


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YEREVAN – 2016

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EDITORS' FOREWORD

The seventh issue of the journal “Wisdom” – the second volume of 2016 – is ready to be presented to the scientific community.

The distinctiveness of the volume reminds us the days of its establishment and entry to the world of scientific periodicals. The publication of the first issue in 2013 by Academician Georg Brutian was remarkable since it was compiled from the results of the international conference *Theoretical and Practical Issues of Transforming Society Development: Philosophical and Psychological Aspects* (April 16-17, 2012, Yerevan) organized under his presidency. Khachatur Abovian Armenian State Pedagogical University (ASPU), Inter-

national Academy for Philosophy (IAPH) and Armenian Philosophical Academy (APA) were the organizers of the conference.

The first two issues of “Wisdom” included the texts of the selected talks of the conference from two main perspectives – *Philosophy* and *Psychology* – in accordance with the sections of the conference.

After four years, on November 22-23, 2016, the aforementioned institutions organized a new international conference *Life and Philosophy*, unfortunately, this time without Academician Georg Brutian, therefore dedicated to his memory and 90th anniversary.

The conference was likewise large in its



Official Opening of the Conference, 22 November, 2016

geographical coverage and participation. Brutian disliked birthday celebrations and honoring ceremonies and he would have never allowed celebration of his anniversary. Thus, it was a kind of predestination, even after his death he stays still true to his motto – always

supporting and helping his students, colleagues, young scientists, once more creating a platform for demonstrating their scientific achievements, acquiring international recognition, and raising the level of academic confidence.



Plenary Session, 22 November, 2016

The authors of the articles were not only the representatives of Armenia and prestigious foreign universities and academic institutions – philosophers and psychologists well-known within international scientific community – but also young researchers who were making their first steps in science. Among the


foreign participants of the Conference were well-known philosophers Professor Hans Köchler (Austria), Professor Armen T. Marsoobian (USA), Professor Georgia Apostolopoulou (Greece), Professor Ana Bazac (Romania), Professor Balázs M. Mezei (Hungary), Professor Kadzhik Ohanyan (Russia).



Hans
KÖCHLER



Armen T.
MARSOOBIAN



Georgia
APOSTOLOPOULOU



Balázs M. MEZEI
& Ana BAZAC

Among other events on the Conference agenda, the Department of Philosophy and Logic of Khachatur Abovian Armenian State Pedagogical University was renamed in honor of Academician Georg Brutian. A number of factors served as a ground for this decision, particularly:

- Georg Brutian's role and contribution in the establishment of the department,
- the professorial staff of the department comprises Georg Brutian's students of dif-

ferent generations who keep alive and vibrant the scientific-organizational and educational-methodological traditions inherited from their Teacher,

- the focuses of scientific research work assumed by the department are mainly formed within the scope of Georg Brutian's conceptions that received their certain place in the process of development of philosophical thought worldwide, namely: Transformational Logic, Polylogic, the

Principle of Linguistic Complementarity, Argumentation Theory, History of Philosophy, Metaphilosophy, etc.

The renaming ceremony was accompanied by the exhibition of the world-renowned Scholar's awards.



The Renaming Ceremony of the Department of Philosophy and Logic in honor of academician Georg Brutian



The articles included in the present volume are the talks introduced at the conference *Life and Philosophy*, the discussion of which in the conference sections is considered as an actual substitute for review procedure, necessary for publication. The content of the issue and its sections are formed according to the

conference sections. The articles involved discuss the current problems of epistemology, philosophy of science, methodology, metaphilosophy, argumentation, socio-political philosophy, philosophy of history and psychology. Like all previous issues, this one also contains the *Chair of Young Scientist* this

time including 8 articles.

The journal “Wisdom” is broadening the indexes of its availability within the scientific community and representation in international electronic platforms. It is included in the list of the scientific journals recognized by the Higher Attestation Commission of the Republic of Armenia among other rated periodicals that address fundamental results and theses of dissertations. “Wisdom” is registered in Scientific Indexing Services (SIS), Journal Impact Factor (JIF), Eurasian Scientific Journal Index (ESJI), Scientific Journal Impact Factor (SJIF), International Scientific Indexing (ISI), European Reference Index for the Humanities

and Social Sciences (ERIH PLUS), Advanced Scientific Index (ASI), eLIBRARY, EBSCO and CYBERLENINKA International Scientometric Databases.

Given the significance of the underlying principle of pluralism over scientific issues and freedom of speech, we should remind that the authors carry primary responsibility for the viewpoints introduced in their articles which may not always coincide with those of the Editorial Board.

The Editorial Board extends its gratitude to all the authors, reviewers, professional critics and assessors of the articles for their assistance in preparing the papers submitted.



EPISTEMOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE,
METAPHILOSOPHY, ARGUMENTATION

THE THREE-TIER CORRECTIVE REASONING

Abstract

Written in honour of the late Academician Georg Brutian, the paper draws attention on one of the most special means of the transformative logic, the *corrective argumentation*, called here reasoning, that better emphasises the specific of arguments as such: that to inform semantically about the intention to arrive to certain conclusions. The corrective reasoning is that which *reviews* not only the validity of *inferences*, but also of the different types of *premises* lying at the basis of the theories people erect about every moment and aspect of life and reality. The corrective reasoning is the *form* of the capacity to critique the former judgements and has three *tiers*: the first – concluding that the former/existing theory was proven to be wrong; the second – gathering the arguments of alternative theories, and the third – focusing on the best/or even only *in present* the more economical alternative theory.

Every tier has *more strata* of reasoning whose result is the correction: the conclusion that 1) the old results (and focus on examples/situations), so the *old* theories require/directly send to their refutation, and 2) the conclusion suggests just some arguments of *alternative* theories. The corrective argumentation is not reduced to propositions, neither to syllogisms, but is constituted of the many relationships between statements.

From all the domains the corrective argumentation does manifest within and about, the scientific one was chose just because here the corrective approach is compulsory and its pattern – the most obvious. An epistemological analysis was deployed and it was demonstrated that the goal of the corrective reasoning is *truth* (in a certain concrete temporal interval) and the way to it involves the better understanding of the *semantic* level of language and its dependence on the real world.

Because the corrective reasoning is a question of *daring* and *imagining* new theories, the mechanism of this process was sketched by showing that consciousness has not only a *passive* face (that of representations) but always an *active* one too (the intention toward the external world), and by focusing on the *logical forms* as structures of thinking and their relationships with the external world “through the medium of” their internal consistence and coherence. In its turn, argumentation has in view both the *formal* model and *substantial* model of situations.

The specific of the corrective reasoning in science shows the difficulty of this endeavour and some deviations from this specific. The conclusion is that, indeed, the corrective reasoning is revolutionary.

Keywords: corrective reasoning/argumentation, science, scientific theories, truth, imagination, logical forms, conditions of validity, incorrect knowledge.

1. Introduction

I intend to present a reasoning that is within the core of transformational logic: *the corrective reasoning*. In fact, it is about *argumentation*, considering not only the validity of inferences, but also the (*changing*) types of premises and the *questioning/reviewing* of their arguments/proofs; as a result of this reviewing, new premises are constituted and the old ones are no longer true, but only true in their temporal frame: and thus they became (historical) hypotheses whose conclusions are, obviously, no longer true.

Indeed, if logic contributes to the transformations within and of the world, it does this through its capacity *to review and critique* its former manifestations. And do not forget: logic is always *propositional*, “mental” or “explicit” (as Brutian has pointed, Brutian, 1998, p. 96), and not a question of unarticulated proof of the empirical facts. On the contrary, these empirical facts are viewed/sensed and thus they have “corresponding images” – specific synapses leading to units of more or less coherent information – in the human mind. These units of information, their deployment and linking must be, however, expressed in words and judgements. The corrective reasoning/argumentation is the *form* of the capacity to critique the former judgements and has three *tiers*:

- the first – concluding that the former/existing theory was proven to be wrong,
- the second – gathering the arguments of alternative theories,
- and the third – focusing on the best/or even only *in present* the more economical alternative theory.

The corrective argumentation constitutes in the diachrony or process of confrontation of theories with reality, including with the theoretical refutations of their tenets, and accumulation of proofs of their falsity or incongruence.

Every tier has *more strata* of reasoning whose result is the correction: the conclusion that 1) the old results (and focus on examples/situations), so the *old* theories require/directly send to their refutation, and 2) the conclusion suggests/brings just some arguments of *alternative* theories (theories opposed to the old ones, and constructing systematically – with the theoretical instruments of scientific theories: arguments, verification, falsification, demonstration, experiments, all of them both real and virtual – the best or most economical alternative theory). Actually, every tier is like a Matrioshka doll, containing more propositions, different levels of arguments and their valuation: the biggest doll being that where the final conclusion of the correction, after the intermediary assessments, is constituted. The corrective argumentation is not reduced to propositions, neither to syllogisms, but is constituted of the many relationships between statements: it supposes the connecting of “simple” truths of propositions and syllogisms in order to configure a new truth/viewpoint about reality.

It’s obvious that the pattern of corrective reasoning is realised in – and may be deduced from – both the common thinking and the scientific endeavour. In the first it is experienced in the practical process of *learning through trial and error*, or of *falsification of prejudices*, or of *experiences in doing and thinking*. And sometimes the correction arrives too late, when the better solution does no longer

change the implacable course of things following the former decisions: then if people say aloud “I regret” (Bazac, 2016) – but many are not educated to think this, let alone to say – they can at least be happy that finally, though often in the final moment, they understood the right alternative as well as the necessity to correct one’s position; but not this ethical analysis is intended here. Anyway, the regret shows that a corrective reasoning already has occurred.

Concerning the scientific endeavour, just its realm is where the pattern of corrective reasoning arises in the most obvious way. It does it through the epistemological analysis of the developed, sophisticated movement of thinking – illustrated in the best way by scientific theories.

2. Epistemology of the corrective essence of scientific theories

How does this pattern constitute? The *ground* is that the former theories prove to be more and more uncomfortable (denied by their consequences, falsified by experiences). Actually, the corrective argumentation is the result of and is doubling both the *doubts* concerning the old theories and the *tensions* between the tendency to keep them *or* to conceive of alternative theories: at the beginning, it advances only the *possibility* of these alternative theories. Consequently, the corrective argumentation is the sign of a *crisis* of knowledge and more, of the possibility of emergence of the novelty that ends the former crisis.

As we see, the problem of the pattern of corrective reasoning is one of epistemology (and one of the more important): and of epis-

temology as conscious and systematic approach of the constitution and development of *rational/scientific theories* which represent the best understanding of the world in a space-temporal framework. This epistemology has developed in the 20th century, *after* the agglomeration of scientific theories with certain and fruitful results. The analysis of these theories has put also the problem of their constitution, evolution and superseding. As we know, Thomas Kuhn with his theory of *discontinuous* scientific revolutions (1962) was one of the leading representatives of the evolutionary/historical epistemology: where the new paradigms correct/substitute the old ones grounding the “normal science”, being thus the result and the sign of a deep corrective reasoning. Another representative was Karl Popper, whose process of *falsification*, being permanent, transforms the evolution of science into a *continuous* revision of theories (as in Toulmin, 1972) following the data/experiments falsifying their tenets. In fact, both these great thinkers have completed each other, coming into notice the different temporal and psychological aspects of the corrective reasoning.

3. What is it at stake in the corrective reasoning: the way to truth

The corrective argumentation is the gate toward *imagination*¹, i.e. *openness toward a*

¹ At the historical level, we can remember one of the first signs of corrective reasoning: that of the making of tools from stones or branches – whose first appearance did not suggest their functions as extension of man’s abilities but only their external objectivity of eventually desired things – but *imagined* by humans as

plurality of alternatives. Firstly, it only overturns the first theory and thus it seems that only one alternative would be possible: the negative form of the first theory. But then, during the first tier – the process of falsification of the former arguments – multiple paths are opening pushing people to reflect on challenging alternatives.

Indeed, in the corrective process one learns and arrives to the *methodological* conclusion that there are never only two alternatives (the former theory and its negation), but always *multiple negations* or, respecting the sides and nuances of the real problems, *multiple paths to understand and solve them*. Therefore, if logic is which “get you from A to B” – as Einstein said, while “imagination will take you everywhere”, he added – the logic itself favours this overtaking, since it plays with *possibilities*: and I do not speak about the modals, but about the formula of reasoning, the mandatory consequences of the premises taking place in different times/realities.

The corrective reasoning once more emphasises the *semantic* level of language (Morris, 1938, pp. 21-28), drawing attention on the relations between the signs/phrases and their denotation/referent. Only from this standpoint of the relations between phrases and their referent do we speak about *truth and false*: or the *criteria* according to which we consider the phrases as true or false refer just to the relations between the phrases and their denotations. The truth value of a phrase is just the denotation / that what the phrase refers to / the *significances* of the phrase. Consequently, the reasoning – relationships between phrases – and especially the corrective reasoning, have

protraction of their hands. Imagination itself was the result of a corrective reasoning.

in view their *informative* value: the significances being true or false *corresponding to the information the phrases provide*. Certainly, it is always about the conditions – among whom the *syntactic* means too – when the significances are true: i.e. the significances are taken into account as true when they present the information in the enounced conditions. In other words, this is the *illocutionary* meaning, and phrases have their illocutionary potential resulted from the illocutionary rule of correspondence between the reality they have in view and their transparent intention to articulate this reality (Alston, 2000, pp. 58-64).

The reasoning is a logical inference, where the inference is valid: according to the informative/semantic/illocutionary rule and value. *The reasoning is that which develops the meanings of the words, and the words themselves*: only by experimenting the logical inferences and their critique/confrontation with other inferences and the real state of things, one creates and becomes aware of new meanings, words and new aspects of reality.

But in this process, the difference between logical inferences and arguments does appear. The simple statement of a fact, as logical as it is/ as logically it is expressed, is not an argument: or, if we use a metaphorical synonymy, it is only an implicit argumentation. “It’s winter and it’s cold” or “Peter doubts Mary is there” have informative meaning about some facts and use the logical inferring, but they do not inform about the intention to use these phrases as *support* of certain conclusions. *The arguments are just those inferences that inform semantically about the intention to arrive to certain conclusions*. The words *for, because, but, nevertheless, howev-*

er, at the same time, even though, almost, as much as etc. signal just this intention. Actually, these words cooperate to give the meaning of a phrase, meaning “claiming to give the orientation of the further dialogue” (Anscombe et Ducrot, 1976, p. 14). *To argument is just to give the orientation toward a certain conclusion.*

If in arguments the premises are considered true – even if they are presented as hypotheses (Anscombe et Ducrot, 1983) – it results that the conclusions must be true too: although the phrases – and more, the chains of phrases – are polyphonic, *the arguments are blocks of phrases and significances which direct the results.*

If so, then the understanding of the world follows an unceasing dialogue and confrontation between arguments. Each of them starting from different premises and orienting to different conclusions. The permanent revision of arguments is then normal: because there is not only about the confrontation of formal expressions, but also – and when all is told – *the confrontation of these formal expressions with the reality they intend to describe and transmit.* The *praxis* that mediates this confrontation – the practical analysis of information resulted from the reaction and action relationships to and with the environment, and the correction of reactions and actions (including the representations about the world) according to this analysis/ the information resulted – supposes and includes just the confrontation between *representations* and arguments.

Thus, the corrective reasoning is the first *human* tool of the adaptation to environment, the inner condition of *action* relationships with this environment. Actually, the human

logos as such and the human action – creating tools of action and transforming both the environment and the human being – intertwine and are interdependent, but the “banal” pattern of logic is the basis of the *human* character of all reactions.

As we know, the Greeks, Plato and Aristotle were somehow naïve: they seemed to presuppose that, since the *logos* and the ability to articulate it were/are the condition of humanity and since the *logos* meant/means to discern the truth from the false and to arrive to/choose the truth because only the truth is the sign of *logos*, if something is known (therefore, people have arrived to the truth) it is already (or at least virtually) realised as such and the positive consequences of this fact follow and are to shape the course of things: simply, people will assume the truth², has thought Plato, while Aristotle has pointed that the incorrect statements and behaviour would be the result of opinions. Actually, this course is more complicated, and unfortunately it is not the result of the truth only (and nor can we emphasise it only from the emotions, since there is always a coexistence of reason and emotions). For this reason: nor can we conceive the corrective reasoning as occurring systematically only with an eye to the truth and its beneficial results. No, the corrective reasoning is only a *means* in man’s concrete historical exploits. In rhetoric – and not only – intentional false corrective reasoning are

² Actually, this standpoint corresponds to a very modern understanding of knowledge as such: we know only what is true – or, obviously, considered as true in a certain temporal and social frame – and assumed by the speaker; for us, the nonsense are only noise and we remove them from our consciousness.

common, since the goal of rhetoric is to convince, and not to learn the truth.

From the multifarious manifestations of the corrective reasoning in the entire human life I chose that from the scientific theory. Here the *conscious / intentional* corrective reasoning is a compulsory demarche: otherwise the progress of knowledge does not take place. The second constraint is that in science the search for truth – and not for convincing and dominating – is compulsory as well: knowledge and its progress depend just on the proportion of true cognisance and ways to them. Consequently, the model of scientific argumentation might be taken as model of the corrective reasoning.

4. The corrective reasoning and imagination

The corrective reasoning is a question of *daring* – to doubt about the existing reasoning and its ordinariness – and of *imagining* alternative arguments. Some elements related to imagination and developed in the first half of the 20th century – on the trail of Kant's constructivism – are useful for the understanding of the corrective reasoning. These elements appear in Husserl and (Sartre, 1936) and consist of new relations between the objective primordially of the external world and the subjective consciousness of this world. Thus, the consciousness is not only *representation* – i.e. the *passive* face of consciousness – but always *active intention* concerning the object/world focused on. Because the awareness is always the awareness of something, the image of this something in the consciousness is different from the external something, and *the intention of the awareness concerns the ex-*

ternal something, and not the image of this external something in the consciousness. However, the internal image – a marvellous invention of the consciousness – is already presenting us two things: the *image* as such – the representation/the realisation of the representation (*noesis*, said Husserl) – and its *meaning* (*noema*, in Husserl's terms) relating the representation and the external object. The meaning is *relational*, and just through the permanent intended confrontation of the internal image to the external intended object the creativity of the consciousness is possible.

And certainly, this *creativity* – arisen from the intentionality of the awareness (Husserl) – has as means and steps the corrective reasoning.

Sartre and Merleau-Ponty too have taken over this standpoint of the *active* consciousness, overtaking the habitual Cartesian view of passive representations, and demonstrating that the image is not a simple contents of the consciousness, but the operation of the *whole consciousness*, they have shown that this operation is *socially relational*: the noemas are socially constructed (Bazac, 2008). If so, the articulation of the understanding of the world – the expression of *logos* – supposes the social confrontation of different reasoning/arguments and inevitably their correction.

5. The logical form of the corrective reasoning

Indeed, the concrete manifestation of imagination / the manner it manifests is the *logical form*. Certainly, both the previous and the present chapter do occupy with what we detect in the human mind / consciousness (here the distinction mind-consciousness is super-

fluous): actually, some aspects of the World 2, of mental processes and facts, as Popper has named them. But without understanding these aspects the habit of reasoning and correcting one's reasoning cannot be grasped either.

Therefore, the logical form is a *structure of thinking*, a logical *general* reflecting or isomorphic with the infinite variety of real particulars. The form of thinking has constituted within the process of complication of the (human) reactions to environment and was "abstracted" in order to reflect and put order within the infinite contents of the real world (or to have the ability to grasp it). This process has entitled the old Greeks to observe that the *logos* of the world and that of humans are the same.

The subtext of this observation was the confidence into both the reasonability of the world and especially the reason/good sense as the most equally distributed among human beings, as later on has Descartes formulated. But what was the reason of this confidence? Just the common logical forms allowing people to think, to judge: and the fact that these *forms were and are always verified*.

How are they verified? Obviously, the transposition of the structures of thinking into structures of language – as we know, this transposition is mostly (but not entirely) the result of a didactic process of separation of naturally interdependent levels – supposes these two types of structures/levels. Sometimes they are mutually hindering themselves in the reflecting/coherent articulating of the coloured various states of affairs: either "we have no words" for what we are grasping and even understanding, or we have some words, including habits of inferences, but things are

not clear for us, and we arrive to substitute the real grasping with words and descriptions and arguments.

Anyway, in order to understand the world, people endeavour three types of verification (which are certainly intertwined): first, they verify the *process of thinking* and, since they have "some knowledge of logical forms" (Dumitru, 2015, p. 13), i.e. they judge within inferences and consider their correctness as a reason of the correct understanding, they are *aware* of this level of logical forms and always meet again them; secondly, they know the *words* and are sensitive towards their *significances* (towards the nuances of different synonyms etc.), and therefore try to fit the words to their intentions and thinking; and thirdly, they verify the *correspondence* of their reasoning and expressing for their fellow humans *with the real facts*.

In fact, as we saw, the human beings are always positioned in a double situation: on the one hand, they act/think/speak/solve the problem, and on the other hand but at the same time, they are *aware* of their acting/thinking/speaking/solving: they speak using/trying to use the right words for the given circumstance, they verify their inner inferences, and put face to face the given circumstance/the real things and their judgements and vocal discourses. It does seem that man is a corrective animal, does it?

The complexity formed by *n* levels of reality as they are grasped by the human intentions and structures of thinking once more appears in the corrective reasoning as such. Here we find *the counter-posing of the arguments to reality* – and certainly, this moment has as a ground *n* premises, experiences, arguments – and the *clash between arguments*,

this clash itself corresponding to different layers/stages of the understanding and again having as a ground n premises, experiences and counter-posing to reality, arguments. Thus, the corrective reasoning appears in front of the necessity to solve a new situation, when the former arguments/theories do no more correspond and the solving needs the exceeding of routine in reasoning and acting: the corrective reasoning is the sign of the *creativity* of the human beings.

The pattern of this Janus type *complex* reasoning is based on the constraint of *validity* and this constraint in its turn is based on that of *necessity*: it is absolutely necessary the new arguments be consistent and coherent, as the old ones were (towards the intellectual conditions of their time, of course). This means that the arguments can explain the “new”³ reality *only if* they meet (therefore, *from the standpoint of logic*) a three tier necessity⁴.

- The first tier, the *logical* necessity means that at the level of *logical forms*, the conclusions follow from the premises “without the need of any further additional as-

sumptions that might turn out to be wrong/false” (Ibid).

- The second tier, the *semantic* necessity means that to some specific meanings (which are the result of the intention of consciousness) some specific words/expressions do correspond: the *meanings* are here the most important. Therefore, from *analytical* standpoint, the *semantic* necessity means that the *words* and expressions have *meanings* which are not denied by the common (or scientific) intuition: the correct use of *words* is here the most important.
- The third tier is the *naturalist* necessity that means that there is always a final correspondence between the logical use of words and the (always changing) real state of affairs: or that there is always a criterion of *satisfaction* (as Tarski has considered even for formalised languages, and Fine has developed in “The Problem of *De Re* Modality” (Fine, 1989)) towards words and thoughts according to their relations with the real world⁵.

³ A new reality may be not only a new real object unnoticed before, but also an aspect grasped with new intellectual tools (theories, experiments, concepts, principles, criteria).

⁴ In the three types of logical necessity – logical (in fact, formal), analytical, metaphysical – are from Dumitru. Fine has talked about metaphysical, natural and normative (“there are three distinct sources of necessity - the identity of things, the natural order and the normative order - and that each gives rise to its own peculiar form of necessity” (Fine, 2005)). I speak about logical, semantic/analytical and naturalist (as the principle of necessity to apply to the objects) and specific/natural.

⁵ Or, as in the good comparison (Fine, 1989, p. 199): “The focus of the logical argument is on the intelligibility of a certain kind of *expression*. The question is whether there is any meaningful use for free variables within the scope of a modal operator. The focus of the metaphysical argument is on the intelligibility of a certain kind of *idea*. The question is whether it makes sense to say of an object that it necessarily fulfills a condition. One might say that in the one case we are concerned with the intelligibility of a certain kind of expression without regard of what it might express, while in the other case we are concerned with a cer-

And for not divagate too much (to the discussion of what does “real” mean, but also of the *normative* approach of the real – the fact that the human subject sees the real from the standpoint of “the good”/perfection of reality according to the models historically created by man, but also according to the explicitly good for the human person – that meaning that there is also a *normative* necessity), one can note that, still from the standpoint of logic,

- one has arrived at a fourth tier of necessity, the *metaphysical* one, explaining the reason of the logical use of words – i.e. the primordially of their meanings as they arise from the relationships with the “objects” cut up by the intentionality of consciousness – in the *correspondence between the logical use of words and the identity of objects*: or, differently put, in the *care* of the human consciousness for the grasping and logical treatment of the identity of objects. Kit Fine has shown that the logical forms too reflect the identity of objects: “if logical form can take account of the repeated occurrence of a sentence, it should also be able to take account of the repeated occurrence of an object” (Fine, *Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers*, quoted in Dumitru, *op.cit.*: pp. 15-16), and thus the modality *de re* is intelligible. Therefore, we define the *words* (according to their meanings) and the analytical truths are the conclusions of the definitional truths according to their meanings; the definition is thus of the *meanings*, but this is tantamount to say that it is of the *objects* signified by

tain kind of idea without regard for how it might be expressed.”

the words: “*the activities of specifying the meaning of a word and of stating what an object is are essentially the same; and hence each of them has an equal right to be regarded as a form of definition*”. Consequently, “The metaphysical necessity refers to the existence of objects in their identity: the necessity has its source in those objects which are the subject of the underlying essentialist claim... The metaphysically necessary truths can then be identified with the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all objects whatever” (Fine, 1994).

Finally, as it was mentioned and already implicated in the above note about the metaphysical identity, there are types of necessity which are beyond the logical criteria: normative necessity and *specific* necessity (that is the concrete manifestation of the naturalist necessity) in different *sciences* and *standpoints of the different levels/layers of reality*. “Neither form of necessity can be subsumed, defined or otherwise understood by reference to any other forms of necessity” (Fine, 2005).

This last criterion of necessity, that of the standpoints *of the different levels/layers of reality* and, certainly, of the sciences studying them, is which is tackled in this paper and it is suggested by those who has shown the complementary character of the formal criteria advanced by logics and the “worldly” criteria of the real life (Toulmin 2003⁶, but also Fine).

⁶ “But analyticity is one thing, formal validity is another; and neither of these is a universal criterion of necessity, still less of the soundness of our arguments”, Toulmin, 2003, p. 134; “logic is a normative subjective, concerned with the appraisal of arguments and the recognition of their merits, one could hardly expect any-

The logical forms allowing the validity of inferences – thus, the formal possibility of truth – are only the scaffolding of the meanings it relates, and relates in such a manner as they might correspond to the real objects (as they grasp the identity of objects). Technically speaking, the relationship between meanings (of words, formulas etc.) and objects is one of *intelligibility*, and not of truth, and the *valid inferences relate intelligibility and truth*: both the intelligible meanings and objects, and the clarification of the complex relationships between *objects* (obviously, reflected in words with meanings). As much, the validity of inferences/logical forms contains an entire history of clarifications (negations, corrections). Simply put and letting aside the logical necessity (the necessity of logical forms and their *sine qua non* character), the logical forms reflect and structure the real necessity (this means also, in philosophical language, the metaphysical necessity of identity): and the human beings are *constitutively aware* of these necessities and their interacting, and they seek to control this complex fact, and arrive to do this. Once more, this is the reason of the Greek idea of coincidence of the cosmic and human *logos*.

6. The argumentation

From the most popular types of argumentation – in mathematics and in the juridical

thing else”, p. 173; it would be necessary “the reintroduction of historical, empirical and even-in a sense-anthropological considerations into the subject which philosophers had prided themselves on purifying, more than all other branches of philosophy, of any but *a priori* arguments”, p. 234.

realm – Toulmin (2003) has derived that to arrive to a valid argument means to combine the “quasi-geometrical” form of the logical inference and the proper procedures to a certain problem. However, this answer “creates a further problem for us: to see how and why proper procedure demands the adoption of simple geometrical shape, and how that shape guarantees in its turn the validity of our procedures. Supposing valid arguments can be cast in a geometrically tidy form, how does this help to make them any the more cogent?” (Ibid, p. 88)

Consequently, one has to unite the simple explanation of logical arguments – the game of logical inferences of conclusions from premises (the logical forms), and the procedural rules of these inferences – with the “field-dependence” of the criteria or standards of evaluation of the choice of arguments and words. The assessment of the validity of an argument (i.e. its consideration as correct/good) has in view both the *formal* model of situations – for example, “In any field, the conclusions that ‘cannot’ be the case are those we are obliged to rule out” (Ibid, pp. 33-34), namely, the negative conclusions do not suppose their opposite would be possible in the same case and in the same time; or for the formal model of possibility the conclusion “must ‘have what it takes’ in order to be entitled to genuine consideration *in that context*” (Ibid, p. 34) – and the *substantial* one specific to domains and problems.

The authority of arguments arises, thus, from their scheme (Ibid, pp. 87-130): *data*, *warrants*, *backing of warrants*, *correctness of syllogisms* in the specific case, and types of *conclusions* (necessary or probable). The scheme always must be adapted to the do-

mains/problems/cases, its weight depends on the substantial reasons/field the scheme is applied within; and the apparent complication of this scheme with the backing of warrants – i.e. demonstration/argumentation of the “proofs” advanced in order to justify the initial claim and to draw to a valid conclusion, or demonstration of demonstrations, or the *burden of proofs* related to the reasons advanced by the claims which links the initial data – signifies that the argumentation is not a syllogism, but a system of syllogisms, *n* syllogisms, as it was mentioned before: the argumentation deals not with propositions, but with statements. And that: even though the conclusion takes place in the register of possibility, the argumentation reflects the logic of necessity, the consciousness of the necessity of that conclusion raising the problem of possibility.

The formal model of argumentation is absolutely necessary: but “it is not a paradigm” (Ibid, p. 133). This emphasis is very important for the corrective argumentation. Not the correctness of only the syllogism is at stake, but the entire coherent articulation of many syllogisms, that supposes: that at the basis people exercises their capacity to differentiate the things, then to link them, in a selective manner, then to arrive to some conclusions, and then to revise and correct the entire cycle of reasoning. Only in this way do we meet with liable argumentation, backing our lives so as to understand the reasons and consequences of our actions.

7. The corrective reasoning in science

In science, the verification is permanent, never once for all, and thus the falsification

(Popper) is, as a matter of fact, only a manner of verification. Thus, in the course of time, it is possible that old theories, already falsified and proved invalid, be used as important elements for a state-of-the-art theory in a domain (as in the present biology, the holistic approach of Aristotle, see only Delbrück, 1971; Bastit, 2016).

The corrective reasoning in science arises when the truth of a theory – and we know from Aristotle that, in order to arrive to the truth in a certain domain and in a certain temporal interval, a theory presented by the master to the disciple must have and has only one solution, and secure, while the answers resulted from a controversy aiming to persuade might have two and have different types and degrees of possibility (probability) – is shaken by different material evidences of its historical character of plausibility. The corrective reasoning is thus the antidote to the perishability of the truth as such.

The problem is that the material evidences of a theory/of its falsification are not the result of a cold analysis observing all the procedural rules of reasoning and scientific research, nor are they the following of the neutral agglomeration of facts being self-evident to the whole scientific community. The scientific research is a social process and all its aspects depend on many socially constructed interests, including the one of the search for truth. As a consequence, as the first step of a scientific research and making of a theory begins with the putting of probable premises, as the corrective approach of the existing theories treats its elements from a social standpoint, i.e. from different social points of view.

If so, the scientific argumentation does no longer appear as a clear-cut phenomenon

in the sky of independent thinking confronting “objective facts” and arriving to one-sided and simple truths, but just a permanent quarrel of different hypotheses related to the same fact as well as to different ones. As Popper has shown, every fact is preceded by a *problem* – actually, the fact is considered through the angle of a *hypothesis* questioning the present theory and the fact as such – and then the hypothesis itself is inquired confronting it with facts. If we do not put the hypothesis to the test of induction (to the test of the confrontation with facts – and do not forget, irrespective of our selection of facts, they are never simple and few), we transform the hypothesis, as well as we did with the former theories, into prejudices.

Yes, before we tack together the hypothesis – the *abductive reasoning*, as Peirce has theorised it – we have a “*perceptual judgement*” (an open wonder regarding the fact, i.e. the new face of the world through the lens of the fact) which is not the object of the logical and scientific analysis, it is outside criticism. Only *the abductive reasoning* constituted on the basis of perceptual judgements is the object of scientific inquiry, for this reason it is “the first step of scientific reasoning” (Peirce, 1958, § 218), the only one type bringing a new idea (Peirce, 1932, § 96) and being put to the test of facts (induction: the experimental testing of the hypothesis, Peirce, 1958, § 206).

The specific logical steps of science are deduction and induction, just on the basis of the abduction that proceeds as a “circumstantial method” from “the humblest details just because of their individualizing attitude” (Caretini, 1988, 141): in opposition with the Galilean paradigm of “universalizing, ab-

stracting, quantifying reason” and tending to eliminate the individual, the accidental (Ibid, pp. 140, 141). We infer by comparing homogenous facts and deducing general features, and then by comparing heterogeneous facts, and a group of homogenous or heterogeneous facts with a single one, an “accident”: and we have either a given rule in order to back our reasoning, or it is selected from plausible but probable rules already existing in our universe of knowledge, or we create the rule and we have to test it with the facts which awakened our need to guess a new rule (Eco, 1988). Thus, in every moment of the scientific research we have to think in a hypothetical manner and to put this hypothetical manner to the test of facts (AB. the test of correspondence) and of the grounds of our knowledge and hypotheses (see also Reichertz, 2010).

There is also the test of coherence of different rational decisions to choose such or such argumentation and theory (see Thagard, 2000), but what is important is that the entire problem of logic is related to the external facts and that this relationship supposes a permanent adaptation of the diverse reasoning to these external facts and milieu: while this adaptation, as well as the logic “of syllogism” (we remember, the syllogism was/ meant the unification of words), reflect the constraints of the social: they are “language games” if I may use Wittgenstein’s formula, reflecting both the empirical causality and the formal one. The universals of the scientific inquiries arise just from this intertwining. Professor Brutian was right: the logic of argumentation (the above-mentioned logical forms) is universal, but argumentation depends on domains and context (Brutian, 1998).

8. Two warnings of psychology

a) If there is never a pure behaviour of emotions – and certainly never one of reasonableness alone –, since reason and feelings intertwine and, beyond the individual, there is always somewhere in the general social atmosphere the intuition or knowledge of the reasonable/logical solution, the scientific endeavour ought to surpass the random character of reasonable control over emotions. In science, one must be conscious about the necessity to free the quest for truth from emotions and interests external to the scientific research. Indeed, science means consciousness of movement/development/change, thus of the logic of critique of every cognisance: consciousness of its inner corrective strategy, consciousness of the absolute necessity of this strategy, consciousness of its inner correctible character, and certainly, consciousness of the corrective endeavour as a result of the social dialogue in narrow and large sense as well. In science, the individual is not an isolated entity.

The consciousness of the corrective strategy – of every human, of society, and of science – is the more important as it reflects and realises that this corrective approach pertains only to the living, and obviously, only the superior living, the humans have the awareness of this approach. *Creation means permanent correction*, for indeed, the living matter does not behave as a simple repetition of the laws of physics, and the human being even more “co-designs its existence” (Nadin, 2015, p. 7). And finally, the importance of the consciousness of the corrective strategy derives from the human consciousness of time, better – of the human treatment of time,

where *anticipation* and *creativity* intertwine (Nadin, 2015). The consciousness of one’s own identity and situation helps people to control themselves – and concretely, to correct their former reasoning and points of view – or to master their own power (as Aristotle has observed in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1150a12 -13): in fact, to impose reason over passion.

b) The consciousness is not enough to correct – and consciously – a theory according to the truthful data existent in a certain interval. As there is an individual superficiality and simplification of the theories one adhere to – see for example the halo effect fallacy, where people have a cognitive dissonance, i.e. the consciousness that they do not know, then they “correct” this situation by inferring from a single aspect the general state of things, concretely from “a perceived single positive trait of a person the conclusion of a generally positive assessment of that person” (Grcic, 2008) – as there is a tendency to reduce/simplify theories about more complicated and “invisible” sides of reality.

9. Finally, the examples related to science

The classic ones are those summarised by Bertrand Russell (Russell 1950, pp. 73, 74, 75, 78, 80-81-82). The clash between the argument of authority and the scientific reasoning having n proofs/data and backings, the theories of the Ages of Faith and those of the modern science are already well-known⁷.

⁷ Let mention only some ones as referred to in Russell: Miracles, many thousands of witches burned; “Men’s sins were punished by pestilence and famine, by earthquake, flood, and fire”; “To suppose that there are human beings

at the antipodes was heresy”; “When Benjamin Franklin invented the lightning-rod, the clergy, both in England and America, with the enthusiastic support of George III, condemned it as an impious attempt to defeat the will of God”; “Although we are taught the Copernican astronomy in our textbooks, it has not yet penetrated to our religion or our morals, and has not even succeeded in destroying belief in astrology. People still think that the Divine Plan has special reference to human beings, and that a special Providence not only looks after the good, but also punishes the wicked”; “It was only very slowly and reluctantly that the church sanctioned the dissection of corpses in connection with the study of medicine. The pioneer in dissection was Vesalius, who was Court physician to the Emperor Charles V. His medical skill led the Emperor to protect him, but after the Emperor was dead he got into trouble”; “It is odd that modern men, who are aware of what science has done in the way of bringing new knowledge and altering the conditions of social life, should still be willing to accept the authority of texts embodying the outlook of very ancient and very ignorant pastoral or agricultural tribes”; “There are logical difficulties in the notion of Sin. We are told that Sin consists in disobedience to God’s commands, but we are also told that God is omnipotent. If He is, nothing contrary to His will can occur; therefore when the sinner disobeys His commands, He must have intended this to happen. St. Augustine boldly accepts this view, and asserts that men are led to sin by a blindness with which God afflicts them. But most theologians, in modern times, have felt that, if God causes men to sin, it is not fair to send them to hell for what they cannot help. We are told that sin consists in acting contrary to God’s will. This, however, does not get rid of the difficulty. Those who, like Spinoza, take God’s omnipotence seriously, deduce that there

People have corrected the old theories having as argument the authority of Holy Scriptures of all the religions, and, though this process of superseding was painful and long, they have arrived to theories having as support the scientific inquiry of phenomena. (And, inherently, absurdities are found in great philosophers too – such as, in Plato, that “men who do not pursue wisdom in this life will be born again as women”, or, in Aristotle, that “the blood of females is blacker than that of males; that the pig is the only animal liable to measles; that an elephant suffering from insomnia should have its shoulders rubbed with salt, olive oil, and warm water...that women have fewer teeth than men, and so on” – but “Commentators on great philosophers always politely ignore their silly remarks” (Ibid, p. 99).

But there are many examples in the science of the last 66 years after Russell’s book, which show the difficulty to correct the scientific theories. The causes of this difficulty may be categorised: as causes arising from the *extra-scientific* domains (political, economical, cultural, ideological), and as causes *inherent to the process of knowledge* itself. The latter manifest as:

- the avoiding of the *definition* of concepts used (Russell, 1950, pp. 92-99: theories about the human nature without defining

can be no such thing as sin. This leads to frightful results”; “As soon as we abandon our own reason, and are content to rely upon authority, there is no end to our troubles. Whose authority? The Old Testament? The New Testament? The Koran? In practice, people choose the book considered sacred by the community in which they are born, and out of that book they choose the parts they like, ignoring the others”.

it; pp. 99-101: belief in ‘nature’ and ‘what is natural’; etc.);

- the *unclear* definitions putting the functional analysis in both the physical and social sciences endeavour in an embarrassing situation: if there is a lack of empirical objective criteria, absolutely necessary for “precise objectively testable scientific assertions”, so only if the concepts are (AB, i.e. consciously) “relativised”, the explanations are valid and allowing predictions irrespective of the domain supposing laws or only tendencies (Hempel, 1965, p. 324);
- the concomitant use of concepts in different registers and their reciprocal substitution;
- the *separation* of *formal correctness* from the *material* one, and the ignorance of one of them, as Aristotle has shown long ago in his *Analytics*;
- in its turn, the material correctness is depending on the material *tools* the researchers use in order to measure and to “view”/perceive reality, and this material condition of correctness is too well-known as to stop on it. But see only the dependence of scientific research on IT, the omnipotent instrument that mediates our understanding of the world: a recent study (Eklund et al. 2016, corrected for alleviate and at the same time make more precise two phrases, but “These errors do not affect the conclusions of the article. The online version has been corrected”) has proved that the fMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) machine, providing an image of the brain and not the functioning in real time, and more, an image interpreted by a computer pro-

gramme, was and is depending on the quality of the software programme. And when this quality is improved in order to eliminate the errors made by the former programme, it is necessary to review all the studies elaborated with the former programme. Two epistemological problems results from this situation: one is the necessity to repeat the experiments – including with different means – in order to validate them; the repetition of experiments/studies is compulsory for the accuracy of the scientific knowledge; and certainly, the necessity to create new (theoretical and practical) instruments of experiments and their validation; the other one – is the necessity to do away with the extra-scientific impediments to make and validate scientific experiments: the prohibitive costs of experiments – when today the states fund the tireless hunger of the military-industrial complex and wars – and the privatised scientific research (of companies that search for the immediate favourable costs-benefits formula) must be annulled in a new philosophy of the scientific research;

- another source of slow correcting is the avoiding of the empirical observation “thinking that you know when in fact you don’t” (Russell, 1950, p. 103) and, once more, the avoiding of correct verification/falsification through sufficient experiments and concluding data;
- another one – is the avoiding of criticisms from the standpoint of other/opposed theories (Ibid, pp. 105-106; Popper, 1995). And certainly, the main cause of this avoiding is not technical, nor does it pertain to the psychology of researchers, but

is the dependence on the social-political constraints of the scientific research: see only the *conflict of interests* of the researchers paid by concerns like Monsanto in order to justify the healthy results of the use of their products;

- the inertia of the use of old *premises* – already demonstrated as false –: just because the premises are based on tacit scientific and social/political *presumptions* which are believed to be proper to the general atmosphere of ideas, and thus more “academic”;
- the *low flexibility* of the researchers’ model of scientific approach; indeed, we should be critical not only about the premises, but also about what occurs in every moment of the research: as we know that the “lab research” has in view cut conditions/ideal conditions, as we have to exercise our attention to the changes related to every part of the scientific pattern; because what is the most important is not the accommodation to the basic hypothesis we started from, but the *telos* of the concrete research, or its ultimate reason: like the prices of the works of art which are the result not of the starting price or of the evaluation (both these premises are “lab/ideal conditions”, with all the criteria included), but of the phenomena occurred later, when the “subjective” facts as the interest of persons and institutions and the sums allocated by them appear.

These few aspects should make us careful of the danger of “dogmatism” (Russell, in Preface), whose “growth”, though grasped by lucid minds in the mid-century, is nowadays geometrical: the neo-liberal turn of modernity

tends to impose *superficiality*, rather the *incapacity to articulate the “why” of things* (“the wherefore and the cause”, said Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1, 981a1), (and “when adults fall back to the primitive causal schema and over-extend it beyond the realm of mechanical causation, misconceptions are bound to occur” (Chen, 2015, p. 21), the *relativisation of meanings*, the *incapacity to understand the difference between evil and good*, and all of these turns are but a burden with ugly consequences for the logical thinking. Then what can we say about the corrective capacity of this logic?

10. Instead of conclusions

The corrective reasoning is always *revolutionary*: it changes the former theories – their presumptions, demonstrations, steps – and thus it erases the common impression that the logical forms/ the logic of argumentation or demonstration would be always cold and separated from the exuberant ontological diversity and possibilities of human points of view. Yes, the difficulty to see, to grasp and to understand seems as if the cold forms would lead to conformist manners of thinking: or as if their habit is that of fixing and reducing, impoverishing the infinite profusion of levels of reality and moments of their human understanding. In effect, the logical forms and the logic of argumentation are only *means*, so *tools*, of the understanding of the world and they *follow* the variety and wealth of its levels, moments and problems. People do understand when the logical tools are used in a non-logical way, and if they blame the logic and seem to be tired of so many arguments, it is not because of their turn toward an

illogical status – though the rulers tend to determine this turn – that would oppose to reasonable arguments, but just because they are thirsty of logic, of accuracy, of precision. They feel that just the lack of logic, of accuracy, of precision does erase the infinite richness they could enjoy humanly.

The guilt of the illogical attitudes of people is then not the powerlessness of logic, but of the domination-submission relations which instrumentalise the logic, as they do with all the human features and instruments.

And let me mention that the power of the corrective reasoning (and attitudes) is shown by one of the most interesting forms of human practice: the *fables*, which are not simple lessons abstracted from tales, but demonstrations of the corrective characteristic of humans. Let me remind two old Armenian fables, written by Mkhithar Goch in the 12th century: 1) “The fig tree was asked: ‘Why you bend your branches so much to earth?’ It answered: ‘I have many enemies and I lower myself for they do not break my branches. Before one climbs on me, I reassure them and the enemies forget their malice’...; 2) “A foolish man badly hit a jujube tree, taking it as a blackberry. The tree became angry and said: ‘O, cruel man, one must recognise the plant according to its fruits, not according to its appearance’... (Deux...2006, pp. 16, 21).

The corrective reasoning has a *holistic* perspective. It takes account of all the tiers and aspects of a problem and its alternative theories, and this means that when all is told *the logic of arguments cannot be opposed to the ethical scruples* of peoples: the logic of arguments is for the sake of the Good, as Aristotle has considered and, later on the Stoics (Di Vita, 2016).

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COMPLIMENT TO A COMPLIMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECH ACT OF A COMPLIMENT

*Dedicated to my father
Academician Georg Brutian*

Abstract

In the paper, an attempt is made to thoroughly analyse the speech act of a compliment as a rhetorical device. In particular, the value of compliments from the viewpoint of effective communication, as well as the motives of compliment making and accepting/non-accepting are being considered. In addition, the speech act of a compliment is analysed in the light of gender and intercultural similarities and differences. It is shown that with all the similarities in the functioning of the speech act of a compliment, there are essential differences that reflect the peculiarities in the mentality of the language bearers.

Keywords: speech act of a compliment, rhetorical, impact, effective communication, gender, intercultural.

Today, as a result of intensification of contacts of various kinds the study of both interpersonal and intercultural communication which aims at minimization of communication failures and the achievement of effective and harmonious communication has been in the focus of keen interest of linguists, psychologists, philosophers, specialists in communication and in related disciplines, because of its urgency and importance.

In the framework of modern anthropocentric scientific paradigm the theory of speech acts as an integral part of the theory of communication, which is based on the ideas of outstanding philosophers of language Grice, Searle, Austin and others, occupies its own, very important niche. The object of our

investigation is the speech act of a compliment, one of the types of speech acts which has been analysed little so far. Our goal is to analyse the given speech act thoroughly, from different aspects and in the light of modern theories and research tendencies, in particular, pragmalinguistics, gender linguistics, theory of communication, etc. The following questions will be analysed in the paper: the impact of a compliment, the reasons for compliment making/not making and accepting/non-accepting, compliments in the light of gender differences, compliments in the context of intercultural communication.

As A.P. Sadokhin correctly mentions, "it has been ascertained that the character, form and the style of communication depend to a

great extent on the first minutes, sometimes – seconds of communication. There exist a lot of very simple devices that allow practically in every situation to make the initial stage of communication easier, which determines the entire further course of this process. Among such devices is a compliment” (Sadokhin, 2010, p. 139).

There are different types of compliments: sincere and flattering, effective and ambiguous, appropriate and inappropriate, etc. In rhetoric there are several requirements to compliments. In this connection I. Gorelov and K. Sedov write: “Compliment is a “small form” of epideictic eloquence which goes back to the speech culture of Middle Ages, to the tradition of extolment by the knight of his beautiful lady. ... Compliment requires realized speech efforts from the speaker, it presupposes artistic and creative orientation in speech. It goes without saying that different language personalities follow different speech strategies in creating a compliment, and the choice of these strategies is determined by the types of individual styles of the speakers. Yet, as the observations of every-day discourse have shown, ... in the choice of intragenre strategies the type of the language personality of the speech addressee plays a great role. It is not by chance that the main rhetoric recommendation in this genre is the orientation on “loving attention to the addressee and polish”. Indeed, compliment arises from the wish to please the speaker. And to evoke positive emotions in a man, one must know his individual features, including the peculiarities of his language personality. That is why the main rhetorical requirement to a compliment is harmony (compliment is made differently to different people depending on their age,

degree of closeness with them of the speaker, etc.) and the right situation (in some cases the appearance can be praised, in some other – the intellect, etc.) Besides, a compliment must be sincere and non-trivial, which corresponds to the rules of cooperative communication” (Gorelov & Sedov, 2005, pp. 180-181).

There are different **reasons** of making compliments. It is, first of all, a good means “to achieve the affection of the addressee and to establish the foundations of long-lasting and effective communication” (Sadokhin, 2010, p. 139). Compliments are made also because of courtesy. On the other hand, often compliments are made to receive a compliment in return: “You scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours”. In connection with the two-way character of a compliment F. Laroshfuko said: “As a rule, we praise other people just to hear words of praise addressed to ourselves”. There are also other reasons: “We sometimes extol the valour of one person to humiliate another person (Laroshfuko, 1990). Finally, among the intentions of compliment making flattery and personal advantage can be singled out.

From the point of view of the **impact** on the addressee and the **value** of words of compliments in general, it is worth mentioning that, first of all, compliments satisfy the most important psychological need of a person – the need of positive emotions and have also educational importance. Besides, the ability to notice positive qualities in other people helps us to reveal good features in ourselves (Soon//<http://lifecouachesblog.com>). Victor Hugo has compared words of praise with a kiss through veil. Hence, the value of complimenting is also in giving pleasure to each other.

Thus, the value of complimenting as a verbal activity is in that it lays the foundation of effective communication, establishes good relations with the addressee, influences him in the favour of the addresser, puts in the right mood, has educational importance, raises the estimation and self-estimation of both the addresser and the addressee.

Let us consider now the **reactions** to compliments. Although the majority of people likes to receive compliments, their perception and replies to them are different determined by various factors, including intercultural differences. On the whole, compliments are received with pleasure, as each person is delighted by the fact that the speaker wishes to say something nice to him, and the possible slips can be easily excused. Yet, there are cases when the compliment is being received in the opposite meaning (with the sign “-“). Thus, for example, quite an opposite meaning can attach to the words of a compliment a specific smile accompanying theses words, which transforms them to mockery. Or other associations, negative emotions can arouse in the addressee the ambiguous or flattering compliments. The replies, such as “It is only a compliment”, “You are flattering me” and the like come to prove that the words of a compliment do not reflect the reality and are just flattering. Another case when the compliment is not being accepted, can be perceived wrongly and interpreted as flattery is the case when the addressee and the addresser are in the relations of “chief and subordinate”. That is the reason why often subordinates avoid making compliments to their chiefs. Sometimes compliments are not being accepted by the listener who has the intention to hear it again. This tactics of compliment rejecting

can be considered as an indirect fishing for a compliment. In F. Laroshfuko’s words, “Eva-ding praise is a request to repeat it” (Larosh-fuko, 1990).

Thus, the speech act of a compliment is on of the types of speech acts which, in its turn, consists of complimenting words and expressions of various character, different tactics of accepting/non-accepting a compliment by the addressee and is characterized by variety of intentions and motives of compliment making (expression of courtesy, raise of estimation and self-estimation, the wish to please the addressee or even to insult him, personal advantage, etc.).

Of interest is also the study of compliments in the aspect of **gender differences**. It is believed that compliments must be addressed only to women, that by means of two or three trivial compliments her vanity can be flattered, that men do not like compliments. In fact, it is fallacy. In reality, as observations, as well as various investigations of researchers in the field of psychology of communication show, both women and men like to hear compliments. And the false opinion that men do not like compliments can be explained, first, by the fact that they, being more reserved, hide their reaction (in fact, positive, if it is not flattery), whereas women, being more emotional than men, do not hide their emotions, their satisfaction and joy when getting compliments and are always open to them: it is known that women love by hearing, they strongly need “verbal strokes” (N. Formanovskaya’s term). It should be added that the difference in the attitude to a compliment on the part of two sexes is in that women are never tired of compliments, they want to always hear them to keep up their self-esteem and

self-confidence. On the other hand, in many cultures it is typical for men to make compliments to women and not vice versa: males, being “strong sex”, allow themselves to “favour women with attention” and say pleasant words determined by their higher status. There is one more factor: compliments concerning appearance are addressed mainly to women but not men, and there are many things to praise (the new dress, the hair-do and so on and so forth). Finally, in spite of gender discrimination the woman has always been an object of worship, admiration, reverence and the muse for men. In V.G. Gak’s words, “it is common knowledge that the best words in the world have been addressed to the women or said about women...” (Gak, 2003, p. 598). All the abovesaid speaks to the inequality of distribution of compliments among men and women: women receive them more often though men like to get as much.

