


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W I S D O M

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EDITORS' FOREWORD

The fifth issue of the periodical "Wisdom" is presented to the scientific community.

On December 8, 2015 at the age of 89 passed away Chief Editor of the periodical, founder and president of the International Research Institute for Metaphilosophy, Transformational Logic and Theory of Argumentation, academician of NAS RA Georg Abel Brutian. The death of the renowned scientist is a great loss for both the science and the scientific community.

The Department of Philosophy and Logic of Khachatur Abovyan Armenian State Pedagogical University assumed the scientific-research projects, organizational and publishing functions of the Institute and particularly the right to publish the periodical "Wisdom".

The Editorial of the periodical is determined to fulfill all the outlined and projected plans launched under the guidance of academician Brutian.

Hereinafter the articles and scientific publications in the periodical will mostly be in English in order to be more accessible for the international community and educational institutions. The trilingual (Armenian, Russian, English) webpage of the periodical will continue its activity and in the section "Archive of the Issues" will be included the abstracts and the summaries of the articles also in Armenian and English.

This issue is devoted to 100th anniversary of Armenian Genocide carried out by the Ottoman Empire. The articles on the topic of genocide involve methodological analyses of the socio-philosophical, psychological, ethic and political viewpoints of the problem.

The issue also includes sections covering philosophical, epistemological problems and issues of theory of argumentation.

The present issue as well as the previous ones contains articles of prominent Armenian and foreign scientists well known among the international scientific community. Among them, you will also find not so famous but promising novices.

"Wisdom" is true to its principles of guaranteeing pluralism over scientific issues and their comprehensive reflection. The authors have primary responsibility for the viewpoints presented in the articles and publications, which may not necessarily always coincide with those of the Editorial Board.

The Editorial Board extends its sincere gratitude to all the authors, reviewers, professional critics and assessors of the articles and to the authorities of Khachatur Abovyan Armenian State Pedagogical University for the support in publishing the periodical.

ACADEMICIAN GEORG BRUTIAN

Academician Georg Brutian passed away peacefully surrounded by his loving family on December 8, 2015 about three month short of his 90th birthday¹.

The prominent Armenian scientist, Academician of the NAS of RA, Doctor of science in philosophy, Professor Georg Brutian was born on March 24, 1926 in Sevqar, Armenia. He graduated from faculties of Engineering, International relations, Philosophy, and Philology in Yerevan and Moscow. He got PhD and Doctor of science degrees in Moscow in 1951 and 1961 accordingly becoming the youngest soviet Doctor of science in philosophy.

Georg Brutian's contribution to Armenian science and education could not be overestimated. He founded and a number of leading chairs of philosophy and scientific organizations: he was the founder and head of the chair of philosophy at Yerevan pedagogical institute after V. Briusov (1962–1970) and of the chair of philosophy and logic at Yerevan state University (1962–1970). He played significant role in founding the faculty of philosophy and sociology at Yerevan state University. He was chosen corresponding member of the National Academy of Sciences in 1971 and full member – in 1982.

G.Brutian was chosen to the position of academician-secretary of the department of philosophy and philology of the NAS of RA in 1977 and was academician-secretary of the department of humanitarian sciences and Vice-President of the NAS of RA in 1994-2002.

Despite his venerable age, academician Brutian remained true to his high calling, worked tirelessly and eagerly, continued to put his expertise and capacities into the development of national and world

sciences guiding founded by him International Research Institute of Metaphilosophy, Transformational Logic and Argumentation at Armenian State Pedagogical University and being the consultant of the President of the NAS of RA.

Brutian was author of more than 60 monographs, books, and handbooks, about 200 scientific papers translated and published in 20 languages.

G.Brutian was founder and author of a number of branches of sciences. A number of methodological principles and conceptions are named after him like

- a) the principle of polylogic,
- b) transformational logic,
- c) the principle of linguistic complementarity,
- d) Brutian conception of argumentation and founded by him Yerevan school of argumentation that deserved wide international recognition.

G.Brurian made significant contribution for the elaboration of problems of Armenian philosophical thought and methodological principles of Armenology.

Taking up leadership positions for many years in the field of sciences and education, Academician G.Brutian made a significant contribution in educating the young generation of scientists and forming a new army of Armenian philosophers, logicians, sociologists, and politicians.

Academician G.Brutian made significant and valuable efforts in presenting to international scientific society the importance of righteous solution of Karabakh problem and organizing the true attitude of the prominent scientists all over the world in regard of Armenian's 1915 genocide by Ottoman Turks.

Georg Brutian had founded and guided the International Institute of Argumentation, Armenian Academy for philosophy, International Academy for

¹ Parts of messages and letters of condolence received by Wisdom ed. in connection with the death of academician Georg Brutian see in appendix (pp. 131).

philosophy, thus opening new perspectives and horizons for his young colleagues.

He was member of World Literary Academy (Great Britain, 1990), founding member of London diplomacy academy (Great Britain, 2000), received Soviet, Armenian, and a number of foreign country awards, got honorable titles and awards from many leading universities and International institutes.

As a genuine philosopher Georg Brutian loved the beauty of life. He was a hospitable, cheerful, smart and witty personality. He enjoyed the achievements of his students and colleagues, congratulated them by all his heart, yet when things concerned his own personal life, he was rather ascetic and by all the means avoided publicity even regarding his birthdays and jubilees.

Anyhow, Brutian's friends and students succeeded to organize the celebration of his 80th anniversary in 2006. Great number of scientific research centers and universities, official and non-official organizations, his students and colleagues sent enormous number of congratulations and messages from many places all over the world. The Academi-

cian very much delighted by these worm words thanked all friends and participants in his jubilee speech and invited them to take part in his 100 years jubilee adding with characteristic to him humor that if it happens that he were absent by some respectful reason then there should be no sorrow among the invited people who may just enjoy each other's presence. Unfortunately, the scientific community, his students and friends did not get the opportunity to celebrate with George Brutian his 90th birthday.

Nevertheless, it is quite consoling that Brutian way of life, his style of philosophizing, his tradition of boundless devotion to science and the country, his significant contribution to science have encouraged and guided many and will lead them forward in years to come.

The name of the great scientist, pedagogue and citizen is inscribed in golden letters in the history of Armenian and world science.

The memory of Academician Georg Brutian will live forever in the hearts of his colleagues, students and friends.

ON 100th ANNIVERSARY OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

STOP THE DRIVE OF EMIGRATION TOWARDS NEW GENOCIDE

Abstract

This paper discusses the ways for reducing the modern huge wave of emigration from Armenia that became a serious threat to national security. The author suggests introducing a temporary law of emigration quotas for immediately bringing down the emigration rates to the medium international level. USA and other developed countries regulate their immigration problems just with the help of immigration quotas. This paper also suggests discussing perspectives of a special law, according to which a family would have the right of emigration from Armenia, if all grown up members of the family have university or technical college diploma or a craft certificate. This law could help Armenian emigrant families to get decent life abroad and keep strong ties with motherland thus avoiding the danger of assimilation, the nowadays “white genocide”.

Keywords: mass emigration, white genocide, preventive measures, temporary laws, emigration quotas, social security of emigrant families, ties with motherland.

One of the most important results of public events in remembrance of Armenian genocide centenary was the realization of the fact that the present tendency of mass emigration from Republic of Armenia is comparable to the danger for the very existence of Armenian nation caused in the past by Ottoman Turks. Moreover, the present huge dimension of emigration from Armenia is rightly evaluated as real danger to the national security of the Republic of Armenia. “In the entire period of existence of the Third Republic the problem of emigration was assessed as very actual and in recent years the emigration got frightening dimensions which grew to the extent of a real danger for national security”, - is stated in the program of Armenian Revolutionary Federation “We shall live in our country” (ARF 2013).

At present emigration is not a specific Armenian phenomenon since it is “the native child” of globalization. The latter is usually interpreted as the process of formation of the world’s unified economic market (Sahakyan 2009). Economic globalization

requires international division of labor. This circumstance, in particular, is underlined by V. Kirakosyan: “Globalization is more than formation of global economy. The latter presumes uniting countries in the international division of labor, in world financial system” (Kirakosyan 2007: 35).

Countries that are in the same phase of economic development as Armenia are defined by international division of labor to serve a source of manpower that inevitably starts emigration waves of laborers and their families to more developed countries that require masses of manpower. Thus, the present process of globalization unavoidably becomes an insurmountable factor of unprecedented mass emigration from Armenia and many other underdeveloped countries.

It is no secret that globalization is kept in motion by means, influence and direct dictate of international financial and technological corporations. A. Marjanyan points out that under the pressure of several factors of globalization the very foundations of national states are shaken down. Classical con-

cepts of “national economy”, “national security” and related notions became diffused and “unfashionable”(Marjanyan 2011: 31). Well known financier G. Soros mentioned: “The global capitalism puts countries of the world in non-equal conditions. The precipice between the rich and poor gets bigger. The system that does not give any hope and does not help losers, incites them to make non-constructive steps, dictated by hopelessness, and is risking to brake the system from inside (Soros 2001).”

The social-economical experience of the last two centuries makes it clear that in the society where the highest values are money and wealth, just the financial capital becomes the ruler of the country. One can't establish social justice and descent life conditions for people in the society where the highest values are money and wealth (Gasparyan, Djidjian 2015).

The power and dictate of the wealthiest social elite is the deepest and most basic cause that has demoralized the entire people of this country and has decreased patriotic feelings of Armenian young generation. Just by this reason the young generation of this country becomes used to the idea that it is quite a normal behavior to leave motherland and immigrate to foreign countries for a better life.

Thus it becomes quite clear that the present problem of mass emigration from Armenia could be radically solved when the entire society puts all its energy and activity to form with the help of family and school education a deep and truly patriotic belief that the highest values of life are freedom of his people and independence of this country but not money, wealth or bodily pleasures.

The specific difficulty for solving the mass emigration problem is conditioned by the circumstance that all political parties in Armenia and Diaspora realize the necessity for immediately and radically decreasing the rate of mass emigration from Armenia, yet none of them succeeded to suggest a convincing solution to the problem.

Authorities of this country in their government of AR 2011 program for migration regulation present a complex study of the situation. Yet official interpretations try to convince that there is nothing extraordinary in the present rate of emigration from Armenia. It is assessed in the official forecast that “in the next 5 to 10 years this country might leave around 300 thousand people”. According to the opinion of the organization Analiticon, the representatives of the government admit that they are worried by the mass emigration, but do not think that its rate is dangerous and presumably mass media data are rather overstated. But if we consider the upper level of the official mass emigration forecast - 300 thousand people in five years – then in coming 20 years around one million people should emigrate from Armenia. If the upper level of the official forecast comes true, then by 2030 the population of Armenia may become less than half of the 4 million population of Soviet Armenia in 1991. Considering the outlined situation, one may recall the bitter words of the Armenia's great patriot **Charles Aznavour**: “An inner genocide is taking place in my country”.

The political opposition parties of this country, by exception of ARF, unanimously declare that coming to power they would solve all the problems of the RA, including the problem of mass emigration. Yet they do not suggest any immediate solution to the problem. Moreover, some opposition writers obviously driven by the psychology of political struggle suggest a kind of justification for emigrants from Armenia following “free-market democracy” line argumentation. Each citizen, insist radical libertarians, has the right to demand from the government of his country to fulfill its high-priority obligation – to provide him descent salary and descent life conditions. And if the government appears unable to carry out its high-priority obligation and there is no real perspective for political power change in the country then the citizen, in full accord with free-market ideology, has full moral right to leave this

country. In short, if one can't change government then he is free to emigrate from his country. Yet it's easy to see that this "democratic" line of judgment is a certain kind implicit argumentation in favor of emigration. But the proponents of this type "free-market democracy" argumentation should realize that after another change of political power another group of people would emigrate from the country this time already unhappy with the new political leadership.

One should mention that beside the government of AR 2011 program for migration regulation there are another two serious investigations – the above mentioned ARF 2013 strategic program for prevention of mass emigration from Armenia and the Qololyan commission for emigration study 2013 Report. All three documents are serious and valuable investigations undertaken scientifically and profoundly. They pursue the same goal: to reveal the system of causes and negative factors of mass emigration from Armenia and to find out the ways for liquidation or/and limitation of these negative factors and causes.

What are the conclusions of these three fundamental investigations in regard of the causes of mass emigration from Armenia? Concerning this question I would like to mention the 2014 sociological inquiry carried on by the prominent sociologist Aharon Adibekyan Centre "Sociometry" with the task to reveal the tendencies of emigration in different regions of RA. "Sociometry" Centre inquiry established the main cause of the mass emigration from Armenia, which writers on the subject have pointed out earlier, namely, the economic hardship of the significant part of the population.

The government of AR 2011 program for migration regulation, though not using the term *massemigration*, actually accepts its significance: "today the government of the Republic of Armenia considers the task of effective solution of the migration regulation problem as one of the main challenges for the state". According to this Program, the

government of the Republic of Armenia, starting from the year 2000, has taken a number of strategic decisions in regard of migration process regulation which declare the unlawful and unregulated emigration, especially that of white collar specialists of education, science and culture, as real danger for national security and pay serious attention to processes of migration in their relation and influence to social-economic problems of this country. According to the above mentioned government decisions all the instruments of the state policy making should be put into action for preventing mass emigration from Armenia.

Unfortunately the authors of the government Program for migration regulation do not pinpoint the concrete negative main factors causing mass migration and do not suggest ways and mechanisms of their regulation. The Program rather gives the general outline of the problems and mentions those strategic decisions of the government of RA that contain general political measures and arrangements for the regulation of the entire scope of the revealed problems. In fact, the government Program for emigration regulation is just another strategic document for activation of the previously accepted strategic documents in regard of massive emigration regulation. Unfortunately the government Program does not suggest immediate and urgent measures for prevention and regulation of the present time mass emigration from Armenia.

This kind of complex and all-embracing approach calls on to undertake solutions of such a deep and multilateral political and social-economic problems for which this country has no time resource because of the huge dimension of the present time mass emigration. Indeed, all investigators of the present situation with emigration from Armenia point out that one of the main causes of the mass emigration is that of economic hardship. On the other hand, the Republic of Armenia is at present in economic blockade and in acute conflict over Nagorny Karabach that caused war with Azer-

baijan and nowadays is in the state of smoldering temporary truce. In fact, the economics of Armenia being rather oligarchic than free market type needs decades for its radical reforming and improvement.

Last but not the least, undertaking the solution of the problem of regulation of mass emigration one must take into account that the huge dimension of the emigration has created in the RA an emergency situation from the viewpoint of national security. In general, the regulation of an emergency situation requires urgent measures. It is necessary to find out such emergency ways for immediately decreasing the present emigration from RA which could afford bringing it down in a couple of years to that of the medium emigration rate from neighboring post-soviet republics.

As such an urgent measure we suggest the following: to take a government decision for *quotas of emigration* from the RA that could bring down the emigration rate from this country to the medium value of emigration from neighboring post-soviet republics. We would like to underline that USA and several other states regulate the problems of immigration to their countries just using the instrument of immigration quotas. By using our suggestion the government of RA and the patriots of this country would gain time for more profound solution of the problem of mass emigration.

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THE SPECIFICITIES OF THE PHENOMENA OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT IN PUBLIC OPINION (Sociological Survey Result Analysis)

Abstract

The research was conducted in 2015 from March 15-April 15, based on the method of formalized survey. Five hundred and sixty Yerevan citizens took part in the survey.

According to the survey the moods of reliving the pain, the hope and belief for future, optimism (91.2%) exceed the moods of complaint, wrath, revenge and compensation (88.2%) and the moods of regret, pain, depression and declining moods (76.2%).

However, as the results of the study come to prove, the mosaic of the public perception and the psychological reflection of the Armenian genocide as a phenomenon is very sophisticated. In the above mentioned categories the included components are intertwined and bound together. The moods and feelings included in those groups appear next to each other alternating quite fast.

Key words: genocide committed against Armenians, public perception, moods, feelings and positions, ways of overcoming the consequences of the genocide.

(I)

THE METHODOLOGICAL BASES OF THE STUDY

The Essence of the Fundamental Problem

Public opinion is a unique sphere of transformations which is part of the social system with the respective moods, positions, stereotypes and dynamics. The experience testifies that the projects and policy which are being implemented often lead to mistakes and unwanted results, bring forth the public's mistrust and discontent if the public opinion regarding vital problems isn't examined and the existing dynamics aren't taken into consideration. Meanwhile the policy and tactics based on the stud-

ies of public opinion have a desirable productivity and a positive consequence.

The genocide committed against Armenians living in the areas of historical Armenia and Ottoman Empire has left an indelible trace in the mentality and public consciousness of the 20-21 centuries Armenian people. Memories and the aftermaths of Armenian genocide have become a vital part of the collective identity of Armenians.

International recognition, condemnation of the Armenian genocide and the factor of elimination of its consequences, plays a crucial role in the agenda of the foreign policy of the Republic of Armenia. In this regard, it is essential to reveal and examine the viewpoints formed in public opinion regarding this phenomenon.

The purpose of the study

To bring forth the spectrum of moods and positions existing in the public opinion regarding the fact of the Armenian Genocide planned and committed by the authorities of the Ottoman Empire in the 20th century and the spectrum regarding the steps of easing and eliminating its consequences.

To prepare an analysis based on the received data which might be actionable for the official bodies that pursue a policy in the sphere.

The problems of the study

To bring forth the spectrum of perception of the Armenian Genocide, the moods, emotive responses and reasonable viewpoints regarding this historical event among the citizens of Yerevan.

To study the positions of the public opinion on a number of different options discussed in the political circle regarding the elimination of the consequences of the genocide.

To evaluate the positions regarding the genocide and the countries, political bodies which play or have played any role in the process of its recognition and condemnation.

The target audience and tools of the study

The study has been implemented in Yerevan (among Yerevan citizens). The choice has been made up in 2011 based on the census with the method of multivariate lamination. The conglomerate of the target audience has been formed according to

1. Gender
2. 4 age groups: 18-30, 31-45, 46-60, 61 and older and educational

3. Levels: incomplete secondary, secondary, secondary vocational and high education; divided into 24 groups with the principle of proportional representation.

560 Yerevan citizens have taken part in the survey. The sociological study has been implemented with the method of formalized interviews. The initial work of the collection of the sociological information was done within March 15-April 15 of 2015.

(II)

WHAT MOODS AND FEELINGS DO THE RECOLLECTION OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND THINKING ABOUT IT AWAKE AMONG THE RESPONDENTS?

The participants were presented probable moods and feelings and they were offered to mark the ones they experience and how much they do that while speaking about the Armenian Genocide.


The moods and feelings offered in the list were grouped in 3 categories.

Feelings of:

1. regret, pain, depression, declining moods,
2. complaint, wrath, revenge, struggle for the compensation,
3. reliving, belief and hope for the future, optimism.

The average indicator for the manifestation of the feelings and moods of the first group was 76.2%. The feelings and moods of the second group are more expressive. It is of note that the moods of the third group reliving the catastrophe, belief and hope for the future, optimism) are even more expressive - 91.2%. See in the graph.

Graph 1: A comparative table of the existing moods regarding the Armenian Genocide in the public opinion.



However, as the results of the study come to prove, the mosaic of the public perception and the psychological reflection of the Armenian genocide as a phenomenon is very sophisticated. In the above mentioned categories the included components are intertwined and bound together. The moods and feelings included in those groups appear next to each other alternating quite fast.

The feeling of regret and pain was on the first place making up 96.4%. The 23.4% of the participants experience this feeling considerably much, while 73% have even stronger feelings. Moreover, the existence and strength of this feeling is not only nearly the same for both men and women but also for all the age groups. It increases a bit with the simultaneous rise of the educational qualification.

- The ones with incomplete secondary education experience this feeling - 95%.
- The ones with secondary, secondary vocational education – 95%.
- The ones with incomplete high and high education - 98.6%.

The second one is the feeling of hatred against those who organized and committed genocide. This has been marked by 95% of the participants (16.1% experience this feeling considerably much, while 78.9% even stronger feelings). Moreover, the indicator of this feeling is nearly the same for all the

age groups. It decreases slightly with the simultaneous increase of the educational qualification.

- The ones with incomplete secondary education experience this feeling - 100%.
- The ones with secondary, secondary vocational education – 95.3%
- The ones with incomplete high and high education - 94.0%

The third one is the feeling of endurance and the determination to live despite the catastrophe of genocide – 93.4%. This mood is nearly the same for both males and females for all the age groups and it rises slightly with the simultaneous increase of the educational qualification. (Among the participants with incomplete secondary education it makes up – 90%. Among those with secondary, secondary vocational education – 93.8 %. Among the ones with incomplete high and high education – 94.0%).

On the fourth place it is the feeling of determination to get the loss back at least partly – 92.9%.

This mood is a bit more noticeable among older generation (40-60 year old) respondents – 94.1%. Among comparatively young people (18-45) it makes up 91.2%.

Based on intensity on the fifth place are the moods of struggle for demand and compensation – 92.0%. This mood is more noticeable among the

representatives of the young generation (18-45), than among older people (46-61) – 90.2%.

On the sixth place is the mood of improving and making Armenia powerful with everyday work – 90.5%. It is more expressed among women (92.2%) with 5.3% than among men (87.6%).

The seventh is the feeling of wrath and revenge – 88.8%. This feeling is more expressed among older generation (46-61 and older people) – 90.6%, than among younger people (18-45 year old) – 87.3%.

On the eighth place are the moods of hope and optimism – 87.9%. The indicator of the existence of these moods is nearly the same for women and men and it is expressed more noticeably among the young (18-45 year old) – 91.2 % than among older people (46-61 and older) – 83.9%. The indicator of the mood of hope and optimism sees some rise also with the simultaneous increase of the educational qualification. Among the respondents with incomplete secondary education it makes up 85.0%, among the ones with secondary and secondary vocational education it is 85.4%, while among the participants of the survey with high education it is 91.7%.

The ninth one is the wish to speak to others (to the people of other nationalities) about Armenian's pain – 77.0%. 79.0 % of women and 74.4% of men have chosen this. Moreover, with the rise of age, the number of people with this mood increases (among people at the age of 18-30 it makes up 72.0%, among 31-45 year old people – 76.1%, 46-60


– 78.1%, and among 61 year old and older people it is 84.3%).

The tenth one is hesitation and alarm for the future – 73.1%. This is comparatively more noticeable among the older generation (46-61 and older) – 76.4% than among the young (18-45) – 70.3%. This mood is expressed more considerably among the participants with a low educational qualification (incomplete secondary) – 80.0%.

The eleventh one is the feeling of being a victim and persecuted – 68.4%. This feeling is more considerably expressed among 34.6% of the participants. With its volume (altogether – 73.1%) and intensity (more expressed among 50%) this is more considerably expressed among 61 and older people. For instance, among people at the age of 18-30 this feeling is noticeable generally in 68.3% and more considerably 31.7%.

The list of moods connected to the moods and feelings of genocide is concluded by the feeling of depression and disappointment – 66.8%. With the intensity of manifestation it is again on the last place in the row of feelings and moods. This feeling considerably exists among the 28.9% of the participants of the survey. Moreover this feeling is more considerably expressed among people at the age of 61 and older- 85.9% and the most considerably among 36.1% of them. For the comparison, it is of note that this indicator makes up 23.8% among 18-30 year old people.

Graph 2: A table of the existing moods and feelings in the public opinion regarding the Armenian Genocide.



(III)

THE VARIETIES OF THE ELIMINATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE GENOCIDE
ACCORDING TO THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE SURVEY

The participants of the survey were offered to choose from 10 options which are being studied in political and experimental circles, and also from the ones which appear in Mass Media choosing the most realistic and useful utmost 2 options.

On the first place is getting the areas of Historical Armenia back – 62.7%. The number of the supporters of this option is greater among 18-30 year old people (67.1%) and it decreases gradually with the simultaneous rise of the age scale (30-45 year old people – 62.7%, 46-60 year old people-61.0%, 61 and older – 58.3%).

On the second place is the recognition and condemnation of the fact of Genocide by Turkey committed against Armenia – 48%.

The third option according to the public opinion can be the resettlement of the victims, their relatives and heirs in the historical homeland – 27%.

The rest of voting result is as follows:

4. The recognition of the Republic of Karabakh by Turkey – 24.6%.
5. The provision of a material and financial compensation to the victims' heirs -24.3%.
6. The provision of a favorable location as a territorial compensation for the Armenian side, particularly provision of the exit to the Black Sea – 24.1% The supporters of this option are more common among men -28.4, (among women it is – 20.6) and among the respondents with high education 26.1% and among people older than 60 it is 25.9%
7. The provision of a financial compensation to the Armenian side (the republic, Panarmenian organizations) from Turkey – 19.1%.

8. The definition of some privileges (business, tax etc.) in Turkey for Armenians -11.3%.
9. The implementation of some historical, cultural, propaganda projects which would shed off the denying and anti-Armenian moods – 11.3%.
10. The implementation of propaganda, cultural projects for the Armenian society which would shed off the psychology of a victim.

(IV)

THE ATTITUDE OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES, POLITICAL BODIES TOWARDS ARMENIA AND ITS PROBLEMS ACCORDING TO THE PUBLIC OPINION AND THE ATTITUDE OF OUR CITIZENS TOWARDS THESE BODIES

The fact that the international recognition and condemnation of the Armenian genocide is a question of vital importance to the foreign policy of the Republic of Armenia means close relationships and considerate work with different international organizations and countries.

What is the attitude of different countries and political organizations towards Armenia and its problems according to Yerevan citizens?

With the positive attitude the first country on the list of 24 organizations and countries suggested by the participants of the survey is France. 81.1% of the respondents have chosen this option.

On the second place is Russia – 68.6%.

The third one is Greece – 55.0%.

On the fourth place is the United Nations. – 51.6%

The fifth one is Italy – 47.3%

Among ten countries and organizations with a positive attitude towards Armenia and its problems the participants of the survey also included: Syria - 43.2%, Uruguay – 42.9%, Commonwealth of Independent States – 41.8%, Georgia – 4.1, Germany – 40.5%.

Among the countries with a negative attitude towards Armenia and its problems Azerbaijan and

Turkey are in the lead with 96.1%. The second one is the Islamic Republic – 49.6%. The third one is the USA – 22.1% (Though 33.1% of respondents have chosen the USA as a country with a positive attitude towards Armenia). The fourth one is Kazakhstan - 13.9%. The fifth one is Hungary with 22.7%.

What is the attitude and position of respondents towards different countries and organizations?

The most favorite one for the respondents is again France. 82.5% of the respondents have expressed their positive attitude towards this country. The indicator¹ of the mutuality of the positive attitude in case of France according to the answers given by respondents from Yerevan is 0.99.

The second one is Russia – 73.2%. The indicator of mutuality is a bit less – 0.94 in comparison to France. This means, according to the survey they have a more positive attitude towards those countries – 73.2% than the latest towards Armenia and its problems – 68.6%. Among the first ten countries and organizations which gained the goodwill and positive attitude of the respondents are also included Italy – 63.8% (the indicator of the mutuality of the positive attitude – 0.74), Greece – 60.7% (the indicator of the mutuality of the positive attitude – 0.64), Germany – 56.1% (the indicator of the mutuality of the positive attitude – 0.72), The USA - 48.9% (the indicator of the mutuality of the positive attitude – 0.64), Belarus – 45.2% (the indicator of the mutuality of the positive attitude – 0.79), The UN - 47.7% (the indicator of the mutuality of the positive attitude – 1.1), Georgia – 44.8% (the indicator of the mutuality of the positive attitude – 0.92), Commonwealth of Independent States- 41.6% (the indicator of the mutuality of the positive attitude – 1.0).

¹Shows the relation of the indicator of expressing the positive attitude of that country to the indicator of the respondents' positive attitude towards that country regarding Armenia and its problems according to the participants of the survey.

Azerbaijan leads the list of countries which received a negative attitude from the participants of the survey. 92.2% of the respondents have expressed such an opinion. On the second place is Turkey – 90.4%. The third place – Islamic Republic – 49.1%.

The facts received through the public opinion should not be perceived as expertise. Very often there are essential differences between them.

However, acquired statistics based on public opinion regarding such vital problems create a huge foundation for further scientific studies, research and analysis, as well as increase of productivity of similar projects and policy in a particular sphere.

“THE UNEXAMINED LIFE IS NOT WORTH LIVING”: THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

Abstract

The article discusses the work, research and efforts Professor Armen Marsoobian has done towards explicating and representing the fragments left from the Armenian Genocide period. Armenian Genocide has had its huge impact on the lives of Armenian people and the national ideology.

Professor Marsoobian, through photography exhibitions and his books, retells the story of Armenian people and events of 1915 to the world. The past needs to be examined, for we need to clearly understand the reasoning behind historical events, in order to prevent and be more secure in future.

Key words: Armenian genocide, history, 1915, photography, family, ancestors, massacre.



The statement by Socrates “Unexamined life is not worth living” applies to every aspect of our lives.

Philosophers raise questions and explore vital topics that need to be examined, highlighted and explained. What about Armenian philosophers? Every Armenian throughout his or her life is connected to our history, history that is full of pain and struggle. Armenian Genocide and the fight for achieving recognition are forever sealed in the national identity of Armenians.

Dr. Armen T. Marsoobian is an Armenian-American professor, who has been realizing a project that aims to bring Turks and Armenians closer through sharing the common past, as well as estab-

lish new standpoints to the long existing issue. The overall objective of the project is the memorialization of the Armenian Genocide in Turkey. It consists of two books, photography exhibitions and foundation of memorial sites that are linked with the Dildilians’ (his mother’s family), which all together come to tell us about the pre, after and post genocide times in Ottoman Turkey. The project also includes various lecture series in different parts of the world, all of which are in the frames of the Armenian Studies Program.

Armenian Genocide, Holocaust and other genocides are depicted in thousands of photos that were preserved over time. The history of Armenian Genocide is acknowledged through thousands of


documents, memoirs, reports, eyewitness testimonies and stories of survivors. Photos by foreign and Armenian photographers during the years of Genocide come to serve as exceptional proofs of the history that is still being denied. Marsoobian's photography exhibitions are new sources of information and proofs. The exhibitions initially launched in Istanbul, Merzifon, Ankara and Diyarbakır featuring photographs that document the social life of the Armenian people living in Anatolia, throughout the 19th century. Marsoobian's ancestors, the Dildilian family practised photography, and the photographs presented in the exhibitions were given to him by his uncle towards the end of his life. Hundred photos were chosen to be presented out of thousands.

Each and every photo carries a great responsibility to transfer unique and important information about Armenian Genocide or Armenian social life of those times. These photo-stories convey messages and history, but most importantly they serve as an essential evidence of the crimes committed against civilization and humanity by the Ottoman Empire. These photos with their exceptional stories give the audience an opportunity to get a deep insight of the tragedy of the Armenian people. The photos not only come to prove the genocidal policy performed by Turkish Government, but also raise awareness, call for action in order to prevent similar tragedies in the future. The recorded terrible scenes from history speak with us through photographs in the language of facts – facts of struggle.



In an interview with *Today's Zaman*, Marsoobian talked about the major goal of his exhibition: "The exhibition changes a little, depending on the location. But what I would like to do is to expose Turkish citizens, whether they are of Armenian background or not, to the cultural wealth of these lands from which Armenians were removed in 1915 and where, in years after, they were silenced and repressed" (Marsoobian, 2014).

It is important to note how working with these materials and realizing this memorialization project coincided and matched with professor's work in philosophy, particularly in the fields of moral theory and ethics. Armenian-American professor sees photography as an art form, accordingly sharing them as sharing the art. He is sharing memories and history through the art of photography. These materials are irreplaceable source of education that leaves room for questions and clarifications.



The Armenian Genocide had critical impact on people's lives, besides all of the innocent victims people were displaced from their homeland left without anything and yet only few people could survive. Armen Marsoobian's book "Fragments of a Lost Homeland: Remembering Armenia" is collective work of history that Dildilian family preserved and transferred throughout time to next generations. The Dildilians chose to speak up about their experience and history of the Armenian people. Professor Marsoobian used all of the saved resources: video and audio recordings, memoirs, diaries, letters and, of course, photographs and drawings to represent Armenian and Ottoman history from the late nineteenth century to the 1920s.

Professor Marsoobian's exhibitions, lectures and books on the Armenian Genocide present different facts and angles of the history to the world. His work and devotion are great sources of appreciation. "The unexamined life is not worth living" (Socrates). The unsolved wounds that come from history need to be examined the most.

Profile:

Armen T. Marsoobian is a professor of philosophy and chairman of the Philosophy Department at Southern Connecticut State University. He holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the State University of New York at Stony Brook. His articles on Dewey, Peirce, Buchler, Emerson, pragmatism, aesthetics, and genocide studies have appeared in a variety of

journals and anthologies. He has co-edited two books in systematic metaphysics, the first an expanded and revised edition of Justus Buchler's *Metaphysics of Natural Complexes*, the second, an anthology of essays on philosophical naturalism entitled *Nature's Perspectives: Prospects for Ordinal Metaphysics*. He published an anthology of essays on classic American philosophy, entitled *The Blackwell Guide to American Philosophy*. He is editor-in-chief of the Wiley-Blackwell philosophy journal Metaphilosophy and is also general series editor for monographs in contemporary philosophy entitled, *Metaphilosophy Series in Philosophy*, published by Wiley-Blackwell Publishers. His article, "Acknowledging Intergenerational Moral Responsibility in the Aftermath of Genocide," appeared in *Genocide Studies and Prevention* (2009). His recent essay, "Rescue in Marsovan: The Untold Story Behind a Photograph," won the Hrant Dink Prize for Historical Research in 2011.

He is a frequent presenter at conferences and seminars on topics related to his work on genocide, including reparations, reconciliation and memorialization. He has lectured on these topics in Armenia, Europe, South America and the United States.

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THE MORAL BURDEN OF MEMORY: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL NARRATIVES IN DEMOCRACY BUILDING

This essay is a meditation on memory and democracy. I will argue that democracy as a way of life is conditioned upon how well a community remembers its past. The concept of democracy as a way of life, as distinct from a particular form of governance, has its origins in the political philosophy of John Dewey. I will approach this issue in a somewhat roundabout manner. In the first part, I will examine a series of Dewey's writings from the early 1920s that resulted from his visit of the newly established Republic of Turkey. I contend that the serious shortcomings in Dewey's analysis of Turkish state nation-building highlight deficiencies in his otherwise laudable and nuanced democratic theory. In the second part, I provide a more sustained analysis of the role of collective memory within a community, especially one that aspires to a democratic way of life. I will then conclude with a few reflections upon issues arising from Turkish collective memory in relation with the Armenian Genocide.

I.

The impetus for this part of my essay derives from John Dewey's writings in the early 1920s that had their origins in his travels to Turkey. Dewey had accepted an invitation from Mustafa Kemal (later known as Atatürk), the president of the newly proclaimed Republic of Turkey, to visit the country for the purpose of studying the nascent public education system. He was asked to prepare a report of recommendations setting out the direction the Ministry of Public Instruction was to take in building a secular public education system, a system to be built basically from scratch. This was an attractive proposition for Dewey, for he had long struggled in the educational reform movement in the United States but given its local and decentralized character, reform was a slow and piecemeal process. Now he was given an opportunity to make proposals that could be implemented on a systematic nation-wide basis.

Dewey's 3-month trip to Turkey, including visits to Istanbul, Bursa, Ankara, and the rural countryside of Anatolia, produced four short articles for the *New Republic* and two reports to the Turkish ministry of education. Dewey's educational project in

Turkey was clearly in harmony with his educational philosophy in the States. Public education was to prepare citizens to function in a democratic nation-state. In the introduction to his final report he writes: "Unfortunately, there is no difficulty in stating the main end to be secured by the educational system of Turkey. It is the development of Turkey as a vital, independent, and lay republic in full membership in the circle of civilized states" (MW15 275)¹. Though he doesn't use the word "democracy" here, later in the same report he does emphasize the need to reject methods of instruction and discipline that impede the development of democratic habits: "Methods of dictation, arbitrary control and mechanical obedience do not fit pupils to be citizens in a democracy" (MW15 294). Dewey clearly laid out the goals for public education. These

¹ I employ the standard citation format for all references to John Dewey's writings. The complete works of Dewey are published in three sets: *The Early Works, 1882-1898* (cited EW followed by volume number and page number); *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924* (cited MW); *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953* (cited LW). See Works Cited for full bibliographic reference.

goals were in harmony with his educational writings of the previous decade, especially *Democracy and Education* (1916). Dewey spells out the following three main tasks for these new schools:

Schools must (1) form proper political habits and ideas; (2) foster the various forms of economic and commercial skill and ability; (3) develop the traits and dispositions of character, intellectual and moral, which fit men and women for self-government, economic self-support and industrial progress... To realize these ends, the mass of citizens must be educated for intellectual participation in the political, economic, and cultural growth of the country, and not simply certain leaders. (MW15 275)

Dewey recommends that schools should have a broader social function than merely training “pupils in academic subjects.” They must serve as “centers of community life” (MW15 275). As such schools will play a central role in fostering democracy as a way of life.

In July and August of 1924, John Dewey and his wife Alice traveled extensively in the rural countryside around Ankara and ventured further into the Anatolian plateau. Ten years of war and social conflict had taken a heavy toll on these lands. The economic and agricultural needs of the rural towns and villages were great and schools would serve the vital needs of these communities. Besides training students in the skills and habits needed for economic growth, schools were to serve as community centers to gather and disseminate agricultural, industrial and hygienic information and advice. In addition, all schools were to be equipped with libraries that would serve the needs of both the students and the surrounding communities. Dewey called for an active “campaign at the beginning to take books into the homes of the town until the people form the habit of coming for them” (MW15 279). The goal was to promote and strengthen the reading habits of adults and thereby reinforce the reading habits of school children.

At first blush, these school-community centers have a striking resemblance to the functions of settlement houses, as chronicled in the work and writings of Jane Addams. These Turkish centers would serve as the rural equivalent of Hull House. Dewey argues that these schools and community centers must be adapted to the local circumstances of their communities. He sees a great danger in an overly centralized educational system that would impose a uniformity of curriculum that would stifle “local interest and initiative” and “prevent local communities” from “taking the responsibilities which they should take” (MW15 280). A system needs to be developed that is “flexibly adapted to the varying needs of different localities, urban, rural, maritime, and different types of rural communities, different environments and different industries, such as pastoral, grain-growing, cotton, fruit, etc.” (MW15 280). Yet there is a glaring omission in the diversity that seems to be celebrated here. While there is a passing reference to the need to teach local geography and history, there is no mention of the ethnic and religious diversity of these communities. Granted that as a result of the genocide, massacres and population exchanges, there were no Armenians (except “hidden Armenians”) or Greeks left in Turkey aside from those in Constantinople, there were still significant numbers of other minorities, including Kurds, Alevis, Ezidis, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Laz, Caferis, Roma, Circassians and Jews. Reading Dewey’s writings on Turkey give one the impression that the Turkish state consisted of ethnically and religiously homogenous communities. It is as if we had Hull House minus the immigrants. True, Dewey was in Turkey for less than three months and may have found it difficult to penetrate into the nationalist ethos of the new republic, an ethos that emphasized unified Turkishness over diversity, yet it is still striking how blind this report is to the presence of minorities. One could attribute this to a degree of self-censorship, for we must re-

member that the intended audience for this report was the Ministry of Education.²

Let me probe this issue a little further. Dewey was certainly aware of the heightened sense of patriotic nationalism that suffused the life of the Turkish Republic. The new republic had been proclaimed less than 8 months earlier. Independence was achieved after a hard-fought and costly war against British, French and especially Greek occupying armies. But the process of nation-building had begun much earlier. In the first two decades of the 20th century, the intellectual and political stirrings of Turkish nationalism were taking place under the centuries-old decaying socio-political structure of the ethnically and culturally diverse Ottoman Empire. The 100-year long dismemberment of this Empire came to a head in the Balkan Wars of 1912 and the First World War. Dewey was certainly not ignorant of the phenomenon of the rise of the nation-state in the Modern era. In his *Ethics*, he writes of this phenomenon:

The most characteristic political phenomenon of recent centuries is the development of national states. ... Internally they presuppose or aim at a certain unity of culture, and a system of common laws supported, usually, by some sort of representative government. The gradual substitution of the word "nation" for other terms which designate supreme political units implies, if not actual popular participation in government, at least a personal attachment and loyalty which had previously been

found only among the members of small city-states. (LW7 367)

The above could certainly characterize the developments that took place in the transition from the Ottoman Empire, beginning with the 1908 restoration of the Ottoman Constitution with its introduction of parliamentary government and restrictions on the powers of the Sultan, to the eventual abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate prior to the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923.

