


ISSN 1829-3824

# WISDOM



1(8), 2017

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Published by the Decision of the Scientific Board of  
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Department of Philosophy and Logic  
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## W I S D O M

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## EDITORS' FOREWORD

The current 1(8), 2017 issue of the journal "Wisdom" includes the selected talks introduced at the International Conference *Life and Philosophy* dedicated to the memory and 90<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Academician Georg Brutian, organized by Khachatur Abovyan Armenian State Pedagogical University (AS-PU), International Academy for Philosophy (IAPh), and Armenian Philosophical Academy (APA) on November 22-23, 2016. The discussion of these talks in the conference sections is considered as an actual substitute for review procedure, necessary for publication.

The articles involved discuss the current problems of Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Methodology, Metaphilosophy, Argumentation, Socio-political Philosophy and History of Philosophy. Like all previous issues, this one also contains the *Chair of Young Scientist* – this time including the research results of three authors.

Taking into consideration the respect and great interest of Armenian and world scientific community to the scientific, social and political activities of Austrian Philosopher, Professor of Innsbruck University Hans Köchler, the urgency and principal importance of his *Philosophy and Democratic Prejudice* talk presented at the Plenary Session of the aforementioned conference for the solution of the controversial issues in modern world, the Editorial Board of the journal considered it expedient to publish

the text of the talk in this issues devoid of the rigidity of scientific articles.

The journal "Wisdom" is consistent to its policy to be available within the scientific community and represented in international electronic platforms. It is included in the list of the scientific journals recognized by the Higher Attestation Commission of the Republic of Armenia among other rated periodicals that address fundamental results and theses of dissertations and is registered in Scientific Indexing Services (SIS), Journal Impact Factor (JIF), Eurasian Scientific Journal Index (ESJI), Scientific Journal Impact Factor (SJIF), International Scientific Indexing (ISI), European Reference Index for the Humanities and Social Sciences (ERIH PLUS), Advanced Scientific Index (ASI), eLIBRARY, EBSCO, CYBERLENINKA, CROSSREF, PHILPAPERS, WORLDCAT and Google Scholar International Scientometric Databases.

Given the significance of the underlying principle of pluralism over scientific issues and freedom of speech, we should remind that the authors carry primary responsibility for the viewpoints introduced in their articles which may not always coincide with those of the Editorial Board.

The Editorial Board extends its gratitude to all the authors, reviewers, professional critics and assessors of the articles.

EPISTEMOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE,  
METAPHILOSOPHY, ARGUMENTATION

## THE ROLE OF SCIENTOMETRIC INDICATORS IN MODERN SCIENTIFIC WORLD

### Abstract

The article touches upon one of the most topical and controversial issues of the sphere of modern scientific research: the review, control and guidance of the effectiveness of the scientific activity of the authors through scientometric mechanisms. Drawing parallels between various historical periods and particularly highlighting the importance of the issue in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the indirect but important influence and role of the Internet is emphasized. Some proposals and guarantees are also put forward which can slightly alleviate the frequent inequality and inadequacy in the field of assessing and evaluating scientific researches and researchers.

*Keywords:* scientometrics, references, publications, impact factor, h-index, scientific journals, scientific indicators.

### Introduction

In modern scientific world the quantitative description of references to the scientific works of the researcher is observed as the most convincing factor of the effectiveness of his scientific activity. Therefore, it seems quite logical that in the context of modern scientific research activity the number of references to their own publications, which is referred to as reference index, is quite important for all the representatives of the scientific community. However, it is worth admitting that researchers, thinkers and philosophers have always cared for the effectiveness of the results of their intellectual and rational activities, that is, in all periods of time researchers have always been interested in the opinion of their "colleagues" and the ways they perceived and evaluated their activities. Although, initially

there were no universal and general standards in this respect, some scholars set out some mechanisms of the differentiation and evaluation of the effectiveness of scientific research activities, which practically existed in all ages with slightly different interpretations and perceptions. If in early scientific and philosophical conceptions the number of works or, as Diogenes Laertius puts it, the number of lines in them (see, for example, Borukhovich, 1976, p. 99), was considered the standard for the effectiveness of the activity of the researcher, the medieval scientific and philosophical minds, in addition to this quantitative indicators, also considered references to authorities, particularly Aristotle. In modern times, in the light of the discredit of Aristotelianism and scholastic traditions, as a criterion for the effectiveness of scientific activities qualitative indicators have been mainly put



forth, particularly, the overestimation of the data of experimental researches, based on the best philosophical traditions of Fr. Bacon, J. Locke and other philosophers of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. However, the further evolution of the scientific activity led to the fact that it was no longer possible to describe, evaluate and value the level of effectiveness of the scientific activity of researchers based on purely general qualitative criteria. Since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century within certain scientific and philosophical frames various solutions to the demarcation problem can be observed not only as an attempt to differentiate between scientific and non-scientific knowledge, but also as an initiative to outline further goals to clarify the standards for the quality of science and, consequently, of the effectiveness of the scientific activity of the researcher. Without going into detail of the logic of debates on the demarcation problem, it is worth noting that in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the scientific mind on a qualitatively new level formed a new requirement for the evaluation and assessment of the scientific activity, which at the beginning of the 60s was for the first time interpreted through introduction of quantitative indicators of the references to scientific publications. It is worth noting that by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century one or two attempts had already been made, as a result of which it can be mentioned that the mechanism of quantitative indicators through references had already been tested (Shephard index, index Medicus) (see Gevorgyan, 2016).

#### Scientometric Issues and the Internet

By the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Internet penetrated into all the spheres of human activity, consequently it also penetrated into

the sphere of scientific activity. At first sight it may seem that it should not have any connection with the issue in question, however, we must admit that it not only influenced the qualitative decision of the issue of the effectiveness of the scientific activity, but also in the context of quite complex diversities of mutual impacts eventually became one of its most important and influential components. When in 1961 E. Garfield introduced the mechanism to calculate the effectiveness of scientific works through references, the Internet did not even exist, however, in the 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the existing interesting innovative information system from the very beginning of its existence evaluated and valued the factor to link web pages together through references, and later the factor to evaluate the qualitative weight and effectiveness of those pages through the number of those references.

Nowadays, it is practically impossible to identify and in terms of priority to definitely evaluate whether the mechanism of scientific references brings qualitative clarification in the domain of online diversity or whether the Internet opportunities guide and dictate the sequence and the process of the actions and steps aimed to increase the effectiveness of the scientific activity. But one thing is clear: it is no more possible to observe the scientific activity separately from the opportunities aimed to evaluate its effectiveness provided by the Internet.

#### Modern Scientometric Indicators

In modern scientific world in the role of the standard of the effectiveness of scientific activity it is accepted to mention various factors establishing the quantitative characteristics of references. When speaking about the

reference indicator of scientific articles the so-called impact factor is usually mentioned, which is an important numeric indicator of the effectiveness of the scientific journal. This factor is calculated annually by the Institute of Scientific Information (ISI) (from 1961 onwards) and is published in the "Journal Citation Report".

The calculation of impact factor is done for a three-year period. So, the impact factor of the journal in 2016 is calculated by using the formula  $I_{2015}=A/B$ , where A is the number of those references during 2016 which were made in that journal in the articles published from 2014-2015, and B is the number of articles published in that journal from 2014-2015 (Zhukova, 2013).

The next scientometric indicator which is quite widely spread and famous is the so-called Hirsch index or h-index. It was suggested by an Argentine American physicist Jorge Hirsch in 2005. This index was initially suggested for the evaluation of the effectiveness of the scientific activity of physicists, however, Scopus started to use it as a universal scientometric indicator.

According to h-index, a scholar has an index of  $h$ , if  $h$  out of his  $N$  articles is cited at least  $h$  times, in case when each of the rest  $(N-h)$  articles is cited less than  $h$  times.

In other words, a scholar with an index of  $h$  has published  $h$  papers each of which has been cited in other papers at least  $h$  times.

H-index has its modifications: g-index, i-index, etc. The traditional impact index also has its modifications but they have still to be systematized. After all, all of them are represented as a unit absolutizing the quantitative characteristics of the references to the researcher's work (Bolotov, Kvelidze-Kuznecova, Laptev, & Mo-

rozova, 2014).

### The Effectiveness of Scientific Activity

Undoubtedly, this scientometric unit is an extremely important and irreplaceable element in the process of the description, analysis and interpretation of scientific journals, the works of authors and even Universities, the quantitative characteristics of the effectiveness of the scientific activity. However, we should not exaggerate and observe this "tool" as a previously unavailable environment providing the universal, comprehensive and brief description of the science image. Many researchers are sure that the scientometric assumptions based on the number of references can only serve as a means, and in no case can be represented as a complete, systematic standard for the final analysis of the scientific activity. For example, some specialists claim that the effectiveness of the scientific activity of the researcher can be evaluated only by appropriate professional expert groups, which, of course, can use the internationally accepted standard of scientometric indicators as a helping means and as a "necessary tool" (for example, Tomski, 2015 or Orlov, 2013). At least, there is hardly a researcher in the scientific community who will question the argument that the existence of centralized and specialized databases and scientometric indicators is extremely useful and opens wide horizons for the advancement of the scientific mind, as well as helps scholars socialize their ideas and share with a large number of interested audiences. Such claims emphasize the fact that scientific activity cannot and should not be limited. Following this logic, we should agree with the idea that sci-

ence should strive for some universalization, in terms of some factors and standards should become understandable and available for a large audience. In this respect, there are interesting researches which obviously point the advantages of popular scientific works to digital, published and, consequently in terms of availability, less available works (for example, Epshtein, 2006). However, such claims are unable to turn scientific communities, which are practically separated and delimited by objective barriers, into elements of a single unified system, artificially uniting various scientific fields and spheres which practically have no connection with each other. Even many of the existing modern systems of databases cannot solve this problem. Over the last decade even specialized databases have been split, because those responsible for them realize that they cannot (in fact, it is impossible to) be guided by the same or similar standards to evaluate, compare and describe the effectiveness of researches, journals and scientists representing various fields of science.

The most famous database system, WoS, has long been split into *Science Citation Index Expanded*, *Social Sciences Citation Index*, *Arts & Humanities Citation Index* and into other subdatabases, as the scientometric databases describing humanitarian and social sciences definitely cannot compete with the databases including natural science, especially medicine and other similar fields of science. However, this does not mean that the field of natural science has the absolute superiority. It just states that in terms of quantitative indicators researches in natural science react to objective developments and changes more quickly. And it could not be otherwise, as natural science is dependent on any minute and less

significant transformations of the objective reality, which very often require immediate and urgent solutions. While social-humanitarian researches can react comparatively slowly to such transformations, and in case of reacting can discuss, analyze and interpret the same realities an events for months, even years discovering new platforms and sub-elements.