Let us now consider the speech act of a compliment in the light of **intercultural differences and similarities**: with all the commonality of one and the same orientation – to please the addresser – the form of the expression, as well as the perception and interpretation of a compliment often differ to a great extent in different cultures. This is determined by the mentality of the bearers of this or that culture, the sex and age of the communicators, by the difference in the norms of expressing emotions, in particular, the feeling of liking. There are also essential differences in the reactions to compliments in different cultures, sometimes even in close ones. That is the reason why one and the same expression used as praise, admiration, approval in one society can be perceived in another one as flattery, and even as insult.

Thus, for example, in English-speaking cultures “they encourage to praise people to raise them in their own eyes. On the contrary, in the Japanese culture they do not encourage to praise in somebody’s face, but they approve to speak “badly” about themselves” (Wierzbicka, 1997, pp. 397-398). The Japanese who are restrained in praise and compliments (and who, at the same time have a special form of gratitude in reply to the words of praise) interpret the direct compliments made by Americans as flattery but not expression of sincere praise.

It is known that in the USA to make a compliment to a woman during work hours (to praise her appearance, her clothes, etc.) can be interpreted as sexual harassment which can lead to imprisonment and heavy fines (by the way, many American feminists have used this opportunity). In the USA complimenting a woman can, indeed, be sometimes very dangerous, whereas in Italy where there is a general cult of beauty, “it is common to admire a woman and to express this admiration. A feature that characterizes Italian men positively is that they admire and, most importantly, demonstrate their admiration to each woman, with no exception: ugly, old, young, silly, beautiful.... Even if it is a game, it is a game that is pleasant deep in the heart to the most awful feminists” (Pavlovskaya, 2006, pp. 234-235). In the muslim countries, on the contrary, it is forbidden to make compliments on the appearance of the addressee’s wife, even though in the countries of Arab world it is common thing to shower praises on each other.

Though, as it has already been mentioned, women, generally speaking, like to receive compliments very much, in this, too,

there are intercultural differences. Here is an example of how the women of Scandinavia, which is considered to be “the bulwark of victorious feminism”, react to compliments: “The 8th of March, as usual, was marked by the battle for women’s rights. Many Scandinavian women reject on the “Women’s Day” flowers, *compliments*, small presents and other manifestations of gallantry typical for other countries, as they see in them a hidden attempt to return to the patriarchal structure of a society where “the weak sex” is subordinate to males” (“Novoe vremya”, 2010).

Frank Miller, Professor of Colombia University in New York, who teaches there Russian and who has a rich experience of communicating with the Russian people, describes in one of his interviews the difference in reactions to compliments determined by different cultural traditions: “The Americans will gladly accept a compliment with words of gratitude, while the Russians will by no means reject it, saying: “Not a bit of it!” (“Oh, come!”) or “Knock a wood” (“Russkii yazyk za rubezhom”, 2011).

It is worth mentioning that in many linguo-cultures comparisons with animals are used as compliments, and often what is used as a compliment in one culture can not be accepted as such and even be perceived as insult. Thus, in the Russian culture, “птичка, рыбонька, сокол, орленок” (birdie, little fish, falcon, eaglet) are all terms of affection or praise” (Feller, 1964, p. 59). In I. Gorelov and K. Sedov’s words, “very curious impression on bearers of other cultures can leave some compliments to women. In India people can flatter a woman comparing her with a cow and the way of her walking with that of elephant’s. A good compliment to a Japanese

woman is the comparison with a snake, to a Tatar and Bashkir woman with a leech which is an embodiment of the perfection of forms and movement. Addressing a woman by means of the word “Гусыня” (goose) is insulting in the Russian culture. In Egypt it is a gentle compliment” (Gorelov & Sedov, 2005, p. 132). In Armenia a compliment to a male is a comparison with a lion, with an eagle; a little child can be gently called a lamb, and a compliment to a woman is comparing her with a fallow-deer.

Let us consider compliments in the Armenian culture more in detail. The Armenians are in a sense a nation of extremes. On the one hand, during different festive occasions and especially during the unique female holiday which lasts for a whole month in Armenia a woman can hear praises and lots of compliments. On the other hand, in every-day life people are reluctant to make compliments to each other which is the result of difficulties of life, as well as our mentality. The famous Armenian actor and public figure Sos Sarkissian in one of his interviews once said: “A saving lie is a powerful thing. It is possible to make a compliment even to an ugly woman, to make her happy. My people have political... truth” (“Komsomol’skaya pravda”, 2009).

And how do we receive compliments, if they are good, sincere ones? The observations show that the Armenians, especially the Armenian women are in the habit of rejecting them with words: “No, it is not so”, “Just the opposite”, etc. Such reactions reflect our mentality: the lack of confidence in the speaker, the orientation towards seeing some trick or flattery, some implicit, hidden meaning, as well as our certain restriction, the lack of experience in getting compliments. It should be

stressed that this concerns to a great extent middle-aged and senior women. Today's young Armenian women and girls accept compliments with great dignity and words of gratitude under the influence of globalization and widely spread Americanization.

Aiming at a deeper analysis of the speech act of a compliment in Russian, Armenian and English linguo-cultures, we have analysed the corresponding dictionary articles, phraseological units, word combinations, proverbs and sayings, as well as patterns of complimenting discourses in the mentioned languages. The comparative analysis has led us to the following conclusions: 1) from the viewpoint of axiological characteristics compliments have the most positive colouring in the English linguo-culture whereas the most negative and subjective one in the Armenian culture. In the Russian language consciousness compliment has, alongside with positive connotations which prevail, also negative connotations connected with the overevaluation of the addressee and mercenary intentions of the addresser; 2) in the English culture as compared with Russian and Armenian compliments have a more formal character; 3) in the Russian and Armenian language consciousness, unlike the English one compliments are connected with the intention of the speaker aiming at personal advantage; 4) in the English mentality compliment is associated first of all with approval, which lacks in the Armenian culture; 5) in the English and Russian linguo-cultures, as distinct from the Armenian one, compliment is associated with the notions of politeness and respect; 6) in the Armenian linguo-culture, unlike Russian and English, compliment is a groundless praise; 7) compliment as sympathy and wider – em-

pathy is met only in the Russian linguo-culture; compliment understood in this meaning is a purely Russian phenomenon; 8) compliments in the Russian and especially Armenian cultures, unlike the English one, are accepted with difficulty.

To sum up all the above-said, it can be concluded that with all the similarities in the functioning of the speech act of a compliment in different linguo-cultures, there exist essential differences that reflect the peculiarities in the mentality of the language bearers.

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ON MORAL ASPECT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE

Abstract

The paper deals with the modern processes of large-scale destabilization of the geosphere and the role of the scientific prediction of global environmental crisis. We also present an analysis of the reorientation process of civilization to sustainable development and ethical foundations of the relationship of humanity and nature.

Keywords: sustainable development, natural disaster, the destabilization of the geosphere, environmental ethics, the Earth Charter, the culture of moderation

To be sustainable, a steady state may require fewer natural resources, but much more moral qualities

Herman Daly

(op. by. Meadows et al, 1994, p. 16).

The XX century is considered to be the period of the full-scale process of destabilization of the geosphere, which is most obviously evident in the global climate change and increase/strengthening of various natural disasters – activation of volcanoes, earthquakes, tsunami, typhoons, mudflows and floods, droughts and wildfires, etc. are obvious. The listed processes are combined and aggravated with the accruing processes of environmental pollution, degradation of natural ecosystems, depletion of natural resources.

It is enough to give some evident facts.

- 2000-2009 years are designated as record decade in the context of climate change.
- The quantitative and qualitative depletion of the natural resources increases at all;

36% of types under the threat; in 25 countries forests are completely disappeared, and in 29 countries were reduced by 90%. Losses constitute 5,2 million hectares per year.

- During 1970-2007 population of vertebrates was reduced by 30%, sea types – by 24%, fresh-water – by 35%.
- 60% of the natural ecosystems are degraded or are used unstably;
- Anthropogenic pressure on the biosphere increased by ~5,5 times between 1910 and 2000, social and economic disharmony - by ~2,5 times.
- During 1980-2000 the quantity of droughts increased by 38%, and floods – by 230%.

- More than 90% of tests of water and fish are polluted by POP. Fish inventories are exhausted.
- The level of underground waters decreases as a result of the extensive use of aquifers.

The each next year is practically declared recorded from the point of view of one or another destabilization process. So, in February, 2016 in the Inter-Agency Secretariat of the International strategy for disaster reduction was declared that 2015 was the hottest for the whole history of observations and became yet another confirmation of the fact that natural disasters and the abnormal weather phenomena, which lead to death of a large number of people and to huge economic losses, became frequent in the world. Overall, in the last year were registered more than 30 large-scale droughts from which suffered about 50,5 million people, 27,5 million people suffered from mudflows, floods and storms, 1,2 million people suffered from a heat, from them 7346 died from overheating and sunstrokes, as a result of earthquakes and tsunami 9525 people, landslides – about 1400 people died. Judging by preliminary data, we believe that the results of 2016 will be less consolatory (see Danielyan, 2014; “Keeping Track of our Changing Environment,” 2011; “Global Assessment Report on Disaster Reduction 2015. Inter-Agency Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction”; “The United Nations General Assembly 2005, Report of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction”; “Climate change and health. Newsletter number 266”, 2016; “Protecting health from climate change. Treatment of different groups of the population and sectors. World Health Organization,” 2016; “Emerging Issues in

Our Global Environment. UNEP Year Book”, 2011; “Global Environmental Outlook -5, UNEP, Environment for the Future We Want. UNEP,” 2012).

The above-mentioned global process of destabilization is shown both in temporary, and in spatial measurements. Information on the alternating multidirectional temperature anomalies is combined with messages on the "geographical dispersion" of natural disasters – on the same continents of the territory with mudflows and floods literally adjoin to the territories, affected by droughts and widespread forest fires.

The above-mentioned numerous phenomena bring some scientists to the following hypothesis: "The Earth of the Gaia begins to reject humanity", which is shared also by the authors of this article (Yablokov, 2012). This assumption is based on the Le-Chatelier's well-known principle according to which "the system which is in equilibrium state is reconstructed so as to neutralize the impact of threats to its equilibrium". Currently the human civilization acts even as the similar destabilizing factor which the planet aims "to neutralize".

The question is periodically discussed in the scientific literature: How could happen, that the science having so powerful potential reacted to the above-mentioned processes with such a delay? Why the science only fixed the fact of the entrance of the civilization to deep ecological crisis, which already held on, but didn't promote prevention of this phenomenon due to the timely scientific foresight.

The answer generally is in the narrow differentiation of scientific disciplines, whereas the global problems require a comprehensive

interdisciplinary approach. As it accepted figuratively to say: "The nature isn't divided into faculties, like university". For this reason, within the framework of the "UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development" the special emphasis was placed on carrying out multidisciplinary researches of modern environmental problems.

However, in fairness, it should be noted that a number of scientists timely specified danger of the approaching ecological crisis, but the humanity gave and continues to give much more attention to the ethnic/international conflicts, financial and economic interests of the countries and separate groups and to the other priorities.

So, for example, in the 30th of the XX century, Nicholas Roerich presciently wrote:

"The nature is sick with human madness. Spasms of the planet become frequent ... it is already possible to see how harmonic vibrations are disturbed, and the planet shudders in pushes of heat and cold. Several years there are daily earthquakes, Earth is in continuous trepidation.

In the increasing of the waves of Earth awe, it was possible to become more cautious and think out – weather is it all correctly?" (Nicholas Roerich, Op. by *Seven Great Mysteries of the Cosmos*, 1999).

In 1971 2000 scientists appealed to mankind to pay attention to the expanding environmental disaster and to take adequate measures.

Respectively, in 1972 the UN called the high-ranking representatives of the countries to Stockholm for discussion of this problem. As a result it was created UNEP (United Nations Environmental Program), the Commission of Gro Brundtland was formed and prac-

tically so-called process "The way to Rio" was started, which was crowned in Rio-de-Janeiro in 1992 by the Earth Summit on Environment and Development, which approved sustainable development as the cardinal way of modern civilization development. It became obvious that the cycle of development of the civilizations, based on the principles of conquest of the Nature lasting for millennia, comes to the end. It is necessary the transition to a civilization of essentially new type – a civilization of equilibrium environmental management, where all the constituting impacts of the human-being on the Nature are brought into accord with a capability of natural systems to carry the anthropogenic loading. Sustainable development is based on a harmonious combination of economic development to an ecological safety and social justice (see "Earth Summit. Agenda 21 – The United Nations Programme of Action from Rio", 1997; Danielyan, 1996).

At the Earth Summit the document "1992 World's Scientists' warning to Humanity" was presented to the country delegations, under which 1600 world's leading scientists from 71 countries, including the majority of Nobel laureates, issued this appeal. In particular, it is emphasized in the document:

"Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course. Human activities inflict harsh and often irreversible damage on the environment and on critical resources. If not checked, many of our current practices put at serious risk the future that we wish for human society and the plant and animal kingdoms, and may so alter the living world that it will be unable to sustain life in the manner that we know. Fundamental changes are urgent if we are to avoid the collision our present course

will bring about. ... No more than one or a few decades remain before the chance to avert the threats we now confront will be lost and the prospects for humanity immeasurably diminished" ("Caution Scientists of the World of Humanity," 1992).

20 years later, the Summit of the UN "Rio +20" in Rio de Janeiro, in 2012 noted that though the countries and the international organizations accumulated extensive positive experience in the sphere of sustainable production and consumption, of education on SD, in general on promotion to sustainable development, however, destabilizing processes in the ecosphere advance our efforts on prevention of destructive anthropogenic influence. Estimating the way passed by the civilization after the Earth Summit «Rio-1992», the final document of the "Rio +20" Conference of the UN on SD "The Future We Want" states:

"Point 20. We acknowledge that since 1992 there have been areas of insufficient progress and setbacks in the integration of the three dimensions of sustainable development, aggravated by multiple financial, economic, food and energy crises which have threatened the ability of all countries in particular developing countries, to achieve sustainable development" ("Resolution 66/288 adopted by the UN General Assembly," 2012).

Respectively, the UN Summit "Rio +20" urged the countries and the international organizations to intensify significantly ongoing efforts on promotion to development in line with the sustainability, as well as the Parisian agreement on climate, as the UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction held in Sendai... (see "Paris Agreement on Climate";

"The UN General Assembly, seventieth session, paragraph 20 (c) of the Agenda," 2015).

And, finally, in our opinion, the Russian scientists attitude stated in the "Appeal of Russian Scientists to the International Scientific Community", from which (2007) fragments are stated below is absolutely fair:

"Qualitatively new, moral view on these problems and the scientific theory oriented to sustainable development of the terrestrial civilization are necessary today for providing guarantees of sustainable development. The Russian science addresses the international scientific community with the offer to be determined with the position of science in these questions ...

As the fundamental purpose of humanity it should be recognized the necessity of preservation of earth civilization and to suggest to enter this purpose as a constitutional basis of the states entering into the UN. This will allow to consolidate the humanity and to orient it in the direction of building a rational terrestrial civilization while preserving all its diversity of nationalities and cultures. The scientific theory of development of society constructed on this basis allows a possibility of preservation of a terrestrial civilization only on condition of all-round harmonious development of the whole world community" ("Appeal of Russian Scientists to the International Scientific Community /Vernadsky - Dmitriev Manifesto/", 2007). Thus, authors urge to include the postulates of sustainable development into the constitutions of all countries.

We consider, it is regularly, that the above-mentioned processes were crowned with the 70th anniversary session of the General Assembly, which approved the world

program on sustainable development until 2030, including 17 interconnected sustainable development goals.

If to address to the history of moral bases evolution of relations between human and the Nature, then it is possible to allocate the following series of stages:

- Nature worship, spiritualizing of components of the Nature (spirit of water, spirit of the forest, etc.), struggle for existence;
- struggle with the Nature, expansion of an ecological niche, gain of new ecological niches;
- conquest of the Nature, aspiration to master the maximum quantity of natural resources (in virtue of the achievements of a scientific and technological revolution illusion of omnipotence and absolute power of the human is created);
- awareness of the necessity of following the laws of Nature, coevolution of the human and the Nature (human – is not the lord, but an organic part of the Nature), Environmental ethics.

The present stage of development of moral of civilization and the Nature relations is characterized by one more essential principle – respect to the Nature, recognition of its rights to natural, harmonious development, including the rights of all types of biological diversity to life. Most brightly and generally these ideas are provided to the Earth Charter recognized by UNESCO as one of the main instruments of education for the benefit of sustainable development. The basic principles of the Earth Charter are given below:

- Respect Earth and life in all its diversity.
- Care for the community of life with understanding, compassion, and love.

- Build democratic societies that are just, participatory, sustainable, and peaceful.
- Secure Earth's bounty and beauty for present and future generations ("Earth Charter").

Discussing the way of development of Republic of Belarus and human civilization in general, V.F. Baynev, V.T. Vinnik write: "The present unprecedented aggravation of raw materials, energy, ecological, etc. problems, referred to only as the global civilization contradictions, shows that for an exit on a trajectory of sustainable development, the humanity lacks some important fundamental conditions. We are convinced that such missing factor is spiritual and moral component, ignoring of which is the authentic reason of the listed above global problems" (Bains & Vinnik, 2010).

Authors see the pronounced moral measurement of social and economic processes based on Christian values in specifics of the Belarusian model of development.

Accounting of moral aspect, and also responsibility is emphasized also in "The strategy of UNECE in the field of education for sustainable development" ("The UNECE Strategy on Education for Sustainable Development," 2005).

The analysis of the above-mentioned can bring us to the following assumption. With the Nature the Humanity passed in the sphere of development of moral of relations on a cyclic way, returning on a spiral to a stage of worship of the Nature, but at the new intellectual and technical and technological level. Now, when we know about a capability of water to store and transfer information, whether we think involuntarily of spiritual essence of the Nature.

It is known that one of the main determining components of sustainable development is the Culture of moderation designed to reduce considerably scales of modern super exploitation of natural resources, practiced by modern consumer society, to be exact, society of overconsumption. About thoughtless overconsumption of "the developed civilization" very strictly and figuratively it is spoken in widely known "Message of the leader of Seattle": "We know that our traditions are unclear to the white person ... It treats the earth as to the enemy, but not as to the brother, therefore it moves further when subdues the part of it. It concerns the mother – the earth and the brother-the sky as if they can be sold, plundered,

bought as sheep or bright jewelry. His appetite will devastate the earth and will leave behind only the desert ... Your purpose – a riddle for us.

Perhaps, transition to Culture of moderation is the most hard-to-reach, because requires radical reorganization of the value system on which vital practice of the vast majority of the population of Earth is based. Whether the person will be able to pass in general from self-affirmation in material values to self-affirmation in spiritual values? Whether will be able really to listen to the principles, approaches and recommendations, being basic for many world religions and beliefs of the ancient indigenous people (table 1).

Table 1. World religions and the ancient people about consumption (Durning, 1991).

Religion/people	Basic thesis
Christianity	"It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich person to enter the Kingdom of God". "Gospel of Matthew"
Buddhism	"The one who will overcome the desires in this world, from that grieves, as water drops from a lotus flower, will fall down". Dhammapada
Confucianism	"Both excesses, and a shortcoming equally create difficulties". Confucius
Hinduism	"The person, who lives free from desires, without passionate desires, achieves the peace". "Bhagavad Gita"
Judaism	"Don't give me either poverty, or wealth" "Book Solomon' parables"
Islam	"Poverty is my pride" Prophet Muhammad
Taoism	"The one who knows that he has enough - is rich" Dao De Jing

American Indians	"What pathetic we seemed in your eyes, we consider ourselves much happier, than you yourselves, because we are happy with that small, that we have" Leader Micmac
Ancient Greeks	"Nothing in excess" Inscription on the Delphic oracle

It is curious that the recommendation to keep an ecological food pyramid of fauna contains already in the Old Testament. We usually remember the phrase about the need of salvation from the flood "a pair of every creature," but in the next verse contains more specific recommendations to Noah, namely: "You shall take with you seven each of every clean animal, a male and his female; two each of animals that are unclean, a male and his female; also seven each of birds of the air, male and female, to keep the species alive on the face of all the earth" ("The Old Testament, the head of the Flood", verse 7). It is known that are meant by pure animals herbivorous, and dirty – predators, that is it is about need of preservation of an ecological pyramid.

Anyway, today it is obvious that modern civilization has two ways: to pass to sustainable development or to undergo self-destruction. And the main prerequisite for positive transition to sustainable development is transformation of the homo sapiens into the homo sapiens and moral.

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TOLERANCE AS A CONSTRUCTIVE MECHANISM OF DIALOGUE IN THE FIELD OF HEALTHCARE

Abstract

Modern bioethical issues (doctor-patient relationship) should be based on a tolerant attitude towards patient. Tolerance is an important value in Ethics, medical Ethics and Bioethics. As a moral norm, tolerance is a virtue. It is a rational human response, social value, which ensures the rights, freedom and security of human beings. Tolerance is a social ideal originating in society.

Keywords: tolerance, trust, respect, dialogue, doctor-patient relationship, informed consent.

In the modern globalized world, the problem of tolerance as a mechanism for constructing trust and dialogue has a great importance. Nowadays tolerance is more crucial than ever before. The leading role of tolerance is obvious in almost all areas of the contemporary world: moral, medical, political, economic, cultural, social, etc. As a social-cultural norm tolerance is a capacity to endure different opinions, thinking of views, ideas and lifestyle. It is the ability to respect and accept cultural diversity, different ethnic and social groups and religions. In order to understand what tolerance is and its role in the modern bioethical issues, particularly in the doctor-patient relationship, first we should take into consideration the origin, theoretical foundations and historical stages of development of tolerance.

Tolerance is a complicated and multifaceted social-cultural phenomenon. “At first glance the idea of tolerance seems to be very simple but in fact it isn’t like this at all. Toler-

ance is closely related to the fundamental philosophical issues focusing on the discovery of human nature, understanding human identity, the boundaries of human knowledge and capabilities” (Lektorskiy, 1997, p. 46). In order to determine the concept of tolerance first we should mention that it is a cultural quality of each citizen, regardless of age, gender religious, ethnic and racial background. According to the linguistic analysis, tolerance (Latin «tolerantia») is defined:

1. as an ability of organism, power of enduring or resisting the negative effects and action of a drug, poison, etc.
2. as a patient and tolerant attitude towards something or somebody. Tolerance has different meanings in different languages depending on each nation's cultural, historical and national features.

According to the Declaration of Principles on Tolerance adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its twenty-eighth session in Paris, on 16 November 1995.

1. Tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication, and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in difference. It is not only a moral duty; it is also a political and legal requirement. Tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace.
2. Tolerance is, above all, an active attitude prompted by the recognition of the universal human rights and fundamental freedoms of others.
3. Tolerance is the responsibility that upholds human rights, pluralism (including cultural pluralism), democracy and the rule of law. It involves the rejection of dogmatism and absolutism and affirms the standards set out in international human rights instruments.
4. Consistent with respect for human rights, the practice of tolerance does not mean toleration of social injustice or the abandonment or weakening of one's convictions. It means accepting the fact that human beings, naturally diverse in their appearance, situation, speech, behavior and values, have the right to live in peace and to be as they are. It also means that one's views are not to be imposed on others¹.

As we see, according to the UNESCO's Declaration of Tolerance, the main character-

istics of tolerance are variety and differences. The aim of Declaration of principles on Tolerance is preserve the world from the religious, political and cultural wars, which are inevitable in the modern globalized world. Only the acceptance of the principle of tolerance is able to face the various challenges of the 21st century, which is growing and becoming uncontrollable.

As a moral norm, tolerance is a virtue. It is a rational human response, which depends on the level of individual's knowledge, personal experience and skills. Tolerance does not mean patient attitude towards social injustices. Being tolerant, does not mean to give up own beliefs and adopt other ideologies. Tolerance is a social value, which insures human rights, freedom and security. The meaning of tolerance has changed from religion tolerance into moral tolerance and is now perceived as a moral principle and the universal value of the modern world.

Tolerance is a significant value in ethics, bioethics and medical ethics. The contemporary bioethical dilemmas and problems (doctor-patient relationship, human cloning and genetic engineering, organ transplantation, abortion of human embryos, euthanasia, medical secrets, patient's rights and doctor's duties, palliative care, etc.) should be based on tolerant attitude towards all human beings. In the doctor-patient relationship, it is important that the doctor is tolerant and respectful towards patient, because the treatment process and efficiency directly depends on the nature of the relationship between doctor and patient. "All doctors are well aware that recovery does not often depend on the nature of the intervention and/or effectiveness of drug therapy but rather on the fact if the patient believes in

¹ Declaration of Principles on Tolerance adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its twenty-eighth session in Paris, on 16 November 1995, p. 9-10.

the therapy, or whether he/she wants to get better or prefers the role of patient, if he/she likes or dislikes the doctor and so forth. The influence of the socio-psychological situation of the individual patient on the effectiveness of treatment is considered by physicians, but it does not arouse any real their professional interest. Therefore, the concept of personalized medicine is not complete and scientifically credible until specialists in humanities, first of all, in bioethics get involved in its development” (Sedova & Basov, 2015, p. 21). First of all the doctor must take into account the patient's individual experiences and characteristics, because for the patient it is more important his/her own subjective disturbances and disease.

The main principle of doctor-patient relationship is tolerance towards patient's freedom of choice, rights, informed consent and medical secret. “Respect for patient autonomy is the basis of informed consent. For patients to be autonomous and provide informed consent, the treating physician or psychiatrist must provide adequate information to the patient about their illness and treatment options that are available” (Avinas, 2015, p. 51). In the case of informed consent, the doctor's ability of decision-making is vital. The doctor must know in which way to inform the information about patient disease. All patients, without any restriction, have fundamental rights to obtain relevant information about their disease and its further developments, accept or reject the treatment recommended by a doctor. The clear derivation of the constitutional right of the individual to decide which treatment to undergo is evidenced by its ability to represent a synthesis of two fundamental human rights: to the definition of this space of

freedom for the individual it competes the right to self-determination as well as the right to health, because if it is true that every individual has the right to be cared for, he has also the right to receive adequate information on the nature in the course of treatment which may be submitted, as well as possible alternative therapies (Lorenzo, 2013, p. 35). Therefore physician must inform the patient about his/her health situation and disease, the treatment process, methods and possible risks. The doctor should be patient and tolerant. He/she must respect any choice of the patient, conscientiously fulfill patient's decision and wish.

According to the Lisbon Declaration on Patient Rights which adopted by the 34th World Medical Assembly (1981) patient has right to medical care, right to freedom of choice, right to make his/her own decision without any restriction. This Declaration claims that the patient has the right to accept or refuse to accept medical treatment after getting information. According to this claim, the doctor must inform the patient about the purposes of medical tests ordered, about the results of diagnostic tests and treatment procedures as well as possible risks of treatment. This declaration gives rights to patients and restrict doctors' absolute autonomy (Davtyan, 2013, p. 74). Therefore the realization of the right treatment is largely depend on the doctor's professional skills, knowledge, experience, intellect and tolerant attitude. Before making a final decision, doctor need to stop and think more carefully, however, when she/he makes decisions in circumstances that are more difficult. The doctor must take into account all possible consequences either positive or negative.

The doctor's dilemma is: “To tell the

truth to the patient or not?” During 2002-2008 years Yerevan State Medical University after M. Heratsi, department of social sciences with Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law of National Academy of Sciences of Republic of Armenia conducted sociological investigations. PhD students point out the fact that the people in prosperous developed countries are expected to undergo free of charge preventive examination (screening), several times a year. For example, in 2015 total health expenditure per capita in USA is more than 8000 USD, in Canada is 4429 USD, in France is 4124 USD, in Germany is 5002 USD, in Italy is 3126 USD, in Israel is 2428 USD, in Japan is 3768 USD, in Russian Federation is 957 USD and in Republic of Armenia is only 159 USD². If something suspicious is revealed, the patient calmly, and without any stress, accepts the information and starts the treatment, being quite sure that the illness is completely curable at that stage.

What is the situation like in Republic of Armenia? In country which, from a developed one has turned into a developing country it is almost impossible to get such a free annual examination; it can be available in very rare cases, which can be classified as being extremely critical. Patients are generally informed about their illness when they reach a terminal condition. In this case telling the patient about his/her incurable illness means warning him/her that death is close and his/her days are counted.

Unfortunately, the principles of a healthy mode of life is not very developed in Armenia. The role of mass media, family and

school is poor; they do not provide the population with decent and appropriate knowledge. No work is done in this direction in order to develop a culture of a healthy way of life, sport and food regime for people of different ages.

Yerevan is flooded with internet clubs. Every day new e-net clubs are being opened; they co-exist, side by side, on the same street; the main problem is that they offer young people a virtual life instead of a real one. In these clubs, filled with cigarette smoke, you can see young people just sitting, pushing the buttons and feeling as if they are the fastest runners, the best fighters and shooters, and the winners, etc.

Unfortunately, in real life a complex of inferiority arises, because it turns out that they are not only very far from being champion, but also they can't even shoot, fight, build or win at all. For a young man who is weak-willed the simplest way is to return to virtual life and get his immediate satisfaction there.

This problem calls for an urgent intervention by the government in order to provide an applicable solution. If the government will not take any measures and will pursue its policy to focus on profits, the situation can deteriorate, and we may run the risk of losing a considerable number of our younger generation. We should seed taste and striving endeavor for a healthy mode of life.

At the PhD students have pointed out, getting a medical service is, for the majority of the population, an expensive “pleasure”. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that even in cases when people can afford to apply for a medical service, they are still reluctant and are not convinced much in the efficiency of these

² Total health expenditure per capita
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_total_health_expenditure_per_capita.

services. This behavior has already become a characteristic feature of the nation.

Armenia wants to become a part of Europe but it is an Asian country and its population is hypersensitive (in contrast, e.g. to Americans who are cold-minded and pragmatic, sometimes romantic-pragmatic). So, as have answered the majority of the students: “telling the truth to the patient is only justified in economically developed countries.”

At the end of the lecture the students were again handed forms sent by UNESCO containing 20 questions, in four thematic blocks. In contrast to PhD students, the freshmen, who had only studied this subject for 26 hours (4 hours with 2 testing) and didn't know anything about it before, gave relatively poor answers (Davtyan, 2012, pp. 505-507).

The doctor must have a high sense of responsibility towards the patient and a high degree of tolerance. If in doctor-patient relationship there is no tolerance, patients cannot trust the doctor. Agreement between doctor and patient largely depends on the existence of a trust atmosphere. Trust is one of the characteristic features of public relations and is manifested both in the personal and social levels. It is a social virtue. The harmony of human and social relation is directly determined by the degree of trust in the society. That is why it is obvious that in the modern world trust, tolerance are the main regulative principles.

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PARADOXES OF HUMAN COGNITION

Abstract

This paper presents the main paradoxes of the theory of human cognition, namely the paradoxes of epistemology and methodology. Each of paradoxes is given its laconic solution using a more strict definition of relevant concepts. Suggested solutions could be helpful in developing further the complete teaching of human cognition.

Keywords: human cognition, philosophy, truth, proof, contradiction, paradoxes of epistemology, paradoxes of methodology.

Introduction. Søren Kierkegaard has suggested a paradoxical interpretation of the notion of *paradox*: “the thinker without the paradox is like the lover without passion”. As all the negative statements this beautiful aphorism does not reveal any positive feature of its subject. In sciences the term *paradox* is strongly connected to self-*contradiction* or a *contradiction* to well established facts and general statements. A classical example of self-contradiction is presented by “The liar” paradox. The opposition to “apparent” facts usually emerge by the discovery of revolutionary theories like relativistic mechanics and quantum mechanics.

In regard of paradoxes of science the central point is the following: “Could the paradoxes of science be resolved?” Philosophers gave very different answers to this question, especially considering Zeno’s aporias. Learning about Zeno’s aporias Aristotle without hesitation took up the challenge and suggested his solutions of the so called “aporias of motion” though some of Aristotelian argu-

ments were quite difficult to conceive. For instance, commentators are divided in their understanding of Aristotle’s analysis of the so called aporia “Stadion” (Physics, 6 9 239b33).

Quite unexpectedly Immanuel Kant who assessed laws of formal logic as evidence of absolute truth made an exception for contradiction (“antinomies”) of reason. His daring mind even suggested proofs in regard of the infinity of the world space and time. Yet modern time analysis revealed certain flows in Kant’s argumentation like using incompatible substantial and relativistic conceptions of space and time (Djidjian, 2004, pp. 174-185).

The great system builder Georg Hegel extended Kantian liberal attitude to logical contradictions believing that just “the contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity.”

The 20th century greatest mathematician David Hilbert categorically denied the very existence of paradoxes: “The true reason why

no one has succeeded in finding an unsolvable problem is, in my opinion, that there is *no* unsolvable problem. In contrast to the foolish Ignorabimus, our credo avers: We must know, we shall know” (Dawson, 1997).

Understanding paradoxes requires an adequate knowledge of the essence of the truth and its negation – the false. We follow Aristotelian fundamental definition “Truth is the adequacy of the thought and reality.” And since the concept of the truth lies in the bases of the “The liar” paradox we start just its analysis.

I would like to mention also that the main principle of our approach to any kind of contradictions and paradoxes is that all of them *could be solved by a certain correction of relevant concepts*.

Pardoxes of epistemology

1. The “absolute lire” paradox

An ancient philosopher Epimenides declared: “I am a liar”.

Thesis. Epimenides’ statement “I am a liar” is true. Then Epimenides is a liar. Then his statement is false.

Anti-thesis. Epimenides’ statement “I am a liar” is false. Then Epimenides, according to the content of his statement, is not a liar and so must be a truth-teller. So his statement is true.

Solution. The above *Thesis* presumes that liars say only false things, or in other words, it presumes the notion of the *absolute liar*. Similarly, the above *Anti-thesis* presumes that a truth-teller says only true things, or in other words, it presumes the notion of the *absolute*

truth-teller. But in reality there are no *absolute liars* and no *absolute truth tellers*.

2. The fundamental lire-paradox

Epimenides declared: “I am lying now” and did utter not utter any other word.

This *fundamental* version of the lire-paradox has the following contemporary formulation also: (“The sentence in these brackets is false”).

To analyze the *fundamental* lire-paradox let us denote the sentence in these brackets as A.

Thesis. The sentence A (“The sentence in these brackets is false”) is true. Then according to its content A is false.

Anti-thesis. The sentence A (“The sentence in these brackets is false”) is false. Then according to its content the sentence A is true.

Solution. From the days of Medieval logicians it is well known that the fundamental lire-paradox is caused by its self-referential nature: the sentence A speaks about itself. For excluding this type of paradoxes we have to *deny using self-referential* sentences and expressions.

3. Senses versus ratio paradox

Thesis. Ratio and thinking without sensual data are empty, out of any subject matter (Kant, 1781).

Anti-thesis. Scientific knowledge is the knowledge of general which can be provided only by ratio.

Solution. Senses provide the elementary units of knowledge from which human ratio composes general concepts.

4. *Empirical versus theoretical paradox*

Thesis. There could be no knowledge without empiric cognition and practice.

Anti-thesis. The human understanding of the world is provided by scientific theories.

Solution. Empiric knowledge is the basic level of human understanding, its highest level being provided by scientific theories.

5. *Relative truth versus absolute truth*

Thesis. Truth is the adequacy of the thought and reality (Metaphysics 6 3 1027b20). This adequacy can't be absolute, it can be only relative.

Anti-thesis. Laws of logic and postulates of mathematics are examples of necessary, absolute truth (Kant, 1781). One can't imagine a world where the postulates of Euclidean geometry are inconsistent.

Solution. After the emergence and acceptance of the non-Euclidean geometry and mathematical logic in the second half of the 19th century, scientists are unable to demonstrate any single case of a theoretical absolute truth. As an adequacy to reality, truth is relative in its very essence (Plank, 1949).

6. *Apriori versus aposteriori*

Thesis. From the times of Aristotle scientific knowledge is considered necessary and general. No experience can guarantee the necessary nature of its conclusions (Hume, 1777). The necessary can't be dependent on experience. It could be only *apriori*.

Antithesis. Scientific knowledge should be true; any scientific statement should be checked by experience and experiment. Thus

the truth of scientific knowledge follows from experience, truth is *aposteriori*.

Solution. In times of absolute dominance of Euclidean geometry, Kant's conception of *apriori* was the only possible explanation of the existence of the absolutely true human knowledge. And on the contrary, since the acceptance of the consistency of non-Euclidean geometry (Riman, 2004) there remained no need in the concept of *apriori*.

7. *Mathematical proof versus mathematical truth*

Thesis. The strength of mathematical knowledge is in its proof. Proof is the truth of mathematics (Hilbert, 2004).

Anti-thesis. Mathematical knowledge has such an abstract level that mathematical truth is never checked by experience, empirically.

Solution. Though a highly abstract science, geometry's adequacy to reality, the choice between Euclidean geometry and non-Euclidean geometry could be made at galactic distances.

8. *Conventionalism versus progressiveness*

Thesis. The revolutionary theories of theoretical physics in the first decades of the 20th century were in such a contrast to human experience and common sense that the transition from an old (classical) theory to a radically new theory could be conceived just as a convention between leading, prominent scientists later extended to the whole scientific community (Poincare, 1946).

Anti-thesis. Learning the history of sciences one could not miss that science keeps con-

stantly progressing, and that just by the transition from an old (classical) theories to the better ones.

Solution. New radical theories come to life by the discovery of radically new levels of the nature that require radically new ideas contrasting ordinary experience and common sense. Changes of theories follow the need of better description of reality but never are accepted by convention.

9. *Human cognition versus animal cognition*

Thesis. Only humans think rationally. All animal behavior is instinctive, genetically inherited.

Anti-thesis. Higher animals demonstrate a wide range of learned, non-instinctive behavior (Darwin, 1874).

Solution. Human cognition is rational, abstract, and verbal. Animals possess different levels of sensual cognition based on the ability of generalization by sense-perception (Diener et al., 2006).

10. *Reason versus judgment*

Thesis. The highest level of human cognition is provided by human reason. Judgment is non-productive and only provides simple, logical solutions (Hegel, 1969).

Anti-thesis. Thinking and cognition are functions of human brain, yet there is no evidence of the existence of separated brain-sections for reason or judgment.

Solution. If we define human judgment as the ability to prove, while reason – as the ability of research (by solving problems and finding answers to questions), then we can presume

human brain having a separate algorithm for proofs and another algorithm – for research. But nothing can prevent considering these two algorithms as the main parts of the general algorithm of human cognition.

11. *Consciousness versus self-conscience*

Thesis. Consciousness is that mental wholeness which is responsible for all processes of human cognition including that of self-cognition and self-conscience.

Anti-thesis. Self-conscience is the main attribute of human cognition that separates humans from the animal world.

Solution. Self-conscience is just the ability of a living organism to cognize its own separate being in the surrounding world. Theoretically, nothing could prevent or forbid animals to have an ability of cognizing their own separate being. The social relations in chimp tribes in this sense are identical to that of human social life.

12. *Conscious versus subconscious and unconscious*

Thesis. In Freud's conception, subconscious is the lowest level of consciousness governed by instinctive desires, including the sexual and anti-social deviations (Jung, 1964).

Subconscious by Henri Poincare is the function of the part of human brain busy with production of creative ideas (Poincare, 1946). The process of production of new ideas is that of making combinations of simple ideas the best of which are pushed to the conscious level as creative solutions.

Anti-thesis. By Freud, subconscious is the set of units containing instinctive desires. As desires – be it conscious or unconscious – they have no connection to cognitive processes.

By Henri Poincare, subconscious thinking presumes a hypothetic mechanism of producing new ideas as combinations of simple ideas that, in his own words, can't work independent of conscious thinking. Even so, after almost hundred years that past after Poincare's report his hypothesis has never been confirmed.

Solution. All human ideas including the so called creative ones are produced by conscious analysis of problematic situations followed by hypothetical syntheses of ideas of solutions.

Paradoxes of methodology

13. *The paradox of the universal method*

Thesis. The history of science proves that each scientific discovery has been made by its own exceptional, unordinary way (Whewel, 1864).

Anti-thesis. There are many powerful *general methods* of scientific investigation like analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, experimenting and modeling, idealization and formalization, etc., which work effectively in all branches of sciences. So uniting these general methods into one logical structure would provide science the *universal method* of research and investigation.

Solution. All general methods of scientific investigation are the structural parts of the universal method of scientific research. And this universal method is the **method of hypotheses**.

14. *Hypothesis versus proof*

Thesis. Any scientific idea is born as *hypothesis*, as a hypothetical solution of a problematic situation.

Anti-thesis. Mathematical knowledge is comprised of strictly proved theorems, and there is no place for hypotheses in the kingdom of mathematics.

Solution. Any theorem as a mathematical statement is a mathematical hypothesis before it eventually gets its proof.

15. *Scientism versus hermeneutics*

Thesis. Scientism as the theoretical-experimental model of building scientific teachings is the only reasonable model for all branches of science.

Anti-thesis. The main task of humanities should be understanding individuals and their groups, revealing their interests and intentions while the task of natural sciences is explaining natural phenomena (Wright, 1971).

Solution. There could be no explanation of a natural phenomenon without its understanding. In its turn, understanding interests and intensions of people helps to explain the events of the past. The special feature of social phenomena is the immense number of acting factors and their instability.

16. *The whole versus its parts*

Thesis. To know the whole we have to investigate its parts (Heidegger, 1962).

Anti-thesis. To know the parts we need certain knowledge of the whole (Heidegger, 1962).

Solution. The knowledge of the whole helps investigating the parts, and the investigation

of the parts enriches the knowledge of the whole.

17. Creativity versus standards

Thesis. The true values in science, technology, and arts are produced only by creative thought.

Anti-thesis. Technology can't function without standards; the most valuable results in science are those that provide methods (algorithms) for standard solutions of problems.

Solution. Any new idea is a creative solution. Creativity is often a new way of using standards.

18. Insight versus logic

Thesis. The only way to discovery is the momentary insight into the true essence of the problem under investigation.

Anti-thesis. There can be no solution of any theoretical problem without logical reasoning.

Solution. Logical reasoning is the necessary basis of problem solving while insight is the crowning moment of the logical search for the winning idea.

19. Analysis versus synthesis

Thesis. The unity of the analysis and synthesis is one of the most powerful means of research and problem solving.

Anti-thesis. Analysis is the precondition of problem solving yet synthesis is a higher level of scientific thinking.

Solution. Problem analysis is the first phase of problem solution procedures providing the best condition for effectiveness of the second

phase – the synthesis of the idea of solution (Djidjian, 1984; Djidjian, 2004).

20. The paradox of analogizing

Thesis. Analogy is the weakest form of logical inference.

Anti-thesis. As history of science confirms, scientific discoveries have been made helped by analogies (Mach, 1905).

Solution. Each new idea is synthesized by analogy with the solution of a similar prototype problem. (Djidjian, 1984; Djidjian, 2004).

21. Talent versus geniality

Thesis. Talent is gained by learning while geniality is inborn.

Anti-thesis. Genius is self-made while talent is inborn.

Solution. Three greatest geniuses of science – Einstein, Darwin, and Mendel never demonstrated problem solving qualities higher than ordinary ones. So we know geniuses of science not by their extraordinary intellectual capacities but by their fruits – their great revolutionary conceptions. Talents are known from the early childhood by their extraordinary problem-solving abilities which presume inborn great mental capacities (Djidjian, 2002).

22. The paradox of intuition

Thesis. The greatest scientists have usually prescribed their discoveries to scientific intuition though not being able to point out its content and essence (Descartes, 1637; Bunge, 1962).

Anti thesis. It is impossible making discoveries not having the following cognitive components – a sufficient level of inborn mental capacities, a sufficient scope of knowledge in the given field of research, a sufficient level of own problem-solving experience in the given field of research.

Solution. Scientific intuition is the unity of the above mentioned cognitive components – a sufficient level of inborn mental capacities, the scope of knowledge, and own personal problem-solving experience. So every scientist has as stronger intuition as stronger capacities, relevant knowledge, and personal experience he has got, the latter being the most important component (Djidjian, 1984; Djidjian, 2004).

23. The paradox of Gödel's theorem

Thesis. Gödel's formula $A_p(p)$ is undecidable in the system of formalized arithmetic what means that formalized arithmetic is incomplete (Whitehead & Russell, 1910-1913; Gödel 1931).

Anti-thesis. The only content of Gödel's formula $A_p(p)$ is the following: "The formula $A_p(p)$ tells that it is unprovable" (Kleene, 1952). So it is absolutely clear that Gödel's formula $A_p(p)$ has no mathematical content.

Solution 1. Having no mathematical content, Gödel's formula $A_p(p)$ can't support the claim that formalized *arithmetic* is incomplete.

Solution 2. It is widely accepted that the content interpretation of Gödel's formula - " $A_p(p)$ tells that $A_p(p)$ is not provable" - is a self-referential sentence. So Gödel's proof of the incompleteness of formalized arithmetic can be accepted only by those mathematicians who think that in some branches of mathemat-

ics proving theorems would be much more difficult denying the use of self-referential formula (Kleen, 1952). But such an argument should be principally rejected since here the *foundations of mathematics* are discussed.

Solution 3. Gödel's proof is rigorous due to using his invention of Gödel's numbering (Smith, 2007). But it is not difficult to show that using Gödel's numbering one violates the fundamental law of identity. Certain Gödel's number p in the frame of the same proof is used in two different meanings – as a certain natural number p and as the number of Gödel's formula $A_p(p)$.

Conclusions

Let us review the useful conclusions of the above analysis of the paradoxes of epistemology and methodology of human cognition.

Senses provide the elementary units of knowledge from which human ratio composes general concepts.

Empiric knowledge is the basic level of human understanding, its highest level being provided by scientific theories.

As an adequacy to reality, truth is relative in its very essence.

Kant's conception of apriori was the only possible explanation of the existence of the absolutely true human knowledge. Nowadays the acceptance of the consistency of non-Euclidean geometry abolishes the concept of apriori.

Geometry's adequacy to reality, the choice between Euclidean geometry and non-Euclidean geometry could be made at galactic distances.

New radical theories come to life by the discovery of radically new levels of the nature

that require radically new ideas contrasting ordinary experience and common sense.

Animals possess different levels of sensuous non-verbal cognition based on the ability of generalization by sense-perception.

We define human judgment as the ability to prove, while reason – as the ability of research yet nothing can prevent considering them as the main abilities of the general human cognition.

Self-conscience is just the ability of a living organism to cognize its own separate being in the surrounding world. Theoretically nothing could prevent or forbid animals to have an ability of cognizing their own separate being.

All human ideas including the so called creative ones are produced by conscious analysis of problematic situations followed by hypothetical syntheses of ideas of solutions.

All general methods of scientific investigation are the structural parts of the universal method of scientific research. And this universal method is the **method of hypotheses**.

Any theorem as a mathematical statement is a mathematical hypothesis before it eventually gets its proof.

There could be no explanation of a natural phenomenon without its understanding. In its turn, understanding interests and intentions of people helps to explain the events of the past.

Creativity is often a new way of using standards.

Logical reasoning is the necessary basis of problem solving while insight is the crowning moment of the search for the winning idea.

Problem analysis is the first phase of the problem solution providing the best condition

for effectiveness of the second phase – the synthesis of the idea of solution.

Each new idea is synthesized by analogy with the solution of a similar prototype problem.

We know geniuses of science not by their extraordinary intellectual capacities but by their fruits – their great revolutionary conceptions. Talents are known from the early childhood by their extraordinary problem-solving abilities which presume inborn great mental capacities.

Scientific intuition is the unity of inborn mental capacities, the scope of knowledge, and own personal problem-solving experience, the latter being the most important component.

Gödel's theorem does not prove the incompleteness of formalized arithmetic or of anything else.

It is said that science is about that what we know, while philosophy – about that what we do not know. The above solutions of paradoxes of human cognition provide some grounds for the hope that epistemology and methodology departing from philosophizing come closer to science.

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*Armenuhi MANUKYAN,**Mnatsakan MANUKYAN*

PHILOSOPHICAL WISDOM AS A METHOD OF FORMATION OF WORLDVIEW OF AN INDIVIDUAL

*Only those youngsters who are smart become wise at an old age.**Georg Brutian*

Abstract

The article observes the role and significance of philosophical wisdom in the formation of person's worldview. It also demonstrates the efficient ways of its usage, methods and conditions. It is noted that throughout ages Philosophy has mainly been studying the imagination, logic and abstract thinking of humans where the formation of personality is determined in its subjective existence. It is not secret that each phase of the development of civilization dictates new approaches and ideas, opinions and beliefs, values and standards, in other words, a new philosophy of life and being. Such transformations lead to the change of human being, to the modernization of his image and to the adaptation of a person to current demands. However, as a result of research and comparative analysis, we have come to the conclusion that, in spite of change in the mode of life and activities of a person, the main components characterizing the essence of a person remain unchanged. Among these components, the special role and importance is given to person's worldview as it decides his/her thinking and attitude towards the world and to himself/herself, also to the quality of life style, morals and social aspects for which the effective way of formation is philosophical wisdom.

Keywords: philosophical wisdom, worldview, mean, formation, personality, human being, type, levels, concepts.

For centuries, human logic, imagination and abstract thinking have been the important aspects of the study of philosophy where the formation of a person depends on his uniqueness. It is not a secret that each phase of the development of civilization dictates new approaches and ideas, opinions and beliefs, values and standards, in other words, a new philosophy of life and being. These changes, in turn, contribute to the transformation of hu-

man nature and the creation of a new image. However, in spite of a change in the mode of life and activities of a person, the main components characterizing the essence of a person remain unchanged. Among them, philosophical wisdom plays a special role, which is not only a powerful factor in preserving the national identity of the person, but also a way of shaping his worldview.

In the broadest sense of the word, philo-

sophical wisdom is the environment of human's cognitive activity, his spiritual nature which is created, reproduced and transmitted to generations as formed stable values, traditions and wisdom. Philosophical wisdom as a result of human activity, is an alteration of nature in accordance with semantic laws and regularities. In this regard, it is noteworthy to quote M. Heidegger. He believes that human activity is organized in a meaningful way, which in modern world is regarded as implementation of supreme values by the perfect expression of human creativity.

By considering the philosophical wisdom as a way of shaping the worldview, we cannot miss out the theory of evolution, which in cultural studies and cultural anthropology is perceived as a process of adaption of human beings to their natural environment. Evolutionists in their approaches of philosophical wisdom highlight concepts which in terms of scientific laws, morals and laws of life should constitute as explanatory objects. In this regard, White's role is very valuable. He is a successor of philosophical wisdom studies which is an important part of the culture. For White's conception it is typical to aspire to define the objectives of philosophical wisdom which have its own patterns of functional development (White, 1959, p. 29).

They are very diverse but among that diversity the most important is the formation of person's worldview in the implementation of which, in certain chronological sequence, ideas accumulated over the centuries have transformed into wisdom. It is not a secret that a person's worldview is shaped not only by the assumption of knowledge but mostly by certain cultural traditions and wisdom due to peculiarities of family education. The formation

of philosophical wisdom is an independent process where in the result of interaction of cultural attributes occur clear convictions. Thanks to those convictions a person is regarded as a developing system and semantic factor of evolution. The initial element of wisdom is the person's ability to understand symbols, loans and allegories, also the perception of their physical form and meaning. Unfortunately, not everyone has that ability. Nowadays, there are many smart but few wise people.

Let's try to understand what wisdom is. In Ozhogov's dictionary it is defined as the unity of intelligence, knowledge and experience. But this definition does not include the idea of love. Due to our strong belief there cannot be wisdom without love. Only the idea expressed with love can be wise. To be wise means to live with love and in love by displaying and disseminating the light which is peculiar to wise mind full of love. Thanks to that many "Wisdom Schools" have been formed, preserved and reached to us over the centuries and by their powerful influence many generations have formed their outlooks and beliefs about the surrounding world.

The term "worldview" was introduced into scientific circulation in the second half of XVIII century. The term comes from German "Weltanschauung" word and refers to a wide world perception. Of course, it is obvious that notions about worldview existed before the origin of this term in ancient world and was described as wisdom or high knowledge. The issues related to the formation of worldview are rooted in the unity and integrity of the world surrounding man and balancing the concept about life and death is a cognitive need for every individual. In the modern

world the worldview is perceived as a point of view of a person about his role in life and society. The point of view includes attitudes, beliefs, principles and morals. In other words, worldview is a complete way to understand the self and to generalize views about the surrounding world and man's place and role in it. Taking this into account, we can argue that through philosophical wisdom it is possible to achieve self-awareness and to the identification of man's role and place in the world as each of them involves components, levels and forms about worldview.

A.A. Radugin classifies four structural components of the worldview of an individual. They are cognitive component, value-orientation component, emotional-volitional component and practical component.

The cognitive component includes knowledge which man acquire from different sources and in different ways during his lifetime. The philosophical wisdom can be one of those ways and sources. Therefore, cognitive component provides the scientific side of the world which encompasses personal and social skills in generalized and systematic manner.

Value-oriented component is based on different values, beliefs and ideals. It includes social norms and moral interpretations of phenomena, the understanding of which leads to a proper formation of interpersonal and social relations. Obviously, philosophical wisdom, which is generated from universal values, is equipped with this component. The system of values imply the meaning of life, happiness, misfortune, notions of good and evil, love and hate, attitudes and beliefs.