In the same pages, Dewey goes on to discuss "a certain state of mind" or "social consciousness" that arises in the citizenry of newly emerging nation-states. There is a heightened sense of loyalty and belief in "the intrinsic excellence" of the national mission. Dewey is careful to point out that there are both positive and negative moral consequences to this new social consciousness. On the positive side, the effect is "to widen the sense of social unity, to deepen the civic sense and to generate public spirit, which may be defined as interest in the affairs of the community as if they were one's own concern" (LW7 368). The negative effects are characterized by "increased exclusiveness, by suspicion, fear, jealousy, often hatred, of other nations..." Dewey concludes: "Public spirit is often converted into a belief in the inherent superiority of all significant virtues of one's nation; the native egoism of individuals is swollen to identify itself with an entity designated *the "State"* (LW7 368). Much of the rest of the discussion in this section of the *Ethics* focuses on the negative effects of patriotism as they foster wars between nations. What is striking here and is relevant for my concern, is Dewey's neglect of the effect of this new social consciousness on diverse communities within the geographical boundaries of these new nation-states. He does in passing mention that for the United States, this translates into the belief that any belief that smacks of "internationalism" is deemed unpatriotic and not a hundred-per-cent American.

²Under Kemalism community-based educational institutions were developed less than a decade later. First in 1932 with the development of People's Houses in towns and later in 1937 with Village Institutes in the more rural areas of the republic. While both contributed in positive ways to improvements in literacy and economic development, they also were used to suppress minorities and elevate a mono-cultural Turkishness. See Alexandros Lamprou, *Nation-Building in Modern Turkey: The 'People's Houses', the State and the Citizen*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2015.

In an earlier essay from 1916 entitled, “Nationalizing Education,” Dewey makes a similar point. Here he recognizes a genuine American nationalism as an internationalism, by which he means our nation is “itself complex and compound. Strictly speaking it is interracial and international in its make-up. It is composed of a multitude of peoples speaking different tongues, inheriting diverse traditions, cherishing varying ideals of life. This fact is basic to *our* nationalism as distinct from that of other peoples.” He concludes that “our unity cannot be a homogeneous thing like that of the separate states of Europe . . .” (MW10 204). Not only is this last claim false of the Europe of 1916, I would venture to say that it is false of Europe today, evidence, the ethnic and regional diversity found in countries such as Spain, Belgium or the failed cultural assimilation of Muslim minorities in much of Western Europe. What is abundantly clear, is Dewey’s failure to recognize the diversity that characterized the Turkish nation-state in 1924. The great irony is that when these words were written in 1916, a systematic campaign of “race extermination,” to use American Ambassador Henry Morgenthau’s term, against the Ottoman state’s Armenian population had been taking place for over a year. Within a year and a half, over a million Armenians had perished. This was Turkey’s first step in its nationalist project of homogenizing its nation-state, a process that continued well into the 21st Century.

John Dewey met with numerous officials and groups of teachers during his visit to Turkey in 1924. He visited schools in many villages and towns but because it was summer he was unable to visit schools while they were in session. Of particular importance to my concerns was one particular individual that he met in Ankara, Ziya Gökalp (1876 – 1924). Gökalp was a deputy in the Grand National Assembly, chaired the Official Committee on Writing and Translation, and served on the Committee on Education which was responsible for developing new curriculum and textbooks for the national

school system. He was a philosopher, sociologist, poet and popular newspaper columnist, professor at Darülfünun University (now Istanbul University). His writings on Turkish nationalism and Turkish culture laid the foundation for the modern Turkish state founded by Atatürk. Gökalp is a highly celebrated yet controversial figure in Turkish history. The controversy stems from the fact that he was a central figure in the Armenian Genocide. A long-time member of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), Gökalp became a member of its Central Committee in 1911 and remained so until 1918 when the party was dissolved upon Turkey’s defeat in the war. Under the leadership of Talaat, Enver and Jemal Pasha, the CUP carried out the Armenian Genocide of 1915 to 1918. Gökalp was arrested by the successor Ottoman government at the end of the war and placed on trial for the massacres. He denied that any massacres had taken place but stated that he approved of the deportations of the Armenians. He was convicted and imprisoned but soon was transferred into British custody on Malta. He was later released in a prisoner exchange arranged by Mustafa Kemal and soon found himself back in the midst of Turkish nation-building.

Gökalp’s influential nationalist theories are found in his most important book, *The Principles of Turkism* published in 1923. The nation was to be defined in linguistic and religious terms. The Turkish nation was defined as consisting of those people who spoke Turkish or close variants of the language and practiced Islam. This was to be a modern Islam divested of impure elements adapted from more traditional non-Turkic societies (e.g., Arabic tribes). In addition, the Turks shared a common history and culture dating back thousands of years. Gökalp propagated the need for a foundational history of the Turkic people. This was a pre-Islamic history that identified and glorified the “Great Man,” the warriors and sages of the past such as Attila, Genghis Khan, Timur Babur and Süleyman the Magnificent. This “Golden Lost Age” was part of a mythic

history that was to have pedagogical value for the inculcation of values in the youth of the new nation. How this has come to be worked out in the educational curriculum of the Turkish state is beyond the scope of this article. Studies of Turkish history textbooks evidence the highly selective telling of the story of the Turkish people. Other cultures and peoples are downplayed or completely ignored. Needless to say, textbooks for decades made no mention of the Armenians and Armenian Genocide but in recent years have adopted the denialist account that portrays Armenians as “treacherous” and “in revolt,” thus requiring relocation of this traitorous element to areas away from the frontlines. In addition, whole periods of 19th and 20th century Ottoman history are ignored or selectively described because they portray the decline of the Ottoman state.

In a series of four articles published in the *New Republic* subsequent to his visit to Turkey, Dewey discusses many of the issues facing the new republic. He evidently was keeping up with the events as they were unfolding in Turkey. It is also clear that his encounters with the nationalist leaders and intellectuals were coloring his views on these events. In the first of these articles analyzing the recent abolition of the Caliphate, Dewey applauds the move as reflective of a modern state’s need to separate church and state. He accepts the nationalist’s view that the Caliphate was often used as a tool by Europeans to manipulate the internal affairs of the Ottoman state. He further argues that this is not just the view of liberal “enlightened Turks” but is true of the peasants of the interior. Dewey claims: The succession of wars has left what remains of Turkey – for the first time in four centuries a homogenous and compact people – with a new spirit, a spirit which has touched even remote peasants. They wish above all a free and independent Turkey; they are nationalists to the extreme; and they are convinced that a free Turkey and a modernized Turkey are one and the same. (MW15 131)

One would have a hard time convincing the Kurdish peasants of Dersim, who a decade later would be massacred by Turkish troops, that this “new spirit” of Turkish nationalism was benign. Dewey had claimed in this same article that the “baleful fusion of race, religion and politics” was the origin of the massacres that took place in the Near East. This was all the more reason for Turkey to separate religion from government, for this would serve to “establish the rule of tolerance and liberty.” He concludes that, “Nationalism has its evils, but its loyalties are at least less dreadful than those of dogmatic religious differences” (MW15 132). I do not know how one is to judge such a claim today, given the horrors perpetrated by both authoritarian nationalist and Islamist movements in the Middle East. Who is “less dreadful,” Bashar al-Assad or the Islamic State?

Certainly for Turkey of the last hundred years, the nationalist project was far from benign. The nationalist Turkification of all the inhabitants of Anatolia has generated more evil than “dogmatic religious differences” had ever done. Kurds and Turks both practice Islam but in this case the loyalties of nationalism turned out to be more dreadful than those of dogmatic religion. Kurds have suffered not primarily on the basis of religion but on the basis of ethnicity, an ethnicity rejected by the Turkish nationalist project.

In the two of the remaining *New Republic* articles Dewey takes up a number of problems facing the new Turkish Republic including the negative reaction of the West to the closing of foreign, in particular American and French schools in Turkey. One of these articles entitled, “The Turkish Tragedy” begins with a description of the destruction Dewey had witnessed in the city of Bursa, “the seat of Ottoman power before the capture of Constantinople.” He describes the closed houses and shops of the Greeks and Armenians and the ruins of Turkish buildings destroyed by the retreating Greek army. He remarks that the separating of these popu-

lations is “the only hope for the avoidance of future atrocities” (MW15 140). Words such as these underlie the harsh geo-political calculations that have been used to justify acts of ethnic cleansing perpetrated numerous times over the last hundred years. Dewey continues his melancholic description of the Brusa landscape but interrupts his narrative to highlight one bright spot, the Jewish quarter: “We passed through the Jewish quarter, and found the Jews still in possession of their homes and property, the more flourishing perhaps because of the total absence of their former commercial competitors, the Greeks and Armenians.” He concludes, “Happy the minority which has had no Christian nation to protect it” (MW15 140). This is evidence for Dewey, in line with the Turkish nationalist claims, for the thesis that it was as a result of foreign meddling on the part of the Christian allies of the Greeks and Armenians that the Turkish state was compelled to expel its traitorous minorities. Unfortunately for the Jews, this thesis proved to be incorrect. During the Second World War, a war in which Turkey remained ostensibly neutral, an oppressive wealth tax (*Varlık Vergisi*) was imposed on Jewish, Armenian and Greek businesses, forcing many of merchants in Bursa and Constantinople out of business and throwing many individuals into jail for non-payment. This was the end of the many “flourishing” Jewish merchants Dewey observed in Bursa that day in 1924.

This article on the Turkish tragedy concludes with the most blatant denialist account propagated by the Turkish national narrative. Here Dewey is arguing against those Americans and others who are trying to revive the Wilsonian mandate for an independent Armenian republic in eastern Anatolia that would be protected by the United States or some Western “Christian” nation. According to the Deweyan nationalist reading, this same form of foreign meddling encouraged the Armenians to revolt in 1915 and eventually led to the deprivations they suffered under the Turks:

Few Americans who mourn, and justly, the miseries of the Armenians, are aware that till the rise of nationalistic ambitions, beginning with the seventies, the Armenians were the favored portion of the population of Turkey, or that in the Great War, they traitorously turned Turkish cities over to the Russian *invader; that they boasted of having raised an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men to fight a civil war, and that they burned at least a hundred Turkish villages and exterminated their population. (MW15 141)

My purpose here is not to point out all the factual inaccuracies and exaggerations in this account and the numerous other errors Dewey has committed in this article. There is a very well-established body of historical research to refute most of what Dewey claims here and in other places in this article.³ What is clear here is the fact that Dewey has bought into the selective and distorted reading of history that is typical of many foundationalist histories of nation-states.

For someone who was often extremely insightful in his analyses of social problems, Dewey’s reading of both Turkish history and the facts on the ground display either extreme naiveté or unintentional bad faith. Dewey had bought into a mythic national history that is often employed by ruling elites to cover over or justify the crimes they commit. While Dewey was insightfully perceptive regarding the historical myths of his own nation, he uncritically accepted those of the Young Turks and their Kemalist Republican heirs.

³Just to cite three authoritative histories of the Genocide, I refer you to Ronald Grigor Suny, *“They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else”: A History of the Armenian Genocide*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015, Raymond Kevorkian, *The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2011, and Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.

II.

The shortcomings of Dewey's analyses of the conditions for democracy highlighted in part one, especially in nations born out of cataclysmic events of mass ethnic violence, prompted me to think more deeply about memory and the role it should play in fostering a way of life conducive to democracy. A preliminary formulation of my thesis may be summarized as follows:

A community's success in embodying the democratic way of life is conditioned upon how well it collectively remembers its past.

Dewey in many of his writings, but most centrally in *The Public and Its Problems*, highlighted the essential components required for transforming what he called the Great Society into the Great Community. Free and open communication, unhindered inquiry, communal problem-solving modelled upon the successful methods of the applied sciences, all play contributing roles in creating the kinds of communities central to Deweyan democracy. Normatively healthy communication is a prerequisite for a normatively healthy community. A normatively healthy community is a prerequisite for democracy. Communication is not possible at the public level without a set of shared meanings and values. I contend that it is often through collective memory that these shared meanings are created. How we cultivate this collective memory is thus critically important to the success of democratic nation building.

Let me briefly define what I mean by collective memory. First, collective memory does not imply a belief in the reality of a group mind or some mental entity that exists independently of individual human beings. Neither is collective memory merely the aggregation of individual personal memories. While it is impossible to have personal memories devoid of social or situational context, this does not account for the truly collective nature of the memory of which I speak. Collective memory in this aggregate sense fails to capture the socially constituted

nature of collective memory. In contrast to the aggregate view, collective memory is a form of remembering together. Remembering together is a common activity of groups and is self-constituting and re-constituting. Whether it is the shared memories of family members at a family reunion or the collective community activities of ethnic groups who come together to memorialize past wrongs perpetrated on their ancestors, such as Armenians do every April 24th for the Armenian Genocide, these conjoint activities both reflect and construct collective memory. The philosopher Jeffrey Blustein calls this phenomenon, "a community of memory." Such activities create collective memory and at the same time foster a sense of community: "Members of a community jointly recall and jointly reconstruct the past and through these joint activities bind themselves together in particular ways."⁴ This is especially true in those instances when such memories have broad reach and long endurance. Such a community of memory does not require personal first-hand experience of an event that is collectively recalled. Often through symbolic, artistic or literary re-enactments of the trauma of others, one may have a personally emotional response that is not significantly different from the response one might feel in recollecting a painful personal event in one's own past. One may cry, as I did, in front of the names etched on the polished black granite of the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington DC, even though one did not know the individuals there memorialized. The collective memory of that war deeply marked a generation of Americans despite the lack of consensus as to the war's meaning. "Collective memory can also be passed down through many generations, with each generation creating a new context and content for what will be jointly recalled by subsequent generations."⁵

⁴ Jeffrey Blustein, *The Moral Demands of Memory*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 183.

⁵ Ibid.

Earlier I claimed that Dewey had bought into the Turkish mythic national history. In what sense was I employing the concept of myth and how is it related to collective memory? There are many varieties of myths and accounts of the role they play in society. The one I am particularly concerned with is often referred to as a nation's "foundational myth." The renowned yet controversial Romanian historian of religion, Mircea Eliade claimed that a foundational myth "supplies models for human behavior... it expresses, enhances, and codifies belief; it safeguards and enforces morality... and provides practical rules for the guidance of man."⁶ Blustein further elaborates on the social function of these types of myth by identifying three important features:

Myths of this sort [foundational myths] provide symbolic resources for underwriting present identity-constituting values, institutions, ideals, and so forth; they connect a group to its own past and help to distinguish it from other groups [the other] in the eyes of group members [group identity]; and they embody norms that serve as organizing principles of social life, norms that are capable of generating not only intellectual assent but emotional commitment. These features are all essentially independent of the historical truth of what the myths relate, and they explain both the value and the peril of collective memory.⁷

In short, who we are, what we believe and what we aspired to, are strongly influenced by our community's foundational myths. None of these features are necessarily connected with what in a social science sense we call critical history. Such history is governed by a methodology whose focus is upon establishing the truth about past events.

Dewey in *Democracy and Education*, devoted a chapter to the proper role of history and geography in the educational curriculum of a democratic society. As one would expect given Dewey's educational

theory, history as taught in the classroom should not be an accumulation of facts about the past that are learned by rote. In contrast Dewey proposes a genetic approach that connects the study of history to the current social situation:

Genetic method was perhaps the chief scientific achievement of the latter half of the nineteenth century. Its principle is that the way to get insight into any complex product is to trace the process of its making,—to follow it through the successive stages of its growth. To apply this method to history as if it meant only the truism that the present social state cannot be separated from its past, is one-sided. It means equally that past events cannot be separated from the living present and retain meaning. The true starting point of history is always some present situation with its problems. (MW9 222)

Yet there is always a danger of the "present situation with its problems" being so manipulated by the ruling elite that a problematic present is unproblematized. This is easy to do when you have a highly centralized national educational system. Turning back for the moment to remarks I made earlier regarding Dewey's educational recommendations to the Turkish state, I must commend him for having perceived the dangers of such a centralized system in which all curricular content was determined by the Ankara bureaucracy. Dewey had recommended a "thin" coordinating authority. Needless to say, the Turkish Ministry of Education ignored this recommendation along with much else in his report.

Another danger that Dewey warns against in *Democracy and Education*, is the misuse of biography in the teaching of history. While he recommends the use of the biographies of "great men, of heroes and leaders," for they "make concrete and vital historic episodes otherwise abstract and incomprehensible," he cautions against the "sugar coating" these stories in order to make the past "easier to swallow" (MW9 222). Needless to say, modern Turkish history's hagiographic treatment of

⁶ Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality*, NY: Harper & Row, 1963, pp. 2, 5-6.

⁷ Blustein, p. 198.

Atatürk is central to the foundational myth of the Republic. Mustafa Kemal's own recounting of the war of independence in his 36-hour speech to the Grand National Assembly in 1927, known as the Nutuk, was central to this mythic construction. Since 1951 a variety of Turkish laws, most recently penal code 301, have made it difficult to critically examine this mythic history. Denigrating Atatürk, Turkishness, the institutions of the state, have all been criminalized in one form or another over the last 50 years. Nobel Prize winner, Orhan Pamuk stands out as one of the many individuals so prosecuted under this law.

Let me conclude this examination of collective memory by highlighting two important ways by which collective memory is transmitted from one generation to the next: memory activities and memory places or sites of memory. These practices can be used positively in promoting a morally healthy democratic way of life, or misused, as is often the case, to foster ethnic and racial tensions that culminate in crimes against humanity and genocide. Such practices have been much discussed among scholars who study collective forms of memory and can only be mentioned here. Memory activities and memory places are non-discursive forms of collective memory transmittal. Traditional practices, whether of a religious or secular kind, embody collective memory. Public commemorative ceremonies, pilgrimages, and historical reenactments are all forms of memory activities. These activities are often tied to memory places. Archives, museums and libraries are places of memory that serve the explicit function of collecting and preserving memory. Though often they can be used to manipulate and distort memory, as has been the case with Turkish government's cleansing of the Ottoman archives in regard to the Armenian Genocide. Some memory places such as historical monuments and plaques are intentionally created in order to keep us from forgetting important community events. Architectural edifices such as public build-

ings, historical homes, places of worship, and cemeteries are places of memory. Even street names, neighborhood names, and the names of towns and cities all can have a memorial function.

What I have sketched above is important for the claim I made earlier with regard to memory and democracy. Judging how well a community remembers its past is no simple matter. When the community is a nation-state that aspires to become a healthy democracy in the Deweyan sense, the complexity of factors involved in making such a judgment may seem daunting. How do we grade such success? What grade do we give the United States for the place the genocide of its native population plays in its collective memory? Similar questions can be raised with regard to many nations and their treatment of ethnic minorities. My concern in this article has been Turkey. President Obama on April 6, 2009 in remarks to the Turkish Grand National Assembly said that Atatürk's "greatest legacy is Turkey's strong, vibrant, secular cy."⁸ Whether you agree with Obama's judgment or not – and there are many in Turkey who would disagree – we can all agree that "a strong, vibrant, secular democracy" ought to be a Deweyan end-in-

⁸ Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama to the Turkish Parliament, April 6, 2009." *The White House, Office of the Press Secretary*.

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-turkish-parliament>.

(Accessed 25 December 2015.) In the same address President Obama does call for memory work on the "events of 1915": "History is often tragic, but unresolved, it can be a heavy weight. Each country must work through its past. And reckoning with the past can help us seize a better future. I know there are strong views in this chamber about the terrible events of 1915. And while there's been a good deal of commentary about my views, it's really about how the Turkish and Armenian people deal with the past. And the best way forward for the Turkish and Armenian people is a process that works through the past in a way that is honest, open and constructive."

view for Turkey. There is a growing minority in Turkey, especially in the NGO community, who are actively working toward this end. They have faced strong resistance in the last three years from the current government and nationalists on both the right and left, but their work continues. Central to their work are projects of what some call, “counter memory.” I have been privileged to work with these courageous Turks who have a deep concern with

the health of their community’s collective memory. While Dewey may have misread the facts on the ground with regard to Turkey in the 1920s, I believe he would laud these current efforts at a positive reconstruction of Turkish collective memory. For it is only through such memory work that the end-in-view of Deweyan democracy can be achieved for the Turkey of today.

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THE ISSUE OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE RECOGNITION AND ARMENIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RA (1991-1996)

Abstract

In 1991 Turkey recognized the independence of Armenia but did not establish diplomatic relations with the latter, the only reason of which was not to face its own history and refuse the fact of the Genocide. Although Ter-Petrosyan's regime did not include the fact of the Genocide recognition on the agenda of foreign policy of the RA, however, it did not bring any positive changes in relations with Turkey. On the contrary, the Turks did not miss the opportunity to put forward their preconditions of illegal nature to normalize relations.

Keywords: Armenia, Turkey, international recognition, demands, Armenian-Turkish relations, symposium.

Turkey recognized the independence of Armenia on December 16, 1991. It seemed, that out of its own interests, Turkey would establish good-neighborly relations with especially Armenia among its neighbors, we think because of the reasons as follows:

1. Turkey holds territorial and other arguable issues with almost all its neighbors in the region, so establishing neighborly relations with Armenia it would make the latter opt out of the affiliation of countries possessing anti-Turkish moods.
2. Establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia Turkey would have a chance to repair its damaged reputation in front of the international community at least for a while.
3. Turkey would have a chance to enter The Southern Caucasus with no obstacle, keeping Russia's military-political presence in the region to minimum. (Taregirq 2015: 64).

In spite of all, Turkey not only refused to establish diplomatic relations, but also put forward a number of preconditions to normalize bilateral relations. The realization of the preconditions for Yerevan would mean a renunciation of the Artsakh

Liberation War conquests, as well as a new genocide of the historical memory of the Armenian nation¹.

Official Ankara has repeatedly declared the preconditions for starting a dialogue with Yerevan. On the contrary, Yerevan insists on the significance of building relations with no preconditions. Ankara's similar policy is a result of clear geopolitical calculations, for the Armenian-Turkish relations are also just one tip of the Caucasian geopolitical iceberg. Let's bear in mind, it is in this region that the interest of the main powers of the international relations - The USA, Russia, The UN and others, get crossed. In such conditions, the issue of the Armenian-Turkish relations grabs a considerable part of the international community's attention.

Trying to start a dialogue with its Western neighbor, Armenia excluded the issue of Armenian Genocide recognition from its foreign political priorities in the first phase of the independence, though the importance of the international recognition of the "Great Catastrophe" was fixed in the

¹ Armenia and Turkey had a very short experience of intergovernmental relations during 1918-1920 (about the issue see *Xatisyan 1930, Vracyan 1928*).

Declaration of Independence passed on August 23, 1990. Official Yerevan came up with reconciliation statements supporting the magnitude of establishing good-neighborly relations with neighboring states².

Powers that be, the leaders of the Armenian National Movement, considered it groundless and subversive for Armenia to exist in support of only one state, while being surrounded by hostile-oriented countries.

Already in November, 1990, The ANM leader L. Ter-Petrosyan during the second party convention announced, "Let's look for and create more trustful guarantees for the existence of our nation. The normalization of the relations between Armenia and Turkey is only one of the circles of these guarantees."³

Turgut Öza, Turkey's president, reacted to L. Ter-Petrosyan's announcement positively. Thus, on January 7, 1991 (day 32nd), answering the question of a famous Turkish publicist Mehmet Ali Birand on a Turkish Television, he underlined Turkey's plans to establish economic relations with Armenia⁴. It goes without saying, this announcement could have a positive influence on the Armenian-Turkish relations.

Literally, Turks couldn't but worry about the fact that the significance of pursuing the Armenian Genocide International Recognition was included in the Armenian Declaration of Independence. For some period, the Turkish side managed to reach the exclusion of the Genocide issue from official Yerevan's foreign policy agenda. It's noteworthy, that Ankara specified its stance on Armenia only in April 1991, when Volkan Vural, ambassador of Turkey to the USSR, took a 3-day official visit to Armenia (*Arshakyan 2009: 51*). Receiving the Turkish diplomat, L. Ter-Petrosyan particularly stated. "Ar-

menia experiences changes, and we should be neighbors with new thinking in this new world. We are ready for any mutually beneficial cooperation. Armenia has no territorial demands from Turkey"⁵.

Hence, The Ter-Petrosyan's regime anchored the framework of Armenian-Turkish relations normalization at a more moderate ground. In fact, the newly independent state would not raise the issue of Armenian Genocide International Recognition in the context of bilateral relations, thus confiding it to the Diaspora⁶.

The Turkish diplomat held his own view on the development of the Armenian-Turkish relations. If for Armenia the activation issues of economic relations were of priority, the Turkish side highlighted the normalization of Karabakh Issue and recognition of the existing Armenian-Turkish border (*Safrastyan 2003: 39*).

Ankara tried to oblige Armenia to deter official Yerevan from adopting a policy of the international recognition of Genocide. They thought in Ankara that in case of realizing the Turkish scenario, Armenia would convince the Diaspora of following them⁷.

The Embassy of Turkey to Moscow, headed by Ambassador V. Vural soon went too far coming up with a note of protest, in particular stating. "No state unit neighboring Armenia can and should give a piece of land to the RA... an appeal and moreover the distortion of historical facts is impermissible"⁸.

Trying to alleviate the unrest among Turkish political regions on the 1st point of August 23 Declaration, 1992, L. Ter-Petrosyan, already as an RA president, answered the Turk journalist's question during the interview with "Jumhuriyat" newspaper.

⁵ *Azg o'rat'ert'* (Nation daily) 30.05.2002.

⁶ *HH GAA Hayoc ceghaspanut'yan t'angaran-instituti fond* (The Armenian Genocide Museum-institute found), Bajhin 32, t'p 26, p' 5, p. 4.

⁷ *HH GAA Hayoc ceghaspanut'yan t'angaran-instituti fond* (The Armenian Genocide Museum-institute found), Bajhin 32, t'p 26, p' 5, p. 4.

⁸ *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (Independent Newspaper), 14.05.1991.

² See at *Hayastani Hanrapetut'yun o'rat'ert'* (The Republic of Armenia daily) 28.11.1990.

³ *Hayastani Hanrapetut'yun o'rat'ert'* (The Republic of Armenia daily) 28.11.1990.

⁴ *Aza o'rat'ert'* (Nation daily) 17.04.1991.

The question was as follows: "The expression "Western Armenia" is found in the Armenian Declaration of Independence passed on August 23, 1990. What do you think, does it introduce the demanding into the agenda itself?" The answer was. "The Declaration had been passed before the USSR collapse, and Armenia was neither a member of the CSCE nor of the UN yet. We are currently clarifying the frameworks of the Independence. However, per the CSCE principles, which we regard, that expression itself is excluded from the agenda. Let me announce clearly, that we are faithful to the principles of border security and don't put an eye on a territory of other countries. Armenia has no demand of land from any neighbor, and it concerns both Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan (Xurshudyan 1995: 79-80). As they say, comments on this point are unnecessary."

In fact, L. Ter-Petrosyan renounced the constituent areas of the Armenian historical homeland in favor of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia and without considering the opinion of the Armenian people. A fact the latter couldn't reconcile with.

The ANM Authorities were sure that in case of leaving the Issue of the Armenian Genocide Recognition out of the RA foreign policy, the independent Armenia would have more threats comparing with the Soviet Armenia vis-a-vis transferring the issue to the state political platform. There was no Soviet Union as a security system, no new security systems, nor was the Armenian army formed, there was also the Karabakh Issue and at last, there were superpowers' conflicting interests together with geopolitical and regional rearrangements taking place."⁹

We think that this is not a well-supported thesis, because, particularly without touching upon the issue of the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, Armenia was not strengthening its own security. Besides, during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Turkey fully displayed all the possible forms of open

hostility, but for armed attack on Armenia (Chakryan 2001: 17-19), Ayvazyan 1998: 21-37).

In the context of the mentioned facts, referring to the issue of the Turkish – Armenian relations, turkologist H. Chakryan quite correctly states that among us the importance of establishing relations with Turkey was overestimated, Ankara in turn underestimated the possibility of the potential Armenian-Russian alliance, that is why Turkey recognized Armenia's independence, but did not establish diplomatic relations with it¹⁰.

In July 1992, Ter-Petrosyan – Demirel meeting took place, which had been preceded by meeting between the Turkish Prime Minister and his Armenian counterpart, H. Bagratyan.

Already in August 1992, the Turkish diplomatic delegation headed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, B. Unan, paid official visit to Armenia. According to the foreign policy advisor to the first President of the RA, Zh. Liparityan, during the negotiations with the Turkish MFA the issue of the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide was not discussed (Ananyan 2006: 3). However, the issue of the Armenian Genocide, according to the advisor to the first President of the RA, Zh. Liparityan, "was informally raised on different occasions, as well as other issues of common interest"¹¹ in the context of the Armenian-Turkish dialogue.

On March 12, 1993 in a hotel in Paris, the head of the Turkish "Grey Wolves", Türkeş, had a secret meeting with the President of the Republic of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan. "Milliyet", once being referred to as Ter-Petrosyan's retainer, provides the Armenian Samson Eozararat, who was born in Turkey, with media clarifications, as well as clarifications on secret meetings¹². It is noteworthy that the meeting with Türkeş was initiated by the

¹⁰ HH GAA Hayoc ceghaspanut'yan t'angaran-instituti fond (The Armenian Genocide Museum-institute found), Bajhin 32, t'p 26, p' 3, p. 1.

¹¹ HH GAA Hayoc ceghaspanut'yan t'angaran-instituti fond (The Armenian Genocide Museum-institute found), Bajhin 32, t'p 26, p' 5, p. 3.

¹² Yerkir o'rat'ert' (Country daily) 29.04.2005.

⁹ Ar'avot o'rat'ert' (Morning daily) 21.10.2000.

Armenian side. For the settlement of the Armenian-Turkish relations and Artsakh conflict Türkiye put forth six preconditions:

1. Cease-fire is established between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
2. Armenian soldiers leave the occupied territories,
3. Both sides recognize each other's borders,
4. The practice of interfering in one another's internal affairs is excluded,
5. The Lachin corridor is announced open and observers are deployed there,
6. The Artsakh conflict is settled after the cease-fire, within the framework of the Minsk Group.

According to Eozararat's testimony, sometime later after the meeting the possibility of building a monument to the victims of 1915 on the Armenian-Turkish border was discussed. There would be a note on both sides of the monument in Armenian and Turkish: "We grieve for the pain we caused". The newspaper does not explain what kind of pain the Armenians caused the Turks, what kind of crime they committed that would be equivalent to the Armenian Genocide of 1915-1923. The Armenians and Turks are considered on the same level: both sides share the guilt. In fact, Ter-Petrosyan and Türkiye's meeting ended in vain.

It is not difficult to guess from the above-mentioned that the Turkish side has never refused to consider the Armenian Genocide as a precondition for establishing bilateral relations. Even in October 1993 at the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, after the meeting with the President of Armenia, Ambassador Kamil announced that in order to improve Armenian-Turkish relations Armenia should refuse to touch upon the events of 1915 (Kurtov, Khalmukhamedov 1998: 455). According to the testimony of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Arzumanyan, the Turkish preconditions for establishing official relations with the RA were also: "Not to mention the Armenian Genocide, to abandon

claims officially, to stop the anti-Turkish activities of the Armenian Diaspora"¹³.

In 1996-1997 the Armenian side was trying to move the dialogue to an economic platform hoping that economic interest would promote to start political dialogue without any preconditions. In this way the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. Oskanian, thought that if Turkish businessmen got profits, they could influence the Turkish authorities and the latter would abandon the preconditions already put forth.

However, Turkey still refuses to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia and continues to insist on its previous preconditions (Manukyan 2005: 34).

Today, we are happy to emphasize that in the international arena Armenia does not weaken its position concerning the question under discussion.

As evidence for the above mentioned we quote some part of RA President, Serzh Sargsyan's speech at the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, which particularly says, "Expressing the united will of the Armenian people, based on the Declaration of Independence of Armenia of 23 August, 1990 and the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia (Minasyan 2003: 246), recalling the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December, 1948 (Harut'yunyan 2005: 14), reiterates the commitment of Armenia and the Armenian people to continue the international struggle for the prevention of genocides, the restoration of the rights of people subjected to genocide and the establishment of historical justice. Confirms that the Armenian people will always remain standing by the side of those who suffered from crimes against humanity. The unyielding international struggle against crimes of genocide will remain an integral part of our foreign policy"¹⁴.

¹³ *Haykakan jhamanak* (Armenian Times daily) 18.07. 2002.

¹⁴ <http://president.am/hy/press-release/item/2015/04/24/President-Serzh-Sargsyan-Genocide-April-24/>

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EPISTEMOLOGY, ARGUMENTATION

PANAYOTIS MICHELIS' CRITIQUE OF DIALECTICS

Abstract

Panayotis Michelis focuses on Plato's and on Hegel's dialectics, because these philosophers put the question of art on the highest level of truth. He, however, argues that they pose a 'outside dialectics' on art, because they consider truth as metaphysical truth and then they maintain art fails more or less to manifest this truth. Michelis develops a dialectics of synthesis as a 'dialectics in art' and vindicates the place of his aesthetics between philosophy of art and history of art.

Keywords: Michelis P., aesthetics, dialectics, Plato, Hegel.

Preliminary note

Panayotis Michelis (1903-1969) belongs to the pioneers of philosophical aesthetics and of the theory of architecture in Greece. He was born in Patras in 1903; he attended the elementary and the middle school in his home town and the Humboldt Gymnasium in Zurich (Schweizterland). Subsequently he studied in the Dresden Technical University and he finished his architecture and engineering studies in 1926. From 1941 until **1969** he was professor of architecture at the National Metsobion Polytechnicum of Athens. Philosophy of art and theory of architecture, interpretation of ancient Greek and Byzantine art, aesthetic consideration of Greek popular architecture became the main issues of Panayotis Michelis' teaching, research and congress papers in Greece and abroad.

Further, Panayotis Michelis was very active in establishing philosophical aesthetics as an independent kind of theorising in Greece. So, he founded the Hellenic Society for Aesthetics (1960) and served as its first president; he also founded its periodical *Annals for Aesthetics* (vol. 1/1962 ff.). Furthermore, he organised the Fourth International Congress of Aesthetics in Athens **and he edited its Proceedings (Actes: 1960)**. After his death, his wife, the painter Effie Michelis, founded the Panayotis

and Effie Michelis Foundation in 1979 in Athens and she served as its first president until her death in **1984**. The ideals of Panayotis and Effie Michelis continue to be sources of inspiration for further research in aesthetics. Panayotis Michelis' work remains a significant contribution to the recognition of aesthetics not only as a philosophical discipline and as a specific kind of theorising about art, creativity and aesthetic experience, but also as a place of intercultural communication and cooperation.

Introduction

Dialectics has a long history and encompasses a variety of concepts from Greek antiquity up to our time. Panayotis Michelis focuses on philosophical theories that considered art from a dialectical point of view. Although he did not set out to articulate an extensive theory of dialectics, critique and re-interpretation of dialectics are important aspects of his philosophy of art as well as of his theory of architecture. His main interest is dedicated to arts that were 'outside' philosophical aesthetics, such as contemporary architecture and Byzantine art. Panayotis Michelis develops his own philosophy of art as a philosophy of arts, since he always keeps the connection between theory and the arts. While looking for a way between philosophy of art and

history of art, he considers the work of art as the centre of dialectical relations leading beyond the facticity of the work of art towards social relations and human expectations. So, he emphasises the human experience expressed in art-works and, at the same time, the continuous creativity of the work of art in space and time.

Panayotis Michelis re-interprets dialectics as the dialectics 'in art', in order to explain the structure, the meaning and the human context of art. The main issues of this procedure are the autonomy of art, the history of art without metaphysical claims, art beyond its realised history, dialectics of synthesis, and the work of art as dialogue. He recognises that dialectics, as it is set out by Plato and Hegel, has investigated the broad interrelation of art to creativity, to achievements, and to the expectations of human life. In Michelis' view, both philosophers have raised the question of art on the high level of the question of truth. Nevertheless, truth is for them the culmination of metaphysics. In Plato's dialectics, the source of truth is the transcendent idea of the good, while the idea of beauty is the refuge of the power of the good. In Hegel's dialectics, truth is the self-conscious supersession of contradictions within the development of spirit, while beauty is the appearance of the absolute idea.

Plato's critique of art as well as Hegel's aesthetics is more or less restrictive towards the possibility that art manifests truth. Panayotis Michelis' way of theorising encompasses the meta-critique of Plato's critique of art as well as the refutation of Hegel's interweaving of art with the absolute spirit. This examination liberates those aspects of Plato's and of Hegel's dialectics that can be relevant for aesthetics after the critique of metaphysics. It is plain that Michelis' critique of dialectics goes along with the creative reception of its hermeneutic results. So, the limitations and the perspectives of dialectics are reconstructed and dialectics 'in art' can explore the question of art by taking into account the contemporary theoretical demands of aesthetics.

Meta-critique of Plato's critique of art

Panayotis Michelis criticises Plato's dialectics as underestimating the creative inspiration of poets and artists in favour of true knowledge provided through philosophy. He stresses that Plato, who was a philosopher-poet, was conscious of the limitations of dialectics and attempted to face them through poetic means, as myth and dialogue are. But Plato never abandoned the priority of *logos*. Yet Panayotis Michelis interprets Plato's critique of art as a theoretical account that puts a constraint on art in terms of the highest aims before assessing that art fails to accomplish these aims. He argues against Plato that art, not only philosophy, is also ruled through dialectics. In his view, philosophy and art constitute two different but equivalent paths to the highest values of truth and of beauty respectively (Michelis 2004: 115). The good, the true, and the beautiful are the highest values for Michelis' aesthetics. Although this solution is not genuinely Platonic, it is set out in the spirit of Platonism.

Michelis' creative interpretation of Plato's dialogues is similar. Plato's dialogues are unique, but dialogue itself is transformed into the intrinsic feature of the work of art. In fact, Panayotis Michelis characterises the work of art as the 'text' that 'tells the truth' without words. This 'text' is the link between inspiration and creation; it constitutes the dialogue between artist and spectator, between the artist and the human community. Since the work of art leads beyond the necessity of reality, it liberates the human towards emotion and further towards the appreciation of beauty. So, the work of art constitutes the relation between the good, the true, and the beautiful (Michelis 2001: 103).

Panayotis Michelis interprets the work of art in terms of a minimal ontology focusing on the richness of the work of art and not on the split between transcendence and immanence, as Plato did and tried to overcome through *mimesis*. In this way, Panayotis Michelis obtains an additional argument against Plato's critique of art. Yet he maintains that

the idea is not separated from the work of art, but it 'exists within' the work of art, it is immanent in the work of art. This turn towards the immanence of the beauty of the work of art goes together with the internalisation of the beauty of the work of art. Panayotis Michelis stresses that this turn is the revolutionary achievement of Plotinus' aesthetics (Michelis 2004: 5, 200; cf. Michelis 2002: 103). For, Plotinus criticised the conception of symmetry as the one-sided conception focusing on the external characteristics of the work of art. Further, Plotinus juxtaposed his own view concerning the immanence of the idea of the work of art. In fact, Plotinus considered the work of art as a bearer of truth beyond the surface and the sensuous experience. Michelis' conclusion is that Plotinus' aesthetics is the turning-point in the path leading from Plato's critique of art to Hegel's moderate appraisal of art.

