlights the main advantages and disadvantages of security policy as the philosophy of national security. It presents the philosophical basis of national security idea in the context of changing international relations in recent decades, largely driven by globalization, technological advancements, and the emergence of new threats. Ensuring national security, which is already a crucial component of modern foreign policy, is achieved through various practical measures. Among these, two opposing approaches stand out: soft security policy and hard security policy. These approaches play an important role in determining how states respond to threats and what kind of relationships they form with other countries. Soft security policy involves the use of diplomacy, economic, and cultural means to exert influence in the international arena. In contrast, hard security policy is traditionally associated with the use of force, sanctions, and the deployment of military resources to eliminate external threats. Both of these approaches have their strengths and weaknesses, making it essential to assess how they interact with each other and their place in contemporary international relations. The main aim of this article is to provide a fundamental comparative analysis of the two approaches by examining their characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages.

Keywords: security, international relations, state politics, system, process, strategy, concept, legislation, challenge, philosophy.

Introduction

Security has been and remains one of the main priorities of states and peoples throughout human history. In the modern globalized world, security policy has become a much more multifaceted and complex system, which includes both the traditional military component and economic dependencies, as well as new phenomena, such as: the spread of influence

through information technologies and cultural influence.

The diversity of challenges in a changing world order affects approaches to ensuring security, as these phenomena requires transformed strategies and policies aimed at guaranteeing it. Political, economic, and technological changes also result in new threats, such as cybersecurity, biological hazards (e.g., pandemics), as well as robots and artificial intelligence. Thus such

changes demand new approaches to security combining technological advancements and international cooperation.

Methodological Foundations

The issue of security is simultaneously a problem of major theoretical significance and one directly related to political practice, state governance, and operations, thus representing a complex, multifaceted and multi-layered phenomenon (Kocharyan, 2012, p. 72). Consequently, trends toward globalization increase coordination between countries, making them more vulnerable to international threats. This in its turn requires the operation of more integrated security systems. As a result, security policy has become a field of strategic importance for modern states. Its aim is to protect national interests, preserving state sovereignty and strengthening their position in international relations. In this context, the coordinated evaluation of two main approaches—hard and soft security policies—becomes even more crucial. To assess the effectiveness of soft and hard security policies, various analytical methods can be employed. One of them is the method of comparative analysis, which allows to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of each approach within the context of specific examples and cases. The comparative analysis of conflicts is emphasized, where specific examples of international practice are studied, examining how each conflict has affected strategic outcomes (Torosyan & Petrosyan, 2015, p. 142).

Another distinct method is the analysis of multipolar relations, which helps to evaluate how different factors, such as economics, politics, and culture, interact within the frameworks of each security approach.

Network analysis methods can also be applied to study how various actors in international relations (states, international organizations, non-state actors) influence security decision-making. This method allows to clarify how each security approach, whether soft or hard, affects not only relations between states but also those formed between international organizations, humanitarian organizations, or even individuals. When applying statistical methods, an attempt is made to avoid conflicting explanations

through, albeit weak, yet valuable statistical control, but even in this case, it is not always possible to collect sufficiently accurate data.³ In such analyses, it is important to consider global conditions, such as the role of international law, economic globalization, and geopolitical changes.

Such a range of methods is especially important for evaluating the effectiveness of soft power policies, as their results are not always obvious and require consideration of a broader context.

To assess the effectiveness of soft and hard security policies, various analytical methods can be employed. One of them is the method of comparative analysis, which allows to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of each approach within the context of specific examples and cases. The comparative analysis of conflicts is emphasized, where specific examples of international practice are studied, examining how each conflict has affected strategic outcomes (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006, p. 335).

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Within the context of comparative assessment,

it is necessary to clarify the main approaches to the institutional differentiation of soft and hard security policies.

Philosophy of Security Policy

Soft security policy, the concept of which was developed by the American scientist Joseph Nye, involves the use of diplomatic, educational, and cultural means to exert influence in the international arena. Nye introduced the term “soft power,” which refers to a state’s ability to attract and persuade rather than coerce (Nye & Joseph, 2005). Soft power is employed through cultural and educational programs, economic initiatives, as well as foreign policy aimed at improving a state’s external image or character.

On the other hand, hard security policy focuses on force or the threat of its use to achieve strategic goals. This approach is linked to the concept of “hard power,” where security is attained through the application of force or the threat thereof. The main instruments of hard policy include armed conflicts, military alliances, economic sanctions, and the use of force to protect state interests. Examples of hard security policy implementation can be seen in the context of NATO activities, conflicts in the Middle East, or interventions by major powers in regional wars. Soft policy aims to strengthen international ties through shared interests and cooperation. One example is the European Union’s foreign policy, which actively utilizes its cultural and economic resources in Eastern Europe and the Balkans to promote democracy, human rights, and sustainable development. Through initiatives like the “Eastern Partnership” program, the EU seeks to establish strong ties with neighboring states by offering them not only economic assistance but also the prospect of integration with the European market (Raik, 2022). Similarly, the European Union often responds to international threats by proposing policies and programs that contribute to conflict resolution globally without the use of force. Thus, soft policy can have a profound and lasting impact, allowing for the prevention of potential tensions. It’s worth noting that in the current phase, parallel to the development of states’ foreign policy concepts, many experts and researchers have introduced into scientific

and practical discourse concepts equivalent to or adjacent to soft power, such as “harmonious development,” “global harmony,” “universal unity,” and others, based on the development of intercultural cooperation.

Soft policy is particularly applied in the field of foreign trade, where states can utilize their economic capabilities to engage partners and protect their interests. For example, China actively uses its economic power to establish mutually beneficial ties with developing countries, particularly through the “Belt and Road Initiative” (McBride et al., n.d.). In this context, China can exert influence by providing loans and infrastructure projects without resorting to military force. Furthermore, soft security policy also encompasses the protection of human rights, support for democratic institutions, and the work of international organizations to create a stable and peaceful world order. It is primarily implemented through long-term cooperation, providing countries or regions with the opportunity to develop economically and become more stable. China itself developed its modern foreign policy concept taking into account several factors. The first relates to that state’s significant involvement in global integration processes.

In addition, in recent decades, there has been a noticeable increase in the PRC’s activity in global geopolitical processes, driven by China’s growing needs as a world power. To address this issue, China, finding itself in a catch-up role with countries that have achieved security success, began to widely implement the “soft power” policy, tested and successfully applied by other developed countries. Currently, China is consistently improving the means and tools of such a policy, widely using the unique characteristics of its ancient civilization, sometimes presenting them to the world as an alternative to the Western way of life and thinking.