Emotional-volitional component is the emotional side of values, beliefs and convictions and provides psychological functioning

of those elements. They are formed more effective under the influence of philosophical wisdom.

Practical component involves practical application of theoretical knowledge. In other words under the influence of philosophical wisdom human lifestyle is formed according to certain values, beliefs, orientations, principles and attitudes.

It is natural that the worldview of every man comprises the above mentioned components but each of them appear in a favorable situation depending on individual's age, personal qualities, practice and wisdom. Therefore, in the framework of worldview the individual's cognitive and emotional experience, his emotionality and intelligence are performed in different ways which is considered as the basis of emotional-psychological worldview and is called "world perception". The individual's perception about the world, its effectiveness and goal-orientation is greatly influenced by philosophical wisdom, which, in this case, is a powerful method of influence.

It should be noted that both in native and foreign schools of philosophy, the worldview is traditionally classified into household, theoretical and practical types. Nevertheless, they are logical continuation of each other and in the scope of "world perception" are linked to each other. Certainly, there are some differences which depend on individual's good knowledge, ideas and reasoning, critical and logical thinking, imagination and wisdom. We strongly believe that philosophical wisdom as a method of formation of worldview, can also contribute to a formation of the personality, can strengthen priorities both in household practical and theoretical levels. For instance,

in level of household worldview, man expresses his daily routine values, the interpretation of which vary in the framework of philosophical wisdom, folk traditions, customs and social stereotypes. Yet, the theoretical level of the worldview is the superstructure of daily practical level, which stands out by its systematization and hierarchical structure.

After analyzing the influence of philosophical wisdom on the formation of individual's worldview, we have come to the following conclusions:

- Philosophical wisdom is a universal, cultural and natural value through which personal, historical and social experiences are transferred from generation to generation.
- Philosophical wisdom has educative, formative and developing function.
- Philosophical wisdom as a way to formation of an individual's worldview is perceived in the framework of evolutionary and cognitive theories.
- Philosophical wisdom in the framework of culture and cultural anthropology is perceived as a process of adaptation of an individual to natural environment.

- Philosophical wisdom acts as explanatory objects in accordance with scientific approvals, morals and rules of life.
- Through philosophical wisdom is formed not only the person's worldview but also his world perception.
- Philosophical wisdom can have personal, pedagogical and psychological interpretations.

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THE METHODOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE NOTION OF DIVINE REVELATION IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Abstract

I offer an overview of the relevance of the notion of divine revelation to the methodology of the sciences. The notion of revelation is to be considered in the framework of a well-formed philosophical theory. In such a theory, the theological notion of revelation is important as well, because as a historically evolving notion it has contributed, in its own fashion, to the formation of other sciences. The method the notion of revelation entails is instructive for the methodological presuppositions of the sciences. Most importantly, the dynamism given in the notion of revelation to produce genuine newness – *ad intra* as well as *ad extra* – appears to be the decisive methodological factor defining scientific methodology. I also reflect on the importance of various forms of knowledge – apodicticity, certainty and probability – as they appear in the notion of revelation and define scientific forms of knowledge in a historical as well as logical fashion. Finally, I show the place of the methodological discussion in an overall view of revelation as a well-formed philosophical theory.

Keywords: Divine revelation, theology, philosophy, methodology, science, history, newness.

1. Introduction: The Centrality of the Notion of Divine Revelation

Divine revelation is one of the central terms in the epoch in which we live. This epoch is the epoch of Christianity with all its intrinsic and extrinsic features, together with its rise and flourishing, decline and even dissolution. Revelation, nevertheless, is the most fundamental notion in this tradition, a notion that comes before other notions in the logical order, such as being, time, history, society, person, wisdom, morality, philosophy, or science. The reason of the primacy of the notion of revelation is simple: in principle, it is revelation that defines itself and its outcomes, nature and human beings included. On a histori-

cal scale, it is revelation in its specific Christian form that has defined the development of Christianity including its crises and fragmentations. On a theological scale, the revelation in question is revelation in a unique sense which is characteristically different from other notions of revelation in the history of religions, while these other notions are in many ways related to the notion of revelation in Christianity.

These three kinds of relevance – logical, historical, and theological – should be investigated separately. Here I confine myself to the logical investigation of the primacy of revelation taken in itself. Other aspects of this problem, such as the historical importance and the relationship to other religious forms

must be limited to the context of the main topic of my present text, the methodological importance of revelation. Indeed, the Christian form of revelation calls for a historical analysis of the relationship between other forms of revelation and thus also for an encompassing notion of divine revelation in which such relations can be scrutinized. However, it is precisely the Christian notion of revelation which is the basis of such a general notion, so here I can confine myself to the latter taken in the perspective of methodology.

On the logical level, revelation is conceived as the ultimate source of all reality and knowledge. The recognition of the primacy of revelation itself belongs to the effects of revelation. Inasmuch as revelation is defined as the source of reality, revelation is not reality in this sense, but is more original than reality; revelation embodies the source of reality, its realness. That is to say, revelation as the revelation of the real is taken in its utmost significance. Reality in its various forms, such as empirical, mental, external or internal reality, the reality of time and history, or even the eschatological dimension of reality, is contained in, and expressed through, revelation. Inasmuch as our knowledge is rooted in the knowledge of revelation, our knowledge is revelation-bound or, to be more precise, its main function is the reflection of revelation on various levels.

Such an approach to revelation undoes any substantive metaphysics and ontology which presuppose some kind of original stuff, matter or spirit, or perhaps a set of ideas or ideals which has been progressively developed in the course of history. In this sense, the theory of revelation – which I have re-

peatedly termed ‘apocalypics’ – is the reflection of the knowledge of revelation on the realness of revelation, a realness that is presupposed, reflected, and disclosed in the theory itself.¹

One may rightly ask as to how the present notion of revelation is related to the received view of divine revelation interpreted in the framework of religion. My approach in this context is *philosophical* which takes as its basis the historical notion of revelation as is given in Christianity and it considers all other forms of revelation as logical and, partially, historical ramifications of that central notion. Let us recall that in Christianity the realness of reality is disclosed in the revelation of incarnation. As a result, we become aware of the Trinity as the basic structure of the divine both in itself and as the source of reality. As a secondary result, we become aware of the fact that *our becoming aware of revelation as the disclosure of the realness of the real is itself the working of revelation.*²

Traditionally, revelation is classified into ‘natural revelation’ – the revelation given in creation – and ‘supernatural revelation’ – revelation given in the incarnation of the second person of the Trinity and its effects on the course of history. Part and parcel of natural

¹ Cf. Mezei, Balázs M.: *Radical Revelation: A Philosophical Approach*. New York: Bloomsbury (forthcoming in 2017).

² The Trinitarian notion of Revelation is considered here as having produced all other forms of revelation on the logical level, but partially also historically. For instance, the notion of revelation in Islam is considered as a development of the Christian notion, a development overemphasizing just one aspect of the original notion, the aspect of transcendence.

revelation is 'natural reason', but this reason is directly enlightened by supernatural revelation with respect to the subject matter of the latter. However, reason, either natural or illuminated, needs to be aware of its own limits concerning the intrinsic features of supernatural revelation. 'Mystery' is still a term we can apply here to describe the relation of supernatural revelation to our mind. But even with this limitation, reason is capable of recognizing the centrality of revelation in its own workings as well as in what is called nature outside reason. Both in the world and the mind, revelation has a centrally important position as source and structure.³

As to the problem of methodology of a philosophical research of revelation, let me refer to a third traditional notion of revelation: 'private revelation'.⁴ Traditionally, a revela-

tion is considered private if and only if it remains in the framework of 'public' or 'general' revelation yet a certain interpretation of personal importance is attached to the general doctrines of revelation. Moreover, private revelation is revealed to the receiver of revelation in special ways the essence of which is the emergence of the unique awareness of the reception of revelation. It is not the possible contents of private revelation that concerns me here but rather the fact that revelation as such possesses an ultimately personal relation to human beings in their attempts to conceive revelation. Indeed, revelation in its entirety is public both as given in nature and in history. But any aspect of revelation can be conceived and understood exclusively on the grounds of a private communication, that is, in the framework of *my own understanding* of revelation. This understanding is not something foreign to revelation but its most important dimension, its being understood, conceived, or received.

Thus the private aspect of revelation emerges as the actual method in which revelation as such is conceived. In this way, the function of revelation as received revelation is expressed and this function is the basis of the philosophical methodology applied here. Revelation is revealed so that its overall structures may be conceived, understood and properly interpreted through its function of a personal, subjective, or 'private' communication.

³ See also my other work: Mezei, Balázs M.: *Religion and Revelation after Auschwitz*. New York: Bloomsbury, 2013.

⁴ In his work *De revelatione* Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange explains that the notion of revelation can be classified according to the Scholastic doctrine of causes. That is, the notion of revelation is to be investigated in accordance with its form, its agent, its material cause and its final cause. Formally, revelation can be supernatural in terms of its substance or in terms of its mode. Still as supernatural, revelation can be defined in accordance with the fashion in which it is revealed or in accordance with the psychological state of the receiver of revelation. On the side of the agent, revelation can be active or passive; as to its material cause, it can be immediate or mediate. Finally, as to its final cause, revelation can be private or public. Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, Réginald: *De revelatione per Ecclesiam Catholicam proposita*. Romae:

Libreria Editrice Religiosa, 1951, vol. 1, pp. 153-54.

2. Revelation and the Sciences: A Historical Outline

We tend to interpret the notion of revelation in a framework which is denoted theological and is strictly separated from other fields of human knowledge. However, revelation both in its original form and its effects on the broader human culture is not a notion rigidly separated from the other fields of human awareness. This point can be underpinned in three different ways: on Biblical grounds, on the grounds of the history of theology, and finally on the grounds of a philosophical theory of revelation.

Revelation is given especially as the collection of writings in the form of the New Testament. The New Testament is nevertheless attached to the Old Testament just as theology is attached to the various fields of human culture. The Old Testament is traditionally considered as the preparation of the New Testament, 'praeparatio evangelica', a way to Christ. This way, nevertheless, is two-directional: on the one hand, the form and contents of the New Testament could be approached from the Old Testament, and *vice versa*, the Old Testament could be better understood on the basis of the New Testament. Obviously, this bi-directional understanding is easily applicable on the fields of revelation and the sciences. Revelation has a formal methodological importance; the sciences, on the other hand, possess the material factor shaped by the overall form of revelation.

Indeed, the New Testament is full with references to various aspects of general human culture, aspects that are better understood in the context of revelation. Jesus teaches and what he teaches is relevant to the sciences,

such as the imminent coming of the end of the world, the plurality of 'heavens', the manipulability of natural forces, such as the sea and the wind, the right way to sow in agriculture, or even the possibility of crossing the limits of human life. In the letters we find further claims concerning the workings of nature, society, morality, and history. There is a trajectory in this respect in the New Testament writings: from the historical and moral teachings formed by revelation we slowly approach cosmological teachings emphasizing the structures of the universe with respect to 'the end of all times'. This trajectory culminates in the highly metaphorical Book of Revelation which aspires to give a synthetic view of cosmological, theological and moral teachings in the form of an ultimate revelation.⁵

As to the history of theology, it is fairly obvious that leading Church writers, such as Clement of Alexandria, Augustine, or St. Thomas Aquinas among others considered theology not as a field strictly isolated from the other fields of human knowledge but rather as a field illuminating, exacting, ordering and enriching the latter. For instance, Clement of Alexandria considered the various sciences of the Greek mind as 'fragments of the Eternal Truth' and described theological knowledge as the general framework in which such

⁵ See for instance James 3:7 on the taming of all animals; also 2Pet 3:8-13 where we find the doctrine of water and fire in the construction and destruction of the universe; 1 Cor 15 on the nature of bodies (earthly and heavenly), with a special emphasis on the various brightness of stars. And 1 Pet 4:7: 'But the end of all things is at hand; therefore be serious and watchful in your prayers.'

fragments are properly conceived.⁶ It is a well-known fact that the scientific nature of theology is defined by Thomas Aquinas as an accomplishment of the rest of the sciences. In a similar fashion, modern theological perspectives, such as those of Teilhard de Chardin, Jacques Maritain or Hans Urs von Balthasar, consider theology as an encompassing approach not in detriment to but rather as accomplishing of the rest of the sciences.

Theology is often seen as the proper field of dealing with the problem of revelation. This is true to some extent inasmuch as theology axiomatically *presupposes* the notion of revelation and considers the implications – presuppositions, consequences, and corollaries – of this axiom. However, by possessing revelation as its axiom, theology properly speaking is unable to consider revelation in itself, because for such a consideration we need a critical view of the axiom. This view is provided by a specific theory of revelation, a *philosophy of revelation*. The question *what* revelation is and *how* it is relevant to the rest of human culture, including the sciences, is then a question raised by such a theory. This philosophical theory shows that the notion of revelation, that is, the notion of an ultimate source of all knowledge and reality, has shaped the human mind in such a way that the notion of universal science could emerge. This science is not just a sum of various sets of information, theoretical or practical, but rather a truly universal science with an absolutely reliable and authoritative source and

structure. Moreover, this science possesses a historical character according to which it can be developed, detailed, made even more perfect along the line of a finite historical trajectory. Revelation as fully given yet as also to be developed are the two poles in which all human investigations necessarily situate themselves. For instance, in contemporary cosmology, the reality of the universe is presupposed (even if this reality is likened sometimes to a computer simulation). And it is equally presupposed that the process of knowledge is such that it can arrive at a satisfactory understanding of the fact of the universe in the framework of a finite sequence of discoveries and their conclusions.⁷

In more concrete terms, let me highlight the most important features of the dependence of the sciences on the contents of the notion of revelation.

a) Creation. As among others Stanley Jaki pointed out, the rise of the modern natural sciences would not have been possible without the notion of a created universe which can be accordingly known – at least in principle – in its forms and contents. However, it belongs to the core of Christian revelation to emphasize not only the difference between

⁶ Clement of Alexandria: *Stromata*. In: *Fathers of the Second Century: Hermas, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria*, C. Cleveland (ed.). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, p. 313.

⁷ See the recent Isaac Asimov debate in the American Museum of Natural History on the chances that our universe is a simulation: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wgSZA3NPPBs> See also the summary of the debate here: <http://www.space.com/32543-universe-a-simulation-asimov-debate.html>; and see especially Nick Bostrom's Are You Living in a Computer Simulation? at <http://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html> (accessed 8/11/2016).

the creator and the creature but also the latter's rational nature. The act of creation has been deemed to be a rational act of the creator with the rational result of the created order.

b) The essence of rationality with respect to the created order is the doctrine of causality. *Human or natural reason* is capable of assessing causes and effects. The reasoning faculty was most often considered, accordingly, as the arithmetical faculty capable of formalizing logical and real relationships. Logic and mathematics are the most important fields in which the notion of natural necessity (as opposed to theological necessity) could be observed, followed, and modelled in symbolic forms (such as in letter or numbers).

c) The emergence of the notion of human personhood is intrinsically bound up with the notion of divine personhood developed throughout the Trinitarian debates of the first millennium of the Christian doctrines. The translation of *huposthasis* into *persona* and the definition of the human nature of Christ in the framework of his divine personhood determined the discussions on the essence of a human being in the First Scholasticism. However only when Thomas Aquinas decided to attribute the faculty of intellect to human individuals – as a reaction to Averroism – did it become possible that an integral notion of human personhood evolved. This notion corroborated the unique nature of a human person and led, in its course, to the emergence of the modern notions of the special and intrinsic dignity of human persons.

d) Even in political science, the peculiarly double character of Western Christianity, with the doctrine of the Two Swords in its center, decisively shaped the nature of the worldly power. First, it defined worldly power

as subservient to spiritual power. Just in this relationship, as a consequence of its definite position, kingship was able to develop a peculiar form of independence, a form which was building up its structures for many centuries. Thus, the notion of the political government developed, in many important phases, through the influence of the spiritual realm and led to the emergence and even domination of non-spiritual notions of politics in modernity. This is the basis of the famous sentence of Carl Schmitt, according to which “all significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts”.⁸

e) In these developments, the peculiar understanding of *history* as an eschatological process is to be emphasized. The notion of the ultimate termination of the created order shaped and structured the understanding of history as a complex, dynamic, and meaningful process throughout the centuries. Thus not only the notion of history was formed – leading to eschatological ideologies of the twentieth century – but also the eschatological horizon of human existence became emphasized in various ways as essentially constitutive of being a human person.

The notion of creation as the production of a functional complexity on the basis of natural laws and other technical rules of operation is clearly the backdrop of the production of machines in modernity. True, machine production was developed to some extent even in Hellenism as is shown by the compli-

⁸ Schmitt, Carl: *Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*. Edited and translated by George Schwab. With a Foreword by Tracy B. Strong. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985, p. 36.

cated planetarium of the so-called Antikythera Mechanism. However, the mass production of machines began only with the making of mechanical clocks, for many centuries the most advanced examples of mechanical machines. While such machines were produced on a certain level even in Antiquity, the mass production of clocks and similar machineries were clearly related to the ever more elaborated theological notion of creation *as* the creation of a meaningful, rule following and well-designed complexity. The notion of creation, the theological sophistication of the doctrine of causality, and the ever more refined technologies in shaping iron, steel and wood made it possible to build such machines from the 10th century on.

In its historical role, revelation may be compared to the source of simulation emerging in related arguments as to the nature of reality in which we live. If, as Bostrom argues in his paper I referred to, the probability that we live in a simulated universe is closer to one than to zero, then the source of this simulation is a conscious activity expressed in mathematical processes. Such an activity, however, is very close to what the original notion of divine revelation suggests, a notion nevertheless much more complex than what we gain from simulation arguments today.

3. Problems in Methodology I: What is Revealed in Revelation?

The first and most important task to do in this context is the description of *what* is revealed in revelation. The question concerning this *what* is the pivotal methodological question, because in all methodologies the object of method defines methodology. The second

question of methodology is the *how* an object is reached, and I shall discuss this point below. As to the *what*, it is the ultimate reality of revelation that is revealed. Inasmuch as revelation is the source of reality, revelation is the revelation of the realness of reality. That is to say: in revelation reality is revealed that is in no way partial, aspectual, or particular but rather absolute, overarching, and all-containing. Yet this generality is expressed in the factuality of revelation. Revelation is fact, the ultimate and absolute fact; it is an infinite fact in the non-reduced meaning of infinity (n).

It is in the context of the infinite fact of revelation that particular facts, again facts of revelation, take place. Most importantly it is the fact of revelation in the form of nature that appears under the horizon of the infinite fact. Nature becomes defined with respect to the infinite fact and thus their contents and correlations become the substance given in revelation. Inasmuch as revelation is always revelation *directed to* the receiver of revelation, the receiver of revelation gains access to the contents and the correlation given in revelation as an infinite fact and as nature. Without this correlation, both the infinite and the finite fact of revelation would be inaccessible. Insofar as they are accessible, however, they become objects of knowledge and thus a well-defined structure of objects, under the horizon of the infinite fact, appears for the receiver of revelation.

In revelation it is revelation that is revealed above all and thus it is in revelation that we gain access to the appropriate objects and their structures for our knowledge. In the revelation of revelation, a knowable universe emerges which has a definite content – under

the horizon of the infinite fact – and also a meaningful structure of such contents open to the enquiry of the receiver of revelation. The same point may be expressed in the following way as well: the infinite fact of revelation does not only presuppose the finite facts of revelation in the form of nature, but also the fact of the receiver of revelation as a rational subject that is capable of conceiving and knowing the reality of revelation on the basis of a rational structure. In this way, the receiver of revelation may repeat the fact of revelation in their understanding and thus produce a mental model of revelation with its contents and structures. This model may be expressed in language, in symbols, in activities, or even in moral behavior of individuals and communities. Ultimately, the model may be formed in the form of a computer of various kinds (Antikythera Mechanism or Tianhe-2). Revelation as a fact appears as the source of all factual and possible contents of various kinds of modelling.

Moreover, revelation becomes particular not merely in the natural sense but in a more concrete historical and cultural sense as well. Think of the fact of incarnation at a certain point of time, at a certain location, in the form of a concrete human being using a certain language and living in definite a historical context ('under Pontius Pilate') as the example of the particular fact of revelation. This particular fact is like a window through which we gain sight of the horizon of the infinite fact. The two levels of factuality are related to one another and are then conceived in the terms of each other: the infinite fact in the terms of the particular fact and *vice versa*. Thus, in the factual nature of revelation not only absolute and particular factuality are ex-

pressed but also their complex relations in a historically concrete setting.

Scientific methodologies presuppose the rational universe under the horizon of the infinite fact. In some theories, this infinite fact is conceived as the original fact of the birth of the universe ('Big Bang') or perhaps a string of original explosions leading to sequential births of universes. In such theories, however, the problem of the capacity of discovering and assessing such an original fact remains obscure. How does it happen that such an original fact is a fact also for me? The naiveté of scientific objectivity is too obvious: what is 'out there' counts as the totality of the real and the role of the mind is neglected or not even identified as a problem. Yet the fact of the origin is by definition is a fact related to the fact of the mind discovering this origin, thus the two facts should be described in a unified theory which cosmological theories do not offer. The theory of revelation, however, described the original fact as *entailing* the receiver of revelation and offers a unified description of the two facts in the form of their correlation.

4. Problems in Methodology II: How is Revelation Revealed?

In the traditional accounts of revelation, we distinguish general, specific, private and final revelation. General revelation is the revelation of nature in creation. Specific revelation is the revelation given in the history of salvation. Private revelation is communication given to individuals with respect to their personal needs. And final revelation is the ultimate accomplishment of revelation at the end of all times. We can further elaborate these

kinds of revelation in accordance with other modes of communication, but it seems to be more important to point out that by all these distinctions we presuppose an original and integral notion of revelation. This notion of revelation is the fundamental *what* to which there belongs an equally fundamental *how* of revelation. So what is this *how* of revelation?

My short answer is this: Revelation is the revelation of revelation in such a way that revelation is enriched by itself. The very occurrence of revelation is an occurrence that embodies self-enrichment. But how can revelation as an infinite fact self-enrich itself? The answer may be given in turning around the same question: *How could not revelation as an infinite fact self-enrich itself in the occurrence of revelation?* Infinity is such that it is infinitely more than itself; it is infinitely more real, more rich, more complex, more detailed, more living, more substantial than itself. This sounds paradoxical, but the very notion of infinity is paradoxical for our comprehension. Let it suffice to say that the fundamental *how* of revelation is its infinite self-enrichment in such a way that in all instances of revelation not only the particular contents express this self-enrichment but also the infinite horizon itself is an infinitely self-enriching horizon.

In the Biblical language we may express this notion of self-enrichment as ‘making all things anew’: ‘Behold, I make all things new!’.⁹ In the original text it is clearly said that the act of making all things new is the *essence of revelation* – not only the essence of the Book of Revelation but also and more importantly of divine revelation itself – taken both *ad intra* and *ad extra*. And the expres-

sion ‘all things’ does not only mean ‘the heavenly Jerusalem’ but indeed all things conceivable and unconceivable. Revelation, thus, is not only infinite self-enrichment but more importantly infinite *self-renewal*; and this infinite self-renewal is the fundamental *how* of revelation as revelation.

All other notions of revelation – in nature, human beings, and history – are particular exemplifications of the fundamental newness of revelation. They express this newness in particular ways; yet these ways are not unrelated to one another. Their structure is such that it is in nature that history becomes possible and it is in history that human beings receive revelation. On the other hand, all these moments are arranged along the lines of self-enriching newness, or – to use the expression of Miklos Veto – renewing newness (*nouveauté novatrice*).¹⁰ In this way, we may say that nature and history are just two aspects of the realization of revelation in human beings; and it is in human beings that not only the fundamental *how* but also the *what* of revelation is realized in a communicative fashion. By ‘communicative fashion’ I mean the notion of the ‘communicatio idiomatum’ or ἡ ἀντίδοσις τῶν ιδιωμάτων. Just as the original doctrine of ‘antidosis’ allowed the mutual acknowledgement of properties for both the divine and the human natures of Christ, human beings as receivers of revelation realize in themselves both the *how* and the *what* of revelation in the way these factors determine the reality of revelation itself. In more concrete terms: the fundamental *what* and *how* of revelation can be recognized in the receiver of

⁹ Κατὰ πάντα ποιῶ, Rev 21:5.

¹⁰ Vetö, Miklos, *L’élargissement de la métaphysique*. Paris: Hermann, 2012, p. 43.

revelation as entailed in the reality of revelation.

Let me try to translate the above points into a more concrete example of the methodological problem. According to the fundamental discovery of the special theory of relativity, the position and movement of the observer influences the simultaneity of occurrences, the movements of clocks, mass, and length. Just as the Copernican discovery of the central position of the Earth, the special theory of relativity must take into account the position and movement of the observer so that it can properly describe the movements of objects outside the observers. In a somewhat similar fashion, quantum theory realized that the presence of an observer ‘changes’ the behavior of light particles travelling through a slot. In both cases, the fact, position and movement of the observer becomes decisive. Not that reality could be a subjective illusion but rather that reality is to be conceived so that the fact (and movement and position) of the observer is included into the notion of reality. What was conceived as reality in classical physics has to be enlarged to include the observer in concrete ways.

However, the theory of revelation as based on the traditional notion of revelation has always been clear about the correlational nature of revelation as being expressed in various ways but also as being addressed to the receiver of revelation. The receiver of revelation, the ‘observer’ as it were, is part and parcel of revelation, *because revelation is such that it is to be received*. It is in the structures of the receiver of revelation that the reality of

revelation may be conceived; and it is the realness of revelation, as received by the receiver, that the realness of revelation may be understood. This feature of revelation can be properly called the correlational nature of revelation.

It is an implication of the physical theories mentioned that the presence of the observer not only influences the observed state of affairs but even realizes a new state of affairs. Yet it has always been the very essence of revelation that its workings have been conceived in terms of renewing newness, *nouveauté novatrice*. Scientific inquiry can never be conceived of in terms of merely establishing ‘what is out there’. Rather, scientific inquiry needs to understand itself as contributing to reality not only theoretically but also in terms of its contents. I do not say that in science we find what we want to find, but I say that our search contributes to reality in important ways and this contribution must be taken into account in our assessment of achievements. We must begin with the fact that reality is self-enrichment and our search for knowledge – and also our production of models and machines – is a particular aspect of the self-enriching processes of reality. As often seems, such processes may be turned into self-destructive ones, and human beings has a clear responsibility here.¹¹

¹¹ The dimension of newness is what appears to be the most difficult obstacle to a theory of reality as a mere simulation: for in simulation no newness could be discovered, thus, to begin with, the fact of the simulation itself.

5. Problems in Methodology III: Apodicticity, Certainty, and Probability

One of the clear mistakes of Peter Sloterdijk's theory of 'the apocalypse of the Real'¹² is that he does not seem to recognize the importance of the principle of *nouveauté novatrice*. Sloterdijk considers the history of modernity as the history of such an 'apocalypse' and construes this process in terms of a certain emergentism. The new understanding of reality emerges out of the confusion of misleading pseudo-theories, mainly religious in nature, and the spherical emergence of a non-fossil-bound source of energy, the light of the sun, will clear our mind of the last remnants of old theories. However, old theories, especially the theory of revelation in a theological form already contained some of the most important factors shaping our scientific history and even showing us a way beyond limited interpretations of reality.

Let me show you briefly how modern science based its epistemological dogmas on certain aspects of the notion of revelation, how it isolated these aspects from one another, and finally how these aspects may be combined again on the basis of a better understood theory of revelation. Revelation appears in its Christian form as an objectively certain, even apodictically certain understanding the necessity of which outshines the necessity of philosophy, logic, or everyday experience. One of the well-known sayings of Jesus mentions natural phenomena as predicting certain occurrences; however, the level of certainty

concerning divine revelation ('the signs of the times') are much higher:

'When it is evening you say, "It will be fair weather, for the sky is red"; and in the morning, "It will be foul weather today, for the sky is red and threatening." Hypocrites! You know how to discern the face of the sky, but you cannot discern the signs of the times' (Mat 16, 2-3).

The schema we find here is this: natural certainty is surpassed by revelational certainty. We may add: the certainty of revelation was deemed to surpass even philosophical, logical certainties as well, because revelation was seen as possessing the highest apodicticity possible. This apodicticity concerned the saving power of God vis-à-vis sinful human beings, that is it concerned the reality of salvation. Certainty was the personal experience of this salvific apodicticity expressed in faith, such as in Hebrew 11:1: 'Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.' Probability – that is the aspectual ambivalence of an assertion – was delegated to the introductory realm of revelation. Probability is mentioned a number of times in the New Testament as 'possibility', such as 'The things which are impossible with men are possible with God' (*dunatos*, Luke 18, 27).

Thus, revelational apodicticity, certainty and probability are organically connected to one another. In the perspective of a theory of revelation we may say that these dimensions of knowledge express various aspects of the same whole in which revelation as revelation is realized. This whole may be described in

¹² Cf. Sloterdijk, Peter: *Was geschah im 20. Jahrhundert?* Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2016, pp. 106-115.

terms of truth and reality expressed by the Hebrew word ‘amen’ so often used by Jesus in the gospels.

In the history of the sciences, the organic relationship between apodicticity, certainty and probability disintegrates. Apodicticity in its mathematical and logical form gets rid of the two other dimensions, especially of the dimension of certainty; and probability evolves into a calculus which has gained an increasing significance in contemporary science. What the theory of revelation may teach us in this respect is twofold: on the one hand, an organic connection of these modes of knowledge is not only possible but even advisable. Thus we need to work out a new form of apodicticity which integrates the aspects of logical apodicticity, certainty, and probability. In this work, the principles of faith, hope and love are instructive. These principles describe modes of the reception of revelation in three important aspects. All have been influential in the history of the sciences, because faith became understood not merely as faith in God but also as faith in the rational order of everything; hope was understood not merely as the connection to the ultimate fulfilment of revelation but also as the hope concerning genuine understanding of ourselves and our world in which we live; and finally, love was not only understood as the love of God and our neighbors, but also as the love of knowledge, wisdom, and humanity as such.

In my understanding, these three aspects must be seen in their entirety and combined into the organic whole of the reality of revelation. We need to receive revelation and have faith in it, hope for it, and love it; but we also need to be uniquely certain of the reality of revelation which leads our world out of its present confusions and to reach a better order of things in the form of a universal renewal. This renewal makes our methodology instructive to an encompassing scientific methodology: because the aim of human knowledge is not only to understand what is ‘out there’, not only to produce limited models of natural goings-on in the form of machines, but rather to aim at the overall renewal of reality in which all the fragments of our knowledge and reality may be organized into a meaningful whole. The notion of revelation, as is substantiated by the theory of revelation, teaches us to follow this way.

6. Conclusion: Methodological Apocalypics

What I outlined above belongs to the field I mentioned above under the title of apocalypics. Apocalypics is the overall form of the study of revelation. Beyond its fundamental introduction, apocalypics has three important fields: 1. Theoretical Apocalypics; 2. Historical Apocalypics; 3. Methodological Apocalypics

Here is the structure of these fields:

Structural fields ►	<u>Methodological</u> <u>Apocalypitics</u>	<u>Theoretical Apoca-</u> <u>lyptics</u>	<u>Historical Apoca-</u> <u>lyptics</u>
Content fields ▼			
<u>Contexts of Logic</u>	Logical problems of method	Logical problems of theory	Logical problems of history
<u>Contexts of Philosophy</u>	Philosophical problems of method	Philosophical problems of theory	Philosophical problems of history
<u>Contexts of Theology</u>	Theological problems of method	Theological problems of theory	Theological problems of history
<u>Contexts of Phenomenology</u>	Phenomenological problems of method	Phenomenological problems of theory	Phenomenological problems of history
<u>Contexts of Religious Studies</u>	Problems of method in religious studies	Problems of theory in religious studies	Problems of history in religious studies
<u>Contexts of the Sciences</u>	Problems of method in investigating the sciences	Problems of theory in investigating the sciences	Problems of history in investigating the sciences
<u>Contexts of the Arts</u>	Problems of method in investigating the arts	Problems of theory in investigating the arts	Problems of history in investigating the arts
<u>Contexts of Personhood</u>	<i>Relevance for Apocalyptic Personhood</i>		

All these fields are actually disciplines which consider fundamental problems of the study of revelation: its methods, its theories, and its history. As to the methodological venue, the study of revelation includes the study of the logical, theological, phenomenological, scientific, religious, and artistic problems. In other words, it considers the problems of revelation in the context of the human sciences in general. Its ultimate aim is threefold:

- a) to show the organic connections among the various fields of methodologies;
- b) to show the relationship between these

methodologies and the fundamental method of apocalypitics; and

- c) to show the relevance of such methodologies to the receiver of revelation, human personhood, in their perspective of renewing newness, *nouveauté novatrice*.

In my presentation, all I wished to summarize has been the special correlation between the study of revelation and scientific methodology in a general sense and in a historical perspective. While I find it very important, I did not have appropriate place to show the relevance of such a general method-

ology to human or ‘apocalyptic’ personhood. However, I believe it is of paramount importance to recognize that all our considerations are worthwhile if and only if they contribute not only to a better understanding of the sciences, philosophy, or culture, but essentially to the self-renewal of human persons in their concrete historical situation.

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SOCIAL, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

NORMATIVE CONTRADICTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

Abstract

In order to be perceived as legitimate by those subject to it, a system of legal norms should be free of contradictions. The very idea of justice is incompatible with an erratic interpretation and, subsequently, arbitrary application of norms. Systemic contradictions make actions by state authorities unpredictable. However, at the domestic as well as at the international level, considerations of power and interest have often made of the respective body of norms a “hermeneutical minefield.” The international legal order in particular contains contradictions even between the most basic principles such as state sovereignty, self-determination and the rules of international humanitarian law. While, at the national level, the authority of constitutional courts may help to eliminate contradictions and inconsistencies, there exists, apart from limited regional arrangements, no such separation of powers at the international level. The lecture analyzes, *inter alia*, the systemic, destabilizing impact of normative contradictions in exemplary cases related to the interpretation of the United Nations Charter and draws conclusions in terms of the philosophy of law.

Keywords: Rule of law; validity of norms; justice and law; normative contradictions; *jus cogens*; sovereignty; national interest; power politics; United Nations.

THE PRECARIOUS NATURE OF THE RULE OF LAW

The stability of any state system, whether national or international, depends on the rule of law. This essentially means *general acceptance* and *consistent enforcement* of norms that govern interaction among *citizens*, at the domestic, or *states*, at the inter-governmental level. The very rationale of a state, indeed the main justification of its existence, is the capacity to enable its citizens to live free from fear and guarantee their physical integrity. The essence of it is a kind of “social contract” on the basis of mutuality and without “meta-

physical” or ideological implications that would privilege only certain groups of society. The major challenge, however, and in the international context in particular, is that it has proven to be virtually impossible to avoid, or eliminate, certain normative contradictions from the respective corpus of norms.

Consistency (A) in the *enforcement* of norms, i. e. avoidance of double standards, presupposes consistency (B) of the respective *system* of norms. Domestically, this relates to the Constitution and the body of laws created under it; internationally, the “system” means the corpus of norms regulating relations between states (general as well as customary

international law), including those of *jus cogens*, and the ever increasing set of specific norms contained in intergovernmental treaties, particularly the United Nations Charter. If (A) is not guaranteed, we are faced with an erosion of confidence in the system, indeed a loss of legitimacy. If (B) cannot be ensured, the system as such *collapses* since the very validity of norms is at stake if a Constitutio – more generally: a system of norms – contains (logical) contradictions. Although the validity of norms (values) as such cannot be proven in the *material* sense, i.e. in terms of their content (a normative statement is neither true nor false), logic applies at the *formal* level, i.e. to the *relations* between norms, namely questions as to the compatibility of their content.¹

Strictly speaking, the *rule of law* remains an abstract ideal if (A) or (B) cannot be ensured. While the requirements under (A) can – in principle at least – be fulfilled on the basis of sincerity and good will of state authorities, and under the watchful eye of an active citizenry, those under (B), pertaining to the very integrity of the respective system of norms and to doctrinaire issues, are an entirely different matter. In actual fact, contradictions between norms are often overlooked or covered up, whether for reasons of “legalistic” convenience or political expediency – the latter often as a result of power interests

or, more precisely, power politics, described as “realpolitik” at the global level.

We shall concentrate here on the latter, namely contradictions between norms in the political context. Unavoidably, we can only elaborate on some of the most striking and potentially destabilizing cases of normative conflicts.

TYPES OF CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

In relations between states, confusion resulting from irreconcilable normative conflicts abounds. Not only is the body of norms subsumed under the term “international law” law only in very *rudimentary* form – as there exists no universal and consistent mechanism of enforcement; there effectively exists no separation of powers either to adjudicate such conflicts. The International Court of Justice, part of the edifice of the United Nations Organization, is not the “constitutional court” of the international community. The sheer number of contradictions risks undermining the very legitimacy of the United Nations and may make the “international rule of law” an elusive goal.

There are essentially *two types* of normative inconsistencies of which we shall highlight some of the most striking ones, with far-reaching consequences for the stability and reliability of the system of inter-state relations. We are dealing (a) with strictly logical contradictions, i.e. incompatibilities of normative content, as in the case of “sovereign equality” vs. inequality derived from special privilege as embodied in the *veto power* of certain member states of the UN Security

¹ For details see the author’s considerations: “Zum Verhältnis von logischen Prinzipien und Rechtsnormen,” in: Hans Köchler, *Philosophie – Recht – Politik: Abhandlungen zur politischen Philosophie und zur Rechtsphilosophie*. (Veröffentlichungen der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Wissenschaft und Politik an der Universität Innsbruck, Vol. IV.) Vienna, New York: Springer, 1985, pp. 9ff.

Council.² (In this context, both “equality” and “inequality,” are to be understood in the normative, not factual, sense.)

The second type of inconsistencies (b) results from ambiguity in regard to the *hierarchy of norms* in the international system. This particularly relates to the status of *jus cogens* of general international law. One of the most obvious examples is the conflict between the norm of non-interference, derived from national sovereignty, and fundamental norms of human rights. Do norms of a higher category effectively abrogate those of a less basic nature? (The question is similar to the normative conflict in a domestic system where the individual’s right to property may, in certain cases, be subordinated to considerations of the common good. In such cases, however, there are elaborate judicial procedures to resolve the conflict on the basis of the respective constitution.) The dilemmata resulting from and controversies surrounding practices of “humanitarian intervention”³ – or actions under the “Responsibility to Protect”

doctrine, to use the more recent term – have made drastically obvious that, in actual state practice, there exists no consensus on the hierarchy of norms that would allow to resolve those normative conflicts. To the contrary, disagreement on these doctrinaire issues has further fueled international tensions as in the cases of the use of force against Iraq (2003), Libya (2011), and, more recently, Syria. Can norms, enshrined in the United Nations Charter, such as that of “sovereign equality,” be defined as relative, i. e. subordinated to the validity of other norms such as human rights, understood as *jus cogens* of general international law? Can one, in fact, argue in favor a general “human rights caveat” that would be tantamount to the “measuring” of every other norm of international law against standards on which there is, as of yet, no agreement as to their specific meaning? The question of “who adjudicates?” in cases of disagreements cannot be answered under the present conditions. In the absence of legal mechanisms, i.e. without a separation of powers with an International Court of Justice with compulsory jurisdiction as an integral part,⁴ the risk is that these normative conflicts and disagreements are resolved by resort to the arsenal of power politics, not the instruments of law.

We shall exemplify the above types of contradictions in different areas and respects, relating to: (a) the normative consistency of the Charter of the United Nations Organization and of the body of norms of international

² On the implications of this contradiction for collective security and the international rule of law see the author’s analysis: *The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council: Examining a Normative Contradiction and its Consequences on International Relations*. (Studies in International Relations, Vol. XVII.) Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1991.

³ For normative contradictions and moral dilemmata see the author’s analysis: *The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics: Is the Revival of the Doctrine of "Just War" Compatible with the International Rule of Law?* (Studies in International Relations, Vol. XXVI.) Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2001.

⁴ According to Article 94(2) of the UN Charter, enforcement of judgments of the ICJ by the Security Council is at the discretion of the Council, which is not compatible with the idea of compulsory jurisdiction in a context of a separation of powers.

criminal law; (b) the overall compatibility between different bodies of international law and specific treaties (“systemic consistency” of contemporary international law); and (c), on an exemplary basis, contradictions between specific *maxims* of international law. The issues will be demonstrated, in particular, in regard to the legal status and doctrinaire evaluation of the international use of force, of national sovereignty and of human rights. The enumeration of 10 exemplary cases – most of which, most of the time, are hidden from public scrutiny – will be followed by questions as to the reasons behind these contradictions and inconsistencies and by a reevaluation of the meaning of “rule of law” in the international context.

Contradictions within the United Nations Charter

- (1) Principle of **sovereign equality** (Article 2[1] of the UN Charter) versus the norm underlying the **veto privilege** of the Security Council’s permanent members (Article 27[3] of the UN Charter):

The rule that all decisions of the Council other than procedural ones require the consent of the five permanent members⁵ makes the notion of **equality** of all member states, derived from the principle of sovereignty,⁶ void of any legal meaning. If one of the basic principles of the world organization is effectively invalidated by a norm on decision-making in the body vested with supreme executive power, the entire edifice of the UN Charter is – due to this normative inconsistency – on

shaky ground. In actual fact, this means that the norm of *equality* strangely “coexists” in the UN Charter with its very antithesis, namely the (unspoken) norm of *inequality*. It goes without saying that a logical contradiction between the contents of norms, in fact a conflict with one of the system’s *basic* principles, makes it impossible to characterize such a system as in conformity with the rule of law. It may more appropriately be characterized as a system of *political*, not legal, rules and regulations.

- (2) **Ban on the use of force** (Article 2[4] of the UN Charter) versus the effective **re-introduction of *jus ad bellum*** because of the non-abstention clause of Art. 27(3) of the Charter:

The principle that all member states “shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force” becomes virtually meaningless as regards the permanent members’ “accumulated privilege” of (a) preventing any resolution of the Council on matters under Chapter VII (collective security) by withholding their consent, and (b) being free from the obligation to abstain in a case where a permanent member is itself “party to a dispute,” as in the very case mentioned in Article 2(4), namely an act of aggression “against the territorial integrity or political independence” of another state. As the veto rule itself, circumscribed as the requirement of the “concurring votes of the permanent members” (Article 27[3]), this additional decision-making rule is introduced only *obliquely*, namely by implication, insofar as the Article stipulates that the indicated voting

⁵ Article 27(3).

⁶ Article 2(1): “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”

procedure (including the veto privilege) is to be understood under the condition (“provided that”) that in decisions under Chapter VI (which deals with *non-binding* measures on the peaceful settlement of disputes) a party to a dispute “shall abstain from voting.” Ergo, the obligation to abstain does not apply to decisions under Chapter VII. This provision applies to *all* members of the Security Council, permanent and non-permanent, but in combination with the veto right it becomes a *tool of power politics* by which a permanent member can prevent the Council from taking coercive measures against its own acts of aggression. The Council will, thus, always be paralyzed when it comes to the most serious transgressions of international law by its permanent members. There is a special irony in the fact that for non-enforceable decisions (under Chapter VI) a higher standard, namely the obligation to abstain in case of involvement in a dispute, applies than for binding, enforceable resolutions (by use of armed force) under Chapter VII (in cases of “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”). Again, as under (1) above, it goes without saying that such an outright contradiction between the general rule of justice *nemo judex in causa sua* (heeded by the Charter in regard to less important, i.e. non-binding decisions) and a decision-making rule (privilege) in the field of collective security (i.e. coercive measures) makes the idea of the rule of law in relations between states void of any meaning.

- (3) **Non-interference in the internal affairs of states** (a norm generally derived from the *principles* in Articles 2[1] and 2[4], and affirmed as binding upon the world organization in its own actions in Article 2[7]) versus the **right to intervene** according to the doctrines of “humanitarian intervention” or “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), both of which are based on the interpretation of human rights as *jus cogens* of general international law:
- As explained in the introductory remarks of chapter (B) above, this normative conflict may only be resolved if consensus can be reached in the international community on the *hierarchy* of norms and if there is an independent, impartial body to decide on the use of force and its scope. The UN Security Council’s coercive powers are tied to its role in the preservation of peace and security and may only *indirectly* be activated for a collective use of force with humanitarian purpose, namely if the Council, under Article 39 of the Charter, determines that a situation of human rights violations or a humanitarian emergency in a member state constitutes a “threat to the peace.” However, the crux of the matter is that the Council, for reasons partly explained under (1) and (2) above, can not act as arbiter in cases of fundamental rights. Because of the voting procedure of Article 27(3), the Council effectively operates as a *political* organ. Notwithstanding the solemn collective commitments to the Principles of Article 2, its decisions are dictated by considerations of power politics, not by a fundamental concern for the preservation

of human rights.⁷ Furthermore, the Council's vast coercive powers, in tandem with its de facto *legislative* authority and quasi-judicial competence it has arrogated in recent years,⁸ make it prone to arbitrary action. Furthermore, a *practice of double standards* is the inevitable result of the veto privilege of the permanent members. If the basic norm of state sovereignty can indeed be "temporarily" abrogated for the defense of human rights (i.e. in cases of humanitarian emergencies deemed by the Council as threats to international peace and security), *arbitrariness* resulting from the ever-changing constellation of power and interests among the permanent members defeats the very idea of humanitarian action and negates the legality of such action. The case of Libya, just to mention one of the most recent examples, speaks for itself.⁹

⁷ For details see the author's earlier analysis: "The Politics of Global Powers," in: *The Global Community. Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence*, 2009, Vol. I, pp. 173-201.

⁸ On the implications of the change of the role of the Security Council for international legality see the author's analysis: *The Security Council as Administrator of Justice?* (Studies in International Relations, Vol. XXXII.) Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2011.

⁹ See, *inter alia*, MEMORANDUM by the President of the International Progress Organization on Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) and its Implementation by a "Coalition of the Willing" under the Leadership of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. International Progress Organization, Doc. P/22680c, Vienna, 26 March 2011,

(4) **Self-determination of peoples** (Article 1[2]) as *purpose* versus **state sovereignty** (according to Article 2[1]) as *principle* of the United Nations:

An irreconcilable normative conflict exists between a state's right to preserve its territorial integrity, derived from the principle of sovereignty (to be respected by all states on the basis of *mutuality*), and the right of peoples to determine themselves their form of political organization, including the decision to which sovereign entity they eventually want to belong. In the contemporary system of international law, self-determination has the status of a fundamental human right.¹⁰

The United Nations Charter, nonetheless, leaves the question of that right's status in relation to national sovereignty in limbo, and the numerous solemn declarations in favor of "self-determination" by the General Assembly have only added to the legal ambiguity. If the right of self-determination as *collective* human right is indeed the foundation of the legitimacy of a state,¹¹ if it is invoked as legal (not only moral) justification for *state creation*, it can hardly be argued that its exer-

<http://i-p-o.org/IPO-Memorandum-UN-Libya-26Mar11.pdf>.

¹⁰ Article 1(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."

¹¹ See also Allen Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-determination: Moral Foundations for International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

cise is ultimately at the discretion of an existing state. The very notion of “self-determination” makes no normative sense if its exercise in a given case depends upon the consent of the state that sees in that very act a threat to its territorial integrity, i.e. a challenge to its *sovereign* status within the international community, guaranteed by the UN Charter.¹² This unresolved conflict between two foundational norms of international law has profoundly destabilized the international system and has been the source of political disputes with the threat of extra-legal settlement by resort to armed force. Again, this contradiction exemplifies the precariousness of the international rule of law as guiding principle of a global system of peace.

Contradictions related to international criminal justice

(5) National sovereignty versus universal jurisdiction:

The norm of “national sovereignty,” enshrined in the UN Charter as “sovereign equality” of all member states, implies strict adherence to the rule of non-interference into the internal affairs of states (of which criminal jurisdiction is one of the main areas). There are basically two instances where an irreconcilable normative contradiction exists in terms of the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. (a)

The doctrine of “universal jurisdiction,” recently incorporated into the legal systems of certain states,¹³ implies the authority of any *domestic* judiciary to exercise jurisdiction over international crimes irrespective of the nationality of the suspect and the territory on which the alleged crimes may have been committed.¹⁴ This has led to numerous controversies and disputes among UN member states such as those between Belgium and the United States or Israel over the application of Belgium’s war crimes law of 1993. Because of its repercussions on the country’s foreign policy, Belgium has eventually modified the law, conditioning its application to a direct connection of a case to the Kingdom of Belgium, thus trying to avoid a conflict over the sovereignty issue.¹⁵ As such, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction constitutes one of the most serious and far-reaching challenges to the norm of national sovereignty in contemporary international law.¹⁶

¹² For an overview of the legal and political issues see Y. N. Kly and D. Kly (eds.), *In Pursuit of the Right to Self-determination: Collected Papers & Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Right to Self-determination & the United Nations, Geneva 2000*. Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2001.

¹³ This step has in most cases been connected to those states’ decision to join the International Criminal Court – in view of the Rome Statute’s principle of complementary jurisdiction.

¹⁴ For the development of this doctrine see the author’s *Global Justice or Global Revenge? International Criminal Justice at the Crossroads*. Vienna/New York: Springer, 2004, pp. 79ff.

¹⁵ For details see op. cit., pp. 93ff.

¹⁶ As regards the “sovereign immunity” of state officials, this is also reflected in the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of the arrest warrant by a Belgian investigating judge, dated 11 April 2000, against the then Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: International Court of

(b) The “creation” of international criminal jurisdiction by fiat of the UN Security Council has often been qualified as violation of the sovereignty of member states. It is an open question whether *ad hoc* courts such as the Yugoslavia or Rwanda tribunals, established by way of Chapter VII resolutions of the Security Council, are in conformity with international law.¹⁷ If the creation of courts can indeed be construed as measure to maintain or restore international peace and security according to Article 41 of the Charter, Article 2(7) of the Charter would apply, which provides an exception from the rule of non-interference for all Chapter VII measures. If this were not the case (i.e. if judicial measures cannot be construed as part of the UN system of collective security), the jurisdiction of *ad hoc* courts would be in strict violation of the norm of national sovereignty.¹⁸

Justice, Year 2002, 14 February 2002, General List No. 121: [Judgment] *Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium)*.

¹⁷ Concerning the Yugoslavia Tribunal see MEMORANDUM on the Indictment of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the President of the Republic of Serbia and Other Officials of Yugoslavia by the "International Tribunal for Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991". International Progress Organization, Caracas, 27 May 1999, at <http://i-p-o.org/yu-tribunal.htm>.

¹⁸ See the author's analysis: "The Security Council and ad hoc international tribunals," in: Hans Köchler, *The Security Council as Administrator of Justice? Reflections on the Antagonistic*

(6) **International humanitarian law** versus an interpretation of international law that considers the use of **arms of mass destruction** as legally neutral act of warfare:

According to the norms of international humanitarian law, the indiscriminate targeting of civilians constitutes a war crime. "War crimes" are defined as "international crimes" which concern the community of states as such and over which – since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals in particular – international criminal courts (such as the International Criminal Court) have jurisdiction. The use of arms of mass destruction, in particular nuclear arms, makes the distinction between civilian and military targets effectively impossible. It has thus been argued that the use of such arms is *per se* incompatible with international law. As regards nuclear arms, this was clearly stated, *inter alia*, by the General Assembly of the United Nations. In a resolution adopted on 15 December 1983, the member states declared: The General Assembly "Resolutely, unconditionally and for all time condemns nuclear war as being contrary to human conscience and reason, as the most monstrous crime against peoples and as a violation of the foremost human right – the right to life."¹⁹ In an Advisory Opinion, requested by the UN

Relationship between Power and Law. Studies in International Relations, Vol. XXXII. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2011, pp. 17-47.

¹⁹ 97th Plenary Meeting, A/RES/38/75 ("Condemnation of nuclear war"), Paragraph 1.

General Assembly,²⁰ the International Court of Justice determined, *inter alia*, and with a caveat “in an extreme circumstance of self-defence,” “that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”²¹ International humanitarian law would thus be rendered obsolete, indeed void of any normative content, if it were perceived as not applicable in cases of the most extreme violations, namely the use of arms of mass destruction. The inherent normative contradiction would also totally undermine the meaning and statutory position of human rights in the international system.

- (7) The prohibition of the indiscriminate targeting of civilians under **international humanitarian law** versus a restriction of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in cases of the use of nuclear arms, i.e. in a matter of **international criminal law**:

Related to the above-described contradiction (paragraph 6) is a normative conflict implied in the position of France concerning the *jurisdiction* of the International Criminal Court. In an “interpretive declaration” made upon ratification of the Rome Statute, France has stated that the

Court’s jurisdiction over *war crimes* solely relates to cases where conventional weapons are used. It specifically excluded the use of nuclear arms from jurisdiction of the Court, stating that Article 8(2)(b) – that deals with intentional attacks on civilians – only covers conventional warfare.²² Although the declaration further stated that this exclusion from jurisdiction will only prevail as long as there exists no comprehensive ban on the use of nuclear arms – which would have to be specified in an annex to the Rome Statute by way of an amendment, the declaration effectively amounts to a “reservation,” something which is explicitly excluded in the Rome Statute (Article 120). Should this unilateral declaration by France (that effectively undermines the Court’s jurisdiction) be accepted, the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over war crimes would become totally meaningless since this reading of the Statute would only allow the investigation and prosecution of “minor” crimes while the potentially gravest violations would be beyond the reach of the law. For a legal critique, the interpretive declaration of France should also be validat-

²⁰ Resolution 49/75, 15 December 1994 (“Request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons”).