### Instead of Conclusion

Next to the issues discussed above there is an objectively important sub-issue in modern scientific world. Even surface observations show that in terms of journals registered in leading international scientometric databases, and consequently from the perspective of the effectiveness of the scientific activity of researchers non-English speaking countries are in unfavorable conditions (Sargsyan, Ghazaryan, Iskandaryan, & Ayvazyan, 2010). The majority of countries try to solve this problem by introducing their own scientometric databases or equivalent systems, which inevitably leads to the increase in the percentage of self-reference. In Armenia such a perspective on the future of scientific researches outlines quite gloomy and vague horizons, especially if we take into account the lack and limitations of specialized scientific journals, conferences and other scientific environments. Of course, there are objective reasons for this, but this justification does not contribute to the increase in the effectiveness of the field of scientific researches. If the peculiarities of national scientific mind were not neglected, the attempts to find systemic solutions to this problem would be efficient, taking into account the international experience. Another solution is to give a boost to the scientific re-

search trends in cooperation with international researchers. However, taking comprehensive steps to increase the international reputation of local scientific journals is the most important thing, which will give Armenian researchers the opportunity to make the results of their researches available for their colleagues with very low expenses, thus becoming a part of a big global research company.

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## ANIMAL LEARNED GENETIC COGNITION AND THE LIMITS OF ANTHROPOMORPHIC APPROACH

### Abstract

This article discusses the cognitive function of instincts in animal world. The undertaken research demonstrates that the formation of individual's ability for a certain (complex) action requires having a corresponding specific inborn genetic capacity – the scheme of instinct for that action. Using anthropomorphic approach and the critical verification of its application, authors of this article have revealed the elementary inborn cognitive capacities lying at the basis of the main types of animals' learned behavior. Special attention is given to the inborn mechanism of animal learning by imitation. The suggested conception of the schemes of instinctive behavior is applied to the analysis of the level of cognitive skills that could be achieved by exercising and training.

*Keywords:* instincts, inborn capacities, scheme of an instinct, cognition, learned behavior, elementary cognitive capacities, animals' learning by imitation, abilities and skills.

### Introduction

In modern biological science, since the publication of the remarkable works of Konrad Lorenz, cognitive ethology occupies a prominent position<sup>1</sup>. Ethology can be defined as branch of biology studying animal behavior under natural conditions. By these times biologists have understood that there is few chance of revealing the true nature of ani-

mal behavior putting them into cages and suggesting unnatural tasks so characteristic for the period of radical behaviorism.

Readers of Lorentz works were influenced by details of his approach especially by his famous imprinting phenomenon. Readers were delighted with the picture of a group of goslings hastily following their "mother" - strolling Professor Konrad Lorentz. There was also a significant scientific achievement: Lorentz revealed the phases of animal instinctive action. Instinctive action begins with the perception of the triggering indicator, called the "releasing stimulus". The following rigid sequence of invariant instinctive actions Lorenz called fixed action pattern (FAP). Taken as a whole, the Lorentz concept of instincts was strictly evolutionary, fundamentally based on

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<sup>1</sup> The most influential publications of Conrad Lorenz include King Solomon's Ring, Routledge Classics (2002), Civilized Man's Eight Deadly Sins. Egmont Books (1973), Behind the Mirror: A Search for a Natural History of Human Knowledge, Mariner (1973), The Year of The Greylag Goose, Eyre Methuen (1979), The Foundations of Ethology, Springer (1981).

the principle of natural selection. "Among the driving forces of all organic formation, along with the processes of mutation and recombination of genes, natural selection plays the most important role," - wrote the founder of ethology (Lorenz, 1974).

Since the sixties of the last century the following general characteristics of instinctive behavior have been widely recognized:

- automaticity (a modern term for the rigidity of instinctive behavior),
- insuperability (in regard of individual's capacities),
- "maturation" at a certain point in the development of the individual,
- "launch" by some external indicator,
- the inherent nature for each species of animals,
- immutability for the period of activeness of the given instinct,
- not requiring any prior learning (Birney & Teevan, 1961).

Many aspects of cognitive psychology actually present philosophy of animal cognition especially when they discuss not only problems like sensual perception and memory but also such specific areas as animal reasoning and problem solving. Philosophy of animal cognition today is largely overlapped with *psychology of animal cognition*, *evolutionary psychology*, *cognitive ethology* and *theory of animal intelligence*. Quite naturally the philosophy and psychology of *human cognition* is far ahead of the theory of animal cognition. Consciously or unconsciously investigators of animal cognition use the results of theories of human cognition and human intelligence. Actually, this natural trend in cognitive ethology is a kind of anthropomorphism well known by its penchant for ex-

tremes. It raises doubts if wouldn't the present anthropomorphic approach to animal cognition land into errors of extremes.

Anyhow, to move forward with the strategic line of getting better understanding of animal behavior and cognition by applying anthropomorphic approach we have first to formulate strictly the means and basic principles of modern conception of human cognition. So we complete these introductory notes by a short outline of the basic statements of the theory of cognition and problem solving.

Let us start with a short overview of the theory of cognition. Cognitive system is a system composed of scope of initial (basic) knowledge capable to produce new knowledge. The history and philosophy of science prove that knowledge is a kind of relative truth that becomes more precise and reliable with the progress of sciences.

Knowledge is an answer to a certain question. The latter together with its context composes a problem. So producing knowledge requires solving intellectual problems. Producing new knowledge humans and animals achieve a better view of the world – a process which is called cognition.

Intellectual capacities we consider as the main basis of cognition and problem solving. From the standpoint of biology, mind is the cognitive function of the brain. It is not occasional that in everyday language having good mind means having brains. Thus we conclude that cognition, problem solving and intelligence are close synonyms.

From the evolutionary point of view, higher cognitive abilities provide better adaptation. Everyone could agree that cognition and knowledge are resultants of thought. But since there are more than a dozen interpreta-



tions and definitions of human thinking we will consider the term *thought* in its most narrow sense: *thinking* is first and foremost the process of searching answers to questions, the process of problem solving. Accordingly, psyche we interpret as the function of the brain for guiding organism's behavior. It is important also to take into account that humans have two levels of cognition – the sensory cognition and the abstract thinking.

Now some principle statements of problem solving approach to the processes and mechanisms of cognition. Problems are solved by problem analysis and solution synthesis (idea generation). The main means of problem analysis are

- concentration on the main factors of the problem,
- deduction of conclusions,
- division of the problem into sub-problems (by animals – extending the frame of main factors).

The above outlined problem solving approach helps to conceive that the level of (animal and human) intellect may be measured only by standard tests (by animals – in natural environment). In this line, one can define creativity as the ability for finding new solutions. In certain situations significant creative solutions are indispensable. But significant creative solutions are rare occasions in individual's life. So success is brought predominantly by good solutions backed by strong analytic abilities, sufficient amount of knowledge and will for problem solving.

In the following parts of this article we'll examine the applications of the above short sketch of the main statements of the theory of human cognition and problem solving to the main forms of animal cognitive activities thus

revealing the effectiveness of applying the critical anthropomorphic approach for understanding basic phenomena of animal cognition.

### Instincts and Animal Cognition

Philosophers and biologists fully agree that all the immense diversity of behavior of animals and humans belongs to two distinct classes – instinctive behavior and learned behavior. It is widely accepted today also that instinctive behavior has quite a rigid mechanism: it starts by perceiving a genetically recorded indicator (releaser) and continues in strict succession of genetically conditioned steps (actions). The genetic nature of instinctive rigid behavior, from the first glance, leaves no room for presuming a connection between inborn genetic behavior and cognitive processes.

Learned behavior by man and animal requires individual's experience and in one way or another presumes the presence of intelligence. In its simplest form, learned behavior could be gained by blind try and error activity. At this level there is no need for any high level cognitive capacity. Judging superfluously, learning by blind try and error activity needs only sensual perception and memory. But why should an individual keep on attempting errors after errors? So we should presume that to solve problems by try and error method animals need also a kind of special instinct, namely, *the instinct for finding solutions of problems*.

Frogs and lizards have no teachers to learn hunting. Instead they have the instinct of hunting. The instinct of hunting, as any other instinct, tells them in a *generalized* form: in

all cases of appearing releasing indicator (RI) follow the *scheme* of a corresponding instinctive action (IA). However, having the *general* rule of instinct is quite far from the ability to *generalize* personal experience. To be able to *learn generalization* an individual should be *endowed* by nature (by the genome of its species) the genetic instinct of generalization, more precisely, the *genetic instinctive scheme of generalization*.

Instincts of animal species comprise a fundamental encyclopedia of “knowledge” of their environment and means of survival accumulated by thousands and thousands of generations. The advantage of genetic instincts and inborn behavior are completely apparent: from the moment an individual comes to this world it knows the ways of survival – without spending a single minute of time for learning the huge scope of useful information stored in the genome of species.

Unfortunately, instinctive behavior adapted to certain environment becomes a serious disadvantage for animal species in a rapidly changing environment. In the periods of rapid environmental changes like Great Ice Age, animals could be helped by learned behavior giving a chance for adaptation to newly formed environmental conditions. Possibly, if there were no rapid climatic changes on the planet Earth the learned behavior and stronger cognitive capacities would not provide significant advantage in adaptation and to these days there would not appear yet on the Earth abstract thinking exercised by human intellect. On the other hand scarce food and fierce struggle for existence have greatly stimulated the appearance of species capable of learning behavior.

The behavior of animals and humans is divided into instinctive (genetic) and acquired (or learned) forms. The first of them is characterized as being inborn, sufficiently rigid, automatic scheme of behavior for each given biological species. The second type of behavior is based on the life experience of the individual. Within the framework of these characteristics, everything seems to be fairly clear, straightforward and not causing any discussions. Disagreements arise mainly in connection with the following question: how is principally possible the process of animal learning as such if a particular biological individual does not preempt the corresponding anatomical and physiological structures and mental qualities, in particular if he does not inherit in any form the acquired experience of the parents?

The answer to this fundamental question could be significantly facilitated if it was first considered in relation to man and then the answer, in the appropriate modification, were extended to all kinds of animals. The activity of a modern adult as a social being in general terms is characterized by a division of labor. Society is a conglomerate of people of various specialties. We can consider generally accepted the principle that *the effective and successful teaching of a given specialty requires the trainee to have a corresponding natural, innate capacity*. This conclusion becomes quite obvious if we consider modern school education. Specifying this reliable conclusion of the modern pedagogy, we can, as an intermediate prerequisite, adopt the following statement: the effective formation of a young specialist requires an *innate capacity for learning*.

As noted above, the classical instinct



contains the cognitive experience of previous generations of animals of this species. With the advent of learning behavior, animals acquire a new channel for gaining knowledge about the surrounding reality. It is quite clear that the higher is the rank of the animal species in terms of the level of development of the psyche, the higher is the possibility of learning behavior in this species and the more important is the role of the acquired experimental knowledge in the behavior and life order of this species. In this respect, the position of the human species is exceptional, since man's *ratio* can even overcome instinctive urges.

#### Learned Behavior and the Instinct of Making Conclusions

The instinct for finding solutions of problems may provide an individual certain advantage in the struggle for life if there would be made useful conclusions from problem solving experience. There are three ways of deriving conclusions in human logic of reasoning:

- Deductive (necessary) conclusions from given premises,
- Inductive conclusions (generalizations of empiric data),
- Conclusions by analogy, guessing a solution for a given case on the basis of the solution of a similar case.