Hard security policy is a crucial component of security policy at both the state and international levels. It encompasses security measures such as the protection of state borders, ensuring the security of strategic facilities, strategies for maintaining international peace, and so on. Hard security policy provides “physical” protection and resilience, used in combating wars, conflicts, and terrorist acts. A primary component of hard security policy is border protection.

It requires the application of international standards that clarify how security should be guaranteed (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, n.d.). Currently, many countries around the world are confronting interstate conflicts and terrorist threats. Driven by globalization and the development of new technologies, hard security policy is also changing in parallel. In the last few decades, hard security policy has expanded to include new approaches and strategies, such as the use of “smart” technologies, regional security methods, and so on.

It was emphasized that hard security policy, unlike soft policy, is directed at the use of force or the threat thereof to achieve strategic goals. An example of hard security policy is the US participation in armed conflicts, initiating the Iraq War (Lebovic, 2019) or intervening in Afghanistan (Theros, 2023). In both cases, the United States used its military force to protect national interests and fight terrorism. Hard policy tools were also used in other regions – for example, the US military operations in Syria in 2015 when the civil war unfolding within the country became a focus of international pressure.

This type of security policy is also applied in counterterrorism operations to achieve faster results but entails certain losses of human and military resources. In this regard, having a short-term impact, hard policy is more effective for the territorial defense of states. Consequently, hard security policy is based on the use of physical force and threats to neutralize dangers. However, hard policy involves both hot military conflicts and economic, political, and military sanctions to deter adversaries. This form of security unites states pursuing the same interests mainly in military alliances (NATO, CSTO, etc.). For example, the actions taken by NATO (Sperling & Webber, 2018) member countries in the context of the Libyan conflict also demonstrated the impact of hard security policy. The military intervention in Libya aimed to prevent violence and protect civilians.

But the same occurred in the cases of Iran and North Korea, where the US and other countries applied diplomatic and military pressure methods, proceeding from the prism of international security. Another example is NATO’s active military presence in Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries in the context of “deterrence

against the Russian threat”. Military bases have been established in these countries, and military exercises are regularly conducted, which are integral parts of this overall strategy (Mälksoo, 2024).

While having differences, soft and hard security policies have similar or overlapping goals – to ensure security and stability, but they achieve these goals through different means (Tchotchua, 2024). Soft security policy has clear advantages in the long term. It helps build trust, develop mutually beneficial relationships, and reduce conflicts. However, achieving noticeable results in complex political contexts often requires significant time and resources.

On the other hand, hard power is effective in short-term processes and ensures a rapid response to threats. It allows for the quick neutralization of dangers, such as, as already mentioned, terrorism or armed conflicts. But it can also lead to serious consequences on an international scale, such as economic sanctions, deterioration of relations with other states, and increased antagonism. In the long term internationally, hard power can lead to a chain reaction of violence and destabilization.

In the context of comparative analysis of soft and hard security policies, it is emphasized that hard and soft power are two different tools in international relations that states use to achieve their interests, resolve security issues, and pursue geopolitical goals. These two approaches, although different in nature, are often employed together, complementing each other. Hard power refers to the use of force and threats, aiming to coerce or subdue other states or groups, and this is usually carried out through military force or economic sanctions.

The use of hard power tends to yield quick and obvious results, but it can have a negative impact, remains short-term, and often ignores the concerns or disagreements of partners or the international community. The application of soft power is a more long-term strategy aimed at spreading a country’s values and building trust without coercion or force. This is especially important when the goal is to gain influence without using military force. These two approaches can be used together, thus providing a more effective strategy. States often need to combine hard and soft power, creating a more multifaceted approach that incorporates a mix

of force and diplomacy.

This is especially important when a state aims to achieve long-term peace and stability while simultaneously addressing international challenges. For example, US foreign policy often combines military presence with diplomatic efforts and international cooperation. Typically, states are wary of using only one strategy, considering the long-term complexities.

Modern Interpretations of Soft and Hard Power Policies

Studies on modern meanings of soft and hard power are certainly based on the ideology of national security. However, a comparative analysis of the approaches of different authors allows us to draw conclusions about modern interpretations of soft and hard power policies. Thus, De Martino (2020) classifies soft and hard power as the components of national security, according to the following criteria:

- Definitions of soft and hard power in the context of national security,
- Functional interdependence of soft and hard power,
- Correlation of sources of formation of soft and hard power,
- Social actors involved in the security policy of soft and hard power.

Fenenko (2021) pays attention to the problem of identifying, defining and studying phenomena opposing security policies. Thus, he puts forward the term anti-soft power, the manifestations of which can be seen in modern rapidly changing societies, which are characterized by deep globalization and transformation processes. In this case social norms and stratification structures are considered in crisis. In such a situation, the author distinguishes the following criteria that are characteristic of soft and hard powers, in particular:

- The national security system is based on chauvinistic or authoritarian ideas, as a result of which soft power is manifested through the use of hard methods,
- The inclusion of ideological alternatives in the national security system, as a result of which both soft power and hard power can be manifested on an opposing

ideological basis,

- The inclusion of soft power in the national security system is artificially limited, as a result of which the functionality of hard power is perceived as the only viable guarantor of national security.

The security content of the use of soft and hard forces has been addressed by a number of authors who have emphasized the importance of social justification and addressing of security policy (Matlary, 2018; Ilgen, 2016; Wilson, 2008; Lackey, 2015; Barr et al., 2015). In these studies, the concepts of soft and hard power are analyzed in the context of the transformational socio-political and cultural processes of modern societies, and national security policy is formulated mainly as a hybrid system of security policy, where it is not possible to clearly distinguish between soft and hard power policies. On the contrary, the complex, hybrid manifestations of soft and hard power are characterized as smart power policy and are presented as a key feature of national security policy characteristic of contemporary societies.

Security Policy Tools

Hard and soft security policies are applied in many different situations, and their impact is usually assessed not only as expected future outcomes but also as a direct response to current threats. The application of soft policy can be seen in the activities of large international organizations (often extending beyond purely security or military frameworks), such as the UN (Nye & Joseph, 2007) and the EU, which focus on maintaining peace and security, as well as economic and cultural development processes (Ferreira-Pereira & Pinto, 2021). At the same time, there are some limitations, for example, soft policy is effective in conditions where diplomacy can lead to understanding and mutual interests.