²¹ International Court of Justice: *Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict. Advisory Opinion*, Year 1996, General List No. 93, 8 July 1996.

²² “The provisions of article 8 of the Statute, in particular paragraph 2(b) thereof, relate solely to conventional weapons and can neither regulate or prohibit the possible use of nuclear weapons ...” United Nations, *Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General – Treaty I-XVIII – 10*. “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998.”

ed in the context of the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on the use of nuclear weapons.²³

Contradictions related to issues of jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court

(8) **International treaty law versus international criminal law:**

Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties²⁴ states that "[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent." This norm is contradicted by the provision of Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. According to this rule, the United Nations Security Council is given the right to "refer" – by way of a Chapter VII resolution – a situation in which one or more crimes referred to in Article 5 of the Court's Statute²⁵ "appears to have been committed." This applies irrespective of whether the State on the territory of which the crime may have been committed, or whose citizen may have committed the crime, is party to the Rome Statute or not. The Security Council has made use of this "privilege" – to "create" jurisdiction where it would otherwise not exist – in the cases of Sudan²⁶ and Lib-

ya²⁷ against whose state leaders and other officials the ICC subsequently issued indictments. That this provision is prone to political abuse has also become obvious in the fact that permanent member states of the Security Council not party to the Rome Statute (i.e. who *reject* the jurisdiction of the Court in principle)²⁸ have enabled the Council to adopt those resolutions.²⁹ Apart from the *normative contradiction*, this has introduced an element of *political inconsistency* and *arbitrariness* in so far as states, for political motives, may make use, in a particular case, of a norm, which they reject in all other cases, and especially as far as their nationals are concerned. This means that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court not only contradicts international treaty law and, subsequently, the principle of sovereign equality of States, but also subordinates the Court's jurisdiction to a body that operates outside, and above, the Court's jurisdiction, giving the Council higher rights than the States Parties of

²³ Fn. 26 above.

²⁴ Concluded on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980.

²⁵ Crime of genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; crime of aggression.

²⁶ Resolution 1593 (2005) adopted by the Security Council at its 158th meeting, on 31 March 2005. For details see the Statement of the International Progress Organization: *Double Standards in International Criminal Justice: The Case of Sudan*. Vienna, 2 April 2005, <http://www.i-p-o.org/Koechler-Sudan-ICC.pdf>.

²⁷ Resolution 1970 (2011) adopted by the Security Council at its 6491st meeting, on 26 February 2011.

²⁸ As regards the United States, cf. the letter, dated 6 May 2002, from John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations: *Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General – Treaty I-XVIII – 10*. "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998," Note 6.

²⁹ In the case of the Sudan resolution, the United States and China, both not parties to the Rome Statute, abstained. In the case of Libya, the resolution was adopted unanimously.

the ICC themselves.³⁰ The matter could only be redressed if the referral right of the Council were defined in the same way as that of the State Parties, namely linking it to crimes “within the jurisdiction of the Court.”³¹

(9) **International criminal law versus United Nations Charter:**

Indirectly related to the above contradiction between international treaty law and international criminal law is a contradiction between the Rome Statute of the ICC and the voting privilege in the Security Council. Article 27 of the Rome Statute (“Irrelevance of official capacity”) unequivocally states that “[t]his Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity.”³² This means that no official can claim impunity for acts in the exercise of national sovereignty. The notion of “sovereign immunity” is alien to international criminal law. This is also evident in the statutes of international *ad hoc* courts established by the Security Council such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

(ICTR).³³ Similarly, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, applied by the domestic judiciary in a number of states, excludes impunity for action in official capacity.³⁴

However, as regards the (in itself legally problematic) jurisdiction of the ICC on the basis of Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute,³⁵ officials from permanent member states of the United Nations Security Council enjoy *de facto* impunity, i.e. immunity from prosecution, due to those states’ voting privilege under Article 27(3) of the UN Charter. Whenever officials from a permanent member state, or

³³ See articles 7(2) and 6(2) respectively of the statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR: “The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”

³⁴ Following the affirmation by the UN General Assembly of “the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal” (resolution 177[II] of 21 November 1947), the International Law Commission of the United Nations has drafted this norm in the following way: “Principle III. The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as a Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.” For details see also Christopher C. Joyner, “Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability,” in: *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Vol. 59, No. 4, Autumn 1996, pp. 153-172.

³⁵ See paragraph 8 above.

³⁰ For details see also *The Security Council as Administrator of Justice?*, pp. 49ff.

³¹ Article 14(1) of the Rome Statute.

³² The Article further states: “In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.”

a state allied with the former, might be subjected to the prosecution of the ICC, the concerned state may veto the respective Chapter VII resolution on referral of a situation. Ironically, in a twist of power politics, this provision “neutralizes” the effects of Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute which would allow the ICC to exercise jurisdiction even in cases where officials of states not party to the Rome Statute are suspected to have committed crimes referred to in Article 5 of that Statute. Although this relates to all nationals of the respective permanent member states, the potential implications of Article 13(b) for the heads of state and other high officials from non-state parties of the ICC make the veto provision a particularly powerful tool according to the maxim “might makes right,” effectively allowing those states to instrumentalize a statute of international criminal law in the interest of power politics.

In general terms, however, the contradiction exists between a norm regulating the jurisdiction of the ICC, namely Article 13(b) of its Statute, and a norm regulating the voting procedure in the Security Council, namely Article 27(3) of the Charter, potentially “immunizing” all nationals from non-states parties of the Rome Statute insofar as those states are permanent members of the Council. Again, this is a case of *judicial inequality* of the highest order, effectively linking legal privileges (immunity from prosecution) to a privilege of power politics (the veto provision in tandem with the non-obligation of parties involved in a dispute

to abstain from voting on Chapter VII resolutions).³⁶

Contradictions related to the status of human rights

(10) **Human rights** norms versus the rules of the **United Nations Charter** regarding the coercive powers of the Security Council:

Since the collapse of the global power balance upon the end of the Cold War, the United Nations Security Council has increasingly resorted to the use of economic sanctions as coercive measures under Article 41 of the UN Charter. The most comprehensive sanctions régime to date were the measures imposed on Iraq in the period 1990-2003, mainly victimizing the civilian population. In the pursuit of its mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council enforced conditions that caused suffering and death to hundreds of thousands of people.³⁷ In a deposition before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the International Progress Organization, on 13 August 1991, deplored the violation of the most basic human right, the right to life, “by an intergovernmental body [namely the UN Security Council / H.K.] against the population of a member state of the UN.”³⁸

³⁶ See also paragraph 2 above.

³⁷ See the report *The Human Costs of War in Iraq*. New York: Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR), 2003.

³⁸ “Statement by the delegate of the International Progress Organization, Warren A. J. Hamerman, before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of

Although the Council, under Article 41, enjoys full discretion in the use of coercive measures – not involving the use of armed force – “to maintain or restore international peace and security” (Article 39), including the “complete or partial interruption of economic relations,” it must not be overlooked that the consequences of those measures have often meant the denial of the most basic human rights to the affected civilian population, indeed a form of *collective punishment*.³⁹ In these cases, a basic normative contradiction cannot be denied between the validity of human rights, as codified in international covenants, if not as peremptory norms (*jus cogens*) of general international law,⁴⁰ and the norms regulating the United Nations’ mandate for the maintenance or restoration of international

peace and security.⁴¹ In the ultimate consequence, the “normative dilemma” consists in the Council’s need to reconcile the pursuit of two basic “Purposes” stated in Article 1 of the UN Charter, namely the “maintenance of peace” (Par. 1) on the one hand and the “promotion” of respect for human rights (Par. 3) on the other. In spite of the Council’s almost absolute powers under Chapter VII, enabling it to interfere into the sovereign domain of member states, the Council, according to Article 24(2), is still required to act “in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations,” which means that it is also bound by human rights constraints. However, in the absence of a separation of powers within the UN system,⁴² there exists no body with the authority to review coercive (Chapter VII) resolutions of the Security Council in regard to their compatibility with human rights. In the words of a former Secretary of State of the United States: “The Security Council is not a

Minorities, on UN sanctions against Iraq and human rights, 13 August 1991.” UN Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/SR.10, 20 August 1991.

³⁹ On the legal aspects see also: “The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions.” United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Fifty-second session, item 12 of the provisional agenda, Economic and Social Council, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33, *June 21, 2000*: Working paper prepared by Mr. Marc Bossuyt.

⁴⁰ On the status of human rights norms see, *inter alia*, Menno T. Kamminga and Martin Scheinin, *The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. – Predrag Zenović, *Human rights enforcement via peremptory norms – a challenge to state sovereignty*. RGSL Research Papers, No. 6, Riga Graduate School of Law, 2012.

⁴¹ On the question of the authority of the Security Council see also Mary Ellen O’Connell, “Debating the Law of Sanctions,” in: *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 13 (2002), pp. 63–79. – On the compatibility issue see also the author’s analysis: *The United Nations Sanctions Policy & International Law*. Just World Trust: Penang, 1995.

⁴² The Charter of the United Nations Organization provides for a predominant role of its supreme executive organ, the Security Council, completely marginalizing the role of the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice. As regards the latter, see also Attila Tanzi, “Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the International Court of Justice and the Law of the United Nations,” in: *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 6 (1995), pp. 539–572.

body that merely enforces agreed law. It is a law unto itself.”⁴³

NORMATIVE CONTRADICTIONS AND POWER POLITICS: CONCLUSIONS OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

Most of the normative contradictions and systemic inconsistencies listed above result from issues related to the *international status of the state* – in terms of the preservation of (state) power in a global competition over the assertion of “sovereignty” and the “national interest,” and in a context that is still only marginally determined by law.⁴⁴ (In view of what was explained under paragraphs 1 and 2 above, there is simply no way to legally restrain the exercise of power by the Security Council’s permanent members.)

The predominance of considerations of power politics over the commitment to norms related to individual rights in particular has been the reason why normative conflicts are often “resolved” with a *casuistic* approach. Which norm is given priority depends on the fluctuation of political interests, defined as the respective “national interest,”⁴⁵ in an ever-

changing global power constellation. This is particularly obvious when and where the norm of national sovereignty is concerned (referred to as “Principle” of “sovereign equality” in Article 2[1] of the UN Charter). When, i.e. under what circumstances, does it trump human rights or norms of international humanitarian and international criminal law, and when does it not?

The American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002,⁴⁶ ironically labeled the “Hague Invasion Act,”⁴⁷ is an especially drastic illustration of what may be at stake in terms of establishing a *hierarchy* of norms when legal principles are in direct contradiction. This law constitutes a direct challenge to the *territorial* jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court on the basis of Article 12(2) (a) of the Rome Statute.⁴⁸ In the hypothetical case that a US citizen would be prosecuted for the commission of an international crime, and would be extradited to the Court under Article 89 of the Statute (“Surrender of persons to the Court”), the law provides that “The President [of the United States / H.K.] is authorized to use all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of any person de-

⁴³ John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace*. New York: Macmillan, 1950, p. 194.

⁴⁴ See also the author’s earlier analysis: “The United Nations Organization and Global Power Politics: The Antagonism between Power and Law and the Future of World Order,” in: *Chinese Journal of International Law*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2006), pp. 323-340.

⁴⁵ On the notion of national interest in the global context see also Hans Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy*. New York: Knopf, 1951.

⁴⁶ United States Congress, *American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002*, H.R. 4775, Public Law 107-206, Sec. 2001-2015, Aug. 2, 2002.

⁴⁷ “U.S.: ‘Hague Invasion Act’ Becomes Law.” Human Rights Watch, 3 August 2002, at <https://www.hrw.org/news/2002/08/03/us-hague-invasion-act-becomes-law>.

⁴⁸ The Court may exercise jurisdiction if “[t]he State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred” is a Party to the Rome Statute.

scribed in subsection (b)⁴⁹ who is being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the International Criminal Court.”⁵⁰ While, under the Rome Statute, the investigation and eventual prosecution of international crimes committed by nationals of non-States Parties on the territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute is a clear-cut case of jurisdiction of the ICC, for the United States this is an equally clear-cut case of violation of the norm of national sovereignty against which – as a last resort – the use of force, by the United States, on the territory of the Netherlands, the seat of the ICC, would be justified.⁵¹ In addition to this, Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is also quoted according to which “A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”⁵² Apart from the legal arguments, this appears to be a matter of the interpretation and exercise of the “national interest” by a permanent member state of the Security Council that is not prepared to accept any judicial restrictions, resulting from treaties concluded by third parties, on the conduct of its foreign and security

policies – for which it anyway enjoys de facto “immunity” due to Article 27(3) of the UN Charter.⁵³

As of today, there exists no overarching system of norms, agreed upon among all states, that would make it possible to resolve this conflict (between the exercise of sovereignty and the requirements of international criminal justice) *within the normative realm*. In spite of its labeling as “the principal judicial organ of the United Nations,”⁵⁴ the ICJ is not the constitutional court of the international community. In its own interpretation, for instance, it cannot rule on any complaints of member states when the Security Council of the United Nations has acted on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter.⁵⁵ The inbuilt sys-

⁴⁹ This relates in particular to United States military and allied personnel and for persons acting in official capacity.

⁵⁰ Sec. 2008(a).

⁵¹ Also in current Security Council terminology, the phrase “all necessary means” includes the use of armed force.

⁵² Concerning the U.S. position see, *inter alia*, Bartram S. Brown, “U.S. Objections to the Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Brief Response,” in: *NYU Journal of International Law and Politics*, Vol. 31 (1999), pp. 855-891; esp. pp. 868ff (“Does the Statute Violate the Law of Treaties?”).

⁵³ See ch. B(9) above.

⁵⁴ Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 1.

⁵⁵ *This follows, by implication, from the Judgment of the ICJ of 27 February 1998 in the case Libya vs. United States (Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), esp. paras. 39-44. The Court ruled: “As to Security Council resolution 731 (1992), adopted before the filing of the Application, it could not form a legal impediment to the admissibility of the latter because it was a mere recommendation without binding effect (...). Consequently, Libya's Application cannot be held inadmissible on these grounds.” N.B.: Security Council resolution 731 (1992) was not based on Chapter VII of the Charter, while all later resolutions (adopted after Libya filed its Application) were based on the Council's coercive powers under Chapter VII, which meant – in the interpretation of the Court – that the matters dealt with in those*

temic contradictions in contemporary international law, and in particular within the United Nations system, resulting from an unrestrained exercise of the national interest under the auspices of state sovereignty, have not only made the global order ever more precarious, and even more so in the absence of a balance of power,⁵⁶ but threaten to undermine the very idea of the “international rule of law,” embodied by the United Nations Organization.

As a kind of guiding principle of a polity, whether domestic or international, the notion of the “rule of law” makes no sense unless normative contradictions are eliminated – or avenues are seriously pursued to resolve systemic inconsistencies. If not, norms may be declared valid simply on the basis of a *priori*ty of interests – which will nurture a legal culture of “anything goes” where arbitrariness replaces reliability and accountability of state behavior. What would be important, in that regard, is that consensus is reached on a precise *hierarchy of norms* whereby norms of

higher order derogate those of a lower order.⁵⁷ So far, however, a basic precondition of such a normative syllogism in the inter-state context is not in place: In spite of the vast compendium of definitions produced by the International Law Commission of the United Nations, a “normative hermeneutics” that would assist states to agree on a clear and unambiguous definition of legal terms (even as basic as “self-determination,” “sovereignty,” “use of force,” “self-defense,” or “equality”) is not in sight – as there exists no general agreement either on what, for instance, constitutes norms of *jus cogens*.⁵⁸ There is also the obstacle of realpolitik: a more precise definition of those terms will remain a desideratum simply because vagueness is often a requirement of consensus – especially when interests are to be camouflaged in legal terminology.

Apart from the *philosophical caveat* that makes us aware of the fragile nature of law in the power-centered framework of inter-state relations, there is also a twofold *caveat of realpolitik* (or, more euphemistically, diplomacy): (a) Contradictions between norms often result from conflicts of interests, and, (b) as far as the United Nations Charter is con-

resolutions were excluded from scrutiny by the ICJ. In their Joint Declaration, annexed to the Judgment, Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva and Korumu however stated “that it is not sufficient to invoke the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter so as to bring to an end ipso facto and with immediate effect all argument on the Security Council’s decisions.”

⁵⁶ See also the author’s analysis: “The Precarious Nature of International Law in the Absence of a Balance of Power,” in: Hans Köchler (ed.), *The Use of Force in International Relations: Challenges to Collective Security*. (Studies in International Relations, Vol. XXIX.) Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2006, pp. 11-19.

⁵⁷ On an earlier effort of the author to establish criteria for such a procedure see: “Die Prinzipien des Völkerrechts und die Menschenrechte: Zur Frage der Vereinbarkeit zweier Normensysteme,” in: *Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*, Vol. 32 (1981), pp. 5-28.

⁵⁸ For a critical assessment see Ulf Linderfalk, “The Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora’s Box, Did You Ever Think About the Consequences?,” in: *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 18 (5), pp. 853-871.

cerned, inconsistencies that are the legacy of a compromise with power politics cannot be eliminated because of the veto.⁵⁹ Due to Article 108 of the Charter, linking amendments to the consent of the permanent members, the world organization is indeed caught in a vicious circle. The *predominance of interests*

over norms leaves the international community – or, more precisely, the system of interstate relations – in a state of limbo that makes the “international rule of law” ever more elusive.

⁵⁹ See paragraph 1 of chapter (B) above.

IDEA AND MODELS OF CIVIL SOCIETY: DEVELOPMENT TENDENCIES, ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON

Abstract

The article presents the main stages of development and major modifications of the idea of civil society from Greek and Roman antique philosophy to modern researchers. It discusses two – broad (philosophical) and narrow (the third sector of organizing civil society) – perceptions of civil society and proposes corresponding definitions. Etatic (controlled), liberal, conflicting, partnership, segmentational and linked models of civil society are analyzed. The expediency of linked and partnership models is substantiated from the position of security and harmonious development of the civic society.

Keywords: civil society; civil society organizations; civil system security; etatic, liberal, conflicting, partnership, segmentational and linked models of civil society.

In the course of global history various concepts have been shaped of how best of all to organize the society, the desirable future. While religion promises the best life in extramundane world, variable political and philosophical schools and doctrines have tried to imagine and shape that best life conditioned by effective organization of social relations in actual reality.

Among these dreams could be Plato's ideal state, Th. More's «Utopia», T. Campanella's «The City of the Sun», K.H. Saint-Simon's, F.Ch. Fourier's utopian views, Marxist ideas about communism and others. The most viable and realistic among all these dreams and programs, perhaps, appeared to be the **idea of civic society**.

The idea of civic society, similar to that of democracy, is not a dogma. It has modified and undergone amendments in the course of

history of global thought and practice, thus being edited, rectified and developed.

In modern times, too, the future of democracy is mainly linked to the idea of civic society. Resolution of several issues typical of the current stage of development of democratic systems is concomitant to the development of the civic society. And the latter supposes methodologically substantial study of the idea of civil society, of its components, of its structural and functional features, of possible ways of development and models, and also the existence of their realistic elaboration.

Although in professional literature the formation of the idea of civic society is more often connected with the era of Enlightenment and Enlightenment philosophy, it should be noted that it dates back to the roots of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy.

One may come across the notions **Poli-**

tike Koinonia¹ and **Societas Civilis** (Cicero, “De Republica,” XXXII, 49; “Civil Society: history and possibilities”, 2011, p. 33)² in the works of ancient Greek and Roman thinkers.

Within the ancient Greek civilization the notions of city and state were objectively synonymous. Citizenship was interpreted as the reality of being a full member of a given society, of having regulated relations with government structures, of enjoying rights and responsibilities. The perception of a civic or political society was that of a public where the core role in organizational and governmental processes was allocated to state institutions.

Somewhat similar understanding of the civil society is also characteristic of the 17-18th centuries Enlighteners. The English philosopher of the 17th century Th. Hobbes, in line with other theorists of the public alliance (B.Spinoza, J.Locke, CH.Montesquieu), divided the social history into two stages: **natural** (or pre-political, pre-civic) and **civic** (or political). The natural state is characterized by the absence of state as the core institution regulating and administering public life. During that phase people interacted not as member-

citizens of the same given society but as biological individuals (“A man is a wolf to another man”) (Hobbes, 1998, p. 3). Unregulated freedom, the desire to possess and own, competition and distrust towards one other gave rise to “war of all against all”³ (Hobbes, 1991, pp. 94-96).

Constant dangers and insecurity forced people to unite and create a structure of common safety – the state. People gave up some of their natural rights and empowered the state with them, thus in return receiving guarantees to enjoy the other rights freely and without restraints. This is how they acquired a new status – **that of a citizen**. Civil status and citizens’ society are the most civilized and warranted form of lifestyle and exercise of rights (Ibid, pp. 129-133).

The idea of civic society underwent further modifications and improvements within both Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment philosophical theory. The idea of monarchic rule was replaced by the ideas of power sharing between the legislative, executive and judicial branches, of creating the principle of checking and balancing them, which would grant citizens more opportunities to exercise and protect their rights.

19th century mass movements and political processes introduced some new alterations into the ideas about civil society actors and institutional constituents. This was an era when, as French sociologist and psychologist G. Le Bon described it, the right of monarchs was replaced by the right of masses, the time

¹ “... this is that which is called in the State and the Political-Association”. (Aristotle, 1877, p. 107. Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, 1994, pp. 84-85)

² The term was introduced by M.T.Cicero: “... quare cum lex sit civilis societatis vinculum, ius autem legis aequale, quo iure societas civium teneri potest, cum par non sit condicio civium? si enim pecunias aequari non placet, si ingenia omnium paria esse non possunt, iura certe paria debent esse eorum inter se qui sunt cives in eadem re publica. quid est enim civitas nisi iuris societas civium?”.

³ “Homo homini lupus est”. Thomas Hobbes uses this famous expression from the comedy “Asinaria by ancient Roman playwright Titus Plautus to describe the pre-political stage of social history.

of heroes was replaced by the “era of crowds” (Le Bon, 2005, pp. 5-8) and the era of political parties to organize and direct these crowds. The latter assumed the functions of balancing and counterbalancing in relations with the state; of integrating citizens’ interests and submitting them at the level of political decision-making. Thus, the modern understanding of “government” and “opposition” poles emerged.


In the modern stage of evolution of notions about civil society, Alexis de Tocqueville’s and G. Hegel’s ideas regarding the significance of decentralization and autonomy in the processes of public administration had a huge influence (Hegel, 1991, pp. 219-226; Tocqueville, 1848^a, pp. 42-94; Tocqueville, 1848^b, pp. 35-53).

In the 20th century the role of non-governmental (non-political), non-profit organization – “the third sector” – in the social life became increasingly signified. Currently these

organizations are entrusted with a special role to integrate citizens’ interest, to aggregate, articulate and voice them; to represent them in relations with parties and government structures. In public administration processes they conduct organizational, regulating-integrating, propagating, monitoring and several other core functions.

In modern understanding of the civil society, besides government structures and political parties, a vital mission in the processes of organizing and governing the public life is fulfilled also by non-government organizations formed on voluntary basis and common interests and functioning on the principle of autonomy. (See *Diagram 1.*) In the broader sense not only formal non-governmental organizations, their networks and associations but also movements, interest groups and mass media should be observed within the third sector.

Diagram 1. The Basic Components of Civil Society



In various stages of development of universal mind, despite certain variations in descriptions of the civil society, there has been one common ideological-methodological fabric for them: *the idea of the citizen as the*

central value of the social system possessing certain interests and inalienable rights (see Hovhannisyan, 2005, pp. 24-25).

Two definitions of the civic society can be, thus, proposed.

In the broader, philosophical sense, *the civic society is a mode of organizing and governing public life where the individual-citizen is the core value, the main functioning subject and final end with his/her interests, requirements and rights.*

This perception observes all the civil society institutions demonstrated in the diagram above.

In the narrower sense, highlighting the role of non-governmental organizations in the processes of organizing and governing public life, *the third sector is meant by civil society; that is non-governmental, non-profit organizations, foundations, associations of legal persons, artistic unions, charity organizations, civil movements and other forms of activism.*

Thereby, *within a democracy the civic society is a mode of organizing public life characterized by: 1) a wide network of non-governmental structures formed voluntarily (unions, associations, organizations); 2) a comprehensive system comprising economic, political, social, spiritual, cultural relations.*

The second definition is more widespread and involved in the documents of international organizations (“CIVICUS Civil Society Index. Armenian Civil Society...” 2010, p. 14)⁴.

⁴ The World Bank has adopted a definition of civil society developed by a number of leading research centers: “the term civil society is to refer to a wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, ... involve a wide array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable or-

A number of possible models of the civil society can be identified regarding relations between non-governmental organizations and the state, and non-governmental organizations and political parties.

On the basis of relations between non-governmental organizations and state departments etatic⁵ (**controlled**), **liberal (sometimes conflicting)** and **partnership** models can be singled out.

In case of the first model non-governmental organizations are initiated mainly by the state, their objectives and forms of functioning are dictated and strictly controlled by government bodies. These organizations are assigned the role of “the fifth wheel of the cart” in public administration. This model is mostly typical of societies with totalitarian form of government (for example, the Soviet Union).

In case of the second, **liberal** model intrusion and involvement of the state into the sphere of non-governmental organizations is undesirable and is minimized. Accountability of non-governmental organizations to the state is mostly reduced just as well. Relations between non-governmental organizations and the state are often **conflicting**; they appear “on opposing sides of the barricades” and perceive each other as predominantly undesirable rivals.

ganizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations”. See: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERN AL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK:20101499~menuPK:244752~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~theSitePK:228717,00.html> (Last visited on 13.12.2016.)

⁵ From the French word *état* – *state*.

Those two models comprise some dangers from the position of balanced development of the social system. They can both hamper and restrain the development of non-governmental organizations, and lead to social concussions.

The most preferable, namely for Armenia, and perspective type is **the partnership model**. This model is characterized by the principles of cooperation, mutual control and interpenetration. Civil organizations are more flexible in their activities; they can act as opponents, critics as well as supporters of the government held policy if that policy complies with their programs and aims. In this model most knowledgeable and experienced representatives of non-governmental organizations get more and more involved in various departments of state authorities and local self-government, while representatives of state authorities participate in projects conducted by non-governmental organizations. The partnership model allows overcoming alienation, polarization and conflicting situations in relations between civil society organizations (SCOs) and the state, thus contributing to efficient dialogue and cooperation.

To develop the partnership model in Armenia, apart from educational and propaganda projects, some steps should be taken: **1) to increase effectiveness of financial support allocated from local funds to CSOs and 2) to form and work out mechanisms and culture for interaction between the state and CSOs.**

Only few Armenian CSOs have paid staff⁶. Most of these organizations conduct

⁶ According to 2010 survey these constitute 19,1%: (CIVICUS Civil Society Index. Civil Society of Armenia...2010, p. 29).

their projects via grants from foreign and international organizations.

Grants are allocated also from some local sources, namely from the state budget of RA. In 2012 AmD 7.4 billion was granted to local non-governmental organizations from the state budget. That sum was distributed among 115 organizations⁷. It should be noted that 2/3 of the sum – AmD 4.87 billion was given to merely 19 organizations.

The process of allocating grants to Armenian CSOs from the state budget is characterized by the lack of a systemized policy, definite and transparent procedures, little accessibility of information about the projects conducted and corruption risks.

To solve the problem effectively, “**Civil Society Support National Foundation**” (CSSNF) could be established, following the example of a number of western European countries⁸. In result, the budget funds intended for CSOs as grants and donations will be allocated not to various bureaucracies, but will accumulate in the CSSNF.

The Foundation will, then process the offers and applications submitted by government bodies and CSOs, will examine them to reveal the array of issues for the solution of which involvement of CSOs is vital. Then, expertise will detect the degree of importance and urgency of those issues, relevant coefficient will be set to allocate the funds per year.

There are an array of issues beyond the interest realm of foreign and international do-

⁷ According to the Ministry of Justice, there were 3432 public organizations, 733 foundations and 301 legal entity unions registered in Armenia as of October 2012.

⁸ Such foundations function in Hungary, Croatia, Albany, Estonia, the Czech Republic.

nor organizations, that are vital for the Armenian society. For instance, the issue of providing aid to military servicemen and their families, widows of fallen soldiers, their family members. CSOs could be especially efficient in the processes of monitoring projects conducted by government structures and in the fight against corruption.

Another means to improve the financial stability indicator of CSOs and to increase efficiency of the policy and projects conducted by government bodies is to form and develop the tradition of assigning certain projects in the spheres of social assistance, education and research, as well as some monitoring and control procedures over state-held programs to non-governmental organizations on competitive basis.

Implementation of that model of social cooperation guarantees reduction in financial expenditure, meanwhile provides involvement of extra human, material and intellectual resources; public awareness about projects being implemented; definition of criteria to assess the quality of projects; extension of monitoring over partnership activity of state bodies and CSOs.

Fulfillment of the above described proposals will give the opportunity:

- To essentially improve the financial conditions of Armenian CSOs;
- To raise the credibility of state structures;
- To enhance state bodies-CSOs partnership and to improve mutual control


processes;

- To increase engagement of CSOs in resolution of issues of public importance and to make it more effective;
- To decrease expenditure on issues of public importance;
- To avoid controlled and conflicting models of civil society, instead forming bases for the development of the more efficient model of civil society, that of partnership.

Regarding relations between political parties and CSOs, *segmentational* and *linked models* of civil society are identified.

In the first case, CSOs are classified according to social and political layers. They are classical in essence, are more often established by parties and act as their adjuncts. (See *Diagram 2.*) In that situation the social system is vulnerable against political conflicts and resonant reaction to the latter.

In **the linked model** CSOs seek objectives that unite citizens representing variable layers and having different political-ideological orientation. In the social system CSOs "are arranged vertically" to social and political layers. That arrangement promotes dialogue and partnership between different social classes, reconciles political organizations and reduces clashes, shapes relevant atmosphere for negotiations (Hovhannisyan, 2003, pp. 34-35). This is a preferential model from the position of securing a cohesive and safe social system.

Diagram 2. Segmentational and Linked Models of Civil Society

It is important that the state demonstrates care and consideration towards the formation of such non-governmental organizations that can promote cooperation between various social layers and overcoming social alienation between them.

In theoretical literature one may also come across some skeptical and critical views on civil society. While 18th century French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau found that a political-civil society is based on injustice, economic inequality and exploitative relations (Rousseau, 1762, p.15; Rousseau, 1761, p. 97), modern Indian researcher Jai Sen states that the civil society is a neo-colonization project conducted by global elites in pursuing their interests (Sen, 2010). Persian theorist Mohammad Reza Nikfar notes that a civil society cannot be regarded an ideal

one as it does not exclude misery, persecution and ignorance (Nikfar, 1999). However, it is important that the miserable and persecuted can unite in a civil society and fight for their rights and freedoms.

The existence of critical views can also be considered a positive phenomenon for the development, improvement, avoiding possible drawbacks.

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THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY WITH REGARD TO THE THREATS OF THE XXI CENTURY

Abstract

The alliance between politics and philosophy pursues the object *to change the world* as public or social life. The life implies various degrees of quality, and suggests existence regarded as a desirable condition: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This is the main point of the Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776). We have here a whole philosophy of politics referring to Plato's doctrine of the practical influence of philosophy on the state power to change the world (Plato, 1971, Rp. V 473d, VI 501e, VII 540d). The philosophy of politics holds life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to be unalienable rights and just so lays down the basic human rights as the principles of the political law, public law. The form of government which secures these rights is called democracy. America is no longer the ruler of her own spirit. In Armenia and Russia, there is instituted now *timocracy*, a form of government in which love of honor is the ruling principle (*timē* honor + *kratein* to rule). There exist here public law apart from human rights. The task of the philosophy of politics is to secure democracy in the United States of America and to carry out the transition from timocracy to democracy in the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation.

Keywords: Philosophy of Politics, Plato, Hegel, Montesquieu, Jefferson, democracy, timocracy, information war, slander, dictatress of the world, the system of the threats, the change of the world.

Long time the well-known Plato's thesis about the mergence of power and philosophy with the purpose of deliverance of states from evils seemed to be Utopian. But today with regard to the threats of the XXI century just the alliance between politics and philosophy performs the duties connected with saving mankind from overhanging mortal danger.

For the space of the whole history of mankind, especially the last two centuries, the staunch ally of politics was not philosophy but war. In the attitude of mankind to war it is clearly observed two opposite methods of ap-

proach which can be designated as the lines of Socrates and Glavkon. Both are the main personages of Plato's "Republic" discovering of war origin. The position of Socrates: war arises because of endless rapacity exceeding all bounds of need and impelling to seizing a part of a territory of a neighbouring country. It means evil. The war is the main source of private and public troubles when carrying on. Socrates appealed to beware of war. But it can be evoked by the necessity to protect the country, to repulse aggression. And then one will be forced to wage war. Thus wars may be

unjust, predatory and just, ones of liberation. The position of Glavkon: a war is absolutely inevitable if we intend to have enough pastures and fields. It means good. This appraisal of war predominates in minds of politicians till present day.

An organic connection of war and politics was pointed out by a Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831). He saw in war the continuation of the state politics with other means. "The war is not only a political act but a true instrument of politics, too, the continuation of political relations, their conducting with other means". The position of Clausewitz served as a stimulus for glorification of the old thesis about the inevitability of seizure of foreign territories and practically influenced on the organization of military campaigns of the German Empire and the Third Reich.

The conception of the organic connection between politics and war led to two world wars. The maintenance of their alliance in XXI century threatens to end with the World War III which can wipe off the earth the human race. Only urgent giving the baneful alliance up and the transition to the positions of the alliance between politics and philosophy can save the mankind from the world catastrophe. To paraphrase Plato one can rightfully assert that untill the state power and the philosophy will merge all together and untill in accordance with compulsory procedure will be removed those persons (and there are many of them) who now strive apart either for the power or for the philosophy, the genuine peaceful democratic states will not see the sunlight (Plato 1971: Rp. V 473 d). Thus the approaching World War III is the first real threat of the XXI century.

No less important is another threat: the war of information, the war of words. It came up to take the place of the ideological struggle, of the struggle of the ideas. The main instrument of the war of information is *the slander* directed to fan the conflicts between the states. "And all in the world can be slandered" (Plato, 1971, VI 500d). One becomes a slanderer by lack of education or by dilettantism. So Karl R. Popper in the tendentious work "The open Society and Its Enemies" (1945) represented Plato as a "totalitarian" thinker. This book slanders the mankind. It fabricates a fable that Plato under the name "the ideal state" wordily outlined a totalitarian regime which came true as the Third Reich and the USSR. Popper's arbitrary inventions in connection of "totalitarian" Plato are explained by his will to please the political hawks of the West straight after the end of the World War II. He has done all to close the access to the open society for the staunch ally of the USA and England. For the sake of this aim he has turned the philosophy into the servant of the aggressive politics. The words "totalitarian" and "authoritarian" were invented by Mussolini in 1925 as high – flown epithets of fascism. Lumping the USSR together with the Third Reich, Popper strived to discredit and shake the state of the democratic centralism.

Bertrand Russell's book "A History of Western Philosophy" (1945) slanders the mankind, too. He calls in question the existence of "wisdom" as the principle of aristocracy. Hence it follows: "The problem of finding a collection of "wise" men and leaving the government to them is thus an insoluble one. That is the ultimate reason for democracy" (Russell, 1945, p. 107). There is in this Rus-

sell's conclusion a misunderstanding that must be cleared up. One can think that democracy excludes wisdom and wise men. They can be successfully found by showing their ability to aspire to legal power and philosophy simultaneously. Now the problem of finding a collection of wise men and leaving the government to them is on the agenda in the Republic of Armenia and Russian Federation. Russell erroneously considers Plato's guardians (suppliers of wise men) as "a class apart" to be enemies of the open society and is lumping together with them the Paraguayan Jesuits, ecclesiastics and the Russian revolutionists who were not a class apart: like Jacobins they went in advance to fall the first.

There is a simple and right solution of Russell's "insoluble problem": to exclude from the Constitutions of the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation all reference to the word "successively". This word was arbitrarily added by Yeltsin to the principal clause of the Amendment XXII (1951) to the Constitution of the United States: "No person shall be elected to the office of President more than twice *successively*". "Successively" must disappear. This word gives the former presidents the right to be elected more than twice and creates corrupt clans. Instead of such political wisdom the President of the Republic of Armenia declared coming transition to parliamentary form of government.

Popper and Russell happened to have found followers full of energy: Brzezinski, Friedrich, Linz, Sartori. The latter so characterized the method of the conduct of the information war: "The coinage of the apt words and their unceasing repetition. The whole trick is to start with the help of the apt words *the slander*. We must understand that this is

highly effective method... I definitely do not like the war of words, but so is the reality" (Sartori, 1992, p. 469). The epithets of fascism – "totalitarian" and "authoritarian" – after the more precise definition of their content have become the apt words directed against the USSR, and now already against Russia, too. And to ensure their unceasing repetition, the slanderers have inserted them in a "new" (after Montesquieu) classification of the forms of government: democracy, authoritarianism, totalitarianism. The crowds of philistines, various "learned" gentlemen and officials by means of the frequent repetition of judgements of the type "The USSR is a totalitarian empire", "Russia is an authoritarian state" turned them into most dangerous prejudices threatening the existence of the mankind. That is what brought the transformation of the philosophy into the servant of the politics. The place of the truth has occupied the slander, false accusation.

The western slanderers suggested to ignorant Khrushchev an idea of Stalin's cult to equate him with Hitler's cult. This idea appeared to be attractive because it allowed Khrushchev with the help of the apt words "Stalin's personality cult" to depreciate the merits of his late lord and to exalt himself. The slander against Stalin led to the split of the party top and the whole country. The merits of Stalin in the Great Patriotic and the World War II were recognized by the country and mankind. Even the Americans and Englishmen did great honor to him when he has arrived to Potsdam. The argument about Stalin's merits before the Motherland still is not ceasing.

The traitors of the proletarian thought suddenly felt themselves liberals. In Russia

there exist always two kinds of liberals: liberals in the sphere of morals and liberals of business sphere. The first mentioned are grouping round the parliament, the latter round the president endowed with almost dictatorial powers. In 1993 the parliament was shot down from cannons. After that followed two-day bloody citizen war. Then both of them came to an agreement. The first such a political and social upheaval came over in Ancient Greece, when between the aristocratic, attracting to morals, and the self-interested parts of the ruling top arose hostility. "Using the force and rivaling with each other, they finally came to something average: agreed to establish private property for the land and houses distributing them among themselves, and those whom they till this time protected as their free friends and bread-winners, decided to turn into slaves, making out of them rural workers and servants, but themselves were engaged in the military matter and guard service" (Plato, 1971, VIII 547c). As we see, the new incomers are ambitious men having established the private property only for themselves and having turned the free people into the service for themselves, too. A government which is founded on ambition is known under the name "timocracy". One may think that here Plato has described the transition from the collapsed Workers' and Peasants' republic to Russia of Yeltsin and Putin in which the basic human rights exist only *de jure*, on paper. But *de facto* the ignorant rulers usurped the rights to freedom, security and property, supposing that those are the rights of the state. For the common people only the right to resistance against the oppression is retained. In Russia privatization is constantly realized in the criminal form of "prikhvatization" (to carry

out theft) followed by president's decree about an amnesty of capitals.

The greatest of all these evils is developing today before our eyes: the threat of becoming of the USA the dictator of the world. "America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.... She might become the dictatress of the world; she would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit". Just so John Quincy Adams, sixth president of the United States, son of John Adams, second president of the United States, determined the place of America in the world. The warning prophecy, contained in Adams' words, have come true on that days when America went to Near East to destroy the "monster" Saddam Hussein. At that time she made the first step to become the dictatress of the world. True, the question is of America in the person of the conservative political coalition which at that moment supported the republicans as the party of the majority in the national politics. The spirit of freedom and democracy usual for America began to disappear because of violating the great ideology of American founding fathers. After the liberalization and (as a result) destruction of the Soviet Union which in the opinion of the American conservatives and European liberals was the "empire of evil" remained else the countries of the "axis of evil" representing rather the ready booty than a real threat for the West. In such favourable conditions the American expansion has acquired extremely aggressive character. Among the factors of American expansion (ideology, economics, military strategy, internal politics) first and foremost swiftly went out the military strategy. This is the strategy of the highly precise lightning stroke. The factor of individual possessing the powerful

arsenal of highly precise usual weapons the first men of violence of the XXI century considered to be a “source” of the right of the United States to search in countries of the “axis of evil” banned weapons, to overthrow despotic regimes existing there and to establish democracy. What despotism is in question?

The eastern despotism is being considered. In contrast to the western despotism it never becomes the totalitarian tyranny. It is very important here to note that the Islam imposes a certain bridle on the eastern despotism. According to Hegel who belonged to the generation of John Quincy Adams, the most gifted and educated president of the United States, Islam is in the true sense of the word the religion of the elevated. Concerning the inhabitants of the Near East, especially the Arabs, the best minds of the XIX and XX centuries kept to the idea that this people in its fit to the united god is indifferent to any calamity, generously sacrifice its life and its material wealth. The Islam is abolishing any caste system and spreading the spirit of individual freedom. The true despotism has no place in the states of the Near East. The regime of Saddam Hussein was not a special exception to the general rule.

An acknowledged threat of the XXI century is the international terrorism. Partly it has arisen as a protest against the expansion of America which has become the dictatress of the world. But partly the cause of its origin became the religious fanaticism. Concerning the latter Montesquieu noticed: “The evil rooted in the idea that the man is obliged to take revenge for the deity”. In consequence of the abuse of the deity’s name the concept of the sacrilege became boundless and served as

the occasion to most brutal and unjust punishments generously scattered by terrorists. But one can rightfully point out the idleness of their fanaticism. The terrorists joined the principle of fear, horror to the principle of virtue. The virtue became fearful as in the epoch of the French revolution. Meanwhile it is necessary here tolerance, not fear. Why? The question of tolerance is the fundamental religious question. The sight of this is completely lost by the religious fanatics. Because of it liberals seized the opportunity of declaring tolerance the basic value of Europe. With the help of compliance and mildness the terrorists would achieve many more results if they indeed want to turn virtue into the conviction of a modern man. Then the terror will go down, too. It must be outdated. It is impossible to fight with this evil only by means of physical elimination of death-terrorists and of unceasing repeating the apt words “the terrorist organization banned in Russia”. Montesquieu pointed out the idleness of this method: “The men who wait in the future life for the certain reward escape the hands of the legislator; they despise the death too much”. The governments are obliged to observe strictly tolerance concerning the world outlook and punishment of the religious fanatics. It must be put a veto on the obscene caricatures insulting under different pretexts the memory of the great prophet.

The unquestionable threat of the XXI century is the approaching of NATO to the frontiers of Russia. This is a proud country and great nuclear power. It is dangerous to try its patience by unreasonable sanctions and permanent intimidation. The people of Russia perfectly remembers perfidious assault upon the USSR by the Nazi Germany on the 22nd

of June 1941, terrible defeats and the Great Victory. If the expansion of NATO to East leads to a war then it is not excepted that the Russian timocracy will prevail over the American democracy. As the classical lesson can serve the Peloponnesian War in which the timocratic Sparta prevailed over the democratic Athens.

Thus the system of threats of the XXI century can be presented in the form of a pyramid with the summit “America the dictatress of the world” and the sides representing the ascent to the summit according to degree of strengthening of the threats and the descent according to degree of their weakening.

It remains to be seen (and this is important fundamental question): how are the threats of the XXI century to be fought? First of all it must be put an end to the slanderous war of information. Unexpectedly Germany has given the lead in the cause of abandoning the notorious war of words. On the 2nd of June 2016 the Bundestag recognized the fact of the Genocide of the Armenians after 101 years from the time of its committing. By force of the magical figure 100 the German negationists of the Genocide of the year 1915 were put to silence. This is a whole upheaval in the international relations. For tens of years the war of information was under way against the Armenian people which has suffered the deportation into the other world. The Genocide was deliberately called a mass murder. Through the malicious nonrecognition of the Genocide of the year 1915 the United States and other states are pecking at Armenia and do not let it rise. The active attitude of the German parliamentarians of Turkish origin deserves approval. The German people is tired of the war of words representing a prod-

uct of the devil calling the youth “to stick in polemics to words”, not to ideas, but words, not to struggle of ideas, but to war of words. As far as the morals of the governments of Israel and Turkey are concerned, one can think that they are exactly confused by the devil. These politicians cannot comprehend that in the cause of the recognition of the Armenian holocaust the evidence of Sarah Aronson (1890-1917) outweighs mountains of archive documents. She was tortured to death by Turks, and it became the prelude of the Jewish holocaust. Sarah’s death shows the inner tie of both holocausts.

Paraphrasing Hegel one can by right assert that the state power and politics, however they try to reason without addressing to philosophy, they can possess without it neither life nor spirit nor truth. Meanwhile the war of information, the war of words turned philosophy into a servant of politics. It only has brought nearer the world catastrophe. Under the circumstances extremely actual has become the slogan “No philosophy, no politics, no politics, no philosophy”. Only the merging of the state power and the philosophy, the powerful alliance between them can cope with the oncoming terrible events. Instead of yielding in the field of international relations to wholly human spirit, the governments are only talking profusely about the national interests. They appreciate the national interests above the great ideas of mankind (truth, freedom, justice, humanity, progress). Let us on that score listen to Montesquieu: “If I knew something advantageous for my family and disadvantageous for fatherland, I should try to forget about it, and if I knew something advantageous for my fatherland and harmful for Europe and for mankind, I should consider it

criminal”. Thus to show off a long list of evils produced by the “ideology” and to glorify the national interests, this is only a bad profuse talk against the great ideas of mankind.

The system of the international relations turned out now thus that in Europe one of the states after 20 years of America’s service cast off its fetters and began to speak about equality. This is Russia. All powers of the so-called West scold it and do not let it rise. Then England. It leaves the European Union by force of definite civilizational processes. The western civilization has two faces: the Anglo-Saxon and the eurocontinental one. England returns into the lap of the Anglo-Saxon civilization. This only will widen the borders of the eurocontinental civilization a part of which before the collapse of the USSR was Russia. Huntington is right insisting that “when Russians ceased to conduct themselves as Marxists and began to conduct themselves as Russians the gap between them and the West increased”. It is clear that this gap must be removed. There is no need to become Marxists again. One simply must not be ashamed of Marxism and run down the history of the USSR to please Brzezinski. Then very soon Russia will occupy England’s place in the union of the peoples of continental Europe. Russia is not “Orthodox”, China is not “Sino”-civilization, as insists Huntington. The Chinese conduct themselves as Marxists, therefore the gap between them and West is impetuously reducing.

In the nearest perspective two alliances will countervail: on the one hand the USA and England, on the other hand Russia and China. The approximate parity of their forces will ensure the balance in the international relations. The war of information on the part of Anglo-Saxons will be continued, but it will

lose its blaze as the war of words will be brought to a stop by the fight of ideas.

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ON TWO FACTORS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY: ORIENTATION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY

Abstract

Given peculiarity of Armenian history, the Armenian political thought for centuries debated around geopolitical orientation between neighboring great powers. In post-Soviet reflections, however, the emphasis has been moved towards self-reliance, and the very principle of political orientation was questioned. The attitude towards Israel Ori, whose name was viewed as a symbol of the principle of orientation, became the locus for determining the political-ideological disposition of debater, as well as understanding their approaches towards different concepts of national identity.

A brief comparison between the conceptual paradigms of two renowned historians Ashot Hovhannisyán (1887-1972) and Leo (Arakel Babakhanyan, 1860-1932) in relation to their attitude towards Israel Ori aims to demonstrate that questioning of the very principle of orientation has much deeper roots in Armenian historical studies than commonly is believed. It also illuminates the complex relationship between principle of orientation and desired model of social structure of society, which these two classics have revealed in rather different ways.

Keywords: national identity, geopolitical orientation, social structure, methodology of historical studies, Israel Ori, Leo, Ashot Hovhannisyán.

I

Shortly after the collapse of Soviet Empire, a critical re-examination of conventional perceptions about national identity surfaced in Armenia. One of the key issues around which the debate revolved was the question of geopolitical orientation. Due to peculiarity of Armenian history, the Armenian political thought for centuries debated around orientation between neighboring great powers: whether Rome or Parthia, Byzantine Empire or Persia, whether Turkey or Russia. The distinctive feature of the post-Soviet debates, however, was that any mode of political ori-

entation was viewed as vulnerable and the very principle of political orientation was questioned. The emphasis moved towards the principle of self-reliance, according to which any conflict with neighboring countries should be resolved on their own – stipulated in “the law of excluding the third force”.¹

¹ The doctrine suggested by Armenian historian and philologist Rafael Ishkanyan (belongs to a narrow circle of the Karabakh Committee) argued that Armenia should rely only on itself for resolving its issues with the neighbors and its foreign policy should be therefore limited only to doable tasks (Ishkhanian 1991).

During these ideological debates the evaluation of the role of Israel Ori came to full strength. The name of this famous Armenian diplomat and political activist of 17th century was rightfully viewed as a *symbol of the principle of orientation*. The attitude towards Israel Ori's political thinking became the locums for determining political-ideological disposition of the debater, as well as for understanding their approaches towards different concepts of national identity.

In the following years after the independence the debate didn't go on and was actually forgotten. As well, the linkage between the principle of orientation and other, especially social components of national identity was ignored.

II

The paper intends to demonstrate, that the questioning of the very principle of orientation has deeper roots in Armenian historical studies than commonly is believed. At the same time, I want to show the direct relationship, existing between the principle of orientation, which primarily related to *the external* factors that shape identity, and the problems of social structure of society, which are obviously connected to the *internal* self-organization of national body.

Hence, I will make a brief comparison between two "Great Shushi people" – historians Ashot Hovhannisyan and Leo (Arakel Babakhanyan). I will review their conceptual paradigms in relation to the attitude towards Israel Ori and his idea of "liberating Armenia with the help of foreigners". I hope, that the reflection of historical studies of these two prominent scholars will help to illuminate the

complex relationship between 'the principle of orientation' and the social structure of society, which they have shown in rather different ways.

III

Ashot Hovhannisyan (1887-1972) has confessed in his thesis "Israel Ori and the idea of Armenian national liberation"² (Johannisjan, 2016) that the interest in the topic was fueled by the assessment of his teacher, Professor Karl-Theodor von Heigel, according to which *Israel Ori was an adventurer pursuing his personal interest* (Johannisjan, 2016, p. 416). Hence, A. Hovhannisyan wanted to demonstrate that Ori's "adventurism" had a historical justification, because it has fostered the development of the Armenian aspirations for national liberation.

It must be noted that A. Hovhannisyan wasn't a proponent of the idea of "liberating Armenia with the help of foreign powers". As a Marxist-historian he underlined the common social struggle of the Armenians and other exploited neighboring nations, which in the end should have resulted into liberation. At the same time, being a pragmatic historian, he accepted that such ideas had played significant role in Armenian history. He saw the source of "the Armenian liberation legend" in the dream ascribed to Armenian Katholikos Nerses the Great, which predicted that the Armenian liberation (salvation) would take

² Defended at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich in 1913. The main ideas of this work were further developed in the two-volume monograph "Episodes in the History of Armenian Liberation Thought" (Hovhannisyan, 1957, 1959).

place by Byzantine support. Over the centuries, the legend has metamorphosed several times, but the core idea of the external salvation has remained intact.

The objective of A. Hovhannisyan was to demonstrate that all historical phases of external liberation idea have been propelled by certain class' or social layer's interest. In this way, a nexus between the process of social and national liberation has been established. From this very perspective was analyzed also the shift from Western orientation to Russian one, implemented due to Israel Ori's activities. The real value behind Russian orientation was that thanks to it, Armenians were eventually integrated into new community regulated by Soviet ethos. This switch from the national perspective to the social one has kept in mind another "specific-Marxist"³ Alexander Miasnikian saying "from all orientations the Soviet one is the best".

However, if interpreted in this light, the principle of orientation in its conventional sense is surmounted. The Armenian liberation legend having originated from *national liberation ideology* transforms into *social liberation reality*.

It is not hard to notice that A. Hovhannissian's presentation of historical events has been fashioned as a "grand narrative" in terms of J-F. Lyotard. The essential historical episodes are described and assessed from actual perspective of narrator, who knows the end of story. It is understood that A. Hovhannisyan being a cognizant historian didn't suppose that there were direct cause and effect rela-

tionship between Armenian liberation dreams and historical process conditioned by real economic and social interests. Nevertheless, he thought that in Armenia, which has desperately lagged behind global developments, the ideas, dreams and even delusions about liberation turned into the base for social mobilization; hence they were instrumental in creating new social reality. In that very point Hovhannisyan has noted the positive side of the adventurist activities of Israel Ori as termed by his teacher Prof. Heigel.