Which of them could be revealed or presumed in animal behavior?

Humans and animals are continuously surrounded by “noises” – different kind of stimuli having some biological significance but not related directly to any concrete indicator of instinctive or learned behavior. If a spe-

cies of animals were not able ignoring noises it would spend enormous time and energy responding to noises and thus would be on the side of losers in the struggle for life. The huge amount of evidence of these arguments leads to the conclusion that in the animal world there must be an instinct (inborn genetic capacity) for distinguishing between “noise” and meaningful stimuli.

Since the noise of stimuli by its nature involves innumerable types of agents, there couldn't be any single releasing indicator for the noise discriminating instinct. So this instinct should be a scheme of instinct oriented not towards a concrete stimulus but rather towards the absence of all biologically relevant stimuli. The instinct of discrimination must also have a threshold, as it is in every classical instinct.

A special case of noise discrimination is presented by the behavioral phenomenon of habituation (Groves & Thompson, 1970; Bouton, 2007; Domjan, 2010). Due to constant changes in conditions of existence, important incentives and vital factors become insignificant, background conditions. In order to get rid of such a background noise, animals and humans have developed a protective mechanism of ignoring such “degenerate” stimuli, in behavioral sciences called *habituation*. As many observers have mentioned, an animal ceases responding to a stimulus that previously worked as an effective means of prediction just in the result of habituation.

Let us try mental modeling, suggesting possible schemes of algorithms for cognitive activities of animals. With such modeling, the psychological phenomenon of habituation can be represented by the following steps of the “inner discourse” of animals:

- A. When the first few cases of lack of confirmation of the utility of some form of response appear, put this form of response "under control", make it an object of careful consideration.
- B. If the number of unconfirmed cases exceeds the specified threshold value, then turn on the mechanism of habituation – an increasingly rare and less energetic response.
- C. In the rate of habituation, take into account the frequency of unconfirmed cases.

Of course, one can't be sure that just in this formulation the "algorithm of habituation" is written down genetically. Moreover, apparently, in different animal species the pattern of habituation is set by somewhat different formulations. The main thing here is that there is a certain quantitative threshold, after which the mechanism of habituation is turned on. This central moment of the phenomenon of habituation can be set by the following brief formulation: (B\*) "If the number of confirmed cases of the response error has reached a given threshold value, turn on the mechanism of habituation." And this is the scheme of inference by incomplete induction: if all cases considered confirm that objects S possess property P, then we can generalize "All S are P". Thus, we have established that *incomplete induction lies at the basis of the schematic of habituation*.

It remains to make sure that the formulated schematic of the phenomenon of habituation (B\*), identified through an anthropomorphic approach, can be realized at the level of animal sensory cognition. It is easy to see that all the elements of the short formulation of the schematic of the phenomenon of habit-

uation (B\*) - *threshold value, confirmed cases, erroneous reaction, the mechanism of habituation* – all of them without any difficulty can be realized at the level of animal sensory cognition.

The most known form of cognitive activity of animals, known to mankind from time immemorial and studied in detail by scientists, is the conditioned reflex. Non-specialists may ask why Academician Ivan Pavlov was awarded the Nobel Prize for research of the conditioned reflex in the salivation of dogs? In fact, according to the exact formulation of the Nobel Committee, the prize was awarded "in recognition of his work on the physiology of digestion, through which knowledge on vital aspects of the subject has been transformed and enlarged<sup>2</sup>".

The connection of the conditioned reflex with digestion discovered by Pavlov so captivated physiologists that in this subject several areas of research have been formed – like forward conditioning, simultaneous conditioning, second-order and higher-order conditioning, backward conditioning, temporal conditioning, zero contingency procedure, extinction – each of them requiring its theory, models and in certain cases also equations for quantitative assessments. Researchers have mentioned also that the conditioned stimulus has a predictive function (Dayan, Kakade, & Montague, 2000; Kirsch, Lynn, Vigorito, & Miller, 2004).

Yet, in the aspect of the learned behavior, the logic of the conditional reflex is as elementary as in the above case of habituation. This logic can be set by the following brief

<sup>2</sup> Pavlov, I. (1904). Nobel prize presentation ([www.nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/medicine/laureates/1904/](http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1904/))

formulation: (B\*\*) "If the number of cases when a stimulus S was observed before the given unconditional stimulus US has reached a given threshold value, turn on the mechanism of conditioned prediction." And this is the scheme of inference by incomplete induction: if all cases considered confirm that objects S possess property P, then we can generalize "All S are P". Thus, we have established that *incomplete induction lies also at the basis of the schematic of conditioned reflexes*.

Many ethologists have mentioned that animals have to face a multitude of stimuli in their natural environments, very few of which could be useful as predictors. Let us think up what kind scheme of algorithm could be helpful in choosing possible pretenders for being a useful predictor? As a first approximation to the answer, we suggest the following two steps:

- A. When the first few cases of some agents appear that precede a concrete unconditioned stimulus, put these agents "under control", considering them as probable predictors.
- B. If the number of observed cases where an agent under control has preceded the given unconditioned stimulus exceeds the specified threshold value, then turn on the mechanism of conditioned prediction.

We would like to mention also that the suggested schematics of the conditioned prediction (B\*\*) can be easily realized at the level of animal sensory cognition. All the elements of the suggested formulations – *threshold value, agents, observed cases, preceding cases, unconditioned stimulus* – without any difficulty, can be realized at the level of sensory cognition.

Some authors mention among the basic forms of animal behavior also the *learning by observation*. However, such an attitude does not seem convincing to us. In general, *all* learning is based on observation. The subject of learning is the behavior of the animal in the surrounding reality, and information about the extra-world can be obtained only by observation. One could single out learning by observation separately in its opposition to *imitation* learning. However, learning by imitation also takes "information" from observation, though this time not by observing natural phenomena, but mainly by keeping a watchful eye on parents, peers and other members of the pack. So let us concentrate on *learning by imitation*.

Serious studies of imitation in the animal world were started by Thorndike back in the late 19th century (Thorndike, 1911). Over the years, several theoretical models have been proposed for an adequate understanding of imitation: the hierarchical approach (Byrne & Russon, 1998), the structural approach (Whiten, 1998), the ethological analysis (Miklósi, 1999), the model of the mechanisms of imitation (Zentall, 2006), social-cognitive approach (Byrne, 2005), the theoretical-cognitive approach (Bates & Byrne, 2010). As a result, a non-strict concept of "true imitation" was formed, opposing it to associative learning by observation (Heyes & Ray, 2000; Heyes, 2000).

The complexity of the essence and mechanisms of learning by imitation has found its reflection in the terminology of publications. In an effort to emphasize the central role of imitation in the process of socialization, R. Byrne titled his article in the form of the famous slogan: "Social cognition: imita-

tion, imitation, imitation" (Byrne, 2005). Some authors, however recognizing the difficulties in the theoretical understanding of imitation, preferred to return to the common characteristic of imitation as "aping" (Whiten, Horner, Litchfield, & Marshall-Pescini, 2004).

Researchers have mentioned that imitation follows the observation of a concrete behavior (Frith & Frith, 2012). But few of them asked what makes animals to imitate the observed action. One can clarify this situation by comparing the *mechanical imitation* and imitation of behavior. In the first case, imitation occurs without any understanding of the meaning and purpose of the imitated action. Wherein, there are no guarantees that even if the copy were a complete one, the imitator would use it in right place and at the right time. The main hindrance here is that the imitator does not know the goal of the imitated action, as well as does not understand its essence.

Respectively, imitation can acquire some specific behavior, if the imitator envisions what his goal is. An even greater level of understanding is required for a more or less adequate representation of the essence of the imitated action. Since each concrete action can be represented as a solution to a particular problem, the essence of an action can be interpreted as a scheme for solving the corresponding problem.

Finally, as in all the above cases of the learning behavior, three more factors should be involved in the process of learning by imitation – observation, attention and motivation. Observation is the universal feature of the living organisms. Without motivation, there can be no action. Attention to the nearest envi-

ronment became a vital necessity with the advent of predators.

Now let us turn to the most effective means of cognitive activity – inferences by analogy. Being the weakest form of argumentative reasoning, analogy is indispensable as a means of discovering new ideas and solutions. All methodologists of science note the exceptional role of analogy in scientific discoveries and technical inventions (Harry, 203; Baron, 2008; Salmon, 2012). R. Djidjian even argues that the analogy is a universal means of finding solutions to all types of intellectual problems. He introduced the concept of "smart analogy", based on the essential characteristics of the objects being studied, which ensures the effectiveness of analogy when searching for the solution of the problems under study (Djidjian, 2004; 2011).

What about using analogies in animal cognition? Analogy is present in all forms of animal self-learning and independent search for solutions. The simple analogy can be presented by the following scheme of instinct: "Act as in the previous similar cases". But how could be assessed the similarity? This could be done only by understanding. So we come to the central problem of animal understanding. (See the following section.)

### The Inborn Capacity for Certain Activity

In general, every complex action, including cognitive action, has in its basis an appropriate instinct (or instinctive scheme). The main idea of this article is to introduce beside the classical instinct the conception "the instinct of a scheme of action". The classical instinct launches a complex succession of ac-

tions by a genetically recorded indicator (*re-leaser*). In contrast, the *instinct of a scheme* of action needs certain amount of experience and learning. The *inborn genetic instinct of a scheme* of action is a potential *capacity*. The cases of an individual's positive experience in the implementation of this action transform the given potential *capacity* (the potential genetic scheme of action) into effective ability and skill (acquired habit) to produce this action. Just this process of gaining positive experience in exercising the given inborn genetic scheme of action and transforming the given potential *capacity* (the potential scheme of action) into effective ability and skill (acquired habit) is called *learning*.

Learning is a cognitive action. As a *cognitive action*, it requires memory; as a *cognitive action*, it requires motivation. Learning as such requires also *attentive observation* – *attention* to what happens around, *observation* of environment. Positive reinforcement is important in learning since it is a means for increasing learner's motivation. Implying the conception of the schemes of instinct for action to the field of cognition one can conclude that *learning an action requires an inborn genetic potential capacity for this action*. In short, learning requires the instinct for learning.

The genetic instinct of the capacity to a certain type cognitive action (behavior) is radically different from the instinct of action in that that it requires learning, becomes ability only through learning. Using Immanuel Kant's terms one can propose that classical instinct is *a priori* (independent of experience) while the instinctive scheme (capacity) of a certain behavior is *a posteriori*, gained with the help of individuals experience.

The phenomenon of instinctive capacity to a certain action (or behavior) demonstrates itself in the *fast learning* of this action. In human learning it is qualified as having an inborn *inclination* (aptitude or talent). Best of all the inborn inclination is demonstrated by gifted (talented) children, especially in the fields of mathematics and musical performance.