Hard policy, being complex, is not ideal in long-term relationships. However, it can be extremely useful when a rapid response to global threats is necessary. Hard policy can also lead to long-term obstacles in global governance, hindering cooperation in the international arena. Consequently, the choice of the approaches dis-

cussed depends on the specific situation and the goals set for the state. Soft policy is effective in the long term and contributes to the development of stable international relations, while hard policy allows for a rapid response to threats. However, in reality, these two strategies often do not contradict each other, and in contemporary international relations, their combination is often observed, which experts also call “smart power” (Norris & Malknecht, 2014). This approach allows states to respond flexibly to security threats by simultaneously combining diplomatic and military tools and maximizing their influence in the international arena.

In other words, bilateral approaches should be used in combination, depending on the specific situation and geopolitical trends. It is also possible that the use of hard power can lead to long-term damage and deterioration of relations; however, the effectiveness of soft policy can also decrease in cases where immediate and strong actions are required.

These two approaches can be used together, thus providing a more effective strategy. States often need to combine hard and soft power, creating a more multifaceted approach that incorporates a mix of force and diplomacy.

Thus, more states are choosing to apply smart power, offsetting the advantages of soft and hard policy, thereby ensuring their national interests and international security stability (Filimon, 2016). When building its security sector, Armenia adopted a concept regarding types of national security that closely aligns with the multi-vectored security theory proposed by the Copenhagen School, formulated by the Conflict and Peace Research Institute. The latter, demonstrating a multi-vector approach to security, distinguishes five categorical forms, touching upon both military (military security) and non-military (political, economic, societal, and environmental security) frameworks. In implementing its security policy, Armenia relies on a toolkit that encompasses the application and combination of “hard” and “soft” powers, creating greater opportunities to build and implement national security policy on a solid foundation.

The “hard” tools of the Republic of Armenia’s security policy relate mainly to military-oriented measures, which are used to protect its national security, prevent potential threats, and defend territorial integrity.

The “hard power” tools of the Republic of Armenia’s security policy are:

- The RA Armed Forces, consisting of ground forces, air defense and air forces, border and police troops, state security, civil defense forces, and other militarized formations. This is the permanent military force of the Republic of Armenia, tasked with protecting the country’s borders, deterring any external aggression, and ensuring national defense (Sargsyan & Kocharyan, 2016).
- Defense alliances, among which we can highlight Armenia’s membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (Chufrin, 2022), as well as its cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program (Ghevondyan, 2018).
- Deployment of border infrastructure, surveillance technologies, and border forces to secure its borders and prevent illegal activities (smuggling, illegal crossings).
- Organization and utilization of law enforcement agencies within the RA’s security policy to neutralize threats directed against internal security (terrorism, riots, coups, unrest, etc.).

Implementation of cybersecurity measures aimed at protecting critical infrastructure and government networks from cyber threats (hackers, espionage, cyber warfare, etc.) and ensuring the resilience of Armenia’s digital infrastructure. In today’s digital age, cybersecurity is a crucial component of Armenia’s security policy.

Organization and development of the military industry to support its armed forces and reduce dependence on military procurements from external sources. The aforementioned tangible and often military-oriented measures are essential components of Armenia’s overall security strategy and defense posture, which provide means to protect Armenia’s national interests and promote peace and security both within the country and in external spheres.

In addition to the aforementioned tools, the security policy of the Republic of Armenia also includes certain “soft power” instruments that are primarily aimed at promoting stability, building trust, and neutralizing factors that contribute to security challenges. These tools, com-

plementing the “hard power” measures of security, focus on areas such as diplomacy, cultural exchanges, and more.

The main “soft power” tools of Armenia’s security policy are as follows:

- organization and implementation of diplomacy and international relations, where Armenia’s involvement plays a crucial role in promoting regional stability,
- conflict resolution, and
- building trust with neighboring countries and international partners.

In this context, Armenia has successfully established diplomatic relations with around 182 countries and is actively engaged in multilateral diplomacy by being a member of international organizations and participating in various events and forums. Armenia is a member of the CIS, the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and other regional and international organizations (Guseletov, 2021). Application of public diplomacy, which plays a significant role in conveying Armenia’s adopted policies, created and inherited values to both external and internal audiences, shaping perceptions about them, and building new relationships in the process.

Involvement in conflict resolution processes and the implementation of mediation efforts imply a series of diplomatic initiatives, including organizing dialogue, strengthening trust between the parties, and implementing measures aimed at restoring peace in the region.

Cultural and educational exchange programs contribute to mutual understanding, cooperation, and goodwill with other nations. By participating in such events and initiatives, Armenia gains a unique opportunity to build bridges and strengthen relationships with neighboring countries and the international community.

The factor of the diaspora and its involvement plays a decisive role in supporting Armenia’s development, preserving Armenian identity, promoting Armenian interests globally, and strengthening the ties between Armenia and the worldwide Armenian community. Through various forms of economic support, political advocacy, humanitarian aid, and engagement, the diaspora contributes to the growth and prosperity of Armenia as a whole.

The tools of “soft power” play a significant

role in Armenia’s security policy. They contribute to overall security and stability by addressing non-traditional security threats and promoting cooperation with other nations. As a conclusion to the presented comparative analysis, it is important to note that soft and hard security policies require two different strategies but are complementary approaches in international relations and security provision. Soft policy is based on cooperation, cultural influence, and informational diplomacy, which fosters long-term stability and strengthens trust. In contrast, hard policy is applied to neutralize immediate threats and ensure physical security, relying on military force, sanctions, and deterrence methods.

Both approaches have their advantages and limitations; soft policy can often be ineffective in the face of immediate threats, while hard policy may lead to tension, losses, and deterioration of relationships. In modern international relations, states increasingly use a combination of these two approaches to create “smart security,” which is more effective for achieving both short-term and long-term goals. The analysis also indicates that the combination of soft and hard policies not only ensures a comprehensive approach to security but also promotes international cooperation, which is vital for addressing global challenges.

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Security Policies Limitations

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The role of a framework that encompasses and combines these two types of measures is invaluable for Armenia’s security policy. While the tools of “hard power” provide means to deter aggression, protect territorial integrity, and respond to security threats, the tools of “soft power” contribute to regional stability, address the root causes of insecurity, and foster cooperation through diplomatic efforts and cultural exchange programs.

Conclusion

As a conclusion to the presented comparative analysis, it is important to note that soft and hard security policies require two different strategies but are complementary approaches in international relations and security provision. Soft policy is based on cooperation, cultural influence, and informational diplomacy, which fosters long-term stability and strengthens trust. In contrast, hard policy is applied to neutralize immediate threats and ensure physical security, relying on military force, sanctions, and deterrence methods.