Critique of Hegel's aesthetics

Michelis' critique of Hegel's aesthetics bears the characteristics of every pertinent critique. Since Hegel's aesthetics is the most comprehensive one and it unifies the theory of beauty and the history of art under strong metaphysical and logical claims, no critique can lead to an equivalent theory. So, aesthetics after Hegel 'lives' against Hegel's aesthetics, but it does not 'live' without it, or as if Hegel's aesthetics did not exist. Michelis' critique of Hegel's dialectics goes together with the creative reception of its hermeneutic results. Nevertheless, this critique concerns the core of Hegel's philosophy without Hegel's logic. Panayotis Michelis criticises Hegel's account about the unification of aesthetics and metaphysics as well as of art and the absolute spirit, because they restrain the autonomy of art and also of aesthetics. So, he detaches the beauty of nature and the beauty of art from the teleology of absolute spirit. For his moderate realism, the dialectics of the absolute idea that was 'established by Hegel' is a metaphysical exaggeration that must be refused (Michelis 2002: 365).

Anyway, Panayotis Michelis accepts that Hegel was the first philosopher who posed and investigated the relation between art and time. He stresses, however, that Hegel's metaphysical history of art does not offer the answer to the question of art. More exactly, it does not offer the solution of Michelis' attempt of establishing a theory between philosophy of art and history of art. Therefore, Panayotis Michelis argues for the separation of the history of art from the history of the absolute spirit. Certainly, the exploration of the history of art without recourse to the Hegelian absolute spirit is a theoretical account that emerged after Hegel's philosophy, when history of art took the way of an independent science. Panayotis Michelis not only endorses this development, but he also introduces new issues in philosophical aesthetics, as it is obvious for instance in his critique of Hegel's definition of the sublime. Besides, he underlines very often that, while Hegel connected the sublime with Christian art, Hegel came to a positive interpretation of Gothic art and to a negative evaluation of Byzantine art. Further, Panayotis Michelis opposes his aesthetic consideration of Byzantine art to Hegel's one-sided conclusion, and he introduces and investigates Byzantine art as an important issue of aesthetics (Michelis: 2006).

Finally, Michelis' critique of Hegel's dialectics of absolute idea or of absolute spirit leads to a dialectics without metaphysical claims. Michelis retains Hegel's terminology through a new semantics, even if he rarely mentions Hegel by name. Indeed, the dialectical moments of thesis, antithesis and synthesis or supersession, the struggle of the opposites, the contradictions or the dialectical movement are transformed into dialectical moments of 'the dialectics of synthesis', as Panayotis Michelis calls his own dialectics. It seems that Panayotis Michelis criticises Hegel's dialectics in order rather to define the limits of his own dialectics in view of Hegel's dialectics of absolute spirit. Admittedly, Hegel's aesthetics is a part of his extensive dialectics of the existing reality of the Absolute.

Yet Panayotis Michelis sets out his dialectics of synthesis only as a part of his aesthetics. For him, the elaboration of distinctions is more important than the formulation of oppositions. The spiritualisation of the sensuous and the sensualisation of the spiritual is the dialectical achievement of the work of art, as Hegel asserts and Panayotis Michelis endorses this view. Further, Hegel explores art as the supersession of contradictions; first of all, of the contradiction between spirit and nature. Hegel's statements are integrated within Michelis' dialectics of synthesis. Nevertheless, they are transformed to aspects of the finitude of the work of art that do not point to a metaphysical substance as the source of meaning of the work of art.

The main aspects of Michelis' dialectics of synthesis

Through his dialectics 'in art', Panayotis Michelis avoids the metaphysical burdening as well as the naturalistic reduction of the work of art. Maybe he intends to prevent the invasion of a radical Cartesianism into his aesthetics, which could argue for spirit separated from matter, for art without works of art. Michelis' dialectics of synthesis is the theory of the intrinsic movement of the work of art, which goes beyond the sensuous limits of its surface. Michelis analyses this dialectical movement in a chapter of his work *Architecture as An Art* (Michelis 2002: 199 ff.). In his view, dialectics is the dialectics of opposites and of relations, of unity and freedom, of the connection of the work of art with the artist, with the spectator, and with the human community. Dialectical synthesis, as Michelis defines it, means neither closure nor inertia; it is rather the dynamic nexus of coexisting opposites and relations that do not destroy the whole.

This nexus is created and restrained by spirit, while the work of art is the indispensable centre of interrelations. Yet spirit is the power of meaning and value; it is the essential characteristic of life. Spirit is revealed to the human, when the human starts from the senses and from sensuous things, he

or she goes beyond them, he or she feels and understands beauty, freedom and truth. Consequently, spirit is connected with free intuition that searches for a different value of things beyond the immediacy of the senses, beyond the first impression, beyond the everyday life. According to Michelis, it is exactly this free intuition and view that liberates the human towards emotion or towards the appreciation of the beauty of nature as well as of the beauty of art.

Certainly, the human consists of body and mind, but, as a unity, he or she is the subject of life, who has also spiritual needs. In other words, spiritual needs make up the content, the meaning of life. Indeed, Panayotis Michelis emphasises the spiritual character of the human, in order to indicate that art is indispensable for human life. In some cases, Panayotis Michelis uses the concept of economy, in order to assert that architecture has to introduce beauty into life and is not allowed to be contented only with the minimal covering of needs. As he maintains, architecture has to estimate human needs 'according to the measure of art'. Consequently, architecture has to respond to the spiritual needs as well as to the emotional need of the human for a home and not simply for a roof, for beauty and not simply for elementary functionality (Michelis 2002: 442 ff.).

Panayotis Michelis writes as an architect, as an artist, and, at the same time, as a spectator and as a philosopher; last but not least, he also writes as a poet. Although he often refers to all the arts, his thinking is orientated towards the activity of the architect. In Michelis' view, the architect fights for creating synthesis on different levels. He relates construction and synthesis, without making synthesis dependent on construction. The distinctions between construction and synthesis, between dependence and relation are very important for Michelis' aesthetics and theory of architecture. The 'morphological synthesis', namely the synthesis concerning the logic of form, presupposes the opposition between mass and material, it moves through the

transformation of mass to material of art and for art. Besides, architecture cooperates with science and technique, in order to create the solid work of art, whether it is a church, a representative building or a house. This complex activity is the struggle, the fight and the contest for the realisation of the idea of the work of this art. So, the work of art is the way and the result, the inspiration and its expression, the idea and its realisation.

Panayotis Michelis stresses that the dialectics of synthesis presupposes a morphological synthesis, but it is not identical to the latter. In Michelis' view, the final element of the dialectics of synthesis is the spiritual element, which is identical neither to the form nor to the subject of the work of art. The spiritual element points to understanding and self-understanding of the human. For this reason, Panayotis Michelis accuses 'morphocracy', namely the view of the dominance of form, because it leads to the exterior of the work of art, to which no interior element corresponds. He asserts that the work of art is more than its formal elements. For, the work of art is a 'monad' creating community and freedom and offering the spiritual enrichment of human life (Michelis 2002:199).

Further, Panayotis Michelis defends the transcendent validity of the work of art against the arguments about the 'end of art' or about the 'dehumanisation' of modern art (Apostolopoulou 1993). On the one hand, he maintains that art never comes to an end, because art and artistic creativity correspond to the higher needs of human existence. On the other hand, Panayotis Michelis brings to fore the silent dialectics of a contradiction between modern art and modern world. While modern world is without spirit and transcendence, modern art has

discovered 'the poetry of material', the dialectical interplay of matter and light (Michelis 1990: 16 ff.). This is manifested especially in modern architecture. Therefore, modern art rescues the openness of lived experience and still remains within the human context.

Concluding remarks

Michelis' critique of dialectics corresponds to his consciousness of theoretical demands and of methodology of aesthetics as well. His purpose is to bring to fore a connective line between ancient and modern theories and to investigate the realised art as an issue of aesthetics. His critique of dialectics leads to a significant re-interpretation of dialectics 'in art'. In his view, dialectics offers the key notions elucidating reality. Yet reality is a bundle of relations, connections and oppositions. In Michelis' view, the work of art is not only reality, but it also creates reality. Panayotis Michelis explains that reality is more than facticity, because reality has a meaning, a spiritual dimension without metaphysical exaggeration. Therefore, the reality of the work of art has a dialectical structure. Dialectics is the intrinsic dynamics of the work of art that creates in a permanent way the aesthetic component of human life. So, dialectics is a kind of creatio continua of the reality of the work of art. This is why Panayotis Michelis never accepted the views about the end of art. Moreover, he emphasised the innovative character of modern art manifesting the creativity of human spirit. His critique and aesthetic re-interpretation of dialectics are also important contributions to understanding art as an indispensable form of human creativity also in our times of uncertainty.

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THE SOCIETAL CRISIS AND THE HUMAN DIGNITY: EPISTEMOLOGICAL VIEW

Abstract

The paper aims at emphasising the significances of the concept of dignity through the lens of the *relational* character of this concept. Even though it appeared in modernity as substantive/essence, as an autonomous state that might be attached to man – and it was developed in the frame of methodological individualism –, dignity is a *construct* depending on the historical and social relations, thus the culture and values dominant in a certain time. And, because the consideration of the others is assumed by the individual who internalises the intertwining and force of values in the way he seems to not detach his own being from dignity, the paper demonstrates that, although there is an ontological basis of dignity – the human *conatus* – the concept of dignity is incomprehensible without connect it to, or more, without integrating it within the social complex.

First of all, the individual translation of the human *conatus* in the concept of dignity supposes the social character of man. The instruments of the individual, necessary for his survival, are social. The language through which he expresses his self-consciousness as his own dignity is social. The nuances his self-consciousness transposes as feelings and their expressions are borrowed from the culture known by the individual.

But leaving this alone, and considering as a beginning of the analysis only the *individual's feeling of dignity* as transposition of his/her will to live, this feeling is vague, ineffable and evanescent if it would not have the positive or negative reactions of society towards it. Indeed, society is the ultimate *criterion* of the individual consciousness of dignity, because it accredits this individual feeling. If, by absurd, there was no society – or the individual would live in an individual niche and would not know anything about society (but, for the sake of our philosophical experiment, he could express through meaningful words his feelings) – the individual would not be sure that he has a constitutive dignity and he deserves dignity. Only the others *authorise* this feeling, whether they endorse it or not, having the function of a thermometer measuring the individual belief.

Methodological individualism is contradictory concerning the concept of dignity: on the one hand, it lauds to sky this concept (in its essentialist variant) as related to the individual, and on the other hand, it neglects the consequences of social relations over the real state of dignity of all the human beings.

Finally, the paper links this relational standpoint to both the surpassing of the abstract individual and the clash of universalistic and particularistic values.

Keywords: dignity, individual, essentialist and relational views, *oikeiosis*, joy of life, universalism, particularistic view, intellectuals.

1. The modern origin of the present meaning of the concept of dignit

As many – if not all – the concepts concerning the human society, *dignity* is not the reflection of a fix and clear datum of reality, but a *construct*, thus

inherently historical, social and subjective. The *constructivist* approach assumed here sends to the historical localization of the creation of the concept. This localization pertains to the birth of modernity. And the above word – “subjective” – does not mean that every human person would have an untrans-

latable image about the world, hence the impossibility of common criteria and values resulting, but only that the world as it appears to the human beings is that which is seen/known by them. The world is certainly objective, but its meanings, features and colours are depending on the natural and artificial instruments man approaches them.

The constructivist, historical perspective allows fathoming that dignity is a *modern* term, since it is related to all humans, as a real, but feasible quality of them, beyond every discussion related to the abstract model of man. The rise of modernity with its new approach of the free/emancipated *individual* (Burkhardt 1978) and open relationships submitted to the public opinion (publicity/transparency as rights (Kant 1996)) has brought the confidence in the novel trend of a *normalcy of transformation and social transparency*. In this confidence, the praise of the individual has contained the expectation that the abstract character of man will be surpassed and that everyone and all will acquire their dignity. As we know, *Giovanni Pico della Mirandola* was the modern theorist of dignity in the European culture. He gave the reasons of the concentrated characteristic of man he focused on: every man would be dignified or worthy in principle, because every man is *capable to shape himself* according to his own will. This feature – to be able *to shape oneself* had in the upstream that man: 1) is a free being because he has the free *will* belonging only to him from the whole class of animals; thus, the social fact of freedom was, in this theory, the result of the marvellous natural hazard of the human free will; 2) that man has *reason* which is, as later on *Descartes* pointed out, “the most evenly distributed thing in the world” (Descartes 2000: 5; 12); 3) man judges his decisions, he *chooses*; 4) in order not to fall into decay, but to elevate.

Though Pico has based his theory on God’s decision to have created such a special being – it is God which “bestowed seeds pregnant with all possibilities, the germs of every form of life” (Pico 1996: 8) –, once He decided the form of His creation

(as followed from Pico’s reasoning), He let this one free, namely with *free will*: just as later on Erasmus has specified in a work reflecting the most progressive anti-Protestant argument of the Catholic Church (Erasmus 1524); this argument was that of the human free will leading to humans’ choice between good and evil; this free will was the *immediate (efficient, in Aristotle’s terms) cause* of human facts, and not God – who was only the *ultimate cause* –; He could predict the evolution, the fate of humans, but never interfered in men’s choices, who were the only responsible for the consequences of their decisions. In the language of Renaissance, it was necessary to demonstrate man’s free will as God’s decision; God would have been the omnipotent Pater counselling His creature; “We have made you a creature...” (Pico 1996: 7). But, besides this diplomatic moment of ultimate origin of man’s genuine power, in the modern thinking no discussion about man’s deeds did not necessitate this “hypothesis” (as even more later on it is said Laplace would have circumscribed his cosmogony theory).

If so, the analysis of man emphasises the exceptional character of man: he is *like* God, since he is “the free and proud shaper of your own being”, fashioning himself “in the form you may prefer”. Man is not a simple animated creature following the path of infinite repetitions of its instincts, but a being that has in its “power to descend to the lower, brutish forms of life” or “to rise again to the superior orders whose life is divine” (Pico 1996: 8).

Just this capacity – and the human reason makes man a creature “of heaven and not of earth” and this means that man is a “higher divinity, clothed in human flesh” (Pico 1996: 11) is which gives man dignity: to *every* man, and not as until this spring of modernity, only to God and *some* humans.

In Pico, dignity is a divine feature, and now it becomes *every man’s dignity*: the most specific quality of man.

As a general and universal quality – signalling the modern development of *universalistic* values, beyond every particular manifestation of people within their cultures –, dignity has been developed as an *essence*, or *substantive* concept designing an *autonomous state* towards which people strive to enter within. An autonomous desirable state: that may be described as an ‘objective’ thing with somehow neutral characteristics which may be acquired *exclusively through the individual effort*. Here is the *essentialist* standpoint: *as if* the individual effort would lead to dignity without the endorsement of the others.

This is the reason of the lack of interest of the modern philosophers: who considered dignity either a supposed, implied general state, or an arid quality, instead of which it was more useful to study the mechanisms supporting dignity. Between these mechanisms the most important were those of the human reason/consciousness and not, or in a far lesser measure, those of the social relationships. The *methodological individualism* was, thus, linked to specific neglects of the philosophical research.

This situation has corresponded to the historical division between the physical and intellectual work: where the bearers of the latter were not too sensitive towards the bearers of the former, and where the preoccupations towards the problems of the human being were satisfied through the abstract individual. But, obviously, this state of things was too the result of the general level of understanding, culture and civilization.

2. But dignity is a relation, the result of inter-human relationships

Actually, just *etymology* shows that the essentialist standpoint and approach of the concept of dignity is a weak one. Dignity is neither an inherent quality of man, nor an *a priori* of all men, nor again an objective entity (like *Plato's* ideas). People have considered themselves – or, better, one or another member of the communities they lived

within – as worthy of *respect* according to the concrete deeds and behaviour of these members and, more, according to the ideological representations and values dominant in their communities and assumed by the bearers of this attitude. These representations and values were the *criteria* of people's assessment and ‘measurement’ of their and others' behaviour.

Then respect is given *by the others* and, because this respect of the others is very pleasant, being a necessary element of the humans' *need have esteem* (see *A. Maslow*), it is highly desired. But what is respect? It is the estimation that an individual has realised the tasks he ought to fulfil at the highest level possible, and that he deserves public *recognition* for this: public recognition of the good or adequate/commensurate facts and behaviours. The test of practice is which shows that an individual deserves or not respect. At the same time, practice is the ground emphasising people's representations, prejudices and clichés forged within the power relations/relations of forces which establish the dominant values.

The human civilisation structured and framed by the power relations has transposed into the *material exteriorisation* of the intangible human respect. Respect became dignity, and dignity was the attribute of those who managed the social relations: the rulers, the powerful. *Dignity became a characteristic of these ones*: the more so as it was manifested in forms transformed into habits. The essentialist standpoint about dignity originates in this social/political mediation of the technically/ontologically proper or suitable or correct qualities of facts and behaviours.

The Sanskrit etymology illustrates the relational standpoint. On the one hand, one name of respect/attention/consideration – *pratikSA* – comes from the verb *Aprathayati*, to spread, to extend (the others' opinion about). On the other hand, another name of respect is *tejasvin* (coming from *tejas*, authority) meaning: inspiring respect, noble, powerful, dignified.

Things are, certainly, more complicated. The attitude of people towards each other was separated from this relational origin and *objectified*. For example, another name of respect, *Adara*, came from the name of regard (as both looking and considering) and, with a slight *h*, (*Adhara*) was also base, foundation, grounds. Not the origins of these words are important here, but the logic they articulated. For example, the same origin in the verb *Aprathayati* has led to the adjective *mahApratApa*, very dignified.

But the Latin, closer to us, shows the same logic. *Dignātio -ōnis* – esteem, deference, and respect – has led to *dignitās – ātis*, title, merit, eminence, dignity. Actually, dignity was not necessarily the exterior sign – given by the others – of the correct, if not exceptional behaviour of a person according to the results of his deeds, but of his superior *social* status. The respect of the others is shown through their psychic attitude towards the person. The bow of reverence is not necessary: a simple smile and warm tone of the voice is sufficient. If there are excessive signs of obeisance, as well as gifts and privileges, they follow from the social relations of domination-submission.

Therefore, dignity is the particularity of man – historically, missing from the existence of the majority of humankind – *resulted from the social terms*. These ones translate, transpose, but also create activities, goals, values necessary as means of the humans' preservation.

Actually, if by absurd the human individuals would born instantaneously following the will of a god and would live absolutely alone, if they would not need any other human fellow and nor would they come across other people, they would not know the feeling to having dignity and to striving for dignity. Without society, there would not be any idea of dignity. The desire of dignity shows the *state* of society, of social relations, of its tradition and culture and of its capacity to integrate the individual aspirations of creation, of realisation of the self.

Letting aside history, this emphasis on the relational character of the concept of dignity is the most important in our everyday life. No, dignity is not an inherent quality of man, but the estimation of the others during the social relations. The positive estimation made by every human being towards himself is very important for him; but it is not sufficient to think to myself as a dignified person: it is absolutely necessary *the others do the same*, and this social consideration must transpose not only into a respectful tone and cared language, but compulsorily into dignified conditions of living. These means: conditions so as to can develop my creativity, my divine uniqueness.

And, for I grasped what the respect of others means and I want to be respected, and for this desire is or brings my consciousness of my uniqueness – i.e. this desire and consciousness is dignity –, I understand that I have to behave in such a manner as to be respected, as to my dignity be respected. Consequently, I am not a lazybones and I give to the others as much as I can, in order to receive in exchange their respect and the social conditions necessary to develop my possibilities to create. Therefore, the consciousness of my dignity does not enclose me in the circle of my solipsism and does not favour an asymmetrical relation Me-society but, first of all, the feeling of *belonging to society* and then the feeling of *reciprocal* relation of supply and demand: I require my dignity and my dignity to be recognised, and I offer my full will to create and to recognise the dignity of the others.

3. Ontological foundation of the human dignity

In fact, the feeling of being dignified or having dignity, though it is shaped/ culturally translated by society, nevertheless has a profound impulse in the mind-body unity of the human being. If we ask – and we must do this – *why man* (but this means: *each man and all of them*) *must have dignity*, or what the presumption of dignity is based on, we un-

derstand that we plunge into the level of ontological foundation of the existence of the human being.

How can we describe man so as to give reasons to his endeavour, his effort, his aspirations and expectations? Are all of these only random occurrences within a mad dance of indeterminism? (Or: of a grey determinism of routines passing in the same random manner?) Or: only some aspirations and claims would be legitimate, and other – like dignity – would be suspect?

3.A. *Conatus*

Actually, the desire of dignity has its ground in the human *conatus*. As we know, the conative¹ force or the will to persist was suggested by Plato's nephew *Speusippus* (408 – 339/8 B.C.) in his *Definitions* (Diogenes Laërtius 1972: Book IV, 5) which were considered by some ones as Plato's work; but it is an apocryphal Plato. Anyhow, in this book, the power of the soul to move by itself is the cause of the vital movement of the living beings². Later on, by meditating on the reason of the vital movement, the Stoics said that this reason is self-preservation: "An animal's first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as *Chrysippus*³ affirms in the first book of his work *On Ends*: his words are, "The dear-

est thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof"; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it" (Diogenes Laërtius 1972: Book VII, Zeno, 85).

Then, this will to self-preservation was either understood and implicated – i.e. something non-interesting, as dignity was – or a too difficult problem in front of the social reality. How could the philosophers write about self-preservation when the value of the human person was so insignificant in the whirlpools of wars and despotic decisions? However, from the standpoint of *universalism*, *St. Augustine of Hippo* has repeated the Stoics' argument (it is nature that impulses man to love himself and to have an instinctive aversion towards death, because he wants to keep the union of the body and soul (Augustin 1855: 19). *Thomas Aquinas* too was interested to justify the universalism of the ideology of the time: it was absolutely necessary to point out man as the privileged creature of God. The superiority of the human being was based on its consciousness of the natural *conatus*⁴.

¹ In Latin, *cōnātūs –ūs* is effort, attempt, trial, inclination; and *cōnor – āri, ātus sum* – to try, to dare, to compel, to prepare.

² (Platon MDCCCXL: 195, 197): «L'âme est ce qui se meut soi-même et la cause du mouvement vital des êtres vivants. Une force est ce qui agit par soi-même...le sentiment de l'ordre est la soumission volontaire à ce qu'on reconnaît pour le bien, le calme au milieu des mouvements du corps ». (The soul is that which moves itself and is the cause of the vital movement of living beings. A force is that which acts through itself...the sentiment of order is the voluntary submission to what one recognises as the good, the calm in the midst of the movements of the body).

³ 282-206 B.C.

⁴ (Thomas Aquinas 1265-1274, *Secunda Secundae Partis*, Question 64. Murder, Article 5. Whether it is lawful to kill oneself? Article 1, Reply to Objection 1, <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3064.htm>): "According to the Divine ordinance the life of animals and plants is preserved not for themselves but for *man*. Hence, as *Augustine* says (De Civ. Dei i, 20), "by a most just ordinance of the *Creator*, both their life and their death are subject to our use".

And *op. cit.*, Article 5, <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3064.htm#article5>: "everything *naturally* loves itself, the result being that everything *naturally* keeps itself in being, and resists corruptions so far as it can".

However, universalism was not the fashionable feature of Christianity: it was promoted, somehow outside the current, only by idealist theorists and common people opposing the socially induced suffering. But the birth of modernity has given hope that the leadership of society would promote democracy and respect of the human being. It is not without significance that *Spinoza* with his conception of *radical democracy* has remembered to thinkers and decision-makers that “Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being” (Spinoza 2002: 283). Everything “is opposed to all that could take away its existence. Therefore, in so far as it can, and in so far as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist in its own being” (ibid., Proof). While *Leibniz*, in the same spirit of rationalism⁵ and implicit democratic respect of the human being, aimed too at demonstrating the foundation of *conatus*⁶.

3.B. *Oikeiosis* and the joy of life

The problem was (and is) that it is not enough to show that every man wants to persist. It is equally important to emphasise that he wants to persist as a *human* being, in a *human* manner.

⁵ (Leibniz 1921: 154): “there are people who think that it would be of *bel esprit* to rant against reason”.

⁶ (Leibniz 1694/1890: 69-70): “active force includes a sort of act or *εντελέχειον*, which is midway between the faculty of acting and the action itself and involves an effort, and thus of itself passes into operation; not does it need aid other than the removal of impediments”, this force being “energy or virtue, called by the Germans *kraft*, and by the French *la force*”.

See also (Leibniz 1714/1890: 219-220) where he insisted: “11. The natural changes of the monads proceed from an internal principle” and “15. The action of the internal principle which causes the change or the passage from... (“a transient state” to another, a transient state of reaction/*conatus*”. At the level of living bodies, it is more understandable: as *instinct of self-preservation*.

The old concept of the Stoics, *oikeiosis*, helps us. It meant in fact that, normally, every man feels “at home” (*oikos*) in his being. By using the related Greek words, Wayne M. Martin (2006) has indicated the plural meanings of the term: as “self-consciousness, self-awareness or sentiment of self”, as familiarization, affinity, as *conatus*. But I think that the origin of the word allows us to mention not a “simple” self-awareness, but also the *feeling of good* related to the personal *conatus*. The folk saying refers to the fact that, normally, man “feels comfortable in his skin”. If this does not happen, it means that the person is ill in a way or another and feels that his body/even his mind does no longer correspond to his soul’s enthusiasm. He does not “feel comfortable in his skin” and wants to transform it somehow just in order to accord it with his *élan*, his *conatus*.

Or, the individual, as healthy he is and physically having no troubles, is restless and worried, indignant, feeling his helplessness to follow his will to live / or rather, his will of life to follow from his helplessness. It is not his body that brakes him, and nor even his mind imagines painful situations so as he feels as in a nightmare. It is not about imagination, it is real life. He feels his possibility, his availability to create something marvellous and to participate to the effort of society to construct: since life is always construction. But he cannot actualise his possibility: the path of his life was shaped once and for all, and he cannot – as formally free as he is – escape.

In this moment, his *conatus* is hit, sometimes until he questions his *raison d’être* (Camus 1942). And therefore, he can no longer feel comfortable in his life. It is the *joy of life* that misses to him.

To feel at home in our life, to have reasons for our striving for keeping it needs not only our *conatus*, but also our joy of life. And if philosophers were in a way or another preoccupied with the first, they were not concerned of the joy of life. But this is a big shame, because the joy of life is an ontological concept, as *conatus* is.

Spinoza spoke about it: because man has the consciousness of his effort to persist, he has feelings related to this effort. And the most important feeling is the joy (*hilaritas*) because it is felt by the integral human being, by both mind and body, while sadness and the desire relate to the most affected part of man (Spinoza 2002: 285). As a result, the good is “every kind of pleasure, and all that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our longings, whatsoever they may be” (ibid: 298). And “when the mind regards itself and its own power of activity, it feels pleasure” (ibid: 305). Does it not follow from this that man must do everything in order to always experience joy of life?

And, because Spinoza has utilised the word “pleasure”, it should be noticed that joy of life is not pleasure. According to *Henri Bergson*, the sign of man’s consciousness and *élan vital* is the “joy of life”: it is not “pleasure” since this one is only the means nature gave to man in order to conserve his life, but the “announcement” that life has succeeded and that “there is creation” (Bergson 1919: 18-25).

If there is no joy of life, the *conatus* reason is not at all enough for man to feel himself as the *end* of existence. And, in fact, only this feeling supports dignity. If man cannot manifest his creativeness and see that the others do not consider his possibility and humanity, he does not feel dignified, but reduced, insignificant.

The above-mentioned ontological concepts show that dignity and the claim to be dignified are not absurd and artificial, “culturally made” qualities. They certainly are culturally forged, but not this aspect was emphasised here: but the fact that the feeling to be dignified corresponds to the deep resorts of the human being. If man enjoys his life – not as pleasure, but as creation – he is available to fight for life and to cherish life. And if he fights for life, it does this not as a simple animal creature, but from the standpoint of a conscious being: conscious about his uniqueness and worth despite his finite and limited existence.

But there is the mutual causality we understand. To the consciousness, joy of life and determination to fight for life contributes the state of dignity: i.e. the state given by the others, by society. *The human ontology cannot explain man and the individual existence on the basis of methodological individualism*. From the beginning, man is a relational concept, and the conclusion of the reason of *conatus* and joy of life is that: since the individual wants to actualise his potentiality, to fulfil – and he wants in a rational manner, by proposing to himself only those goals possible according to his potentiality⁷ –, and he cannot do this with all his effort, and in this situation he does no longer have motivations to live and life is no more beautiful for him, society and its brakes need to be discussed.

And if society does not consider that the individual’s aim to fulfil is organic, therefore if society does not endorse this aspiration, the dignity of everyone and all could be annulled. The historical and social mediation and reality in the human ontology is thus *sine qua non*.

⁷ Letting here aside the social conditions and the ideologies which legitimise the human aspirations and the power of action only according to the social place people occupy, in this manner circumscribing even the potentialities of every person, normal people do not want what they are not interested in / what they cannot do with their own power. If I have no musical voice, I want not be an opera singer.

But at the same time, people are frustrated if they cannot – because of the social conditions – do and become what they could through their own power, and the philosophers (Aristotle, Leibniz) have shown that freedom is just the situation when people do what they rationally want with their own powers. See (Bazac 2015b). For his reason, one cannot speak about freedom in the case of those subjected, constrained by their social condition, even though they accept the relations arising from this condition; there is no such thing as “consensus” in structurally asymmetric relationships between those who have the means to impose these relationships and those who have not.

The concept of dignity as a stake

Both the concepts of its ontological basis and dignity as such are *criteria* for the analysis of the human being and society.

Indeed, although the will and choice exercised in order to attain self-esteem and self-realization belong to the individual, they reflect the social and historical circumstances where the consideration of the others is crucial.

If this consideration is missing and if the lack of human conditions and future substitutes the opportunities, people are far from the situation to demonstrate their human dignity. And if they are not dignified, if the others do no longer consider them as worthy of representing the human dignity, they become *indignant* towards this condition: in Latin, *in + dignatio* means just the opposite situation to dignity, and the awareness of the situation where the others do no longer treat a person with respect for his/her humanity, but treat him/her *indigne* – unjustly, with cruelty, shamefully.

Therefore, indignation – and we are facing nowadays waves of worldwide indignation against the disregard of the right to be considered, each of us, as a unique and unrepeatable human person – is the natural, but human answer to undignified behaviour towards us. *Indignation belongs to the human person, not to the abstract man*. But, just because the worth of the human person is jolted, the worth of man as such is jolted (see Bazac 2015a).

Our questions, expectations and aspirations, our indignation in front of the lack of dignity of those who do not behave unworthy are answered to if we do not separate the illusive ontology of the individual – a historical construction of the European philosophy constraint by the domination-submission frame – from the societal analysis.

Society as a stake

Therefore, although the concept of dignity can be analysed starting from the human *conatus* – which is an individual faculty or force –, it is incomprehensible without connect it to, or more, without integrating it within the social complex. First of all, the individual translation of the human *conatus* in the concept of dignity/as dignity already supposes the social character of man. The instruments of the individual, necessary for his survival, are social. The language through which he expresses his self-consciousness as his own dignity is social. The nuances his self-consciousness realises as feelings and their expressions are borrowed from the culture known by the individual.

But leaving this aside, and considering as a beginning of the analysis the individual feeling of dignity as the transposition of his will to live, this feeling is vague, ineffable and evanescent if it would not have the positive or negative reactions of society towards it. Indeed, society is the ultimate *criterion* of the individual consciousness of dignity, because it accredits this individual feeling. If, by absurd, there would not exist society – or the individual would live in an individual niche and would not know anything about society (but, for the sake of our philosophical experiment, he could express through meaningful words his feelings) – the individual would not be sure that he has a constitutive dignity and he deserves dignity. Only the others *authorise* this feeling, whether they endorse it or not, having the function of a thermometer measuring the individual belief.

And if society refuses this individual belief, even this one shatters and vanishes: “may be I am a bad egg, a nobody; I do not deserve the others’ consideration of my existence and unique possibility”. And since this existence is not considered by society, the individual too can no longer cherish it: the original *conatus* – that which differentiates between the animated and inanimate things – disappears, and the life of the individual is derived from

any value for him; because: it lost any value for society.

By explaining the intertwining of society and the individual in both the historical constitution of the concept of dignity and the realm of human ontology, we suddenly shudder in front of the real social relations and become more responsible towards the social appellations attributed to people. We certainly know that these appellations were constituted in the frame of *power relations*, but now we are more careful concerning names, communication, labels, since they can shape the thinking and life of so many individuals. I speak here only about *theoretical care*, and this one concerns first of all the *consistency* of our reasoning and theories. Yes, on the one hand, we raise hosannas to the concept of dignity and see it as related to every individual. But on the other hand, we do not inquire – and anyhow not *all the way* (and this last expression means to epistemologically and critically support all kinds of *studies* concerning the meanings and consequences of theories and ideological messages; an absolutely necessary support (see Bazac 2013)) – the *results* of the social relations and denominations promoted by the ideological mainstream over the individual consciousness.

And these results are disastrous: if an individual is systematically *called* a rag – but this means *treated* as a rag –, his consciousness of his dignity is jolted and he will no longer cherish his genuine dignity, but will behave as a ragamuffin, a punk, a good-for-nothing. Neither his dignity nor the others' exist for him anymore. He has no longer *human* aspirations – and to preserve his own dignity is no longer an aspiration – and refuses to consider the human aspirations of the others.

Actually, the cause of the contradistinction highlighted above is the abstract individualism specific to the mainstream theories having the *methodological individualism* as a background. In their abstract representation of the individual, this one has a theoretical charisma that sends to the presupposition of the *exceptional* character of the indi-

vidual taken into account. And, obviously, this exceptional character seems to exclude the concrete individuals from the masses. Namely, this theoretical pattern opposes the glorified but abstract individual to the grey masses. However, the result is not the understanding of the individual, since this one is not concrete, i.e. whichever and everyone and, at the same time, unique. Rather the opposite pattern – let say, *methodological collectivism* – is fruitful.

In this pattern, no individual is covered by the mass/collective/community it belongs to, and not the mass/collective/community is the first factor of the explanation, but the *couple individual-mass*. Therefore, the methodological collectivism is not the pendant of the methodological individualism, bearing the same dogmatic bias but with a contrary sign. Thus, the mass is not grey at all – i.e. it has not only the characteristics of a collective *system* – but is constituted of unique individuals, every one of them with its own standpoint, soil and anchor.

This mass was called by Spinoza *multitudo*. It was not a disciplined entity, having *ab initio* one will and behaving as One person. On the contrary, its constitution was the result of fierce debates, and the common goals and means were always *revisable* according to the individual interests and standpoints. In Spinoza, “the **multitudo** indicates a **plurality which persists as such in the public scene**, in collective action, in the handling of communal affairs, without converging into a One, without evaporating within a centripetal form of motion. Multitude is the form of social and political existence for the many, seen as being many: a permanent form, not an episodic or interstitial form. For Spinoza, the **multitudo** is the architrave of civil liberties” (Virno 2004: 21).

If so, in the type of society constituted from and developing this *multitudo*, dignity still remains the cherished good of the individual, it does not transcend this one and does not become only the specific of an abstract community or institution. Consequently, in order to preserve the individual

dignity of every one and all, we need to surpass the pattern which refuses the *concreteness of whichever* from the inherent mass⁸.

Uncomfortable question

If the *manner to be* of dignity – or its ontological character – is a basic presumption, how is it substituted with the presumption of *selective* dignity? I do not discuss here the violation of the expectations of being to be considered dignified, since this violation is the result of domination-submission relations, but the legitimating of or the refusal to question the selective dignity: so, the ideas or representations of this phenomenon. These ideas are dominant in the social organisation based on domination-submission relations and are promoted by the *intellectuals*.

The representation of the selective dignity illustrates the real face of the Western intellectuals as it was grasped even by one of them, a “classicist” but not a naïve idealist. Julien Benda has emphasised the betrayal of the intellectuals (Benda 2006) as *abandonment of the universalistic values and rationalist criticism* and as *taking over and supporting of the particularistic values and standpoint*. But just through this turn man is no longer considered as a being unconditionally deserving dignity: “our culture/civilisation”, “our people”, “our religion”, “our group/clan/family” are the viewpoints *fragmenting* not only humankind, but also the approach/logic of human identity. Because: “ours” has in subtext not the simple concrete manifestation of the values and forms of mankind, and the joy occasioned by experiencing them, but the opposition in a way or another to all other “ours”.

The particularistic approach promoted by so many leading intellectuals in the First World War⁹

and experienced by Benda has led to the known tragedies of colonialism (before and after the First World war, of course), of Nazism, militarism, of attacks on independent countries, of destruction and the consideration of the civil casualties as “collateral damages” (see an analysis of the wars by deputy through the focus on one of the most significant technical means mediating the warrior relations of the attacker and the attacked – Chamayou 2013): this particularistic approach was and is not at all interested about the dignity of the others outside the imagined circle of the close-knit. On the contrary, these others are only a *means*, an *object* on which the powerful exert their power, and their arbitrary interest – without taking into account the reasonable will of the attacked, which they annul – they may kill cohorts of people without any punishment. The powerful think they have impunity¹⁰. But if they have this power, they should expect at the same attitude from the others, should they?

This correspondence is obvious not only in the exceptional relations concerning individual killings and mass slaughters, but also in the “normal” situations when, despite the huge progress of civilisa-

⁹ I began to read something about this problem when I worked at the paper (Bazac 2005) and I confronted Einstein’s social non-conformism to the dominant intellectual conformism which led to the signature by 93 German intellectuals of a pro-war manifesto in 1914. Einstein and only 3 other scientists have signed a counter-manifesto, pro peace.

See also: Nees 2014.

¹⁰ Impunity is immunity. But what does immunity means? According to (Esposito 2011: 5, 6), “*munus* refers to an office – a task, obligation, duty (also in the sense of a gift to be repaid), by contrast, *immunis* refers to someone who performs no office... Whoever is disencumbered, exonerated, exempted (*dispensatio*) from the *pensum* of paying tributes or performing services for others, is defined as immune. Those who are immune owe nothing to anyone, in terms of both *vacatio* and *excusatio*; ...“but it is also a privilege. Immunity is perceived as such when it occurs as an exception to a rule that everybody else must follow”.

⁸ The theory of mutuality opposes the abstract theory of dignity. According to (Bowles and GINTIS 2011), just mutuality has generated human persistence, development and dignity at a progressively larger scale.

tion, some categories of people – who are not the usual subjects of particular discrimination (as the present immigrants) – seem to have been “destined to be dead”, internalising the “sentiment of not being really welcomed” and thus being “infinitely more fragile, brutish, sad, pallid, and ill than all preceding generations”, marked by “the shadow that an unknown abnormality projects over their life”. This is, as Pasolini has formulated, an “anthropological mutation” (Escobar 2014).

Only as example, as illustration of the universalist values, or clearer, only *integrated within universalism* is particularism an acceptable ideology.

Passing over the (including pre-modern) history of the idea of dignity in relation with the intellectuals, the hypothesis of the present work is that the attitude of the intellectuals towards the problem of dignity or lack of dignity has followed the evolution of modernity: concretely, the sociological status, the appurtenance of the intellectuals to the “middle classes”. As a result, the intellectuals have spoken *in the name* of these classes – ultimately, only in the name of the dominant class – and much rarer *from the standpoint* of the ruled classes.