The decisive role of inborn aptitude and giftedness in achieving highest level of performance is widely accepted in modern pedagogy. The heads of the educational sphere of the United States show a great understanding of the problem of educating gifted children. A federal Act suggests the following definition for giftedness: "The term "gifted and talented" when used in respect to students, children, or youth means students, children, or youth who give evidence of high performance capability in areas such as intellectual, creative, artistic, or leadership capacity, or in specific academic fields, and who require services or activities not ordinarily provided by the school in order to fully develop such capabilities<sup>3</sup>" (Johnsen, 2011, p. 7).

In modern pedagogy has received wide recognition the principle that giftedness is an inborn (we would say - genetic) intellectual quality which should be developed by educators into specific skill the highest demonstration of which is usually called talent (Gagne, 2000; Johnsen, 2011).

The giftedness of an individual is a potential capacity. Only hard work and exercises could transform it into high skilled talent. The role of systematic exercises is so significant that even experienced educators often have

<sup>3</sup> No Child Left Behind Act. P.L. 103–382, Title XIV, p. 388.



difficulties in setting apart the contribution of the inborn giftedness and hard training (Colwin, 2008; Gladwell, 2008).

Here arises the principle question: is there a limit for the strengthening the level of a certain action by appropriate exercises? Yes, this limit is contained in the definition of action. The instinctive capacity becomes an ability of performing the concrete action through learning by copying, while farther progress is made through self-learning. The latter could be realized by blind method of search and errors or by independent thinking using analysis and analogies (Djidjian, 2004).

The inborn inclination for certain activity is a potency, the content of which is realized (filled up) by accidental search and training. In large, it is the combination of instinctive behavior and learning. Apparently, every animal species has its own set of inborn inclinations.

“Talented” (more capable) animals (like humans):

- A. require less examples,
- B. achieve a higher skills,
- C. show creativity, find new methods of action.

At the same time, both qualities are genetically assigned since the speed of learning is determined by inborn inclinations for attention, interest, motivation, imitation, understanding, competitiveness. The level of mastery achieved is determined by the amount of training exercises.

However, even the highest level of mastery belongs to the given concrete form (or skill) of action. An animal and human individual can achieve a radically new form (or modus) of action through the constant search for new ideas and solutions either by blind

search, or by analogy. And this is what is called creativity.

From times of W. Kohler’s famous banana problem solving experiments with chimps (Kohler, 1927), there were few studies on animal creative behavior. The situation radically changed by the end of the past century (Goodall, 1986; Boinski, 1988; Griffin, 1992; Reader & Laland, 2003). Modern ethologists have got deeply involved into studies of animal creativity. All of them are fascinated by the creative insight of the macaque Imo who was first to wash potatoes before eating them – an invention that soon started the tradition potatoes washing in her troop. Researchers claim that they have established examples of innovations in primates, marine mammals, dogs, insects, and even birds and insects. Anyway, professional ethologists have to admit that recorded cases of animal creativity are rare – by primates about two dozen (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004).

A. B. Kaufman and J. C. Kaufman claim proposing the first model of animal creativity (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004). They call their conception of animal creativity “three-step pyramid”. Its first level comprises the ability to recognize the novelty; the second level is presented by observational learning. The third and highest level, “the actual ability to be innovative” authors define as the ability “to create a tool or a behavior that is new and different with the specific understanding that it is new and different” (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004).

By stressing the importance of “specific understanding” in the process of innovation, A. B. Kaufman and J. C. Kaufman hit the principle point of creativity. Unfortunately, rightly accentuating the principle importance

of understanding in creative innovation, they actually reject animal creativity. Because there is no scientific study proving that animals possess any level of understanding (Miklosi, 1999; Call & Tomasello, 1995; Whiten & Ham, 1992).

The well-known facts tell us that chimps can't learn human language (have not the instinctive capacity of building words), while parrots do not understand the words they hear and pronounce (since they have not the instinct of contextual use of words). So it can be concluded that *besides the general instinct of learning there are instincts for learning a special type of action (behavior) and these are the instinctive capacities for certain actions*.

Moreover, Henri Fabre's striking experiments demonstrate unconditionally that there is no trace of understanding in the most complex and "purposeful" activities of insect (Fabre, 2002). Is not enough the example of the chimp behavior, who, imitating a person, extinguishes a small fire with a wet cloth, to conclude that he has no understanding of his actions?

And how it could be other way if we humans are so far from understanding human understanding?

### Conclusions

In general, every complex action, including cognitive action, has in its basis an appropriate instinct (or instinctive scheme). The main idea of this article is to introduce beside the classical instinct the conception "the instinct of a scheme of action". The classical instinct launches a complex succession of actions by a genetically recorded indicator, in

modern terms – the *releaser*. In contrast, the *instinct of a scheme* of action needs certain amount of experience. This process of gaining positive experience in exercising the given scheme of action is called *learning* (or learning behavior).

Learning is a cognitive action. As a *cognitive action*, it requires memory; as a *cognitive action*, it requires motivation. Learning as such requires also *attentive observation* – *attention* to what happens around, *observation* of environment. Positive reinforcement is important in learning since it is a form of increasing learner's motivation. Implying the conception of the schemes of instinct for action to the field of cognition one can conclude that learning an action requires an inborn potential capacity for this action. In short, learning requires the instinct for learning.

The instinct of the capacity to a certain type (cognitive) action (behavior) is radically different from the instinct of action in that that it requires learning, becomes ability only through learning.

The capacity to a certain action is set genetically, its implementation occurs due to the minimum number of examples, and the level of development of the ability is determined by the training exercises.

There are three basic schemes of the learned action – the conditioned reflex, learning by imitation and self-learning by analogy. The *seeds* of deduction are present are present in the structure of conditional reflexes. We saw incomplete induction in the basis of learning by imitation.

Learning an action requires an inborn potential capacity for this action. The capacity of learning itself requires the instinct for learning.

There are no limits for critical anthropomorphic approach to animal cognition. Anthropomorphism is the best heuristic for understanding animal psychology. It requires only introducing critical corrections to exclude all the presumptions of human abstract thinking and conceptual understanding by animals.

Analogy is present in all forms of animal self-learning and independent search for solutions. The simple analogy in animal cognitive capacity can be presented by the following scheme of instinct: "Act as in the previous similar cases".

The phenomenon of instinctive capacity to a certain action (or behavior) demonstrates itself in the *fast learning* of this action. In human learning it is qualified as having an inborn *inclination* (aptitude or talent). Best of all the inborn inclination is demonstrated by gifted (talented) children, especially in the fields of mathematics and musical performance.

Apparently, every animal species has its own set of inborn inclinations.

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An animal and human individual can achieve a radically new form (or modus) of

action through the constant search for new ideas and solutions either by blind search, or by analogy. And this is what is called creativity.

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## SOCIAL, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

## THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN BEING IN POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHY

## Abstract

The originality of postmodernism consists in the negation of the intellectual achievements of previous eras and losing the continuity of the problems of human existence, thus, losing the search for its solution. So, it is forced to justify its postulates and methodology by the way of reflection. How can the individual in the case of the negation of philosophical ontology, epistemology and logic make more or less adequate reflection and comparative analysis? Last resort is found in philosophical methodology, which remained beyond criticism of adherents of postmodernism as their different sentences can be considered as a product of detailed methodological postulates. The methodology is veiled by the concept of "**discourse**", i.e. the characteristics of Postmodernism as a special spiritual attitude and ideological orientation, expressed in "**image I**" possessing certain connectedness and immersed in a socio-cultural, socio-psychological and other contexts. However, in the postmodernists is implicitly shown the methodological function of philosophy in the formation of the "**reflexive consciousness**" and "**social reflection**" as of the two fundamental determinants of human existence in the post-industrial society.

*Keywords:* philosophy of postmodern, structure of human being, reflexive consciousness, methodology.

Postmodernism is a relatively recent phenomenon, and its age is defined in different ways, but it is clear that it is the culture of post-industrial, information society and is represented as a special spiritual state and mentality as a way of life and creation, and, perhaps, the new era of which one will judge in the case of the following era, as it has happened in history. If the adherents of previous epochs are mainly engaged of its implementation of theirs vision of human destination - as a demiurge of social and cultural reality, originality of postmodernism consist in the negation of the achievements of previous eras and losing the continuity of the problems of hu-

man existence and thus loses the search for its solution, it is forced to justify its postulates and methodology by the way of self-reflection.

A prerequisite for the criticism of the traditional Western European way of thinking with its "logocentric tradition" is the principle of "**decentration**" – overcoming the fundamental principle of European cultural consciousness – the principle of "**centration**" that penetrates virtually all the spheres of intellectual activity of European Human:

- **in Gnoseology and Psychology** - it leads to a ratiocentrism, the primacy of discursive-logical consciousness over all other

forms;

- **in Cultural Studies** - to Eurocentrism, converting the European social practices and mindset in line with the criteria for the assessment of other cultures,
- **in History** - to futurocentrism emanating from that historic moment is always the "best", "progressive" over the past, and its role - "preparation" of the better and more enlightened epochs in the future;
- **in Worldview** - to substantialistic reductionism postulating the existence of a certain stationary source entity, which needs embodiment in a particular material;
- **in Philosophy** - of its view of the subject as a kind of center of semantic irradiation, which "externalizes" in the object;
- **in Linguistics** - the idea of the primacy of the signified, which fastened by means of the signifier, or primary of the denotation with respect to the connotation;
- **in Literary criticism** - is the concept of "content", which is preceded by a "form of expression" or the concept of the author's unique "personality", "soul" of which the material otherness is a product;
- **in Positivism** (in its causal-genetic "mythologeme") - any work has a reason (Derrida, 2000).

The philosophy of postmodernism opposes itself especially Hegel, whose philosophy is based on the categories such as "single, whole", "universal", "absolute", "being", "truth", "reason", "progress", etc., seeing in it the highest point in Western rationalism and logocentrism. In this sense, it is a philosophical movement that can be defined as Anti-Hegelianism, which is leaning towards extreme subjectivism (sub-

jectless subjectivism), relativism and pluralism.

The forerunners are of the philosophy of postmodernism is Nietzsche, Heidegger, Weber, Sartre, Camus, etc. The first of them rejected Hegel's systematic way of thinking, opposing his thinking in the form of small fragments, maxims, aphorisms and sententias from the standpoint of extreme nihilism, whit the loss of faith in the mind of man and humanism.

In Sociology – Max Weber with his theory of ideal types, which are distinguished not through inherent social characteristics, and are designed exclusively for research purposes as a tool of knowledge and social management. Heidegger advocated reappraisal and the abandonment of the fundamental concepts of classical philosophy.

For the French existentialists Human is not a manifestation of given essence, but is an individually realized project.

Postmodern philosophy refuses from:

- a) the consideration the world as a whole with the unifying center or substance: the world is divided into many pieces, between which there are no stable connections;
- b) the category of being, which in previous philosophy was "the last foundation" indisputable credibility of thought and must give place to language - the only being that can be cognized;
- c) the concept of truth, revises the previous understanding of knowledge and cognition, it rejects scientism and resonates with agnosticism;
- d) from recognition of the man as a subject of activity and knowledge, from anthro-

pocentrism (man as center of the universe and the purpose of all events in the world) and humanism.