At the domestic conceptual level, countries that adhere to a hard version of security policy

have normative-legal frameworks for the formation and functioning of their security systems, as well as value-based fundamental issues. Consequently, the role of political power becomes more defined within the framework of ensuring and implementing these norms. In the case of adopting a soft policy, foundational security concepts are established in the country—primarily in the form of strategies and doctrines—without essential normative-legal documentation. The entire array of tools for implementing this policy and its objectives is determined by political leadership and leaders who thereby assume “personalized” responsibility for ensuring security.

Manifestations of soft and hard power policies have certain functions in the context of the concept of national security. Based on the main, consolidating, function of the concept of national security, we can draw some conclusions regarding the functionality of soft and hard power. In particular,

- the use of soft and hard power policies is aimed at preserving the territorial-state integrity of the country,
- the predominance of one or another power policy speaks of the priorities of national security, which can be expressed both in the long-term and in the short-term,
- the manifestation of soft power policy is based on the transformation of the value system and goal-setting in society, which implies, mainly, the internal transformation of society, a change in ideology and a change in educational, behavioral and value attitudes,
- the manifestation of hard power policy is based on the principle of rapid response in connection with the need to ensure national security.

The concepts of soft and hard power policies have multi-level manifestations. The genesis of these policies is directly related to the concept of national security, with the awareness of the need to form and implement protective mechanisms to counter threats to society. In other words, the formation of soft and hard power policies corresponds to the historical, philosophical and social foundations of the formation of the state, and the predominance of one or another policy is due to various, socially signifi-

cant conditions of the existence of the state and society.

Based on the comparative analysis, it can be concluded that the distinction between soft and hard power policies is currently quite arbitrary, since the functionality of the national security system is expressed at the level of practical implementation of countering threats to society, and therefore can include the concept of both soft and hard power policies.

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THE CONCEPT OF HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE APPLICATION OF ALGO-HEURISTIC METHODS

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Abstract: Over the centuries, historical and philosophical thought has developed various principles and methods for understanding the historical process, moving from objective-idealism and subjective-methodology to civilizationalism.

This article discusses the application of heuristic methods and algorithmic patterns in historical philosophy.

The aim of the article is to identify the advantages of the applicability of heuristic methods and algorithmic patterns, the use of which will contribute to conducting historical-philosophical research, also outlining the biases (or, in other words, flawed thinking) of heuristic methods, discussing and revealing the practical and theoretical consequences arising from them.

In historical philosophy, there are a number of still unexplored and unexplored problems, and when there is a need to divide them into a predetermined structure and sequence for the purpose of analysis, historical-philosophical algorithms are developed, that is, precise instructions. According to this theory, all cognitive and cognitive processes can be analyzed or divided into algorithmic, semi-algorithmic, heuristic or semi-heuristic content.

Heuristic methods and algorithmic patterns make it possible to best identify and compare the stages of development of the historical event under study, the changes that have occurred.

Keywords: algorithmic heuristic patterns, heuristic methods, cognitive and cognitive processes, principle of analogy.

Introduction

Heuristic methods and algorithmic patterns

have specific technologies, methodologies and rules: analysis, synthesis, generalization, comparison, deduction and induction, certain

aspects of historical events or facts (Documentary historical data can be considered not only official laws or regulations issued in the era under study, but also inscriptions found on objects, etc.), observation, chronology, which, when preserved and applied, will help in the process of studying, researching, revealing, describing a historical event, historical material through the prism of a given era.

Historical-philosophical heuristic methods are intuitive reasoning processes that operate under uncertainty, quickly generating a generally adequate, though not ideal or optimal, decision, solution, prediction, or conclusion. Because heuristic methods do not lead to an ideal or optimal outcome, but simply a “good enough” outcome, they significantly reduce the complexity of a decision, problem, or issue.

The basis of the activity of heuristics, creative research, is the methods of trial and error, the search for possible options. If we, for some important information, hastily study a separate section of the historiographical material, or, as much as possible, focus only on those parts that we want to understand best, we resort to the historical-philosophical heuristic method.

The main function of historical-philosophical heuristics in historiography is the study of historical events, research, the peculiarity of discovering something new, describing it, and making decisions for non-standard situations.

The facts of the philosophy of history are mainly those materials thanks to which the construction of a scientific theory or historical concept is created.

Those conducting research in the field of historical philosophy do not limit themselves in their studies to collecting purely historical facts. They face many problems, they strive to see internal historical and philosophical patterns, to reveal their interconnection and the logic of historical development.

These patterns can be used in historical and philosophical thinking as a clear chain of periodicity. Thanks to them, studying various changes and phenomena of historical samples or events of a given era, based not only on the validity of individual historical events, but also on the logical correspondence of actions and details of certain historical sources, to reconstruct, recreate knowledge about a given era, to study cultural life, the psychology of

historical figures, to “touch the atmosphere of that very era.”

Studying the process of decision-making and the psychology of their formation in the philosophy of history, we can notice certain similarities between the heuristics of history and the algorithmic regularities of history and philosophy. However, let us note that these are two different modes of cognition.

Heuristic methods of history and philosophy define the most probable strategy of the solution process, while stimulating not only the intuitive thinking of the researcher, but also the generation of new ideas, which often leads to the effective solution of historical and philosophical problems. This experimental strategy significantly reduces the time for decision-making, enabling researchers to take accurate and effective steps in their subsequent actions (Gavrilov & Yolkin, 2018).

As we know, science, including historical and philosophy, is a continuous and uninterrupted process. Over time, new approaches to the study of historical and philosophical phenomena are being developed, new methods of processing and database analysis are emerging. Solving a problem, due to the diversity of data, requires a proper classification of methods. In order to make the latter easier and faster, the heuristic method can be considered one of the most optimal and best (Bush, 1986).

Researchers rely on a limited number of heuristic principles that reduce complex tasks of probability estimation and magnitude prediction to simpler judgmental operations (Kahneman et al., 2005).

Unlike heuristic methods, algorithmic patterns are comprehensive, step-by-step processes that reliably end with the correct solutions to specific situations.

Algorithmic patterns in historical research best express the interconnectedness of historically documented realities.

Algorithmic patterns are based on the principle of historical-philosophical analogy and help to find differences or similarities in certain historical events, even if there are no obvious facts at first glance. One of the advantages of using algorithmic patterns is chronology. It allows you to consider historical phenomena and events step by step.

Discussion

Heuristic Methods

Heuristic methods play an important role in both problem solving and decision-making processes. We often resort to these mental shortcuts when we need to solve problems or make decisions quickly and efficiently.