The societal crisis of capitalism

As all the social-economic systems, capitalism has an evolution figured through the form of a bell or pointed arch. In a very brief presentation, while at the beginning the new productive relations have stimulated the development of the productive forces, from a moment on, the advancement generated by the development of these productive forces is more and more countered by the same productive relations and the negative phenomena resulted from these ones. This moment begins the *system crisis*. And although capitalism enters – say, from the 70s of the last century on – its *trans-national*

phase that fortifies it¹¹, just despite of this strengthening of capital does the crisis show itself¹². Actual-

¹¹ Through delocalization, the capital owners dispose of the labour force of the whole world, thus of cheaper labour force than that of the traditional countries where these capital owners reside. They sell the products of this world labour force everywhere and, by using the wage earners (with tiny wages) from the “emergent” countries, they can however sell (at least some of) their products even in these countries. But not the international trade is the mark of transnationalization of capital (from this point of view, there were globalised periods of capitalism much earlier than the present one), nor the export of capital and the seizure of resources and the subjugation of the peoples through political means: but just the *relationship of capital with the labour force and with the states*. This relationship integrates the whole world labour force into the logic of the more powerful capital and puts the states into a savage race of competition in order to “attract” the trans-national capital. In this frame, the labour force is no longer defended by the states, as in the post-war period of *welfare state*. Transnationalisation means also *financialisation*, i.e. the autonomy of the financial capital towards states but also towards the productive capital: but this autonomy means concentration of power, superiority in the logic of capital. The reason of this phenomenon was and is the huge world competition and the fall of the rate of profit in the productive realm because of the rapid generalization of new technologies with all its aspects.

But all these phenomena led, on the one hand, to the strengthening of capital, i.e. of the financial capital (which has more money to buy the resources and the means of existence of the world and, obviously, to pay the ideologists and mass media). This enrichment means a never seen social polarisation, supporting the metaphor of the 1% versus 99%. (Actually, this is not only a metaphor).

On the other hand, even the world economic and political competition and the present scientific-technological revolution, together with the giant world problems and contradictions and the social consciousness of the many, lead to the weakening of capital.

¹² There is a general crisis of institutions, an “omnicrisis” (Hardt and Negri 2001: 189, 197).

ly, capitalism *has no longer solutions for the global problems* it has created and which agglomerate and not alleviate at all.

Anxiety of the intellectuals

In this period, because the scientific and technological revolution generates a convergence of the physical and intellectual labour, on the basis of the weakening of the social division of labour, namely on the basis of the loss by the intellectuals of their traditional “exceptional” social place, as well as on the basis of the gradual loss of the advantages of the middle classes gained during the post-war *welfare state*, the intellectuals become more preoccupied with phenomena and concepts related to their own worldly life.

The present world economic crisis that is not finishing (Beams 2012) hits the intellectuals too. They still do have a cognitive capital that they hope to sell in the most advantageous manner possible. They still have the *inertia* of the intermediary bureaucratic category they belong to, and thus, the *illusions* of this category.

It is about an *ideological* illusion: concerning both their exceptional status – *as if* no change would have occurred at the level of general cognition, communication and labour – and the possibility of a real dignity of everyone in the frame of capitalist relations. Or, this last aspect is substituted with the total exclusion of the problem of dignity of all from their consciousness.

The sociological explanation of the attraction of the intellectuals – and I think there is no much difference between the scientific ones and those from humanities – for some concepts and topics aims at emphasising some epistemological aspects of the approach of the concept of dignity. One example is the predilection of the mainstream intellectuals for the *political rights in the frame of the Western type representative democracy*, which, however, do not lead to the human dignity of all.

Instead of conclusions

But dignity is a *metaphysical* concept: a basis of the *efficient* concepts – if I may transpose Aristotle’s theory of the four causes – or *concepts-means* (as the rights).

There is a balance between the universal and the particular of this concept. This balance takes into account both the dignity of the individual and of the institution/community/people/culture.

Both the substantive/essentialist and the relational concepts of dignity may be interpreted in a more efficient manner through the *sociological* lens.

The European philosophers have focused on – rather indirectly, through the concepts of liberty and responsibility, for example – the *dignity-aspiration*: as an implicit, though vague and mostly unconscious critique of society.

They have focused on the dignity of the *abstract individual* – which they tried to represent in the best manner, and which, rather unconsciously, superposed their own figure/the figure of the intellectual – because they had no instruments to go to the concrete and whichever one.

Nowadays – in a full and visible system crisis – there still are some intellectuals who think that dignity would be hit only by the economic crisis.

The more the system crisis advances, the more some intellectuals think that dignity would be imposed – if they think about dignity at all – through the restoration of some out-of-date relations, as those of the welfare state, and values, as those of the “national capital”. But these ones do not represent the universal. On the contrary, and even though the illusion of the possibility of their restoration could pertain also to countries fighting the terrible unipolar “Empire” of the Western imperialism, in fact they prolong the domination-submission relations. Letting aside that the above-mentioned fight is inherent/objective, it is necessary. But the particularistic consciousness of the intellectuals – is not.

Some intellectuals see the jolted dignity of the “middle classes” and intellectuals through the old abstract lens: and wonder why this dignity is so weak.

But, by thinking in this manner, they contribute, consciously or unconsciously, to the preser-

vation of the pattern of social relations linked only to a selective dignity. In fact, they do not leave room – nor time; actually, they waste the time necessary to humankind – for the *research* of the possibility of the dignity of every one and all.

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ARMENIAN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND MEDICAL SCIENCE: NAREK AS A REMEDY

Abstract

This article is devoted to the scientific-philosophical analyses of the ideas of the X century outstanding Armenian mystical philosopher Gregory of Narek on objectification of the non-objective.

Keywords: spiritual remedy, sins, diseases, objectification of the non-objective.

From ancient times medication was considered to be a miracle, something that only magicians and those with supernatural powers could do. Hence a special reverence was conferred to those who mastered this unique trade.

Health is a divine grace. The human creature is made of both flesh and spirit thus the term health applies to two entities: to body and to spirit. The disease was considered to be a chaotic condition of the body or spirit or both. Health was considered to be a harmony between the body and the mind. If a person was healthy it was believed that all parts of his/her body were in a harmony and order. The opposite is also true: if a person was ill, it was believed that his/her spirit was rebelling against his body or vice versa his/her body was fighting against the spirit. The disease was associated with chaos. Thus a person could pass from the domain of order and harmony to the domain of disorder and chaos.

It was also believed that there were two types of diseases: one physical and the other one spiritual (as against psychological). As there were two diseases, both spiritual and physical means of curing were stressed in the past (of Gregory of Narek 1970).

Spiritual health was considered to be akin to common sense to the capacity of healthy judgment. Only those, who have proper capacity of judgment, who have clear mind and aspire to be present have

common sense and are spiritually healthy. To be spiritually healthy means to be peaceful. Those who are spiritually healthy can differentiate the truth and falsehood. The spiritually healthy people are empathetic and support their fellows in need. Spiritually healthy people, according to Narekatsi are those with strong faith, they are free from negative passions. Being spiritually healthy means being humanly perfect that is as perfect as a human can be. Spiritual health is ensured through repentance, holiness, with strong faith, hope, love and other virtues.

The book known as Narek was written by Gregory of Narek a monk from Eastern Armenia. Narek was written in 1001-1003 A.D. Gregory of Narek was a high rank priest who was both a very influential cleric as well as social/political figure of his time. Narek is an extensive prayer, composed of 95 parts and over 10000 lines none of which repeats the other. The prayer was highly valued in the middle ages and it was copied over and over numerous times. The Book of Narek, otherwise known as Book of Lamentation, is valued both for its artistic style and the important role it played among Armenians. Up to date thousands of Armenians maintain the belief that the book has a healing capacity and read it for the diseased.

Narek was written for both glorifying the Almighty and for curing spiritual and physical diseases.

es. Each of the 95 parts of the "Book of Lamentation" cures one disease.

During the history specific lists have been created which specifically name the diseases each part (In Armenian Ban which means logos, word, and idea) cures. These lists also indicate the number of times each part needs to be read for observing its curing effect. In the introduction of the academic publication of Narek (Yerevan, 1985, pp. 158-168) five similar lists of remedies are presented. A. Petrosyan, a scholar of Narek, adds another list from the manuscript # 8428 from the Matenadaran, the institute of Ancient manuscripts. This manuscript also indicates the number of times Narek needs to be read for attaining each of its curing effect (Petrosyan 2002. 58).

All 10000 lines are filled with love, the ultimate reverence towards the Almighty and with the consideration of human limitedness and sinfulness. The Book starts with the following lines:

The voice of a sighing heart, its sobs and mournful cries,

I offer up to you, O Seer of Secrets,
placing the fruits of my wavering mind
as a savory sacrifice on the fire of my grieving soul

to be delivered to you in the censer of my will.

Compassionate Lord, breathe in
this offering and look more favorably on it
than upon a more sumptuous sacrifice
offered with rich smoke. Please find
this simple string of words acceptable.

Do not turn in disdain.

May this unsolicited gift reach you,
this sacrifice of words
from the deep mystery-filled chamber
of my feelings, consumed in flames
fueled by whatever grace I may have within me.
As I pray, do not let these
pleas annoy you, Almighty,
like the raised hands of Jacob,
whose irreverence was rebuked
by Isaiah, nor let them seem like the impudence

of Babylon criticized in the 72nd Psalm.

But let these words be acceptable

as were the fragrant offerings

in the tabernacle at Shiloh

raised again by David on his return from captivity

as the resting place for the Ark of the Covenant,
a symbol for the restoration of my lost soul.

St. Gregory was a devoted son of the Armenian Church. He believed that the Armenian Church had a special mission and hoped that his book would help deliver that message: "as I was conceived and born in the womb of the Church... I now should address the great and immaculate queen... my glorious mother, so she may be known and proclaimed and the extent of her venerable glory might be told to the nations in the future." Having lost his mother when he was a child, he loved the Church like a mother: "This spiritual, heavenly mother of light cared for me as a son more than an earthly, breathing, physical mother could."

People believed that Narek was a sacred book because of the majestic prayers it contained and believed that even touching the manuscript would cure them from diseases. People initiated long pilgrimages to see Narek, to have a touch of Narek or to pray on Narek. Few books have been as influential as the Narek. People had such a strong faith in Narek, that even the touch of Narek has produced positive results in terms of alleviating pain or curing. Numerous examples of curing with Narek are registered historically (Davtyan 2012).

Many scholars think, that if a book similar to Narek was written by any European writer, it would gain universal acceptance even in the Middle Ages. The only reason Narek is not as widely known and read as works of Confucius, Descartes, Hume etc. is because he has written in Armenian, a language that only a handful of people can read.

The Narek is a nicely written book which makes everyone to analyze him/herself and to honestly evaluate his/her behavior and values. It leads

the person to stand in front of God and in front of his horrible sins against his/her body, his/her spirit, other individuals, the humankind and the Almighty.

Narek is written in Grabar, the ancient Armenian and is a melodic prayer. It was believed that thanks to the fine style of its lines, it has gained even more power in leading people towards repentance, towards communion with God. Anyone who has read the Narek, will assure that it eventually brings peace, harmony and love onto the reader.

St. Gregory was the son of Bishop Khosrov Andzevatsi. He was from a family of scholars at the Monastery of Narek, on the south-eastern shore of Lake Van, near his birthplace, home to the magnificent, newly built 10th-century island cathedral of Aghtamar. He grew up in an atmosphere infused with ritual and Bible. Born in 951 shortly before the first millennium of Christianity, he followed his father and his uncle, the Abbot Anania, into Narek Monastery as did his brother Hovhannes, who later helped St. Gregory with the Book of Prayer. Abbot Anania was an original thinker and teacher, the founder and one of the pillars of Armenian mysticism.

His father and uncle earned the ire of the church hierarchy for being independent thinkers. According to some commentators, these views may have implicated them in certain doctrinal disputes, which St. Gregory had to wrestle with throughout his life. Church tradition relates that, in his old age, he was called before a religious tribunal to defend his adherence to accepted doctrine. On this occasion he prepared a work, called the Root of Faith, once thought lost, but which appears to have been preserved in five doctrinal prayers of the Narek.

The reverence for St. Gregory was already evident in his life time and his sainthood was recognized by his contemporaries. He is referred to as St. Gregory in the earliest extant manuscript of the Book of Prayer, copied and illuminated by the scribe and miniaturist Gregor Skevratsi, containing a hagiography of St. Gregory written by St. Nerses

Lambronatsi (1153-1198). During his own life, he was looked upon as a great teacher:

"I was dubbed, 'Master,' which testifies against me. I was called, 'Teacher, teacher,' in the manner of the saintly, his unworthiness was ever before him: "There is another ache in my heart, for they consider me to be something I am not." He was uncomfortable with this reverence: "I was called by the highest names, but by my works I earned the worst of these descriptions" (Narek of Grigor 2003).

Narekatsi searched the human perfectness in the perfect faith in God and suffered greatly for his "poor faith" in the Almighty:

Look with mercy upon me in my doubts and perils,
glorified Son of God, who alone are compassionate
and will pardon, heal, save, protect, renew, restore,
lift up, support,
and create me again in blissful purity.

The idea of curing from diseases is mentioned in Narek numerous times. However, Narek and its curing methods are not comparable to today's scientific curing methods, its results are not comparable to the results achieved by any contemporary medical institution. These methods are in two different spheres of culture and are used for two different types of diseases: one for spiritual diseases, the other for bodily ones. Thus these curing methods are better to consider complementary rather than contradictory (Davtyan 2013^b).

Narekatsi claims that he has written this text for curing the ills of body and soul: And may you make this book of mournful psalms begun in your name, Most High, into a life-giving salve for the sufferings of body and soul. (Prayer 3, E).

Narek offers mainly spiritual remedy. Its powers, as believed from early Middle Ages, was based on the power of the Word and Will of God. In all cases, when Narek suggests using a physical item for remedy it is a symbolic item, e.g. the Right Hand.

Gregor of Narek relates sins and diseases. According to Narek, human diseases are a result of human sins. Sins force people to live with a life not naturally designed for human beings. For example, adultery, avarice etc. are forms of behavior that are not natural to human beings. Thus when a person sins, he/she starts to behave in a way for which the human body is not designed for and thus the body gets ill.

Because both sins and diseases are caused by breaking the Divine law, they both can be overcome by repentance. The will, the decision to repent brings relief on the human being. But it does not happen all at once, the relief from pains comes during time and it may take long.

In Narek first the sinful character of humans is depicted. Gregor of Narek undertakes the whole responsibility for all sins committed by all human beings at all times and thus demonstrates the need for curing the mankind. In order the mankind and individuals to be cured humans need to first conceive their sins. Once the sin is conceived the person needs to repent and later to suffer for sins as the Almighty decides.

Narekatsi moves forward, in addition to depicting the vast majority of human sins and thus discovering the true nature of human psyche (I think no other writer or thinker has ever so well pictured the true nature of human psyche), he reveals the way for salvation. Narek is first of all a way for salvation.

It is through this way of salvation, that the complexity and severity of his sins are revealed.

And these sins include the lack of true faith, negative human passions, unhealthy social settings etc. On the other hand, Narek also pictures the positive aspects of human being: aspiration towards light, desire to have freedom, to clean and improve one's own spirit.

Narekatsi, being a Christian monk, based his book, the Narek on the Bible, because he believed no other book could be the bases for wisdom, genius, moral perfection and aesthetic joy, for fortification of will and attainment of eternal hope, for attainment of freedom and for clearing sins, for multiplying graces and freeing oneself from vices.

Narekatsi claims that the non-objective, the word and will of God can be objectified, that is to get body and heaviness. Throughout his prayers he makes the same claim over and over again. All that happens in this word is simply objectification of divine word and will (Davtyan 2013^a).

There can also be non-physical, non-objective pain, that of the sin. When someone sins, he/she is hurt already and it eventually causes physical harm. Curing the physical damage of the body does not heal the person as a whole. Only the moral courage, the courage to repent and ask for forgiveness heals the person and cleans the person from sins. Thus, according to Narekatsi, diseases are nothing else but objectification of the non-objective, the will of God, the word of God, and to cure a disease, one needs not only physical means, but also non-objective, non-physical remedies such as repentance.

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THE ARGUMENT OF NATURE IN SHAKESPEARE'S "AS YOU LIKE IT"

Abstract

This paper examines the diverse ways in which the characters of Shakespeare's comedy "As you like it" praise or mock each other on behalf of nature. Shakespeare works during the Renaissance, when the ideas of the ancient philosophers and rhetoricians are highly influential, and for this reason the argument of nature is presented with emphasis on Ancient Greek Philosophy and rhetoric. The notion of nature in the play is examined in three main aspects: (1) human nature (2) the objective reality opposing the human organic and inorganic world (3) constructive beginning, strength, God. The argument of nature in the play is examined in relation to upbringing, education and free will. Since "As you like it" is a pastoral comedy, the argument of nature is present in the very setting of the play, for this reason the last section of the study deals with the innate virtue of nature and its cleansing power over men.

Keywords: nature, Shakespeare, education, free will, fortune, ancient philosophy, rhetoric.

This paper is an abstract of a study on the argument of *nature* in Shakespeare's comedy "As you like it", seen in the light of Ancient Greek philosophy. The study examines the argument of nature and its ties and relationships to upbringing, education and free will, through the diverse ways in which the characters of the play praise, abuse or make fun of one another on behalf of nature. Nature, being on one side the unchangeable field of predetermined human activity, and on the other an open ground for the expression of free will.

William Shakespeare (1564-1616) is hailed as England's national poet and greatest playwright of all time¹. His plays, written in the end of the 16th and beginning of 17th century are crossing all national boundaries and are now staged more than ever – all over the world in different languages and different interpretations. The pastoral comedy "As you like it" is a meeting place for different human

emotions and inclinations, for different social backgrounds, for different philosophical outlooks on the world. In this comedy Shakespeare's characters are often speaking with the words of wise philosophers – about the nature of things and the destiny of men.

The notion of nature comes from the latin *natura* and the greek φύσις², meaning birth, growth, creation and in that sense – the whole world as a process, as becoming. But on the other side, nature also means that which is unchangeable, a constant characteristic of things, *ahaeceity*. Human nature³ then is the aggregate of qualities that define a man or the channels through which he can express his free will. These qualities can vary significantly according to the philosophers – the man is a

¹ William Shakespeare (2015). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved from <http://www.britannica.com/biography/William-Shakespeare>

² *Novaya filosofskaya entsiklopediya* (2000 - 2001) (New Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2000 - 2001)) in 4 vol. available at <http://iph.ras.ru/elib/2440.html>

³ *Filosofskii rechnik Cambridge* (2009), (Cambridge philosophical Dictionary (2009)) p. 875

bird without feathers, or the measure of all things, or a rational animal.

The notion of nature in the play is examined in three main aspects: (1) human nature (2) the objective reality, natural world, opposing human organic and inorganic world) (3) constructive beginning, strength, God.

The study begins with a review on the notion of nature as it was defined by the Ancient philosophers. The authors in this section are chosen by three main criteria: (1) that they have written on what nature is (2) that their ideas have been prominent during the Renaissance (3) that their ideas correlate to what is said about nature in the play.⁴

Shakespeare works during the Renaissance when the ancient's ideas of beauty, virtue, wisdom and justice are rediscovered and if a man is supposed to speak and write well then he must follow the examples of the playwrights and rhetoricians of antiquity. Rhetoric has been a mandatory discipline in the schools and eloquence has been a distinctive trait of the well-educated man of the time. This is obvious throughout the play in the words of the Duke's daughter Rosalind and the court jester Touchstone, who not only speaks of rhetoric, but wields it with mastery.

During the Renaissance rhetoric is the language of education and of the well-educated⁵. The ideas of the ancient philosophers find their way into the everyday language of the Elizabethan era through the Grammar schools, where the pupils are expected to memorize elaborate Latin phrases and participate in debates between one another. Through study and practice in the art of rhetoric, the students are expected to harness the power of language to heal and to do harm, and grow into el-

loquent and noble young men. The characters of the play love nothing more than a good conversation: Rosalind engages Orlando in a series of long debates, at the end of which they mutually convince each other that they want to get married, and the exiled duke seeks the company of Jaques because he loves to argue with him, especially when he is in one of his melancholic fits.

"As you like it" is a pastoral play, in the tradition of Hesiod and Theocritus, and in it Shakespeare writes about the golden age of the ancients, the migration of the souls and the music of the spheres, the wisdom and goodness of nature. About the shepherd Corin who is a "natural philosopher" and Rosalind who is filled with all graces wide enlarged. Empedocles said that the whole world is moved by the two opposing forces of love and enmity, so it is also in Shakespeare's play, where both sides of the human nature are present.

The argument of nature versus the argument of education

Examining the argument of nature in the play and its links to upbringing, education and free will, we will start with the words of the young Orlando, furious that what has been given to him by nature is scattered away by the lack of proper education. In his opinion, it is good education that distinguishes men from well fed cattle and the nobleman from the peasant. Also the lack of good manners is the result not only of the lack of education but of improper education.

Orlando, the third son of Sir Roland de Bois, is unhappy. Having not received what was left to him by his father, he is forced to lead a life that is not corresponding to his desires. The basic discrepancy between what nature has given him and the unfortunate turn of events, the inability to develop and fully express his natural potentialities, have created a strong conflict in the young man. Even though he is well fed and gains on weight, the lack of proper education and realization is still troubling him.

⁴ The section includes the following: Thales, Heraclitus, Anaximander, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Democritus, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian and Epicetus. This section is only briefly presented throughout the text of this abstract

⁵ Aleksandrova, D. (2013). *Osnovi na retorikata* (Basics of rhetoric) Sofia, UI „Sv. Kliment Okhridski“, p.189

Staged in the very beginning of the play, the question of education is in direct opposition to the question of diet. It is true that the ox in the barn and the animals on the dunghills can find a good meal and gain on weight, but something more is needed for a full and happy life. This goes not only for people, but also for the livestock – Orlando makes a reference to the horses that also need training to achieve their high results.

When presenting his case Orlando uses the following phrases: “for my part, he keepes me rustically at home, or (to speak more properly) staies me heere at home vnkept: for call you that keeping for a gentleman of my birth, that differs not from the stalling of an Oxe?”, “besides this nothing that he so plentifully giues me, the something that nature gaue mee, his countenance seemes to take from me”, “...and as much as in him lies, mines my gentility with my education”, “I am helping you to mar that which God made, a poore vnworthy brother of yours with idlenesse”

In these excerpts from the beginning of the play the notion of nature is present in the following words and phrases: “gentleman of my birth”; “gentility”; “something that nature gave me”; “that which God made”. We see the ease with which Shakespeare uses together the words “birth”, “nature” and “God”. This interchangeability continues throughout the play – not as an example of a terminological chaos, but as a representation of the way those words were used together during the Renaissance, when the church was losing its ground and people were turning toward the ideas of the ancients. Seneca, who has been very popular as a playwright and a philosopher during that time, in his work on natural philosophy *Naturales quaestiones* (II, 45)⁶, says that every name is appropriate to the supreme guardian and ruler of the universe. We can call him fate because all things depend on him, we can call him providence because

all events in the world’s drama are moved by his wise counsel alone, or we can call him nature because from him all things derive their being. If you prefer to call him the world, you will not be in error, because he is everything that you can see, he has all his parts in him and is himself the source of his inherent power.

The second place where the question of nature and education is discussed is in Act three, second scene, in the words of the shepherd Corin, who from the position of his native wisdom also outlines the difference between natural potentialities, received in inheritance, and the mind that has been cultivated through education.

The clown Touchstone and the shepherd Corin give us their understanding of philosophy in a genuine conversation upon life in the forest:

Corin: And how like you this shepherds life Mr Touchstone?

Clowne: Truely Shepheard, in respect of it selfe, it is a good life; but in respect that it is a shepherds life, it is naught. In respect that it is solitary, I like it verie well: but in respect that it is priuate, it is a very vild life. Now in respect it is in the fields, it pleaseth mee well: but in respect it is not in the Court, it is tedious. As it is a spare life (looke you) it fits my humor well: but as there is no more plentie in it, it goes much against my stomacke. Has’t any Philosophie in thee shepheard?

Corin: No more, but that I know the more one sickens, the worse at ease he is: and that hee that wants money, meanes, and content, is without three good frends. That the propertie of raine is to wet, and fire to burne: That good pasture makes fat sheepe: and that a great cause of the night, is lacke of the Sunne: That hee that hath learned no wit by Nature, nor Art, may complaine of good breeding, or comes of a very dull kindred

Clowne: Such a one is a naturall Philosopher...

This dialogue gives us a brief outlook on the ideas of the first natural philosophers, who put a special emphasis on the movement of the celestial bodies. The very first of them, Thales, was able to

⁶ *Antichna filosofiya, antologiya* (1994) (Ancient philosophy. Anthology), Sofia, St. Zagora, “Ideya”, pp. 508-509

predict solar eclipses, because he was aware that they are caused by the passing of the Moon in front of the Sun. The words of Corin also sound like the sentences of another famous natural philosopher, Heraclitus, who said that if there was no Sun, we would live in a perpetual night⁷; it is sickness that makes health pleasant and good, hunger - satiety, and weariness – rest⁸. The clown Touchstone also speaks with the words of Heraclitus, when he shares his impressions about life among nature: “As it is a spare life (looked you) it fits my humor well: but as there is no more plentie in it, it goes much against my stomacke”. Corin’s observations on the characteristics of rain and fire are similar to Anaximander’s conclusions on the oppositions of the different elements of nature: air is cold, water - moist, fire – hot, if one of them was infinite, the others would have ceased to be.⁹

Again in brief formulations Corin expresses his opinion on the origins of the human mind in particular and the human nature as a whole: the intellect is congenial to a certain extent, but it can also be further developed through proper upbringing and education, through Art. “That hee that hath learned no wit by Nature, nor Art, may complaine of good breeding, or comes of a very dull kindred.”

In Act Three, third scene the clown Touchstone whines that nature hasn’t been generous enough towards his beloved Audrey. The gods haven’t made her poetical and she is unable to understand his contentious jokes. This is a misuse of the argument of nature - it is obvious from the dialogues throughout the play that the clown has received a splendid education and Audrey hasn’t been schooled at all. And still she has common sense and a natural inclination towards honesty and justice that can’t be overturned by all his sophisms. She

doesn’t understand the words he is speaking but she has a good nature.

And so when Touchstone, embittered by the lack of good wit and understanding in his beloved, tries to blame the gods for not giving her a predisposition towards poetry, it is obvious that the question is not so much about her natural potentialities but about the lack of proper education. The clown has probably mastered the trivium (grammar, rhetoric and logic) and the quadrivim (arithmetic, geometry, music and astrology) since this was the good education of the time. And as is obvious from all the dialogues, he not only speaks of rhetoric, but wields it with mastery – he even tries to pass on some of his knowledge in rhetoric to the country man William. The amusing disagreements and misunderstandings in the dialogue come over the incongruity between the education of the clown, who uses both the complicated scholastic terms and the simple popular slang, and Audrey’s ignorance in terms of this kind of knowledge. This is also obvious in the dialogue between the clown and William, who also hasn’t received a classical education and is oblivious to his elaborate phrases. So it is necessary for Touchstone to translate his intentions towards their common interest Audrey in more popular terms:

Clowne: Giue me your hand: Art thou Learned?

William: No sir

Clown: Then learn this of me, to have, is to have. For it is a figure in Rhetoric, that drink being powered out of a cup into a glass, by filling the one, doth empty the other. For all your Writers do consent, that ipse is he: now you are not ipse, for I am he *William:* Which he sir?

Clowne: He sir, that must marry this woman: Therefore you Clowne, abandon: which is in the vulgar, leave the society: which in the boorish, is company, of this female: which in the common, is woman: which together, is, abandon the society of this Female, or Clowne thou perishes: or to thy better vnderstanding, dyest; or (to wit) I kill thee, make thee away, translate thy life into death, thy liberty

⁷ *Antichna filosofiya, antologiya* (1994) (Ancient philosophy. Anthology), Sofia, St. Zagora, “Ideya”, p. 112.

⁸ *Ibid*, Stobaeus, Anthology, I, 177, p.113.

⁹ *Antichna filosofiya, antologiya* (1994) (Ancient philosophy. Anthology), Sofia, St. Zagora, “Ideya”, pp. 96-97

into bondage: I will deal in poison with thee, or in bastinado, or in stele: I will bandy with thee in faction, I will ore-run thee with police: I will kill thee a hundred and fifty ways, therefore tremble and depart.

Eventually the clown achieves victory through the power of language alone – even though his words are abusive and threatening, the disagreement ends peacefully in his favor.

By the examples so forth presented we see how in the course of the play the proposed idea is that nature, natural gifts, are not the only factor in the development of reason – men also need good environment, good upbringing and education. The argument of nature is valid only when it takes into account the argument of education.

The argument of nature versus the argument of
fortune. Free will and responsibility.
Beauty and virtue.

When we discuss the role of natural gifts, upbringing and education, even in the very beginning of the play we can also see the complex connections and relationships between nature, fortune, predetermined circumstances and the expression of free will. Orlando knows his true nature and has a purpose. The spirit of his father, which still lives within him, starts to mutiny against the poor conditions in which he is placed by his brother – the lack of education and opportunity. Orlando takes responsibility for his life and departs from his brother's ward, seeking his own fortune.

In Act one, second scene the two young girls, Celia and Rosalind, are talking about Fortune and the unjust ways in which her gifts are bestowed. Rosalind argues that while Nature determines the character and ability of men, it is Fortune that takes care of everything else from then on – by sending us good or bad luck, by placing us in one situation or another.

Whenever we use the argument of nature, we should always keep in mind that sometimes chance

and spontaneity do exist in the world and even nature's fairest creation may by fortune fall into the fire. But also throughout the play in the actions of Rosalind and Orlando we see that men are not bound by fate, and by taking responsibility and expressing their free will they could build their own fortune.

Rosalind, the daughter of the exiled Duke, is beautiful and wise. The courtier Le Beau says that the people praise her for her virtues. She says that since the age of three she has been apprenticed to a great magician, most profound in his art. Taking into account her conversation skills, delicate sense of humor and verse, it is most probable that this great art was rhetoric. In all the dialogues of the play we can see her serious reflections on the situation and the other characters. For she knows that time runs differently for different people and compares the orators to the lovers¹⁰, who when having nothing to say, go for a kiss or start coughing. Also in the dialogue with the shepherdess Phoebe, Rosalind is aware with the power of language to heal or to do harm.¹¹

So being wise and virtuous Rosalind takes active actions towards achieving her happiness – with passion and reason. It's true that she's in love with Orlando, but she does not rush blindly into his arms relying on fortune alone, instead she decides to test him first and see if they really are meant for each other. She challenges Orlando to a contest and through a series of conversations they mutually convince each other that they want to get married.

In act three, third scene the clown Touchstone tries to seduce the shepherdess Audrey with his elaborate phrases and sophisms. Although she is not familiar with the meaning of the words "poetical" and "features" Audrey has common sense about what is good in life and she wants to be true and honest herself. She says: "I do not know what Poetical is: is it honest in deed and word: is it a true

¹⁰ Act four, Scene one.

¹¹ Act three, Scene five.

thing?” And despite of Touchstone’s misleading comments, tying together honesty and ugliness, Audrey makes her choice and stays firm, and in that way she determines what happens further in the play – Audrey and Touchstone join together in lawful marriage. And even though she hasn’t been schooled, like Celia and Rosalind, she has a natural inclination towards good and so in her case, as it is with the other two girls, Fortune is on the side of reason and virtue.

Democritus says that people have created the image of Chance as an excuse for their own stupidity¹². Fortune rules over the lives of men only when they indulge in idleness and fail to moderate their desires.

Nature and justice

All the quarrels in the end are being resolved, when the two villains of the play, Duke Frederick and Orlando’s eldest brother Oliver, find themselves in the forest. Even though they go there with evil intentions, they both return to their better selves among the trees.

“As you like it” is a pastoral comedy and in it Shakespeare writes about the beauty, virtue and justice of nature, but also about the difficulties of life away from the comforts of the court. Charles the wrestlers says¹³ that the old duke and his cheerful men live carelessly within the Forest of Arden, like people did in the golden age. But the truth is that life outside the castle is difficult and demanding¹⁴, the exiled duke and his men have to prey up-

on the noble beasts of the forest for their sustenance and bear the changing of the seasons, the rain and the icy fangs of the scolding wind. And still, in spite of all these inconveniences, this exile among nature allows them to get closer to the true meaning of life, hidden in the language of the trees and the sermons of the stones. The Duke Senior refers to his followers as “brothers in exile”, since life in court has turned his own real brother into his worst enemy, life in nature – where all men are equal in front of their creator – has given him the true companionship and love that had been sadly missing in the artificial manners of the palace.

The artificial and pretentious manners of the courtiers are also an object of ridicule for the clown Touchstone in his dialogue with the shepherd Corin.¹⁵ And whether or not Corin is indeed a natural philosopher, he finds peace and satisfaction in his life, which the clown is unable to disturb with all his tricks and misleading questions. Corin leads a simple and honest life in the forest, he earns what he eats, he hates no man and envies no man’s happiness. And although the clown tries to dissuade him and make him feel ashamed of his earnest living, their disputation ends in a tie, interrupted by the arrival of Rosalind.

The simple and honest life in the forest is a remedy for men’s vile passions and desires. Through what happens in the lives of the villains in the play, through their personal stories, Shakespeare outlines the idea of the innate justice of nature and its cleansing power over men. Duke Frederick repents from his evil when he meets an old hermit living in the forest. Oliver, who is ready to kill Orlando, is himself threatened with violent death and is saved by the very brother he wanted to kill. Life close to nature urges men to better

¹² *Antichna filosofiya, antologiya* (1994). (Ancient philosophy. Anthology), Sofia, St. Zagora, “Ideya”, pp. 186-187.

¹³ Act one, scene one, “*Charles*: They say he is already in the Forrest of Arden, and a many merry men with him; and there they live like the old Robin Hood of England: they say many young Gentlemen flock to him every day, and fleet the time carelessly as they did in the golden world.”

¹⁴ Act two, scene one

¹⁵ Act three, scene two, Touchstone is mocking the habit of the courtiers to perfume their hands with civet musk: “*Clown*: ...learn of the wise and perpend: Ciuert is of a baser birth then Terre, the very uncleanly flux of a Cat...”

know themselves and turns them towards their inherent virtues.

So in this case we are claiming that something is good, virtuous and beautiful because it is natural or because it is close to nature. But this use of the argument of nature is valid only if we believe that men and the world are inherently noble and just. If, on the other hand, we are inclined towards a more pessimistic view of things, like the melancholic Jaques, then men can only bring their bloodlust and savagery to nature, which in turn punishes them with bad weather and all sorts of perils. And while it is true that life close to nature urges men to better know themselves, it is also true that Socrates was not found of long excursions in the country (Phaedrus, 230d)¹⁶ - he preferred to tackle vice and virtue on the streets of Athens, among his fellow man, not in the solitude of some desolate forest.

Conclusion

By showing us the actions of the different characters, coming from different social backgrounds, Shakespeare guides us towards the idea that human nature is inherently good and can get even better through proper upbringing and education. The shepherdess Audrey, even though she hasn't been schooled, still has in her a natural inclination towards honesty. And in her case, as it is with Celia and Rosalind, Fortune is on the side of reason and virtue.

Used separately, relying on natural potentialities, but ignoring such factors as upbringing, education and free will, there is a risk that the argument of nature may refer to men and their role in society as something completely predetermined. But the argument of nature can also support and encourage men to realize their full potential. Since it is founded in the believe that nature is inherently good, when we use the argument of nature we

should also take responsibility, exercise our free will, and take action toward achieving that good, through proper education and through creating a good living environment.

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¹⁶ Platon. Dialozi. (1982), (Plato, dialogs (1982)) Vol. Sofia, „Nauka i izkustvo“ (you don't leave the city)

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

THE UNITY OF PERSONALITY IDEAS OF KANT, HEGEL, NITSHE, VAINTSVAIG, PLATO, DAVID THE INVINCIBLE AND GAREGIN I, BENEDICT XVI

“I accept the truth regardless who has issued it.” Pifagor
“I do not agree with your opinion, but I am ready to devote
my life for your liberty to express it.” Volter

Abstract

In the present paper theories of creative personality are considered, developed by great philosophers, social psychologists, humanists, and also by representatives of religious confessions. On base of known triad of Hegel about subjective, objective and absolute spirit is done relative gradation of personality, which is containing in each man: ‘Empiric’, ‘Social’ and ‘Super empiric’ man or simply creative subject in all aspects. All this is related also to gradation of whole peoples and states. On this base it is shown complete coincidence of, on first sight contrary theories of personality. It is shown, that often first and second types of man demonstratively break laws of mentioned categories, pursuing in their actions, unnecessary for nobody momentary benefits and ‘victories’. As it was mentioned by Pope Benedict, the rescue of the Mankind is in the rapprochement and in community of all religions in general for all these doctrines, the creation of an image of the pure high strong personality. There aren’t any differences between these doctrines.

The analysis of many contemporary problems in psychology and ethics of individuals and nations in terms of priority common to all approaches to relationships of modern conditions of the individual and society, of all countries and peoples are given.

Keywords: creative personality, Superempiric personality, spiritual perfection, Civilization, mankind, human being.