The world including man is perceived as a "chaos" of endless individual phenomena and events which originally reflect in the consciousness of every human being, and the man himself in his singularity and uniqueness of the universe, also is a collection of individual endless manifestations ("**individual**" here becomes "**dividual**"), which acts here and now, rather than in the past or in the future (see Derrida, 2000).

The approach of the old philosophy of man as a "**universal subject**" of knowledge and action, capable in some approximation to understand the essence of life and act according to its rules, is replaced by the task of each individual to form his own vision of the world and of themselves, as well as the "**others**" in order to ensure their participation in group interaction.

In another approach, the idea of the "death of the subject", according to L. Althusser follows that man - as a phenomenon in all its complexity of its manifestations and relations with the world - due to the fact that he is already the result of theoretical reflection, not its starting point, is cannot be explanatory principle in the study of a "social whole" (Baudrillard, 2015).

Person or separate human in the post-modern receives two opposing definitions:

1. the person is not the starting point, is a result of the socio-cultural environment, a chaotic reflection of this chaos;
2. the socio-cultural environment itself is composed of chaotic actions of separate persons - the actors of this environment.

According to these approaches for **Baud-**

**rillard** is a **simulacra** (Simulacrum in Latin - the image, likeness) as a results of the process simulation, interpreted it as "a product of hyper-real" using the real models that do not have their own origins and reality.

To be completed or "pure simulacrum" the image passes through a series of successive stages:

1. "it is the reflection of a basic reality;
2. it masks and distorts the basic reality;
3. it masks the absence of a basic reality;
4. it has no relation to any reality;
5. it is its own pure simulacrum" (Furs, 2012).

Under the influence of simulation the "replacement of the real at the signs of this reality" takes place resulting in simulacrum, and which in principle does not correlate with reality directly, if in generally may by correlated with anything, besides with other Simulacres.

Actually, this is the fundamental property of the simulacra.

Thus, the person in the world is a kind of landmark formation which does not have any object correlation and exists only in personal mind.

Since simulacra arises on the basis of cultural and other unconscious (when a person goes through primary socialization stage) and is comprehended in the process of personal formation, the significant role here becomes "**everyday life**" (or in terms of the post-modernists "**quotidian**") a set of direct contacts with the environment and the realization of value preferences.

Therefore, the postmodern in sociology and the humanities is designed to redirect the philosophy with traditional issues (dealt mainly by "sub specie aeternitatis" - from the

"point of view of eternity"), on the problems of everyday life, where most vital processes occur that, usually, escape from rational analysis.

Moreover, according to **Bourdieu**, each social group is distinguished by its way of life, manners, thinking, feeding; it depends on their own traditions, even when they want to avoid, and group preferences and tastes, even aesthetic, predetermined political and philosophical and other views (Bourdieu, 1993).

The foregoing also applies to the individual, which is unique and inimitable, and in condition of post-industrial society obtained relatively maximum freedom of choice is not only a profession, but a way of life (including gender) and the basis for selection are:

1. "**reflective consciousness**" (for self-knowledge and self-esteem)
2. "**social reflection**" (for the understanding and evaluation of the "others").

Lacan formulated and theoretically substantiated the existence of the structure of the human mind as a complex, contradictory interaction of components: the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real (Lacan, 2005).

**Imaginary** - is the set of illusory notions that man creates of himself and which plays an important role in mental protection, or rather, self-defense.

**Symbolic** - the sphere of social and cultural norms and beliefs that the individual learns mostly unconsciously, to be able to exist normally in this society it.

**Real** - this is an area generated biologically and psychically sublimated needs and impulses, which not given to the individual consciousness in rationalized form that is accessible for him.

In general terms, we are interested in the

meaning of the Symbolism: when a person enters the symbolic kingdom, he finds it in the form of the Father (with his name and prohibitions) and the "third term" of the primary. The basic "human relations" and "others" mean for him an acquaintance with culture as a social and linguistic institution of human existence.

The question arises, as in the denial of philosophical ontology; epistemology and logic can ensure each individual is more or less adequate reflection and comparative analysis?

Last resort - is a philosophical methodology, which remained beyond criticism adherents of postmodernism, because their different sentences are a product of the detailed methodological postulates.

The methodology is veiled by the concept of "**discourse**" - the characteristics of the postmodernism as a special spiritual attitude and ideological orientations, expressed in the whole "**image I**" possessing a certain connectedness and immersed in a socio-cultural, socio-psychological and other contexts.

However, in the postmodernists implicitly is shown the methodological function of philosophy in the formation of the two fundamental determinants of human existence in the post-industrial society:

- "**reflexive consciousness**"
- "**social reflection**".

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## CREATIVE POTENTIAL OF HUMANISM

## Abstract

The article analyzes the gist and certain specific features of contemporary humanism, reveals its creative and unifying potentials, and sheds light on the role it plays in solving the global problems the humanity faces in the current complicated and critical period of the development of civilization.

*Keywords:* humanism, civilization, creative potential, spiritual unity of the mankind, global problems of today, challenges of the new millennium, antipodes of humanism, confrontation, de-humanization, terrorism.

Humanism as a fundamental worldview concept, a unique and comprehensive teaching, formed back in the Renaissance era, has covered a long and prolific way. One of the key problems of philosophy, it has not only proved viable through the historical evolution, but, having enriched itself with the achievements of the philosophical-theoretical thought and the live practice of the social progress, has deepened its content and acquired unprecedented importance in our days. It is hard to name another philosophic category that would define the distinctive features and the gist of one or another historical epoch so precisely and profoundly, and would assess the progressiveness and social ripeness of one or another society.

Given the new challenges and threats the mankind has been facing lately, the problem of humanism became particularly actual. The historical path of the mankind evidences that in any historical epoch, the human society encountered risks that needed to be neutral-

ized for the sake of the further progress of civilization. This tendency has grown into kind of regularity, particularly critical at the current phase of the world history, having no analogues in terms of the extent and gravity of the impending challenges. Menacing are the dimensions of such antipodes of humanism as proliferation of nuclear technologies and militarization of the cosmic space, military conflicts and environmental collisions, increasing negative consequences of the scientific and technological progress, gradual depletion of natural resources, exhaustion of biological resources of the planet Earth, fast and uncontrolled growth of the world population, underproduction of life necessities, developmental lag and poverty in some countries and regions, high level of illiteracy and other negative facts which remain our companions to date. In the modern world, contrary to the logic of historical evolution, political and military collisions, various types of violence, acute socio-economic contradictions,

national (ethnic) and religious (confessional) intolerance and other prejudices are still to be observed. These risks are of comprehensive, global nature, threaten the entire mankind, its existence per se, which is why the struggle against them acquires increasing actuality, becomes a general problem for all the nations and peoples. To withstand it, people need to consolidate around common goals, unite their material and spiritual potentials.

To overcome the global crisis that fell to the lot of the mankind in the new millennium, new ideas conformable with the ripe problems and inner needs of the epoch, a new model of world perception and assessment of life values should be developed and introduced in the public consciousness to achieve ideological-political transformation of the contemporary society, to instil humanistic principles of activity, to bring countries and peoples together around common goals, panhuman values and harmonizing interrelations, to create a world without wars and conflicts. Most likely, exactly such prospects of evolution of the humankind had in mind the renowned German philosopher and sociologist Jurgen Habermas when remarking that, if in the XIX-XX centuries, man showed himself as an uncompromising and conflicting being, in the new century he ought to show readiness for accord and compromise.

Among the basic and enduring values, lofty and fundamental ideas, around which the mankind can rally, the ideas of humanism take their deserving place thanks to their significance and life-affirming potential, optimism and mobilizing power, consonance with the vital necessities of the current phase of the evolution of the civilization, with the very spirit of the new epoch.

Humanity has stepped into a radically new, unusual phase of historical development, which most characteristic feature is the unprecedented dynamics of the social progress, deep and radical changes occurring in the world, affecting all the spheres of life, the very basics of human existence. However, these changes and processes are quite contradictory and alarming. The new, technogenic civilization has made the life much more comfortable, yet in no way more humane. The mankind appeared before the lure of hedonism and conformism. Thirst of gain and consumer's psychology root themselves; unrestrained individualism and egoism become dominant, substitute collectivism and altruism.

The modern world, which has become an arena for collisions of confronting socio-political and religious-ethnic forces, cannot but disturb and worry. Numerous are the cases of humiliation and disparagement of the interests of small nations and countries. People get estranged from each other, distance themselves from the spiritual values. The cult of violence, brutal force and cruelty is being imposed which, coupled with avidity and thirst of gain, with other negative manifestations that have risen to the top of the scale of values, dissociate people, drain their forces, create an atmosphere of all-round confrontation. Positioned in the center of spiritual-moral reflections, humanism appeared before a fateful alternative, called to determine how much humane a human being will become, how much he will serve his lofty purpose.

The modern progress in science and technologies leads to the formation of a global world. Globalization has become a total, undeniable factor of the world development, relying on the new – informational phase of the

scientific-technological revolution, which, having penetrated the sphere of information, directly affects the creation, processing, preservation and transmission of information on a global scale.

When the mankind came across the crisis phenomena of the contemporary civilization, the new social realities and challenges of the third millennium, it felt the need for mastering the humanistic legacy of the past, apprehending the classic humanistic values<sup>1</sup>, on the one hand, and, on the other, the need to develop new approaches to the problem of humanism, a new humanistic paradigm, stemming from the specifics of our epoch, from novel socio-historical realities and man-society interrelations, from serious and sizeable problems, and to offer rational ways out of the crisis society, dependable methods and models of solving the ripe problems. This is what we call “rational humanism”.

<sup>1</sup> The comprehensive problem of humanism we reduce to its three topmost, fundamental aspects. The first of them – the theoretical-philosophical, common worldview aspect, proceeds from the perception of man as the paramount creature of nature, an absolute value, the unique center of the Universe. The second aspect of the problem is a humanistic imperative; it focuses on the creation of such conditions in the world that would ensure an individual's free and unimpeded evolution, full-fledged manifestation of creative aptitudes, physical and spiritual potentials. The third is the ethical aspect of humanism, based on the inculcation of humanistic principles and norms in the interrelations between nations and peoples, all the humans, on the unconditional observance of the principles of humanistic ethics by all the individuals and the world community.

What is the basic content of modern humanism? Which are the fundamental principles and value criteria the new teaching shall be built upon?