The German mathematician and philosopher Joachim Jungius was one of the first to use the terminology *heureka*, calling for the creation of a research society in 1622. Jungius distinguished between three stages or levels of learning and cognition: empirical, epistemic, and heuristic. Those who had reached the empirical level believed that what they had learned was true because it corresponded to experience. Those who had reached the epistemic level knew how to derive their knowledge from principles based on evidence. Those who had reached the heuristic level had new methods for solving unsolved problems, formulating new theorems, and introducing them into science (Ritter et al., 2017).

Heuristics are often described as procedures with basic rules that can be used to speed up the decision-making process. To make sense of the decision-making process and analyze vast amounts of information, our brains rely on mental strategies to simplify the situation, allowing us to avoid wasting time on every detail.

Heuristics are reliable, but not perfect. In the application of broad decision-making “shortcuts” to respond to specific situations, random errors are both inevitable and have the potential to catalyze persistent errors (Del Campo et al., 2016).

In the philosophy of history, a heuristic is a mental shortcut or rule of thumb that facilitates decision-making and problem-solving. While heuristics often speed up the process of finding a satisfactory solution, they can also lead to cognitive biases, without guaranteeing a successful outcome. Still, biased thinking can handle uncertainty more effectively and robustly than unbiased thinking, which relies on more resource-intensive and general-purpose processing strategies.

A cognitive bias is an erroneous but pervasive judgment that results from an illogical pattern in cognition. In simple terms, a cognitive bias

occurs when a person accepts a subjective perception as reliable and objective truth.

The trade-off between thoughtful rationality and cognitive efficiency encompasses both the advantages and disadvantages of heuristics, representing a fundamental concept in historical and philosophical inquiry.

When studying heuristic methods, one must consider their relevance to all areas of the interaction of phenomena and the performance of events.

Heuristics are ingrained cognitive processes that are used by people and can lead to various biases. However, this does not mean that the biases induced by heuristics are inevitable. Since the widespread impact of such biases on social institutions has become a popular research topic, researchers have focused on techniques for making more informed, thoughtful, and fair decisions in our daily lives.

To focus on the main details of a given problem, one can make a mental list of clear goals and values. To clearly identify the effects of a choice, one must imagine its impact over time from the perspective of all parties involved. Most importantly, one must develop a conscious understanding of problem-solving techniques and the common errors they cause. This awareness allows you to quickly identify and eliminate the biases (or, in other words, faulty thinking) that they tend to create.

Heuristic methods have been studied in various fields. These methods can be used deliberately, consciously, and subconsciously. In recent years, the concept of “heuristics” has attracted considerable attention in fields such as philosophy, history, psychology, cognitive science, etc.

There are many heuristic methods, each of which plays a certain important role in analysis and decision-making.

Heuristic methods are often used in historical and philosophical research because they can be fast and accurate in certain contexts, reducing the time and mental effort required to make choices and decisions (Brighton & Gigerenzer, 2012).

The use of heuristic methods can help us better understand which ones we use and when.

However, when it comes to historical and philosophical heuristics, they have both advantages and disadvantages.

There are pros and cons to using heuristic

decision-making in historical and philosophical research. While they can help us find a solution to a problem more quickly, they can also lead to inaccurate judgments about a given event. Some researchers argue that heuristics are actually more accurate than biased (Schwartz, 2016).

However, there is one feature that distinguishes heuristics from other, usually more complex, procedures: Heuristic methods are problem-solving methods that do not guarantee an optimal solution. Therefore, the use of heuristics is inevitable when there is no method for finding an optimal solution, in particular when the problem and/or the optimality criterion are poorly defined. However, the use of heuristics can be beneficial even when the problem to be solved is well-defined. The latter is due to the fact that definitions of optimality usually ignore the existing constraints on the problem-solving process. Compared with infallible but elaborate methods, heuristic methods can provide a faster and more efficient final result. In 1637, the French philosopher René Descartes published one of his first major works, *Discourse on Method*. Descartes proposed four simple steps that should contribute to the solution of problems. First, accept as true only that which is beyond doubt. Next, break the problem down into as many subproblems as possible. Then, organize the ideas in an orderly manner, starting with the simplest and gradually moving to the most complex. Finally, make the enumerations so complete that nothing has been omitted (1998). Referring to his other methods, Descartes (1908) began working on appropriate heuristic rules, converting each problem into algebraic equations whenever possible, thus creating a *mathesis universalis* or universal science. In his unfinished *Rules for the Direction of Thought*, Descartes proposed 21 heuristic rules (out of an intended 36) for scientific research, such as simplifying the problem, rewriting the problem, and so on.

In historical and philosophical studies, search is a vivid example of assessing the value of time, since one of the most important criteria is to obtain acceptable results within the specified time frame. In a complete search algorithm, especially in the case of studying large events, the recovery of optimal results can take a huge amount of time, which makes it necessary to use heuristic search. Heuristic search is a type of

search algorithm that is used to find solutions to problems faster than exhaustive search. It uses specific criteria to guide the search process and focuses on the most favorable search domains. The latter can significantly reduce the number of nodes needed to find solutions, especially when performing complex searches.

Many emotional reactions are the basis for simplified thinking patterns that help make quick and effective decisions, without spending unnecessary time or energy on long discussions, guided by heuristic methods.

The main point is the ability of heuristics to replace complex problems with simple models, which, thanks to it becomes possible to quickly find intuitive solutions. If the decision has provided a positive result, as is often the case, then we do not even realize what actually happened. However, sometimes simplified schemes lead to cognitive distortions, that is, incorrect judgments that are not based on a correct assessment of the situation. Distortions cannot be eliminated, but they can be recognized and neutralized if we are attentive and strategic.

Affect and Effect Heuristic

One of the most common types of heuristics used is the affect heuristic. Affect is an emotional impulse that arises suddenly and unexpectedly. Affect-based judgment occurs when subjective ideas about good and bad act as heuristics and can lead to quick, perceptual judgments and systematic errors. It is the tendency to see the world in black and white, to believe that positive emotions are devoid of negative characteristics and negative emotions are positive. The affect heuristic is the tendency to use a simplified decision-making framework based on the intensity of positive or negative emotional reactions to choices.

The affect heuristic causes a tendency to be guided by a strong emotional response to choices, even if the emotional response is misleading.

If we have a conservative mindset, we tend to evaluate conservative arguments positively and arguments of the opposite nature negatively. And vice versa, if we strongly associate ourselves with liberal politics, then liberal ideas seem convincing and useful to us, and their opposites

seem unfounded and harmful. Isn't this too radical and simplistic a picture?

If something seems good, then involuntarily, naturally, we underestimate the negative aspects of this phenomenon. It is equally natural to ignore the merits and advantages of a subject that seems dangerous or bad to us. When we try to make an alternative choice, the emotional impact outweighs all other factors.