Within the same context we should assess A. Hovhannissian's ambivalent approach towards the falsifications in history. To wit, he demonstrates that Israel Ori and his confederate Father Minas have falsified the reality for Peter the Great, trying to convince him that Armenians have always been of Russian orientation. Hovhannisyan believes that the fake letter, *presenting something as reality, which in fact didn't even exist*, has given an impulse for creating a new historical perspective.

It is noteworthy, that the same fact uncovered by A. Hovhannisyan provoked the second hero of this paper – historian Leo, to review his positive assessment of Israel Ori in his earlier works. Some scholars believe that Leo's change of attitude towards Israel Ori had moralistic grounds. I think there were other reasons. In order to persuade them, let us turn to Leo's concept of historical study.

IV

Leo's (1860-1832) most popular work – the three-volume "Armenian History" (the first volume published in 1919), was written in opposition to the academic school of Ar-

³ Group of Armenian Marxists (similar to the Jewish "Bund"), which tried to combine the ideology of social liberation with "specific" features of Armenian national identity.

menian historiography. Leo consciously ap-posed himself to the conventional Armenian historians, in trying to inject emotional, “vivid” elements in his studies thus orienting his work towards more patriotic, ideological dimension.

The tragic experience of Armenian Genocide turned into a powerful impulse resulting into U-turn at second stage of Leo’s work, which can be understood as self-overcoming, if not self-denial.

Leo of later period becomes a ruthless critic of the liberation project, linked with external support. I believe, that the shift of his attitude towards Israel Ori was not necessarily connected to morality issue, but conditioned much more by a conviction that fake ideas that do not reflect the reality in a proper way push for adventurist and irresponsible actions, leading to consequences, which can be disastrous for the whole nation.

Hence, we can say that our two proponents had concentrated on different constituencies of ideology (in sense of Karl Mannheim). Hovhannisyan tries to explicate utopian element of the idea of national liberation, while treating it as a kind of futuristic vision. Leo understands the ideology of national liberation as a collection of delusions, as “false consciousness” in sense of the Frankfurt School. Therefore, we can consider the second stage of Leo’s work as a *critique of ideology*.

This concept has emerged from Leo’s work “The Ideology of Turkish-Armenian Revolution”, written in 1928, published in 1934 in Paris (Leo, 1994). Here Leo demonstrates the clear nexus between Turkish-Armenian liberation ideology and the principles of Russian socialism, in particular with

the ideology of “*narodniki*” and that of M. Bakunin. As a figure who has transmitted those ideas to the Armenian ground, he has considered Mikael Nalbandian - a publicist, poet and political activist, to whom, by the way, Ashot Hovhannisyan has dedicated his second fundamental monograph (Hovhannisyan, 1955, 1956).

The weak point of Nalbandian’s liberation project Leo sees in the contradiction between social and national ways of liberation. This important problem has been codified in Nalbandian’s classical article “Agriculture as a direct Way” written in 1862 (Nalbandian, 1985). The willful postponement of the social component of liberation project and limitation of national liberation to Western Armenia only (Leo noted that in fact Nalbandian had no idea of real situation there) has rendered his liberation project to being abstract and adventurist one.

That adventurism for the sake of success of the endeavor, has especially exhibited itself in one episode, which in fact repeats - although unsuccessful - the story of Israel Ori’s fake letter. In order to mobilize the Armenian community, Nalbandian has attempted to persuade Istanbul-Armenian Serovbe Tagvoryan to spread news that there is an active underground secret committee in the city. The request was turned down on grounds that it would discredit the movement.

Leo’s methodological idea of *orientation as false consciousness* was further developed in his book “Khojas’ (Merchants) Capital” (Leo, 1934). It was transformed to the concept of “clerical diplomacy” and applied on all of Armenian history. When this specific form of diplomatic activities, based on class interest of the clergy and inalienably chained with re-

ligious principles, dogmas and beliefs, transcends into secular realm it turns into an unrealistic policy guided with abstract ideas⁴.

It is easy to see, that Leo's "Khojas' Capital" – like Hovhannisyanyan's monograph - is constructed in "grand narrative" fashion. However, unlike A. Hovhannisyanyan, who presents a sequence of ripening liberation ideas, Leo qualifies the same chain of historical events as a rally of starry-eyed and destructive delusions⁵.

V

This principled opposition is explained by the difference of the respective perspectives of two historians. A. Hovhannisyanyan views Armenian history from resurrected Soviet Armenia, which marches towards the future. Leo's perspective, in contrary, streams from the tragic experience of Armenian Catastrophe.

Notwithstanding the considerable differences, there is significant degree of similarity in the concepts of these authors. The most

important common feature was the interest towards the social dimensions of history. Ashot Hovhannisyanyan has shown how the question of geopolitical orientation was transformed into the question of choosing a preferable social model. In Leo's work there was a key shift of research focus towards studying the economic relations, first of all the international movement of the Armenian trade capital, which, as he believed, had enormously influenced the national history. Moreover, cooperation as well as competition of Armenian merchants with East Indian Company came to signify the Armenian participation in shaping a new economic world order. In this regards, Leo follows the footsteps of Professor M. Pokrovski and alongside the latter, he can be viewed as forerunner of the "world-system" theory.

Thus, the analysis of different methodological traditions in historical studies unveils that the correlation between geopolitical orientation (the essential component of national liberation ideology) and the models of social organization of national life - is rather complicated and is often functioning on implicit levels. This hidden linkage is an important factor, which influences further transformations of national identity. This is yet another reason for scholars who are interested in Armenian identity to direct their researches towards understanding nonlinear relations between desirable ("ideal") and existent ("real") forms of social organization in Armenia.

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⁴ It would be of scientific interest to compare the Leo's "clerical diplomacy" with the "protestant diplomacy", which, according to some scholars has defined the policy of US president W. Wilson towards the victims of Armenian Genocide. For more accounts see (Grabill 1974).

⁵ Do not be amiss to notice that in order to create a general impression of holistic historical perspective the both historians tried to avoid forms of continuous linear narrative and preferred to work with large "episodes". This specific fact is reflected in the titles of their masterpieces: "Episodes in the History of Armenian Liberation Thought" and "Episodes from Armenian Clerical Diplomacy" (covering heading for "Khoja's Capital") by Leo.

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

FROM ANCIENT GREEK LOGOS TO EUROPEAN RATIONALITY

Abstract

Because of history, culture, and politics, European identity has its archetypical elements in ancient Greek culture. Ancient Greek philosophy brought Logos to fore and defined it as the crucial problem and the postulate of the human. We translate the Greek term Logos in English as reason or rationality. These terms, however, do not cover the semantic field of Logos since this includes, among other things, order of being, ground, language, argument etc. The juxtaposition of Logos (reason) to myth makes up the matrix of rationalism. Ancient Greek culture, however, was a culture of Logos (reason) as well as of myth and had enough room for forms, gods, and heroes, for science, poetry, and religious festivities. While ancient Greek culture seems to follow the logic of forms, modern European culture follows the logic of things.

Plato criticizes myth and, at the same time, he sets out a philosophy of myth. He follows the principle of ‘giving reason’ (logon didonai) about things, as his master Socrates did. He establishes dialogue and defines dialectics as the science of principles and ideas and their relations to the things of this world. Aristotle did not accept Plato’s interpretation of Logos. He considered dialectics only as a theory of argumentation and defined his ‘first philosophy’ or ‘theology’ as the science of highest Being. His program of rationalism is based on ontology and accepts the primordial relation of Logos, life, and order of things.

European modernity begins in philosophy with Descartes’ turn to the subject. Descartes defines the main elements of European rationality and their problems. He brings to fore the human subject as the ‘I’ that is free to doubt about everything it can know except itself. Knowledge has to consolidate the power and the mastery of humans over things and nature. Besides, the distinction between soul and body in terms of thinking thing and extended thing does not allow a unique conception of the human. Especially Kant and Hegel attempted to eliminate the impasses of Descartes’ and of Cartesians. While Kant defined freedom as the transcendental idea of reason, Hegel highlighted the reconciliation of spirit and nature.

Nowadays there is a confusion regarding rationality. The power of humans over nature and over other humans as nature is increasing. We have lost the measure of our limits. Perhaps we need the ancient Greek grammar of Logos in order to define the measure and the limits of modern European rationality.

Keywords: Logos, reason, rationality, myth, dialectics, order, human identity, subject, freedom, nature, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, idea of Europe.

1. Introduction: Politics and Culture

The idea of Europe almost belongs to everyday vocabulary, but its semantics is fluid, even though there is the impression that it is not so. For politicians the idea of Europe seems to be clear, since it expresses the unity of European people as a reality in process and as an ideal as well. It is suggested that this reality embraces the common political actions of European people for freedom, prosperity, peace, and education. Nevertheless, behind political actions, goals and rules, there is a long and alive tradition of European culture including cultural goods, values, and expectations that belong to the common horizon of life. It is plain that we have to take into account these elements and to set out a broader interpretation of the idea of Europe that would allow European people to recognise their contribution and relation to European culture and to participate in the various activities intending to make Europe the common home of the Europeans. In fact, the aforementioned European culture seems to be a differentiated and open unity, the main components of which are ancient Greek culture, Christian religion, and Roman law. These components are the spiritual property, the offer, and the proposal of Europe to itself and to humankind for understanding the values and the dangers of human life. Nevertheless, the idea of Europe is not a theoretical conception of what European culture is, or a projection into a future for everyday purposes. On the contrary, it is connected with the value-based attitude of citizens towards politics, culture, and humanism and with the critical awareness and participation in public life.

When we raise the question of what the

‘identity’ of the idea of Europe is, we have to refer to ancient Greek culture, not only because ancient Greek culture is the universal heritage of humankind; but because the alleged ‘identity’ of the idea of Europe has its archetypical element in ancient Greek culture and has been formed through renewing the relation to it. Ancient Greek culture has not only offered important creations in poetry, philosophy, history, art, or rhetoric; it has also brought to the fore important conceptions concerning the order and the meaning of human life, like political freedom, isonomy, the equal right to public speech, justice, measure, and Logos. The most important discovery of the ancient Greeks is the idea of Logos that makes up the crucial problem and the postulate connecting ancient Greek culture together with European culture. We translate Logos in English usually as reason, or rationality. These terms, however, do not cover the whole semantic field of Logos. The main problem does not concern the translation, but it is related to the difference of human self-understanding and understanding of the world. Generally speaking, Logos can be reason and language, ground of things and order of Being, discourse, and discursive rationality. The semantic focus depends on the semantic interrelations within a concrete context.

Even though Logos characterises ancient Greek culture, it is ancient Greek philosophy that has attempted to develop a theoretical account of it. In fact, ancient Greek philosophers developed different theoretical accounts, distinguished through a critique that never questioned either Logos or the primordial interrelation of life and thinking. For ancient Greek philosophy, the question of Logos refers to reality and to the human attitude to-

wards reality, and it is not a simple problem of semantics. It is the connection to this reasoning attitude towards life and the world that offers to the idea of Europe historical depth as well as openness and perspective.

In this paper, I shall explore some structural characteristics and transpositions in the philosophical theorising about Logos that manifest the common principle and the difference of European rationality from ancient Greek Logos.

2. The Hermeneutic Outset

Focusing on *Logos* and Reason does not mean either the absence of reason or rationality from other cultures or a rationalistic interpretation of ancient Greek culture in terms of European rationalism. The common foundation of cultures is the conditio humana, the human condition including the metaphysical need of the human to give a meaning to its life and the world and to create an order of life corresponding, as far it is possible, to this meaning. Max Weber has brought to the fore the various forms of rationality in religions and cultures and has emphasised that the rational need of giving a meaning to the world makes up a constitutive characteristic of humans (Weber, 1972, p. 307).

Nevertheless, the rationality of religions and cultures is mediated through scientific research, while in the case of ancient Greek culture Logos makes up a characteristic of the self-consciousness of the people that created this culture. The ancient Greeks conceived the reasoning character of the human and, at the same time, they became conscious of the relevance of their discovery, so that they considered Logos as a content with value in itself,

and they created concrete cultural expressions according to Logos, like philosophy, history, and the sciences. Philosophers searched for the way to truth according to Logos, they discovered method and concept, dialectics and logic, ethics and politics. In ancient Greek culture, a novel view of the human and of the world emerges, because the human is 'here' and the world is not determined anymore through the relation to mythic powers. The human and the world make up an order with Logos, with reason, that becomes the unique problem of philosophy. Husserl admits that the spiritual birth of Europe happens in ancient Greece, when philosophers introduce a new attitude towards the world, namely the theoretical attitude, that differs from the practical-mythic one, because it is a self-purpose purpose in itself and shapes the work of philosophy, namely of the universal science of the world (Husserl, 1976^a, pp. 326, 328, 331).

In this way philosophy constitutes the identity of European culture and, at the same time, it belongs to it. Since philosophy has as its work to explain the question of Logos, of reason, philosophy itself holds the book of the open accounts of reason in European culture. This consciousness of the importance of reason makes up the foundation of the differentiated continuity of reason in European culture. Even though the juxtaposition of Logos against myth constitutes the origin of rationalism, the fact is that ancient Greek culture was the culture of reason as well as myth; it made space for the critique of myth and for tragedy, for art and philosophy. It was exactly the creative plasticity of the ancient Greek spirit that allowed the human to express its relation to itself and to the world in the different expression of reason and myth. In the continuity

of reason that is explored in philosophy there is a turning point indicated by Descartes as the leader of European rationalism and the 'grandfather of the French revolution' according to Nietzsche's words (Nietzsche, 1966^a, p. 649). It is the turn towards the human subject as the 'I' that defines the order of the human and of the world as an epistemological relation.

Max Weber has characterised the course of occidental culture as a course of detachment and rationalisation due to a bundle of factors attributed to religion, science, economy, science, bureaucracy. Some of Max Weber's remarks allow the conclusion that, in ancient Greek culture, things exist and receive meaning through their essential relation to forms, to gods, to heroes, to the human. Modern European culture undermines this logic of forms and ascribes a specific sense in the logic of things (Weber, 1972, p. 250). So, rationalisation develops together with reification, and things lack every other meaning except that of exploitation and mechanistic relation. This distinction of two logics, namely of the logic of forms and of the logic of things, does not indicate that there are two separate epochs of European culture; it only points to the fluid tension existing in the relation of the human to the world and, at the same time, it points to the open historicity and to the open worldness of the human.

If we use this distinction as a hermeneutic outset, we can ascertain that the differentiation of modern European culture from ancient Greek culture is obvious in terms of abolishing the idea of ontological order and in the radical consciousness of the freedom of the human, of the human concretely considered as the knowing and acting subject.

3. Logos and Myth – Logos and Order

In ancient Greek philosophy an order of the meaning of Logos emerges, which is pertinent to the answer to the fundamental question 'what is?'. Logos is the primordial corresponding order of the human and the world. The human approaches this order through thinking and expresses it through language indicating that beings are as well as what beings are in their essence. Since philosophy appears as a peculiar approach to the world and, at the same time, as a peculiar utterance of Logos as language, it becomes juxtaposed to poetry and myth, since they have their origin in inspiration and imagination. Nevertheless, except for this justified juxtaposition, there is also a primordial connection between them. So, myth and metaphysics exist together in Parmenides' poetry and, at the same time, they become different. The critique of myth, even in its radical expression, does not abolish myth, because the scientific-rational spirit with its abstraction from the forms exists, but it has not yet become dominant, as it happens in modernity.

In ancient Greece, Logos remains human and myth is also human, since myth is the creation of the old poets and not the revelation of a transcendent Being that defines and restrains forms. In this aspect myth is present in ancient Greek poetry, art, and religion and it feeds the logic of forms. In fact, this logic of forms characterises ancient Greek culture, and not even ancient Greek philosophy abandons them. Without doubt, Plato is the philosopher who investigates myth as an independent problem of reason. Through his critique of myth, he comes to a philosophy of myth that creates a favourable field for the

emergence of some fundamental elements of rationalism. Plato started as a poet and was acquainted with myth and its relevance for life. Later, he became a philosopher and he formulated a harsh critique of myth in order to restrain anthropomorphism and to oppose dialectics to the extensive mythic narrative. Nevertheless, Plato remains a philosopher with poetic inspiration. While banishing poets from his ideal state, Plato himself is confident that he realises the essence of poetry through dialogue, since his speech divines truth through the inspiration of the philosophic muse (Plato, 1961^a, 676b6-7).

The ontological connection of philosophical speech to ideas and the truth allows Plato to define philosophical myth as the probable narrative of becoming. But this is a narrative the limits of which are examined, while its place within philosophical dialogue has been determined (Plato, 1961^d, 29b-d). The consequence is the ontological re-evaluation of myth as well as the poetical re-evaluation of Logos, since myth presents truth in picture, while Logos (reason) is elevated to the divine level from which poetry draws its inspiration. So, Plato finds his own solution for the problem concerning the limits of Logos. It is worth mentioning as an example the myth of recollection from Plato's dialogue Phaedrus. This myth narrates that the soul has seen the eternal ideas during its pre-existence. When the soul was embodied, it forgot what it had seen in its previous existence. It is the work of philosophy to help the human soul recollect the truth of ideas. This myth explains within the Platonic context how the soul knows ideas that are not tangible things. At the same time, it includes the origin of the rationalistic view

regarding the priority of logical elements in relation to experience.

Anyway, dialogue itself relies on the priority of Logos. Plato, as well as his master Socrates, follows the principle of logon didonai, namely of 'giving reasons' about things (Plato, 1961^d, 534b). But this principle points to an interactive performance, since it presupposes a common investigations and a mutual examination of the arguments by two persons. Therefore, this principle offers a distinction between critical dialogue and anti-critical authority in knowledge and action. As Aristotle writes, while examining the arguments and searching for definition and universals, Socrates opened up a new way of thinking (Aristotle, 1963, 987b-988a, 1078b17-30). Plato followed this conscious turn of Socrates towards definition and the universal and he achieved the conscious discovery of the concept. In the view of Max Weber, this discovery was the greatest contribution of the ancient Greeks to the development of scientific thinking (Weber, 1973, p. 596).

Nevertheless, a concept does not make up the only component of the idea. First of all, the idea is the ontological universal that offers a solution to the problem concerning the relation between one and many, since the many are what they are through their participation in the one. Plato transposes the problem on the level of the two primordial principles, namely the One and the Indefinite Dyad. The ontological priority of ideas and principles defines dialectics as the fundamental philosophical science of Being and keeps together method and intuition. In this aspect, 'method' is not some instrument for every purpose (Plato, 1961^c, 510b). On the contrary,

method is the appropriate way of thinking that leads to the manifestation of truth. Nevertheless, the crucial point and moment of this manifestation can hardly be described through language, since it is an event accessible to intuitive vision (Plato, VII Epist, 341c-d). In epistemological terms, dialectics is the summit of sciences; it founds the sciences of the second class, namely mathematics, and defines dialogue as the formulation and examination of arguments concerning the highest issues of human life. Nevertheless, this definition does not lead to the marginalisation of desire. On the contrary, Plato ascribes to desire (*eros*) the power of elevating the soul to the idea of Beauty, which is 'the refuge of the power of the idea of Good' (Plato, 1961^b, 210d-211c; Plato, 1961^a, 64e-65b).

Plato sets out a comprehensive program of rationalism that is based on the primordial ontological interconnection of the two principles, namely the One and the Indefinite Dyad, to the ideas, to nature, to soul, to political state. Further, the 'appropriate' unity and order of every field fits into the order of the whole that has its primordial point of relations in the 'idea of Good'. This idea is beyond essence, and it affords truth, possibility of knowledge, and value. Since all things of this world participate in other ideas, they receive through these ideas ontological and axiological quality (Plato, 1961^c, 508e-509a). It is plain that Plato establishes an ontological model of relations. The relation among the specific idea and the sensuous things is called participation as regards the sensuous things, while it is called the presence of idea in the sensuous things. This consideration includes indirectly a conception of judgement. For example, the relation of the idea of beauty to the

beautiful things of this world points to the priority of the predicate towards the subject. So, in the judgement 'this rose is beautiful', the predicate indicates the essential 'one' that is also 'unique', namely it points to the idea of the beautiful.

Taking into account Plato's conception of participation and presence, we have to underline that the human does not have this ontological order of relations in terms of an object opposite to itself, as is the case in the modern split of subject-object. In fact, the human participates in this order and, at the same time, it is invited to establish through its own activity the appropriate order in the soul, in the city, in its whole life. The privilege and the work of the human are to discover and to know the primordial order in which humans participate. In this way, human life becomes a life with reason and spiritual joy. While discovering the primordial order, the human also discovers itself as participant of this order. Therefore, the dignity of the human is primarily defined through the participation to this primordial order and not through any achievements.

Nonetheless, Plato's comprehensive program creates new problems through the solution of old ones. Subsequently, Aristotle, the most famous of Plato's pupils, undermined his master's program. He criticised the exaggerated ontological interpretation of *Logos* (reason) as well as the unifying principles and the idea of the Good. His argumentation concerns the very existence of the ideas on an ontological level beyond sensuous things. His famous argument disrupts ontology by reducing it to a semantic pluralism: For example, 'Good' is said in many ways; consequently, the term 'Good' is not some exclusive essence

existing beyond the concrete things that are good. As regards the judgement, priority is ascribed to the subject, while the predicate is deprived of the priority it had in Plato's philosophy.

So, Plato's comprehensive ontology of beings and relations is broken down, the order of things is relegated from the transcendent level to the cosmological one, to this world, to nature, to city. Nevertheless, Aristotle avoids the naturalistic reduction of Logos (reason), since he defines the first 'moving unmoved' as 'the thinking of thinking' (Aristotle, 1963, 1074b34-35). Aristotle develops a pluralistic ontology and argues that the essential element is in things themselves and not in transcendence (Ibid, 1032b1-2, 1037b25-27). These novelties cut down on Plato's definition of dialectics as the highest science of principles and ideas and of their relation to things. So, Aristotle defines dialectics as a peculiar investigation of argumentation, without abolishing its truthful intention, as it had been established through Socrates and Plato. In Aristotle's consideration the highest science is the science of Being and is named 'first philosophy' (prote philosophia) and sometimes 'theology' (theologia), since the highest is the Divine Being. In Aristotle's pluralistic ontology, sciences have their own principles and shift attention from transcendence to experience (Aristotle, 1968, Anal. post., 87a39-87b1). Nevertheless, they are not detached from ontology. Aristotle and Plato do not separate philosophy from science. Therefore, they consider the (philosophical) science of principles, of the highest and ultimate Being, as the highest science. It is worth mentioning that even logic remains connected to ontology for Aristotle, even though logic tends to abstraction.

Aristotle considers knowledge as the result of methodical investigation as well as of restraining transcendental connotations. Indeed, Aristotle's epistemic and epistemological considerations bear characteristics that foreshadow the modern scientific spirit. One could mention here considerations about the systematic character of scientific knowledge, the distinction between facts and explanation, the role of empirical description. Further, Aristotle established the independent philosophical research of ethics, of the theory of argumentation, of political philosophy, or of sciences like biology, embryology, zoology, and others. Nevertheless, Aristotle does not endorse some version of scientism in modern terms, namely the conception that only science can provide answers to the main questions of life. In Aristotle's view, only philosophy can explore the order of being qua being (on e on) and, at the same time, describe the rational order of knowledge as well as of science. His first philosophy or theology manifests that the highest Being (Aristotle, 1963, 1064b2-5) is the point of the teleological relation of all things, of the celestial spheres, of natural elements, of living nature, and of the human too.

Aristotle's program of rationalism rests upon the primordial ontological connection of reason, species, and life, human life included. The human considered as a 'living being', namely as a being moving itself (Aristotle, 1960, 252a11-16), just like the other living beings on earth, belongs to living nature that is subject to the order of becoming and decay. At the same time, the human is endowed with Logos (reason) and lives with and from reason in political society, in family, in friendship. Moreover, the human is endowed with

intellect (Nous) and related to the Divine Being that lives beyond process and change in its actuality of ‘the thinking of thinking’ (Aristotle, 1963, 1072b26-30). Since Aristotle criticised the transcendent idea of the Good as a universal principle, he considers the category of relation (pros ti) as a component of virtues indicating the relation to the self or to others. Wisdom is the only virtue that does not need the relation to others, because it is the activity of intellect towards the Divine Being.

In fact, this activity presupposes the cognitive acquaintance with the whole of reality, at the summit of which is the Divine Being. So, wisdom as the characteristic of the theoretical form of life indicates the activity and the purpose of philosophy. Aristotle draws attention to the main reasoning activities of the human. Theory (theoria) is the disinterested search for truth (Aristotle, 1970, Eth., 1177b1-2), action (praxis) is the moral and political activity performed in the light of the Good and fulfilling the richness of life. Creative activity (poiesis) creates things and artworks (Aristotle, 1970, 1140a2-16).

Also, for Aristotle human activities take place within an ontological and cosmological interconnection that has a differentiated relation to the meaning of life. The human realises its intrinsic purpose (telos) through the aforementioned activities within social and political relations that exist ‘by nature’, namely they are essential to human life. Consequently, they are not constituted by humans; humans carry out their forms of life within them and realise their primordial relation to the teleology of the whole.

As it is obvious, Plato and Aristotle set out two programs of rationalism with an onto-

logical foundation. Both of them retain the priority of the ontological universal as well as the correspondence of the human to the order of reality. As seen, the broad differences between the two programs do not marginalise the common perspective of intuitive access to the primordial source of ontological meaning. Plato mentions love and intuition, Aristotle points to theoretical intuition as an intrinsic activity of the soul. These aspects precede method, and retain the logic of forms.

The conception of ontological and cosmological order as the primordial frame of life is characteristic for ancient Greek philosophy. Later, it makes up the foundation of the conception of order (ordo) in the philosophy of the Middle Ages, namely of the conception about the order of beings that are created and preserved and ruled by God. This conception will be deconstructed in modernity. Nevertheless its merits and problems are like splinters still present in modern and contemporary philosophy.

4. Rationality and Subject – Subject and Freedom

The formation of European rationality is a complicated event extended over the whole of European culture. In philosophy, the beginning of modernity is connected with Descartes’ name, because Descartes signals with his turn to the subject ‘the primordial foundation of philosophical modernity’, as Husserl writes (Husserl, 1976, p. 438). Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to consider how this turn has been understood in Neohellenic philosophy. We take as an example the view of Nikolaos Kotzias who lived in 19th century, was a critical student of Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling,

and, consequently, was acquainted with the question about what philosophical modernity is. Kotzias maintains that there is no rupture between ancient Greek philosophy and modern philosophy; on the contrary, their continuity is obvious, because the human is taken as the principle and the starting point of theorising in both cases. In his view, the difference between them consists in the relationship between spirit and nature; while ancient Greek philosophy brings to the fore the 'identity' of spirit and nature, modern philosophy promotes the split between spirit and nature (Kotzias, 1878, p. 490). Kotzias admits that Descartes 'has put rationality, namely the thinking subject' as the principle and the foundation of philosophy. But he criticises him by arguing that this rationality is not 'right', because it denies reality and remains hemmed within the subject (Ibid, p. 6).

However, we have to take into account that the human is not taken as the principle of philosophy with the same meaning in both cases. For ancient Greek rationalism, the human is the participant of the primordial order of Being and it realises its participation in this through the order of its own life. It is exactly this primordial ontological interrelation that protects ancient Greek Philosophy from the abstraction from the human as well as from the danger of the subject-object split. Anyway, Socrates' turn from nature to humans as well as the focusing upon the question 'what is the human?' is decisive events in the history of ancient Greek philosophy, because they take place at a time when the research of nature trends to become independent from human reality.

Maybe in this sense there is a coincidence with Descartes' philosophy, similar to

that of Socrates'. Anyway, as far as the question about the human is concerned, Socrates' rationalism is different from that of Descartes' rationalism, since the former focuses on ethics, while the latter aims at grounding knowledge. For Socrates, the question of the human is an anthropological one, since it takes into account some ontological elements, like the universal of justice or the universal of the sacred, which do not depend on human input. Therefore, they do not allow the total reflection of thinking onto itself, as this becomes possible primarily with the philosophers of German idealism. In Descartes' view, however, the human as the subject, namely the 'I' makes up the point at which rationality is gathered and concentrated; consequently, it leads to anthropocentric considerations. For, even God undertakes the burden of solving problems defined by the subject, like the objectivity of the world or the guarantee of truth according to the prerequisites of the subject.

In Descartes' philosophy the elements of the logic of things emerge gradually, as it is obvious in his conception of the human. Nevertheless, this logic manifests the world as the space of things and enlarges the practical chances of the human. Further, the view that the human is a subject means that only the human is a subject. Descartes' version restricts the conception of subject and abolishes the rich ontological and logical consideration of Aristotle, for whom a subject can be the human but not only the human. Besides, the distinction between methodology and ontology concerning the conception of the human is not made clearly enough by Descartes. While dealing with the question about the human, Descartes denies, among other qualities, the

view that the human is a 'living being endowed with reason', since he interprets it as a psychological one; instead of it, he defines knowing consciousness as the main characteristic of the human (Descartes, 1969, VII, 27). In this way, Descartes does not consider the primordial relation of reason and life, and he answers questions as to what the 'I' is but not questions as to what the human is. The subject as the 'I' has the peculiar freedom not only to doubt everything except itself but also to deny the existence of those things which it doubts (Ibid, VII, 12).

Nevertheless, doubt is connected with a new conception of method. In this case, method precedes beings, because the firm application of method determines the existence of beings and relates them to the subject. This ideal of method has, indeed, contributed to the progress of modern science. However, while suggesting that the method of mathematics is unique and effective for every kind of knowledge, either mathematical or philosophical (Ibid, VI, 20-21), Descartes does not leave many possibilities for philosophy in terms of referring science to the world of life. The result is that science becomes autonomous towards the world of life. For Descartes, doubt does not have existential connotations (he has overcome them in his biography), but it becomes the principle of the methodical production of knowledge as regards God and also the things of this world (Ibid, X, 515). Since subject is the centre of reality and decides through its cognitive effort about Being, it corroborates its power as well as its domination over beings. Philosophy receives a new determination, since it has to promote the domination over nature, so that humans be-

come 'masters and possessors' of nature (Ibid, VI, 62).

Even though the distinction of 'thinking thing' substance and 'extended substance' is useful as the starting-point for the development of specific sciences, it has negative consequences for the consideration of nature as well as humanity (Apostolopoulou, 2007). For, nature is considered to consist in bodies subjected under laws of mechanics and to constitute an object of science. Further, the human body is considered as a complicated machine (Descartes, 1969, VII, 229-230). After all, one ignores that nature is a vivid order of becoming and decay; at the same time, the unity of the human being is split. Under these presuppositions, there is no unique meaning connecting humans and nature in terms of life.

While the Cartesian program of rationalism introduces a split between subject and world as well as the radical freedom of the modern human, it is characterised by this calling for domination of the human upon the allegedly mechanical nature and by the destabilisation of philosophy. Because philosophy founds knowledge, but what it declares as the calling of the human is misleading, since nature is not only the space of things determined to be dominated by the human, since nature is the interrelation of life to which the human also belongs. Even though the Cartesian program brings the subject to the fore, it does not mean that the human is brought to the fore as a living and reasoning being –as 'soul' in Aristotle's terms (Aristotle, 1984, 431b21). For Descartes, the consciousness of the subject is only the object of rational psychology and it is considered as an object. In this aspect, the subject abolishes its existential depth. Further,

the subordination of nature under scientific rationality excludes the possibility of a hermeneutics of nature that could establish nature as the realm of appearance manifesting a variety of qualities, of forms, colours, light, and darkness, namely of elements enriching human sensibility. In fact, this exclusive subordination will function as a foundation for the exaggerated development of objectivism as well as for the detachment of human interventions in nature from the question of meaning and of the order of human life on earth.

Anyway, philosophical proposals for revising the Cartesian program have not been lacking. Living nature has been a serious philosophical problem, for Leibniz, for Kant, for the philosophers of German idealism. In the twentieth century too, philosophical biology and philosophical anthropology have set out another proposal for considering the primordial interrelation of life to which humanity and nature belong without arguing that the human is merely a natural being. These Aristotelian interventions have not led to the expected results, at least up to now. It seems that the objective powers representing the ambiguous rationality of modernity are not willing to adopt a common meaning of reason and life. Nevertheless, modern philosophy does not offer only the Cartesian consideration of the connection between nature and freedom. Another perspective results from Kant's and Hegel's philosophy that has to tell the human something important about its relation to nature; it is the view that domination cannot be the principle defining the presence of the human in this world, because domination misunderstood as freedom without boundaries leads to catastrophe. It is plain that humans cannot live without consuming the material

side of the world; but it is necessary to consider an order of freedom and recognition of protecting and in some way respecting the order of nature.

When Kant deconstructs the Cartesian program of rationalism, he releases the subject from the demand for domination over nature. While exploring the third antinomy of pure reason, Kant considers freedom in terms of cosmology and solves the antinomy through elevating freedom to a transcendental idea of pure reason (Kant, 1998, B561; B574). This transcendental freedom as the peculiar characteristic of reason is the source of practical freedom, the positive expression of which is the autonomy of will, namely the self-commitment of the will towards the moral law (Kant, 2003, pp. 58-59). In Kant's view, only the human expresses freedom in this world. Then the human could be considered as the being that can express the freedom of nature in terms of respect or protection of nature, so that nature preserves the status of the relational other of reason.

Philosophy has explained the primordial relation of humans and nature that cannot be abolished in favour of the alleged domination of humans over nature. Since humans have 'subdued' nature –according to the demand of modernity– in order to carry out their lives and to realise their own freedom, humans have the duty, since they are free beings, to offer nature more freedom and to let nature be what it is, namely relational and co-existing otherness of the human. Maybe this conception could be the conclusion from what Hegel writes about the reconciliation of spirit and nature (Hegel, 1975, 505f.), even though we are sceptical about the absolute terms of his discourse. Nevertheless, European rationalism

includes a critique and meta-critique of its versions and shows that the problem concerning the order of reason and life remains still open after the breakdown of what was considered as metaphysics. The impasses of European rationalism do not imply the abandonment of reason. For, reason is the 'raft' of human life. Reason, freedom, reconciliation indicate the way in which modernity becomes enlightened about its limits and unforeseen consequences. The history of humankind is an open process of education; the lessons of modernity are not yet exhausted and can contribute to facing the problems of our days.

5. Concluding Remarks

If we consider the current situation of reason in terms of Aristotle's distinction of reasoning activities, we ascertain that there is a confusion of them. Theory has almost lost its primordial meaning as the search for truth, because the discovery of truth has been subordinated under the construction of truth. Philosophy, religion, and pure science retreat before techno-scientific knowledge. Action has lost its connection to the question about the meaning and the order of life, namely to that question which, according to Socrates, offers value and endurance to the presence of humans on earth. While the logic of things regards the world as the field of the infinite possibilities of the subject, the human itself tends to be reified; that means that the only living form that is a person is considered as a thing.

It is not obvious what the solution can be to these problems. Nevertheless, *Logos*, reason is a fundamental power, a chance and a duty that is always open and gives meaning to human effort and to human history. Perhaps

we need the ancient Greek philosophical grammar of *Logos* in order to find the way from the infinite subject to the free human and to reconsider what it means to be human. The critique of reason, which does not intend to be a critique against reason, has always the purpose of finding the boundaries and the measure of reason in and with the world (Apostolopoulou, 1994). Nietzsche defined this as 'the fatal issue of Europe. Together with our fear for the human we have lost our love for the human, our respect towards the human, our hope for the human, really our will for the human. To see the human makes us tired. What is nihilism today if it is not exactly this? We are tired of the human...' (Nietzsche, 1966^b, 789, Trans. from German G. Apostolopoulou). Nevertheless, we have to read these words against Nietzsche's prelude of the transition from the human to the super-human, but as an instigation to reconsider what it means to be the human and to live as the human, without the alibi of the defeatism of reason.

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GEORG BRUTIAN AND NAS RA INSTITUTE OF ARTS

Abstract

The author recounts the cooperation of the academician Georg Brutian with the Institute of Arts, NAS RA. In particular, the scientific symposium, organized on the initiative of G. Brutian in the Institute of Arts on March 9, 2010 and dedicated to the 90th anniversary of the world-renowned French painter of Armenian origin Jansem, as well as the booklet “Jansem-90”, published the same year by the International Academy of Philosophy, the Armenian Academy of Philosophy and the Institute of Arts NAS RA and edited by the academician G. Brutian are spoken about.

Keywords: Georg Brutian, Institute of Arts NAS RA, creative cooperation, scientific conference, Jansem’s jubilee.

On December 8, 2015, Georg Brutian, academician of the RA National Academy of Sciences, an outstanding philosopher and efficient organizer passed away. At once, three organizations - the International Institute of Argumentation, the Armenian Philosophical Academy and the International Academy for Philosophy - lost their leader ...

NAS RA Institute of Arts lost a great friend.

On the 90th birthday (March 24, 2016) of academician G. Brutian, the management of NAS RA Institute of Arts visited the academician’s grave and laid flowers.

Among academician G. Brutian’s many talents, the best known was that for organizing science: back in 1977, he was elected academician-secretary of the Department of Philosophy and Philology of the Armenian Academy of Sciences; in 1994-2002 he was academician-secretary of NAS RA Department of Humanitarian Sciences, held the post

of NAS RA vice-president. In those years, the Institute of Arts was part of the mentioned Department and, quite naturally, all the accomplishments of the Institute during that period of time were to a greater or lesser extent attributable to the strict and demanding, yet sympathizing and caring head of the Department.

In 2018, NAS RA Institute of Arts will celebrate 60 years of its founding. During these six decades it had but three directors, and they all enjoyed academician G. Brutian’s favor. Thus, he played an important role in the scientific career of Ruben Zaryan, academician of the Arm. SSR Academy of Sciences, who headed the Institute from the day of its founding in 1958 through 1987, when he was removed from office upon his own application and appointed advisor to the directorate of the Institute of Arts, having recommended Levon Hakhverdyan as his substitute. On October 1, 1987, by the decision of the general

meeting of NAS RA Department of Philosophy and Philology, Doctor of Philology Levon Hakhverdyan was appointed director of the Arm. SSR Institute of Arts.

Friendly relations between academician G. Brutian and NAS RA Institute of Arts continued through the days of Ararat Aghasyan, the third director of the Institute. Incidentally, it was on the initiative of G. Brutian that A. Aghasyan was elected as member to the Armenian Philosophical Academy.

The friendship between academician G. Brutian and NAS RA Institute of Arts was deeply rooted in the philosopher's love and appreciation of arts.

Taking advantage of the occasion, I would like to bring up an episode of cooperation between academician G. Brutian and NAS RA Institute of Arts. On May 9, 2010, on the initiative of G. Brutian, a scientific symposium, dedicated to the 90th birth anniversary of the French Armenian internationally known painter Jansem (Hovhannes Semerdjian, March 9, 1920 – August 27, 2013) and NAS RA Foreign Member (2002), was held in the premises of NAS RA Institute of Arts. A telegram was sent to the hero of the event, which in particular said:

“Dear Master,

On behalf of the Armenian Philosophical Academy and the Institute of Arts of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia, on behalf of the participants of the symposium, dedicated to Your 90th birthday anniversary, we extend our heartfelt wishes on this remarkable occasion.

Your art of profound ideal and visual content, broad genre and thematic scope and high artistic qualities has long taken its steady and solid place in the history of Armenian and

the world fine arts of the XX century and our days. A hard worker of arts for decades, you have mastered all the secrets of painting, and thereby reached ultimate artistic craftsmanship. Your amazing and fascinating art has earned numerous admirers across the globe.

Dear Master, we know you as an individual of honest and bright soul, the talented and worthy son of the Armenian people.

On this anniversary day we wish you good health, long years of creative life, boundless vitality, wellbeing and personal happiness.

With best regards,

President of Armenian Philosophical Academy,

Academician of NAS RA

Georg Brutian

Director of NAS RA Institute of Arts,

Doctor of Arts, Professor

Ararat Aghasyan

March 9, 2010,

Yerevan.”¹

On the occasion of the 90th anniversary of Jansem, the booklet “Jansem – 90” was published in 2010 by the International Academy for Philosophy and NAS RA Institute of Arts, under the general editorship of academician G. Brutian.

In his address to the artist, dated March 9, 2010, the President of the Armenian Philosophical Academy G. Brutian particularly says: “Dear M. Jansem, on behalf of the presidium of the Armenian Philosophical Academy, the international community of philosophers and myself, I heartily wish You a very

¹ See Archives of NAS RA Institute of Arts.

happy 90th birthday. The fact that Your art has earned you world fame and rightfully ranked you among the Immortals, fills our hearts with pride. We know you as not only a Great artist and painter, but also a true patriot of Armenia. The title of Honored Member of the Armenian Philosophical Academy, awarded to you years ago, evidences your exceptional role in the world of art, as well as the close association of Your art with philosophy, the philosophical framework and gist of Your wonderful oeuvre.

Dear Master of Masters, on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of your birth, the Armenian Philosophical Academy decorates You with the most prestigious award of the Academy – the David Anhaght Medal. We also hope that You will accept our invitation to celebrate Your glorious 100th anniversary in Yerevan.

President of the Armenian Philosophical Academy,

Academician Georg Brutian

March 9, 2010

Yerevan” (Brutian, 2010, p. 3).

Jansem first visited Armenia in 1973. His second visit to Armenia in 2001 was on the invitation of RA President Robert Kocharyan. The artist presented his “Genocide” series of 34 canvases (2000-2001) to the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute. The series is exhibited in the special Jansem Hall opened in the Museum.

The first and last meeting of Jansem and academician G. Brutian took place in 2001 in Paris, the valuable remembrances of which, titled “A Meeting with Jean Jansem”, are nar-

rated in the “Jansem – 90” booklet, pages 14-19 (see Ibid, pp. 14-19).

“... I was fortunate to meet with Jansem in person. Just once! We talked, or, rather, I listened to him talking, and thereby enriched my soul and thought. It happened in Paris in 2001. Just a single day, just a single time... Yet every time I make a mental visit to the world of art, I meet Jansem and continue our interrupted talk: I see what I had failed to see during our first meeting. The first meeting that was to be the last one. Let this not be perceived as pessimism. It is but realism. Both of us are in our advanced ages, and the distance between Paris and Yerevan is not so easy to cover.

As it usually happens, I became familiar with Jansem’s works before I met him. That familiarization took place at rather extraordinary circumstances. Academicians F. Sargsyan, Em. Gabrielyan and I were in Japan, enjoying the hospitality of the world renowned artist, art historian, scientist, philosopher, in a word – the profusely gifted Goino-san. However, there was a flaw in him – his English was pretty poor, and his articulation was even poorer. Obviously, I should not have said anything like this about a person who had been doing his best to please us, his guests. Among others, he took us to a museum, whose name Goino-san pronounced with a strong Japanese accent, so none of us got any idea of whom it was about. The situation brought about arguments, our incorrect guesses took so much time that we left the museum without even seeing the exhibits.

It happened so that academician Goino invited me to a second visit to Japan, this time with my grandson Ara. With Ara’s quick mind we realized that the museum is named

after the great artist and our great compatriot Jansem. Incidentally, Jansem and Shahan Khachatryan did know about the museum, yet had never been to it. Who knows whether any Armenian from Armenia or Armenian diaspora has ever been to the Japanese city of Azumino 150 kilometers away from Tokyo, or is aware of that museum?

Later Jansem told me that there are two, not just one, museums of his works in Japan.

We talk... I prefer to be silent, to have a longer time to listen to Jansem. He stops, tired of talking. When he does not talk, he plays the violin. He has a powerful sensation of the languages of arts, and easily switches from the language of painting to that of music. This reminds me of the English mathematician Sawyer's teaching about the languages of science. Particularly, he maintains that it is very important to be able to switch from the language of algebra to that of geometry and vice versa. In the first case, the abstract symbols of algebra become understandable when a formula's content is translated into geometrical forms. The language of geometry makes visible the content of the algebraic formula. In the second case, we switch from the language of geometry to that of algebra to check how precisely the geometrical representations correlate with the algebraic problems.

I do not think Jean Jansem has read Sawyer. However, he has the innate sensation of the regularities discovered by the mathematician. In his own way, he transitions from the language of one art field to the language of another. This both relaxes him and gives power to solve his own fundamental problems. By the way, his love of the violin was so widely known that when, a year after our meeting, Jansem arrived in Yerevan, he re-

ceived a violin as a gift from the famous violin master Martin Yeritsyan. The artist said he was very happy and could not even think of a better gift."

During their talk, G. Brutian reads some philosophical thoughts between the lines. "I do not think Jansem chose to speak so because he talked with a philosopher. His philosophical ideas about art sounded so naturally. I am convinced that whatever issue or field we touch upon in our conversation, the thoughts will be based on philosophical contexts. Although, there is a difference in to what extent the philosophical context seeks to become an overt text and to complete what has already been said openly. Such authors are usually labeled as "physicists-philosophers", "historian-philosophers", "artist-philosophers", etc.

My impression was that Jansem belongs to the painters whose artwork enriches not only fine arts, but also the overt and covert world of philosophic reflections."

At the very first elections held at the Armenian Philosophical Academy after the philosopher and the artist had met in Paris, Jean Jansem was elected as Honored Member of the Academy. G. Brutian imparted the news to the artist, whose response was not slow to arrive. The booklet brings both the original text in French and the Armenian translation:

"Dear Mr. President,' Jansem writes, 'I am touched and proud to hear I have been elected as Honored Member of the Armenian Philosophical Academy. I am grateful to You for this honor to belong to Your respected organization. Jean Jansem."

In 2002, Jansem was elected as Foreign Member of NAS RA.

“Born and brought up beyond his fatherland Armenia’, G. Brutian continues, ‘Jansem’s thoughts belong in Armenia, and his every heartbeat is dedicated to Armenia. The facts to prove this are plenty, yet I would like to first mention the creative enthusiasm, which drove him in his advanced age to create multiple canvases depicting the Armenian Genocide. The paintings make emotional not only those who condemn the Genocide, but every viewer. It is a scream of the soul, an outburst of concentrated thought and sensation, a deed of an individual whose fatherland is always within his heart. A deed that can deeply impress anybody. During his visit to Armenia, the Great artist and patriot presented these large-scale pictures, reproducing the horrors of the Armenian Genocide, to the Armenian Genocide Museum for permanent exhibition.

Our dear painter lives far from his fatherland Armenia, yet he, his oeuvre and spirit, are always here with us”, G. Brutian concludes his recollections.

Jansem died on August 27, 2013, at the age of 93. Two years after, in 2015, academician G. Brutian passed away. Thanks to the booklet “Jansem – 90”, two written documents and academician G. Brutian’s valuable memories about the world famous artist were brought to the attention of academic circles.

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THE MAIN THESES OF THE ARMENIAN TRANSLATION OF THE *DEFINITIONS* BY HERMES TRISMEGISTUS

Abstract

Academician Sen Arevshatyan, a great connoisseur of medieval philosophy, enumerates a series of philosophical and theological works, translated in the middle of the 5th century and the beginning of the 6th century, the texts of which have been preserved only in Armenian. Among them one shall cite seven works by Philo of Alexandria and the *Definitions* by Hermes Trismegistus.

The text of the Hermes' work, which has an international value, was prepared to publication by academician Hacob Manandyan and it was printed in the journal "*Banber Matenadaran*" ("*The Messenger of the Matenadaran*"). To prepare the critical text of the work under study H. Manandyan has utilized six manuscripts kept in the Mashtots Matenadaran of Yerevan, the most ancient of which was written in the 13th century, before 1282.

The *Definitions* by Hermes Trismegistus were translated into Old Armenian at the second half of the 5th century. Translations made in that period from Greek and Hellenic works have deeply influenced Armenian authors of the Golden Age.

The careful study of this philosophical treaty shows numerous relations between this work and those of the Armenian authors of the 5th century and the following period.

The Armenian translation of Hermes Trismegistus' work proves how much the scientific thought was developed in Armenia still in the 5th century. The fact of the translation of the *Definitions* by Hermes Trismegistus shows that in the 5th century Neo-Platonism was among the fundamental directions of Armenian philosophy and it is not fortuitous that David the Invincible became the greatest figure of this philosophical direction in Armenia.

Keywords: theologian, philosopher, Neo-Platonism, translation, Golden Age, scribe, international, value, oriental, Hellenic.

As a result of the mighty translation activity during the Armenian Golden Age numerous philosophical, theological, literary and historical works were translated from Greek and Syriac into Armenian. They represented the most important manifestations of Antic Greco-Latin, as well as Oriental and Hellenic thought. The originals of a part of

these translations were lost, while, fortunately, their translations into Old Armenian Grabar language have been preserved and have now the value of originals, contributing at the same time to the development of Armenian studies. The work *Armenian Translations of Ancestors (5th – 13th centuries)* by Garegin Zarbhanalian from the Mkhitarist Congrega-

tion is devoted to Armenian translated literature.

Academician Sen Arevshatyan, a great connoisseur of medieval philosophy, dates back to the 5th century and the beginning of the 6th century the translation of a series of philosophical and theological works which have been preserved only in Armenian. Among them one shall cite seven works by Philo of Alexandria and the *Definitions* by Hermes Trismegistus (Arevshatyan, 1973, p. 19).

The text of the Hermes' work, which has an international value, was prepared to publication by academician Hacob Manandyan and it was printed in the journal "*Banber Matenadaran*" ("*The Messenger of the Matenadaran*"). To prepare the critical text of the work under study, H. Manandyan used six manuscripts kept in the Mashtots Matenadaran of Yerevan, the most ancient of which was written in the 13th century, before 1282. This manuscript is a "Homilies" written by the scribe Mkhitar Ayrivanetsi in the monastery of Geghard (Catalogue of Manuscripts, 1965, p. 568).

Historian, theologian, theorist of the calendar, poet and pedagogue, Mkhitar Ayrivanetsi gathered in the manuscript he copied an authentic treasury of philosophical and theological works. Among them one can find the works by Dionysius the Areopagite, translated in the 8th century by Stepanos Siunetsi, the *Book of Fasting* by Basil of Caesarea, the *Definitions of Philosophy* by David the Invincible, the *Introduction* by Porphyry, the *Art of Grammar* by Dionysius of Thrace, the *Definitions* by Hermes Trismegistus, as well as several works of Aristotle and other important works.

According to the evidence given by Sen Arevshatyan, the *Definitions* by Hermes Trismegistus were translated into Old Armenian in the second half of the 5th century. Translations made in that period from Greek and Hellenic works deeply influenced the Armenian authors of the Golden Age. "It is a clear and undisputable fact that translations of the works by Dionysius of Thrace, Aphthonius, Theon of Alexandria, Philo of Alexandria and Irenaeus, as well as many other works of the same circle (*Definitions* by Hermes Trismegistus, *The History of Alexander of Macedonia* by Pseudo-Callisthenes and so on), were done from the end of the 450-es to the 480-es, or the latest in the middle of the 480-es, and their ideological and lexical influence on the Armenian contemporary authors as Eghishe, David the Grammarian, Movses Khorenatsi and Mambre the Decipherer (supposedly Anonymous), is mentioned by many scholars" (Arevshatyan, 1973, p. 166).

Nowadays famous specialist in Armenian studies Jean-Pierre Mahé, while receiving the spade of membership of the Academy of Inscriptions and Literature of the Paris University La Sorbonne, heartily thanked those Armenian medieval translators who translated into Armenian the works of the Ancient world men of wisdom, a part of which are preserved only thanks to Armenian translations, at the same time expressing his gratitude to Armenian scribes who preserved these works until our days by copying and multiplying them during the following centuries. He praised these translations as the valuable memory of humanity (Mahé, 2002, p. 54).

Mkhitar Ayrivanetsi was among those who preserved the *Definitions* by Hermes

Trismegistus, copying the Armenian translation of this work.

According to H. Manandyan, the *Definitions* which came down to our days under the name of Hermes Trismegistus are a mixture of Neo-Platonism, Oriental mysticism and Egyptian philosophical thought. He insists that the original of the *Definitions* published by him has not reached our times and adds that “the importance of the Armenian translation is indisputably great as the Greek original is probably lost” (Manandyan, 1956, p. 289). Manandyan explains the meaning of Hermes Trismegistus’ name according to the explanation given by the authors of the *New Dictionary of the Armenian Language*. They think that ‘Trismegistus’ means ‘three times great’, famous. Trismegistus has borrowed the name of Hermes, the great Egyptian philosopher. Among Armenians David the Invincible was also called Trismegistus.

According to the evidence given by Kirakos Gandzaketsi, historian of the 13th century, Mkhitar Ayrivanetsi was called Trismegistus as well (Nouveau Dictionnaire de la Langue Arménienne, 1836, p. 662).

The *Definitions* by Hermes Trismegistus are published in Old Armenian with parallel translation into Russian done by Sen Arevshatyan.

The careful study of this philosophical treaty shows numerous relations between this work and those of the Armenian authors of the 5th century and the following period. Thoughts contained in it can be easily found either in *Faithful Speeches* by Mesrop Mashrots or in the *Refutation of the Sects* by Eznik Koghbatsi, the *Book of Lamentation* by Grigor Narekatsi, the *Epistles* by Grigor Tatevatsi and in the works of other authors. In the

issues of microcosm and macrocosm interrelations the representatives of Armenian official literature are completely corresponding with the theses of the *Definitions* by Hermes Trismegistus.