The core of the new humanist paradigm is its secular content. It is a scientific materialistic worldview, firmly standing on the pedestal of the thinking mind, reason, relying on the achievements of the modern science, and opposing any manifestation of anti-intellectualism and irrationalism. The strength and viability of modern humanism stem from its scientific nature and rationality<sup>2</sup>. Rationality as a more substantive feature of the new pan-human teaching, acquires a unique and unalterable value. “If we dare again to look for the light of reason”, A. Schweitzer writes, ‘we will not degrade down to the level of the generation incapable of any enthusiasm, but will burst out with a grand and profound passion of grand and profound ideals” (Schweitzer, 1973, p. 83). For that reason, the new era of civilization should start with shaping the contemporary humanistic worldview – the “thinking worldview”, since “only permanent appealing to the thinking worldview can arouse all the spiritual aptitudes of a human being” (Schweitzer, 1973, p. 82), only through deepening of the thinking worldview is it possible to get out of the dense woods, where we've got lost (Schweitzer, 1973, p. 84). In general, “any real progress in the world is eventually predetermined by rationalism” (Schweitzer, 1973, p. 84).

<sup>2</sup> We are convinced that rationality – not in the generally accepted, but in the broad sense of the world – does not only underlie the social reality, the “human's world”, but makes an indivisible feature of all existent, of the Universe as a whole.

An important feature of modern humanism is its panhuman, planetary orientation, for which typical are both dissemination of the fundamental principles of the humanistic worldview at the global developments, and its openness – in certain dimensions – for interaction with diverse philosophical, moral, environmental, political and other doctrines and programs. In this respect, of special value is elaboration of norms of global ethics for the global society. This will give every member of the society an opportunity to rise above the narrow-minded day-to-day interests, moving to the foreground the panhuman interests (see “Humanist Manifesto 2000”, 1999).

Yet another substantial specificity of the new humanist paradigm is the new perception of interrelations between different nations and peoples, cultures and civilizations, the non-traditional approach to their communication and collaboration, the innovative understanding of their role and significance.

The striving for national and cultural seclusion, the nihilistic, negative attitude and, the more so, intolerance to other cultures contradict the spirit of the new time, the evolution of cultures. No culture, for all its uniqueness and value, is self-sufficient and perfect, able to seclude in its shell. Any culture needs to cross own narrow borders, communicate and collaborate with other cultures, and through active communication and collaboration to unveil its hidden creative potentials.

Given this, utterly important are the interrelations between humanism and globalization, the latter being a complex phenomenon with inherent diverse manifestations. As a total phenomenon, void of spiritual-moral senses, it often paves its way as brutal, blind and impersonal social elements with no hu-

manistic charge whatsoever, deaf and indifferent to the spiritual constituent of the human life, to the fate of an individual and whole nations and peoples. It is all important not to allow that globalization led to spiritual impoverishment of generations, levelled the specificities of cultures and civilizations, created uniformity, deleted the national (ethnic) and religious (confessional) distinctions, eliminated the linguistic and cultural diversity.

The ideas of humanism are capable of building secure bridges between the dissociating vectors in the social, cultural, ethnic and religious-confessional spheres, thereby contributing to the collaboration of countries and to the well-being of peoples.

Only the life-asserting ideas of humanism, the combined efforts of civilizations and cultures, imbued with the spirit of mutual understanding and solidarity, the sober and viable forces of the modern community are able to withstand the negative manifestations of globalism, its “side effects”, to channel the blind and elemental processes of globalization into the fruitful field of the rational. No doubt, it would promote achieving the goals, included in the “Millennium Declaration” (year 2000), which has set guidelines for all the nations to create a more harmonious and better world in the XXI century. In this context, quite valuable and encouraging are the persistent and vigorous efforts of some countries of the former USSR, particularly of the Russian Federation, towards intensification of the integration processes in the Eurasian region, consolidation of the peoples in that region around grand and long-term plans.

One of the cornerstones of the new humanistic teaching is the principle of negation

and elimination of violence from public life, while the fate of the humanistic ideal is associated with the denial of the ideas of suppression and hegemony. Violence, intolerance and confrontation are unreliable advisers, they cannot lead to truthful and fair decisions. Conflicts are not solved in such ways, but only smoothed down for some time to break out again, still further complicated and exacerbated, fraught with severer and graver consequences.

In such spirit shall advance the struggle between polar and mutually negating ideas. The idea of “new thinking” is taking deeper roots around the world. It relies on the concepts of primacy of panhuman, global values and problems over one-sided, class approaches, the superiority of common civilizational processes over formational ones<sup>8</sup>. These ideas are reflected in the new perception of the global problems, in the interpretation of progress (including scientific-technological) from the perspective of “human dimension”, in the acknowledgement of priority of man and humanism, in such notions about the new civilization, where man and man’s evolution becomes “an end in itself”, “a criterion for everything”.

For the global processes happening today, relevant is the analysis of the tendencies of integration from the humanistic standpoint, since they bring about formation of a new community on the bases of humanity and democracy, of a radically new civilization, which over centuries and millennia has been

the dream of the major philosophic trends.

The main mission of the humanistic philosophy is to direct its creative potential towards “exaltation” of man, the interdisciplinary, complex cognition of man applying methodologies of various sciences and arts, having radically changed the priority system in the cultural and social spheres. Not the artificial, mechanical consolidation of different philosophical trends, teachings and schools, not their merger within a “single metasystem”, but the common humanistic orientation and pathos, capable of overcoming intolerance and confrontation, will lead to a unique panhuman philosophy, to the formation of “philosophical ecumenism”. And, as a result, the deep-laid sacrament of the human existence will become a reality, a spiritual unity of the whole mankind will be created, in which the paramount synthesis of the humanistic philosophy will be achieved.

This humanism is also destined to corroborate the anthropocentric view of the world as a common cradle of human civilization, to instill in the people’s minds that, given the differences and peculiarities, caused by worldview, ethnic, religious, cultural and other circumstances of the socio-historical development, they belong to the single human family, bear the same panhuman ideas, values and ideals, are bound together with common goals, common historical fate, that “Gens una sumus”<sup>9</sup>, and “Homo homini deus est”<sup>10</sup>.

Humanism will save the world.

<sup>8</sup> See academician I.T. Frolov’s works, particularly, his last interview “The Enigma of Life and the Sacrament of Man: Quests and Delusions”, “Voprosy filosofii”, 1999, № 8, pp. 36-60, (<http://www.frolov-it.ru/interview.html>).

<sup>9</sup> “We all are one family”.

<sup>10</sup> “Man to Man is God”.

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## PROMOTION OF HEROIC CHARACTER AS SOCIAL SCIENCE AND EDUCATION TASK

### Abstract

The article analyzes the catastrophic moods in some segments of Armenian society. This occurs due to the ongoing war, lack of faith in the future, loss of social orientation. The Armenian society does not feel care on the part of the ruling class, do not see its responsibility, feels helplessness in the face of external and internal threats, and, therefore, is in confrontation with the ruling class. And here is the new phenomenon of mass heroism of the people as a response to the catastrophic situation and reliance on heroes as saviors of the nation. Social science and education should more closely examine this phenomenon and try to make the heroism more meaningful and much full of sense.

*Keywords:* catastrophism, heroism, society, ruling class, education, social science.

### Catastrophic Mentality as a Fear of the Future

The modern world faces the growing level of military conflicts and crises, to which the world community has no means to answer. The main cause of the situation is that the response appears only when it's too late, when metastases of a crisis are already spread throughout the whole region or country. Late reactions cause the growth of the catastrophic mentality, which is based on the fear of the future. The future is perceived as a catastrophe. Fear, expectation of the negative events and processes that are likely to happen, play today an important and, in some cases, even a crucial role in public and global reality perception. It is a vicious circle: even in the absence of the visible traits of negative phenomena, catastrophic mentality projects the fears

and creates the attitude. A major source of fear is information, which a person draws from cultural and social society institutions, especially from the media, educational institutions, art and literature, which are today full of false insinuations. Giant growth of the value of this information, its fundamental inclusiveness and global scale, especially when the computer networks and multichannel TV become an ordinary thing, the sophisticated potential impact of the modern mass media on the consumer – is the factor of the utmost importance for the growth of mass fears in modern societies.

Nowadays the vector of catastrophism has been steadily shifting from the fear of natural disasters to the fear of the mankind itself, the fear of those destructive forces concealed in an individual, within the organizations, institutions, communities, and the forc-



es unleashed on the individual and group levels. The philosophy shifted to the reflections on the destructive beginning hidden in a human, in the depths of his personality. This trend finds its expression in a new humanistic and ecological worldview, which makes a person feel guilty about the environment and fear of his own destructive activity.

Let's look at the problem from the scientific point of view. The hypothesis of techno-humanitarian balance has acquired more credibility in science. It states that with the strengthening of the new types of technological weapons and the emergence of the new threats to a society, the last responds by deploying and harnessing the new forms of social and human behavior, performing the function of protection against anthropogenic threats. The society inevitably is changing in response to these threats. There are new values and norms of behavior, institutions, and programs that prevent catastrophic trends. It happens not by itself, but as a result of the conscious and deliberate actions of groups of people who feel responsible for the future.

From the scientific point of view (the theory of complex non-equilibrium systems with non-linear laws of development, which represents the society), the world has created an unstable and paradoxical situation: the world is on the threshold of the transition phase, which is already visible to the naked eye. The laws of functioning of nonequilibrium systems are based on the principles of cyclicity and regularity. They state that the development of such systems takes place through a series of ups and downs, their disasters and outputs. In relation to the society, this means that the world will have to increase its sociogenous, humanitarian component as a

reaction to the excessive development of the means of the armed violence.

Mental stability and anxiety of the population of Armenia, living in conditions of smoldering war and especially in potentially dangerous areas, is largely determined by the critical level of population density and the country's defensive capability. If this level is maintained and supported, a sense of security and confidence in the future of the region is high. Today this level is insufficient. The population of the RA is rising the representatives of catastrophism (Catastrophic mentality).

In addition, the international geopolitical environment, which is becoming more and more intense especially against migrants, including Armenians, contributes to the anxiety growth. Migrants, residing in a number of countries have become subjects to the pressure from the indigenous population of these countries, and this pressure increasingly takes on the color of religious nationalism. In these countries the growing atmosphere of anger is generated by the growing social polarization and the potential threat of inter-ethnic conflicts. However, this has become already a reality: such conflicts arise more and more often. Shortly, the situation became explosive, and the consequences can be disastrous on a large scale. All these processes clearly affect the mentality of the population of the Republic of Armenia. The media also creates a negative impact on the consciousness of the population.

The advanced part of the society is trying to develop a new philosophy of public (world) development that would allow rather than to avoid disaster, but at least to minimize losses. However, the demand for the new



forms of the sociality is significant. At the same time, society in the midst of the major phase of the disaster will be more stable if its new meanings will have to rely on some continuity with the past. Among those principles and regulations, which will have to be updated in the frames of the socio-humanitarian ideology, and which seems to be useful and important pillars of the society are the rule of law, the doctrine of human rights, democratization of public life etc. But, alas... Even if they are looked through a prism of new knowledge and, consequently, receive the new content, they are insufficient in the time of military conflicts and crises.

The world community has no major holistic project of deploying such human viability, where each person would have his role or even more, would become a constructive element in this project. In the absence of such project people do not need each other, and therefore, the concepts of the overpopulation of the planet are born, mutual destructive wars are multiplying. But where is perdition, there is also salvation.