In the present paper theories of creative personality are considered, developed by great philosophers, social psychologists, humanists, and also by representatives of religious confessions. On base of known triad of Hegel about subjective, objective and absolute spirit is done relative gradation of personality, which is containing in each man: ‘Empiric’, ‘Social’ and ‘Super empiric’ man or simply creative subject in all aspects. All this is related also to gradation of whole peoples and states. On this base it is shown complete coinci-

dence of, on first sight contraries, theories of Kant and Nitshe about personality. It is postulated the presence of three unconditional categories: Nature, Civilization, History, whose laws nobody can break with impunity, the corresponding examples are given. It is shown, that often first and second types of man demonstratively break laws of mentioned categories, pursuing in their actions, unnecessary for nobody momentary benefits and ‘victories’. It is shown also unity of view on personality of mentioned thinkers and those of the supreme

patriarch of All Armenians Garegin I. It is shown full correspondence of ideas of Plato, developed by representative of his school David Invincible, with theories of Kant, Hegel, Nitshe. The great German philosopher Hegel in his work 'Phenomenology of Spirit' wrote that the World Idea in its other being, i.e. in mankind, accomplish the process of self-knowledge. It is well known how it was occurred actually, namely all motions of human history have passed in infinite destructive wars, in violation by the states and their rulers of elementary human rights. Especially brightly it appeared in the XX century, when for two well-known totalitarian regimes neither human rights nor even human lives in fact means nothing. Nowadays, after wreckage of mentioned 'Empire of harm' the mankind somehow came to the conclusion that the main value in the world is the human personality and human rights. In 1990 was published the book of the well-known Canadian social psychologist Paul Vaintsvaig 'Ten precepts for the creative personality' translated into Russian. In its foreword Soviet psychologist V.S.Ageev had written pathetically about actuality of aspirations of the image of valuable, creative in everything personality, especially in questions of interrelation between people. The Biblical character of the name of the book adjusts on the highest hopes in reception of precise recommendations in that important issue, and the author justifies them. In our paper (Bagdov, Manukyan 1999) we, certainly independently, came to the same conclusions as P. Vaintsvaig had. Both he and we put liberty and creation in the first place in the ethics of the creative personality of the present and especially of the future, and appeal to refuse in the vital acts from the purposes of achievement of momentary petty benefits and victories and certainly from aspiration for the domination above people. In his book instead of our term 'Superempiric personality' or simply subject of creation in all, Vaintsvaig used the concept the 'Personality Power'. Certainly 'power' is considered to be not the household concept of physical power, not even the power of

character of aspiration to superiority over surrounding people, but self-perfection of personality, self-knowledge and spiritual perfection. Non momentary successes and victories over surrounding people can be compared to this Personality Power. About the same it is spoken and in (Daniel, 1990) where it is directly told, that attitudes in community are frequently characterized by tactical reasons and momentary benefits, and they do not correspond to those high principles that should be peculiar to attitudes of creative persons who have been proclaimed by the great thinkers, particularly by F.Nitshe. By the way, specified situation in attitudes of people to what it opposed with an image of the raised strong personality that is identical (Daniel, 1990) to correctly understood term of the superman entered by it, takes place also in the modern human society consisting from creative persons, but in practical interests cooperating at a lower level (Bagdov, Manukyan, 1999). It is necessary to note, that in introduction to the book (Daniel, 1990) of the French scientist D. Galevi, it is spoken about the urgency of the question of creation of original philosophy of the person. And in (Otto, 1910) it is directly spoken about the basic value and the purpose of the world development: 'What is the center of apperception?', 'It is the personality'. Very close to ethical principles are ideas of Christian morals. They were stated in the interview by the Catholicos of All Armenians Garegin I to the famous Italian writer D.Guajta (Guayta, 1990), where he said that the human happiness is not in his well-being and momentary benefits, successes and victories, but in self – knowledge and development of the spiritual life. It is deeply stated by Garegin I, that people who are not burdened with families, whose typical representative he was, even unwillingly, began to think in cosmic scale and live with the interests of the Universe. Now we can return to the problem of synthesis of ethical studies of great thinkers of the last and the present, and also additions to them being formulated by the first author of (Bagdov ,

Manukyan, 1999) in 1968, his ethical problems. Kant in his ethical recommendations said: "One must relate to man not only as to means but also as to aim". F. Nitshe in his book "So it is said by Zaratustra" wrote: "I teach you about 'Superman'. The man is that what must be overcome". "In a man it is great that he is a bridge, not an aim." "Let your will tell you 'Superman' must become the meaning of the Earth". The impression is that theories about personality of Kant and Nitshe are opposite. Nevertheless it is said that all personality theories of all great philosophers and thinkers almost do not differ from each other, since they have the same aim- creation of image of perfect personality. We shall show that truly interpreted above mentioned declarations of Kant and Nitshe coincide with each other. First of all let us remember known, typical for Hegel's philosophy triad about 3 kinds of man's spirit, or simply of man, -subjective spirit, objective spirit, absolute spirit. Naturally it is considered, that as the first type of man one must understand "empiric man" with all its dignities and defects, and, it is fixed, that justly it is overcome by the second type of man, namely by social man or simply collective, which has his own truth and morals and makes to obey to them the 'empirical' person and to serve together with the all others to the general, other very useful, goals posed by the collective. But also this type of man cannot be the aim of the all development of nature and mankind since each collective has its own "truth" and aims and that brings to collisions of between them and even to wars. Therefore social man also often must be overcome by 'Superempiric' personality, which can be believed, as it was said, as subject of creation in all. Neither Kant nor Nitshe had carried out that gradation; therefore their statements at first sight are opposite. However, it is easy to understand, and it is agreed with interpretation of Nitshe's philosophy, given in (Daniel, 1990), that by saying 'man' he meant just 'empiric man' which certainly must overcome his defects and vices, and by saying 'Superman' one must understand

'Superempiric personality' or simply just object of creation in all. The same is Kant's statement which due to height of his philosophy, certainly by saying 'man' to whom one must relate as to the aim, meant 'Superempiric man'. By the way, both Kant and Dostoevsky believed in primary imperfection, certainly in 'empiric man' and the same does Christianity in understanding of 'fall of man'. Namely, to the such type of man in Kant's declaration one must relate as to means. By Nitshe that man is a bridge, of course, for passage to 'superman'. Thus, using Hegel's triad about human spirit, we could reconcile and even join Kant's and Nitshe's statements about personality. And what about synthesis of Ethic studies of their personality theories, it was already said and will be said more in future. By the way the first attempt of synthesis of ethic theories and the presence of the 'sixth sense' of great Russian writers and thinkers and of the greatest Armenian poet and writer of the XX century was done by west Armenian writer Eduard Hovhanisyan in his book " Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Sevak", published in Venice in 1977. The mentioned imperfection of 'empiric man' and 'public man' first was mentioned by Nitshe, whose phrase is recently often quoted in public papers is the following: "No any great idea, at least in its initial stage avoided distortion and misinterpretation, having passed through mankind". To the same conclusion we came independently, and that is why. Indeed, how many people were killed and burnt in the name of celebration of religious dogmas? Did Christ or Mohammed in their sacred books claim it? How many people were killed in the name of, appeared illusive 'victory' of light ideas of communism? Did Nitshe in his appeals on overcoming the 'empirical person' in our terminology claim to create gas chambers? About these distortions of Nitshe's ideas by nazi were spoken both in (Daniel, 1990) and in the book of Czech expert on ethics Egnst. Certainly, utopian theories could avoid these distortions. The mentioned book (Guayta, 1990) also contained the statement of Garegin I that though

the real carriers of creative activity are men, the carriers of the spiritual beginning. In interrelations between themselves and confession are women. This, at first sight, the paradoxical conclusion become clear, as Garegin I said, when we consider that men mainly were busy with making career and in interrelation between each other and surrounding, according our terminology at the highest level of 'public man', they act no more then on the level of momentary benefits and victories. By the way, we think, that as a compass for 'Superempiric personality' it is necessary to consider the presence of already mentioned triad of categories, laws of which cannot be broken with impunity.

The Nature, the Civilization, the History.

There are also other known concepts, to what everyone worships, but anyhow, they either contain instructions, or through them are expressed. Certainly, laws of Nature sometimes are broken in the important question of continuation of life, but as a rule, there are extenuating circumstances and finally the repentance of the marked person before himself and others takes place that certainly softens and usually eliminates the punishment. The majority of not strong-willed people simply are rescued by the Civilization, but also for all the others it remains the only way of self-expression and activity, without it they would be simply strong cave people. Nowadays it is well known and consequently that those even bullish figures, who, even sometimes, break its laws, showing not deserved, unjust attitude to the other people, as a rule sooner or later one estimates adequately. We are going to bring a well-known example about infringement of laws of History and immediate punishment. In 1973 under the initiative of another except M.Gorbachev, the Herrostrat-like laureate of the Nobel prize of the world, that he received when he had lost the shameful war for the USA in Vietnam, the State Secretary of the USA G.Kissinger and a well-known American company, had occurred a fascist military coup d'état in Chile. Israel, which wasn't asked about it, was the first

who recognized that fascist junta, while flown into a rage from blood of citizens military clique applied inhuman tortures towards harmless captives, simply showing 'a blood bath' and disgracing not only themselves but also the all Chilean people. As far as we know, during our epoch, representatives of any other nations haven't shown such senseless sadism towards the fellow citizens. On the next day of the mentioned 'recognition', Arabs broke the 'unapproachable' Barley Line, and so the domination of Israel in the Near East was ended.

There are lots of other examples when somebody digs a ditch for the others, he himself gets into it. And one can ask where the mankind is. Certainly the mankind, to be exact, its best representatives, has created the Civilization and its main norms are well-known. But as it was already said that almost all, without exception, people in the past and the present, operating in their professional activities on the level of creative 'Superempirical' personality, as a rule in the interrelation among themselves act on the level of 'empirical', and in the best case, of the 'public' person, namely open conjuncture and generally speaking, of absolutely useless for them momentary benefits. And all these maybe are 'inevitable' and 'natural' but have no connection with the demands of the Civilization. Moreover, it concerns to the mutual relations between nations. In that sense the mankind in name of the state and separate leaders representing it at all levels had to deserve confidence of their citizens-creative or 'Superempirical' personalities. Its estimation of their creative actions and their positions among other people and nations almost never are at above-stated 'Superempirical' level. Easier being expressed, we may quote the Russian poet Yevtushenko, "Justice is a train that is always late". One must recognize that mentioned reasoning in the occasion of necessity, as possible, to act with the demands of the Civilization which, certainly, nobody can refute look a little bit grandiloquently and pretentiously in comparison with the simple humorous saying of

‘Great Combinatory’ from the book of If and Petrov. “I would like to smash into your face but Zarathustra didn’t allow.”

By the way there is another quotation in the same book from the Bible. The matter is that in (Ajvazyan, 2006) devoted to the interpretation of historical and moral Bible truths, it is written that the great Jewish nation already for that feat which it has made by the creation of the Bible, is worth genuflection. It is difficult to add anything to that panegyric. However, also great Larosh Fuko had said: “Great people had great defects.” So even on that great nation there should be corresponding compromises. It isn’t a question of household defects that are often primitively and unreasonably attributed to Jews. In close contact the majority of the Jews known to us, are an example of wisdom, modesty and goodwill with sense of humor towards themselves and the surroundings. As to the compromises, certainly, it is well known on the highest level of power both in politics and in science. The great compromises consist with the presence at political leaders of Jews of two morals and estimations: in angry condemnation of the Holocaust and in full indifference, and even denying, of its forerunners, and even it is possible to tell confidently, of original cause, of non-recognition of the genocide of the Armenians in 1915. About this original cause once spoke the Frenzied Fuhrer in his appeals to the German soldiers: “Kill. Kill. Kill. Who remembers now the mass murders of Armenians?” Besides as writes in his book S. Ajvazyan, in his times the confessors of Israel-T.Herzl and Vainsman had addressed to the bloodthirsty sultan Hamid with suggestion; “ Help us to create the state of Israel and we `ll help you to solve the Armenian question.” Close to our previous sayings there are in Ajvor Beison’s book “The factor of Zionism”/2001/. Not standing on other examples let us bring only recommendation of the same ancient Yews from Bible, which is containing also in book of If and Petrov: «Sim the prayer is doing, Kham the wheat is sowing, Jafet the power is hawing». As

it is seen the ancient Jews themselves conned to Yews of all times the Zole of creators of spiritual and mental values, the subjects of creation, but, on no account, not rulers over people, which never should not bring to them laurels. Of course, there are lots of exceptions, too. The most vivid one for us was A. Linkoln, who perhaps excepting of J.Kennedy and F.Roosevelt the only president of the USA, operating according our terminology, at a level of “Superempirical” person and was its typical example. By the way, in our activities we also, as possible try to be only the subject of creativity and we do not aspire to any official social standing, i.e. simply to authority, in this case being straight lines, even not consanguinity, successors to Sim.

By the way, the modern civilization and science mainly are carried by Jews. The great German mathematician and philosopher Leibnitz was named ‘genius of compromise’ as he tried in his philosophy to reconcile and approach Christian churches, and also religious morals and morals of the personality, based on the intellect. As one can see we are straight followers of Leibnitz in our aspiration for synthesis. He had met another great philosopher Spinoza and found out that they are antipodes in the question of moral. Both admit the spiritual origin, but Leibnitz, later Kant and Dostoevski, distinguished the presence of good and evil in that origin, appealed towards the bright ideal of the personality itself, as we do. Spinoza considers that in spiritual origin there were no gradation and simply one might adapt for it and for the surrounding reality. It is like very much Bantam’s utility ethics of right understanding of interests. From our observation, mainly in scientific environment, we may confidently note that the civilized mankind, as it was mentioned, on the level of ‘public’ personality, including relations between scientists, and states, estimations of creative personalities, follow not the ethics of Leibnitz, Kant and Dostoevsky, maybe considering it more intelligent whim, but the rational and stiff ethics of Spinoza. But as it was already mentioned, these abso-

lutely different morals of the 'public' man, i.e. collectives, countries, confessions will bring the mankind to the unknown. So, propagated by as the morals of 'Superempiric' personality or only creative not only in their own profession but also as it is more important, in relations towards themselves and surroundings, or that is the same, towards spirit, are, maybe, the only mean to unite people all over the world, and as we consider, the salvation of the mankind from itself. In detail, we'll speak about it in our next article: "The Universe of Spinoza and the Universe of Leibnitz." (2007, N 10).

We'll note that Garegin I supported rapprochement of all Christian churches (Guayta, 1990)

As it has been told earlier, there is much common in doctrines of great thinkers, which at first sight expresses differently, but at definition to their main aim –creating of an image strong and elevated creative person –spoke the same. It is possible to approve confidently the presence of also full accord of these doctrines with the ones of all Christian churches whose purpose is the same– 'spirituality' in human being, with appeals to act on that high, by our terminology 'Superempirical', level. It is possible to go further, and it was made by Pope Benedict XVI during his visit to Turkey. The pope had declared that the rescue of the Mankind is in the rapprochement, and, we may add, in community of all religions: Christianity, Moslem, Judaism, Confucianism, Buddhism, in general for all these doctrines, the creation of an image of the pure high strong personality. There aren't any differences between these doctrines, as we know.

With regard to the aforesaid it is possible to apply Mao Tsze Donne's famous saying, 'Let blossom all the roses'. That can be carried both to unification of all churches and confessions and to mutual relations of scientists. By the way in present time in capital of Kazakhstan Astana already from 2006 there are organized conferences on union of all world religious confessions concepts to find the common aim for all peoples and confessions as

primary value, which is in full correspondence with conceptions of this paper. Another matter is, that individualities of religions, nations and separate people, philosophical doctrines about personality, will certainly keep, but the main thing that unites them, that is to put on the top of the corner the person who is creative in all, anyhow should become the aim of all personalities and people. There is no other way for mankind at all. To say the truth, in present that basic position is known very much, the only question is; how much every day self-interests and cares of people and states prevent the success of that important for everybody aim. And this proverb is related not only to scientific creature, but also to relations among people. As it is said: "One must not only to know much, but also to be able much." Also we must note that all our messages to mention organizations and congresses on ethical problems remained without any answers and following dialogs. But due to great Plato those who do not want dialogs will not reach any perspectives. In comments on Hegel's philosophy in his philosophical note-books V.Lenin often abuses it. And only with that saying he agreed somehow and said, "It is worth of respect the virtue of a peasant and a shepherd, however the right of the World Spirit is above all private rights." It is well known how that right was used by the leader of the world proletariat. In our everyday life, including in science, conscious or non-conscious, many try to represent that right, and there is nothing bad in it. But it is important how one must to understand it, as the right of selfless and devoted serving to truth and to the science or try to treat everybody who can be treated.

Let's state now briefly the main content of the basic ethical principle offered by us in (Bagdov, Manukyan, 1999).

We recognize Kant as the greatest authority on ethics. Before his highest Reason, his starry sky and moral duty we stupefied in admiration. Intellect is the most highest. Therefore Ethics should follow the logics. But the Life goes forward, and

together with it philosophy does. Now Kant's Reason and Hegel's Idea are withstood the Will, as a certain Space effort. Life of the space is a sea of energy from which acts of Will are allocated. These acts shaped the active beginning, generation of a Life and Being. Schopenhauer in his book 'The World as Will and Presentation' was the first who introduced that will as the concept 'Will to Life'. F.Nitshe introduced cosmic 'Will to Authority'. Bergson interpreted Will as a Vital Burst. We postulate together with Kant, that the maximum display of transcendental in personality is moral law in it, not intellect but moral duty as display of transcendentalism. Therefore at defining the formulating of the beginning of Life we start from ethical. As a forming beginning that drives the matter to the highest condition, we consider neither Bergson's Vital Burst, nor Schopenhauer's will to Life and F.Nitshe's will to Power but introduced by us moral rank-Will to Freedom. The Will to Power conducts to nonsenses, to chaos and falsity in the Life. As it is specified in (Daniel, 1990), it can be accepted only as Power above oneself in overcoming the weaknesses. The Will to Freedom conducts to progress, to becoming and development of Life that is constant movement to freedom. The Will to Freedom expresses Kant's categorical imperative. In an empire of freedom Kant searched the realization of high morals. Hegel made the concept of Freedom terrestrial defining it as true necessity. Communists wished to build a society of freedom in the world and to carry out in it their ideals. The developed of mankind, if to take it in aggregate of the person and the nature, is a movement to a society more free. As we clarified later the terminology of 'Will to Freedom' first was introduces by Jean Pole Sartre in his paper "Existentialism and Humanism". We offered an ethical principle that allows to estimate morality of an act and to stimulate the actions. It is formulated so. The act is moral that conducts to the maximal prize of total freedom for creativity. Total freedom is understood as the sum of increments of freedom of all persons

concerning an act, thus, probably, the person making act loses, a little in freedom, but other persons participating in a situation, are released so that freedom totally wins. Not getting into details substations of necessity of a such principle, described above we dare to hope that it is actual and, at least on its experience, we constantly check its correctness and utility in attitudes towards people and first of all towards himself. In the sense of fidelity of the last statement we shall say that those succeeding personalities, who prefer the vital the vital blessings and momentary benefits to authentic creativity, are always known. By the way in (Otto, 1910) to his occasion is written 'The knowledge of the world is conducted only through suffering.' There are lots of examples that can confirm this idea. We'll bring the most vivid one-about the most gifted and the greatest Soviet mathematician and mechanic M.Keldish. His father, who wished him, of course, only good, had said, 'I thought that from him will turn out Anri Puancare, but it turned out to be only the President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR'. So to that it is necessary to think of freedom for creativity not only for oneself, but for the surrounding, that usually almost nobody does. Well bring another witty example. It is known that T.Petrosyan differs from other chess players by making complicated combinations and, simply thought not only for himself but also for his contender. This is inherent, certainly, to all chess players but that brightly pronounced feature took away from him much more than from others, but invariably conducted him to success. You can check up on your own experience, whether it is concerned with the attitude between people, mainly between scientists, when somebody aspires to achieve success and only freedom for creativity due to another's, except for momentary, doubtful success and victory, finally wins nothing. Concerning such 'scientific' disputes and corresponding 'victories' does not suit the known saying, 'In disputes is born the truth', but it does V.Hugo's saying 'From two arguing is guilty only the one who is

cleverer'. On the same theme there is winged, though too severe, saying of N.Winner, the best mathematician of the XX century, the founder of the theory of games,' the mankind is divided into two categories: fools and rascals. The first ones do not use all means in vital struggle and, certainly, lose, the second use all means and win, i.e. gain the victory. We wouldn't like someone relate us to the second category. As we have found out, very close to the questions of the article, already more than ten years, on a large scale the Russian Humanitarian Society is engaged. In one of its journals (Kruglov, 2006) there was the interview of the academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.Ginzburg propagandizing the necessity of secular or civil humanism. In the same number there was an article of the assistant to the editor-in-chief A.Kruglov, where it was said, 'Humanists approve the priority of universal values before any state national, class religious, etc., not denying the right of these private values of existence. This platform will constrain nobody, who only does not want to oppress others'. In the same number (Kruglov, 2006) we can find the following saying of the academician G.I.Abelev, 'Today the struggle for reason, humanism and common sense can be conducted only contrary to any common sense'. These and other aspirations of humanists of Russia and all world are according to our aspirations of creation of the general for all ethics creative 'super empirical personality', operating according to the cultural, values that are created by the best representatives of the mankind.

It is necessary to note thoroughgoing struggle of humanists with not less thoroughgoing Orthodox Church in their aspiration to represent ideology and cultural wealth of the modern personality. In this plan our positions are closer the aforesaid positions, ideological tolerance and even synthesis of all ideologies and it doesn't matter whether they are expressed by separate great thinkers or various religious faiths when it is a question about creating

an image strong in sense of creative in all personalities about what it was in details spoken above.

After writing the main article we have got acquainted with philosophy of the personality developed by the remarkable follower and continuer of ideas of great Plato the great Armenian philosopher of the V century David the Invincible. He wrote quoting his teacher Plato: 'Philosopher is not one who knows much and not one who speaks much, but one who conducts innocent and pure way of life.' David the Invincible divided philosophy into 2 parts: theoretical philosophy or according Kant 'criticism of the pure reason' and practical philosophy, according Kant 'criticism of the practical reason' and the same as also Kant preferred the second, representing nothing but ethics or the theory of morals for the personality. Here it is approved once again that all great thinkers speaking about the construction of the theory of the moral human personality, express the same ideas. In full accord with F.Nitshe's ideas about necessity to overcome the weaknesses there is a statement of David the Invincible that proposes of practical philosophy – with assistance of reason is to decorate morals and to subordinate to it the emotions. In full conformity with Hegel's philosophy is David's theory about experiment, that makes the Supreme Essence or the World Idea having created the nature and the mankind, and this beings comes to the self-actualization and to the movement to the basic purpose of the development of the nature and mankind: to the creation of an image of ideal godlike personality i.e. on our terminology 'super empirical' personality or the subject of creativity in everything, and on Nitshe's terminology 'super personality'. The practical philosophy according David is justice that conducts a person and a human society to the perfection. To those Plato's ideas David added a little with giving due to the knowledge and propagation of the truth, but on the first place puts the kindness. This kind of category in moral theories one couldn't find anywhere, including in antique, and in German philosophy. Besides, he as-

serted, that for the kindness one may sometimes wander from the real truth. David's statement sounded more real to our construction of the ideals of Armenians what we consider suitable and for all mankind. It is a question of the spiritual heritage that has been created by the best representatives of all nations and people, which is followed by everyone in the present and in the future, according to their tastes and bents to use for their self-improvement. Hardly there will be such 'strong' personality who without essential damage for himself will risk in a pointed manner to neglect that simple unpretentious recommendations. Let's note that in David's theory about the primary meaning of the category of the kindness on the first place is humanism.

In paper (Drize, 2006) it is spoken about ethics of science, about that even great scientists of world, as Newton, Kepler, Galilei, Mendel, in any case broke it very much (all it by mentioned phrase of Larosh Fuco). These facts in his interview brought assistant director of Institute of physiology correspondent- member A.V.Yurevich, specialist on ethics of sciences. He quoted the famous sociologist Robert Merton, who formulated main ethical norms of scientific activity:

1. Objectivity, i.e. only aspiration to truth 2. Impartiality. 3. Communism, i.e. wide association propagation of knowledge, the result of scientist belongs to all. 4. By Rene Decart "Subject of all to doubt". And then: "The scientists, probably, more than anyone, are subjective; aspire to glory by all

possible means and so on." These conclusions, declared by leading psychologists are in accordance with main propositions of our paper, i.e. with conclusion that mankind, more precisely its leading representatives, yet must prove its impartialities and competence in precision of creative results of personalities. By recapitulating of all these, we can assume, with more resoluteness, that for greatest effectiveness of the science it must be directed only by Brahmins. The ideas of this paper are in accordance with ideas of humanism, formulated in (Kruglov, 2006) where there are not references on Jean Pol Sartor paper "Existentialism and Humanism", and where there are speaking about priority of common to all mankind values.

Of course, one must completely agree with this appeal to allow enter into high level information society only of the high level personalities, who not only know much, but also to be able much. Indeed all known to us men during their interrelations show in this sense that although they know much, but are able nothing. But by comparison with modern science theories (Sedov, 1982) one must accept, that unfortunately, as in genetics high level of vitals form with low entropy must be supplemented by low level of mutations, without which cannot be the development of species. So we are obliged to accept that the low order of present interrelations among people one can adopt, also in future, but by taking into account and pointing out their low level and necessity of their Submission to aim and demands of high level laws.

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WORLD ORDER AND NATIONAL INTEREST

Abstract

A rational foreign policy must define the criteria of “national interest” in a consistent and transparent manner in order to enable other states to calculate their behavior accordingly and to avoid global instability. The basic rationale of “national interest” is the self-preservation of the state from which all specific interests, including those of national security, are derived. The concept as such is multidimensional, comprising the realization of economic, social and cultural rights of the respective polity in the worldwide interplay of forces. In the era of globalization, it must naturally be defined on the basis of interdependence at the factual and reciprocity of interests at the normative level.

In a unipolar power constellation such as the present one, the unilateral assertion of national interests by the dominant power, cloaked in the guise of universal values, risks to cause regional conflicts and global instability. Only if exercised in a framework of checks and balances, is the policy of national interest compatible with peace. This means that a global balance of power, whether bipolar or multipolar, is indispensable for the assertion of the national interest. The principle of sovereign equality of nations, a basic norm of the UN Charter, is only meaningful, and the United Nations system of collective security can only be realized, if states act on the basis of mutuality.

For the policy of the national interest not to undermine its very foundation, namely the sovereignty of the state and the inalienable rights of its citizens, it must include universal values shared by all members of the international community. The concept should thus be redefined in the context of “mutual global interests.” Those must include the principles of human rights and the rule of law as guidelines of a just world order.

Keywords: balance of power, *bonum commune*, collective security, multipolarity, national interests, realpolitik, sovereignty, United Nations, universal values, world order.

(I)

The evolution of world order

When the so-called “cold war” ended at the beginning of the 1990s, expectations were running high for the emergence of a *new* and *peaceful* world order.¹ It was widely hoped that the rivalry between

that era’s two superpowers, which was commonly characterized as “East-West conflict,” would be transformed into a stable system of co-operation among all states at an equal level and on the basis of common goals.

The prophesied golden age of “liberal democracy” and “peace,” however, quickly turned out to be a Fata Morgana when it became clear that one party to the erstwhile confrontation – that saw itself as the winner in the global struggle for power – insisted on a monopoly of definition of the basic principles of world order, including human rights and the rule of law. In the years that followed, the

¹ For an analysis of the term “New World Order” and its ideological implications see the author’s paper: *Democracy and the New World Order*. Studies in International Relations, Vol. XIX. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1993.

majority of United Nations member states nonetheless challenged the remaining superpower's claim to political and ideological supremacy. Francis Fukuyama's initial proclamation of the "end of history,"² implying global acceptance of the supposedly victorious doctrine, was quickly proven premature.

The sudden disappearance of the global power balance, in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, resulted in a constellation of *hegemony* where the dominant global player felt emboldened to present its **national interests** as if they were the **universal interests** of mankind.³ In the new unipolar framework (after the end of the bipolar order of the cold war period),⁴ the lack of checks and balances in inter-state relations led to a profound destabilization of the international system, represented by the United Nations, and to a kind of legal anarchy that condemned the world organization to the role of impotent spectator of the hegemonial power's unilateral actions. The wars of aggression against Yugoslavia (1999) and Iraq (2003) are just two examples of how the United Nations' system of collective security – that is based on the balance of power among the Security Council's permanent members – was eroded, and eventually undermined, in favour of the interests of essentially only

one member state.⁵ This development had already become obvious in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq when the United States succeeded in exploiting authorization for collective enforcement action against Iraq to advance its peculiar agenda of a "New Middle East."⁶ The measures, officially conducted by a so-called "coalition of the willing" on the basis of binding resolutions of the UN Security Council,⁷ included punitive economic sanctions against the country's entire civilian population that caused the death of up to a million people.⁸ In the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 it has again become obvious that in the absence of proper checks and balances the strive for power virtually knows no limits.

In an effectively hegemonial environment the very *legitimacy* of the use of armed force on behalf of the United Nations Security Council is undermined, even negated, and the system of collective security is rendered dysfunctional. This is mainly because of the *abuse* of the provisions of Chapter VII

² Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" in: *The National Interest*, Vol. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18. See also Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York and Toronto: Free Press and Maxwell Macmillan, 1992.

³ American political commentator Charles Krauthammer pointedly and, for his part, affirmatively described this imperial understanding of the global hegemon's role: "America must be guided by its independent judgment, both about its own interest and about the global interest." "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," in: *The National Interest*, Winter 2002/03, pp. 5-17; p. 16.

⁴ For details see, *inter alia*, Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "American Primacy in Perspective," in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 4 (July/August 2002), pp. 20-33.

⁵ See the author's analysis: "Quo Vadis, United Nations?" in: Hans Köchler, *World Order: Vision and Reality. Collected Papers Edited by David Armstrong*. New Delhi: Manak, 2009, pp. 189-204; esp. ch. II, pp. 192ff.

⁶ On this concept see also Trudy J. Kuehner, "A New Middle East? A Report of FPRI's History Institute for Teachers," in: *The Newsletter of FPRI's Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 2005), Foreign Policy Research Institute, USA, at www.fpri.org/footnotes/101.200501.kuehner.newmiddeeast.html.

⁷ For details of the marginalization of the United Nations in the handling of this conflict see Hans Köchler (ed.), *The Iraq Crisis and the United Nations: Power Politics vs. the International Rule of Law. Memoranda and declarations of the International Progress Organization (1990 – 2003)*. Studies in International Relations, XXVIII. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2004.

⁸ See, *inter alia*, the report of the "Harvard Study Team": *Unsanctioned Suffering: A Human Rights Assessment of United Nations Sanctions on Iraq*. Center for Economic and Social Rights, May 1996, www.cesr.org/downloads/Unsanctioned%20Suffering%201996.pdf.

of the UN Charter by the *most powerful* actor for the sake of its own strategic agenda. Under such conditions, the dominant country will seize any authorization of the use of force by the Security Council as an opportunity to advance its strategic interests. (In the period that followed the end of global bipolarity, this was clearly the case with the United States, the self-proclaimed winner of the cold war.)

The practice of power politics under the conditions of *military* unipolarity has become the most serious challenge to the principle of national sovereignty, and in particular to the *sovereign equality* of nations, enshrined in Art. 2(1) of the United Nations Charter. The dominant global player has increasingly tried to cloak its national interests behind the veil of *universal values* such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law – albeit in its own parochial interpretation.⁹ This, in turn, has triggered a counter-reaction from members of the international community that are resisting marginalization by the reassertion of their national interests.¹⁰ In the name of trade “liberalization,” the hegemonial country also uses predatory economic globalization to advance its strategic interests. In response to this comprehensive and global claim to power, new forms of intergovernmental co-operation have developed such as the grouping of the BRICS states

(Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) or the Shanghai Co-operation Organization.

In the post-cold war environment, global tension is also the result of an increasing *disparity* between unipolarity in the military-political domain and multipolarity in the socio-cultural (or civilizational) sphere.¹¹ What Samuel Huntington described as “clash of civilizations”¹² is partly also an effect of this tension and the dominant global player’s tendency to establish civilizational (and ideological) supremacy over the rest of the world.¹³

A new balance of power will thus be indispensable for the *politics of the national interest* not to lead to global dictatorship and permanent conflict. The exercise of national interests must be pursued in a *cooperative* framework and on the basis of *mutuality*, which alone is in conformity with the United Nations’ principle of sovereign equality of states. That notion does not conform to a stable international order of peace if it is interpreted in an exclusivist (or absolute) sense, excluding – or, more precisely, absorbing – the interests of all other international actors as competitors for global influence. The politics of national interest must not remain the *domaine réservé* of the dominant power(s) of the moment.

The urgency of this is even more obvious in the light of claims expressed following the events of

⁹ As early as during the Second World War, General Charles de Gaulle noticed in the declarations of the President of the United States the tendency to cloak the will to power in idealism: “Je écoute Roosevelt me décrire ses projets. Comme cela est humain, l’idéalisme y habille la volonté de puissance.” (Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires de Guerre*, Vol. 2, Issue 1: *L’Unité. 1942 – 1944*. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1956, p. 238.)

¹⁰ This has also been observed by Charles Krauthammer who, in regard to the United States, acknowledges that “(o)ur experience with hegemony historically is that it inevitably creates a counterbalancing coalition of weaker powers ...” (*op. cit.*, p. 8). He is mistaken, however, when stating that no such “counterbalancing” occurred in the unipolar environment after the events of September 11, 2001 (*ibid.*).

¹¹ For details see, *inter alia*, the author’s paper: “The Shifting Balance of Power and the Future of Sovereign States,” in: Bulletin 2010. (Moscow): World Public Forum “Dialogue of Civilizations,” 2009, pp. 129-142.

¹² Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49.

¹³ See also Hans Köchler, “Civilization as Instrument of World Order? The Role of the Civilizational Paradigm in the Absence of a Balance of Power,” in: Fred Dallmayr, M. Akif Kayapınar, İsmail Yaylacı (eds.), *Civilizations and World Order: Geopolitics and Cultural Difference*. Foreword by Ahmet Davutoğlu. (Series “Global Encounters: Studies in Comparative Political Theory.”) Lanham/Boulder/New York/Toronto/Plymouth (UK): Lexington Books, 2014, pp. 19-33.

September 11, 2001 that the United States' "unique global power allows it to be the balancer in every region,"¹⁴ and in view of the propagation of a so-called new unilateralism that "argues explicitly and unashamedly for maintaining unipolarity, for sustaining America's unrivaled dominance for the foreseeable future."¹⁵

(II)

National interest in a multipolar world

In theory as well as in practice, the term "national interest" has always been used in a rather vague manner – and this in spite of its centrality in inter-state relations. While, in the realist doctrine of international relations, national *interest* is generally defined "in terms of power"¹⁶ (or, more precisely, the interest in the preservation of power), making it the "perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed,"¹⁷ the notion needs to be described in its implications for the different spheres of state action (economic, social, cultural, military, etc.) in order to be useful for understanding the dynamics of inter-state relations and for appropriately identifying today's global challenges. Apart from conceptual precision, every state should play with open cards and clearly define and indicate the *parameters* that define the scope of its national interests. This is one of the most essential requirements of a *rational* foreign policy, which alone will make a state a reliable member of the international community. A stable order of peace is only possible

if states make it possible for their fellow states to rationally calculate their behavior.

A definition of a state's national interests must be precise and comprehensive.¹⁸ The policy of the national interest should be *transparent* and the underlying principles must be declared vis-à-vis the community of states. Naturally, such a definition will focus on the aspect of *national security* that is to be guaranteed in order to enable citizens and society to realize their aims in the social, economic and cultural fields, and it will have to establish a clear hierarchy of interests (values).¹⁹ Accordingly, "national interest" is a *multidimensional* concept that can only be described in a concrete operational framework and on the basis of specific historical circumstances. As the self-preservation of the state as collective of citizens is at stake, national interests are nonetheless long-term in nature. Their *international* dimension, with the central aspect of military

¹⁸ On the need for a precise definition see e.g. James F. Miskel, *National Interests: Grand Purposes or Chatchphrases?* Newport (RI): Naval War College, 2002.

¹⁹ As examples see the national security concepts of the United States and Russia announced at the beginning of the new millennium. The President of the United States identified as "vital" interests of the US "those directly connected to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation." (William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*. Washington, D.C.: White House, December 2000, p. 4). In a statement of principles released in the same year, the Russian Federation described the country's national interests as "a totality of balanced interests of the individual, society and the state in economic, domestic, political, social, international, informational, military, border, ecological security." (*National Security Concept of the Russian Federation. Approved by Presidential Decree No. 24 of 10 January 2000*, Chapter II.) For a structural comparison see also: *Russia and U.S. National Interests: Why Should Americans Care?* Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report. Center for the National Interest and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Washington DC, October 2011.

¹⁴ Charles Krauthammer, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 4th edition. New York: Knopf, 1966, Chapter "A Realist Theory of International Politics," "Six Principles of Political Realism," principle 2. See also Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.

¹⁷ *Politics among Nations*, p. 9.

defense of the state, follows from the fact that each sovereign entity must operate, and define its role, in the concert of all other sovereign actors. It cannot do so in splendid isolation. Legal “sovereignty” alone – and the status of sovereign equality – does not shield a state from the potentially hostile intentions of other states or from the adverse effects of the pursuit of their interests. This is even more so in our era of global interdependence.

Furthermore, as said earlier, in the era of globalization, a *rational* definition of the “national interest” is only possible on the basis of *reciprocity*, i.e. by taking into account the *interdependence* of the actions of sovereign states and considering the interests of other state actors when outlining one’s own state doctrine. This is particularly relevant in regard to global environmental issues – concerning which we are all “in the same boat” – and in view of the nuclear arms potential, whether declared or undeclared, of some of the major global players. Regional conflicts – whether in the Middle East, Central Asia or Europe – have also made drastically evident the *complexity* of national interests and the interrelatedness of that notion with interests related to the international level (in terms of peace and stability, regionally as well as globally). The conflict in and around Ukraine is a case in point.

In the era of globalization, the most challenging question, however, is whether a sound notion of “national interest” requires the inclusion of *general* (or *universal*) interests that are shared by all. In other words: Is, under those conditions, the *bonum commune* (not merely of the community of the state’s citizens, but of the international community) a defining element of the national interest?

The question becomes even more complex in terms of realpolitik. Will sovereign states only be prepared to include the global *bonum commune* in their definition of “national” interest if the power constellation is actually *multipolar* – while in the absence of a *balance of power* (in a *unipolar* framework where all are “at the mercy” of one dominant

player²⁰) it would be a struggle of all against all, an unrestrained assertion of each one’s interests, trying to gain favors vis-à-vis the hegemon at the expense of all the others?

An understanding of the national interest on the basis of *mutuality* is most relevant in the military domain, namely in all matters that relate to the armed defense of a state’s vital interests, first and foremost its very survival. In this sense, national security is the *conditio sine qua non* for the exercise of a state’s interests in all other domains, whether political, social, economic or cultural. In the era of arms of mass destruction, and in particular nuclear arms, war, in its ultimate consequence, is no longer – as put in the famous dictum of von Clausewitz – the continuation of politics by other means,²¹ but a recipe for *universal annihilation* – “mutual assured destruction.”²² In all issues where the survival of mankind is at stake, the exercise of the “national interest” has thus to be conducted in an *inclusive*, not *exclusive*, manner, i.e. by respecting the rights of other states on the basis of mutuality. This is the very essence of peaceful co-existence among na-

²⁰ A report issued by “The Commission on America’s National Interests” is an example for the definition of “national interest” in a strictly unipolar framework, which is meant to justify that country’s (the United States’) claim to “global leadership.” See *America’s National Interests: A Report from The Commission on America’s National Interests*. Washington DC, July 2000.

²¹ “So sehen wir also, daß der Krieg nicht bloß ein politischer Akt, sondern ein wahres politisches Instrument ist, eine Fortsetzung des politischen Verkehrs, ein Durchführen desselben mit anderen Mitteln.” Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege. Hinterlassenes Werk; ungekürzter Text*. New edition. Berlin: Ullstein, 1998, p. 44.

²² The term was coined by US mathematician and strategist John von Neumann during the 1950s. However, for an assessment of the notion in the context of the prevention of war see now Michael Shermer, “Will Mutual Assured Destruction Continue to Deter Nuclear War?” in: *Scientific American*, Vol. 310, Issue 6, June 1, 2014, at www.scientificamerican.com/article/will-mutual-assured-destruction-continue-to-deter-nuclear-war/.

tions. In a context where arms of mass destruction are the ultimate means of the assertion of the national interest, an exclusivist attitude, putting the interests of a particular nation (state) above those of all the others, would be intrinsically *irrational*. The withdrawal of the United States, in 2002, from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty²³ is indeed one of the most drastic illustrations of an exclusivist, *unilateral* understanding of national interests that is in itself a challenge to global peace and security.²⁴

The need for an “inclusive” – and comprehensive – interpretation of the national interest is also evident in *global environmental issues* and in matters of *global economy and finance*. The self-destructive nature of a unilateral, un-coordinated approach has revealed itself, among others, in the economic as well as political instability triggered by the global financial crisis of 2008 and in the inability of the community of states to agree on effective measures to deal with the ecological problems resulting from either unforeseen or deliberately ignored effects of industrial production and consumption.

In today’s hegemonial environment, the arrogant assertion and unrestrained (unilateral) exercise of national interests has brought chaos to geopolitically sensitive regions such as the Middle East or Central Asia and has led to an *unstable global order*. Due to the imbalance in global power relations, the militarily strongest international actor is always tempted to intervene even in distant regions and continents, outside its “natural” sphere of influence. Under these conditions, a lone superpower

such as the United States will increasingly define its national interests in a global, all-encompassing sense, and without due consideration for the interests of the weaker players. The hegemon will not recognize any geographical limits to the assertion of its power. It is no coincidence that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), established as an instrument of *collective defense* in the era of the cold war, redefined its mission shortly after the end of this era. When the United States emerged as the sole superpower during the 1990s, NATO declared virtually the entire globe as area of operation, effectively transforming what had been a *defensive* into an *offensive* posture.²⁵ Originally, the organization’s mission had been to assist member states in case of an attack (according to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949).²⁶ This mandate (that applied to the territory of the member states) was based on the principle of collective self-defense according to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and was meant to complement that organization’s system of collective security.²⁷ Following the collapse of the bipolar balance of power, this approach was completely abandoned and the concept of “out-of-area operations” or, more euphemistically, “non-Article 5 crisis response operations” was introduced to describe NATO’s new defense doctrine.²⁸ It was unavoidable that this posture brought

²³ The Treaty was signed in 1972 between the Soviet Union and the United States. In 1997, a Memorandum of Understanding determined that, for the purposes of the treaty, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine are successor states to the Soviet Union.

²⁴ For a critical assessment see Jing-dong Yuan, “Bush’s ABM bombshell: The fallout in Asia,” in: *Asia Times Online*, Hong Kong, January 8, 2002, at www.atimes.com/China/DA08Ad01.html.