The latter says in his *Definitions*: “God is eternal and uncreated; the man is mortal, always staying a creature” (Manandyan, 1956, p. 299).

We read the same thing said by Eznik: “Everything proceeds from Him (God – A.S.) and He from nobody. He put the beginning of being to invisible-immaterial and to visible-material, to each according to its class” (Koghbatsi, 1970, p. 32).

The theory of the four elements of existence, which comes from Antic philosophy and continues in the Middle Ages, is also found either in the *Definitions* by Hermes Trismegistus or in the work of Eznik. We read in the *Definitions*: “The corpse consists from four elements; it is a unique harmonic combination consisting from warmness, coldness, dryness and humidity. From the warmness of fire, the coldness of air, the dryness of earth and the humidity of water” (Manandyan, 1956, p. 299).

Eznik Koghbatsi writes about the same four elements: “And so, the four elements from which this world is made are separately destructive for each other, but combined with their parallels they become useful and advantageous” (Koghbatsi, 1970, p. 33).

It should be noticed that we find the analog of the relation between the Heaven and the Earth of the *Definitions* by Hermes Trismegistus in the song *Discussion between the Heaven and the Earth* of Nerses Moats, philosopher and poet of the 17th century: “I consider that God is in the Heaven and the Heav-

en is above the Earth” (Manandyan, 1956, p. 301). Nerses Mokatsi also ends the discussion between Heaven and Earth by their union, because he sees divinity in both. The Heaven bows down before the Earth, because it is the last refuge of the human bodies (Mokatsi, 1975, pp. 42-43).

Specialists know that the famous masterpiece of Grigor Narekatsi, his *Book of Lamentation* examines the issue of life and death and comes to the conclusion that the human being is mortal by his flesh, but immortal by his wise word.

“And even if as a mortal I shall die
But by the durability of this book I will
remain immortal”

(Narekatsi, 1979, p. 527).

We find the same statement in the *Definitions* by Hermes Trismegistus: “As to the body human beings are mortal, while as to the word they are immortal” (Manandyan, 1956, p. 302).

Among the authors of the 5th century most of all we can find the influence of Hermes Trismegistus’ thoughts in the works of Eghishe. Eghishe considers that the projects of conversion of Yazdegerd II are the result of his ignorance in religious issues. “And all this evil penetrates the human mind because of the lack of instruction. The blind is deprived of the sun’s rays, but the ignorance deprives of perfect life. It is better to be blind by eyes, than blind in mind. Just as soul is greater than body, the vision of mind is greater than the vision of body” (Eghishe, 1989, p. 29).

Hermes Trismegistus expresses the same thought in the following way: “Eyes see external things, while mind sees internal ones. Light is where mind is, as the mind is light,

and the light is mind” (Manandyan, 1956, p. 307).

In 451 all the Armenian people raised in rebellion for the sake of its national independence and its religious freedom against the conversion project of Yazdegerd II. Eghishe was among the rebels, in the ideological field as well as in the practical one. The following wise formula can be considered as the motto of his history: “As it was said in ancient times, unconscious death is death, conscious death is immortality. Who doesn’t know what death is, is afraid of it, but one who knows what death is, doesn’t fear it” (Eghishe, 1989, p. 29). We find the same thought in the *Book of Lamentation* by Grigor Narekatsi:

“As a foreign philosopher
Considers that death is the greatest evil
If it is not really conscious and meaningful,
And I am certifying the same with my words”

(Narekatsi, 1979, p. 330).

Neither Eghishe in the 5th century nor Grigor Narekatsi five centuries later cited the name of Hermes Trismegistus, but they conscientiously confessed that the thought was not theirs and belonged to a philosopher of the ancient times. This philosopher is of course Hermes Trismegistus whose *Definitions* were known to those two great Armenian authors. We can read in Hermes’ work: “Conscious death is immortality, unconscious death is death” (Manandyan, 1956, p. 311). In his *Definitions* Hermes Trismegistus speaks about the existence of three worlds: “Subsequently, there are three universal worlds: the first is perceived by feelings; the second is understood by mind (i.e. God) and according to the kind of man, and the third one accord-

ing to the completeness of the whole. All the multitude of things belong to these three worlds: two visible worlds, perceptible and perishable, which are the man, while knowable invisible, i.e. immaterial God who is not visible, but manifests Himself in the visible” (Manandyan, 1956, p. 299).

About this passage Sen Arevshatyan writes: “Using the thesis of Hermes Trismegistus, one of the predecessors of Neo-Platonism, Eghishe says: “There are three worlds: God, the nature and the man. God is the spiritual world, the nature is the sensual world, the man is the spiritual and sensual world” (Arevshatyan, 1973, p. 128).

While studying the issues of good and evil, Eznik Koghbatsi shows relations with the *Definitions* by Hermes Trismegistus. Eznik is convinced that the man has free thinking and he serves whom he wants. And this free thinking exists not for serving the evil, but for good purposes. “God ... gave him (the man) free thinking to deepen in good things, to be able to do what he wants, and recommended to put free thinking at the service of good things” (Koghbatsi, 1970, pp. 48-49).

In his turn Hermes formulates this thought the following way: “The man has the same power as gods. Only the man is a free creature, only he has power on good and evil” (Manandyan, 1956, p. 307).

The philosophical and theological legacy of Hermes Trismegistus keeps being interesting for orientalists and those who study Antic philosophy. Nowadays, scholars continue to study the treasury of humanity’s ancient wisdom. Jean-Pierre Mahé, who knows the Armenian translation of the *Definitions* by Hermes Trismegistus, has published a series of works of this ancient man of wisdom, com-

paring them with Greek and Roman philosophers (Mahé, 1978).

The Armenian translation of Hermes Trismegistus’ work proves how much the scientific thought was developed in Armenia still in the 5th century. The fact of the translation of the *Definitions* by Hermes Trismegistus shows that in the 5th century Neo-Platonism was among the fundamental directions of Armenian philosophy and it is not fortuitous that David the Invincible became the greatest figure of this philosophical direction in Armenia.

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THE ECLIPSE AND REBIRTH OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL PLURALISM: A HISTORY LESSON ABOUT HISTORY

Abstract

The 1950s and '60s saw a struggle in American academic philosophy between a philosophical tradition that maintained a central role for the history of philosophy along with an openness to diverse philosophical methods and an ascendant analytic approach that marginalized its own history and restricted the scope of philosophy to self-generated philosophical problems. Columbia University in this period, while marked by these tensions, still provided a fertile ground for generating teacher-philosophers whose pedagogy reflected a deep and serious respect for history and philosophical pluralism. John Herman Randall Jr. and Justus Buchler were two of the central figures who fostered such an environment in Columbia's Philosophy Department. Joseph P. Fell was a product of this environment and brought these traits to his classroom at Bucknell University. Playing off of Hegel's insights into history, this essay will reflect upon the philosophies of Randall and Buchler with an eye toward pedagogy, especially as recalled in classes taught by Fell. The subtext of these reflections will provide a commentary on trends within academic philosophy in America over the last 40 years.

Keywords: history of philosophy, pluralism, pedagogy, Columbia University, G. W. F. Hegel, John Herman Randall, Jr., Justus Buchler, Joseph P. Fell.

The 1950s and '60s saw a struggle in American academic philosophy between a historically grounded and pluralistic philosophical tradition and an ascendant analytic approach that marginalized its own history and restricted the scope of philosophy to self-generated philosophical problems. For half a century American philosophy had maintained a central role for the history of philosophy while at the same time demonstrating openness to diverse philosophical methods. The post-war years saw a significant shift taking place. Columbia University in this period, while marked by these tensions, still provided

a fertile ground for generating teacher-philosophers whose pedagogy reflected a deep and serious respect for history and philosophical pluralism. This respect was also reflected in the life and career of the Armenian Academician Georg Brutian. John Herman Randall Jr. and Justus Buchler were two of the central figures who fostered such an environment in Columbia's Philosophy Department. Joseph P. Fell, my first mentor in philosophy, was a product of this environment and brought these traits to his classroom in Bucknell University. This essay is a brief reflection upon the philosophies of Randall and Buchler with an eye

toward pedagogy. The subtext of these reflections will provide a commentary on trends within academic philosophy in American over the course of the last 40 years.

The mid-point of twentieth century marked a fundamental moment of transition for philosophy as practiced in American academia. Partially as a result of the influx of European philosophers in the post-World War II period and the rapid expansion of scientific knowledge with its benefits and dangers, the categories of the American philosophical landscape were changing. Idealism, Realism, Naturalism, and Pragmatism, were no longer sufficient to capture this landscape. Philosophy in America shifted its focus to issues and developments in logical and linguistic analysis that stemmed from the influence of the Vienna Circle and from the work of philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and J. L. Austin in Great Britain. To a somewhat lesser extent, some philosophers in America turned their attention to work in phenomenology and existentialism that had its primary home in Germany and France. By the time this transitional period ended in the 1960s, many philosophy departments, especially in the major doctoral granting institutions, had become less pluralistic and had relegated history of philosophy to a less central role in the curriculum.

Illustrative of this shift are the remarks of two of America's leading philosophers of the mid-twentieth century, John Herman Randall, Jr. and Willard Van Orman Quine. The former, nearing the end of his distinguished career at Columbia University by the 1960s, while the latter rising to the first ranks of philosophical prestige at Harvard University, can be illustrative of this shift. Randall in a

1958 volume titled, *Nature and Historical Experience*, republished an essay first written in the mid-1930s. In that essay titled, "Historical Naturalism," Randall writes:

It is obvious we must inquire into our world in its temporal dimensions: we must understand our past, the past that made us what we are and still constitutes us, the past that is an essential part of our present world. Our culture that is changing is itself the precipitate of a long series of changes; and these our materials and our tools can only be understood in terms of the past changes that forced men to create them. To know what our ideas meant at their birth enables us to understand better what they have become . . . (Randall, 1958, pp. 4-5).

Nearly 20 years later while still early in his career, Quine in sharp contrast writes:

Philosophy is in large part concerned with the theoretical, *non-genetic underpinnings* of scientific theory; with what science could get along with, could be reconstructed by means of, as *distinct from what science has historically made use of*. If certain problems of ontology, say, or modality, or causality, or contrary-to-fact conditionals, which arise in ordinary language, turn out not to arise in science as reconstituted with the help of formal logic, then those philosophical problems have in an important sense been solved: they have been shown not to be implicated in any necessary foundation of science. Such solutions are good to just the extent that (a) *philosophy of science is philosophy enough* and (b) the refashioned logical underpinnings of science do not engender new philosophical problems

of their own (Quine, 1953, p. 446) [emphasis added].

In his more than half century of teaching, Quine only taught one course in the history of philosophy, a course on the philosophy of David Hume.

Randall's choice, maybe at Buchler's urging, to begin his volume with the above quoted essay can be seen as a response to logical positivism and the narrow empirical basis upon which it is founded. Randall's prescient warnings in his reprinted 1930s essay were certainly not being heeded as academic philosophy "progressed" into the decade of the 1960s. He further writes in the same essay:

Philosophies of experience which start with experience as a subject-matter are in fact starting with certain ideas of experience, and that those which end with experience as a conclusion are in fact ending with a certain experience of ideas. And a whole range of philosophies, including most of those called empirical, stand condemned as inadequate, unenlightened, and blind. We must start with tradition, and we must end with tradition criticized, clarified, and enlarged (Randall, 1958, p. 10).

Randall's concerns with the growing neglect of history may well have motivated him to explicitly examine the issue of how philosophy deals with its own past. The resulting 1961 Machette Lectures, subsequently published under the title of *How Philosophy Uses Its Past*, is a small yet profoundly important book that should be essential reading for all would-be philosophers. Another Columbia colleague of Randall who voiced a similar concern in the 1940s was John Dewey. In a new, at the time not yet published, preface to

his seminal work, *Experience and Nature*, Dewey proposed retitling his book, "Culture and Nature," in order to avoid the ahistorical and narrowed appropriation of the term "experience" endemic to the then rising tide of Anglo-American empiricism. For Dewey, culture has a history, while experience is often misinterpreted and limited to a here and now.

Justus Buchler, in this same period, was developing metaphysics of experience that jettisoned some of the traditional vocabulary that was stymying the understanding of the broadened naturalistic philosophy of his Columbia colleagues, Dewey and Randall. *Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment* in 1951 marked the introduction of his concept of "proception" as an alternative to the shopworn concept of experience. Buchler did not elaborate upon the genesis of this concept at the time but years later in a new introduction to the second edition of the book he conceptually tackled the history of the shortcomings of the concept of experience that necessitated this reconceptualization (Buchler, 1979). Dewey's own dissatisfaction with the term "experience" was mirrored, though on different metaphysical grounds, by Buchler's own criticism of the term and its replacement with a more conceptually precise yet metaphysically general term, "proception." The distinctly human relationship with the world that would become his concept of proception was thus based upon a deep critique of the history of philosophy. Buchler had often taught a course, both at Columbia and then again at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, that examined the history of the philosophical use of the term "experience." He approached this concept historically, beginning with Hume and Locke and tracing it through to

twentieth century philosophers in both the Anglo-American and Continental traditions. Working out ideas through a critical examination of the history of philosophy was a trait shared by both of my most important philosophical mentors, Justus Buchler and Joseph P. Fell. While Buchler rarely presented his own philosophical system in his classroom teaching, you could clearly see its origins in the careful analyses and critiques that constituted the core of the historical subject matter we examined.

Joseph P. Fell's courses also reflected this deep regard for the necessity of working through the historical tradition in order to make sense of the contemporary philosophical problems that are the grist of the present-day philosophical mill. In Fell's introductory philosophy course from the fall of 1970 one can see this in evidence. The course titled, "Five Types of Philosophy," provided a historical approach to what Fell labels, "Spiritualism," "Naturalism," "Dualism," "Idealism," and "Pragmatism." On the blackboard the first day of class was the following quotation from G. W. F. Hegel; a quote I could not fully appreciate at the time and still today is well-worth pondering:

The living spirit that dwells in philosophy demands, in order to reveal itself, to be born again by a kindred spirit. Before an historical attitude that, prompted by some interest, is after information about opinions, it passes by as a strange phenomenon without revealing its inside.

Hegel's words have prompted me to probe further into what I did not understand at the time. I have now discovered that the quoted passage was from Hegel's essay, "The Differ-

ence Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy." I now see that Hegel was expressing his attitude toward how the history of philosophy should play a role in philosophy itself. In this essay he calls those who misunderstand the historical approach to the history of philosophy, "the curious collector[s] of information." Those who have little time or tolerance for philosophers who labor on the history of philosophy sometimes display a distained dismissal toward such activity captured in Hegel's characterization of the "curious collector." History of philosophy is for them a collection of mostly false curiosities. Collecting opinions from the past is not the approach Hegel nor Fell and Buchler advocated. Picking up from where the quotation left off, Hegel goes on to claim:

It matters little to the spirit that it is forced to augment the extant collection of mummies and the general heap of contingent oddities; for the spirit itself slipped away between the fingers of the curious collector of information. The collector stands firm in his neutral attitude towards truth; he preserves his independence whether he accepts opinions, rejects them, or abstains from decision. He can give philosophical systems only one relation to himself: they are opinions – and such incidental things as opinions can do him no harm. He has not learned that there is truth to be had (Hegel, 1977, p.86).

These "mummies and the general heap of contingent oddities" must have been what Fell had in mind when on our second class meeting he uttered: "Human outlooks are more determinate in a philosophy than are facts or data. They determine what facts are explored"

(“Class lecture”, 1970) It is curious that these two sentences are the only notes that I bothered to write down that day; yet they do capture the essence of Fell and Buchler’s approach to philosophical pedagogy.

Contrary to Quine’s quip that “philosophy of science is philosophy enough,” Hegel goes on in this same passage quoted above to elaborate upon the connection between the history of philosophy and science:

The history of philosophy [seems to] acquire a more useful aspect, however, when the impulse to enlarge science takes hold of it, for according to Reinhold, the history of philosophy should serve as a means “to penetrate more profoundly than ever into the spirit of philosophy, and to develop the idiosyncratic views of one’s predecessors about the grounding of the reality of human cognition further in new views of one’s own.” Only if this sort of information concerning previous attempts to solve the problem of philosophy were available could the attempt actually succeed in the end – if mankind is fated to succeed in it at all (Hegel, 1977, p. 86).

The connections I have drawn between Randall and Hegel could also have been made with other important philosophers in the tradition. Randall was, as was his mentor and teacher, Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, a great admirer and exponent of the Aristotelian method of conceptual analysis. Whether it was the concept of cause or that of human *arête*, we always begin by first turning to our predecessors and their “previous attempts to solve the problem[s] of philosophy.” As earlier quoted from Randall: “We must start with

tradition, and we must end with tradition criticized, clarified, and enlarged.”

This method of reading the philosophical tradition with the goal of ending with “tradition criticized, clarified, and enlarged,” marked the philosophical pedagogy of Randall, Buchler and Fell. The brilliantly crafted historical writings of Randall in his two-volume tour-de-force, *The Career of Philosophy* (Randall, 1962-65), epitomized this approach. This is a work that continues to play an important role in my career as professor of philosophy and one that I would recommend to others who teach historically oriented courses.

I would like to conclude on a personal note. I have had the fortune, though I sometimes think the misfortune, of spending thirty years of my teaching career at one university. The fortunate side of my career comes from the fact that the philosophy department I joined was both pluralistic in philosophical orientation and strongly committed to the history of philosophy. We have a mandatory four-course sequence in history plus required courses that take up important figures in twentieth century philosophy. We have managed to maintain our commitment to history while at the same time building our strengths in a variety of applied areas of philosophy such as computer ethics, business ethics, bio-medical ethics, environmental philosophy, gender studies, etc. It is heartening to see that philosophers from across the philosophical spectrum, whether they are trained in the Pragmatist, Continental or Analytic traditions, are contributing in important ground-breaking ways to these applied areas in philosophy. While the academic profession of philosophy

has become more pluralistic and relevant to the global human predicament, its existence is threatened now more than ever. As with many disciplines in the humanities, the last decade has been one in which we have increasingly been forced to defend what we do and how we do it. As one who sees himself aligned to the Pragmatist school of philosophy, I have no problem with innovating our curriculum to achieve better outcomes for all our students, whether they are majoring in philosophy or not. What I am troubled by is a deemphasizing of the humanities and a narrowing focus on what are called the STEM disciplines (science, technology, engineering and math). Politicians and administrators who only have their eye on the financial bottom line and workforce training often decry the need for courses in the liberal education core, calling them a luxury we can no longer afford. Under this mindset, philosophy, art history, literature, creative writing courses must make way for courses that train our students for the technological future they all will face. Yet it is precisely in these courses in the humanities that we critically engage with history. The critical and creative response to how thinkers have thought in the past is the source of innovation in the future. This is a lesson borne out across many fields of human endeavor and one that lay at the heart of the education I re-

ceived from the philosophers who trace themselves back to philosophy as it was practiced at Columbia University half a century ago.

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DAVID THE INVINCIBLE: PHILOSOPHY AS A LIFESTYLE

Abstract

The most outstanding representative of the history of Armenian philosophy, Neoplatonic thinker of the V-VI centuries, David the Invincible continues the tradition reached the peak of its development in the Ancient Greece by Socrates and Plato, according to which philosophy is first of all a way of life, a means of transformation and perfection of the human being. Following the principles of the Greek Paideia David considers philosophy as a care of the soul, in which theory and practice are intertwined, and cognition of the world depends on the efforts of self-improvement by a subject. Author shows that in David's definitions of philosophy is clearly seen the significance of self-formation, "zardarum" in the process of reality formation, comprehension or rethinking. It is also mentioned that we can use Michel Foucault's notion of the "care of the soul" and Pierre Hadot's notion of "spiritual practices" to characterize David's optimistic philosophy, which was developed further in the theories of Armenian thinkers Grigor Narekatsi, Grigor Magistros, Hovhannes Imastaser, Arakel Sjunetsi, etc.

Keywords: David the Invincible, Socrates and Plato, Paideia, care of the soul, spiritual practices, Foucault, Hadot.

David the Invincible, Armenian great Neo-Platonist philosopher of V-VI centuries, continues the tradition that reached the peak of its development in the Ancient Greece by Socrates and Plato, according to which philosophy is first of all a way of life, a means of transformation and perfection of the human being. Following the principles of the Greek Paideia David considers philosophy as a care of the soul, in which theory and practice are intertwined, and cognition of the world depends on the efforts of self-improvement by a subject. His epithet "Invincible", according to Armenian tradition, David earned winning in philosophical debates with representatives of Hellenistic philosophy of the time. David is

also known as one of the most outstanding figures in Armenian intellectual history. His influence was so great that, as a rule, every Armenian thinker attempting to make judgments in the field of philosophy, started with the interpretation of David's main works. Nevertheless, his life, activities, and his philosophical writings are not fully investigated yet and there are many uncertainties and questions concerning his personality and philosophical heritage.

David the Invincible acted in the era called Golden Age of Armenian literature. That was an era generated by adoption of Christianity as a state religion of Armenia in the beginning of the 4th century and by crea-

tion of Armenian alphabet by St. Mesrop Mashtots in the beginning of the 5th century. Armenian intellectual, literary and artistic life was developed simultaneously with establishment of Philhellene school which translated many ancient texts on grammar, rhetoric, and especially classical Greek philosophy. Works of Plato, Aristotle, Philo, Porphyry, Dionysus of Thrace, Theon of Alexandria and others were rendered. The translations as well as the original works of the Philhellene scholars laid the foundations for the secular sciences in Armenia and paved the way for David Anhaght's (Invincible's) unique contributions to the development of Armenian Philosophy (Sanjian, 1986, p. 2).

David's survived heritage contains of four works that are texts of his lectures wrote down by his students. Greek texts of David are published in *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (CAG), vol. XVIII, part 2 (Busse, 1904), and one work, "The Interpretation of Aristotle's Analytics", has survived only in its Armenian version (David the Invincible, 1980^{a, b}).

In his works David states that "**Human being is a rational, mortal creature, able to think and learn**", and salvation of the human being, according to David, is connected with rational activities of humans, as we can see in his texts (David the Invincible, 1980^{a, b}). David the Invincible was elevated to the rank of saints by Armenian Apostolic Church. The date and circumstances of the conferral of sainthood upon David are unknown. But we can state, however, that among the numerous ancient Armenian authors only Eghishe, Movses Khorenatsi and David the Invincible have been canonized. The first two were historians, who wrote the History of Armenian

nation in the light of Christianity, and developed Armenian Christian Identity; and only David was a philosopher whose survived works are secular by their nature. For many researchers his canonization implies that he must have made a significant contribution to the Armenian Church and maybe he authored other important works of a religious nature as well. We also know that at an advanced age, when David was already well-known and accepted philosopher in the Alexandria and Greek-speaking world, he returned to his homeland, Armenia, and devoted himself to teaching philosophy. But he was met with displeasure and even opposition: his independent thinking and belief in human abilities maybe contradicted with the dominant doctrine of the time. Medieval Armenian sources indicate that David "suffering many tribulations, deprivations and persecution at the hands of his fellow-countrymen" was compelled to take refuge in the northernmost part of Armenia, near the Georgian border (Sjunetsi, 1797). David took refuge and later died in the monastery of Haghbat. His remains were subsequently removed to his native Taron and interred in the monastery of Surb Arakelots at Mush. Of course, it was after his canonization (Muradyan, 1981).

The reason that David's works were read and reread many times by intellectual Armenians since the 6th century till our days is that he developed a theory of humanity, anthropological philosophy which is helping a person to become stronger and more powerful against uncertainty of circumstances. David considered philosophy as a lifestyle, as an ongoing work of soul on its self perfection, and became a teacher for many generations of Armenian thinkers as the challenges of the

Armenian reality demanded a culture of internal work, of self-improvement and cultivation of soul.

David solved the problem of human being considering philosophy as the care of the soul. This tradition is beginning from Hilo's and Socrates' "Know thyself", and as Michel Foucault mentioned, the demand of self-cognition is based on the demand of the self-care (epimeleia) (Foucault, 2007). And self-cognition is the private case for the self-care. In its turn the self-care consists of two aspects: the care of the body and the care of the soul. David says that for the care of the body there are different things: hygiene, hairdressing, gymnastics, etc., and for the care of the soul there is philosophy. "And philosophy deals with soul, because it revives and illuminates the soul cleaning its muddy eyes capped with bodily wishes. And now how much the soul is preferable than the body, that much the philosophy, beautifying the soul, is preferable than other arts beautifying the body" (David the Invincible, 1980^b, p. 124). David belongs to the philosophical tradition of the self care of the soul which was investigated by Michel Foucault who tried to understand the techniques of the self in the Greek-Roman culture. Foucault at the end of his life turned to the classical tradition of philosophizing with the question how ancient thinkers were constructing themselves as subjects. Eventually Foucault concluded that the human being has the moral responsibility towards him/herself in the four aspects: a) there is a material, substance, which is the object of the care; it is the way the person constructs a part of him/herself; b) it is the way by which the individual states his/her relationship towards the law; c) there are means by which the care is "training

itself": the person is changing him/herself, transforming as a result of deliberate spiritual exercises to become a moral subject of his/her own behavior; and d) it is the telos, the will to take such a care, which stands as a purpose of personality (Foucault, 1986). The co-author of this approach Pierre Hadot in his works returns to the Plato's notion of the philosophy as an art to live, stating that nowadays there are professors or teachers of philosophy, but not philosophers (Hadot, 1995).

Analogically David states that philosophy is the care of the soul and the most enjoyable and privileged activity for the human being. Philosopher is not the person who merely knows many things, but is the one who lives philosophical life. In his main work, "Definitions and divisions of Philosophy", David represents six definitions of philosophy earned from Greek philosophers: Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle, choosing these six definitions because of their anthropological orientation. He defines philosophy by the nearest and the most distant subject, by the nearest and the most distant purpose, by priority and as a translation. As a translation "*philosophy*" is "*love of wisdom*" – "*imastasirutyun*" (in Armenian). By priority David defines philosophy as an art of arts and a science of sciences. David stresses this definition many times saying that philosophy is the most important occupation, and other sciences and arts are less important and respectable. Philosophy is the most essential business for a person to make him/herself constant, wise and happy. Philosophy is mother and source for all other sciences and arts according to David. He also compares philosophy with the king: "As king does not directly talk with crowd, but assigns noble men to care for the needs of the neth-

ermost people, in the same way philosophy puts forward the arts by means of which knows all the things” (David the Invincible, 1980^b: 88). But this is not the end, he also compares philosophy with the King of kings – the God: “As the God has invisible power to care about mundane creatures, in the same way philosophy puts forward the sciences in order to know their subjects” (David the Invincible, 1980^b, p. 88).

As every art and every science has a subject and a purpose, philosophy as art of arts and science of sciences also has both a subject and a purpose. And each of these is divided into two categories: a proximate subject and a distant subject; a proximate purpose and a distant purpose. The proximate subject of philosophy is essences as such and distant subjects of philosophy are things or realities: human and divine. So *defined by its distant subject philosophy is knowledge of divine and human realities*. David says that because philosophy concerns itself with human behavior, it should not ignore the examination of the divine state and that it must follow the examples set by the God. On the basis of what it can learn from the God, it must attempt to elevate human beings to a state of perfection. But for David the theory is practical and the praxis is theoretical, and the knowledge is needed for the right action, which he describes speaking about the proximate and the distant purposes of philosophy. *The nearest purpose of philosophy is thinking about the death and the most distant and ultimate purpose of it is becoming like the God to the best of human's ability*.

The Invincible understood thinking about the death as the care of the soul and cultivation of virtues; as the death of passions and

affects; and cleaning the soul for ability to see the God's light (Petrosyan, 2000). David asserts that the fundamental subject of philosophical concern is comprehension of divine logos. God illuminates everyone, but people who don't have “an eye of soul” can't see this light. The attainment of this objective presupposes liberation from the sinful passions, the “death” or “mortification” of passions. David speaks about “mortification” of passions and negative aspects of the soul. He says that some critics misunderstood Plato's judgment on the death as a desirable thing. They got it in a direct way, but speaking about the death Plato, according to Armenian philosopher, means only cleaning of souls from impurities. To see the daylight we clean our eyes, so for being able to see the God's light we must clean and purify our souls. But a normal person alone is not able to make such changes, h/she needs help. And philosophers, according to Armenian thinker, are the most perfect human beings who care about souls of other people helping them to find their way to the God. With the help of philosophers the care of soul should become an everyday procedure: we have to clean our souls from different negative emotions, impressions, and resentments. So soul needs cleaning as body does. The hygiene exists for the body's needs and philosophy exists for the soul's needs. In his treatise David twice brings the same citation from Plato's *Timaeus* 47B to emphasize the importance of philosophy: “Such a thing, Theodorus, has neither been generated by men nor bestowed by God”.

The ultimate purpose of philosophy is becoming like to the God. But human being can not be alike the God totally. David says: “We say that the philosopher is like the God

in the same sense as when we say that Socrates' image is the same as Socrates himself, although Socrates' image and Socrates himself are two different things, because the one is animate and the other is inanimate object. It is in this sense that we say that the philosopher resembles the God, although the God has one essence and the man has another essence" (David the Invincible, 1980^b, p. 67). David thinks that the God has three characteristics: omnipotence, omniscience and unlimited kindness. The God bears unlimited kindness which means that He is unable to do anything unkind. The human being cannot fully become like to the God. But in his/her possession is trying to strengthen his/her will, to become wiser and kinder as much as possible. And this purpose is achievable only for philosophers, the best representatives of mankind, who care about their souls all the time.

The philosopher is the perfect human being ("mard") who has similarities with the God in the three above mentioned features. The God is omnipotent and He can do and He does whatever He wishes. The perfect man also can do whatever s/he wishes as the human, because s/he never aspires to do that which is impossible for him/her to do. David says that unfulfilled wishes cause a big sadness. This statement is very actual for contemporary situation of the human being. Peace in the soul and happiness nowadays are rare not because the conditions of life are difficult, but because today's people want more and are not satisfied. We don't think on limitation of our desires. But this is the way to become like to the God, according to David. In Armenian the word "Definition" ("sahmanq") also means limitation and David the Invincible says that philosophers are thinking

about limits, borders that human's desires must have.

The God is kind or good, because He cares for humans and desires all of mankind's welfare. Indeed, goodness is God's essence. According to David goodness is not human's primary essence; rather, a human being acquires goodness. Armenian thinker explains this contrast metaphorically, as follows: God's goodness is similar to the sun, which can not co-exist with darkness (evil); whereas man's capacity for goodness is similar to the air, which receives light when the sun rises and stayed in darkness when the sun sets. So the purpose of philosophy is cultivation of the light of kindness.

The God is omniscient: He knows all and at all times. The human also aspires to omniscience, but his comprehension is dictated by possibility and not reality, because he knows different things at different times (David The Invincible, 1980^b, p. 69). The human acquires wisdom, which is unity of the theoretical and the practical. The wise man is not the one who knows many things and is able to speak about them; wise man is the one who lives life full of goodness and virtues. The God cares about the existing world because of his wisdom, and if wisdom exists so does philosophy; hence human's ability to resemble the God is granted to him through philosophy.

The human is the most important actor in David's philosophical system as a formulator of the "cosmos", because even the God needs the existence of the Human being. The human being exists for appreciation of the God's creation and for attempt to create similar order in the own world. The philosopher as the perfect human being is forming/ improving his/her soul and helping others to care about them-

selves in order to be able to see the God's light of kindness. Forming ("zardarel") can be understood in other meaning also. David says that the God needs a human being as a creature that will appreciate God's creative endeavor. Here David's thinking is not merely medieval, it is evidently actual for us, and because he says that a human being is the one that can form ("zardarel") not only his /her self but also the whole Universe. This means that the human being is giving the meaning to the whole existence, and philosophy is the sphere of signification, and the care of the soul is bringing meaning to this life. So people who like this love of wisdom live in a meaningful reality and feel the wholeness of the life.

This is why David was highly appreciated by his students and followers. Although for some religious or ideological reasons silence surrounded the name of David in the VI-VII centuries, the titles of his lectures maintain the signs of the highest appreciation of the thinker. David's Greek texts preserved his titles "**theophilestatos kai theofron**", that is "**the most loving the God and godly-minded**" (Busse, 1904). A. Muradyan noticed that some Armenian manuscripts also contain the mentioned titles (Muradyan, 1981, p. 198). Contemporary researchers in contrast to the Armenian historical tradition consider David as "a figure of minor importance" (Barnes, 2009, p. 14) or as one of the last representatives of the Alexandrian school of Neoplatonism (Sorabji, 1990, pp. 29-30). Trying to understand this mismatch of the approaches and for comparative purposes I looked at the volumes of CAG, containing the works of the well noun philosophers of the time to see if they also bear such titles as David does. We

can see that the titles "**the most loving the God and godly-minded**" are attributed only to David, while the leader of the Alexandrian school Ammonius in the commentary of the "Categories" just is called a philosopher (CAG IV, 4: 1), and in the commentary of Porphyry's Isagoge is called the son of Hermias (CAG IV, 3: 1), Olympiodorus is also called a philosopher (CAG XVIII, 1:1), Dexippus is called a platonian philosopher (CAG IV, 2: 2) and Simplicius's name merely is written on the title of his commentary on Aristotle's "On the Soul" without any epithet (CAG, XI: 1). Not having an opportunity to look at all the volumes of the CAG, just from the mentioned above examples we can understand that David the invincible earned a highest respect from his followers. He was called not merely "**theophilos**" - a lover of the God, but in the superlative degree - "**Theophilestatos**" - the person who loves the God more than anyone. Comparing the works of David and Ammonius we see the same six definitions of philosophy and the main approach to philosophy as a likeliness to God, but why Ammonius, the head of the school, is not called "theophilos"? Question is remaining open. Instead, David is called not only "theophilos", but also "**theofron**", which means "**having divine mind, godly-minded, holy**" (Dworetski, 1958), (Liddel & Scott, 1968). These epithets are mentioning the importance of David thinker and present him as a former of a tradition not just merely as one of the last followers. Of course, there are many uncertainties concerning David's lifetime, heritage and view-points, but the fact he was highly appreciated in the Greek philosophical cycles cannot be denied.

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PSYCHOLOGY

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CHANGING STEREOTYPES WITH REGARD TO SPECIAL NEEDS THROUGH CHILDREN'S LITERATURE

Abstract

We had the idea of this research, when we learned, that the children's book about special needs: R.J. Palacio "Wonder" was translated into Armenian for the first time.

Books on this topic have not been written yet by Armenian authors. The point is that during Soviet years the working assumption was that all the people were "like each other", perfect, beautiful, without problems, without disorders; all those, who did not meet those criteria (who had visual, auditory, physical, mental, even speech and communication limitations), grew up and spent their lives in special boarding institutions, segregated from their families and society. Being ashamed of their children, who were not ideal, the parents kept them at home, hidden from acquaintances, neighbours, sometimes even from relatives.

Attitudes have begun to change since then, and inclusive education has been a goal in Armenia since 2001. Despite the 15-year history of efforts at inclusive education, acceptance of people with special needs is still not evident in all corners of Armenian society. One of the most prevalent shortcomings is the stereotyping of people with special needs.

We decided to use the reading of the book R.J. Palacio "Wonder" for the purpose of helping people confront their attitudes and stereotypes about disabilities as they explored the lives in this unique book.

Keywords: inclusive education, bibliotherapy, self-esteem measurement, M. Rokeach Value Survey, pre-reading discussion, post-reading discussion, a meeting with children with special needs.

At the present stage of society development, the attitude towards people with special needs is getting more and more humane. In Armenia, steps are taken towards this as well. The transition to inclusive education is one of indicators. The assessment of the child not from the perspective of problems he/she has, but from the perspective of his/her resources and potential is the evidence of the above

mentioned. However, the issue of preception of "different individual or white crow" is still open. Often classmates, who do not have experience of communication with these kinds of children, and face them for the first time, can spontaneously react in various ways, from rudeness and laughter to pity, that is equally unacceptable. The issue of regulation of perception of "different" individual is becoming

actual, finding ways to teach the child to perceive the individual with deep respect towards his/her strong points, fully accepting his/her differences. The strategy of such an influence led us to the idea of bibliotherapy application, since reading is part of both learning and leisure for schoolchildren. Tale and story can be considered as natural way of information indirect transfer, instead of direct instructions and preachiness. It is typical for children to identify themselves with the main story characters, and with the help of the book the child can deeply experience the feelings of the main character.

Children's literature can be a way to share powerful examples of how we all may or may not relate to individual differences. This can be especially true for understanding how disabilities impact the lives of individuals and their families and friends. Reading children's literature can be instrumental in changing readers' attitudes about stereotypes, and it is important for educators that these changes be beneficial (Kurtts & Gavigan, 2008). Considering this fact, we decided to use the reading of the book R.J. Palacio "Wonder" for the purpose of helping people confront their attitudes and stereotypes about disabilities as they explored the lives in this unique book. The translation of Wonder to Armenian was published in 2015. The story is about a 10-year old American boy August Pullman /Auggie/, who suffers from Treacher Collins syndrome, which is characterized by craniofacial deformities of the child.

In our work with this book, we were interested in looking at how children build positive understandings of disability from children's literature and how their attitudes, beliefs, and stereotypes are changed. The book

should not be read as a fiction, but applied as a means of bibliotherapy, which includes the following stages:

- a) pre-reading discussion,
- b) post-reading discussion,
- c) a meeting with children with special needs.

After the pre-reading discussion, the children were given time for reading the book and then discuss again after reading. Debates were included as part of the discussions. These supported the children in identifying differences of people, as well as perceiving the importance of equal rights and social inclusion. Concepts, such as "difference", "prejudice", "tolerance", "justice" in a relationship with people, who are different from them, were discussed, as well as issues were analysed on how the person reacts, when the other one is drastically different, and whether it is possible to control the reaction. They also identify the notion of friend, realize the difficulties of Auggie's friends, describe Auggie as a friend, and so on.

The organization of meetings with peers is a critical component because not all the schools carry out inclusive education in Armenia; hence, the children do not always have experience interacting with their peers with special needs. The accomplishment of this stage served as a base for research questions and the study.

The research question was:

- When to organize the meeting, before or after reading the book with the purpose of making bibliotherapy effective?

With the intention of finding the answer for the first question, we formed two groups of 14-year old students, 15 participants for each group. In one of the groups (group A),

participants met children with special needs (peers) before reading the book and taking part in the discussions. The meeting was effective and full of positive emotions; the children quickly got acquainted with their special needs peers and developed a warm relationship. There was a long-lasting farewell, even some of the children wanted to go back after leaving and continue the interaction.

The participants of the group B read the book at first and took part in the discussions; afterwards they met children with special needs. From the very beginning the children had hesitation with regard to the visit, they thought it would be emotionally difficult, some of them were excited during the meeting.

In order to explain the effectiveness of bibliotherapy in the two cases we examined the behaviour of the above-mentioned children. Also, comparisons were examined of before and after scores on a self-esteem scale (Dembo-Rubinstein) as well as a value system scale (Rokeach Value Survey).

Self-esteem measurement by the scale of Dembo-Rubinstein in the modification of A. M. Prichozhan.

The methodology is based on direct assessment (scaling) of a number of personal characteristics of students, such as health, abilities, character, and so on. The ones being examined are offered to mark by certain signs the level of development of the above mentioned qualities they have on vertical lines (a measure of self-esteem) and the level of

claims, i.e. the development level of the same qualities that they would be satisfied with. Each of them is offered a methodology form, containing instructions and assignments.

Accomplishment of the research

Instructions: "Everyone appreciates his/her abilities, capabilities, nature and etc. The development level of each quality, aspect of human personality can be divided to represent a vertical line, the lower point of which will symbolize the lowest development level, and the top - the highest one. You are offered seven such lines. They mean:

- health;
- intelligence, abilities;
- character;
- reputation among peers;
- the ability to do many things with your hands, capable hands;
- appearance;
- self-confidence.

Mark by a hyphen (-) on each line, how you assess the development of that quality, the sides of your personality at a particular time. After that, put a cross (x) mark, mentioning the level of development of these qualities, sides, you would be satisfied with or would feel proud of yourself.

The one being examined is given a form, showing seven lines, the height of each one is 100 mm, with an indication of the top, bottom and middle points of the scale. The upper and the lower points are marked by notable stripes, the middle one – by a barely visible dot.

Processing and interpretation of the results

Parameter	Quantitative characteristics (score)			
	low	average	high	Very high
The level of claims	Less than 60	60-74	75-89	90-100
The level of self-esteem	Less than 45	45-59	60-74	75-100

For revealing the important values for the child, the latter is given a list of values, without enumeration, and he/she is asked to enumerate them according to their importance.

According to Dembo-Rubinstein scale, children were asked about both their actual self-esteem and its desired level. It is assumed, that in this way the level of individual claims can be estimated. The aim of the following research is to assess the correlation between the actual and desired levels of self-esteem and on this basis to draw the conclusion concerning the usefulness of this modification of the method.

By the application of children from group A of Dembo-Rubinstein Method, it turned out, that after the experiment there was a significant increase in self-esteem of physical and mental health, decrease in health care, which means, that the child had real assessment of his/her possibilities.

There was an increase of self-esteem with regard to abilities, authorship, happiness, appearance, and self-confidence as well. It is evident from the results, that the experiment was successful and effective for the children's emotional state and self-esteem.

It was obvious, that there was a decrease in self-esteem of physical and mental health, as well as happiness of children from group B.

With the purpose of revealing the changes in value system of the same children, M. Rokeach Value Survey was applied. The children were given a list of values, and they had to enumerate the values according to their importance. It is well known, that the value system, as a complex personality structure, is less likely subject to change, though before and after the experiment, there were changes even in it.

Before reading the book and meeting peers with special needs, the children of group A gave importance to health /95%/, happy family life /44%/, wisdom /20%/, love /16 %/.

After reading the book and meeting with peers with special needs, health /97%/ and happy family life /31%/ remained as important values, but the presence of good and loyal friends was given importance to as well /26%/.

Before reading the book and meeting peers with special needs, the children of group B mentioned health /93%/, the presence of good and loyal friends /29%/, happy family life /21,4%/.

After reading and the visit, health / 98%/, the presence of good and loyal friends /36,5%/ and happy family life /18%/ remained as important values, but the children gave importance to self-confidence as well /15%/.

Conclusion

Hence, we come to the conclusion that bibliotherapy is effective, especially if meeting and interacting with children with special needs before reading the book. The supposed reasons for this fact are the following:

- When reading the book, the child imagines the one with special needs as ideal, that is why meeting the latter causes disappointment.
- When reading the book, the child identifies himself with the personage, hence after reading, the meeting gives rise to negative emotions.
- Meeting the children with special needs before reading the book gives rise to the child's emotions and empathy, though reading the book supports in caring and focusing on the individual's inner world, strengths and potential, hence the book has positive impact, and the attitude towards these children is positive as well.

As a matter of fact, effective bibliotherapy is carried out in this case.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL-PEDAGOGICAL CRITERIA FOR NEW GENERATION TEXTBOOKS

Abstract

The article dwells on the main psychological and pedagogical criteria which should lay the foundation for all the reforms in school textbooks of transformational societies in transition period. After having analyzed the criteria and aims of textbooks a manual is presented which, as the author suggests, may be valuable in directing high school students in their choice of careers.

Keywords: transformational societies, transition period, main purpose of education development, functions of a textbook, criteria of textbook evaluation, the overall psychological atlas.

The education system becomes especially vulnerable within transformational societies as it fails to meet its main mission in the maelstrom of changes (Dzhurinski, 1999; Yasvin, 2004).

The project on “The State Education Development Programme” of RA 2016-2025” states that the main aim of education development is to provide every citizen, at any stage of his/her life, with qualified education in compliance with his/her requirements, mental abilities and objectives; to meet the economic and public challenges, to serve the national interests. In the maelstrom of tasks to achieve the main goal of education development, the qualitative improvement of educational resources, such as the creation of textbooks, their correspondence to subject-based curriculum and criteria, is of the primary importance.

As has been aptly stated, a good textbook is worth schooling. It allows a child to be well educated, brought up, socialized adds up to

the acquisition of social behavioral standards, language skills, civic and moral codes (Poghosyan, 1996; Imangozhina, 2015).

As an intermediary between “live learning” and other means of knowledge acquisition, a textbook acts on part of a range of functions that are closely considered in the process of evaluating the effectiveness of a textbook. The suggested questions for such evaluation should be designed as follows: does the textbook reflect the outlined pedagogical functions; to what extent does it reflect? What characteristics of a textbook resolve most of the issues under question?

The answers to these questions enable to speak about the textbook effectiveness, the latter being the fundamental purpose of the didactic evaluation process. The main criterion for the efficiency of the textbook is the effectiveness level of application of core functions. What are these functions and what textbook characteristics conduce their implementation?

Pedagogical and psychological sources (Pogosyan, 2005; Imangozhina, 2015; Monakhov, 1997; “The issues on school textbook. XX century. Reviews,” 1996) most often single out the following functions of a textbook: informational, transformational, research, self-educational, coordinating, and self-control - research and self-educational functions being of high interest, the preferable development of which coincides with the overall tendencies of modern didactics. Along with the abovementioned functions, the motivational and training functions are also strongly advised.

The overall application of informational function is to convey factual materials in textbooks. Unlike all other means, the provided information here is given in a logical, subject-based and psychological manner defined by the state educational standards.

The transformational function does not only orient a student in the cognition of the reality but also in its alterations. This function closely relates to the training function, the latter aimed at developing practical abilities and skills among students and at the same time closely connected with the research function the latter being introduced either in the form of description of methods and directions, or in the form of assignments and questions for a student’s autonomous activity. The research function presupposes the implementation of research-related activities that are easily handled by students as a result of which students acquire basic methodological knowledge of each subject.

The self-educational function is aimed at creating the conditions for students to independently use different sources of information. Thus, textbooks should promote new

sources of information, a positive attitude to learning. Such an approach can be achieved through an attractive delivery of materials which, in their turn, would lead to the acquisition of skills for mental work.

The motivational function is responsible for emotional and inspiring background of students which is, in the first run, should be implemented via a positive attitude to the subject matter.

The following observation is to illustrate the importance of the given function. History teachers in schools typically focus on the development of verbal-logical skills embracing one side of the mental activity, thus very often neglecting not less important imaginary component. Thus the study of history through verbal means becomes formality with no illustrations behind the facts. Historical concepts and laws of social evolution which lack adequate and clear images do not communicate lively and precise contents to students, while the latter with imaginary background find it difficult to comprehend the historical notions and definitions. As a result, the delivered material is explicit and comprehensive for only one group of students, while the other part should struggle to understand it.

In our view, the perception and cognition of historical material should be based on emotional experiences which, in its turn, may contribute to the formation of students’ personal attitudes. The emotional background of a person is known to play an essential role in one’s life; thus, the outlines of history lessons should take an emotional moment, a unique psychological phenomenon, into account. This task could be achieved through the representations of historical figures with their true personality traits, positive and negative

sides of character, the true reasons for their achievements and failures. Any state policy is aimed at emphasizing the most glorious events of their historical timeline in history books consciously leaving out the defeats and failures. This is not surprising since textbooks are called to nurture the spirit of patriotism among students. However, we strongly believe that such an approach, is deficient by nature and the concealment of true reasons for historical failures may lead to biased interpretations of historical events and false perceptions about uniqueness of one's nation. Last but not least, the fair interpretation and analysis of unsuccessful pages of history may be more educational and beneficial than those of success and glory.

The remaining functions are linked to the coordinating function. The textbook should provide the development of an attitude to knowledge system as a means of source of self-education. Broadly speaking, the control of knowledge system presupposes the formation of the developing system of self-control and self-estimation, mutual control and mutual estimation.

Would it be expected for one textbook to meet all the functions and be evaluated from that perspective? The answer is not definite considering a big variety of textbooks. According to Okoni's classification, the books fall into the following categories: universal, systematized, practice and curriculum-based textbooks each having their unique characteristics. While a universal textbook is the only example of the combination of all functions, the others are not necessarily to include all the functions. Thus, the textbook may only exemplify informational and research functions or a group of other functions depending on a

particular school's requirements and an author's conceptions related to those requirements.

Apart from being methodically approved in classroom, the application of textbook functions largely depends on other factors such as theoretical, methodical, linguistic, economic and publishing.

Theory and practice are largely the main groups to rely on when investigating textbook effectiveness. These two are closely interrelated; however, while theory can only be evaluated from a certain range of characteristics, the assessment of textbook effectiveness is fully found in its practical usage in schools.

As has been earlier mentioned the core functions are underlying in the didactic criteria of textbook evaluation. The question is whether a textbook contains all the characteristics required to meet the mentioned functions. This concept needs to be thoroughly analyzed and the primary question to answer is to identify the characteristics of a textbook which are linked to the implementation of some functions.

To illustrate this, a number of characteristics needed for a textbook to implement the informational functions are given below:

1. Textbook content

- Alignment with the content of modern scientific knowledge
- Classification in subject-based, logical and psychological outline (as required by a subject structure)
- Conformity with the curriculum aims of the curriculum guide
- Consolidation of names and accuracy of terms
- Conformity with terms and names in textbooks of interdisciplinary subjects

- Variety of information delivery (a word, picture, photo, graphics, etc.)
2. Structure of textbook
- A clear organization of structure; identicalness of units (for example, texts, exercises, tests, summaries, etc.)
 - Implementation of core principles of mental models in the structure of textbooks (Contents at the beginning of textbooks; inclusion of subject-related terms, appendices, etc.)
3. Methodical design of content
- Conformity with modern didactic requirements in the field of language (comprehensibility, accurate structure, flexibility)
 - Conformity with the methodical requirements of the subject matter
 - Variety of examples reflecting an author's conceptions
 - Inclusion of studied references and students' experiences
 - Variety of core assignments and tasks
 - Separation of educational materials according to levels of complexity
 - Management of speculative skills in problem-solving activities
4. Design and publishing
- Ease use of a textbook
 - Objectivity, esthetics and awareness in the choice of a layout (a durable, hygienic; attractive binding that reflects the content of a textbook)
 - Paper standards (a high-quality paper with an appropriate color and shade)
 - A wide range of illustrations (pictures, photos, drawings, graphics)
 - Inclusion of knowledge-based illustrations appropriate to the content and

user level

- Accuracy and briefness of inscriptions to illustrations, their appropriateness in style and form to functions and nature
- Appropriate accentuation (for example, main notions, provisions, etc.)
- Consistency of margins with the inclusion of core notions and images
- Appropriate volume of reading
- Accurate emphasis of an author's name and last name, as well as that of an illustrator, reviewer and editor.

A similar list of criteria can be drawn for all forms of functions. However, as has been mentioned earlier, the effectiveness of a textbook can only be evaluated in comparison of theory with its practical application in schools.

After analyzing the abovementioned functions and criteria an attempt was made to come up with a manual that could, as we may envision, also be applicable for counseling high school students in their choice of careers. Entitled as *Designed in a demonstrative-figurative style* "The overall psychological atlas" (Pogosyan & Pogosyan, 2012) is unique in its methodical approach which allows to facilitate students' studies of the "General Psychology" subject. The simple and easily comprehensible graphs of the manual illustrate a full picture of core psychological principles, main concepts and methods; the main psychic processes, descriptions of states as well as psychological personality traits. The manual enables to apply modern approaches to the processes of delivery, teaching and revision, testing and control. Considering the shortcomings of graphs given alone, each topic is accompanied with an in-

troductory text. The manual “The overall psychological atlas” has been in use for almost three years and thus has proven to be practically effective. To control and self-control the knowledge of psychology “An overall psychological questionnaire” is suggested (Poghosyan & Poghosyan, 2012). It consists of two parts, the first designed by the authors themselves, the second referring to the well-established research materials in the field of psychology, which have been re-published for several times and the authors of which are rightly the most outstanding in the field.

The article has related to the main psychological and pedagogical requirements for changes of textbooks to be considered for transformational societies in a transition period. The other requirements for educational means will be discussed in upcoming publications.

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CHAIR OF YOUNG SCIENTIST

THE METHODOICAL PRINCIPLES OF CHILD'S SPEECH DEVELOPMENT CURRICULUM

Abstract

In the article child's speech development process is observed, which, on the one hand, assumes the accounting of not only didactic, but also methodological principles, which let the preschool pedagogue choose appropriate means for speech development. On the other hand, the basis of the organization of speech development process is the preschool educational curriculum, where the volume of speech abilities and skills, the demands for different aged-groups are defined. But child's speech development peculiarities and regularities should be taken into consideration, when the choice of self-realization and self-organization methods, ways and means of child's speech becomes urgent.

Keywords: speech development, speech abilities and skills, preschool speech development curriculum.

The human society is continually developing, social life, being in movement, is always submitted changes and, as a result of this, new problems and demands are aroused - full of contrasts. The solutions of these problems bring development in social life. It's known, that human being intends not to adapt to new conditions, but to perceive suggested problems and find solutions for them.