The social system can be considered as a self-organized and vibrant integrity where the stable phases in the development are periodically replaced by the catastrophes. One of the essential features of this system, in contrast to the natural life, is the fact that the human community can regulate these processes himself. It needs quite another thing.

### The Birth of a Hero

In these times society needs a strong powerful heroic leader to establish stable long lasting peace in the world. These leaders who serve as a model to people show the way out

of the blind alley of selfishness, hatred and greed. Up to now neither science nor education has paid any serious attention to seeking or bringing up such leaders or even studying the conditions of their appearance. Today the world is craving for renovations. But only heroic strong-willed personalities can change rotten living conditions of people.

Modern ruling classes of many societies, including Armenia, are where hypocrisy and market relations have full reign. They always strive for full permanent control over the process of the public consumption and consequently over the consumers themselves. They need totally controlled individuals living according to "the law of consumption" and not asking questions about the rules and guidelines, they need people of the same shape, the puppets, who put material above all in every situation. Similar modern materialistic society of mass consumption is pagan in itself. But this society is a dream and goal for modern ruling classes. They are being known as more pagan as traditional pagan cultures, worshipping only few objects - the Golden calf and pleasure.

They want that every object designated for consumption would become the special icon and therefore turn into a specific object of worshipping i.e. consciously or unconsciously become deify. Science or TV shows, cars and new movies, art or country house, film stars and detergents, sportsmen and fashion houses, the latest model of vacuum cleaner and bestseller, a football team, a new model of a mobile phone, ideological slogan, and an aluminum can of beer and so on can become icons for different social groups. But money and people's bodies are on the top of this huge pantheon. "Their consumer's socie-

ty" is not and do not need to accept anything heroic at principle. That is because the "heroism" is the triumphant demonstration of the immortality of spirit over the temporal illusion of the body.

Ruling classes of Armenia rely on modern western overwhelming paganism, which states that any object of consumption is an icon, capable of making quasi- miracles. It means that somewhere deep inside the paganism there is a permanent tentative of the turning an object-icon into a "hero", deceitful hero and this is done by means of a constant desecralisation of a person, turning him into unspiritual creature. That is why a true hero is not only useless in such society, and, moreover, he is dangerous, very dangerous for these ruling classes. They are afraid of true heroism in the society as they try to suppress real cult of heroes. Instead there is a carefully planned process of turning heroism into a bureaucracy. There is a whole industry of mass production of virtual heroes, quasi-heroes, and false images. The society of mass production and mass consumption is based on the prediction and the frame of mind of millions of tame people. But a hero is not under control when in action, because the heroism is first of all a special, mysterious form of consciousness and only then the heroic action is the event.

But Armenian people, despite their ruling class's desire, continue to create real heroes. And at the same time of catastrophism they need these heroes. Every person deep in his heart longs for the divine light, the unknown expectation of something unusual, unexpected, the yearn for long-lasting strive for heroism like a faraway cry of the buried but still free and alive soul.

Heroism is creative not in the narrow

sense of this word, but also in the sense of the creation the "stream of life." The Hero by the definition is the person who breaks the frames of the conventional routine, who kills profanity by his existence, who becomes the creative example not only in space but also in time. But the ruling class needs the stability of senseless boredom and hoarding, not the active creative mind, indefinite one. But what is more important is that on their principle there couldn't be any heroism as a phenomenon. There dominate only miserable little men, obsessed by the passion for accumulation, living from one attempt of intercourse to another, who call "terrorist" anyone who doesn't allow to destroy his faith, his people, human dignity.

The paradox of the Armenian society is that it is living, while his ruling class is dying out. The paradox is that the society, who is full of fear of future begets (gives birth) the heroes that put an aim to escape societies' death, at the cost of his/her own life. While the ruling class founds itself in the complete power of Tanatos complex. The will power in this society is so great that people are able to give birth and bring up their offsprings more and more for the salvation of society. They know that hundreds and thousands of tribes, folks and peoples vanished just because they lost their will power that was accumulated and showed up first of all in millions of heroes.

The societies that came through such ordeals are traditional ones. People in these societies are not only law-abiding, they live according to the more deep rules and regulations, they live by the law of history and memories.

The phenomenon of real heroism is very

important for the existence of such society. The appearance and existence of real heroes who deliver God's will and intentions and who become models and examples for millions of people are very important.

This acting like heroes is not just constant Philistine worship but overcoming and fighting all the profane sick and illusive in a man. It is also the returning to the perception and recognition of life of one person, a group of people and the society, which is unusual. It is returning to the recognition of the essence of living and a deep thought of being the part of a total space unity.

If something heroic appears and begins to grow in the society, and this society gives rise to heroes, it means that God cares for this society, it also means that we can feel God's good will for anything heroic in this society.

Acting like a hero is not only doing one's duty for the sake of God but it's also the ability of a spiritual development of a person. Acting like a hero then becomes not only the necessary social but also the personal creative action.

In the long run only the societies where heroes are born survive.

Some societies where there is a little minimum of heroism still keep track in history. And consequently the societies where heroes are not born (because there is no need in them) sooner or later disappear. This sign from above means: such societies make God angry.

"A human being is somebody who has to overcome" (Nitshe, 2005). Frederic Nitshe emphasized this radical opposition between the heroic and profane in a man. Eight hundred years before Nitshe a very prominent Islam thinker Abu Hamid al-Ghazali consid-

ered this overcoming not only the order from above, but the essence of a human life. "The meaning of happiness is the battle with yourself, overcoming yourself in every way, the most you can, though the steps to perfection are endless" (Al-Ghazali, 2002).

There is something direct uncompromising and at the same time the most respectful in the clash of a human spirit and death, when the spirit breaks through the light and dark sides of a powerful death. At that moment the great death suddenly becomes the decisive ordeal, the whole previous life of a man was the preparation to it.

"Live so as if you'll never die. And get ready for death as if you're going to die tomorrow".

The legendary Roman Mootsi Stsevola kept his right hand in a flame of a fire talking to the leader of the invaders in his Motherland. He demonstrated not only his contempt to death, to the physical pain, he demonstrated the will power and the bravery of a warrior, the strength of a real man. He was the courage itself turning into the heroic spirit.

The same trait is peculiar to the Christ: the most important is his contempt to death. His well-known phrase "If you're hit in the right cheek, give the left one for the hit" makes a challenge to any attempts to frighten, to impose fear upon physical pain causing by enemies. There is a parallel to Mootsi Stsevola in this fearfulness and contempt to the foes, the mockery of their threats. The official or false praise sometimes changes the image of heroism in the most radical way and Jesus Christ is an example. Nevertheless the core of heroism remains unchangeable. The most important in the heroic deed is first of all the unusual personal energetic impulse in a certain

place at a certain time but not the instant efficiency. Heroism is more spiritual powerful effort than physical.

Heroism is a deep fragile intuition that causes the complete responsibility of the cruel strategies and harnesses their arrogance.

Take for example another Christ's saying – "Love your enemies". It can be interpreted as the samurai warrior's code "Bushido". First of all the soldier has to know his enemies very well, study their nature, customs, habits, their way of military thinking. Moreover a good warrior has to know how to rule the enemy as his own army and generally consider the enemy as a part of his own army being at his disposal as an additional resource. This is nothing but metaphorical expression of love to the enemy.

The hero as an example to follow is the real hero not only in a social aspect but also in a social context. The example of heroism has a very important sacred meaning. The way of conscious neglecting profane, the way to the spiritual immortality, the way to God always requires such personal great overpowering effort, such heroism when it becomes organically natural as breathing.

The vivid example of a spiritual heroism is the deepest recognition of tradition where the hero capable to commit the overpowering effort is taken care of by God. What the hero commits is a real miracle in which God's holy intention is reflected.

Heroes are born in such societies where the spirit (in spite of everything) continues to fight the self-satisfied stuff, where the true faith dominates other values and where God inspired truth (exactly people's religious faith) is above life. But if people's greed, self-interest and hypocrisy propagated by mass

media rule the society, it cannot generate heroes.

Heroism is a compound integrity of the four components.

1. *The will power of the personality.* Strong will of the personality is exactly unique for the definite place and the definite time. And this will show up only through the special mature conscience of a person, his personal way of thinking. The maturity of a thinking person is shown by the degree of his readiness to give his life for his ideals and beliefs. But if the person is not ready to give his life for his ideals it means that either his ideals are worth of nothing or the person himself is worthless.
2. *Social responsibility* is the utmost dramatic strain of one or the several social values connected with the deepest crisis of a certain society or with the challenge to this society. Sometimes it may be connected with a dramatic aggravation of the problem of survival (external aggression, special home crisis, the civil war, global catastrophe and so on).
3. *Leadership as a relay race.* Leaders do not run from dangers but are subjected to them together with all people. They die together with the people and win victory with them. And if people see that their leaders do not hide behind their backs but lead the way and die for the benefit of their country and people, these leaders are deeply honored, loved, praised and respected by their countrymen. They get everything from them, including life. But it only becomes possible when people trust and truly believe in their leaders.

But without such hero-leaders there

can't be heroic people who can fight for the liberty and justice for all. And if the leader sows the seeds of dictatorship in his organization, he sows the seeds of destruction in it.

4. *The nobility and generosity* are a privilege of a strong people. These qualities crown the self-development of a higher product of evolution but, regrettably, they are unknown to many modern societies, where miserable men dominate. Only they can beat defenseless, kill helpless. Only they as a beast flock hit upon one, they seem weak.

Social science and education face the eternal problem of raising and supporting everything heroic. They must to make the hero-

ism more meaningful and much full of sense. The mysticism of history circulates: the societies without heroes are replaced by those where there's a lot of heroic breed, where faithfulness to the heroic spirit, to the eternity is cherished. This is how the society becomes heroic itself.

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## PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRATIC PREJUDICE

## Preliminary Remarks

Since men have organized themselves in politics, overcoming the state of nature, power has chosen to resort to *principles* to legitimize itself. Innumerable wars have been conducted in the name of noble goals, entire nations have been destroyed in the name of these goals. The prevailing power subsequently ruled by invoking its supposedly noble mission in the defence of humanity – albeit, in actual fact, the driving motive may have been what is nowadays referred to as the “national interest,” a conglomerate of collective volitions, but certainly not a system of *values* that would transcend the actual will to power.

While, in earlier centuries, it has often been the role of *religion* (i.e. religious values) to justify the use of force and a polity’s – or ruler’s – claim to power, in the modern world religious beliefs have been replaced by the *doctrine of democracy* and, as its foundation, *human rights*. Since the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, many wars have been fought in the name of democracy and the fundamental rights of the citizen. The doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” – or “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) – is clear evidence of this trend that gained strength since the end of the cold war in particular.<sup>1</sup> Régimes have been “changed”

and entire regions were destabilized as result of such actions – with the consequence of perpetual conflict (instead of “Perpetual Peace” as envisaged by Immanuel Kant in his outline of a “republican” world order) (Kant, 1995) and the re-emergence of totalitarian systems of which the “Islamic State” is the most frightening phenomenon.<sup>2</sup>

It thus appears appropriate for philosophy to analyze and deconstruct one of the fundamental concepts in the name of which the global claim to power is legitimized in the post-cold war era. It is to be hoped that such an effort will contribute to more cautious and prudent action of state leaders and will make it more difficult to legitimize, and get support for, war at the international level.