Today, due to the frequency of dissemination of information about events, assessments are distorted due to emotional intensity. The human brain is more interested in making a hasty decision than in making it analytically accurate. As a result of this tendency, it is unable to take everything into account. The roots of this go back to the depths of time. As they say: "He who thought long, quickly disappeared into the jaws of the predator." We are the descendants of quick decision makers. Therefore, we use a type of thinking shortcut called the affect heuristic.

Information that increases the perception of risk decreases the perception of benefit. Information that decreases the perception of benefit increases the perception of risk.

Michael Finucane (Finucane et al., 2000) found that time pressure tends to increase the negative relationship between perceived risk and perceived benefit, probably because time pressure increases the prevalence of emotional judgment patterns over analysis.

The affect heuristic simplifies our lives by presenting the world as much more organized than it actually is. Technologies developed in our imagination have fewer negative aspects, poorly developed technologies have no advantages. If something seems good, then naturally we underestimate the negative aspects of this phenomenon. It is equally natural to ignore the merits and advantages of a subject that seems dangerous or bad to us. When trying to make a choice between alternatives, the emotional influence outweighs all other factors.

The affect heuristic in historical and philosophical studies describes how we often rely on our emotions, rather than specific information, when making decisions. This helps us to come to a conclusion quickly and efficiently, but it can also distort our thinking and lead to a suboptimal decision.

The affect heuristic can affect any decision and is especially effective in situations where

there is significant time pressure. This means that if we need to make a quick and important choice, then resorting to this heuristic can lead us in the wrong direction.

That is, in the affect heuristic, judgment is guided by strong emotions, even if this leads to misconceptions.

The influence of the heuristic can also lead to systemic problems. If one of the historical and philosophical researchers needs to come to an important conclusion based solely on his feelings, and more likely, if he is under time pressure, that is, in a hurry, relying on the heuristic, not having sufficient mental resources, it is unlikely that he will make a well-founded decision. In this situation, the emotions of one person can negatively affect the lives of many.

That is, when we are short on time or energy, we are more likely to fall victim to the affect heuristic. This means that our emotional vulnerability can play a huge role in how effectively we use software.

Dual-process theory argues that we have two cognitive systems: one that is automatic and the other that is effortful. It suggests that people have two distinct cognitive systems for making decisions. The first is fast, easy, automatic, and emotional, and the second is slow, effortful, deliberate, and logical.

Research shows that the affect heuristic is a product of the first system. Moreover, the affect heuristic arises because our affective state (in other words, our current emotions) changes our perception of the risks and benefits of a particular outcome.

There is a common misconception that an emotion-based system is inherently flawed and always leads to wrong decisions. decision-making, while the reasoning-based system is superior in every way. However, as Daniel Kahneman noted in his book *Thinking: Fast and Slow* (2013), both systems have their pros and cons.

Thinking with the first system is useful when there is no time to think, because we need to make a decision immediately. This type of automatic thinking allows us to make instinctive choices. In emergency situations, there is no time to sit down and make a decision slowly. It is not surprising that the affect heuristic is a result of thinking, instead of making an informed decision, we make quick choices based on our

emotional state. When we need to make quick judgments, the first system can be useful. But when we need to take time to weigh our options, the affect heuristic can guide us in making decisions, making us make them differently.

Another factor that contributes to the affect heuristic is our perception of the risks and benefits of making a particular decision. Our mood affects our risk assessment, which in turn affects our behavior.

Our emotions can also change our perception of the risks and benefits of a particular outcome, affecting the likelihood of choosing it.

When we are positively affected, we tend to perceive the second system as having low risk and high potential reward. In contrast, when we are negatively affected, we perceive the first system as having high risk and low potential reward. Naturally, if we feel that choosing a particular system will lead to a high reward with a low probability of negative consequences, we are more likely to make a decision in its favor. By the same token, if we feel that choosing a particular system is too risky and we believe that we will not get any tangible results from it, we are unlikely to choose it. Thus, the influence of our emotions on the perceived risks and benefits of a given outcome can significantly influence our decision-making.

Every day we are faced with the need to make decisions. Of course, some are more important than others, but even seemingly insignificant decisions can have significant consequences. In order to make the best choices, we need to be aware of the various heuristics and biases that can influence our decision-making. This way, we can avoid them and make more informed decisions when necessary.

We should not rely solely on mechanical thinking when faced with big decisions. Taking the time to think logically about the choices we face and considering all possible options prevents us from taking mental shortcuts to reach a conclusion.

Moreover, being aware of one's own emotional state is useful in avoiding the affect heuristic. We need to realize that each of us feels and expresses happiness, sadness, and anger in our own way. In this case, we can accept that our emotions can influence our own decision-making, without forgetting to activate the second system, the Affect heuristic, slow, effortful,

deliberate, and logical thinking. It is better to postpone making an important decision if we are particularly emotional, whether it is strong excitement or sadness. This will help ensure that extreme emotions do not influence our choices. In 1980, social psychologist Robert B. Zajonc (1980), in his work "Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Do Not Need Conclusions," emphasized the importance of emotions in the decision-making process. According to him, all perception includes an affective component. Moreover, Zajonc showed that our first reaction when perceiving a new stimulus is often emotional. This contradicted the generally accepted view of the time that affective states arise only as a result of cognitive and perceptual processes. However, Zajonc argued that affect is the only constant. When we perceive a stimulus, we always have certain feelings about it, but our cognitive activity can change.

The theory that we can have emotions before or even without cognitive activity has expanded the field of discussion about how affective states influence decision-making. P. Slovic et al., 2007 published the article "The Affect Heuristic." He presented experimental results that show how our emotions influence our assessment of the risks and benefits of a given behavior.

The affect heuristic refers to how we can make more effective (though not always more accurate) judgments and decisions based on our emotions.

Being aware of the affect heuristic can help us remember to take the time to make important decisions. This way, we can make decisions using sound judgment instead of making impulsive choices based on our emotions.

The first step in reducing the affect heuristic in our lives is to understand and apply the affect heuristic.

Here are some strategies that may be helpful:

Before drawing conclusions, it is worth collecting and analyzing statistical facts. Turn to reliable sources of information and try to objectively assess the situation.

It is important to be critical of the very first information. Why was this event easy to remember? Is it really frequent or just bright and memorable?

Today, with information available and accessible to everyone in the most vivid and dramatic ways, striving for more objective and

critical thinking can help us make more informed and rational decisions and maintain an appropriate level of probability perception in order to avoid unnecessary fears and mistakes.