Our society has social-communicative progress. All the sciences are developing, too. The society - education, science - education - society relationships are improving. And a discrepancy, among these spheres' demands, is aroused. An abrupt and rapid growth of necessary knowledge for a human occurs. It becomes important to orient quickly, communicate rightly, organize own actions properly in the created situation. The

mechanically perception of the amounts of dates becomes unnecessary any more: the consciously and comprehensibly acquisition of knowledge becomes a must, which means to find solutions via new ways and methods.

All the changes mentioned above, have their direct influences on educational system. Proceeded from nowadays' problems, the demands for younger generation's breeding, teaching and educational processes are being changed. It becomes important to improve educational contents, teaching ways and methods. Pedagogue – psychologists have to seek and systematize new teaching methods, by using which it will be possible to develop children's cognitive activity, creative process and be able to follow sciences' developing motion. A necessity of educating, forming and developing new generation as self- think-

ing people, who will be able to enrich knowledge, express their thoughts literately and speak coherently, logically and meaningfully, becomes a must.

From this, two urgent objectives are aroused:

1. to seek new effective developing ways and means for children's breeding process,
2. to review preschooler's speech development methodology making it as a means of solving recurrently problems, which occur during the communication.

These two urgent and mutually connected objectives should have their reflections in the modern educational curriculums, which are the cornerstone of realizing education.

It is known that each human activity is realized successfully, if it has a properly organized curriculum, where every step is carefully worked out, if the means, ways of carrying out of a certain activity are represented ("Preschool Curriculum Framework," 2010, p. 30). In order to realize preschooler's speech developmental process, it is necessary to have a systematized, compact curriculum, which will promote the organization of child's speech development process. Of course, we mean the speech development section of the curriculum for senior preschoolers aged of 5 – 6.

There are some educational complex curriculums in our preschool establishments: 'Preschool educational breeding complex curriculum', 'Kindergarten' preschool educational curriculum', 'Educational complex curriculum for senior group in kindergarten'. The demands for child's speech development are reflected in these curriculums, where each objective of speech development is rep-

resented. Of course, these curriculums somehow lead preschool teachers to organize senior preschoolers' speech development process, but we find that these curriculums need to be reviewed and recompleted, because the peculiarities of forming preschooler's speech abilities and language capacities haven't been taken into consideration. Especially the following factors aren't systematized in the curriculum:

- the linguistic-psychological points of departure of child's speech development, which can be bent by nowadays' demands,
- the main principals of organizing speech development process, rules, proceeded from them, nowadays' demands,
- senior preschooler's speech manifestations – criteria, the analyze of which can promote the perfection of speech development methodology,
- the methodical peculiarities for the lessons of speech development.

From the lack of the factors, mentioned above, the organization of child's speech development process suffers.

There are a lot of theories for child's speech development suggested by pedagogues (Yan Am. Komensky, who connected the peculiarities of child's development with the speech process, Ye. Tikheyeva, who connected speech development with child's activity and social environment), psychologisys (A. Leontev, L. Vigotsky, who emphasized social nature of speech), linguists (Noam Chomsky, who gave emphasized the role of transformational grammar, due to which children can make a lot of sentences (Peter, 1986, pp. 282-284), pedagogue-methodists (F. Sokhin, who mentioned that senior pre-

schoolers are able to conscious language units), Armenian pedagogues Kh. Abovyan, Gh. Aghayan, A. Bahatryan, G. Edilyan, who attached importance to the organization of child's speech development process.

Accepting the approaches above, we consider, that during the organization of child's speech development process we should emphasize the combination of inner and outer sides of speech. We find that, in order to achieve success in child's speech development process, we should take into consideration this factor, and the methodology of speech development must derive from this point of view, when the analyze of child's speech manifestations will allow to reveal the inner organization of child's speech and find appropriate methods, means and ways to increase the efficiency of speech development process. Children at preschool age, particularly senior preschoolers /5–6 - year - old/, can control their outer speech through inner speech. And we suppose, that at senior preschool age developed speech standard is inwardly controlled speech. Senior preschooler is able not only to control his/her lexicon, coherent speech but also grammatical and phonetic structures of the speech. But this occurs only during communication with peers, especially when children try to explain the rules of a game to their players. As a result, senior preschooler master and estimate own speech, control language material internally and becomes a master and possessor of language system.

Methodological basis of speech development is the material-philosophical approach, according which language is a result of social-historical development, in its nation's culture, traditions, social relationships

are reflected (Alekseeva & Yashina, 2000, pp. 7-10). Language is an important means of communication and social mutual activity among people, and is connected with thinking. This philosophical approach reveals the meaning of the perception of language as a difficult human activity, during which knowledge is acquired, abilities are formed. Language, speech are aroused during human activity, and language, as a result of the activity, reflects contents, conditions and results of the activity. From this, an important principal of methodology arouses: perception of language units, formation of speech abilities and communicational skills among children occur during the activity, and the motive is the demand for communication. During communication child perceives speech actively. Though language and speech are united, they are not the same. There is a great difference between language and speech. Language has been aroused during social-historical development, about which we have already mentioned above. Language is the form of the expression of peoples' consciousness, whereas speech is the form of the expression of a person's consciousness. Speech belongs to a person. Language is a means of communication, speech is the process of communication. Speech is the usage of language. In our speech we use the units of language, make expressions, sentences, texts, we express our thoughts with the help of language units in our speech.

The next methodical nature of language is reflected in its connection with thinking. Language is the implement of thinking and cognition. From this, during speech teaching the methods will be productive, if they pro-

mote both speech and thinking development (Clark, 1984, pp. 28-32).

From this, five major properties of all human languages are distinguished. The first property is that language use is creative. Language is merely a complicated habit, a set of acts by ear and mouth that have been acquired by memorization and practice. On this view, the explanation of talking is simple: each of the memorized speech acts is simply performed whenever the appropriate circumstances arise. The next property of language is that language is highly structured, which means that sentences are made in lawful, not accidental way. We construct our sentences in accordance with certain general principles which are often called rules of grammar. The third property is that language is meaningful. Each word in a language expresses a meaningful idea, about something, action, abstraction, relation, quality and so on. The purpose of language is to express all these meanings. The next property is that language is referential, that is, it refers to and describes things and events in the real world. Language users know more than how to put words together into sentences. They also know which words refer to which things, events and scenes in the world. The problem of reference is a complicated one: we refer not to what we see in the world. Rather, we refer to whatever it is in the world that we think about. The fifth property of language is that it is interpersonal, involving the thoughts of more than one person at a time. The primary uses of language are in functions that cross from one individual to another. To accomplish these social ends, speakers must know not only a language, but rules for using language appro-

priately in successful communication (Gleitman, 1983, pp. 226-232).

Language is organized as a hierarchy of structure. At the bottom of the hierarchy, language consists of little snippets of sound, and at the other end, of sentences and conversations. From this, we'd like to introduce the components of language:

- phonology involves the rules about the structure and sequence of speech sounds,
- semantics consists of vocabulary and how concepts are expressed through words,
- grammar involves two parts. The first, syntax, is the rules in which words are arranged into sentences. The second, morphology, is the use of grammatical markers (indicating tense, active or passive voice etc.),
- pragmatics involves the rules for appropriate and effective communication.

The latter side of language involves other three sides, and we are sure that especially this side should be formed at preschool age.

The philosophical perception of language methodology, mentioned above, should be the basis of speech development curriculum. This approach allows us to define the following principles for the organization of speech development process:

- the principle of mutual connection among sensuous, mental and speech development of children. This principle is closely connected with the acknowledgement of surrounding. The perception of language material occurs through deciding mental tasks. This means that preschool pedagogy should use visual aids, means and methods of teaching directed to child's cognitive development.

- The principle of communication-activity approach to the speech development, according to which, speech is observed as an activity, where language is used for the aim of communication. This principle allows kindergarten teacher to use such materials which will promote the formation of children's communicative abilities. This principle changes teaching methods, where the formation of child's speech manifestations becomes initial.
- The principle of language sensitivity, when the child perceives the rules of language unconsciously. Preschoolers are able to combine language units correctly, though they don't realize these rules. Pedagogues should seek for such methods, which will let develop children's language sensitivity. This can be developed through word games.
- The principle of forming child's elementary understanding of language phenomena. The basis of this principle is that children not only imitate adults' speech, but they unconsciously generalize language phenomenon as well. It forms an inner system of language rules, which allow the child to create new expressions. During the teaching process kindergarten teacher should use methods directed to the development of child's awareness of language phenomena (F.A. Sokhin). Language awareness is an indicator of the degree of the formation of speech skills.
- The principle of complete approach toward teaching of different sides of speech. It's known that speech development process solves different objectives of speech: mastering vocabulary, pronunciation skills, grammatical structure, development

of dialogue and monologue speech. These parts of speech are isolated for didactic purpose, but they are interrelated parts of a whole – the process of mastering language system: during the development of one side, others develop too. But the aim of kindergarten teacher should be the formation and development of children's coherent speech manifestations, where all the parts of speech are expressed.

- The principle of enrichment of motivations of speech activity. Enrichment of motives of children's speech activity during learning process is very important, because positive motivation of speech increases the effectiveness of teaching. During speech development lessons pedagogue offers children to answer questions, retell stories, repeat something, but it is not taken into consideration, whether the child need to do so. Hence, an important task for pedagogue is the creation of positive motivation for every action of the child in the learning process, as well as the organization of situations that cause the need for communication. The usage of a variety of interesting techniques for the child is very important, which will stimulate their verbal activity and contribute to the development of speech creative abilities
- The principle of active speech practice. The essence of this principle is that language is learned through its usage, in practice. Reuse of language units in changing environments allows to develop a strong and flexible language skills. Speech activity is not only speaking, it is also listening, the perception of speech. Therefore, it is important to teach children to

perceive and understand others' speech. Thus, during lessons it is important to use variety of factors providing speech activity for all children, positive emotional background, communication among children. The usage of this principle provides wide practice of language use for all the children, not only during the lessons, but during other activities as well (Alekseeva & Yashina, 2000, pp. 48-50)

So, language acquisition by children occurs during communication, which allows to perceive language structure and use it in the speech. This means that we can't teach children language via traditional lessons, which are sometimes dull for preschoolers. And the principles, mentioned above, provide communicative environment for children in kindergartens. The realization of this principles make kindergarten teachers use interactive methods and ways during language teaching. Hence, the preschool educational curriculums, which are used in our preschool establishments should be worked out according to these principles mentioned above. The analyses of those curriculums has proved, that, though they express some demands for senior preschooler's speech development, they are not systematized and defined, moreover, they don't help kindergarten teachers in the choice of methods, ways and means. All these principles derives from the peculiarities of children's speech development. This means,

that during speech development process all the chosen methods and ways should be bent through the characteristics of child's development. These principles allow kindergarten teachers to organize speech development process from the children's speech specificities. Children's speech developmental peculiarities dictate adults to choose appropriate methods and ways for organizing their speech development process. It's without saying that children with well-developed oral language are likely to succeed in reading and writing comprehension in later grade levels than children with less well-developed oral language.

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THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF ELECTORAL PROCESS OF ARMENIA
IN THE CONTEXT OF CURRENT CHANGES IN THE ELECTORAL CODE

Abstract

A constitutional referendum was held in Armenia on 6 December 2015. The amendments to the constitution changed the country from having a semi-presidential system to a parliamentary republic, with the changes planned to take place during the 2017–18 electoral cycle. The results of the referendum determine not only the current changes in the electoral code, but also the necessity and effectiveness of the new electoral system.

Particularly, by replacing the majoritarian system to the proportional system and by increasing the representativeness of the parliament for some groups, we can create basis for the further development of the country. Above all in the article we discussed the main factors that have a big impact on the voting behavior of the citizens.

Keywords: elections, electoral system, voter turnout, political network, clientelism, vote-buying, political support.

Introduction

After the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 lots of countries which were under the communist rule started the movements towards democracy: Armenia wasn't the exception. On September 21 Armenia declared independence and started building new democratic country after being under the Soviet dominance for seventy years.

Obviously, one of the key elements for the politics of new independent state is the good structure of the electoral system and the strong party competition. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the electoral processes in Armenia since 1991 to contemporary time, to identify the structure of electoral system and to make the comparative analyze of the

elections and their outcomes. The attention will be paid to the basic trends of electoral system reforms in the country. This work will include the main examples of Armenian elections since the independence till now and the main results will be analyzed in terms to find the negative and positive outcomes which force the states to change electoral system. This study of elections and current changes of electoral code can help us not only to find out their prospective effects on society and politics, but also to understand what challenges bring the necessity of the changes. The article will be divided in several parts starting with the theoretical part of the issue, and with the explanation of the very first independent elections and simultaneously the comparative analysis will be made with the latest elections

to identify the reforms and development achieved since 1991.

Threads of political networks, clientelism and vote-buying in elections

The study of social networks has grown noticeably across the social and natural sciences over the past years. Both in political and social sciences articles and researches on networks were very few, but recently network theory, data and methodology are in use and very popular within researchers. Network studies cover the part of political science, that explores the effects of individuals, institutions, groups and policies through both formal and informal interaction¹.

Whereas the term of “network” for a long time has been considered in political science as a way of thinking about systems of power, influence, and communication, but nowadays it becomes a formal model of political behavior. There are several factors which determine such great attention on this issue. First of all, current studies give interesting explanations of the concepts of social capital, sexual contacts, small worlds, power laws, and business success. Secondly, the social network analysis becomes somewhat more accessible due to modern computer tools.

Third, the appearance of on-line social networks attracted the attention to networks by mass media and citizens across the world. Finally, the new innovations span through formal and informal networks, which determine such huge attention on it. Gradually a number of people are involved in this topic in order to see the applicability of social net-

works in their daily, professional, personal and political lives.

In the recent years the analysis of political and social networks becomes a basic field in the social sciences. It maintains close association with the disciplines of sociology, social psychology, political sciences, history, anthropology, even with physics. Furthermore now the network studies tend to have their own area of social experience to analyze, their own theoretical and methodological development, in some cases they have even their own conceptual schemes to formulate and test the gathered information for truth.

Indeed, recent developments show that the interest in the original literature, with studies conducted on different community samples to investigate the effect of peer networks on vote choice, social communication, expertise, and disagreement, has increased. It is then significant to know something about the structure of the social network if peer-to-peer communication affects political choices.

Taking this into consideration, we give particular attention to the fields in which social network analysis and political science are connected. Whilst some of the initial examples of empirical political science were influenced by the necessity to consider human interaction and interdependence, only recently the study of political networks was included in the mainstream political science. The concern of the gap between political science and social network analysis is that there are a lot of thrilling opportunities to reconceptualize and reanalyze the discipline with new dispositions. In addition there are essential gaps in the concepts and tools used by social network analysis that could benefit from the insight of political science, particularly in thinking abo-

¹ See: <http://www.polinetworks.org/>

ut the meaning and consequences of power (Fowler, Heaney, Nickerson, Padgett, & Sinclair, 2011). Yet, the investigation of social networks helps to explain why a great deal of political exchange involves neighborhood, associations and goods as a substitute to individual-level material benefits. Indeed local political brokers control the public goods. Basically the access to these local public goods plays a crucial role in political exchange, both in motivating members of neighborhood social networks to monitor each other and in ensuring that slum-level electoral support is sufficiently strong to warrant access to neighborhood-level benefits. On this terms, residents in localities have incentives to coordinate as a group and support the same candidate so that their community will be rewarded with local public goods (Rojo, Jha & Wibbels, "Political Networks, Clientelism and Public Goods"). At the same time politicians, be an incumbent government or the opposition, wish to offer policies to groups of citizens in exchange for political support. Since the law cannot be used to compel such political exchanges, they must be self-enforcing. As has been said, citizens must indeed give their support, and politicians, once in power, must pay for the support with the policies that they promised. The politicians in order to ensure that they have the support of a group of citizens, must be able to use polices that connect the extension utility of a voter to their political success, or in their preference, if the behavior of voters is observable, let them to be punished if they deny on the exchange. On the other hand, for citizens to ensure that politicians honor their promises, the policies must be rational for the politicians to implement after elections. Overall this formulation of

redistributive politics is well known as "patronage" or, more broadly, "clientelism" in anthropology and political science. Thereby the clientelism is a political exchange, when a politician (a "patron") gives patronage in exchange for the vote or support of a "client". As Weingrod articulated, "patronage refers to the way in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special favors in exchange for electoral support". If this occurs, then it can be detected that somehow the social network of individuals whose behavior politicians can observe somewhat well will determine who politicians can credibly exchange with, seemingly because they have social interactions with these individuals. Then, Turner and Young add that the "formation of a patron-client relationship is based not only on reciprocal advantage, but on some principle of affinity which supplies a social logic to the network. Kinship and ethnic affinity are the most frequent bases for network formation." Obviously, Clientelism thereafter becomes significant in countries with poor technology and high inequality. In case of low income levels of citizens, the political loyalty of clients becomes cheaper for buying with job offers, and this brings about such condition, when clientelistic redistribution is more appealing as a way of receiving support. This model can be successfully applied for the situation, when total productivity is low, or for given productivity and average income level becomes insufficient, when inequality increases. Therefore, poverty not only causes, but also is caused by clientelism. Whether there is clientelism, different factors have an impact on the size of inefficiency (Robinson, 2013).

In the present, there are small attempts to

formulate a body of formal literature for providing the models of clientelism. One of the first authors, whose works concern these issues is Susan C. Stokes. Stokes has pointed the problem of liability of secret ballot, when voters probably can't guarantee to vote in the way they agree to in a clientelistic exchange. She tries to figure out the ways when patrons may use punishment strategies to force the voters to keep their promises and stop clients reneging on promises. Actually, vote buying let politicians and governments to ignore the interests of poor people, and in the same way it can be disruptive for the autonomy of vote sellers. Likewise, if a party wants to win enough votes to get elected at the lowest possible cost, it would start by giving the poorest person some benefits, then go on to the next one, and so on until the party has obtained just as much votes, as needed to win. The informal policy of these relations is that vote buying starts at the bottom, not the top of the income distribution. In fact the party has to increase the income distribution and each next voter's support has to be obtained at a higher price.

Hence for the long perspectives of political parties vote buying and programmatic mobilization have a lot of obstacles inasmuch they are not certain things. Moreover, the parties that give public goods and believe that they will have electoral support are acting based on their trust. In some cases when people decide to vote according to a strict calculation of costs and benefits, programmatic mobilization becomes a feeble strategy, taking into account the fact that a person's vote never change the outcome of the election and even he/she calculates the benefits of party's program whether or not he voted for it.

In general, vote buying tends to be even more uncertain offer. Meanwhile, when we speak about secret ballot, vote sellers can accept the payments and vote as they want. But then, we should find out how vote buying works. Some authors argue (Brusco, Nazarenko & Stokes, 2004) that certain kinds of parties, especially clientelist parties, can get over the secret ballot and make clear conclusions about whether people whom they "paid" actually voted for them. Indeed we can observe the structural features of clientelist parties. This kind of parties are bottom-heavy and relies on a group of local-level organizers, who live in the neighborhoods under their political responsibility, know everyone's name, know who went to the polls and who didn't, and know who was able to look them in the eye the day after the election.

The main feature of vote buying is its more finegrained targeting of benefits to similar voters. On the contrary, programmatic mobilization has capacity to reach large varieties of the electorate. Thus vote buying has advantages of correctness and leverage, but programmatic mobilization has advantages of scope. Consequently, we can find many political systems with a mix of vote buying and programmatic appeals. They also use other methods of political mobilization such as ideological, charismatic, identity-based, etc.

The main expenses of vote buying are in supporting a network of party organizers, because these people can help to reveal who has failed the deal and defected, and the costs of the items actually used to buy the vote: be the cash, the food and drink, the building materials, the articles of clothing, and so on. The expenses of the programmatic strategy are those of communicating programmatic ap-

peals to voters: maintaining a party press, advertising, etc. Programmatic parties ought to communicate not only when they are in the opposition and want to win office, but also when they are incumbents and want to retain office. In the first case they have to inform voters about the programs they will provide if elected; in the second, they have to advertise through the programs further achievements of their tenure.

In general, party organization may play a special role in the relative advantages between vote buying and programmatic strategies. For this reason the main criterion of party organization can be the degree of centralization. In this order, the decentralized parties support personalized candidacies, which link to clientelist appeals. Likewise, decentralized, machine-like party organizations also have a higher capacity to efficiently provide goods in exchange for votes. Highly decentralized party organizations are crucial for vote buying because they are able to monitor voters and punish defectors. Overall, these organizational costs usually are higher in wealthy countries than in poor ones, based on the resources that parties have, and that's why vote buying is mainly a phenomenon of the developing world. We can also observe that the party agents, who make vote buying work, are relatively skilled people who, ultimately, find more well-paid outlets for their skills and whose work depends on country development. Once a party has ingratiated itself into local social networks, there is a definite stability to its presence in a community. Meanwhile for the party that hasn't made such investments, the costs of vote buying will be higher.

At the first glance we can conclude that the main cost for programmatic parties becomes mass communications. When the costs of broadcasting one's program is low, it's more attractive to use vote buying strategy. Currently, when higher education becomes more widespread and reachable in developing countries, the capacity of knowledge-costs decreases. In fact what parties buy is not votes but expected votes. The more becomes uncertainty, the more they tend to buy votes, consequently, both strategies can work. If a given price in a program increased the probability less of landing the vote, the effective cost of the vote per head would be higher than under vote buying. So we can assume that uncertainty of results can raise average price per vote of programmatic mobilization.

Yet we should take into consideration that the impact of constituency size on the relative costs and effectiveness of vote buying and programmatic mobilization might not be confused. On the whole, parties can control votes more easily in small communities than in large ones, because social relations in small communities are many-sided. This kind of social relations allows party operatives to know who went to the polls and who didn't.

Meanwhile, the technological features ensuring the transparency of the vote influence the effectiveness of vote buying. There are many ways to detect the votes: people can have the ballot but be forced to vote on an open table, within the range of vision of party operatives or ballots can be observable by color or by the weight of the paper; and numeric codes can allow a ballot to be identified with those individuals who cast it.

In conclusion, there are two central ideas

in this theory. Initially the vote buying is more working strategy among voters who strongly decry programmatic promises. Their life-conditions make them prefer a less valuable reward now over a more valuable reward later. Similarly, if a voter hesitates that the future reward will materialize, he/she will prefer certain and instant payoff. Secondly, poor people used to take high discount rates and to be ambiguous about future promised benefits (Stokes, “Is Vote Buying Undemocratic?”).

The political situation and Historical background of elections in Armenia

Since achieving independence, Armenia has held six presidential (1991, 1996, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013) and five parliamentary elections (1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2012). The president is elected for a five-year term. The **National Assembly** (*Azgayin Zhoghov*) has 131 members, elected for a four-year term, 41 members in single-seat constituencies and 90 by proportional representation. The seats envisaged for the National Assembly by proportional representation are distributed among those party lists, which have received at least 5% of the total of the number of the votes. Armenia has a multi-party system, with numerous parties in which no one party often has a chance of gaining power alone, and parties must work with each other to form coalition governments.²

The 150 members of the unicameral parliament are elected through a mixed system: 73 by two-round system in single-member constituency with majority rule and 77 by

proportional representation in a single nationwide constituency with an electoral threshold of 5 %.

Presidential elections were held for the first time in Armenia on 17 October 1991. The result was a victory for Levon Ter-Petrosian, who won 83% of the vote. Turnout was 70%. On 22 September 1996 Levon Ter-Petrosian was re-elected (51.3% of the vote, turnout was 60.3%). Meanwhile both Ter-Petrosyan and incumbent V. Manukyan claimed victory. Official results by the Central Electoral Commission recorded Ter-Petrosyan's victory in the first round with just above 50% of the total vote in favor of the incumbent. Oppositional leader Vazgen Manukyan officially received 41% of the vote and denouncing them started mass demonstrations in the afternoon of 23 September claiming electoral fraud by Ter-Petrosyan's supporters. An estimated of 200,000 people gathered in Freedom Square to protest the election results.

On February 3 in 1998, the President of the republic Levon Ter-Petrosyan had to resign and hand over the power after agreeing to a plan to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which his ministers, including the Prime Minister R. Kocharyan, had refused to accept. The resignation of Levon Ter-Petrosyan was followed by the resignations of the NA President, Vice-Presidents, Ministers and other officials. Thus, the power was passed on to the people who govern the country today. On 16 March 1998, with a second round on 30 March, Robert Kocharyan was elected President of the Republic of Armenia in early presidential elections. He won 58.9% of the vote in the second round (turnout was 63.5% in the first round and 68.1% in the se-

² See: <http://www.elections.am/>

cond). Prime Minister and acting President Robert Kocharyan and Karen Demirchyan, the leader of Soviet Armenia from 1974 to 1988, won the most number of votes: 38.5% and 30.5% respectively.

Following presidential election took place in Armenia on 19 February and 5 March 2003. No candidate received a majority in the first round of the election with the incumbent President Robert Kocharyan winning slightly under 50% of the vote. Therefore, a second round was held and Kocharyan defeated Stepan Demirchyan with official results showed him winning just over 67% of the vote. However both the opposition and international observers said that the election had seen significant amounts of electoral fraud and the opposition did not recognize the results of the election.

Thereafter, the election held on 19 February 2008, resulted in Prime Minister of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan winning outright with 52.8 percent of the vote, and Ter-Petrossian gaining 21.5 percent according to official results, but this was disputed by former President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who officially placed second. Final results, released by the Central Electoral Commission on February 24, confirmed Sargysan's victory, crediting him with 52.82% of the vote (862,369 votes), Ter-Petrosyan received 21.5% (351,222 votes) and Baghdasarian was said to have won 17.7% (272,427 votes).

Finally, on 18 February 2013 the Armenian citizens participated in presidential election for the sixth and last time. At the end of the election, incumbent Serzh Sargsyan was re-elected with 58.64% of the vote and Raffi Hovhannisyan received 36.74% of vote. Each

of the other candidates received less the 2.2% of the vote.

Parliamentary elections to the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia of the first convocation were held on 5 July 1995, with a second round on 29 July. There were 150 constituency seats and 40 elected on a national basis using proportional representation. The result was a victory for the Republican Bloc (an alliance of the Pan-Armenian National Movement, Democratic Liberal Party, Christian Democratic Union and the Republican Party), which won 88 of the 190 seats. Overall voter turnout was 54.3%. The Republican Bloc parties ran separately in the constituency elections, with Pan-Armenian National Movement winning 62 seats, the Democratic Liberal Party winning 4, the Christian Democratic Union winning one and the Republican Party also winning one.

On May 30, 1999, the elections (131 Parliament Members: 75 majoritarian and 56 proportional electoral systems) of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia of the second convocation were held. The result was a victory for the Unity Bloc, which won 62 of the 131 seats. Overall voter turnout was 51.7%.

The Unity Bloc was an alliance of the People's Party and the Republican Party of Armenia. According to the results of the elections, six parties and an alliance overcame the barrier of the 5 % minimum vote requirement rule, as defined by the law. From the 129 Parliament Members, 76 were partisan and 53 nonpartisan (not belonging to any party).

After the crime of October 27, 1999, by the decree of the President of the Republic of Armenia, at the extraordinary sitting of the National Assembly convened on November 2,

1999, a new governing body of the National Assembly was elected. Mr. Armen Khachaturyan was elected President of the National Assembly, and Mr. Tigran Torosyan and Mr. Gagik Aslanyan were elected Vice Presidents of the National Assembly.

In the elections of the third convocation of the National Assembly held on May 30, 2003, were 56 constituency seats and 75 elected on a national basis using proportional representation. (131 Parliament Members: 75 proportional and 56 majoritarian electoral system). However, the elections were strongly criticized by international election monitors, who cited widespread fraud and noted that they fell short of democratic standards.

Elections of the fourth convocation held in Armenia on 12 May 2007 (131 Parliament Members: 90 proportional and 41 majoritarian electoral system). 1,364 candidates ran for the 131 seats, 41 of which were constituency seats with the remaining 90 being filled by a proportional party-list system. Five parliamentary factions were established in the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia of the fourth convocation: "Republican Party of Armenia" (64), "Prosperous Armenia" (25), "Armenian Revolutionary Federation" (16), "Rule of Law" (8), and "Heritage" (7). These factions were established on June 7, 2007. Eleven Parliament Members were not included in those factions. On August 26, 2007 and on August 24, 2008, by majoritarian electoral system, additional elections were held.

And the last parliamentary elections of the fifth convocation were held on May 6, 2012 (131 Parliament Members: 90 proportional and 41 majoritarian electoral system). President Serzh Sargsyan's ruling Republican

Party gained more majority of the parliament seats. Six parliamentary factions were established in the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia of the fifth convocation: "Republican Party of Armenia" faction (69), "Prosperous Armenia" faction (37), "Armenian National Congress" faction (7), "Rule of Law" faction (6), "Armenian Revolutionary Federation" faction (5), and "Heritage" faction (5). 2 deputies were not included in those factions. By the decree of the President of the Republic of Armenia, on April 13, 2014 Mr. Hovik Abrahamyan was appointed Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia. Mr. Galust Sahakyan was appointed President of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia on April 29, 2014.³

A **constitutional referendum** was held in Armenia on 6 December 2015. The proposed amendments to the constitution would change the country from having a semi-presidential system to being a parliamentary republic, with the changes planned to take place during the 2017–18 electoral cycle. The referendum passed with 66.2% of voters supporting it. Voter turnout was 50.8%, passing the 33% threshold to validate the results.⁴

The new constitution of RA was adopted in July 1995 and revised in November 2005 and 2015. Constitutional reforms to change the system of government from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary system were approved in a referendum in December 2015 and are set to enter force at the end of the president's term in 2018.⁵

³ See: <http://www.parliament.am/parliament.php?id=parliament&lang=eng>

⁴ See: <http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/politics/view/35046>

⁵ See: <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/>

Under the amendments, Armenian National Assembly is going to consist of at least 101 deputies, instead of 131 deputies, of whom 41 are elected from single-member districts and 90 by party list. Next legislative election will take place in May 2017. The president would be head of state, embodying national unity and ensuring the observance of the Constitution. They cannot be a member of a political party. Under the proposed changes the president is to appoint a candidate for prime minister of the party of party bloc that wins parliamentary elections. If parliamentary forces are unable to agree on the candidacy of the head of government, parliament is to be dissolved. A vote of no-confidence in the prime minister can be passed no sooner than a year after their appointment. Moreover, according to electoral law, seats for ethnic minorities will be allocated.

The NA shall be elected for a five-year term in proportional only elections and President will be elected by the National Assembly for a single seven-year term. The Electoral Code shall guarantee the formation of a stable parliamentary majority. If during the first round a clear majority for a political party and stable parliamentary majority is not formed as a result of the election or by building a political coalition, then a second round of the election may be held. In case a second round is held, it shall be allowed to form new alliances. Only two parties, which would receive the most votes in the first round, would then take part in the runoff. The parties which participate in the second round of the voting are obliged to propose a candidate for Prime Min-

ister and fundamentals for government's program. Furthermore, under the amendments, the NA may adopt a law on amnesty by majority vote of the total number of parliamentarians.

The constitutional reform intends a fundamental change of the government system based on a transition to a parliamentary model with strong majoritarian institutions and weak power-sharing arrangements. The suggested system will effectively promote government stability and may give stronger impetus for consolidation of political parties, but at the same time, will evidently weaken the promise of consensual governance and will result in further concentration of power and erosion of intern-institutional (horizontal) accountability and will weaken checks and balances between the government agencies. The majority of experts feared emergence of unrestrained majoritarianism as an outcome, while a considerable number of domestic experts believed that legitimization of a revived Soviet-styled "patocratic" governance would be among the most expected macro-political effects of these reforms.

Ultimately, the proposed change of government form will have intended, as well as unintended effects on consolidation of democratic institutions. The institutions of majoritarian democracy may undermine the prospect for political dialogue between different parties and social groups while strengthening the prospects for consolidation of one party dominated majoritarian rule. The extension of the list of legislation which is now to be adopted in the National Assembly by 3/5 of the votes, including the so-called "organic laws", is a welcome improvement giving the parliamentary minority groups a chance to veto a lim-

ited number of decisions that are now passed by simple majorities, but is not able to compensate for the principally ceremonial role granted to the political opposition under the proposed government model.

Thereby the next parliamentary elections will be held in Armenia in April 2017.⁶ They will be the first elections after the constitutional referendum in that approved reforms to become a parliamentary republic.

Conclusions and considerations based on expert opinions

Methodology

For our research topic we use the method of expert interviews. At the same time we conducted our comparative study based on the secondary analysis of existing reports and documents related to the elections of Armenia and Georgia. The experts were selected from different areas, in order to gain wide variety of opinions on issues and measures regarding to our research questions. The aim of this research is to reveal the necessity and peculiarities of changing the electoral system in Armenia and Georgia.

In addition, a survey concerning the main themes was carried out among 6 experts (academics, activists of socio-political organisations, journalists and representatives from NGOs).

The socio-political situation in Armenia.

Summary of experts' comments:

"Even though in Armenia the parliamentary elections will be held in a few months,

the political situation of our country is far from the so-called pre-electoral and there is an ambiguous situation when nobody knows what to expect. The authorities and party representatives haven't done any steps in order to address their political dispositions. In this case, they might appear as alliance, but still we have a huge uncertainty related to the opposition parties. The main reason of this vague situation is that we still don't have any changes in our political system. Even it is difficult to predict the polarization of the opposition. In addition, the current political situation in our country will bring us to the challenging situation, actually to the absence of any political alternatives. Thus the shape of the future parliament remains unpredictable."

"...Seemingly, the ruling party "Hanrapetakan" will take part in the elections under another name taking into consideration the negative attitudes toward the party. The main problem still remains the starting point. The second problem is that the lists included a lot of artificial people. But these patterns are not unique only for Armenia. Indeed, Armenia is much smaller, that's why the standards are much higher. The second mechanism is that the voters vote in other's names. There is also a pressure on the workers of civil services, hospitals, schools etc. For example they might be forced to vote for certain party. Here, we can emphasize also administrative recourses. I'd say that there are a lot of advantages whoever sitting on the top using networks and patronage over the acceptable stage. Unfortunately the vote buying and bribe are common in Armenia as well. The main reason and misguided perception is that "One vote can't change anything". The second is peer pressure, when we observe it in

⁶ See <https://news.am/eng/news/315206.html>

the villages and regions. Occasionally it becomes more dangerous, when the voters can't refuse it, because it's given by the village head. No one in the villages can contradict in such situations."

"...There is no desire among the politicians to earn the public trust. What we have, even if the new parliament is elected, it's still a parliament of individuals, much more than it's an institution. Thus, this is the lack of trust and incredibility. We can also argue that a great deal of influence on the results of elections had civic activists and observers from Armenia."

"...Therefore, in order to figure out the features of elections in Armenia, we should also examine them in the historical background. If we look at Armenian political history we can observe sudden and spontaneous behavior of voters in certain key areas. Unfortunately the parliamentary elections based on the personalities, and in terms of power-sharing, it is a very difficult concept in Armenia. In this situation there are some challenges, because whoever is elected, in terms of problems, expectations and promises, this would be very difficult task for a new parliament to face all these problems and figure out the ways of solving them. People tired of the ruling party "Hanrapetakan" and I think 16-year political experience approved their position. That's the main reason we have a great amount of absenteeism during the elections."

Elections and electoral processes in Armenia

The upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia are very important for handling the challenges of a new electoral system. It's also

the first election in the new political reality. It gives an opportunity for Armenian government to resolve the internal conflicts of the country. In general, there is a huge concern about improvements of the electoral institutions. But it's crucial for Armenia, as we would see the new face of Armenian political reality. The disadvantages of it might be the situation, when we see the same faces again. So-called oligarchs can pass through these elections, which actually limit the effectiveness of a new parliament.

Compelling summary of expert opinions shows that even though there are a lot of disadvantages, but this is something new and different that we had in a past. So there is a hope for new positive changes. The reason might also depend on the new prime-minister, whom some people believe.

"...The current political situation in Armenia is somehow complicated as there is no show-up political process toward the elections. The main concern in these elections is still remains the absence of real political alternatives. There is no conflict among political parties and the oppositional parties actually don't have opportunities to win the elections at all according to the new electoral code. This is because the oppositional parties in Armenia couldn't pass the defined barrier. There is also a lack of public trust in the electoral processes. Consequently the new electoral code of Armenia should solve the problem of the trust crisis among the people."

In addition, our country decided to change the electoral code taking into account the disadvantages of current political systems. But an average voter in Armenia has historical memories from the communist Party of the Soviet Union. There is a weak party cadre,

where too often there is a dominant party and politics in general is strongly individualized.

Political parties are faced with the common difficulties of party development even after more than two decades of communism. Furthermore, these challenges and difficulties are made by a new developing party culture. Historically, after shifting the old party a new party of power replaces it taking full control of the government.

Meanwhile, party politics especially in Armenia needs a balance of forces as in every democratic country, but the ruling party governs over 16 years. Individual parties in Armenia have mostly failed to create a sense of professionalism, regularity and diversity.

Typical opinions of experts about the current changes in electoral system.

“Although the authorities were eager to make changes in electoral code and replaced the majoritarian system to proportional, but in my opinion it has still hidden majoritarian construction. In other countries this system might be ideal, but given into consideration the traditions and behavioral models of our country, we can’t insist on the fact that it’s a proportional system. On the other hand the majoritarian system which is functional for another country can’t be applied successfully for us. The reasons are obvious: we have oligarchic system leading us to the depth. The name of this electoral system, call them majoritarian, proportional or ranked voting system, won’t change the reality of the electoral fraud. The main concern of the people is that the majoritarian system allows authorities to expand electoral fraud through bribe, networks and patronage. But this electoral system allows the community authorities form the parliament as easily, as it was before. The

second problem is the construction of constituency parties, which will bring about new clans in separate districts. The following issue is that the small parties can’t conquer in the elections, because they don’t have as much resources, as ruling parties. It’s a fact that the constitutional reforms in Armenia passed basically due to administrative resources and electoral fraud.”

For upcoming elections in Armenia most of the experts were sure that the authorities should assert their positions in the parliament after elections, we won't see second round of the election, since in Armenia it usually brings to pre-revolutionary situation and they will do their best not to permit it. In comparison with Georgian elections there will be more electoral fraud, but the state officers will try to organize it before the elections and even we can observe quiet elections in Armenia.

“... The need of changes in electoral code was a must even a decade ago. But this format of changes can’t create fresh political environment and fair relations. Moreover it helps the political parties to assert their positions. The parliamentary elections in Armenia usually had less importance, than the presidential elections. After each presidential election we saw mass violence. In this point of view, the authorities of our country decided to avoid of this post-electoral mess with a hope that in this case they can not only keep the power, but also ca avoid internal conflicts.”

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THE CONCEPT OF TIME IN THE WORKS OF MODERNISTS

Abstract

Time is an important matter of study in science, religion, philosophy, art and literature. The issues that interest scholars and theorists are reflected in the art and literature as well, since those are the embodiments of society, its mind, life and issues. Historical traditions, economic, social and political features have huge impact on the perceptions of concepts and theories. This article aims to identify the relationship between the concept of time and art/literature. Through analysis of the works of modernist artists and authors the article will showcase the representations of the concept of time in the works of Charles Baudelaire, Salvador Dali, Walter Benjamin and Henri Bergson.

Keywords: time, modernism, science, philosophy, literature, art, Charles Baudelaire, Salvador Dali, Walter Benjamin and Henri Bergson.

Time has been a significant subject of study in science, philosophy and religion. Art and culture are the reflections of the society, its mind and life. Thus, the issues that interest scholars, scientists and philosophers are reflected in art and literature as well. The perceptions of different concepts tend to change based on historical traditions, economic, social and political life. This essay will discuss the concept of time by referring to the works of authors and artists of modernism period, such as: Henri Bergson, Charles Baudelaire, Salvador Dali and Walter Benjamin.

The expressions and symbols of evaluating the concept of time differ from writer to writer or artist to artist. Each author has his/her own perspective and style of presenting the ideas. French philosopher Henri Bergson, came up with the theory of “duree” or “duration” which is about time and consciousness. Bergson believed that the tradi-

tions of scientific experience are irreconcilable with lived practice. Bergson got to be mindful that it is impossible to measure the moment and once one tries to do that it will already be gone. Duration, according to him, is the stream of time. Despite the fact that we can separate this continuous stream into sections of time or “states of consciousness” the information that we have is only derived from “concrete time” or the original source of duration. Hence, length of time can't be known in the typical feeling of “knowing.” It requires a specific sort of access or plunge into the self in order for the mind to experience this flux in its creativity and originality (Bergson, 2001). Duration in other words can only be seen through small fragments and can never make a complete image. To grasp duration one can only rely on intuition. This theory of duration was a product of need to understand the reality and change at that time and as a whole.

Bergson's philosophy presents the scientific explanations of time. It is interesting to explore how the concept of time was seen by not only scientists and scholars but poets of the same time period as well. Charles Baudelaire (1821 – 1867), a French poet, had his huge input in forming the modernist literature. He is most famous for his work *"Les Fleurs du mal"* (*The Flowers of Evil*). This collection of poems expresses the change in the nature of beauty the modern and industrialized world. Baudelaire is special for his outstanding style of prose-poetry writing and spreading the duty of art, which is according to him to capture human experience. In his prose-poem *"Be Drunk"* (Paris Spleen 1864), Baudelaire discusses time as a pressure that does not let people fully enjoy their lives: "You have to be always drunk. That's all there is to it — it's the only way. So as not to feel the horrible burden of time that breaks your back and bends you to the earth, you have to be continually drunk." Another poem from *"The Flowers of Evil"* – *"The Clock"* discusses time as well. In this poem, Baudelaire presents time as an evil and treat that reminds and creates our sorrows:

*Clock! Sinister god, terrifying, impassive,
Whose finger threatens us and says: "Remember!*

*The quivering Sorrows will soon be shot
Into your fearful heart, as into a target;*

"Nebulous pleasure will flee toward the horizon

Like an actress who disappears into the wings;

*Every instant devours a piece of the pleasure
Granted to every man for his entire season."*

*"Three thousand six hundred times an hour,
Second*

*Whispers: Remember! — Immediately
With his insect voice, now says: I am the Past
And I have sucked out your life with my filthy
trunk!"*

Baudelaire presents time as something superior to human beings. He sees no way of living without it or without the idea of pressure and rush. The only way to live with it is as he puts in the poem *"Be Drunk"* is to be actually drunk.

*"Remember! Souviens-toi, spendthrift! Esto
memor!*

*(My metal throat can speak all languages)
Minutes, blithesome mortal, are bits of ore
That you must not release without extracting
the gold!"*

*"Remember, Time is a greedy player
Who wins without cheating, every round! It's
the law.*

*The daylight wanes; the night deepens; re-
member!
The abyss thirsts always; the water-clock runs
low."*

*"Soon will sound the hour when divine
Chance,
When august Virtue, your still virgin wife,
When even Repentance (the very last of inns!),
When all will say: Die, old coward! It is too
late!"*


Time and duration are superior to men. Going back to Bergson we can state that humans are never capable of fully grasping the time, but just getting to know it through fragments. Thus, they feel inferior to it as writes

Baudelaire. Time can be seen as something unknown and unrecognizable. Time changes individuals' whole life, yet never allows them to experience the feeling of fully knowing what time really is.

Time or the "clock" symbol for it helps people organize their life. Time is also revealed in the concept of human age. But is that all? The concept of time has had a significant influence on visual arts. Artists depict different symbols for time in order to present and reflect it as an important issue in human existence. The perspectives of artists are different; hence the expressions of time differ as well.

Salvador Dali, a Spanish surrealist painter is famous for his unusual, weird and enig-

matic subject matter and style. His most famous art work is considered to be *The Persistence of Memory* (1931) or just "Clocks" as many call it. The painting is a masterpiece of Surrealist art that conveys multiple emotions and ideas. The concept of time is portrayed with the symbols of melted clocks. What does the painting really say about time and Dali's perception of time? The painting is open to representations, however if one pays close attention the details it might actually give out cues on Dali's perceptions and idea of time. In the painting, four clocks are on display in an empty desert, bent out of shape which conveys the impression of ongoing action of melting. Dali defined art as "hand-painted" dream photographs" (Bradbury, 1999).



The photographic quality of the painting and the fact that there are no humans in it make it even more complex. There are many diverse ways to interpret *Persistence of Memory*. One way to look at it is a depiction of a dream state where the melting clocks symbolize the time experienced while dreaming. Human beings are some-

how able to keep track of time during the day, but what happens with time when we are asleep is a matter of questions. Dali suggests with his painting that the distorted and melting clocks do not have power during the dream state or in the dream world. The painting illustrates how delusional and irrelevant the concept of time is during the

dream state. Hence, it can also symbolize the inferiority of it versus human beings.

In 1930s Albert Einstein's Theory of Relativity brought a huge revolutionary idea. Einstein's theory proposed a whole new concept of time which characterized time as something complex and relative, not easy to track and not fixed. His theory undermined the ability of simple clocks or pocket watches to keep track of time (Einstein, 1916). In the painting, Persistence of Memory, Dali's melting clocks can be assimilated with Einstein's idea of time. The melting clocks symbolize the world, technology and its progressed society losing power against time. Alike, Einstein's theory, Dali might want to state with his painting that simple machines like clocks and pocket watches are too primitive to grasp time.

The concept of time has been of much importance for different scholars, scientists and artist all the time. We see that each and every of them has his/her own way of perceiving, expressing and presenting the ideas. Various factors effect on artists' viewpoints and ways of expression. Time period, socio-economic conditions, psychological state and even political life are features influencing this or that idea and theory. From the works of three modernists Henri Bergson, Salvador Dali and Charles Baudelaire discussed, one can see the connection

of common ideas. One cannot be sure whether the interconnectedness is because of the fact that artists were influenced by modernism, but one can guess that the modernism as time period had significant impact on the artists' and theorists' perceptions. Three of them are absolutely different individuals from different backgrounds, however they happen to perceive and discuss the concept of time as something that can hardly be grasped by human beings. Time was seen by them as superior to people, as well as the simple technology created by them, because of its complex, not fixed, uncertain and partially unknown nature.

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MECHANISMS OF OVERCOMING ETHICAL DILEMMAS
IN NOWADAYS SOCIAL WORK

Abstract

In social work, ethical principles have been important in several key respects, with regard to the nature of its mission; the relationships that social workers have with clients, colleagues, and members of the broader society; the methods of intervention that social workers use in their work.

So, social work is situated between moral choice and professional ethical behavior, which allows orientating among the variety of moral requirements, evaluating activities taking into consideration morality and in this way it contributes to the cohesion and stability of social relations. However, the implementation of professional duties is often hampered by objective circumstances, and as a result a social worker can't always prevent the occurrence of ethical conflicts and facing ethical dilemmas.

In this article we'll discuss ethical conflicts of social work, which affect and determine the course of social assistance, social support at the present; it is also shown possible ways to overcome those ethical dilemmas.

Keywords: social work, ethics; professional duty, ethical decision-making; ethical dilemma, mechanisms of overcoming ethical dilemma

The social work, being a unique condition for a person and society, their development, perfection and self-realization, supposes comprehension of humanitarian motion. It's especially modern in current conditions, when flaring of human existence problems and undermining of values take place in the society undergoing a crisis. Humanitarian principles as outlook and behavior can become improvement guarantee, as humanitarian approach inspires people with faith for overcoming boundaries and promotes flexibility of problematic situations. So, moral mandatory, i.e. humanism, compassion, kindness, love, prosperity, social justice, human dignity,

responsibility, are the cornerstones, on which social work is being constructed. Social workers promote social justice and the emergence of the desired changes. They are very sensitive and careful towards cultural and ethnic differences and are against any discrimination.

Traditionally, the values that are basic for social work are very important for its practice. These values distinguish social workers from the other professional groups. Values have several important attributes and perform several important functions: they are generalized, emotionally charged conceptions of what is desirable; historically created and

derived from experience; shared by a population or a group within it; and provide the means for organizing and structuring patterns of behavior (Williams, 1968). In social work, ethical principles have been important in several key respects, with regard to the nature of its mission; the relationships that social workers have with clients, colleagues, and members of the broader society; the methods of intervention that social workers use in their work; and the resolution of ethical dilemmas in practice.

So, social work is situated between moral choice and professional ethical behavior. We should note that professional ethic has a huge importance on creation of social worker's moral knowledge, perceptions and demands, inner disposition, moral conscious (Medvedeva, 1999, pp. 39-40). It gives an opportunity for a person to combine own moral disposition with actions that are expected from social worker, helps orientate in moral demands and regulations diversity (Levy, 1973, pp. 34-42). On the other hand, professional ethic of social work systemizes the entire experience, generalizes and perfects it, contributing harmony and stabilization of social relationships. Moral regulation of social work guarantees protection and realization of social worker's rights and interests. However, the social work, interacting with different sides of human activity, can clash with contradictions and dilemmas during performance of professional duties.

In this article, social work's professional-ethical conflicts or dilemmas are being examined, which affect and predict the process of social aid organization, as well as possible mechanisms of overcoming the latter are observed.

Logically, dilemma is a state, where choice of two possible contradictions is problematic and where the third possibility is excluded ("Encyclopedia of Social Work", 2008, p. 145). In everyday life, a person makes a choice from own values, persuasions and principles.

Ethical dilemmas in social work occur in three domains: relationships with clients in direct-practice settings (individuals, families, and small groups); social work involving "macro" practice, such as community practice (community organizing and advocacy), administration, management, and policy development and implementation; and relationships among professional colleagues.

These problems are often vague, uncertain and generate the diffidence, and the desire to ignore, to evade them. The most difficult situation for the social worker occurs because of the necessity of choosing between two or more relevant, but contradictory, ethical directives in a constantly changing world.

However, dilemmas occurring in social work are always connected with orientation values of the work. Urgency of the choice is conditioned with the fact that participant subjects of the work have different but equivalent interests, demands and values. Therefore, an ethical dilemma, by definition, is a circumstance which occurs only when two or more social work values are in conflict, i.e., an ethical dilemma involves a conflict between two or more ethical principles.

Ethical conflicts can be a reason of the very society's social-cultural, political, social-economic conditions. Studying social work's origin of morality and its scientific-methodic literature, we can distinguish a group of moral dilemmas, which are special for mainly all

societies ("Encyclopedia of Social Work", 2008, pp. 145-146). They are the following:

Independence and manipulation: In social practice social workers use "indifference and resistance of a client" or "help the client realize the need to overcome the situation" expressions, however these are euphemisms directed to importance radicalization of social work in social consciousness. It can be considered as a form of manipulation, managing client's behavior, restriction of circles of activity and movement.

In similar situations, nevertheless, the main issue of restrictions of social worker by the advisee, the right to make decisions and the level of social worker's responsibility remain without comments. How can they trust the client with the latter?

And for that reason, it is important to restrict possibilities of conscious and behavior manipulations, in order to orient to client to display corresponding behavior. When the client's own values are in the center of their own attention, intensity of interference will decrease.

Professional paternalism and client self-determination: one of the key values for social work is the welfare and dignified existence of the client, which makes the main issue of paternalism modern. Paradigm of paternalism supposes a model of well-regarded relationships between the social worker and client. Tradition of social practice is that in each case social worker decides which client is kind. Supposedly, guided by client's best interest, paternalism gives an opportunity to restrict client's suicidal actions.

However, the issue of allowing the use of paternalistic approach is disputable in social practice and indefinite.

On one hand, client is a self-governing subject, who has to work, make decisions for life's improvement; on the other hand social worker is responsible for protecting the client from their own inadequate understanding of social reality.

In modern world, the mentioned above model decreases gradually, giving its place to interaction of building partnership approach. Client and social worker are observed as equal subjects and client is responsible for own life's improvement. Social workers respect and promote the right of clients to self-determination and assist clients in their efforts to identify and clarify their goals.

On the other hand, we shouldn't forget the level of client's workload issues, as a result of which the latter is displayed as cognitive, emotional and behavioral misfit. Social workers may limit clients' right to self-determination when, according to the social workers' professional judgment, clients' actions or potential actions pose a serious and imminent risk for clients themselves or for the others.

This is a difficult dilemma that is created by the social worker's desire to act in the client's best interest and the need to respect his right to act in a way that he feels is the best.

Credibility of moral conflict will decrease if social worker gets freedom, coming out of situation peremptory, orienting the client towards the path of overcoming, stressing that it doesn't suppose violation of advisee's rights, but creates grounds for productive realization.

Necessity to speak the truth: Truth is a necessary condition for social interaction and communication. Kant's study says that the truth is person's debt against oneself as a

moral creature (Vasilenko, 2004, pp. 100-101). Lying would mean demolishing human dignity in oneself. Balance of values cannot be predicted prior, only by the form of certain rules. However, it's always important to consider that the right of telling the truth is not a must. The social worker is responsible for providing the completeness, quality and timeliness information to the client. Informing the client is necessary in order to create favorable conditions for the revitalization of his personal potential. Besides, the lack of information might adversely affect the quality of the client's decisions, because without knowing all the facts and circumstances he can make a wrong decision, which will lead to the result which is opposite to the goal of social work and his personal interests.