²⁵ See the new defense doctrine of NATO: *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C.* Press Release NAC-S(99) 65, issued on 24 April 1999, at www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm

²⁶ *The North Atlantic Treaty*. Washington, DC, 4 April 1949.

²⁷ “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”

²⁸ Article 52 of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999).

NATO member states in direct conflict with national security interests of many non-member states – particularly when the organization was entrusted with operations in the course of the so-called “global war on terror,” proclaimed by the US administration after 2001.²⁹ The problem was further aggravated by the expansion of the organization’s membership after the disappearance of its erstwhile rival, the Warsaw Pact.³⁰ Due to the increasingly frequent use of NATO for military operations outside the treaty area, and often without proper UN authorization (as in Yugoslavia/Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011),³¹ the implementation of collec-

tive security on behalf of the treaty states was widely perceived as a *threat* to the very security of states in the affected regions, and subsequently to global security.

The escalation of tensions in the Middle East and North Africa, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe, including the armed conflict in Ukraine, is a direct result of this hegemonies policy that is tantamount to the projection of the leading power’s national interests to distant regions of the globe. It is equally unavoidable that this post-cold war imperial policy of “containment” of other powers will lead to the *reassertion* of their national interests by those countries whose influence and projection of power – in the strategic logic of the global hegemon – ought to be “contained” in their own geographical region. Under such circumstances, these countries have effectively no other option; there is no other rational response to this crude exercise of realpolitik (in fact, power politics). The proclamation of universal values (principles) defined by the dominant power alone – and to which all countries are expected to conform – is neither morally credible nor will it convince the weaker states. Any idealism in the face of a monopoly of power is out of place.

The lesson to be learned from these developments in different and distant regions of the globe – not only in the above mentioned regions, but including the Philippines and the South China Sea – is that the assertion of national interests (particularly by the most powerful countries) is only compatible with peace under conditions of a global power balance, i.e. in a framework of *checks and balances*, which was originally to be provided through the very might of the veto-wielding countries in the UN Security Council, its permanent members. Although

²⁹ For details see the author’s analysis: “The Global War on Terror and the Metaphysical Enemy,” in: Hans Köchler (ed.), *The “Global War on Terror” and the Question of World Order*. Studies in International Relations, Vol. XXX. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2008, pp. 13-35.

³⁰ This has become one of the main reasons of increasing geostrategic tensions in Eurasia. An American commentator aptly drew attention to the question of reciprocity (totally overlooked by a country that sees its role as that of the global hegemon): “How would the United States react to a Russian incursion in the Western hemisphere?” Jeffrey Tayler, “The Seething Anger of Putin’s Russia,” in: *The Atlantic*, September 22, 2014, at www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/09/russia-west-united-states-past-future-conflict/380533/. For a critical assessment in the early years after the end of the cold war see the words of the late George Kennan who emphatically warned of the consequences of NATO expansion: “I think it is the beginning of a new cold war ... I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else. This expansion would make the Founding Fathers of this country turn over in their graves.” Thomas L. Friedman, “Foreign Affairs; Now a Word from X,” in: *The New York Times*, May 2, 1998, at www.nytimes.com/1998/05/02/opinion/foreign-affairs-now-a-word-from-x.html.

³¹ On the legally dubious military operations of NATO countries (under the effective leadership of the United States) in Libya see MEMORANDUM by the President of the International Progress Organization

on Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) and its Implementation by a “Coalition of the Willing” under the Leadership of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. International Progress Organization, Doc. P/22680c, Vienna, 26 March 2011, at www.i-p-o.org/IPO-Memorandum-UN-Libya-26Mar11.pdf.

the system has always only worked imperfectly, it had certain credibility and efficiency as long as a bipolar constellation existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. In this framework of mutual control of the two great powers, the national interests of smaller or weaker countries were not entirely marginalized, but those states enjoyed at least a modest margin of maneuver between the two global competitors, and the UN Charter's principle of sovereign equality was not entirely obsolete or ineffective.

In structural terms, the problem of the national interest is indeed similar to that of the definition and exercise of *national sovereignty*. In order to be compatible with an order of peace, sovereignty must be practiced on the basis of *mutuality* – and not as an absolute right of unrestrained self-assertion at the expense of any and all members of the community of states.³² In the latter case, sovereignty would be *mutually exclusive* and, thus, a recipe for perpetual conflict and anarchy – a state of international relations German terminology aptly describes as *Souveränitätsanarchie* (anarchy among sovereign states).³³

The very system of collective security, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, depends on a non-exclusivist understanding of sovereignty and national interests. The coercive powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter would be meaningless and self-contradictory in a context where each state is authorized to exercise sovereignty in an *absolute* sense, including

the right to wage war solely at its own discretion.³⁴ An approach that focuses on an interpretation of sovereign rights in an *isolated* sense (a mindset which is behind the unilateralist doctrine and strategy of hegemonial powers), is not only incompatible with the UN system of collective security, but will ultimately be *counterproductive* because it challenges the very security of each individual actor it is meant to protect; in this sense, it would also be *irrational* – except in a situation where only one world state exists, a leviathan that may not be an enviable model for mankind, and particularly not in the era of globalization. In view of the multitude of states who are destined to co-exist on a globe with limited resources, a state's national interests can only be advanced if the ever more complex interdependencies of a state's actions – in the economic, social, cultural and military fields – are entered into the strategic and foreign policy calculus.

Conclusion

The emerging international system is *multipolar*, and the resulting balance of power will require that each of the global players “negotiates” its national interests in consultation with all other states competing for power and influence, at the *regional* as well as at the *worldwide* level. Under the conditions of global interdependence, this is the essence of *realpolitik* that alone offers a chance of stable peace³⁵ – as opposed to idealistic posturing and claiming a kind of ideological supremacy, as has become the habit of those who see themselves as arbiter, indeed “the balancer in every region.”³⁶ As Andrew Moravcsik aptly observed, “(t)he unwillingness to accept the multi-polar nature of world politics is a critical intellectual failure,” which global

³² For details see the author's paper: “Sovereignty, Law and Democracy versus Power Politics,” in: *Current Concerns*, No. 34, Zurich, 22 November 2013, Supplement, pp. 18-25.

³³ For a further description of the notion in the context of today's global order – after September 11, 2001, see the author's paper: “The Politics of Global Powers,” in: *The Global Community. Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence*, 2009, Vol. I, pp. 173-201; pp. 182ff.

³⁴ The *jus ad bellum* – the right to wage war – has anyway been abrogated in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, the basic provision of which is incorporated in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.

³⁵ Jeffrey Tayler, *op. cit.*

³⁶ Charles Krauthammer, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

powers that enjoy military supremacy at a particular point in time are inclined to make.³⁷ A *coordinated*, instead of an insular, approach towards the definition and assertion of national interests will be the best antidote to the reemergence of imperial rule of only one power, and it will make it increasingly difficult for such a country to veil its aspirations in the cloak of *universal values*.

Wherever and whenever the *bonum commune* of mankind is at stake, the definition and policy of the national interest should thus be in conformity with the “pursuit of mutual global interests.”³⁸ As Thomas J. Christensen has argued, such a universal, *multilateral* approach is more appropriate than a mere *bilateral*, utilitarian strategy and course of action between individual state partners who pledge “to respect each other’s core interests,”³⁹ but in the process may alienate all the others and risk undermining their own long-term security.

³⁷ Andrew Moravcsik, *The Myth of Unipolarity in a Post-Cold War World: Lessons about Power from the US and Europe*. China and Global Institutions Project, Princeton University, USA, December 2006, at www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/unipolarity.doc. Moravcsik’s remarks refer to the policies of the US administration under George W. Bush.

³⁸ Thomas J. Christensen, *The Need to Pursue Mutual Interests in U.S.-PRC Relations*. Special Report 269. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, April 2011, p. 2.

³⁹ *Loc. cit.*

ARISTOTLE ON MORAL AND ECONOMIC CRISES

Abstract

The 24 centuries that separate us from Aristotle despite the historical world changes that have occurred in the meantime, have by no means tarnished the value of his suggestions for curing the ills that strike human societies.

Keywords: Aristotle, corruption, crisis, judgement, justice, mediety, value, virtue.

The Aristotelian value of mediety has often been transgressed during the last decades by competent authorities in economy and finance. It is due to their actions that the crisis which today plagues our societies has derived. What kind of treatment would Aristotle have suggested in this case? I shall try to explore, among the Stagirite's doctrines, how he would conceive the problems of our human present and what processes he would recommend in order to solve them.

Aristotle's *Politics*, combined with his *Ethics*, furnish us with precise indications on the causes of the calamities that be set mankind in its quasi totality. The disequilibrium between technological evolution, developing exponentially, and the shortfall of education in the field of the humanities and of culture stresses the distinction, of Aristotelian origin, between the mentalities of the slave and the master. Aristotle says that the slave is deprived not of reason¹ but only of the faculty of deliberation, which is acquired thanks to education, to which capital importance is assigned (at the end of the *Politics*)². Consequently, the slave is incapable of setting as the aim of his life what is beyond his immediate needs for his survival, in contrast with the free citizen, who goes forward to the pursuit of fur-

ther aims that presuppose the former aims as the means for their accomplishment. This difference becomes decisive as regards the weaknesses of the slave group, who depend on the representatives of the citizen group, able to activate themselves and to manage money in order to enrich themselves. This allows them at least, to hire the services of the slaves, when to not exploiting them. Nevertheless, the economic development of individuals, reflected in the well-beng of the whole city, has its limits. Here again the value of mediety is to be considered. The continuous economic development of some cities suffers due to the behavior of their public authorities, which act as if they were dominated by a mentality becoming to slaves. More precisely, they are exclusively interested in perspectives of immediate gain and not in longer-term, and no doubt not exclusively financial ones. They do not even think to take advantage of their city's actual wealth, not as a purpose in itself, but as a means of reaching more distant aims, such as real and lasting happiness³, leaving aside a tendency of administrators to seek for quick profile, honors and other personal advantages. Instead, their major care ought to be to respect the city's laws without ever diverging from them⁴. Such respect is a supreme virtue that per-

¹ Cf. *Politics*, a 13, 1260 b 5-6.

² Cf. *ibid*, mainly in books Θ and I .

³ Cf. *ibid*, A 1, 1252 b 29-30.

⁴ Cf. *ibid*, Γ 4, 1277 b 24-26; Γ 13, 1283 a 39-40.

mits, without any impediment, the well-being of all the citizens, the optimal and ultimate purpose of life⁵.

A useful administrator governs virtuously, and in keeping with justice. His or her dominant virtue is prudence equivalent to sagacity, and complementing it, without, of course, being identifiable with it. According to the philosophy of kairicity, prudence consists in foreseeing, in patiently waiting and in acting at the right time. One can now understand the importance of Aristotle's formulation. What follows will be no more than footnotes.

After 1973, China opened herself to foreign investment, and American capital flooded the Far East while the American market was inundated by cheap products that weakened the industry of the New World. China, in fact, still holds the major part of American public shares. The American administration has had recourse to printing paper money without restraint, not directly, but through private institutions, and satisfied banking with a low percentage as taxation, while various owners of capital have recourse to their tax havens. The American example has been followed by the rich countries of the Eurozone, which have invested their capital in countries with suitable production costs, and underdeveloped and weakly governed, Greece as well. She has been deprived of means of development, and, of course, of the right to print paper money, while grants, salaries and gratifications of every kind have dizzily multiplied, with tragic results due to the preference of successive governments for chosen categories of citizens. In December 2000, a law was voted in the United States, whereby banking institutions were allowed to act independently of public administration. I was deeply impressed by a recent statement from a representative of PIMCO, one of the peak American financial organizations: «We have enough speculated about Europe; the moment of truth has come». These predictions of the crisis now hitting our societies eluded the parti-

sans of globalization, who turned a blind eye, and by politicians, who proved to be all for of a voluntary serfdom.

How would Aristotle have evaluated the present crisis? From an etymological viewpoint, the term κρίσις, «crisis», has as its root the verb κείρω, «shear», closely linked to the Homeric adjective καίριος, «decisive», and the noun καιρός, opportune moment. It is, therefore, easily understandable that my interest in the meaning of the term crisis is closely linked to the notion of kairicity, which remains so important to me.

The essential character of every crisis is that it marks a discontinuity within a continuity. Every crisis can be foreseen, but at the beginning is confronted with the indifference, habit. Its evident cause is an exaggerated overrun of Aristotelian mediety, a ὕβρις, «arrogance», which inevitably, entails a τίμησις⁶, «retribution», «chastisement»⁷. No crisis appears invisibly. It is just stated παρακαίρως, «long after». Its general trend is due to its opposition to continuity. Aristotle cleverly compares it to the correspondence of the legs, while the individual is in motion⁸. A lack of correspondence would result from the acceleration of one leg while walking, while the speed of the others remains unchanged, the result being a sliding that, mutandis mutatis, might remind us of Bergson, and the insidious effect on those present, of «something mechanical plated upon something live»⁹. It is a momentary sliding, since it allows the accident to stand up again, fairly promptly¹⁰. All this was al-

⁶ Cf. Polit., E 8, 1308 b 2 and 6.

⁷ Cf. ibid, Z 4, 1319 a 19.

⁸ Cf. Probl. I, 30, and 894 a: κατὰ τὴν ἀντιστοιχίαν τῶν ποδῶν ἢ κίνησις.

⁹ Cf. On walking of animals, 8, 708 a 11 - b 8; 13; 15; 31. Cf. H. Bergson, Le rire, Paris, Alcan, 1900, p. 29; Œuvres, Paris, P.U.F., 1959, p. 403.

¹⁰ On laughter in comedy, cf. Poetics, 4, 1449 a 34: (the ridiculous) αἴσχος καὶ ἀμάρτημα ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν; cf. ibid, Ὅμηρος οὐ ψόγον, ἀλλὰ το γελοῖον δραματοποιήσας. Cf. Homer, Iliad, A 599: ἄσβεστος δ'

⁵ Cf. Eudemian Ethics, A 5, 1216 a 19-27.

ready envisaged by Aristotle in his *Physics*, and I shall not dwell on it. It will be sufficient to refer to the crisis of values and the degradation of the virtues that correspond to them.

Indeed, by using the term χρηματιστική, “financial administration” (*Polit.*, A 3, 1253 b 14; 9, 1257 b 18), instead of the term οἰκονομία used by Plato (*Republic* II, 402 b; VI, 408 a; *Laws* III, 694 c; VII, 819 a-e) and Xenophon (*Oecon.*, 1, 1), Aristotle innovates in order to stress the distinction between the administration of family funds and public ones, finance. Let me recall Protagoras’ motto: πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, “Man is the measure of everything” (*D.-K. Vors.* 16, fr. B 110, II, 263, 3-5), a relativistic device par excellence, where χρῆμα, “means of exchange of goods”, etymologically refers to the impersonal verb χρή, used as an alternative to δεῖ, “it is necessary”. Aristotle’s innovation is that here, instead of an egalitarian distribution of goods, as conceived by Plato in his *Republic* VII, 558 c, he adopts a fiscal model parallel to the judicial one where the egalitarian distribution of goods and charges is completed by a corrective process. His thinking about these issues is scattered throughout the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*. I shall try to gather together in categories, so to be able to draw certain conclusions in about how Aristotle would have confronted a crisis similar to the one we are actually experiencing, mutandis mutatis again.

In principle, a crisis has a duration within a certain time. It sometimes reaches a peak before it fades away, not without having left some wounds. However, such a peak contains several other peaks. In his *Physics*, Aristotle mentions days of crises¹¹, establishing the concept of crises within crises¹².

ἄρ’ ἐνῶρτο γέλως μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν // ὡς ἴδον
 “Ἥφαιστον διὰ σώματα πιπνύοντα («hobbling»)). Cf.
Rhet., Γ 18, 1419 b 2-9: τῷ γελοίῳ πῶς δεῖ χρῆσθαι. Cf.
 Plato, *Cratylus*, 425 a.

¹¹ Cf. *Phys.*, E 6, 230 b 5.

¹² Cf. *ibid.*, Δ 14, 223 b 17: πάντα τῷ χρόνῳ κινεῖται. Cf. *Probl.*, 26, 14, 941 b 35: τρίτη ἡμέρα κρίσιμος; *ibid.*, 10, 3, 859 a 10 and 21: αἱ τῶν ὥρων μεταβολαὶ κρίνουσι

One, can equally ask whether crises of habits and of values that provoke economic crises as the symptoms are not themselves social diseases needing appropriate treatment. It is clear that within each *kairos* there are now various *microkairoi* within the principal crisis.

On the other hand, a κρίσις in the sense of “judgment”, is not only an element expressing a thought; it is the manifestation of the mental function by which one judges the truth or the falsehood of one’s thoughts¹³. Such a κρίσις is essentially a discrimination between different themes¹⁴, but it is also a statement about the affinity of “things of a kind”¹⁵. As judgment, κρίσις presupposes a criterion, which refers, in the case of situations, to a mental measure, but in the case of e.g. sense objects to former experience¹⁶. The same occurs in the case of humors¹⁷ and of what is tangible¹⁸, the tongue being the organ which is criterion of the taste¹⁹. For each isolate case (καθ’ ἑκάστω), experience requires a more general criterion, so that the appropriate²⁰ judgment can be understood and above all be controlled as clear and correct; in other words, as not admitting any contest²¹. As for judgements²² on differential, even of animals, exactitude is to be stated, even if it is not required²³. Discrimination and exactitude are also required when stating the difference between identity and similarity²⁴. In the

τὰς νόσους. Cf. *Hist. animal.* I 19, 553 a 11: αἱ τῶν νόσων κρίσεις.

¹³ Cf. *De anima*, Γ 3, 428 a 3.

¹⁴ Cf. *Nicom. Eth.*, I 2, 1163 a 34: τῶν διαφορομένων.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Cf. *Metaph.*, K 6, 1063 a 3.

¹⁷ Cf. *Nicom. Eth.*, Γ 13, 1118 a 28.

¹⁸ Cf. *Phys.*, Δ 8, 216 b 19.

¹⁹ Cf. *On the parts of animals*, Δ 5, 678 b 8; *Hist. of animals*, Δ 8, 535 a 11

²⁰ Cf. *Nicom. Eth.*, Δ 11, 1126 b 4.

²¹ Cf. *ibid.*, H 2, 1237 b 12.

²² Cf. *Rhet.*, Γ 12, 1417 b 24.

²³ Cf. *Gener. Of animals*, E 2, 781 b 2.

²⁴ Cf. *Polit.*, Δ 11, 1295 a 34; *Phet.* B 23, 1398 b 19.

tonger perspective, under test conditions a judgment represents a distinction between the just and the unjust²⁵.

It is only after this step that justice is established²⁶. Prudence is called for the judge or judges in order not to be misled by inexactitudes and by consciously untrue testimonies²⁷, let alone constantly necessary populist harangues²⁸. Criteria are, therefore constantly necessary, so that the judges shall not be influenced by rhetoric tending to act upon their affectivity²⁹ and to incite them to erroneous judgments able to be naive, if not childish³⁰.

I have sufficiently insisted on the term crisis as designating a mental process, in order to clarify that such a process constitutes an act of controlled choice³¹.

The prudence of the city's administrators, together with kairicity intentionally experienced by them, is the manifestation of a mediety expressed by the temporal adverbs not yet and nevermore. Imprudence, on the other hand, qualifies decisions taken by the authorities too early or too late or even inconsiderately, and entailing for the city calamities unforeseen avoided by spasmodic measures that, in the long run, prove useless. The question then arises: how are these people to be punished, since the legislation they have themselves instituted sanctifies their misdeeds³²? The responsibility will be shifted downwards, to the general from the particular or vice versa³³, according to the interest not of the city³⁴, but of the cul-

prits themselves³⁵. Even the ephores may be classified into the category of culprits, in spite of the fact that they are supposed to oversee prominent cases and decide as κύριοι μεγάλων κρίσεων³⁶.

At this point I have to stress the importance Aristotle gives to the notion of autarky. For him an αὐτάρκης is one who does not need any outside assistance or voluntarily have recourse to it, if able to survive without too much joint action. Such an attitude presupposes the possibility of drawing on excessive resources, but also the exhaustion of any available, income. In other words, the αὐτάρκης, the "self-sufficient" one is he who cares for mediety; that is, the right middle, avoiding either the too much or its excessive opposite³⁷. Autarky is a value to cultivate³⁸; a value of the same importance as that of the perfect good which is self-sufficient³⁹. In the animal kingdom we find species which revel in autarky⁴⁰.

At a human level the issue becomes more complicated. The slave, for instance, deprived of freedom and depending on his master, is also deprived of autarky⁴¹. Aristotle blames Plato for not having sufficiently insisted on this⁴². He even adds that a city deprived of autarky also risks falling into dependence. As regards cities, the underlying postulate here is mediety. By analogy, even kings cannot reign if deprived of autarky⁴³. The same applies

²⁵ Cf. Nicom. Eth., E 6, 1134 a 31; Rhet., B 4, 1377 b 21.

²⁶ Cf. Polit., B 8, 1268 b 5; Δ 16, 1300 b 34; E 6, 1306 a 37.

²⁷ Ibid, B 5, 1263 b 21.

²⁸ Ibid, E 6, 1305 b 35.

²⁹ Cf. Rhet., B 1, 1378 a 21.

³⁰ Cf. Polit., B 9, 1271 a 10.

³¹ Ibid, Z 7, 1321 a 30.

³² Cf. Econ., B 4, 1348 b 13: μηκέτι εἶναι περὶ τῶν προτέρων ἐγκλήματα.

³³ Cf. Polit., Γ 15, 1286, a 27.

³⁴ Ibid, H 8, 1328 b 19: κρίσις περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων.

³⁵ Ibid, Γ 9, 1280 a 11: περὶ αὐτῶν.

³⁶ Ibid., B 9, 1270 b 28 and 29.

³⁷ Cf. Nicom. Eth., A 5, 1097 b 14: τὸ αὐτάρκης; Polit., H 5, 1326 b 30; Rhet., A 7, 1364 a 8.

³⁸ Cf. Polit., B 2, 1261 b 14: αἰρετώτατον τὸ αὐταρκέστερον.

³⁹ Cf. Nicom. Eth., a 5, 1097 b 8; Rhet., A 6, 1362 a 27.

⁴⁰ Cf. Gener. Animal. Δ 8, 776 b 8: ζῷα ἐν αὐτῇ ἐχοντα τὴν τῆς τροφῆς αὐτάρκειαν; ibid, A 1, 732 a 17: τὰ τιμώτερα ζῷα καὶ αὐταρκέστερα τὴν φύσιν εἰσὶν.

⁴¹ Cf. Polit., D 4, 1291 a 10 and 14: τὸ δοῦλον οὐκ αὐτάρκης.

⁴² Cf. Plato, Republic II, 369 b-e.

⁴³ Cf. Nicom. Eth., Θ 12, 1160 b 4.

to anyone who does not live with dignity⁴⁴. Like the Good itself, autarcy contributes to the happiness resulting from a contemplative life⁴⁵. Man needs an autarcy of life⁴⁶ which is for the virtuous citizen an aim in itself and indeed the best one⁴⁷. The autarcy of possessing⁴⁸ is therefore a substitute for natural autarcy⁴⁹. In any case, human life remains the best and the most perfect one, provided it is crowned by autarcy⁵⁰. For this reason, in any choice or selection, preference goes to whoever displays the greatest autarcy⁵¹.

As for the wise man, the latter meets his needs to the highest degree, precisely thanks to his wisdom, which allows him to revel his happiness and beatitude⁵². An ascending hierarchy of human autarcies is to be noticed here. A single person may be self-sufficient, but his family has to be more so, and still more the city⁵³. The underlying postulate of mediety, is once more again applied here. In order to remain self-sufficient and prosperous, the city should not see its population at once grow excessively, due to a rush of rural populations towards urban centers or to a flood of metrics, but should develop gradually and regularly, so that it does not exceed at any time a certain limit clearly and prudently defined in advance. The city's institution has to provide the εὖ ζῆν "the well-being" of the citizens⁵⁴ and consequently to be itself strong⁵⁵ from

the virtue of the inhabitants⁵⁶. In case of default, it will lose of its autarcy. The city of Athens developed thanks to its miniature colonial and imperialist "alliances", through which it appropriated the resources of its "allies". Alexander the Great, Aristotle's pupil, on the other hand, creatively propagated Hellenism and its culture, while destroying Greece itself, in the view of the German historian Droysen⁵⁷. Though exaggerated, this indigent contains a nucleus of truth.

If citizen virtue has as its result the well-being of the city, citizen corruptibility, open or hidden, contributes to its weakness. Aristotle seems to define corruption as entailing death⁵⁸ and as a calamity⁵⁹ nurtured by cupidity, generally at the expense of the community⁶⁰ and mediated by bribery⁶¹ or merely by accepting a tip, which is still a kind of injustice towards the city. The most numerous and the most disposed to succumb to such a temptation are those who occupy, even temporarily, a public position; for example, decision makers⁶² or those whose opinion is taken seriously, such as doctors⁶³ or other specialists⁶⁴. Particularly, vulnerable to bribery are the people in long-term positions⁶⁵. Cupidity is accompanied by avidity. "The appetite of pleasure is greedy for it"⁶⁶, declares the founder of the Lyceum, who condemns avidity of any kind,

⁵⁵ Ibid, H 1, 1323 b 34.

⁵⁶ Ibid, H 1, 1323 b 34.

⁵⁷ Cf. H. G. Dreusen, Alexander der Große, 1833.

⁵⁸ Cf. Probl. 10, 47, and 865 b 8: τὸ διαφθαρτικόν... θανατηφόρον.

⁵⁹ Cf. Metaph, Θ 9, 1051 a 21.

⁶⁰ Cf. Polit., Δ 12, 1297 a 11; E 3, 1302 b 9; Nicom. Eth., I 6, 1167 b 11.

⁶¹ Ibid, Θ 16, 1163 b 11; fr. 374, 1540 b 2.

⁶² Cf. Rhet., A 12, 1372 a 34.

⁶³ Cf. Polit., Γ 16, 1287 a 30: διαφθεῖρουν τοὺς ἰατροὺς διὰ κέρδος.

⁶⁴ Cf. Polit., Γ 16, 1287 a 30: διαφθεῖρουν τοὺς ἰατροὺς διὰ κέρδος.

⁶⁵ Ibid, E 8, 1308 b 14: οἱ ἐν πολυχρονίοις ἀρχαῖς.

⁶⁶ Cf. Nicom. Eth., Γ 15, 1119 b 20: ἀπληστος ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις.

⁴⁴ Cf. Polit., A 8, 1256 b 4: ἐλλείπων πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκης εἶναι.

⁴⁵ Cf. Nicom. Eth., A 5, 1097 b 7: θεωρητικὸς βίος.

⁴⁶ Cf. Rhet., A 5, 1360 b 15; Polit., Γ 1, 1379 b 21: αὐτάρκειαν βίου.

⁴⁷ Ibid, A 2, 1252 a 1: τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον.

⁴⁸ Ibid, A 8, 1256 b 32: αὐτάρκεια κτήσεως.

⁴⁹ Ibid, A 9, 1257 a 30: ἀναπλήρωσις τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας.

⁵⁰ Ibid, Γ 9, 1280 b 34; 1281 a 1.

⁵¹ Ibid, B 2, 1261 b 14: τὸ ἐπαρκέστατον.

⁵² Cf. Nicom. Eth., H 12, 1244 d 3-6; 19, 1969 b 3-5; K 7; 1573 b 1.

⁵³ Cf. Polit., Δ 2, 1253 a 23; B 2, 1261 b 11.

⁵⁴ Ibid, B 2, 1261 a 25; Γ 6, 1278 b 16; 9, 1280 a 31 and b 30.

such as the insatiability of human indolence⁶⁷ and of desire⁶⁸, the desire to experience at any cost a voluptuous life of debauch, a life qualified by imprudence and lack of moderation, typical of those who flaunt their status of wealthy parvenus or behave thus according to circumstances⁶⁹, especially dignitaries in long-term positions⁷⁰.

Insatiability and corruption “for profit” are excesses in the exercise of power, ὑβρεις, specific outrages which would normally entail τίσεις, “chastisement”, “payment”. The term τίσις suggests, whether etymologically or not, the other terms, τίμημα, “price”, due, τιμή, “price”, but also “honour”, and τιμωρία, “punishment”⁷¹. By the term τίμημα Aristotle also means “profit”, “increment-value”, “interest”⁷². However the same term applies also to special contributions such as the poll tax (haraç in Turkish), exacted by the Ottoman administration from non-Muslims, which in today’s Greek designates a supplementary tax supposedly temporary, but, in fact, permanently incorporated into the tax system.

In the Politics, unlike those deprived of fortune⁷³, those who are wealthy and fortunate must pay a tribute⁷⁴ to the city in the form of a donation⁷⁵ scaled to their taxable wealth in each case⁷⁶. It is from those with most wealth – (unless they deliberately fail to declare...) that the dignitaries of the city are to be notably side by side with members of illustrious families and notably virtuous citi-

zens⁷⁷. Nevertheless, possible modification of the rate of taxes to pay may entail trouble and changes to a city’s constitution⁷⁸.

A similar danger had been foreseen by the Pythagorean thinker Damon of Oa, who predicted that moving away from traditional musical laws could entail constitutional changes. During his trial before the Athenian Areopagus in 443 B.C., he defended his views, but was sentenced to exile. His teaching was venerated by Plato⁷⁹ and, to some degree, by Aristotle⁸⁰.

Let us stay with Aristotelian concepts of crises of various kinds in order to study his criticism of Plato’s, egalitarian conception of the tax burden on the citizens of his Republic. As we have seen, Aristotle in his Politics contrasts equality and unfair levelling. This distinction equates to his distinction between the two levels of juridical order: distributive law, as complemented by corrective justice. Earlier, in the Topics⁸¹, it is said of legislation, as in Metaphysics of the being⁸², that justice can be understood in various ways (πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον), meaning that various legislations are conceivable. Thus, legislation is envisaged in two stages: isonomy, and adaptation of general rules to particular data, so that during the application of justice by the judges no injustice shall be committed. For him, justice is not alien to values and virtues: values such as the beautiful⁸³; and all virtues⁸⁴.

⁶⁷ Cf. Polit., B 7, 1267 b 2.

⁶⁸ Ibid, A 9, 1257 b 1: ἀπληστία τῆς εὐχῆς.

⁶⁹ Cf. supra, n. 60.

⁷⁰ Cf. supra, n. 65.

⁷¹ Cf. the latin timor, «fear».

⁷² Cf. Polit., E 6, 1306 b 9: τὸ τεχθέν (τόκος).

⁷³ Ibid, Γ 12, 1253 a 11.

⁷⁴ Ibid, Δ 13, 1297 a 20: οἱ φέροντες τίμημα.

⁷⁵ Ibid, Δ 15, 1300 a 10.

⁷⁶ Ibid, B 7, 1266 b 23; Γ 5, 1278 a 23; Δ 4, 1291 b 3; E 7, 1307 a 28.

⁷⁷ Ibid, Δ 15, 1300 a 10; Nicom. Eth., Θ 12, 1160 a 33: ἡ ἀποτιμημάτων μεγάλων εἰσὶν, (ἀλλά) ἴσοι πάντες ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τιμήματι.

⁷⁸ Cf. Polit., E 8, 1308 a 35.

⁷⁹ Cf. H. Ryffel, Μεταβολὴ πολιτειῶν. Der Wandel der Staatsverfassungen, Noctes Romanae (Bern), 1949/2, pp. 23-38.

⁸⁰ Cf. Polit., Δ 3, 1290 a 19 ff.; Θ 5, 1340 b 7 ff.

⁸¹ Cf. Topics, A 15, 1000 b 30; Θ 3, 108 b 10.

⁸² Cf. Motaph., Γ 2, 1003 a 32; K 3, 1060 b 32; K 8, 1064 b 15.

⁸³ Cf. Eud. Eth., A 1, 1214 a 5: κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον; Polit., Δ 5, 1291 a 41: καλῶς καὶ δικαίως.

⁸⁴ Cf. Nicom. Eth., E 15, 1138 a 5: προστάπτοντα κατὰ πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς.

It is, isonomy that prevails in general⁸⁵. The whole of the Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics is an analysis of justice. Its two complementary aspects, distributive and corrective justice, distinct from each other, are treated separately; and then, in relation to each other. Distributive justice is governed by the mathematical ratio 4:3⁸⁶ whereas the harmonic ratio 3:2 is not mentioned, being obviously incompatible with the issue examined⁸⁷. Corrective justice is alternatively designated as reparative justice⁸⁸. Egalitarian distribution presupposes, according to Aristotle, the etymology of δίκαιον, “law”, “lawfulness”, from the adverb δίχα, “separately”, “split in two”⁸⁹.

Justice is animated by a judge⁹⁰ who, in addition, is a τιμητής, a kind of value⁹¹, distinguishing between natural and manmade law⁹². The main stem of justice speaks into an indefinite number of branches, to deal with which would take me beyond the scope of the present essay.

Returning now over the problem of contemporary global economic crisis, as Aristotle would, I think, have viewed it⁹³, we observe financial colossi which, through galloping technology, execute the orders of an economic oligarchy. Hence the globalization in which most of us, having adopted the Stouc notion of cosmopoliticism, had warily invested our hopes, today saturates our eyes and ears while stiffing our voices. These colossi however, have feet of clay. One of them has only to collapse, and all the others tremble and threaten to collapse in turn. Such a hypertsophisticated a system could not have been foreseen by Aristotle in

dreams⁹⁴ his wildest. He considers the οἰκονόμος as the administrator of the benefits of Nature to humankind⁹⁵ and promotes him to the dignity of a governor⁹⁶ bound to be ἀγαθός, “good” and “virtuous” as Nature herself who, on principle, eliminates, disperses and spoils nothing⁹⁷. Man is not only a political⁹⁸, but an economic, social⁹⁹, even a combinatory¹⁰⁰ animal. This means that he is able to organize his thought and behavior in keeping conformingly with his innate sense of the just and the unjust¹⁰¹. He is aware in advance since he deliberates at leisure if he is committing an injustice, and that he will be charged as responsible for his action. The problem is then to decide which authority will charge him with it in due time (allusion to the notion of kairicity).

Aristotle does not reject, the term economic. He attributes it to humans as one of the principal characteristics of their life, contemplative or active, and “one of the most precious faculties of their spirit”¹⁰² provided, of course, that they employ it wisely, honestly and, above all, prudently, therefore in time¹⁰³ (still an allusion to the notion of kairicity). However, economy as an activity, is limited to the individual and the family¹⁰⁴, though one can distinguish diverse species of economies, – the royal, satrapic, private and several others¹⁰⁵. In the case of economic affairs of the city, a particular factor necessarily intervenes: chrematistics, the art of finance that deals with providing and managing the city’s income¹⁰⁶. Chrematistics develops methods of prac-

⁸⁵ Ibid, E 2, 1129 a 34; E 6, 1131 a 13; Polit., Γ 9, 1980 a 11; Γ 9, 1282 b 17; Great. Eth., a, 1193 b 19: τὸ δίκαιον πρὸς τὸν ἑτερόν ἐστι τὸ ἴσον.

⁸⁶ Cf. Nicom. Eth., E 7, 1132 a 2 and 30.

⁸⁷ Cf. De anima, A 3, 406 b 29.

⁸⁸ Cf. Nicom. Eth., E 2, 1132 a 18; E 5, 1135 a 1-9.

⁸⁹ Ibid, E 2, 1132 a 32; b 32.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Cf. Rhet. Alex., 5, 1427 b 6.

⁹² Cf. Nicom. Eth., Θ 11, 1161 a 13: πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον.

⁹³ Ibid, E 10, 1134 b 18 ff.

⁹⁴ Cf. Polit., A 10, 1058 a 25 ff; Γ 11, 1282 a 21.

⁹⁵ Ibid, A 10, 1258 a 31 ff.

⁹⁶ Cf. Gener. Of anim., B 6, 744 b 16.

⁹⁷ Cf. Polit., A 2, 1253 a 22.

⁹⁸ Cf. Eud. Eth., H 10, 1242 a 22.

⁹⁹ Ibid, H 10, 1242 a 26.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Nicom. Eth., Θ 14, 1162 a 17.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Polit., A 2, 1253 a 16.

¹⁰² Cf. Nicom. Eth., a 1, 1094 b 3.

¹⁰³ Ibid, A 8, 1208 b 13.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Polit., A 3, 1253 b 8; A 12, 1259 a 37; Γ 14, 1285 b 32.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Econ., B 1245 b 12 and 19-28.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Polit., An 8, 1256 a 15.

tical organization, and its¹⁰⁷ definition and activities are given in the Politics¹⁰⁸.

Χρήμα, “money”, is understood in that case, as a common and stable means of exchanging goods¹⁰⁹ or services. Money passes either from one person to another¹¹⁰ or from individuals to the city funds. In the second case the city’s money is held sacred. This does not mean that money is never siphoned off from it for reasons of personal interest¹¹¹. The city’s money is regularly allocated after a budget, or exceptionally, to cover unforeseen¹¹² expenses. Those who administer the finances are termed φιλοχρήματοι, “money-lovers”¹¹³, with all that this term implies about manipulation. Finally, Aristotle mentions two devices that are now common practice. One is, the arbitrary increase of money in circulation. This dates from the Bretton Woods Treaty¹¹⁴, when the Gold standard was abandoned. We have recently been informed that the American administration will in the near future suspend printing of paper money. The other is the devaluation of money in circulation, due to its unconsidered increase and to the indirect revaluation, arbitrary too, of some other money, in this case the Chinese yuan¹¹⁵. The first possibility is tightly linked to its correlative, and it obviously entails the second. Aristotle already had these possibilities in mind. For him, on these issues, the prytaneis¹¹⁶ and the eponymous archon¹¹⁷ are supposed to be aware of their responsibilities and will have to decide.

Hence, the imperative questions are, how to prevent the embezzlement of public money¹¹⁸ or, if

not prevented in time (kairicity again!), how to punish it.

How can the pullers¹¹⁹ or their appointed mouthpieces accumulate rights and political advantages¹²⁰? On this point the city’s legislation admits of several corrections, in the form of complementary clauses¹²¹. The city should in such cases adopt dispositions that would exclude equity or clemency, as described in the Nicomachean Ethics¹²², since this would be tantamount to perjury on part of high dignitaries¹²³. Corruption is frequently organized in a criminal manner, with hierarchies and networks that hide from view, where the organizing minds plan undisturbed. Aristotle could not have imagined the development of the computer, where, with a single click, an immense sum of money can be transferred to some tax haven. From now on, equity and indulgence have no more part to play in justice, which will have to become inflexible. As globalization, by means of technology, has opened the way to the escape of capital, it will itself be obliged to restore that capital, albeit by severe measures against avoiders, and their families. It will suffice for alliances of interests to be stopped.

One hears continuous moans about horizontal cuts of salaries and pensions. Here again Aristotle offers a solution that could be adopted by administrative authorities. Instead of suppressing horizontal cuts, corrective law and other measures can be called in, to lighten the burden of victims of serious injustice.

Matandis mutatis, this would also apply to those who would have to pay a contribution (είσφορὰ) or a supplementary tax (τέλος). Aristotle envisages such payments¹²⁴, but, at the same time,

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Eudem. Eth., A 4, 1215 a 31: χρηματιστικά τέχνη.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Polit., an 8, 1256 a 1; an 11, 1259 b 36.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Nicom. Eth., Δ 11, 1119 b 26: χρήματα λέγονται ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματος μετρεῖται.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Cf. Eudem. Eth., Γ 4, 1231 b 37: ἱερά.

¹¹² Ibid: κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

¹¹³ Cf. Polit., E 12, 1316 a 40.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, Γ 15, 1286 β 15; Nicom. Eth., Θ 14, 1163 b 8.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Polit., a 9, 1257 b 34.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Constit. Of the Athenians, 394, 1543 b 11.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 381, 1511 b 20.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Nicom. Eth., H 13, 1153 a 18.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, Γ 1, 1275 a 21; b 29; Z 1, 1317 a 35; Z 8, 1321 b 21.