Stereotypical thinking is a universal feature of our perception not only of strangers, but even of many people we are familiar with. This is just the tip of the iceberg of social bias - prejudices that influence our judgments about others.

One variant of this phenomenon is the focus effect, the tendency to pay excessive attention to a conspicuous feature, which leads to an unbalanced assessment.

This scientific term implies one simple thing: People are often more influenced by the persuasiveness of the presentation of information than by its reliability. It is clear that the inherent desire of each person for a coherent, consistent narrative can lead to a false confidence in the accuracy of judgments that meet this requirement.

Researchers often rely on a clear set of already established heuristics in their analyses.

Below we will get acquainted with brief descriptions of some heuristic methods in the process of studying historical philosophy.

Availability heuristic – The availability heuristic is one of the most common cognitive biases. It is based on the idea that we make decisions based on a set of relevant examples. Because these are more easily stored in our memory, we are more likely to find outcomes that are more common or occur frequently.

This phenomenon describes the tendency for people to judge the probability of events based on the ease of recall of relevant examples.

Simply put, we tend to judge events that we can easily recall as more likely, even though this does not always reflect their actual frequency of occurrence.

The availability heuristic has a powerful influence on our lives, shaping our preferences, reflecting our fears, and influencing our behavior. It distorts our perceptions, so we often make decisions based on emotions and vivid memories rather than on sober analysis of data.

Availability Heuristics are related to the way our memory and attention work. The brain tends to simplify complex problems, and when assessing probabilities or making decisions, it often relies on fast, automatic processes that are in turn emotionally charged.

When we are faced with the question of how likely an event is, we do not perform complex statistical calculations. Instead, we recall the examples that are most vividly remembered and have the greatest emotional intensity. The easier it is to remember an event, the more likely it seems.

This heuristic method refers to the common mistake that, having some historical information, imagining and assuming the events preceding a given event, we base our judgments on the probability of that event.

The availability heuristic method can assume tangible results when human judgments about historically observed events correspond to the true frequency of events, otherwise this can lead to incorrect assessments.

This heuristic describes our tendency to judge the probability or importance of an event or phenomenon in direct proportion to the ease with which it comes to mind.

In other words, a single story that is widely circulated can have a greater influence on people's beliefs than any actual measure of probability or importance.

In general, the ease or difficulty of remembering certain information becomes a direct indicator for us of the probability of the event. In particular, it follows that the more often a statement is repeated, the more likely people are to believe it (this vague sense of habitual truth, even in the absence of evidence, is best captured by the concept of "likelihood").

The availability heuristic gives rise to many interesting phenomena. Of particular note is the tendency to overestimate the importance of recent events because they are easier to remember.

It is well known that we know much less about the distant past than about recent history.

Representativeness heuristic – The representativeness heuristic involves making decisions by comparing the current situation with a mental prototype (AlKhars et al., 2019). It allows us to quickly assign probabilities and predict new events using historical prototypes derived from past experience. This heuristic is the most studied by historical and philosophical researchers in relation to the development of stereotypes.

When we try to determine whether a hypothesis is reliable, we can compare these aspects

with other examples we have.

In the process of this heuristic method, by comparing the prototype or stereotype of a given historical event and the event we have already created in our minds, we predict the outcome of a new event.

Statistical facts are generally viewed as evidence of scientific, accepted truth. Consequently, it is expected that the true historical-philosophical result will be presented as a significant result, and as a consequence, researchers tend to overestimate the probability of a significant result (Kahneman et al., 2005).

This heuristic describes our tendency to look for the closest match to a stereotype rather than meaningful data when evaluating such events. The more a description matches our expectations of what an individual is like, the more likely we are to stick with it. The representativeness heuristic examines how closely an object or phenomenon matches our expectations, but when used incorrectly, it can lead to unfounded judgments, leading to cognitive biases. This is most likely to happen when we are in a hurry, inexperienced, overwhelmed by information, deliberately manipulated, or when we are subject to stereotypes and social biases.

Now consider the risks of misapplying the representational heuristic discussed above. While the technique encourages us to categorize situations into broad categories based on superficial characteristics and past experiences for the sake of cognitive expediency, such thinking is the basis for stereotyping and discrimination.

In practice, these errors lead to disproportionate favoritism of one group and/or oppression of other groups in a given society.

Indeed, the most influential research on heuristics often focuses on the connection between them and systematic discrimination.

Familiarity heuristic - The familiarity heuristic refers to how historians tend to have more favorable opinions about previous studies of a given event than about new studies. In fact, given both options, they may choose the version with which they are more familiar, even if the new version offers more benefits (Schwartz, 2016).

This technique can also be used in historiography to guide actions in familiar situations.

Scarcity heuristic - This method of decision-making is based on the perception of rare events in historiography as inherently more valuable, rare cases and facts.

In historiography, researchers rely on the scarcity heuristic method when, having incomplete information, it is necessary to make a quick choice and decision.

Trial and error - This is the main and, perhaps, the most frequently cited historical-philosophical heuristic method. Trial and error can be used to solve any historical problem that has a certain number of solutions and involves the possibility of experimentally applying a number of options until the correct solution is found.

The technique of this heuristic method is usually used at the initial stage of research in the philosophy of history, since it clearly presents the main goal of historical-philosophical heuristics.

Anchoring and refinement heuristics - The anchoring and refinement heuristic refers to the tendency to have expectations about new historical material based on already established information. The anchoring heuristic guides judgments based on the first information received, even if it is misleading. The anchoring effect occurs when a phenomenon is given a certain direction, turning it into an anchor for judgment.

This tendency may also help to explain the historiographical observation that established information often hinders the assimilation of new information, a concept known as feedback inhibition.

Natural heuristics - In historiography, those methods, tricks and mechanisms of problem solving and effective thinking that arise naturally during the ontogenetic development of human cognitive processes (individual development) and are used automatically and subconsciously when solving historical and philosophical problems, proposing new plans and hypotheses (Nalchajyan, 1984).

Behavioral heuristics - Heuristics define a method of behavior and establish rules that help achieve a set goal. However, a heuristic, unlike an algorithm, which describes a set of actions or procedures that are strictly defined (with a finite number of steps) to achieve a specific result, is a general recommendation based on statistical evidence or theoretical reasoning. The purpose of

a heuristic is to build models of the process of solving some new problem.

Accessibility Heuristic - Increasing awareness of cognitive biases helps us to better understand our own thoughts and decisions. Knowing that the accessibility heuristic exists, we can be better informed about its manifestations.

Try to get information about a given subject or event from a variety of sources and perspectives. This will help create a more complete and balanced picture of reality.