It is the most important legal norm of person's immunity and a moral value in modern civil communities. On one hand receiving correct information about own state, prosperity and opportunities is the right of an client, on the other hand, however, in some cases it is so-called justified and even necessary to hide the truth or change with "savior lie", as the truth can put the entire staff into danger. In western practice of social work disposition is primary. Nevertheless, in moral point of view it's more correct to not tell a lie to the client using doctor's famous "placebo effect" and in the meantime keep high rank of morality in profession.

Privacy, confidentiality, and privileged communication: If the truth provides the intention and social interaction of the client and the social worker, then principle of secret (morality of social work supposes that it is social worker's obligation to respect client's individuality and to not voice information

concerning the latter) is meant for keeping the cell of the society from participants with unauthorized intrusion. Social worker must guarantee the client this confidentiality and take all measures to ensure it.

Aim of silence, on the one hand, is to protect the trust of social worker towards the client, on the other hand, protection of civilians' legal rights.

Although it is always justified, but in some cases, for instance, trusted information is socially harmful, social workers have to observe, discuss the probability of identifying information given by the advisee. In order to avoid similar moral contradictions, it is necessary to inform the client about boundaries of secrecy in certain situations. In any case, this information can be conveyed only with the client's permission, and only the people who are involved in the solution of its problems.

Collegiality and awareness: In social practice there were cases, when social worker was obliged or consciously violated the law of an agency, where actions were taking place. In similar situation he/she makes the colleagues that are aware of the violation face moral choice. On one scale there are professional ethic norms, on the other one professional solidarity and loyalty, sense of friendship, authority and a threat of own position. Such kind of moral choice incites social workers to avoid uncovering and voicing about legal violations in their profession. While, it is social worker's obligation to perform professional responsibilities during similar situations, moving force of their activity has to be professional duty. In any case, the responsibilities of a social worker in a collegial relationship should be based on the professional courtesies of respect and fairness.

Priority of law and interest protection of client: Solution to this dilemma is one of the main problems for social worker. Very often there are situations in social practice when state policy can cause damage to client, as it is not reflecting entirely the social life. This makes the social worker face another hard choice. Some consider fulfillment of any action permissible, and the aim is realization and protection of the client, nevertheless majority of social workers are guided by supremacy of the law. In order to avoid the mentioned above, it is important to present legislative changes concerning possibility of interest protection of client.

For example, a social worker may personally believe that a law that he is required to enforce is wrong. However, under the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, he is required to obey all lawful and reasonable instructions to enforce that law unless there is good and sufficient cause to do otherwise.

Conflicts between personal and professional values: Commonly professional ethics refers to the ethics that a person must adhere to in respect of their interactions and business dealings in their professional life. Personal ethics refers to the ethics that a person identifies with in respect to people and situations that they deal with in everyday life. In some cases, personal and professional ethics may clash and cause a moral conflict.

Contradictions of personal and professional values are based on the mentioned moral inconsistencies. Social worker is an individual, civilian and as one, has a right for value orientations. Personal values are immanent to the profession and it is not always that the first system is harmonic and consistent to the second. For example, a social worker who

holds certain religious or moral values about abortion may face an ethical dilemma when trying to assist a teen client who became pregnant and wishes to have an abortion.

Nevertheless, it's important for social worker to be guided by professional values and best interests of the client while protecting the latter. In each case, the social worker must think through the commitment to the client, colleague, profession, third parties. Moreover, social workers must constantly examine the nature of personal values and the ways by which these values have an impact on understanding the client's problems and social problems, and strategies.

In order to avoid similar difficulties the hierarchy of social worker's responsibilities is useful, which has developed by American social workers Lovenberg and Dolgoff ("Encyclopedia of Social Work", 2008, p. 147). According to their concept the social worker's decision should contribute to an individual's independence and personal development. The protection of human life has the highest priority over all other obligations of a social worker. The social worker's decision should contribute to improving the quality of human life and etc.

Certainly, the hierarchy of the social worker's duties fully resolves ethical dilemmas. It is an important guide which assists social workers in making decisions. Overcoming ethical dilemmas is a serious problem in a social work.

When writing an ethical dilemma paper or when attempting to resolve an ethical dilemma in practice, social workers should determine if it is an absolute or approximate dilemma; distinguish between personal and professional dimensions; and identify the ethical,

moral, legal, and values considerations in the situation. After conducting this preliminary analysis, an ethical decision-making model can then be appropriately applied.

Ethical decision making is a process. There are many instances in social work where simple answers aren't available to resolve complex ethical dilemmas. Social workers should take into consideration all the values, principles, and standards of their profession that are relevant to any situation in which ethical judgment is warranted.

However, the future of social work cannot be predicted with precision, but it is certain that ethical and value issues will continue to permeate the profession. Hence, it will always be essential for social workers to examine these issues, which in the end form the very foundation of the profession.

Summing up, we should note that in social work ethical conflicts mentioned above constantly demand reproduction of handling mechanisms.

Professional culture and moral conscious of social worker can serve as basis for overcoming moral contradictions. The more educated the person, i.e. has professional subjective qualities, the richer the personal employment potential, hence the higher the professional activity quality. Ethic, moral knowledge, moral principles and values have their own place in social work's professional culture, which help orientating and avoiding possible conflicting and contradictory situations.

On the other hand a good social worker needs to be aware of the societal and professional values underlying his or her work so as to empower individuals, families and communities.

The realization of the issue mentioned above can make social worker's ethic upbringing possible, as the making of their professional important component.

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THE ROLE AND MEANING OF THE FREE TIME
IN CONTEXT OF FORMATION OF SOCIO-CULTURAL VALUES
IN MODERN ARMENIAN SOCIETY

Abstract

The article considers the problem of a culture of free time as a factor in the formation of modern society that has entered the era of globalization – with the respective opportunities for a variety of leisure activities and, at the same time, it may assume problematic situations for the person related to the effective use of leisure potential for the development of leisure culture of the person.

The aim of this study was to examine the role and free time value in the formation of social and cultural values in our society between two generations - today's youth (18 to 30 years) and the older generation (56 to 66 years), to identify the particular preferences in the environment of two generations in the field of leisure, to provide a comparative analysis and assessment of the data. The author had the task of considering the organization of free time as scientific and social problems, its effective implementation representatives of the two age groups, the disclosure of the content of free time of concept of culture. The research has used quantitative and qualitative methods of sociological research – unstructured data included observations, expert study using unstructured in-depth interviews, the survey (questionnaires), interviews by stratificat sampling in compliance with the proportions of the population structure by sex and age.

In the analysis, we stopped on such objective indicators of the quality of free time as a variety of leisure activities, especially the preferences of two generations in leisure activities (the prevalence of reading, resort to information and communication technologies, the frequency of visits to entertainment, cultural and leisure facilities, etc.).

The article explains the idea that free time acquires its true value when it is directed to the full development of the person and the acquisition of their socio-cultural values, as well as with the growth of free time, the role of self-development and reduced the share of inactive leisure.

Keywords: culture of spare time, generation, individual, values, society, activity, leisure.

Free time takes a significant place in the socio-cultural life of a society. Nowadays, connected with the fact that people gain more free time due to the technical household appliances, due to the growth of mobility of

people during holidays, the meaning of free time and the problem of organizing leisure have become especially actual.

It should be mentioned that the attention of scholars to this issue has been mentioned in

all periods of development of theoretical knowledge- from the ancient world up to nowadays.

In the works of ancient philosophers (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle) we come across with the same ideas and thoughts about free time. The investigation of historical experience and the cultural heritage of antiquity show that one of the most important distinguishing features of antiquity as civilization was the perception of leisure time, which was widely accepted among Greeks and Romans. Leisure time meant a period of time free of any kind of materially-essential employment, as an important characteristic of civil condition. Free time and leisure were studied along with freedom, social state and self-development.

Thus in Plato's pedagogical theory free time was connected with cognitive activity. According to Plato "Cognition must bring joy, and the word "school" itself translated from Latin means "leisure" and leisure is always connected with something pleasant. That is why it is important to make the cognitive process pleasant and useful in all relations (Tadevosyan, 2011, p. 13).

A thorough scientific philosophical, scientific- social research of a number of issues referring to free time and leisure in foreign and Soviet science is connected with such names as M. Weber, G. Spenser, P. Sorokin, V.A. Gross, S.N. Ikonnikova, M. Kaplan, B.G. Mosalev, A.S. Orlov, V.D. Patrushev, E.V. Sokolov, G.G. Boloshenko, V.A. Volovik and others.

Today the term "free time" and "leisure" are often used as synonyms. We can find various explanations of free time 1) as a time period freed or "cleaned" of expenses, 2) as a

period of time beyond the necessary work, which is devoted to rest, pastime and development of individuality, 3) as a period of "self-evaluation" time, 4) as a period of time during which a person has the opportunity of free action (Osipov, 2008, p. 443).

As sociologist Kravchenko has it: "Leisure is that period of time which a person spares as he/she wishes. Leisure is an activity which is done for the sake of one's own pleasure, fun, self-development or reaching other goals by one's own choice, and not for the sake of material need" (Kravchenko, 2011, p. 30).

British sociologist Bauman mentions that the meaning of leisure strengthens also the special meaning of information as the basic economical resource of post-industrial society. The main source of growth becomes the particular potential of a person who produces information that is why researchers cross out the special meaning of humanitarian factors in modern society (Bauman, 2002, p. 30).

E.V. Sokolov mentions in his research, that free time is not considered as an "empty space" of a life period. It is the "resource" which is gained by special efforts, possesses specific qualities and can be used with more or less efficiency depending on the qualities and the size of potential of a society and an individual (Sokolov, 1981, p. 40).

It should be mentioned that leisure activity is considered as a process of creation, dissemination and multiplication of cultural values. E.I. Tyurina writes "Badly organized leisure, unplanned free time serves the sources of "anticulture" (Tyurina, 2012, p. 8). In this case the notion of free time culture acquires a special meaning.

The term “free time culture” points to a definite level of time usage, including not only size and structure, but also content and nature- knowledge, values, norms, examples of life-activities. Free time is not only a private, but also a social value and the attitudes towards leisure are considered to be important indicators of an individual’s culture (Ikonnikova, 1985, p. 32). According to V.Y. Surtaeva the culture of leisure is the extent of realization of an individual’s socio-cultural potential in terms of leisure time. It is also the extent of gained experience of regulating leisure time, the ability of an individual to take part in socially important types of leisure (Surtaev, 1998, p. 28).

The issue of free time, connected with the efforts of a society to organize leisure, should be accepted as an actual one in conditions of modern society facing the era of globalization. Many important issues and growing interest towards the above mentioned problems brought us to investigate the given sphere, to elaborate corresponding methods, to do comparative analysis, to describe and evaluate the results.

Sociological researches were held during the last four years. One of them was qualitative (from March to May 2015) and the other three were quantitative, held from 2013 up to 2016.

The aim of our research was to study the transformations of socio-cultural values in Armenian modern society. The objects of our research were two age groups, today’s youth (from 18-30 years old) and the representatives of older generation (from 55 to 66 years old) who actively take part in the political and public life of the country. The objects of our research were valuable priorities, continuity

and essential changes of values of two generations in modern society of Armenia.

A pilotage was held during the first stage of research which resulted in specifying and eventually working out the instruments of our upcoming sociological research. During the second stage we gathered information using the methods of qualitative and quantitative analysis. In first quantitative research (2013) took part 198 citizens of Yerevan, and in the second research (2014) the students of National Polytechnic University Of Armenia, and the students of Armenian state Pedagogical University after Kh. Abovyan with 205 students. The participants of survey were students from 18 to 30 years old and the representatives of older generation, ex-students of the above mentioned universities from 55 to 66 years old. We used the method of formalized interview (standardizing), questionnaire. Statistical presentability was provided by giving each participant the chance to be chosen. The third qualitative research was held using the method of expert survey between 56 experts, with the help of unstructured in-depth interview method (2015). The choice of experts was made taking into consideration the fact of belonging to various social institutions (state, non-state, private, and public) and independent experts. The type of retrieval was goal-directed, and the criteria of the choice of experts were experience, the level of being educated, the sphere of involvement, the degree of perception from the point of view of society and etc.

In the present article the results of the fourth research are represented (2016), which was held among two different age groups of our population. The general totality of retrieval of inhabitants of Yerevan, 33.5% are above

mentioned age groups. During the three months of research about 250 inhabitants

were involved, who all were citizens of Yerevan (table1).

Table 1. Selective Totality of Participants by Age and Gender (person, %)

№	Age structure of Participants	Results of Survey	Including		Results of survey	Including (%)	
			Male	Female		Male	Female
1.	Young people from 18 to 30 years old	143	65	78	100,0	45.2	54.7
2.	Older generation from 55 to 66 years old	107	61	46	100,0	57.2	42.5

52.2% of respondents were representatives of youth from 18 to 30 years old (45.3% were male and 54.7% were female) 42.7% of respondents were representatives of older generation from 55 to 66 years old (57.5% were male and 42.5% were female). We used the method of quantitative research- survey (questionnaire) interviewing taking into consideration gender and age. The questionnaire included 58 questions from which 14 revealed the interests of respondents about the culture of organizing free time. Besides, respondents were given a number of questions which required logical thinking, finding out the meanings, points of view and evaluation in terms of the issue under study. Selective totality was calculated by the principle of proportionality from the number of overall population. After that we implemented the principle of random choice. The general totality was divided into age groups using the method of stratified choice. Unproportionality was examined taking into account age, education and gender. In the process of research were included all age categories – young people as well as older

generation, which enabled us to get trusty data in order to hold objective comparative analysis with the aim of bringing out continuity or changing valuable orientations of two generations under study. We carried on a calculation of selection extent for the provision of presentability. We also defined the interval confidence as well as the possibility of incorrectness up to 5.0%. In the third stage we analyzed all the results and data of above mentioned researches. As a result of sociological research we found out that the representatives of these two groups, despite their occupancy, try to find free time and to find ways to use it rationally. While answering the question “How much free time do you usually have?” 5.6% of young people answered “quite much”, 24.5% “enough”, 32.8% “have no free time”, 3.96% “very little free time” and 3.7% “not much”. The representatives of older generation answered the same questions the following way “quite much”, 13.0% “enough”, 12.7% “have no free time”, 25.5% “very little free time” and 21.8% “not much” 23.6%. The results of our research show that this kind of

percentage is due to the fact that very often young people do not perceive the process of education as a free time and do not identify the time spent with their fellow-students as a leisure time. As the famous philosopher I.T. Frolov mentions free time also includes education and self-education, contact with culture (reading, attending theatre, museum, cinema and etc.) social-political activity, scientific-technical amateur creations, artistic-aesthetic creativity, dealing with children, even anticultural activities (Frolov, 1991, pp. 400-401).

The answers of respondents "have no free time" points out the fact that in our society free time is usually associated with that period of time when a person does nothing or rests. As an answer to this particular question 21.8% of respondents of older generation (compared to young people 3.96%. 6 times less) answered that they have very little free time. It can be explained by the fact that a person of that particular age bears a rational character, a person starts to realize that for objective and subjective reasons must refuse definite roles and purposefully strive to achieve all his/her goals, thus exhausting himself/herself as a sexual, parental and working subject. As a rule a person at this age tries to stay in his/her vital and occupational positions.

The results of the survey formed as "How do you prefer to spend your leisure time" showed that the two age groups gave their preferences to family (30.2% of young people, 49.1% of older generation), as well as to friends (54.7% of young people, 43.6% of older generation) and only after that to colleagues (9.4% of young people, 3.6% of older generation) and finally to relatives (5.7% of young people, 3.7% of older generation). De-

spite some percentage variations, we can state that in our society family and friendship are greatly valued. There were also coinciding opinions in the sphere of culture and literature, issues referring to cloth styles while attending cultural places. In all cases the preferences were given to classical styles. Undoubtedly, it represents the continuity of generations, handing over cultural traditions and values of formed orientations and mechanisms from generation to generation.

In the list of fun activities 35.2% of representatives of youth prefer TV programs, watching videos and various programs on Internet. 15.0% attend disco clubs and cafes, 14.0% go in for sports and take part in sport competitions. Lower percents were as follows-9.5%attended cinemas, concerts and 7.5% read literature. And the results of our survey among people of older generation revealed the following data. In the column "do not attend" on the first place are going in for sports and taking part in sport competitions (76.3%), on the second place is attending disco clubs and cafes (65.5%), on the third place is attending restaurants (41.8%), on the forth place are going to the cinema, theatre and concerts (36.4%), and TV programs, watching videos and Internet (24.5%) are only on the fifth place. Most of older people prefer to stay at home and maintain household problems, look after domestic animals, and attend libraries and order books. Our observation revealed that 65.0% of respondents among two generations due to the lack of money can afford only particular kinds of free time. It should be mentioned that connected with the socio-economic state of the country, today we have such kinds of leisure activities as shopping, fast driving and etc. First of all the given situ-

ation affects such a socio-demographic group as youth.

Love towards book, the culture of reading play an important role in our society. However, we can state that lately we are having a decline in interests towards reading among young people compared to representatives of older generation. (Table 2, 3) We can conclude that this kind of results can be conditioned by the fact that compared to older generation; young people do not have the culture of everyday reading. 35.8 % of young people and 23.6% of older generation read science books or press (including electronic,

on Internet). The difference in the percentage referring to electronic literature can be explained by the fact that many representatives of older generation are not able or partially are not able to use a computer or Internet. We come to assume that today on the one hand Internet has its advantages (a large amount of stored information, as well as the speed of its transmission) and on the other hand negative impact on national traditions – relationships in a family, discussions, friendship relations, the desire to discuss a recently read book, to pass it to each other (because it is available on Internet and there is a speedy E-mail).

Table 2. Interests towards Reading among Young People at the Age of 18-30 (%)

№	Activity	Amount					
		Every day	Several times in a week	Several times in a month	Several times in a year	Seldom	Do not attend/ do not read/ do not buy
1.	You read fiction (including electronic on Internet)	5.7	20.8	24.5	-	30.2	18.8
2.	You read science books or press (including electronic on Internet)	22.6	18.9	15.1	13.2	15.1	15.1
3.	You read entertaining magazines and journals (including electronic on Internet)	35.8	15.1	17.0	5.7	17.0	9.4
4.	You read socio-political newspapers and journals, analytical articles (including electronic on Internet)	24.5	11.3	15.1	13.2	22.6	11.3

Table 3. Interests towards Reading among Armenian Citizens at the Age of 56-66. (%)

№	Activity	Amount					
		Every day	Several times in a week	Several times in a month	Several times in a year	Seldom	Do not attend/ do not read/ do not buy
1.	You read fiction (including electronic on Internet)	20.1	21.8	16.4	12.7	14.5	14.5
2.	You read science books or press (including electronic on Internet)	23.6	18.2	14.5	11.0	10.9	21.8
3.	You read entertaining magazines and journals (including electronic on Internet)	23.6	10.9	21.8	10.9	29.2	3.6
4.	You read socio-political newspapers and journals, analytical articles (including electronic on Internet)	36.4	10.8	9.1	5.5	25.5	12.7

Analyzing the peculiarities, the role and the meaning of free time in formation of socio-cultural values in our society among two generations- today's youth (from 18 to 30 years old) and the representatives of older generation (from 56 to 66 years old) we arrive at the following conclusions:

This research is actual both from theoretical and practical point of view, it gives the opportunity to understand thoroughly the phenomenon of leisure, free time. We should accept that it is not only practical source of opportunities, but also a special range of values. The analysis of answers shows that free time today becomes a problem for young people as well as for older generation. Its subjective quality is almost the same for both age groups, but objective quality of their free time differs. Most free time activities even those which are free of financial expenses, seldom

attract older people. Their free time passes less interesting, and as a matter of fact they do not try to change this situation, they rarely think about its meaning and do not express any unsatisfaction. Besides, their free time, though monotonous, differs by its high intellectuality (the level of interest towards reading, attending cultural-leisure institutions and etc.).

It can be mentioned that during the last few years Armenian youth, while choosing the types of free time, gives the advantage to the orientations of values of pastimes (hedonism), success (achievements) and novelty (stimulations) without counting the deep meaning of values, traditions and conformities. Young people spend their free time with friends. They prefer to attend cultural events – concerts, exhibitions, disco clubs and etc. All those things abet on the fact that on the one

hand it makes students different from other youth groups and on the other hand it forms in them such kind of distinguishing feature as reciprocal help, a kind of “collectivism”.

At the same time it should be taken into consideration that in the sphere of free time culture these two generations have preserved valuable attitudes towards family and friends, national and independent peculiarities, as well as traditions of spending leisure and holidays.

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METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION INDICATOR EVALUATION TOOLS

Abstract

The article analyzes issues of political participation. The article discusses main stages and features of formation of the concept of political participation in sociology and political science. Definition of political participation is offered based on the analysis of the interpretations available in professional literature. Political participation is involvement of citizens (in the broader sense including public subjects like organizations, groups, etc.) in political processes, decision making ceremonies, as well as citizen influence on the formation of political systems and institutions, their operation, drafting political decision. Several classifications of political engagement are observed: conventional and unconventional; orthodox and unorthodox, offensive; latent and evident; individual and collective; direct and indirect; acceptable active, acceptable passive, unacceptable active and unacceptable passive, and so on.

Based on logical operationalization, the toolkit for political participation types and index assessment is analyzed. Proposal is made to implement a more comprehensive and sensitive chart. Some attractive results gained after employing a survey in the RA are presented.

Keywords: political participation, political behavior, types of political participation, political institutions, political participation evaluation chart.

Ideas about democracy have been changing and evolving. Yet, the core idea has remained the same: participation of wider societal layers in the processes of governance and political decision making.

The concept of Participatory Democracy has a central role in modern theories on democracy. The idea of participatory democracy was developed by modern political theorists Carol Pateman (author of the term “participatory democracy” and the book “Participation and Democratic Theory”), Crawford Macpherson, Joseph Zimmerman, Benjamin Barber and others (see Fuchs, 2011, p. 260).

Participatory democracy supposes active involvement of citizens in discussions and decision making process in various areas of public and political life. In countries with participatory democratic system citizens are politically relevant; they are to be involved in the political system as active participants (see Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 4).

The issue of engaging citizens in political processes was a matter of analyses even for ancient thinkers. In his work “Politics” Aristotle wrote: “... man is by nature a political animal; and the person who, by nature and not under consequences, lives beyond a state is

either morally infantile or a superman” (Aristotle, 1983, p. 378).

Although the issues of behavior and participation were among the interest areas of researchers during the centuries to follow, namely during the new and modern eras, the notion of **political participation** got its academic status only in the second half of the 20th century.

Some authors define three stages of evolution of the term “political participation”: 1) study of individual aspects of political and civic participation until the mid-nineteenth century; 2) study of participation issue in the context of state governance and participation in elections within political sociology and political science (19-20th centuries); 3) use of the idea “political participation” as an independent academic category in concepts of modern political science (second half of the 20th century) (see Pfetser, 2013, p. 105).

The success of sociological research targeting assessment of political participation indices is largely conditioned by the level of development and logical analyses of notions reflecting the phenomena under consideration.

However, as M. Kholmetskaya notes, in modern professional literature there is no unique and universally accepted definition of the notion “political participation.”

American political scientists Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba define political participation as a citizen activity aiming to impact directly or indirectly public administrators and their activities (see Almond & Verba, 1992, p. 123). Political participation is perceived as a tool through which a citizen influences the authorities, formation of institutions and their activities (Pfetser, 2013, p. 104).

G. Almond and S. Verba highlight that political participation is “first of all instrumental activeness through which citizens try to influence the government for it to act to their wish” (Vasilik, 2000, p. 213).

Thus, **political participation** is **involvement of citizens** (in the broader sense including public subjects like organizations, groups, etc.) **in political processes, decision making ceremonies, as well as citizen influence on the formation of political systems and institutions, their operation, drafting political decision.**

Forms and methods of political participation vary. Among them are participation in elections; active support for a candidate; participation in demonstrations and protests; organization of the latter; membership in political parties; submitting proposals, and so on.

Several classifications of the term “political participation” can be found in professional literature.

American scientist A. Marsh identifies three main types of political participation: orthodox, unorthodox and political offense. By the orthodox form of political participation he understands legal activities providing stable functioning of the political system (engagement in voting, sanctioned demonstrations and protests, actions of lobby and interest groups). Unorthodox participation is an unauthorized action (strike, boycott, civic disobedience) or that of protest against the political system. And political offence (crime), according to Marsh, denotes political activities involving violence (unauthorized demonstrations, seizure of buildings, damage to property, hostage taking, unrest, civil war, etc.) (see Vasilik, 2000, p. 214).

Somewhat similar classification is offered also by another American analyst W. Millbright. He singles out conventional and unconventional forms of political participation. Conventional political participation is legal functioning regulated by law (involvement in elections and parties, interaction with officials, etc.). And unconventional political participation entails illegal actions denounced by major public (involvement in unsanctioned demonstrations, unrest, violence, terrorism, etc.). W. Millbright also differentiates between active and passive types of political participation based on involvement intensity, also between acceptable and unacceptable forms based on the type of involvement. Thus, Millbright identifies four groups of political participation: acceptable active; acceptable passive; unacceptable active, unacceptable passive (see Vasilik, 2000, pp. 214-215).

In their article "Political Participation and Civic Engagement: Towards a New Typology", Joakim Ekman and Eric Amna offer to differentiate between latent (not evident or highlighted) and evident, individual and collective, legal and illegal forms of political participation (see Ekman & Amna, 2012, pp. 283-300). Taking account of the considered specter of definitions of political participation and forms of that participation, it is vital to work out some scale allowing to note various manifestations and levels of participation for all the above mentioned types of political participation and activeness. From this perspective the classification of participation and activeness offered by Russian political theorist A.V. Melnik, is worth mentioning. He proposes the following types of forms and levels of participation:

1. Formed reaction towards the actions of the political system, institutions and/or their representatives;
2. Engagement in actions related to representational powers (electoral behavior);
3. Participation in political parties and non-governmental organizations;
4. Exercise of functions in institutions within the political system or acting against it;
5. Direct involvement in political actions (demonstrations, elections, petitions);
6. Active, leading activity in political movements directed against the existing political system and seeking to achieve radical changes (see Melnik, 1999, p. 345).

This chart can be completed under the criteria set for similar charts and concerning accuracy, comprehensiveness, relevant sensitivity, exactness and reliability (see Gorshkov & Sheregi, 1990, pp. 52-55).

The following should as well be set as a precondition of integration into political and public processes: a) citizen awareness about and interest in these processes and realities; b) certain assessment of, attitude towards and approach to these processes.

Radical or non-conventional manifestations (participation in unauthorized, demonstrations, pickets, insurgencies, etc.) of political and citizen engagement should also be involved in this mode of classification. Finally, this chart should include to some extent motivated and acknowledged inertness, apathy or inactivity of citizens, often referred to as "immobile" form of political engagement. So this diagram will comprise ten characterizing features of citizen and political participation:

1. Interest in and awareness about political processes;
2. Assessment of, attitude towards and approach to these processes;
3. Formed reaction towards the actions of the political system, institutions and/or their representatives;
4. Engagement in actions related to representational powers (electoral behavior);
5. Participation in political parties and non-governmental organizations;
6. Exercise of functions in institutions within the political system or acting against it;
7. Direct involvement in political actions (demonstrations, elections, petitions, etc.);
8. Active, leading activity in political movements and organizations;
9. Demonstrations of radical or non-conventional political engagement;
10. Acknowledged inertness, immobile participation and abstenteizm.

The large-scale survey held by Scientific Research Center “Caucasus” in 2010 imple-


menting this set of tools has revealed rather interesting outcomes.

According to the data obtained, women are less (45,5%) interested in political goings-on than men (54,9%). On the whole women are less aware of political realities than men. Finally, women are less involved in non-conventional political engagement forms (4,2%) than men (8,2%). (see Hovhannisyan, Zakaryan & Osipov 2011: 8, 56)

A major part of the respondents demonstrated significantly passive (33,7%), sometimes inert, apathetic and immobile (16,5%) positioning towards social-political events. Women not interested in social-political events comprise 17,5% and men – 15,3%. Inertness is more observed among the young: 19,8% among people of 18-30; 17,8% among 31-45 age limit. (see Hovhannisyan, Zakaryan & Osipov, 2011, p. 10).

Another major and fundamental index of political and civic activeness is participation in elections of various government levels. Survey results prove that the participation index is increasing among the public depending on the significance and importance of the elections. See Diagram 1.

Diagram 1. Respondents' engagement in elections for different levels.



From comparative analysis of research held by various research centers (see Poghos-

yan, 2006, p. 152; Hovhannisyan, Zakaryan & Osipov, 2011, p. 14) it becomes clear that

since 1995 there is an obvious increase in the citizen participation in political and social processes. If only 2,9% of the questioned in 1995-96 said they belonged to some political party, that number has definitely grown reaching 10,7% in 2011. However, the number of members of non-governmental organizations has remained almost the same – 5% and 5,2% respectively (see Poghosyan, 2006, p. 152; Hovhannisyan, Zakaryan & Osipov, 2011, p. 14).

Besides structural operationalization of the concept political participation in its different manifestations, it is also important to make its factorial analysis; to reveal the role and impact of such factors as the subject's gender, age, level of education, profession, marital status and social conditions, place of residence (rural or urban), membership in or support for some political organization, stereotypes of public opinion. In order to comprehend and interpret modern political processes it is desirable also to expose and analyze the motivation of involvement in politics because most profound information about any phenomenon lies in its determination, in this case in the motivation.

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CULTURAL CHARACTERISTIC OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY

Abstract

The article presents the cultural characteristic of early Christianity in Armenia. In the end of the 3rd century Christianity had a large number of followers. Christianity gave an opportunity to resist with national unity the external invaders and protect national independence and autonomy. Assessing correctly the situation, in 301 Tiridates III (287-330) by the initiative of Gregory the Illuminator declared Christianity as a state religion in Armenia. Gregory the Illuminator could show that only due to Christianity it was possible to ensure the further history of Armenian people. He also explained the philosophical-anthropological bases of that religion, contrasting that with the visible simplicity of polytheism.

The adoption of Christianity was a powerful twist in country's external and internal policy but it rejected by the religious aspect the faith of the centuries, the pagan culture and literature. But nevertheless, remained only pre-Christian spiritual and cultural values which were created by people.

Christianity created its culture, literature, school. In Armenia constructed Christian churches, next to them were opened Christian churches in Greek and Assyrian languages.

In the history of the Christian culture 4th and 5th centuries historical situations were the most important factors for the development of Early Medieval Armenian art and ecclesiastical literature and oriented its essence and uniqueness giving impetus to the creation of high bibliographic monuments.

Keywords: St. Gregory the Illuminator, Tiridates III, Constantine the Great, Constantinople, Mesrop Mashtots, Armenian alphabet, Christianity, polytheism, historiography, ideology, religion, Christian churches, theology, natural science, rhetoric, local culture, cultural characteristic, philosophical-anthropological, socio-political, historian's testimony, ecclesiastical literature, bibliographic monuments.

In the end of the 3rd century Christianity had a large number of followers (Hacuni, 1927, p. 574). How it was seen in Armenian historiography, as a monotheistic religion it was important to strengthen the centripetal monarchy and unite Armenian ministers around Arshakuni king (History of Armenian

People, 1982, pp. 71-72; Gevorgyan, 2001, p. 15) and therefore it has promoted to the most important preconditions of national agreement, unity and solidarity. Besides, Christianity gave an opportunity to resist with national unity the external invaders and protect national independence and autonomy. Assessing

correctly the situation, in 301 Tiridates III (287-330) (Manandyan, 1978, p. 131) by the initiative of Gregory the Illuminator declared Christianity as a state religion in Armenia. Gregory the Illuminatore could show that only due to Christianity it was possible to ensure the further history of Armenian people. He also explained the philosophical-anthropological bases of that religion, contrasting that with the visible simplicity of polytheism. In declaration of Christianity in Armenia it is important to take into account a delicate political circumstance – the Peace Treaty between Rome and Persia in 298, Mcbin. The fact is that Armenia was a bone of contention between two superpowers and according to that contract Armenia was recognized in borders of 66 BC, the Armenian king was committed to promote peace accepting a crown from Rome but maintaining neutrality. Judging by further events they probably have forced the same to Virq and Aghvanq and the general responsible of the solution became Tiridates III. It is clear that the religious situation of the end of the 3rd century could not promote to the neutrality policy, because Tiridates III even though had an obvious neutral position anyway Persia would think that in Armenia dominated Greco-Roman pagan cults and Rome would see that Armenia was predominantly Zoroastrian. In these conditions, the Armenian king as a statesman and diplomat had to add religious neutrality to the military-political and economic neutrality.

And the religion, which wasn't officially accepted either in Rome or in Persia but which had an informal registration as a community form in both countries and at the same time had a sufficient distribution in Armenia and could serve as a social support for a new

religious upheaval, it was Christianity. In the name of his political and religious neutrality, Tiridates III leaned against Christianity declaring it as a state religion, of course regardless of his personal religious sympathies or antipathies. In this case, the king prefers the independent statehood interest and not personal preference and it is better if both coincide¹. And indeed, the policy of religious neutrality was spread in Virq and Aghvanq and it gave its beneficent results in development of the country, till 40-year-old peace ended the formalization of Christianity by Constantine the Great in the new capital Constantinopole (337).

The adoption of Christianity was a powerful twist in country's external and internal policy but it rejected by the religious aspect the faith of the centuries, the pagan culture and literature. Nevertheless, only pre-Christian spiritual and cultural values – created by people – proved to be persistent.

Christianity created its culture, literature, school. In Armenia constructed Christian churches, next to them were opened Christian churches in Greek and Assyrian languages.

In this regard, the spiritual culture of Early Medieval interweaving with the cultures of Christian and not only Christian countries but also Western Asia's, became a new cycle of national mentality shaped in previous centuries. The period of 4-5 century in Armenian history was a period when the national culture was on a new rise, being active in historical-social movements. In that problem the Chris-

¹ Due to the "History of Armenian church"- unprinted lecture of A. Sahakyan we have information about the revelation of the new reason of Christian nationalization in Hayq. Other reasons see in "History of Armenian people".

tianity had an important role too as a new and perhaps more progressive ideology. But it does not mean that it is required to create a barrier between Christian and pre-Christian periods and connect the Armenian new culture of the 4th century with the fact of accepting the Christian faith.

The spiritual and material culture of the Early Medieval was a result of national mentality in its new period of history. In this regard, it is required to consider the Armenian culture of the 4-5 centuries as its continuation.

Actually, in the Middle Ages the national art and cultural attributes got a new formulation which allowed to impersonate the destined difficult and at the same time full of heroic existence.

In Armenian history, in terms of policy, the 4th century was a period of centralization and collapse of Armenian state also a period of struggle of autonomy and independence of Armenia. In terms of public mentality it was a period of a Christian religious mindset.

In the history of Christian culture 4-5 centuries are characterized as a period of formation and development of local culture, when Armenian culture having remarkable achievements reached a considerable level (Azaryan, 1975, p. 9).

In Armenia after the establishment of Christianity the culture would be succumbed to the ideology of that time but even the views and perceptions of people preserved stubbornly got into the new emerging culture having their success in almost all branches (Sahakyan, 2014, pp. 21-25).

The royal court supported Armenian church in ideological, political and economic ways. The royal court took methods to keep people closer. Thus, the ruling class was try-

ing to popularize the new religion and strengthen it and make a big power (Araqelyan, 1949, p. 7). And the church became not the support of the people but of the centralized state.

The situation was changed at the time of Arshak II (345-367) and his son Pap (369-374). They made great efforts to centralize and strengthen the state but they had different methods. The father wanted to involve the church in the policy of strengthening the central power and the son seeing the political method's failure of his father, wanted to achieve the same goal at the expense of the church, reducing its ownership which also did not have any success². Soon, due to the delicate and flexible policy of Pap king, the Armenian Church became independent from the universal power creating a new level and clarified the relationship between state and church and laid the foundation of the further autonomy. As a result, however they could not fight against Sassanid conqueror and Rome. Therefore, the country was divided into two parts (387) and then both were de-throned one after another, Western in 390, Eastern in 428 bringing the end to the Armenian independent statehood. Armenia became Western and Eastern regions of superpowers (Yeghishe 1904: 12).

Under the current heavy historical conditions, in the 5th and 6th centuries were started insurrections against Persian and Byzantine dominions (451, 481-484, 536, 571-572). Sassanid Persia during its domination could not suppress Armenians and dominated administrative, military and financial affairs of

² A. Sahakyan, Lectures from the history of Armenian church (unprinted).

the country. In fact, Armenia was independent and the Persian dominion sometimes was becoming nominal, especially after the rebellion of 481-484 years and almost till the beginning of the Arab domination, the middle of the 7th century (Araquelyan, 1949, p. 7).

The Armenian people losing the statehood and the political independence, they surprisingly were always at the highest level of civilization, survived not only physically but also maintained and developed their national spiritual culture.

In the conditions of the similar political relations, when Armenians were seeking to regain the country's independence they also were making big steps towards the rise of civilization and culture. First, in the 4th century, when due to Gregory the Illuminator's cultural activity and Tiridates III king's support the Christianity became the state religion and during the following centuries it had a role of national preservation in the Armenians life. Almost after a century, in the beginning of 5th century happened the second most significant step, Mesrop Mashtots created the Armenian alphabet which was immediately followed by the rapid development of the Armenian culture and appeared translated literature (Ter-Mkrtychyan, 2011, pp. 129-151). From the middle of the 5th century the Armenian literary mind gave its own first creations. Independent and translated literature was expanded so fast that soon it included almost all of its time branches – theology, philosophy, rhetoric, grammar, astronomy, natural science etc. It is very appropriate the historian's testimony:

“Then, for the tuition of flocks were established schools, increased the number

of writers which surpasses each other and was decorated the holy church cult...

The churches brightened, added splendor to Saints evidence and were restored by flourishing with the testament's offering which always were renewed...” (Parpeci, 1907, pp. 35-36).

With the creation of the Armenian alphabet, indeed, were opened new horizons for strengthening the foundations of substantive national culture and its further advancement.

In Armenia was started a literary and cultural power which was unique scale for its period. For the sake of the idea and spiritual identity, the creation of the Armenian literature became imperative of the century which was destined to become a powerful bulwark against the policy of foreign domination and assimilation.

The beginning of the Armenian schooling was not gradually but in the way of powerful flight. In the case when we take into account two factors: first the serious political situation of Armenia which was deprived of independent statehood and second when comparing with the next few centuries, we remember that the initial phase of the national schooling was at the highest level of schooling.

After the invention of the Armenian alphabet, the beginning of a new period of the Armenian history commenced – Christian in its culture and literature. As we saw, the Armenian literature of the 5th century developed in two directions: first translation, then national. Mashtots personally participated in translation turmoil and as the author of the first translation he was the initiator of the Bibliography of the 5th century. Along with translations with a few decades of difference ap-

peared the first Armenian famous monuments, especially classical works of historiography, the historical works of Parpetsi, Pavstos, Khorenatsi, Yeghishe, Agatangelos, Koryun, as well as the famous philosophical-theological work of Yeznik Koghbatsi and by means of those marked the birth of the great national literature.

The main trends of the ideological content of the classical works of the initial period of Armenian literature, their historical-philosophical and aesthetic principles were imposed on the unique complex circumstances of the socio-political and religious life. The first substantive works were little different from the translated literature, as the ruling ideas were religious. That is why the style of the substantive works was similar to translated.

It is quite obvious the enormous significance of the Bibliography of the 5th century. But it is equally indisputable its huge influence on the all aspects of the national spiritual culture of the further centuries even until the late Middle Ages, as it is actually defined the main thought process of history, artistic development, theology, philosophy and aesthetics.

These mentioned historical situations were the most important factors for the development of Early Medieval Armenian art and ecclesiastical literature and oriented its essence and uniqueness giving impetus to the creation of high bibliographic monuments.

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CIVIL SOCIETY AS AN AREA OF A PERSONALITY SELF-REALIZATION

Abstract

In this article we will discuss the mechanisms of self-realization, and civil duties. The author considers the civic society as a socio-cultural field for effective self-realization. From this point of view, self-realization can be considered as a skill of creative discovery of truth and social justice. Through self-realization a person can gain self-determination – socially, culturally and historically. This paper overviews several mechanisms for realization in Civic society. Civic society supposes protection and acceptance of human rights and freedoms. It creates conditions for manifestation of a person and self-realization, providing the person's active and responsible participation in social processes. Self-realization is a reproductive and identity specification mechanism of a person.

Keywords: civil society, subject of social activity, self-existence, self-realization, mechanisms of self-realization, types of self-realization.

Person-society is an eternal issue. Any person being a social structural element is formulated by social features, skills and qualities.

Concurrent to changes of social environment, a person also changes, acquires a certain group of features and affecting on social environment, changes both oneself and the environment.

Shakespeare said: "Life is a multilayered theatrical play, where the person is the bearer of social roles, the player, the audience and the expert". "Staged society" phrase perfectly expresses the essence of today's society.

Today a person appears more as a social governing active subject, as creator and consumer of material and spiritual values. On the other hand, people, masses, nations, peoples, states keen to be acknowledged, overcome inferiority and vulnerability. For gainful so-

lutions to such issues in social constructive level, corresponding self stage is needed and today the civic society can be the one.

Civil society is one of the most important value and culture-forming phenomena of modern society. Civil society in its generally accepted sense, acts as a set of social formations (groups or teams), joined together by specific interests (economic, ethnic, cultural, etc.), implemented beyond the government activity area and allowing, in conditions of a democratic system of social life arrangement, to control actions of state authorities as hierarchies of power and political institutions.

Civil society is a sphere of public activity, free from the direct influence of the state and its officials.

Civic society supposes protection and acceptance of human rights and freedoms. It creates conditions for manifestation of a per-

son and self-realization, providing the person's active and responsible participation in social processes.

In social-philosophical point of view, person's realization supposes display of hidden potential of person's mental, social-psychological, characteristic features and qualities. Self-realization is displayed in satisfaction of self-existence.

In one overview, Mortimer Adler defines self-realization as freedom from external coercion, including cultural expectations, political and economic freedom, and the freedom from worldly attachments and desires etc (Adler, 1995, pp. 137-138).

A number of ways of person's self-realization can be pointed out, each of which provide favorable conditions for productive process of social society principles. Traditional mean of self-realization is formation of social-economic status, which is an ongoing process in person's socialization progression. In this point, definition of civil society as liberal, democratic, legal one becomes primary, where the person is principle and axis with its private interests, needs and expectations. A person can be relatively free only in case of possessing own life resources. Incontestably, the civil society is connected to the development of private resources, which became stimulus for a person's creative activity and interest in industry development.

Generally, we differentiate several mechanisms for realization private interests, needs and expectations:

- Through violation of other's interests, which is Social Parasitism,
- Through mutual beneficial cooperation, in other words Target Sinergie,

- Through principle of voluntary implementation of other's interests, that is Social Altruism.

Taking into consideration the mentioned above, we must remember that individual interest is not the impetus for the society; it becomes one only when the interest of the whole coincides.

Civil society is a human political-social lifestyle, unity of civilians, within the frames of which each individual is interested in providing dignified life for everyone, and each civilian realizes his/her political activity, interests, satisfies natural needs and social interests (Konoplin & Nagayeva, 2008, p. 51). In modern world, prevailing opportunities of manifestation and self-realization of a person are in economic field. And in case of effective functioning conditions of the civil society, a person has positive self-realization and social development guarantees in economic field.

Each person has a right to use own abilities in civil society, including entrepreneurship and other economic activities allowed by law, which supposes free market development (Orlova, 2005, p. 22), due to person's social activity.

In traditional societies interests of individuals obtain political definition and provide high level of person's self-realization. The developed the civil society the harder the construction in means of interests and their realization mechanisms. In order to act gainfully in civil society, it is important for the person to be distinguished as politically active and ideally open person. Civil society requires a certain political environment where individuals are free to discuss and associate in the first place. It likewise shows that socioeconomic

development is highly advantageous to nations attempting to build a strong Western style democracy (Putnam and the Civil Society Ian Fasel).

We can say that the civil society's economic, spiritual, moral conditions of life is a unique group, which promotes individual benefit, realization of interests, active increase of economic, political, cultural fields. We can say that the civil society is a unique combination of economic, religious, and moral aspects of life, which contributes to private benefit, realization of interests of a person's activity in economic, political and cultural spheres.

In this point of view, self-realization can be considered as a skill of discovering the truth creatively and social justice. Through self-realization a person can self-determinate socially, culturally and historically. Self-realization is a reproductive and identity specification mechanism of a person.

Types of person's self-realization also varies, according to activity fields, there are scientific, religious, economic, legal-political, etc... By choosing this or that field for self-realization a person seeks possibilities (Tsvetkova, 2008, p. 147) for solving important problems of own self in certain historical and social periods of time. In such social-historical conditions a unique way for self-realization becomes strong social bonds and enlarged circle of social relationships. From this point of view bridged social capital is important, as an additional opportunity of self-realization.

Social capital is an effort resource of institutionally based social relationships chain in certain historical time, which benefits the existence of the best option of social system. Despite other types of a capital, social capital

is a construction of role players and their relationships. Attribute of that system is to provide participants with wellness (Burt, 1992. p. 45).

On one hand civil society offers real premises and equipments for person's self-realization and creation, on the other hand a person with its creative impact and innovative aspiration consolidates civil society's organizing ideas, becoming the guarantor of legitimacy of authorities. In civil society's conditions, belief towards legitimate authorities strengthens, as each person achieves legal status in any sub-system of the society for equal self-realization, despite free social, domestic, professional, doctrinal and other statuses

In 21st century, more frequent way of self-realization is constant search and change of work and activity fields. This can be a reason of lack of institutional trust, as well as interchange of social-cultural high-speed processes in post-transitional societies. Self-realization of a person can be observed as focused effort of person's potential. And focused efforts are fed from inner and outer reasons of self-realization. If person's inner self-realization reasons are the demands and interests of an individual, which are defined as orientations in civil society, then outer reasons are person's tendency to freedom and social activity level, which are reinforced and stabilized through civil society. In this regard, we should note that the civil society primarily is a society of free people, where the civil freedom is guaranteed by law in all its senses. And the latter is a necessary condition for person's perfection, as a guarantor of person's dignity uphold. More than that, a person is an owner here, who has an opportunity to choose the form of ownership and dispose it. And

property is an existence of freedom (Gegel, 1934, pp. 72-73).

- Liberated owner is the constructive cornerstone of democratic regime. Hence, the civil society is the field of expressing person's social, political, cultural essence, constructive field for its self-realization, self-assertion. Freedom of ability manifestation of a person is guaranteed here, as well as freedom of choice of activity type and professional selection.
- From this point of view, we should note that the civil society is a collective form of person's dignified relationships and lifestyle. Civil society, based on a person's specifications, gives an opportunity to have a feeling of satisfaction for own achievements.

In this sense, we must note that civil society first of all is a society of liberal people, where civil freedom is lawfully protected in all its manifestations. And the latter is an important component for person's perfection as a guarantee of preservation of human dignity. Moreover, a person is the owner, who has a chance to choose the form of ownership and direct it. And ownership is the existence (Gegel, 1934, pp. 72-73) of availability of accommodation. That is to say, liberalism is not a backbone democratic value (Harutyunyan, 2003, pp. 8-9).

It can become such through active political participation of civilians and through self-realization in their demanding actions in political system. From this point of view John Locke discusses many ideas that are now attributed to Liberalism in *Two Treatises of Government* (1689). Locke comments on society and outlines the importance of natural rights

and laws. He believes that people are born as blank slates without any preordained ideas or notions. This state is known as the State of Nature because it shows people in their most barbaric form. As people grow, their experiences begin to shape their thoughts and actions. They are naturally in the State of Nature until they choose not to be, until something changes their barbaric nature¹.

As Aristotles says: "The truth is that men's ambition and their desire to make money are among the most frequent causes of deliberate acts of injustice."

But Locke says that, civil government can remedy this anarchy. When it comes to the Law of Nature, people are more likely to act rationally when there is a government in place because there are laws and consequences to abide by. It should be noted that person's political self-realization supposes conscious and pressure of law and "brutal" displays of liberalism under legal patronage.

From this point of view, purpose of civil society in Armenia is not realized, more than that, its realization is still but an unclear mirage. Turning that mirage to reality is due to accepting a human being as the highest value.

And in our reality a person's value measured with its blood or relative ties, position in social system. In other words, a person is valued not as being human, but as a connection complex, whose activity range is nepotism. The only way for pressuring and denial of abnormal nepotism in our society is through considering political activity of legally conscious people as propulsive force of self-realization.

¹ See: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberalism> (international_relations)

Surely, not everyone achieve complete self-realization, but the upbringing of the will, developing ambitions to innovations and creativity are the very ways which lead to self-realization of a person. And the bases of uncovering those ways are in the family. Family is undoubtedly mandatory for civil society. We must note that a family can be the primary and major stage for self-realization, making self-determination and self-realization possible, if a person holds the stamp of civil society features, especially if his/hers human rights and freedoms are protected in inner-family relationships and is provided with quality aspects of social development.

Most important features of a person in civil society must be tolerance and social justice. The heart of tolerance is self-control. When we tolerate an activity, we resist our urge to forcefully prohibit the expression of activities that we find unpleasant. More abstractly, toleration can be understood as a political practice aiming at neutrality, objectivity, or fairness on the part of political agents.

These ideas are related in that the goal of political neutrality is deliberate restraint of the power that political authorities have to negate the life activities of its citizens and subjects. Related to toleration is the virtue of tolerance, which can be defined as a tendency toward toleration. Toleration is usually grounded upon an assumption about the importance of the autonomy of individuals. This assumption and the idea of toleration are central ideas in modern liberal theory and practice².

Person-civil-society relationships are ambiguous and bipolar.

Behavior of civilians must be led with

such features as self-organization, self-reliance and self-responsibility. The civil society with its values, basic aspects and guarantee of human rights and freedoms, benefits creation of all ways for self-realization of a person.

As a rule, non-compliance, social inequality and social injustice in traditional and close societies prevent the self-realization horizon of a person and become a reason for a number of crises. Result of a crisis is more tragic, especially in spiritual-cultural field of the society.

Meanwhile, results of positive self-realization are disposed by high level of self-respect, social construction of consciousness of own self, forth bringing of altruistic interests and aims and activation of searches their solutions by accepting both own and others' freedom, meaningful with purposeful and aimed actions.

Self-realization of a person is construction and realization of a person's development opportunities; certain historical time and public management regime have their direct impact on the choice of means of person's self-realization. The latter can be observed as a way of expression, development and perfection of person's efforts. In this regard, it is obvious that in civil society, person's self-realization process depends on people's legal conscious, focused efforts that result from the level of stability of civic identity

Self-realization of a person depends both on terms of use of freedom and justice in the society and clarification of aims of social structures, information level of wide strips of the society and social structures and cultivation of legal guarantees of civilians' cooperation.

² See: <http://www.iep.utm.edu/tolerati>

Level of a person's self-realization is measured by the level of satisfaction by own actions, number of their deeds and frequency of responses social issues.

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
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Ծավալը՝ 229 էջ



GEORG BRUTIAN

(1926-2015)

Professor of Philosophy, academician Georg Brutian was born in Sevqar village located in Tavush region (Armenia) on March 3, 1926. He graduated from 81 Armenian secondary school of Tbilisi (1942), Faculty of Construction at K.Marx Yerevan Polytechnic Institute (1948), Faculty of International Relations at Yerevan State University (1950), Lomonosov Moscow State University (1951). In 1961 he defended doctoral thesis and became the youngest (35 years old) Doctor of Philosophical Sciences in Soviet Union in his profession. In 1982 he was elected as academician. In 1977-1994 he was Academician-secretary of the Department of Philosophy and Philology of Social Sciences and Humanities at National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia (NAS RA). From 1994 to 2002 he was the Vice-President of NAS RA and from 2007 to 2015 the Councilor of the Presidium of NAS RA.

Georg Brutian established number of chairs and scientific organizations. He was founder-chairperson of the Department of *Social Sciences* at Yerevan State Linguistic University after V.Brusov (1962-1970) and *Philosophy and Logic* at Yerevan State University (YSU), (1970-1986). He had a great role in foundation of the faculty of Philosophy and Sociology at YSU.

Georg Brutian was the founder president of the Armenian Philosophical Academy (APA, 1987) and International Academy for Philosophy (IAPh, 2001).

Georg Brutian is an author of more than 60 books and booklets and about 200 articles published in Armenia, Bulgaria, England, Greece, Hungary, Japan, Portugal, Russia, Tadzhikistan, The Netherlands, The Ukraine, USA, Uzbekistan and other countries in 20 languages. Georg Brutian's major scientific achievements are in the following fields: Logic, Philosophy of language, Epistemology, Argumentation theory, Theory and methodology of translation, the history of Armenian philosophy and logical thought, Armenology.

Georg Brutian has significantly contributed to the study of philosophy: he suggested the principle of linguistic complementarity; proposed conception of poly-logic; created the concept Transformational logic; founded Yerevan School of Argumentation (1975); developed some methodological principles of Armenology (history of Armenian philosophy and logic).

Georg Brutian was Editor in Chief and Member of the Editorial Board of dozen of International journals, including *Philosophy and Rhetoric* (Pennsylvania, USA).

Georg Brutian was awarded State awards and honorary titles of many countries, leading universities and international institutes.

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