¹²⁰ Cf. Polit., Γ 12, 1282 b 29: πλεονεξία τις τῶν πολιτικῶν δικαίων τοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν.

¹²¹ Ibid, Γ 1, 1275 a 21; b 29; Z 1, 1317 a 35; Z 8, 1321 b 21.

¹²² Ibid, E 10, 1137 a 32 ff.

¹²³ Cf. Rhet., A 14, 1375 a 9: πολλὰ ἀνήρηκε δίκαια ἢ ὑπερβέβηκεν, οἷον ὄρκους.

¹²⁴ Cf. Polit., E 11, 1313 b 20.

envisages measures of relief for those who temporarily cannot meet their obligations¹²⁵.

In addition to a minimal symbolic per capita, contribution of¹²⁶, a farthing¹²⁷ – each of Aristotle's citizens is asked to pay a sum he can afford, given his life standards (the famous indexes), individual and family needs, state of health, and so on, and to contribute objects of value¹²⁸ and even, voluntarily, his whole fortune¹²⁹, – at any rate, whatever he is willing to give¹³⁰. Admittedly those who have neglected to pay their due will remain on tenterhooks, for their debt will always pursue them¹³¹. The same goes for those who neglect to retribute illegally exported money and exposed by informers. They will all know that they face a punishment in proportion to their misdeed¹³². This is what, for Aristotle, "saves the cities"¹³³; at least, those cities whose governments are not implicated in circles' of corruption. They are mainly those whose judiciary authorities do not obstruct the processes of law by pretending a backlog of court cases and by expressing indignation for very substantial cuts in their salaries, during a period of economic crisis. They will be required to judge immediately, without any delays and without fear or favor. The status of the Aristotelian "perfect city" presupposes virtuous citizens and sanctions against corruption¹³⁴ until it is wiped out completely thanks to an administration entrusted to virtuous citizens whose life is contemplative to the core.

It would be easy for me to prolong this argumentation ad infinitum. Instead, I shall end by affirming that the twenty four centuries which se-

parate us from Aristotle, despite all important historical changes that have since occurred in human society, have in no way tarnished the value of his thoughts, and that his philosophy continues to be topical; so much so, that it gives us, some useful hints about how to use of the means and measures he proposes so as to cure the ills of human societies. We hope of course, that these means and measures will transform for the best a globalization that Aristotle had not foreseen. To him we can safely trust our aspirations our aspirations for a better future for humankind.

¹²⁵ Ibid, B 9, 1271, 37: μή δυνάμενος τὸ τέλος... φέρειν.

¹²⁶ Ibid, Γ 9, 1280 a 20.

¹²⁷ Ibid, B 10, 1272 a 14: εἰσενεγκέναι μίαν μνᾶν.

¹²⁸ Cf. Eudem. Eth., H 10, 1242 b 13: εἰσφέρειν ἀργύριον.

¹²⁹ Cf. Polit., B 9, 1271 b 13: εἰσενεγκέναι τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν.

¹³⁰ Ibid, E 11, 1313 b 27: ὅσων εἰσηγήσαι ἕκαστος; H 10, 1330 a 4-7.

¹³¹ Cf. Constits des Athémiens, 401, 1540 a 12.

¹³² Cf. Neom. Eth., Γ 11, 1117 a 14; E 8, 1131 b 21 and 23; H 5, 1163 a 1; Θ 2, 1255, b 33: ἀντιτεπονθώς.

¹³³ Cf. Polit., B 2, 1261 a 30: σώζει τὰς πόλεις.

¹³⁴ Ibid., Δ 2, 1289 b 15: ἀρίστη πολιτεία.

WISDOM AND JUSTICE FROM A TRADITIONAL, ARTISANAL TOWARDS AN APPLIED SCIENTIFIC JUSTICE

Abstract

Wisdom in its different forms is strongly related to the harmonic use of the different types of intelligence. Wisdom we can observe even on the micro-level of the organism. On the community-macro level the need and the use of wisdom is more clearly present. Nevertheless the wisdom on the micro level is a very interesting heuristic tool too as a metaphor for better understanding the function, use and challenges of wisdom at the community level. Traditionally Justice is an important domain of application of wisdom. Today this is even more true than ever. The implications for surpassing the artisanal in favour of an Applied Scientific Justice are here really challenging.

Keywords: law, wisdom, intelligence, justice, pedagogy, metaphor, enzymes, applied scientific justice, justice-audit, macro auto-immunity, proteolytic actors, dyssocials.

Introduction

That law and in particular justice requires a great deal of wisdom is even legendary. We think of the biblical Solomon and his wisdom in administering justice. However, it is important today that we can make this so vital "**wisdom**" scientifically more concrete and underpinned. This means that we can make the theme of wisdom in the jurisprudence and in first place in the applied jurisprudence debatable, concrete and operational.

How can this happen? How can this be addressed? We must keep in mind that when we talk about **wisdom**, we envision **intelligence**, **the multidimensionality** of the intelligence and finally **harmony** between the many forms of intelligence mutually but also **harmony** concerning and in the context and situation of the participants in question. In what follows we will try to clarify and concretize this.

1. The Framework for Applied Scientific Justice

1.1 The Challenges of Justice

We know there have been many innocents sentenced to death. We know many were found to be innocent after a lifetime prison. Even on a smaller scale many things are going wrong. Structurally, in justice a lot seems to be not working correctly. It is relevant to examine more closely these structural aspects to understand better why this derailment of the judicial applications happen. It is crucial to structurally dam this derailment. Therefore we need to have an eye for the fundamental function and objectives of law in general and the criminal law in particular. We can refer here to the work of Zupancic, Hobbes, Kelsen, Beccaria, Roman law, Freud, Ranulf, Rieder, Van den Wyngaert, etc.

1.2 The Core Task of Justice

The core task of justice concerns peaceful conflict resolution. The alternative is "the law of the jungle: **Bellum omnium contra omnes** or the struggle of all against all". Culture development, progress, prosperity, creativity, etc. require a peaceful conflict resolution. When we are conscious that this is the core task and the objective of justice,

this will have some important consequences for its applications. This includes first of all "**equality**" of all parties. The law should therefore prohibit that one party dominates physically the other party. In criminal law, this is a delicate question. One of the parties is the community that monopolises the physical violence. The community as a party in a conflict within a democracy – this in opposition to a party in a dictatorship - has to renounce, to abstain certainly in a conflict in criminal law, that right to violence. This means that both parties are equals in the non-use of physical violence.

This is why in justice and more specifically in criminal matters the principle of Roman law is so important: "**Nemo contra se prodere tenetur**" or nobody can be physically compelled to testify against himself. In the opposite case, all legality disappears. ("clearly, if the purpose of law is to prevent self-help, i.e. the resort to physical prevalence as a means of winning in the conflict, then self-help within the procedure effectively subverts the whole idea": Zupancic Prof criminal law, member constitutional court, p47).

A form of violence in favour of one party happens for instance, when a judge supervising and judging a conflict resolution, takes a side and for example takes over the job of the Public Prosecution and improvises, generates and creates hypotheses, arguments (burden of proof and burden of allegation) in its stead. In such a situation, the equality between the parties disappears completely and instead of justice, injustice is generated, i.e. justice ceases to exist. To illustrate such injustice, we can refer here to a call from a public prosecutor (Attorney General), who admitted the shortcomings of the prosecutor, but was still advising the judges to be creative and to create the necessary motivations. Indeed, it is the prosecuting party, and not the judge or the accused who has the burden of proof. The burden of proof is indivisible: the prosecuting party has both positive proof of the facts, as the negative supply evidence of the justification and

blame grounds for exclusion. (Van den Wyngaert C. Strafrecht 2004 deel2 p1000).

Above-mentioned form of violence is a practice that prevails especially in criminal law and undermines criminal law in its essence. The reason why innocent people are so often mistakenly condemned can be explained in the first place by this. This form of violence, especially in criminal law, is reinforced by (1) the style used in criminal law and (2) by the overrunning of dyssocials in social pyramid hierarchies. We want to discuss these two in short.

1.3 The Style Used in Criminal Law

Concerning the style uses in criminal law, we cite Zupancic (p 36 § 3, § 4 and § 5), who differentiates two styles: the first is the **inquisitorial style** and the second is the **inductive pragmatic style**. As to the first style, which is typical for the European continent, he states: "... The inquisitorial model in a criminal procedure is pretentious, arrogant and authoritarian. It is pretentious because just like the persecutions of the "Holy Inquisition" it explicitly starts from the premise that "human rules are manifestations of the Divine Will and that human justice can know the whole truth." It is arrogant, because it assumes that, besides possessing the actual power, it also has the moral permission to decide on grounds of what seems true and fair to it. Moreover, it is authoritarian, because on the basis of its pretension and arrogance, it has found a rationalization for power usurpation as humans over other human beings".

1.4 Proliferation of Dyssocials in the Social Pyramid Hierarchies

The Judicial Organisation itself is not only a social pyramid hierarchy, also most prosecuted are indicted by officials from social pyramid structures. Hence it is quite crucial to understand the role, function and the harmful impact of dyssocials, particularly in social pyramid hierarchies. For explanation we want to quote following description of dyssocials:

- In all cultures, historical or contemporary, we see that in their myths much attention is paid to addressing and treating hypocrites or dys-socials. We find that back in the myths and stories of Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, Rome, in Indo-European, American Indians, Islamic, Hebraic, Christian cultures, etc. (cfr. F. Vandamme 2013).
- This illustrates how important it was in ancient times, as well as in the present world, to handle, to address, hypocrites or dys-socials. In other words, it is vital to find a dynamic harmony between cooperative behavior and protective, defensive behavior. Both types of behavior are vital for survival. Wisdom is largely characterized by this harmonious balance between both. Anyway, handling hypocrites / dys-socials is an ultimate challenge of and characterizing a certain level of wisdom. Why is this the case? The answer is simple. Hypocrites, also called dys-socials, are persons (sometimes groups), who simulate very good-naturedly, friendly, social behavior. This friendly social behavior is a cover for attempts to destroy other actors, groups or even cultures, their ideals, goals...
- Hypocrites pretend to promote the ideals of others, but in reality they are trying in a hidden way to make impossible these goals or even destroy their structures. They tell us they want to promote peace (e.g.), they actually do their utmost to promote war, etc. Therefore, these dys-socials or hypocrites, can technically be called "dys-socials", referring to the Greek term "dys" which means "difficult". They are indeed "difficult-social people". It is therefore vital to prevent that cooperation is exploited or abused by dys-socials or hypocrites.

1.5 Provisional Conclusions

- The core of law and justice and its applications consists of conflict resolution without using any form of violence.
- The major challenge is the substitution of the inquisitorial style in justice by an applied scientific style based on empirical research, experiments, pragmatically and hypothetical deductive approaches in view of more efficient conflict resolution in a dynamic harmonic perspective.

tific style based on empirical research, experiments, pragmatically and hypothetical deductive approaches in view of more efficient conflict resolution in a dynamic harmonic perspective.

- In this perspective too it is functionally needed in all organizations and particularly in those with social pyramid hierarchies, such as justice, army, universities, administrations etc., to discover and recognize dys-socials in an early stage, in order to help them to conform and above all in order to protect their victims (usually the most creative and unselfishly people in these organizations) against bullying.
- Here we can and should at least conclude that the use and application of legal judicial rulings and prosecutions should be carefully and thoughtfully handled with. Anyway, it is not acceptable to "deify"(sub and consider these forensic prosecutions and decisions a priori as being the "truth." The intent of law is to search for and find peaceful solutions to conflicts. The solutions can - like all that is human - be totally wrong...Therefore, we must be careful, especially on the basis of the current perverted inquisitorial style of the criminal courts, to attribute moral, ethical, social, etc. qualifications to people and their actions.
- In the 18th - 19th century's anti substantive, anti-authoritarian thinking's, social liberalism, etc. have played a pioneering role in the development of a progressive constitution in which the separation of church and state came forward. In the 21st century, all progressive, democratic and forward thinking individuals and organizations should help in the elaboration and implementation of a modern applied scientific judiciary and legal system, leaning upon a hypothetical deductive method with a broad empirical inductive basis. Continuing the support of and the collaboration with a since long-outdated justice tradition that follows the inquisitorial type, must stop.

- This development of justice in the direction of an applied hypothetical deductive scientific method is not only possible, necessary, but is even inevitable, both nationally and internationally, given the increasing complexity of peaceful conflict resolution and the doomsday scenarios that crop up when scientifically supported alternatives fail.

2. The Micro and Macro Level of Organization: Micro the Organic, Macro the Social

2.1 The Challenges of the Micro-Organization: an Organism

Central here is the fight against microbes and viruses. Equally important, however, is the fight against **dysplasia and in particular** the fight against tumors. Dysplasia refers etymologically to "δυσ" = wrong (bad) and "πλασία": formation. This means in other words difficult, "bad" cell formation. Certain cells become "bad cell". These are targeting, causing destruction of the organism, in particular, they may give rise to the formation of tumours, with wild growth, chaos and destruction: the destruction of the organism. The process called "dysplasia" is a process in which standard cells are transformed into cells that go their own way: even go in the destruction of the organization. Thereby they disguise as ideal cells... In these battles, the key challenges are how to prevent degeneration, derailment by **autoimmunity: the destruction of the organism by its own defense?** How to avoid, redirect dysplasia? Which strategies to develop to this purpose?

2.2 The Challenge of the Macro-Organization: a Society

On the level of society we have the same problems. We need to defense society against internal and external attacks. The social immunity system is here crucial too. The danger, however, of autoimmunity is as big. So we have to make the following remarks:

1. Fight against lawbreakers, exploiters, against dysplasia: how to avoid individuals from degenerating into hypocrites, dyssocials. This battle is inter alia organized by law, judicial system and their manpower (police, clerks...).
2. How to avoid autoimmunity of and through the legal system, with its jurisdiction, jurisprudence, administration of justice, services and employees. Autoimmunity (e.g. by dictators, inquisition, etc.) destroys the social organization, the society.
3. The legal system and the administration of justice is an important way to maintain and improve the social organization, but through autoimmunity it can also damage the social organization. Hobbes' "bellum omnium contra omnes", may occur in different way. First, by the actions of lawbreakers, individuals and groups who destroy and block the law organization. But as much it can happen through autoimmunity: the own defense that destroys the own social structure, causing itself the degeneration of its own legal system, working so blinded that it destroys the social organization and might even create a "bellum omnium contra omnes". In the fight against autoimmunity of the legal system and the administration of justice it is important to study attentively the role of dysplasia/dyssocials (hypocrites) in the organization, control, validation and evaluation of the legal system, the judiciary and their officials.

3. Intervening and Combating Attacks on the Micro- and Macro-Organization

3.1 The Challenge

Intervening and combating attacks and attackers on the micro as well as at the macro level can be done in many different ways. However in this defensive, we must also take into account, inter alia, the side effects and the so-called "collateral damages: or the unintended and sometimes unexpected incurred damages". These are sometimes worse than the ailment. Not only the enemy is fought, at best eliminated, but there is always the danger that many or small parts of the own organism (cfr. own society at a macro level) are temporary or permanently damaged or maimed. Even worse is that the immune system or in other words, the defense system itself is transformed, and instead of defending

the own organism (the society at the macro level), it is attacking it. This is the so well-known but dangerous phenomenon of auto-immunity. The defense becomes in its turn oppressor that disrupts, damages, destroys partially or totally its own entire organism / society.

From this perspective, we can view the general strategies on both the macro and the micro level, with their collateral side effects and risks.

In this overview, it is really important to have an eye not only for the structural conditions and levers to dysplasia. It may be just as crucial and even more important to have an eye for the conditions and levers for EUPLASIA. By this we mean the ability to transform hypocrites, dyssocials: destructive cells (on a macro-level individuals or groups) into constructive, useful cells... The fact is that it seems to be more promising to focus on transformation, on reform of the cells (tumor cells), individuals (dyssocials) and / or groups, instead of focusing on destructing them. The risk of derailment is very high, too high.

3.2 Contemporary Strategies at Micro Level to Combating and Correcting Attackers (harmful bacteria, viruses, tumor cells...)

We will in the first instance concentrate our attention on the tumour cells. We can repeat approximately the same concerning the control of bacteria, viruses, whereby the same problems arise.

The steps made to combat tumors and other attackers at the micro level are evident, even though some solutions have required a lot of research, experimentation and testing. Of course we have "surgery": cutting out the tumor (1), preferably before it enters the stage of metastasis production (metastasis: dissemination of tumor cells throughout the whole organism). The following solutions were radiotherapy and chemotherapy. The first radiotherapy (2) was realized in 1896, more exactly a year after the discovery of X-rays by Roentgen (Dewaele 2015: 10). Another type of approach is chemotherapy (3). This approach is much more recent and has arisen as a result of an yperite

disaster during WWII in Bari (Dewaele 2015: 11). Naturally here many variations and combinations exist. The great problem of course, are the side effects and the risk of autoimmunity. A fourth type involves the use of inhibitors (type INIB and type UMAB). INIBs are small molecules that penetrate through the membranes of the cells and block within these cells further development. "UMAB" are large molecules that act on the tumor cell from the outside and block them very selectively. A fifth way is acting on the surroundings of the tumor cells, so that metastases can be blocked. For example, we can think of shutting off the supply of nutrients and oxygen to the tumor cells, which are able to develop very efficiently new blood vessels to feed them. Here there are many interesting interventions possible.

One of the crucial problems in combating tumors is the phenomenon that tumors have a very dynamic ability to disguise themselves, whereby the immune system becomes unable to recognize the tumors that must be fought /controlled. This happens rather frequently, hence the term **dysplasia** (dyssocial at the level of the social organization). What is more tumours have different methods to hide, to cover themselves. Methods are being developed to inhibit, to break through this disguise. This is a major breakthrough in the fight against cancer and tumors. However, it should be recognized that these techniques and methods have as side effect that they can result in auto-immunity, in other words, that also the own non-tumour cells can be attacked. Of course, attempts can and will be made at the different approaches against tumours, always to have an eye on 1) the side-effects, 2) the risk of auto-immunity, and finally 3) the risk of resistance against the applied products and methods.

3.3 Euplasia at the Micro Level of the Organism.

3.3.1 Breaking through the Disguises of the Tumour Cells.

With the approach of fighting the disguises of the tumor cells, we are actually right in the chal-

lence of **Euplasia**. With dysplasia we have the phenomenon that normal cell formation leads to transformation into cells that are destructive to the harmonious development of the organism. With euplasia (eu (Greek) = good; plasia (Greek): cell formation), we have the process of transformation of bad / harmful functioning cells in the organism into good / useful functioning cells. The major problem with euplasia is the problem of resistance, when the tumour cells become immune to the transformation processes. What is worse, the tumour cells can form new disguises to achieve their destructive work in the organism yet more efficiently.

3.3.2 A next step, but for now still a wishful dream concerning tumours, is not only breaking through the disguises of the tumor cells so that they could be easily destroyed by the immune system. Even better is the alternative wherein the tumor cell could be transformed into a normally functioning cell, which could be positively engaged in the target organism. Obviously, this is also a very vital step in the macro-social approach of dysplasia and euplasia.

4. Macro Applied Scientific Approach to Justice and Law system

4.1 The Challenge

As in the organism, we have within society the important task and duty to create harmony that enables development, prosperity, and welfare of and in society. Fighting the forces and influences that threaten society-organization and lead to Hobbes' nightmare of "Bellum omnium contra omnes": war of all against all, or in other words the complete chaos... is here also at the center. The justice and legal system, as stated by many authors and so beautifully formulated by Zupancic is a crucial "immune system" that could and should save society. As we have already described we have in the operation of this social immune system, like in the organism (micro level), the fight against lawbreakers, the problem of dyssocials (tumor cells): dysplasia and euplasia. Also in the legal system, we

have the challenges and threats of the side effects of the secondary unintended damage (collateral damage) caused by Justice and the legal system. Moreover, we have the risk of autoimmunity, viz. that the legal system, in its fight against illegality, endangers, breaks off, **even** destroys completely its own social organization. Finally, we also have the problem of resistance, where the lawbreakers, dys-socials adapt themselves. The attacks then persist and even intensify. These dangerous developments and menacing effects of law application are **the development of autoimmunity, caused side effects, damage caused by its application and the resulting resistance through this application.**

This is the context in which the applied scientific approach to justice and legal system needs to be adjusted, as an empirical, experimental (subject to very specific conditions) science, in which non-violent conflict resolution of individuals and groups stimulating harmonious development of society is and remains the central issue.

4.2 Strategies for tackling lawbreakers and for conflict resolution in the framework of the Judiciary and Legal System development of social "Immunity".

Traditionally, we have the "surgical intervention" as a societal immunity strategy. The banishment and elimination of the lawbreaker(s), in the many forms of punishment by banishing, dispossessing and killing the "offenders". This is a fairly quite rudimentary naive approach that always has lead and still leads to autoimmunity: social, self-destruction to a greater or lesser extent. The justice and legal system destroy and eliminate again and again the most creative and constructive elements in society. Frequently it also harms the prosperity, well-being and welfare by reason of blind, naive, emotional use of law in function of or because of short-sighted self-assertion, blind supremacy feeling or emotional gut instinct when using justice and the legal conflict resolution by the judge and the legal system. It is therefore high time to search intensively for methods and techniques favoring a

more balanced and non-violent conflict resolution, as stated by Zupancic and so many others. In any case, the inquisition-style of justice is a typical auto-immune phenomenon in the judicial / legal system. This must be contested as fast and as thoroughly as possible.

In this process of conflict resolution the main concern should be the resolution of conflicts in which the involvement of violence (both open and hidden cfr. dyssocials) is directly or indirectly prevented. An important dimension in this conflict resolution approach, in the context of the build-up and defense of the social immunity, is that one should stop restricting oneself to a one-dimensional intelligence approach of the so-called rational intelligence. The society needs to use all the forms of intelligence to maintain social harmony. In a one-dimensional, so called rational intelligence approach we have a reduction of perspectives whereby all kinds of considerations and interests can easily be hidden and used in a way that manipulates and injures the involved individuals and groups. Thence in a serious applied scientific implementation of societal immunity and conflict resolution, we must dare to employ and involve every kind of intelligence in the immunity combat and conflict resolution at all levels.

5. The Use of Pluri-intelligence in Applied Scientific Judicial Conflict Resolution.

5.1 Introduction:

It is evident **applied scientific judicial conflict resolution** requires the use of intelligence as much as possible. Of course it is important to keep in mind that intelligence always takes many different forms. Given the delicate and complex nature of conflict resolution in general, and of legal conflict resolution in particular, it is important also to be aware of the multiple forms of intelligence, which are also relevant here and should be employed maximally. In any case it would be artificial and inefficient to limit oneself, as usually happens, to rational intelligence. This rational intelligence, while important, is only to be an economic perspective on

intelligence and therefore much too poor to be the driving force behind the legal conflict resolution.

Which are the other forms of intelligence that are at least equally important. We can mention here among the main types of intelligence: the caring intelligence, energetic intelligence, emotional intelligence, action intelligence, rational intelligence, storing intelligence, transcendental intelligence, integrative intelligence and sexual or love intelligence. We want to discuss some of these forms of intelligence in terms of their relevance to applied scientific judicial conflict resolution.

5.2 The Caring Intelligence and Judicial Conflict Resolution.

One of the crucial and most important forms of intelligence, perhaps the mother of all intelligences is the caring intelligence. One is concerned about oneself as an individual, about the kids, family, the group, the material in the environment, the community, the nation, the culture, the environment, nature... These different forms of care and corresponding intelligence must be brought into harmony mutually.

Let us apply this to judicial conflict resolution where caring intelligence is employed. "Care" is a primary, huge mainspring as well as target and motivator in judicial conflict resolution in criminal law, civil law, etc... In criminal law the care of all interested parties (in the first instance the civil party) is clear. In the second instance it concern the guardians of the law, judicial investigators, the public prosecutor. In the third instance this is true for the judges in their various grades and qualities. Finally, we have the defense. Each of these parties have in their way to do with caring intelligence.

As for the civil parties, the care is usually the basis of the conflict in the conflict resolution. If the civil parties have no advantage in the conflict and conflict resolution, or even see the conflict as a threat to their own interests, then one must be careful because some parties: judicial investigators, public prosecutors, even the judiciary, might evoke artificially or intensify the basic conflict out of per-

sonal interest, as a dyssocial or as a leverage generating or strengthening other problems, conflicts. If the latter is the case, haven't we actually de facto to do with in-depth pseudo conflict resolution? Such a pseudo conflict resolution might become even worse when the judges: those who are to settle the conflict resolution, position themselves in the place of the civil parties and act implicitly in their name to eventually decide upon the in reality "pseudo conflict".

In the perspective of the inquisition style of judicial action in conflict resolution, it is vital to detect, to correct and sanction such pseudo-care conflicts by all meta-guardians of the care interests, be it judicial inquisitors, public prosecutors and judges themselves. One of the biggest sources of dysfunction of justice is related to this abuse of the caring tasks and caring intelligence of individuals and representatives of organizations and the arbitrariness in their interpretation, propositions and descriptions of the (whether or not pseudo) conflicts and their legal treatment. Anyway juridical conflicts in which the civil parties refuse or fail to act, are always very suspicious as to abuses of such conflicts by dyssocials, in society or in the meta-care management by judicial investigators (police in whatever form), prosecutors and even the judiciary in the manipulation of their legal conflict resolution.

5.3 Emotional Intelligence and Judicial Conflict Resolution.

Emotional intelligence is crucial for individuals and groups to respond as quickly as possible, as adequately as possible to changes, threats from the environment and information from that environment. Emotional intelligence reacts "viscerally" integrating total experiences of an individual, his entire background (even including know-how transferred from previous generations) to the extent that these are built into the reflexes of an individual. Emotional intelligence is therefore very far-reaching in the designation and interpretation processes and buildup of the expectations towards actors, young-

er as well as older ones, as well as on other stimuli in the environment.

How important emotional intelligence is to the survival and success in the surroundings, the less reliable, however, it is to guide, to evaluate, to direct judicial conflict resolution. Indeed emotional intelligence is maximally focused on individual immediate quick action. This rapidity is based as stated already on **implicit** knowledge and expectations that are maximally subjective. Conflict resolution in general and law conflict resolution in particular, should be maximally objective in the sense of maximally inter-subjective. We mean that the perspectives of multiple stakeholders should be taken into account in order to give as much attention as possible to the **"facts"** i.e. establishments that are made from different perspectives. Emotional intelligence, especially from the perspective of the judges and equally from the perspective of the police i.e. those who are expected to make analyses and statements, in particular the official prosecutor (public prosecution) is completely unacceptable, fundamentally wrong.

As Zupancic describes, however, this emotional intelligence unfortunately is prevalent in the contemporary inquisition style of justice and consequently in the contemporary judicial conflict resolution. This also means that one must have maximal attention in the assessment of the quality in justice administration, for the recognition and making explicit of the emotional intelligence present and used by the operators of justice.

We should **not only make explicit** the emotional intelligence used and even hid. We should also ensure that every time after discovery of emotional intelligence used, its role in legal conflict resolution, is cleansed away. By this we do not mean that it must be concealed in the legal process, but on the contrary that after making explicit, its impact should be eliminated, cleansed away. This precisely by showing that emotional intelligence, as a disturbing factor in an objective i.e. inter-subjective way in conflict resolution, has been clari-

fied and made understood to all parties involved and as a disturbing factor be discussed, treated and removed by all parties involved in the decisions of the conflict resolution. Indeed there is nothing worse than emotional intelligence used, remaining hidden and irrationally becoming decisive in the final conflict resolution. This is not only unworthy for justice but also for humanity.

5.4 Preservative (storing) Intelligence and Juridical Conflict Resolution.

For all systems, whether individual or group (organizations, cultures), the preservation of the existing system is important. In conflict resolution in general, and Juridical Conflict Resolution in particular, it is crucial to keep in mind the impact of the conflict on the safeguarding of the system and the quality of the system that is remaining. In particular the staff responsible for the follow up and finalizing the conflict resolution have to keep in mind the impact on the existence, survival and the quality of life of systems and the actors involved. More especially they have to keep in mind and to have an eye on dyssocials. They are responsible that dyssocials do not use the conflict solely for the realization of aimless destruction of the quality and viability of the system (organization) and their actors involved which they engage in a judicial legal conflict. Preservative and storing intelligence in the judges and judicial actors should be very carefully developed and monitored through assessment and evaluation of court legal judicial conflict resolutions.

5.5 Rational Intelligence Juridical Conflict Resolution.

We have to consider rational intelligence as an aesthetic factor. This is about economicity, i.e. the number of principles and steps necessary for example to resolve a conflict. The fewer principles, the less rules and steps are needed to be applied for working out a system, a challenge, a problem, how more economic, and hence more beautiful a system is. However, we must be careful not to make a fetish of this economic / aesthetic principle. Rational intelligence is just a mean, a tool, but not

an end in itself. Ultimately, the impact of the legal conflict resolution is more important for maintaining, preserving sustainability, welfare, prosperity and harmony in the community and cultures where the legal conflict resolution is applied. The rationality that is the aesthetic outlook is just secondary.

5.6 The love intelligence and Juridical conflict resolution

We have experienced that love intelligence, like emotional intelligence, takes a special place in the legal conflict resolution. It is first of all a given about which the actors in the legal judicial resolution follow up and resolution should be maximally conscious. This at every level and every stage: in establishing the facts, aspects, components, in analysing... in judging, in the solutions. The plaintiffs and the decision makers: the courts judges, prosecutor, the involved parties, etc. should pay attention to the processes and cycles in which the love intelligence plays a role and to the extent that they play a role. Conversely, they have to be aware of the power and the rights the actors have, to use their love and emotional intelligence. Though, it is also clear that however much they could and should empathize with the reality, forms, life cycles that are present e.g. in the love intelligence, themselves as legal conflict resolution actors and counsellors must distance themselves maximally from the emotional intelligence as well as love intelligence in guiding and controlling, directing the involved conflict resolution. This means that to the extent that they are themselves in love with an actor involved in the conflict, they have to distance themselves from any involvement in the legal conflict resolution.

5.7 The action intelligence and judicial conflict resolution

The **action** intelligence is very crucial for every individual and social system. Hence, its impact on the actions is very important for each individual and organization, this notably in **judicial** conflict resolution. This has to be made sufficiently operational, both to the actors involved in the conflict resolu-

tion, as to the corresponding meta-actors being the analysts (researchers), the public prosecutor and the judges.

5.8 The energetic intelligence and judicial conflict resolution

The impact of the energetic intelligence on the actions for an individual or organization has to be taken into account when one intervenes in, builds up, develops and implements a conflict resolution. Indeed energetic intelligence is very crucial for every system individually or socially. It is also needed that this approach is made sufficiently operational. This concerns the actors involved in the conflict resolution, as well as the involved meta-actors in the judicial conflict resolution being the analysts (researchers), the public prosecutors and the judges.

5.9 The persuasive intelligence

Convincing others and also oneself requires a very specific intelligence. For the organization, management, control and stimulation, this intelligence is very important. In law generally and in applied scientific law particularly persuasive intelligence plays a very crucial role. This is among inter alia, expressed in the jurisprudence when referring to "have the ear of the judge." But this persuasive intelligence is not limited only to the judge. It has also an important role in communication with the opponents and all other parties involved in the procedures of law in other words in the resolution of the judicial conflict

5.10 The heuristic intelligence

This intelligence is important in the search for data, facts that are relevant to find or solve challenges and problems including those concerning judicial conflict resolution. Heuristic intelligence can be very diverse in nature and may or may not be supported by highly advanced techniques such as statistics and search algorithms.

5.11 Transcendental Intelligence and Juridical Conflict resolution.

Transcendental intelligence is for the community very important for transcending the individual interest of an actor, having an eye for inno-

vation, and the unselfish consequences of that renewal, for the individual himself, but also having an eye for the interests of the greater whole: group, community, culture, environment, nature etc... Transcendent intelligence, however important to the community, entails a whole range of dangers. It is important in the legal and judicial conflict resolution to have an eye especially concerning the risks, which the innovator, the bringer of transcendent intelligence incurs. Therefore he needs to be protected by the responsible actors in the juridical conflict resolution.

Regarding the dangers to the contributor of transcendent intelligence, we need to be aware that those are dual in nature. First of all, we have the danger coming from the dyssocials, in their search for destruction of organizations, cultures. They are targeting especially those bringers of transcendent intelligence. By hitting them, they affect, they damage deeply the future of an organization, a society, a culture. Here their destruction has the greatest chance of profound, radical negative impact. That is why these innovators are always again the first victims of dyssocials. Moreover, we have that dyssocials are not only more successful in their destruction through addressing the transcendent intelligence actors. It is so that from the very nature of transcendent intelligence, these actors are more vulnerable. Why, however, are transcendent intelligence actors more vulnerable? Transcendent intelligence actors have the following characteristics:

- 1) They bring innovation.
- 2) They are more altruistic: their own interest is absent or only present at the background, or only present as a meta-value of innovation for innovation, or of innovation for a higher general welfare, prosperity.

But these are both features that are easily made suspicious or in se are suspect because they bring deviation to the existing situation, existing interests, existing habits...

Concerning renewal, innovation we can state that these are usually following the below described cycle:

Phase 1: innovation is seen as just stupidity.

Phase 2: wonderment

Phase 3: considering/ interpreting as trivial: we have always known this: the idea is trivial, obvious.

This means that innovators may easily be attacked and excluded by the community. Thus they are a grateful targets for dyssocials. That is why they should be given extra protection in legal judicial conflict resolution.

The second reason why bearers / providers of transcendent intelligence, are so vulnerable is that - we could almost say that this is because of the very nature of transcendent intelligence- they are so altruistic, i.e. they have no personal interest in the development and realization of their transcendent knowledge. However, when is established that there is no self-interest, generally one becomes suspicious and may quickly suggest, make suspicious that all kinds of machinations are trying to hide their own interests. Here dyssocials find a vast and fertile field for impeachment or machinations. Also for this reason, extra protection by the staff responsible for/ in charge of /judicial legal resolution is needed and wanted.

5.12 The integrative intelligence in the judicial conflict resolution (Harmony)

In every conflict resolution including judicial conflict resolution in particular, it is important and crucial on two levels to keep the integrative intelligence in the eye. The integrative intelligence strives to achieve a harmony between all perspectives applicable to a determinate system (an individual, an organization, a culture). This can also be done by pursuing a harmonization between the different forms of intelligence. Even so, and equally important is to pursue a harmony between the various evaluation dimensions that are applicable to a system.

At the level of judicial conflict resolution we also have that on both levels harmony could be pursued

from the perspective of the direct actors in the conflict as well as from the perspective of meta-actors of the I conflict resolution (the analysts, investigators, prosecutors, judges...) Harmony is in both perspectives really the crucial goal!!!

6. What definitely not to do in a pluri-intelligent approach of judicial conflict resolution

Zupancic (2014) in his work has described quite extensively the dangers of the inquisitorial style in jurisdiction that is expanding and growing very strongly in both the continental and the Anglo-Saxon law. We can describe concisely the **inquisitorial style of justice** as a **jurisdiction departing from an emotional intelligence, disguised or couched in a rational intelligence**. Moreover we see that this style, starting from the top level of the "Judges", through positive feedback, takes over the whole legal system from the top to the base. Eventually, we will inevitably see that because of this style in the administration of justice, the entire society is becoming by it affected deeply. As a consequence, legal certainty is disappearing, with all its consequences. This inquisitorial style of law leads therefore inevitably to chaos, i.e. to the "**Bellum omnium contra omnes**", what jurisdiction specifically is intended to avoid, being even precisely its fundamental mission.

Let us briefly discuss the higher descriptions of the inquisitorial style of justice. We have provisionally characterized the inquisitorial style of justice as starting from emotional intelligence. By itself, emotional intelligence is not abnormal or wrong. Usually each individual, each actor, an average individual, and thus also a judge, begins with his emotional intelligence when tackling a case. It is important to confront this with the many other forms of intelligence and subsequently to try to achieve a harmony between the different intelligences. Indeed, even though the emotional intelligence is important for introduction and situating, it is **very dangerous if it is too fragmentary, too one-sided, too largely determined by one's own personal and social experiences**.

When emotional intelligence happens to reach, to achieve a conclusion, a result. We have to be aware though that this has been established quite quickly, sometimes in a fraction of a second, based on all kinds of details: smell, color, clothing, view look, movements, tics... of the accused for example. This preconception might remain prominent since emotional intelligence is very difficult to change in the course of the process even when new data and information have been introduced.

The rational intelligence in the inquisitorial style of law is then generally used merely as a means of least effort (rationalization), to build an argument to support the conclusion of the emotional intelligence. This means that the accused (individual, group...), stands very little chance to go against such rational "cover" and pseudo support of an emotional intelligence conclusion. Every counter argument will thus be considered irrelevant.

Besides, in the inquisition style of justice by judges, the frequently employed strategy consists of formulating hypotheses in the form of considerations, based on some cited findings or evidence adduced by third parties in the dossier. These hypotheses are then presented as an argument or an evidence of guilt. Introducing hypotheses, precisely by the prosecutor is certainly acceptable on condition that the accused and his defense can have the opportunity to refute these, and /or introduce other explanatory hypotheses. But the introduction of new hypotheses, even in the form of considerations **as a new element in the judgment** as an argument or proof undermines the rights of the defense. **This is totally unacceptable.**

Hence, usually when the inquisitorial style of justice is used, the only way left to the defence, to achieve results is the procedural outcome: by identifying and invoking procedural errors in the hope that they will be considered relevant at a higher level. But also this procedural way out and fight against the inquisitorial style in the judiciary is highly vulnerable in the light of **the positive feedback** generated by the inquisitorial style. This positive

feedback is one of the hazardous effects of the inquisitorial style of justice. This forms the basis of the **autoimmunity** consequences of this style, namely undermining the legal system and the judiciary as the motor for applied scientific approach to conflict resolution. Moreover, this inquisitorial style of justice generates and will generate and stimulate more and bigger conflicts in society at large. This leads to increasing violence and even to absolute dictatorship.

What is that positive feedback we are talking about? We know that in each system unlimited positive feedback will lead to the destruction of this system. It is vital to turn that positive feedback at some point into negative feedback. A classic example is a thermostat in a heating system. When, within such a system, it is established that the target temperature is not reached, for example 25 °, then heat will be further generated until this temperature is reached. The heat production is then stopped: negative feedback. Suppose however, that the gauge of the temperature is defective, the system will permanently produce more and more heat until it explodes... That is why "negative feedback" is so vital, to stop the heat production at some point!!!

Now, we see that the inquisitorial style of justice within law is stimulating unlimited positive feedback both upwards as downwards. We mean the following. Emotional intelligence, or if you prefer, the gut, feeling, instinct of the judge with his rational background and cover-up, is contagious downwards to the investigating judges, the inspectors, police officers, who through the example of the court are also stimulated to work, based on their gut, feeling with selective rational and pseudo intelligent framework and elaborations. Also upwards to higher judges and courts, we see an increase and growth of the same inquisitorial style. In this perspective for instance, we saw recently in some countries how the use of illegally obtained information by the tax department, may and can lawfully be used in court. This has led to the state-

ment of some lawyers, legal experts and jurists that slowly but surely in the end every form of violence will be approved, admitted by the court with the exception perhaps of physical violence against and on the accused.

7. What certainly to do in a pluri-intelligence approach to conflict resolution: Judiciary audit and Law System audit: Key and motor of an applied scientific judiciary and legal system.

As with all scientific and certainly applied scientific approach, it is inevitable and crucial to work out, collect, elaborate experiences, observations, testing's, hypotheses (to provide /formulate answers) evaluate, validate etc. Inevitably mistakes, errors, etc. will be made. This is not so bad insofar as one learns from his mistakes. Therefore it is crucial that in pursuing and interpreting juridical conflict resolutions, the success and the degree of success but also the failures and even the fundamental failures are not only observed and recorded at regular times but also measured. Adjustments will have of course to be done. This may concern details. However, it may also be necessary to intervene and make changes structurally.