According to the philosophical definition, accessibility is the ease of understanding that generates a certain thought or conclusion. Many people use this type of heuristic when judging the probability of an event that can or will occur in the future. Therefore, people tend to overestimate the probability of a rare event if it easily comes to mind because it is frequently mentioned in everyday discussions (Kahneman, 2013).

How Heuristics Affect Decision Making - In the philosophy of history, heuristics are ingrained cognitive processes that are used by researchers and can also lead to various biases.

The range of heuristics is very wide. The application of heuristics requires intuition, study, or experience; some heuristics are quite elaborate, others are really shortcuts, some are described in somewhat vague terms, and still others are well-defined algorithms.

Strategies for making quick decisions are called heuristic algorithms, or simply heuristics. They can be studied experimentally.

Algorithmal Examples

Those who have studied the psychology of decision-making may notice similarities between heuristics and algorithmic patterns. However, it should not be forgotten that they are two different modes of cognition.

Heuristics are methods or strategies that often lead to solutions to problems, but are not guaranteed to succeed. They can be distinguished from algorithmic patterns, which are step-by-step procedures that sooner or later always yield a solution and can be reliably used to solve a specific problem (Kahneman, 2013).

For example, if we thoughtfully read every line of an article, we are using an algorithm. On

the other hand, if we quickly scan each section for important information, or perhaps focus only on parts that we do not yet understand, we are using a heuristic.

Historical heuristics can be distinguished from historical algorithmic patterns, which are methods or step-by-step procedures that always provide a solution to a problem sooner or later.

Our brains rely on historical algorithmic patterns every day to solve a specific problem. That is, historical algorithmic patterns are a set of mental instructions that are unique to specific situations, while historical heuristic methods are a set of general rules that help the brain process and overcome various obstacles (Kahneman, 2013).

Both of these concepts are established facts. However, this does not mean that the biases caused by historical heuristics are inevitable, since the great influence of such biases has become a topic of research, and researchers have focused on collecting more solid, thoughtful sources.

Historical-philosophical algorithmic patterns are algorithms for solving problems intuitively and are based on process analysis, decision-making, intuition, ingenuity, analogies, and experience. Today, the use of historical-philosophical algorithmic patterns is considered quite effective and innovative.

Algorithmic patterns work by evaluating possible search paths or states and expanding them for further study. They use a heuristic function that measures how close a given state is to a goal state to guide the search. This allows the algorithm to prioritize some paths or states over others and avoid exploring areas of the search space that are unlikely to lead to a solution. The solution obtained is not necessarily the best, however, “good enough” is found “fast enough” in time. This technique is an example of a trade-off between optimality and speed.

Historical-philosophical algorithmic patterns provide a clear plan of action that transforms a complex task into a series of accessible steps (actions), which are systematic sequences, and in order to apply them, it is necessary to divide the problem into smaller tasks through decomposition, then look for certain patterns in these tasks, and finally, based on the initial data of the historical problem, separating the unimportant parts, we can obtain the desired

result of solving the problem of any historical event.

This makes the development of the problem fast and predictable and is effective because it saves both time and effort.

“The journey from understanding the task of the problem to arriving at the final solution can be long and winding. The main step in solving the problem is to develop an idea of a plan” (Poya, 1961).

These patterns are mental shortcuts or basic rules that facilitate research, studies and decision-making in historical philosophy, the process of finding a satisfactory solution to the problem.

Historical-philosophical algorithmic patterns contain the following properties and requirements:

Discreteness - In the study of historical philosophy, the features of this algorithmic pattern should consist of separate simple actions, steps that follow each other, and these intended steps should be selected sequentially correctly, that is, the general search approach: start from the initial state and continue to study subsequent states until the target state is reached. This is called the best search approach, which will lead to the required result.

Specificity - Based on the historical database, it is necessary to have specific, sequential, understandable, user-interpretable steps of historical-philosophical algorithmic patterns, and after each step the next step should be indicated.

Simplicity - Each step of the historiographical-philosophical algorithmic patterns must be clear and unambiguous, with only one possible meaning, otherwise vague instructions will lead to inaccurate results. One of the most important tasks of historiographical-philosophical patterns is the analysis of the resulting database. As a rule, such data are the results of historiographical-philosophical studies. Interpretations are considered from different perspectives, comparing them with those previously obtained. It is also necessary to remember about the conditions for the implementation of the synthesis, since any discrepancy may be due to specific circumstances (Bush 1986).

Universality - In philosophy of history, each algorithm should be applicable to all problems of the type under consideration.

Efficiency - In philosophy of history, after

correctly given initial data and summarizing the final steps, the algorithm of the patterns of philosophy of history should give the correct answer, that is, the researcher should get the desired result.

To focus on the main details of a given philosophy of history, one can create a mental list of clear goals and values. To clearly identify the effects of choices, one should imagine their impact after some time, from the perspectives of all parties involved.

Most importantly, the researcher must consciously understand the methods of solving problems used and the common errors that arise from them. Awareness of these imperfect but consistent paths makes it possible to quickly identify and eliminate the biases (or, in other words, flawed thinking) that tend to arise.

Thus, we have considered the generalization of two complementary processes: historical-philosophical heuristics and historical-philosophical algorithms, as intermediary objects of historical knowledge.

Conclusion

Each scientific discipline uses certain methods and techniques to study various problems, and historical philosophy is no exception. The use of the presented methods allows the researcher to adequately assess the events of the historical period under study, their cause-and-effect relationship, based on historical patterns, especially valuing the subjective, heuristic (inventive), inductive actions of those individuals who had a turning point and a special impact on the key processes unfolding in the period under study. For the analysis of these historical problems, with the help of the strategy of historical-philosophical algorithmic methods, it is possible to create a mental list of clarified goals and values. The effects of events and incidents are characterized by the retrospective disclosure of historical reality, the activities of historical figures, consistent changes in historical reality in the process of development, based on cause-and-effect relationships, patterns of historical development. Thanks to the strategy of algorithmic patterns, people expand their knowledge base, as a result of which they make more correct decisions. In a changing world, this skill is only becoming more

relevant.

The use of these methods allows historical researchers to gain an idea of the problem and possible errors with the help of algorithmic regularities.

Thus, we considered the generalization of two complementary processes: historical-philosophical heuristics and historical-philosophical algorithms, as intermediary objects of historical-philosophical knowledge.

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 (Atkinson, 2007, Chapter 8)
 (Jones & van der Meijden, 2013, Appendix)
 (Dexter & Attenborough, 2013, Table 3, row 5, p. 34)

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However, results from another study suggested that significant differences... (Smith, as cited in Jones, 2012).

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