The essential way of approach is that periodically, every three to four years, for example, an in-depth knowledge audit or knowledge management audit is conducted for each specific court to establish and measure the results, approaches, success etc., at its different levels of operation. The existing know-how of knowledge audit and knowledge management will provide an important contribution here (see Vandamme 2012 Knowledge Management). Obviously the knowledge management audit methodology has to be adapted to the specific needs and challenges of the judiciary and legal system knowledge management, practices and challenges.

In this perspective it is quite fundamental that in the knowledge audit much attention has to be paid to the style of the judiciary. In particular attention is required concerning the detection, the slip-

pages and dangers of the inquisitorial style of justice.

8. The enzymes metaphor of the Applied Scientific Judicial Conflict Resolution.

8.1 Introduction

As an individual: human, animal, plant is an organism, society equally forms a kind of organism. In order to better understand the society, it may be useful to look at the functioning and the optimization of the functioning of the organism of an individual e.g. of a human. We know how important enzymes are to the good functioning of a human body: We quote: "... It is believed that there are hundreds of thousands of enzymes in the body performing different functions. Without them there is no life. The life span of an organism is inversely proportional to the degree of exhaustion of the enzymatic capacity of the organism. So, the less enzymes present in the human body, the sicker the organism is and the shorter it lives."(Filip Muylle). Something analogous we may suggest for the social organism. The enzymes are here the social operators!

8.2 The types of enzymes:

The great mass of enzymes are commonly divided into five groups. Briefly, the following types exist:

- 1) Digestive enzymes,
- 2) The system or metabolic enzymes, These are the enzymes that mainly play a role in the regulation of energy (via liver, gallbladder, and pancreas).
- 3) The intra-cellular enzymes. These mainly have a restoring function within the cells,
- 4) The proteolytic enzymes, which mainly have a protective, defensive function,
- 5) The enzymes which insure production of enzymes.

It is indeed important to keep in mind that these different types of enzymes themselves, integrate/contain many of the same enzymes. We also need to keep in mind that enzymes are high quality proteins that act as biological catalysts operating within and outside a cell, by initiating, speeding,

slowing down or up even stopping chemical reactions.

8.3 The Types of operators in a social organization

We can differentiate analogue types of operators in the social organism, like we find them in enzymes in an individual organism. These are:

- 1) The feeding and caring operators
- 2) The energy supply operators
- 3) The repair and maintenance operators
- 4) The protection and defence operators
- 5) The education or training providers.

Naturally, the question arises in the context of the **enzymes metaphor** where will place the juridical and legal operators. In order to answer this question we need to get to a meta level and to broach the issues of evaluation and optimization of the functioning of the enzymes: **the operators**.

8.4 The judicial operators

When we look at and study the functioning of operators then we have to keep in mind the following distinctions:

- 1) First we need to keep an eye on the **dyssocial** operators. These are operators who carry out pseudo-support. Under the disguise of protection, restoration they commit instead destruction of structures and bring about dysfunctionality.
- 2) A second category of operators are operators who try to optimize their operational capacity, without regard to the harmony of the whole in which they optimize.
- 3) A third category of operators are those who optimize in function of an overall harmony of society in which they operate. They even strive for /pursue relative sub-optimization in function of a global optimization.
- 4) In the light of an evaluation of operators it could be interesting to examine to what extent inequality in appreciation and/or reward by operators could play a role as a epiphenomenon or as a motivator or demotivator of the intensity and quality of the activity and performance of an operator.

In this context, where can we situate the legal / justice operators? Are they the meta-operators who are stimulating and directing the other operators in the community up to a higher, greater harmony...! **Legal / justice operators are and must be operators who support and guide other operators in conflict resolution to reach a larger and much higher level of social harmony.**

8.5 Destructive developments due to some defence mechanism of the social / judicial system or the proteolytic or protective enzymes and their potential as a metaphor for the judicial derailments.

We know that in some circumstances enzymes can easily degenerate into forces that cause autoimmune reactions and become very harmful for the own organism. For example, we know that we should have the right acidity level in the body as an absolute condition to guarantee the normal running of the biochemical processes. For example, food digestive enzymes are for a proper functioning also dependent on a good pH balance in the stomach and intestinal tract. The stomach needs an acidic (<pH 7) environment while the small intestine just needs a basic (> pH 7) environment. The colon in turn requires a slightly acidic environment... In addition, we have that sugar kills enzymes. Eating refined sugars weakens the immune system after only 20 minutes. It inhibits the production of white blood cells (T-cells) ... But all is even much more complex. Dr. Paul Kouchakoff (Institute of Clinical Chemistry Lausanne) states that the performance of the enzymes is also influenced by what we eat: "After a 'normal' meal cooked at high temperature, which consists of a mixture of denatured proteins, carbohydrates with extra refined sugars and fats, an immune system response will develop in the body. This is what is called in difficult words '**digestive leukocytosis**' process. This is a phenomenon that emerges when we eat cooked food. As our primitive blueprint actually is not aware of the change of the molecular structure of cooked food, an increase of the number of white blood cells emerges.

Not only the number of white blood cells will increase, but also the correlation between the white blood cells will change. They are found in large numbers in the blood as if an acute poisoning is taking place. When we eat strongly heated foods, our body does not recognize certain parts of the cooked food and as a response the immune system will create extra white blood cells. When heating food, not the quantity, but the kind of food is decisive for the change in the blood composition. Warming up normal drinkable water for five minutes or half an hour to warm up to 87 ° C causes no changes, but water heated above 88 ° C does. That is the critical temperature. This reaction happens also when heating food in the microwave. The lowest temperature lies with water 87 ° C, then milk 88 ° C, cereals, tomatoes, cabbage, banana 89 ° C, pears and meat 90 ° C, butter 91 ° C, apples and oranges 92 ° C, potatoes 93 ° C, carrots, raspberries and figs 97 ° C. However, if we eat raw food before and also between our cooked meals, the phenomenon will not occur. That means that we reduce or even eliminate the poisoning. Eating unprocessed raw foodstuffs are recognized as “friendly and not hostile” and therefore causes no reaction in the blood. So our only protection against this reaction is the consumption of natural raw food together with the meals and chewing well. (Muylle: 12)”.

Independently from the degree of accuracy of higher analysis and presentation by Paul Kouchanoff, we can notice that we have something analogous with the proteolytic or their equivalent social legal operators. In some environments, they may degenerate into auto-immune or social destructive processes. Some examples?

At an individual, enzymatic level, we see examples of food cooked at high temperatures, etc. Cooking food with additions of denatured proteins and refined sugars gives the important advantage that much more food is available to the individual, is preserved better and longer and that it can be produced and distributed cheaper in higher amounts. All these advantages, however, have the

major disadvantage of putting in motion the proteolytic defense mechanisms excessively. The important side-phenomenon is a significant increase in auto-immune diseases, and a significant weakening of the individual organism.

Do we have at a social level, by stimulation and growth of judicial actors, analogous problems with hazards for the autoimmunity threats to social order and organization? We can think here of the immense growth and strengthening of the information and knowledge dissemination accompanied by an astronomical growth of the information and knowledge control around in society and even over the whole world. Like cooking with its related food improvement ingredients, is in the first instance a major benefit for the food supply to the individual, we can say the same for the rapid enormous dissemination of information and control over the entire world. Via satellites, drones and penetration of electronic networks, we see that at any time, day and night, the slightest movement and communication, exchange of signals of each individual can be and is controlled, also including the statements and actions carried out outside the networks. This at first sight is a very important enrichment. It generates de facto however the introduction of immeasurably second, third etc. level of legal operators following everything and everywhere. The proteolytic explosion that we find in the individual organism, we retrieve very clearly reflected in society. The greater the proteolytic legal actors explosion, the greater also the dangers to autoimmunity. Orwell, Huxley, and so many others have already pointed out the dangers in this regard.

We are now also seeing the negative impact this has on the limitation of **creativity, innovation, diversity and flexibility, favoring stimulating brainwashing, stigmatization and depersonalization**. Increased and excessive control, repression and oppression is an inevitable consequence of this tremendous growth. The so-called social networks play in this process of control, repressive brainwashing and depersonalization an

enormous role. Such an important role that we should explicitly consider how should the legal framework be optimized to counter this exponential increase of control, depersonalization, brainwashing, destruction of creativity, flexibility, innovation, etc.

In this context we also want to refer to the knowledge control over e.g. prisoners with the expansion and extension through digital control, taking a huge expansion in size and efficiency of depersonalization, stigmatization, brainwashing... This "depersonalization" happens (1) by treating the individual as a number, whereby (2) each initiative is a priori excluded (again via a delaying time-consuming procedure), (3) organized structural inactivity (activation is only possible through third-party initiative), (4) temptation to medical sedation as the only (?) tolerated, accepted means in order to break through the structural inactivity and finally (5) absence of privacy self in the treatment of the personal dossier. Since the prisons mainly concern specific social groups, the social inequality is enlarged further bringing with it an increasing risk of inevitable social wild uncontrolled outbursts of social blind violence. Every increasing repression and growth through proteolytic repression actors, including the judicial actors, will inevitably cause increasing mindless violence and destruction: chaos. **This is again diametrically opposed to the aims of applied scientific legal system and judiciary.**

A tragic illustration of it, we see in the Middle East. The intensive sophisticated controls and in-

terventions by international proteolytic legal and military forces have created chaos, expanding through the flow of millions of refugees to Europe. This may result there too in total chaos.

9. Conclusion

In the light of the analyses of Bostjan M. Zupancic in, inter alia, "The Crown and the Criminal" on the one hand and the prospects of an applied scientific justice, we want to draw the following conclusions.

- 1) Applied scientific Justice is a possibility.
- 2) Like all scientific research and approach, applied scientific justice is dynamic. It is and should continuously be changed and adapted to meet the new frictions, social challenges, changes, threats, technical capabilities, social, economic opportunities and needs and the changes in scientific knowledge and technologies.
- 3) The core of applied scientific Justice is applied scientific conflict resolution. Such techniques are not only, like in individual and social conflicts, dynamic developments by themselves. The harmony perspectives encompassing the conflict resolutions are as much in dynamic evolution.
- 4) Moreover the individual and social harmony models orienting/ directing the conflict resolution perspectives, need to be maximally pluralistic and need to be especially explicitly elaborated, described, evaluated and validated in an applied scientific way by and with all parties.

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SOCIOMETRY AND FAMILIAL STATUS-ROLE RELATIONS

Abstract

Being one of the contemporary social psychology directions, sociometry has played a vital role in small group investigations. That direction was formed, developed and widely applied in the first decades of the 20th century by Moreno who was first of all concerned with primary, i. e. intimate, emotional relations of people in small groups, emergence of feelings among group members such as sympathy and dislike, love and hatred, respect and contempt, the desire to be in mutual communication or isolation from each other, etc. With the help of the sociometric method the latter tries to reveal such inter-group relations which are hardly perceptible for “naked eyes” (to observe superficially), however they often have serious, sometimes also critical influence on people’s behavior and state of mind. And though there has been put forth the viewpoint that sociometry is not as efficient in family investigation as it is with other small and medium group studies, nevertheless, family sociometric research is compulsory and useful for investigating family psychology.

Keywords: sociometric statuses, family, relations, social group, psychodrama, cognitive roles, sociogram.

The status-role approach to family issues would not be complete if we were content with the investigation of only that social group: “official” status and roles reveal their mutual relations and role socialization processes. Social psychologists, primarily Jacob Moreno, have shown that in each social group within the course of time emerge pure psychological, the so-called sociometric statuses and appropriate roles as a consequence of its members’ interactions and the whole group dynamics. Despite of the the viewpoint that sociometry is not as efficient in family investigation as in case of studying other small and medium groups, family sociometric research is still compulsory and useful for investigating family psychology.

Being one of the contemporary social psychological directions, sociometry has played a vital role in small group investigations. That direction was formed, promoted and widely applied in the first decades of the 20th century by Moreno who was first of all concerned with primary, i. e. intimate, emotional relations of people in small groups,

emergence of feelings among group members such as sympathy and antipathy, love and hatred, respect and contempt, the desire to be in mutual communication or isolation from each other, etc. With the help of the sociometric method the latter tries to reveal such inter-group relations that are hardly perceptible to the “naked eye” (to observe superficially), however they often have serious, sometimes also critical influence on people’s behavior and state of mind. (Volkov 1970; Moreno 1958).

Unlike other representatives of role theory (Mead and others), Moreno shaped his notions about social status and roles as a result of lasting and rich practical work. He implemented this experimental investigations using the method of psychodrama created by himself. Being a psychiatrist, Moreno was first of all more concerned with active people, their activities and interrelations, and less with society structure, official roles and sanctions. In his works practical issues and theoretical deductions are interlinked. Moreno studies also specific social role performers who act in specific situations

("in situ" as Moreno likes to say). In order to give a name to these relations he promoted the concept of "sociometric networks". In small groups he studied people's interrelations as the main subject for his interests. Still in 1914 he suggested the idea of accepting another person's role while people communicate. By saying "role" he meant spontaneous and emotional activeness of an individual with a person's in-depth involvement in that activity. It is necessary to mention that in G. Meads' works role and the process of accepting it are mostly perceived as intellectual processes. He considers language and speech as a result of role performance, too, and not preconditions of role performance as we see in Meads' theory. (Moreno 1968.).

According to Moreno the concept of "role" is filled with psychological content, while some sociologists oppose this idea, hence, in their opinion the investigation of the concept "role" should be taken up by sociologists rather than by psychologists. Emphasizing spontaneous and creative characteristics of social roles Moreno contradicts Mead's theory stating that a person is always in conflict with his own official roles. One of the best ways of getting rid of such a conflict is to assume unofficial (spontaneous, sociometric) roles. It is in the process of realization of these roles that a person gets the opportunity to fully demonstrate his personality. An individual creates his roles himself and while performing them creatively he solves his problems.

Moreno made those ideas as the basis of one of his best methods in psychotherapy- psychodrama, a method that is also expedient to use for handling inter-familial problems. In 1934, Moreno properly described the processes of role, its acceptance and implementation in his work entitled , "Who experiences emotions?" where he has already promoted the outlook that while performing spontaneous roles, people can also change society structure.

Moreno has not made detailed characterization of social roles. He has not linked people's roles with formal rights and duties either. Those issues

were dealt with by other social investigators such as Nucom, Linton and others. Moreno was particularly interested in specific processes of role performance in certain place and period. However we can state that in his works there is a complete miss of the comprehension and social functions that can be ascribed to the concept "role". In Moreno's works interesting ideas about relations between roles and a person's self-consciousness exist. In addition, he also comes to the conclusion that role performance is the particular demonstration of a person and his own self. Some social psychologists think that the above-mentioned ideas of Moreno allow us to pass from dramatic level of the role to its social level. However Moreno did not take into account the circumstance that spontaneous role performance can also be a realization process of attributed and role expected by referential groups.

Although both social psychologists and family specialists think that sociometry cannot be that efficient in family investigation as in small and medium group studies, it provides very important data about more delicate and hidden, somehow not realized inter-familial relations. For revealing those intrapersonal and emotionally saturated relations and positions they use a special method-sociometric test that allows one to discover the unofficial sociometric status of each group member. Each individual's sociometric status indicates what role he plays in the network of unofficial group relations. Moreno has called those statuses (from the highest to the lowest one) star, preferred, accepted, isolated and rejected. Those statuses are determined according to the ratio of positive and negative selections of each person. As far as sociometric methodology is concerned, the ways of its application have been widely illustrated in the relevant literature, it is not considered necessary to introduce them here. It is noteworthy that each individual performs roles appropriate for sociometric status in a group and in a family. Without a special investigation we can already state that one of the family members (e.g. the youngest child) can be the favor-

ite of each member (this is the position of star), and the other may just be accepted and give birth to warm feelings among others, etc.

In the field of family psychology the application of sociometry seems promising to us, particularly for studying extended families still existing in rural areas.

Unfortunately as far as we are informed this direction is not developing. However in the works of Armenian psychologists there have been enquiries about the necessity of its development. In different countries, especially in Russia and Belorussia there have been conducted wide-scope researches in schools. Those researches assist one to reconstruct human interrelations, change some people's unfavorable positions and roles causing mutilation. They sometimes have positive psychiatric impact on individuals and groups as well.

There are a lot of new issues that can be solved in the field of family psychology due to sociometric investigations. One of them is to find the types of interactions that are among family members' official and unofficial (sociometric) status and relevant roles and the impact of those interactions on observable behavior. Moreover, those interactions and their consequences must be studied at the level of both distinct people and the whole group. The following can be as an assumption: there are two kinds of interactions of the above mentioned types, positions and roles (if we don't observe possible neutral state): a) mutual reinforcement (positive interaction) and b) mutual inhabitation (negative interaction). Study shows that for the investigation of those interrelations an appropriate methodology is necessary to work out.

The next thesis (and issue) is that in our opinion a person's role performance in a family cannot be only considered as an expression of his assumed official status. Sociometric status impacts on role behavior mostly at subconscious level, but there can always be perceived the traces of those impacts on behavior. For instance, pedagogues require parents to treat all children equally. A parent can agree

with this and try to treat in that way, but his sociometric position interacting with each child's sociometric position at the subconscious level spontaneously results in behavior differences. This is one of the phenomena that is usually called "subjectivism".

The application of sociometric classic methodology in the family investigation is connected with serious difficulties as there are few modern nuclear families and the existence of all the sociometric statuses is not possible. Besides, members of a small family, especially spouses have already chosen each other, and asking them questions like "Who would you like to marry if you had a free choice" would be inappropriate and irrelevant. Taking into consideration this and many other situations psychotherapists have created a special family sociogram (similar to Moreno's classic sociogram) which is being introduced to each family member before psychotherapy and in different stages of that process (to the "problematic person" of a family). (Eidemiller, Dobryakov, Nikolskaya 2003).

The methodology enables us to somehow reveal sociometric methodology which remains not realized. Both the above-mentioned and other authors claim that this method is quite efficient and essentially useful for psychotherapists. The subjects (people who are studied) are given forms in each of which there are drawn circles with 110 diameters. The subject is instructed to place both himself and the other members of his family in the shape of circles with different diameters inside the circle. Each subject is assigned to do the work independently without consulting with others. It covers particular sides of familial life before psychotherapy and the kind of data that can be received from sociogram, and the spheres a psychologist should pay attention to? It turns out that it can provide useful information about the following:

1. About the family members presented in the circle,
2. The sizes of circles showing family members,
3. Arrangement of circles towards each other,

4. Distance of circles from each other.

It turns out that those signs and their reciprocal relations are quite informative from psychological point of view. After completing the work the subject must sign under the sociogram.

The number of circles: an investigator must first of all pay attention to the number of persons family consists of and how many people are introduced in the sociogram. However surprising it might seem there are subjects that don't present all their family members in the circle. It implies that not all his family members are significant for him or some are rejected. Such "oblivion" can also imply conflicting relations between the subject and the person in oblivion. Moreover, some subjects include people in circles who are not members of that family. Sometimes they include even their pets.

The size of circles: The main principle is that the bigger the circle introducing a person, the more important and significant he is considered. For example, if a subject presents himself in a bigger circle compared to others it speaks about his very high self-esteem. Otherwise we can conclude that he underestimates himself. Let's mention that interpretation of this peculiarity produces truer results when the subject doesn't know for what purpose the investigation is conducted. Only in this case he will freely demonstrate the psychological information that is interesting for a psychologist and psychotherapist.

The arrangement of circles: In the case of each individual that arrangement is certainly different. If he places a family member in the corner of the circle (testing field) and in a very small size it implies that he isolates or rejects him. Subjects present important members of their family (from the point of view of an individual) in the center of the testing field and in bigger size. From psychological perspective it's important where the subject places himself and in which size. If he places his "self" in the center

of a big circle and in big sizes, it can be concluded that he has well-expressed egoism and high self-esteem. And if he presents himself in the corner and in small sizes he is considered to be oppressed and to have a low self-esteem.

The distance between circles: That index is related to emotion interactions among family members, subconscious peculiarities of the subject. The main principle of interpretation is that the closer some members of a family are placed, the closer they are emotionally. If he places himself and a member of his family so closely, he considers that member as a close person. And vice versa, large distance between himself and another person in the circle symbolizes alienation between them. If in a circle family members are placed far from each other it can be assumed that there are conflicting relations between them, reciprocal emotional rejecting, little or lack of desire to communicate with each other.

That peculiarity can imply some level of positive psychological identity between a subject and another person. If, e.g. a subject places himself and his mother in the form of intersecting circles, some authors (Eidemiller, Olifirovich and others) interpret it as evidence that he hasn't fully distinguished his "self" from his mother's self. And this is a sign of insufficient level of development and maturity of a person. Such a tie between two people is called "symbiotic", however it is mostly related to psychological unity, lack of distinctiveness. As far as a family is a small, but dynamic system, as it can be expected, relationships undergo changes there with time. They can be observed during psychotherapy, too. Those changes are somehow reflected in sociogram. Sociograms presented by the same person also differ in different stages of family life, particularly in conditions of normative and other types of conflicts.

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FAMILY ROLES AS FAMILY FUNCTIONING REGULATORS

Abstract

The author examines the problems related to the formation and functioning of family roles. Having social roots, family roles appear at the individual level by performing the social function of the family formation as a social institute.

Keywords: family, family role, family status, historical development of family.

Family statuses and roles appear as social mechanisms regulating the manifestations of a family-member. When referring to the theory of roles being applied in the field of family psychology, it should be noted that the family role in the modern psychology is defined as an entirety of social roles, which are performed by individuals as a consequence of the fact that they have families, whereby they occupy a certain position (positions). Moreover, as Sedrak Sedrakyan notes, a more specific study divides the roles into two groups: intra-family and inter-family roles (Sedrakyan 2010: 52-53). "Intra-family are considered to be those statuses and roles, - writes Sedrakyan, - which the family-members assume and perform only when interacting with the members of that family. These are marital roles (female and male), parental roles (father and mother), and filial roles (son, daughter, sister, and brother)". The specified roles, according to Sedrakyan, are characteristic for nuclear families. In extended and archaic families, we may encounter some intra-family roles, such as grandfather and grandmother, aunt, uncle and other roles (Sedrakyan 2010: 53).

What functions are the family roles endowed with? Even during the times of formation of the theory of roles the role was considered as a unit of a social structure, as a behavior model having social

conditionality. In the work called "Study of Man" Linton writes that availability of patterns of reciprocal behavior among individuals or groups of individuals constituting the society is required for social functioning.

Such patterns of behavior are called status. Moreover, Linton distinguishes dual application of the concept of status: the particular and the general. In the first case, when the concept of status is applied in its abstract sense, it is linked to the particular pattern, form of behavior. On the other hand, from its generalized aspect, an individual's status is considered as a sum of his/her specific statuses and expresses his/her position towards the society (Linton, 1936: 113).

In Linton's definition of the social status the following fact is more important to us that the status here is considered as an entirety of an individual's rights and obligations. And, as Linton observes, since these rights and obligations find their expression through the individual, it is quite difficult to differentiate the individual from his/her status. The status, according to Linton, is the entirety of potential opportunities of behavior and, depending on the individual, can be realized with certain efficiency, good or bad (Linton, 1936: 113).

The role, as Linton defined it, represents the dynamic aspect of the status. An individual occupies

a certain social status and realizes it within the relationship with other statuses. When the individual exercises the rights and fulfils the obligations constituting his/her status, he/she performs a role that corresponds to that status. The roles and statuses constitute an entirety, and, as Linton notes, their separation carries only a purely academic significance: there are no roles without statuses, and there are no statuses without roles (Linton, 1936: 114).

As in the case of the status, Linton distinguishes two options for application of the concept of role. In one instance he speaks about particular roles. Each individual performs numerous roles, which stem from various social samples of behavior. In other instances all the roles performed by an individual are consolidated and generalized under the concept of role. In these circumstances the concept of role determines the individual's obligations in relation to the society and the individual's expectations from the society (Linton, 1936: 114).

As we can see the statuses and roles, having a social conditionality, however, are manifested through an individual only, are inseparable from an individual and perform the function of regulating the individual's behavior. Indeed, when analyzing Linton's theory, Sprot directly mentions that the role is the form of behavior that corresponds to a specific status. The status, in its turn, appears as a social position, around which the individual's behavior evolves (Sprot, 1952: 153).

It can be concluded from the above-said that a family-member's behavior is determined by the family roles performed by the individual. Meanwhile, regardless of the fact that family roles and statuses are realized at the individual level, their importance has an emphasized social nature: these generally serve the purpose of satisfying the social needs.

It is the latter aspect due to which the family is considered as a social institution. According to Druzhinin, the family is not only a social group, but a social institution, too. Druzhinin continues that

“according to the definition of sociologists the entirety of social roles and statuses is called an “institution”, the importance of which is satisfaction of a certain social need” (Druzhinin, 2002: 45). Moreover, if the family institution gets depreciated, it means that the household consanguineous groups do not perform the functions, which satisfy the corresponding social needs (Popenoe, 2002: 151).

It actually turns out that the status-and-role system of the family serves the purpose of family functioning. Each society “creates” such a system, which, being manifested at the individual level, serves the functioning of a social institution, such as the family, and determines its peculiarities.

In this regard, depending on the social order, the structure and functions of the family also change. According to Schneider, “It can be agreed that each culture gives birth to a certain normative model of the family, or to be more specific - a group of models. The structure of the normative model includes elements – the members of the family, each of which is characterized by a certain status, i.e. a position with certain rights and obligations, which is related to the corresponding form of behavior (Schneider, 2006: 39).

The influence of social and cultural environment on the role structure of the family is clearly manifested throughout historical development of the family. Thus, when observing the family from the perspective of historical development, Morgan distinguishes five main types of the family, each of which is characterized by a unique family structure and certain types of intra-family ties and relationships. These are:

1. The consanguine family – is formed within the same group as a result of consanguineous marriage of sisters and brothers, nephews and nieces.
2. The punaluan family – is formed as a result of marriage with sisters and nieces and the husbands of each of them, as well as brothers and nephews and the wives of each of them. In addition, it is not necessary that the husbands of the

sisters in the first case and the wives of the brothers in the second case share blood proximity/ consanguineous ties. In all cases such families are group families: the group of men marries the group of women.

3. The syndyasmian/pairing family – is formed as a result of one couple's marriage, yet without the right for exclusive cohabitation. The marriage continues as long as it satisfies the couple.
4. Patriarchal family – is formed as a result of one man's marriage to several women, while women are isolated.
5. Monogamous family – is formed as a result of one couple's marriage with the right for exclusive cohabitation (Morgan 1907: 383-385).

As we can see, Morgan's classification of historical types of families is based on the structural peculiarities of the family. In some cases importance is attributed to the type of consanguineous ties of the spouses (sisters-brothers, nephews-nieces), in other cases importance is attributed to the number of parties engaged in marital relationships (group marriages in punaluan and patriarchal families, bigamies in bigamous and monogamous families), whereas in the third case importance is attributed to the factor of marital relationships (the right for exclusive cohabitation in the case of a monogamous family and its absence in a bigamous family).

Some historical forms of the family are excluded from Morgan's system. For example, in the work of the Danish philosopher, sociologist and educator Carl Nicolai Starcke called "The Primitive Family in its Origin and Development" (Starcke, 1889: 141-158) we encounter the description of polyandrous and levirate marriages. In a sense the polyandry is contrasted with the patriarchy: in this case within the same period of time a woman may be in marital relationships with several men. In the case of a levirate marriage a man is obliged to marry the wife of his deceased brother, while a woman is obliged to marry the brother of her deceased husband. And if in the first case the matter refers to the quantita-

tive aspect of marital relationships (polygamy), then in the second case importance is attributed to the nature of consanguineous ties within the marrying couple (the sister-in-law and the brother-in-law).

For the sake of discussing the status-and-role system of the family, importance is also attributed to the issue of historical modification of *marital relationships*. The social order determines not only the nature of the family, but the form of marital relationships as well. The latter has a historical conditionality. Thus, when speaking about historical development of marital relationships, Zatsepin notes that the marital form of regulating the relationships among the individuals belonging to different sex groups has not immediately emerged. According to Zatsepin, marriage is a form of relationship between a man and a woman, which is historically conditioned and certified and regulated by the society, which defines their rights and obligations to one another, as well as their common children. Marriage is a traditional form of formation of the family and its public control, one of the means of the society's self-preservation and development (Zatsepin, 2002: 4).

As we can see, the studies of historical development of the family and marital relationships reveal, and in some cases they are even based on the provision of the social conditionality of the family and marital relationships. This provision is also fundamental for the comparative study of the families functioning within the same period of time in different social and cultural environments. For example, in the work dedicated to marital relationships in China we encounter some paragraphs of the marriage law on relations such as bigamy, marriages settled by families, marriages by convenience, and paragraphs prohibiting blood/consanguineous marriages (Domenach, 1991: 17).

Unlike China, some African countries adopted the practice of marriages settled by families. Here, from the perspective of the traditional law, the marriage agreement between the large family groups serves as foundation for the marriage.

Moreover, the relationships of the wife and the husband - the immediate parties to the settlement – are derived from the settlement between the families (Sinitsina, 1989: 41). The same is true for polygamy, particularly for polygyny (multiple wives), which is traditionally considered to be a form of marriage for some African nations and stems from their everyday life and conditions of life activity (Sinitsina, 1989: 46).

The influence of the social existence on the family and marriage relationships is obvious. The social order is determined by numerous factors (environmental and climate, political, economic, and living conditions), which directly or indirectly determine the nature of the family and marriage, too. According to Kislyakov, “The level of development of the farming agriculture or animal husbandry, crafts, trade relations, monetary economy, and political life has also left its influence on some institu-

tions, such as the family and marriage” (Kislyakov, 1969: 12).

As we can see, depending on the ethno cultural, social and economic conditions, different nations may have different perceptions about the family and marriage, as well as about their structural characteristics. Moreover, the social order directly influences the forms of family and marriage by determining their nature or by means of legal acts or traditional norms historically established within the given society.

Thus, it can be said that the status-and-role structure of the family contributes to the functioning of the family by bringing into compliance as much as possible at the individual and social levels. The family performs the role of a mediator between the individual and the society by regulating their relationships.

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APPENDIX

PARTS OF MESSAGES AND LETTERS OF CONDOLENCE RECEIVED BY WISDOM ED. IN CONNECTION
WITH THE DEATH OF ACADEMICIAN GEORG BRUTIAN

* *

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“With deepest sorrow I learned of the death Doctor of sciences, Professor, Academician of NAS of RA *Georg Brutian*.

Georg Brutian was the greatest figure of modern Armenian philosophical thought, tradition continuer and the tradition creator, a talented scientist who for decades by his productive activities and original way of thinking enriched and developed the world and national philosophy.

What Georg Brutian cared and thought of found its reflection in his philosophical unremitting endeavors, that through wise observations and valid arguments, in the form of papers and lectures were becoming scientific directions and methodological principles forming the Brutian philosophical school a that gained broad international recognition.

His death is a great loss not only for our people but also for world philosophical community.”

Galust SAHAKYAN

Chairman of RA National Assembly, Chairman of the University Council

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“Georg Brutian’s contribution in the field of investigations of the theory of argumentation in the USSR and Russian Federation could not be overestimated. Just his works started the formation of these studies in Soviet Union. Papers of Georg Brutian in leading scientific magazines, his books, and the International conference on philosophy of argumentation organized by him greatly influenced most of scientists.

I myself follow in this field the guidelines of Academician Brutian and his famous Yerevan school of Argumentation.”

Alexander ALEXEEV

Doctor of sciences, Professor, Head of the Chair of philosophy at
Humanities faculties, Faculty of philosophy at MSU after Lomonosov

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It make me feel a deepest sorrow to have been informed about our dearest friend Georg Brutian’s death, and the variety of earthly life, since on this very day I myself assisted to the buried ceremony of my own sister, waiting for my personal turn. Let us hope that we all shall going to meet soon over there. With my most friendly thought.

Evangelos MOUTSOPOULOS

Honorary Rector of the University of Athens,

Member of Athens' Academy of Sciences,
Co-President of the International Academy for Philosophy

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"The stuff of National pedagogical university after Dragomanov and me personally are full of sorrow in connection with the death of Academician Georg Brutian, the prominent 20th century philosopher, the consultant of the President of the NAS of RA, President of the International Research Institute of Metaphilosophy, Transformational Logic and Argumentation at Armenian State Pedagogical University.

"Visiting your famous capital Yerevan I had the honor of receiving personally from the Academician Georg Brutian the highest reward of the Armenian Academy for philosophy. I bow low before the personality of the talented scientist and mourn together with his family, friends, and colleagues."

Academician Viktor ANDRUSHCHENKO
Rector of NPU after Dragomanov

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"I am deeply saddened to hear about the death of the President of the International Academy for Philosophy Academician Georg Brutian. He was a distinguished philosopher and a gentle person; he encouraged the dialogue on the main questions of our epoch and opened new paths of encounter among persons and cultures. It is an honor and a pleasure for me to have the good opportunity to be a member of the International Academy of Philosophy, to participate in philosophical meetings organized by him, and to learn of his thought and wisdom.

His heritage of intellectual tradition and philosophical achievement remains a gift for all of us for further inspiration, dialogue, and cultivation. I express my sympathy and good feelings to the members and the friends of the International Academy for Philosophy. I hope we shall continue our cooperation, friendship, and communication on different aspects of academic activity and research."

Georgia APOSTOLOPOULOU
Professor (em.) Dr., University of Ioannina (Greece), Department of Philosophy,
Full member of the International Academy for Philosophy

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"This is really sad news. It is to me the end of an era".

Frans H. van EEMEREN
Chair ILIAS
Director International Institute of Pragma-Dialectics, Zhejiang University
Guest Professor Leiden University, University of Lugano, Zhejiang University and Jiang Su University
Professor Emeritus Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory
and Rhetoric University of Amsterdam

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"We are in deep sorrow when we learned the information about the passing away of our friend and world teacher, scientist, philosopher and logician Georg Brutian. Our deepest sorrow we like to express to his family, collaborators and colleagues..."

Fernand VANDAMME

Learning team, contributor on Knowledge Systems,
Epistemology and Applied Epistemology, ICIWO vzw

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"So sorry for the late response. I have been traveling again, this time with my wife and daughter. We are in London for the holidays and then I will be moving on to Istanbul.

I was very saddened to hear of the news of the passing of Georg. He was a great man and an important figure in the lives of many. I will surely miss him. While I did not spend much time with him on this last visit, I fondly recollect the dinner I had with him at your home. My profound sympathy to all his family, friends and colleagues.

As for the article, I hadn't realized the amount of work that was needed to get it into shape for publication. I actually combined two talks I had given into one article and retitled it. The new title is "The Moral Burden of Memory: The Role of National Narratives in Democracy Building." The article is attached. I hope this is satisfactory."

Armen T. MARSOOBIAN

Professor and the chairperson of the Philosophy Department at Southern Connecticut State University,
New Haven (USA), editor-in-chief of the journal *Metaphilosophy*

* *
*

"On behalf of the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Russian Philosophical Society we express our condolences on the passing away of Academician Georg Brutyan. Our dear colleague successfully led the Department of Philosophy and History of NA of Armenia, was the founder and chairman of the Armenian Philosophical Society, and was a great friend of Russia. The scientific community of our country will always remember Georg Brutian - a great scientist and a wonderful person."

Abdusalam HUSEYNOV,

Academician, Director of the Institute of Philosophy,

And Vjacheslav STEPIN

Doctor of philosophy, professor, full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Honorary director of the Institute of philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences

* *
*

"It is with a great sorrow that I receive your message about the death of the academician Georg Brutian who has been so important for philosophy in our time. I want to express my deep condolences."

Peter KEMP
Professor of philosophy
Dr. Phil. h. c. at the Armenian State Pedagogical University after Khachatur Abovyan
Co-president of the International Academy for Philosophy

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"Teachers, researchers, graduate students and the guidance of the Philosophy Faculty of Moscow State University after Lomonosov mourn and express deep condolences to family, friends and colleagues of Academician George Abelovacha Brutian. Academician Georg Abelovich Brutian made outstanding contributions for the development of philosophy, logic and argumentation theory, founded a number of new areas of research in these areas, organized an international scientific work in these areas.

For me personally, one of the key books was the monograph "Essays on the analysis of philosophical knowledge" and a series of works devoted to the study of the nature of philosophical knowledge, to the problem of conceptualization of philosophy, the ideas which formed the basis of my dissertation. In our student years, we read all the books of George Abelovich, which, by their content and even the form of presentation, differed significantly from the dominant tradition then. He was one of the central figures of the famous Yerevan School of Argumentation that provided philosophical diversity of the space of Soviet philosophy.

Teachers, researchers, undergraduate and graduate students of the Philosophy Faculty of Moscow State University after Lomonosov this work will continue."

Vladimir MIRONOV
Dean of the Philosophy Faculty of Moscow State University after Lomonosov
Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor

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With deepest sorrow I learned of the death of a prominent philosopher and a wonderful man George Abelovich Brutian. Please accept my condolences and convey to the family, relatives and friends of George Abelovich.

Vladislav A. LEKTORSKI
Doctor of philosophy, professor, full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Head of the department of the theory of knowledge,
Institute of philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences

* *

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“Georg Abelovich Brutian made a significant contribution to the world philosophy, logic and methodology of science. The scientists of our country knew George Abelovich Brutian as the founder of many scientific schools and directions of philosophical thought. He created not only Yerevan school of argumentation, but also by his creative ideas and activity Minsk arguments school was established, in which dozens of doctors and candidates of philosophical sciences have grown in our country. Through his research, my work is still connected with the problem of scientific argumentation, philosophy, and politics.

He was an example of high morality, dedication, humanity, careful attention to the people around him.”

Vladimir BERKOV

Doctor of Sciences (in Philosophy) Professor of the Chair of Philosophical Sciences
and Ideological Works at Minsk State University (Belorussia), and

Jadviga JASKEWICH

Doctor of Sciences (in Philosophy), Professor,

Director of Social-Humanitarian Institute at the Belorussian State Economic University

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“My sincere condolences for the passing away of Academician Georg Brutian. He was a powerful person and great organizer of philosophical activities. I have warm memories of him from my visit to Yerevan.”

Iikka NIINILUOTO

Professor of Theoretical Philosophy, Rector at the University of Helsinki,

Member of the International Academy for Philosophy

* *

*

“I was grieved to hear from Juha Räikkä that my dear friend, most distinguished Academician Brutian, has passed away. He was much more than a colleague, he was a personal friend of mine and my family. I have always admired his efforts to advance philosophy not only in Armenia but also internationally. My visits to Yerevan are ever-memorable, we often recall with my wife and children the overflowing hospitality in Yerevan, as well as his visits with Armenian colleagues to Turku. I remember George as a respectable colleague, very good company and active and energetic scientist. His departure is a serious miss for all of us but in particular for the Armenian philosophical life. I think you will continue his work and wish you all the best in these efforts.”

Juhani PIETARINEN

Professor Emeritus of Practical Philosophy, University of Turku

Member of the International Academy for Philosophy

* *
*

"I share your sorrow and deeply regret Brutian's decease. I hoped that there will be some opportunity to meet him, but this will be never possible on this Earth.

Pavel MATERNA
Prof.PhDr. Hněvkovice, Czechoslovakia
Member of the section for humanities of Grant Agency of Academy of Science (Czech Republic),
Member of the Internationale Bernard Bolzano Gesellschaft,
Member of the International Academy for Philosophy

* *
*

"Georg Brutian was a great philosopher and an exceptional and respected person. You have our sympathies. On behalf of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Turku, Finland."

Dr. Juha RÄIKKÄ
Professor of Philosophy
University of Turku, Finland

* *
*

"Academician Brutian was a very stimulant researcher and pleasant human being. I felt very good discussing with him in 2012 at the Yerevan International Conference. I wished to celebrate him in March and see his joy. But unfortunately the time had no more patience. I hope you will develop his legacy of, indeed, transformational logic from all the philosophical points of view."

Ana BAZAC
Professor of Philosophy
at Bucharest (Romania) Polytechnic University

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