## Terminology

A. *The notion of democracy*

What is referred to as “democracy” in contemporary discourse is, in actual fact, and in most cases, a system of rule on behalf of the people, not by the people. This is in strict conceptual contradiction to the original Greek notion of δημοκρατία. It is a commonly held view that, unlike in ancient times, in our

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*the International Rule of Law?* (Studies in International Relations, Vol. XXVI.) Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2001.

<sup>1</sup> For details see the author’s analysis, *The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics: Is the Revival of the Doctrine of "Just War" Compatible with*

<sup>2</sup> Thus, in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, we are again witnessing a return of religion, by way of reaction, as legitimizing factor in the realm of politics.



modern, post-Enlightenment era, the δῆμος (people) is not a distinct group of privileged persons, excluding all others, but the community of all inhabitants (with the exception of foreigners) as citizens. In reality, however, “democracy” is essentially defined as *parliamentary rule*, i.e. as the exercise of power by a select group of individuals over the δῆμος. Popular rule in the original sense – by way of referendum – is, if at all, only admitted as exception.

Against this background, the terminology established in political science is rather misleading. The distinction between “direct” and “indirect” democracy creates the impression as if the democratic paradigm – originally postulated in the ancient Athenian polity – was compatible with action by proxy. “Rule” is either direct (genuine) or it does not exist at all. This was more clearly understood in the context of Kantian practical philosophy (in view of his notion of autonomy) (Kant, 1989, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Book I, Chapter 1, § 8; *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and, What Is Enlightenment?*, p. 65.) or, more specifically, in Rousseau’s doctrine of democracy: “La volonté ne se représente point: elle est la même, ou elle est autre; il n’y a point de milieu.”<sup>3</sup> The will of the people cannot be represented (i.e. exercised by others on behalf of the citizen); in such a case, it ceases to exist. This also implies that the modern term *participatory* (or: *direct*) democracy is actually a *pleonasm*, wrongly making people believe that there can be genuine practices of democracy other than those of direct

agency of each and every individual as citizen.<sup>4</sup>

This “democratic prejudice,” which has shaped contemporary politics at the global level, must be carefully scrutinized – if we are indeed committed to preserving the spirit of democracy, i.e. the *democratic ideal*. This is the legitimate role of the philosophy of politics – a form of “*Ideologiekritik*” that keeps distance from actual practice, critically reflects political stereotypes and, thus, is able – and has the courage – to “speak truth to power.”

What is commonly referred to as “democracy” is, in most cases, a system of *representation* for which the more appropriate Greek term would be ὀλιγαρχία (oligarchy) – which, however, lacks the legitimizing power of the prevalent term.

#### B. The notion of representation

In modern political discourse, the dominant doctrine is that of *representation*. According to its rarely questioned assumption, “democracy” – as explained above – means the power to decide on behalf of the people (citizens), not the people’s power to decide. In this system, the political competence is vested in specially authorized office-holders (such as president, member of parliament, etc., depending on the respective constitutional provisions) who are understood to re-present (lit-

<sup>3</sup> *Du Contrat Social ou principes du droit politique* (1762), III, 15 /1762, quoted according to *Oeuvres choisies*. Paris: Classiques Garnier, 1954.

<sup>4</sup> For details see also Hans Köchler, “Demokratie – Parlamentarismus – Menschenrechte. Philosophische Überlegungen zum ‘demokratischen Vorurteil’,” in: G. Prabitz and W. Schopper (eds.), *Uni 2000. Zukunftsperspektiven universitärer Forschung und Lehre am Beispiel der Universität Innsbruck*. Innsbruck: Haymon, 1990, pp. 51-61.



erally: “make again present”) the *totality* of the people<sup>5</sup> and who exercise their authority by way of a “free” mandate, i.e. not bound by the will of others, including the electorate, but only by the dictates of their conscience – with the supposed aim to serve the *common good* as they – the representatives – understand it.

However, “democracy by representation” is based on *fictitious premises* that must be identified as such if one wants to understand the nature of most of our contemporary political systems. Those fictitious assumptions are:

1. That there exists a *totality* of the people as an *ideal* entity (**ontological fiction** in the Platonic sense, or a version of false idealism in the sphere of the collective);
2. that the representative is capable to act like an “ethereal being,” without any consideration as to his/her personal interests and motivations (while, in reality, and in most cases, every deputy in parliament acts on party orders) (**psychological fiction**, stipulating an ideal person supposed to be able to act altruistically in an absolute sense);
3. that the will of the citizens, the source of any legitimate democratic order, can at all be represented by an *individual* or a group of individuals (i.e. that it can be made present as act of volition and source of the law) (**normative fiction**). The latter is a double fiction in the strict sense, implying (a) that there exists something like a “collective will” as an entity that can be represented, and (b)

that this might be exercised by an individual on behalf of all.<sup>6</sup>

If connected to the doctrine of representation, the notion of *popular sovereignty* – as foundation of state sovereignty in the international realm<sup>7</sup> – also becomes fictitious, a point which Hans Kelsen, the author of the Austrian Republic’s first constitution after World War I, has also made clear (Kelsen, 1963, pp. 30ff).

### Quid Nunc? – Political Conclusions from Philosophical Disillusionment

What follows from this *deconstruction* – to use a fashionable term – of the democratic prejudice? Is it more than a futile exercise in *Ideologiekritik*, an abstract, non-consequential conceptual analysis? Under conditions of the so-called New World Order – i.e. the system of power relations after the collapse of the cold war’s bipolar balance of power<sup>8</sup> – a more

<sup>5</sup> Cf. the analysis of Carl Schmitt, *Verfassungslehre* (1928). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1954.

<sup>6</sup> On the fictitious character of representation see the author’s analysis, “Demokratiethorien im Schnittpunkt von Verfassung und politischer Wirklichkeit,” in: A. Pelinka and H. Reinalter (eds.), *Interdisziplinäre Demokratieforschung*. (Series “Vergleichende Gesellschaftsgeschichte und politische Ideengeschichte der Neuzeit,” Vol. 11.) Vienna: Braumüller, 1998, pp. 117-128.

<sup>7</sup> On the conceptual connection between sovereignty and democracy see the author’s lecture, “Sovereignty, Law and Democracy versus Power Politics,” in: **Current Concerns**, No. 34, Zurich, 22 November 2013, Supplement, pp. 18-25.

<sup>8</sup> For details see, *inter alia*, Hans Köchler, *Democracy and the New World Order*. (Studies in International Relations, Vol. XIX.) Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1993.

precise use of terms will have multiple benefits for any polity that aspires to be “democratic”:

- (a) Conceptual clarification will help the public – the citizens – to *avoid confusion* over their actual status. Being able to precisely identify the factors of decision-making will enable the citizens to *act rationally* vis-à-vis their “representatives” instead of fatefully accepting their decisions.
- (b) A precise terminology, not confusing democracy with oligarchy or autocracy, will make it more difficult for the holders of power to *immunize* their exercise of authority – because they will have to face a more mature citizenry. In this sense, precision is a kind of antidote to the abuses of power.
- (c) Internationally, it will be more difficult to instrumentalize “democracy” to justify the use of force (as happened, for instance, in the cases of Iraq 2003 or Libya 2011) if an informed public understands that what is invoked in the justification of such interventions is not the right of each citizen to decide, but a kind of *élite rule* that is meant to serve the interests of the intervening power and, actually and more specifically, the lobbies and interest groups of that country.

While, under the ideological cover of representation and the free mandate, the real motives and interests of the political actors can be conveniently hidden, terminological precision and honesty about the exercise of power have a profoundly *de-legitimizing effect* – domestically as well as internationally, and may, in the longer term, contribute to what is often described as *democratization of*

*society and state* – and, subsequently, of the system of relations between states.

A more honest discourse on democracy, in the sense of not equating “representation” with “democracy” – or power with subordination to power, may also help to achieve a synthesis between idea and reality of politics – or between old-fashioned, but stubbornly persisting, *realpolitik* and the ideal of *equality* of states (“sovereign equality” as enshrined in the United Nations Charter)<sup>9</sup> at the global level.

### Idea and Reality of Politics

In the ideal world, freedom and the inalienable dignity of the human being mean that he/she should be able to take part in public life and jointly conduct the affairs of the community *directly*, without any intermediaries, and at an *equal level*. However, in the real – ever more complex – world of the collective organization of the will of human beings in states, large or small, the individual (out of organizational necessity) will have to *delegate* his/her authority to specially designated office-holders, a process which – if there are no corrective mechanisms such as referenda – is tantamount to his/her *abdication* as citizen.<sup>10</sup> In that regard, it may be of interest to study the Swiss political practice, which can be

<sup>9</sup> Article 2, Par. 1.

<sup>10</sup> On the incompatibility of the democratic principle with representation see also, Robert Michels, *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie: Untersuchungen über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens*. Leipzig: Dr. Werner Klinkhardt, 1911, pp. 36ff.

characterized as a kind of fusion of *idealist* and *realist* approaches in the organization of the popular will (Kriesi, 2005).

By using the proper terms in the description of the decision-making processes, we can avoid creating expectations that cannot be fulfilled and will unavoidably lead to political disillusionment. “**Democratic fatigue**” – a phenomenon ever more widespread also in the industrialized world<sup>11</sup> – can best be countered by civic honesty, i.e. if we identify as “democratic” only those practices (i.e. forms of decision-making) where the individual can meaningfully participate in public life. The overcoming of “**democratic prejudice**” – along the philosophical considerations briefly outlined here – will be the precondition for setting one’s “**democratic expectations**” at arealistic and philosophically sound level.

Critique of a false idealism, indeed an idealistic fiction, of the community will be more conducive to a stable order of peace, domestically as well as internationally, than an attitude based on illusions and – ultimately – false expectations.

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<sup>11</sup> See e.g. Carlo Mongardini, “Crisis and Transformation of Political Representation in Western Europe,” in: Hans Köchler (ed.), *The Crisis of Representative Democracy*. Frankfurt a.M./Bern/New York: Peter Lang, 1987, pp. 115-125.

HAPPINESS, LIFE, LIBERTY  
(A Catholic View)

## Abstract

Happiness, life and liberty are central terms in the history of philosophy. At the same time, they belong to the core of Christianity. We find these key terms already in the New Testament and we also find that reflections on these terms have defined their meanings in new ways throughout the centuries. I show the way how the original meanings have gradually changed. In contemporary reflections, we find interesting attempts to reform the traditional meanings, in which the influence of the natural sciences and twentieth century philosophies (such as phenomenology, existentialism, Marxism and post-modernism) have proven to be decisive. Christianity-oriented philosophies in contemporary academia, such as those of Michel Henry or Jean-Luc Marion, offer versions of these thoughts. The main defect of the traditional understandings may be seen simply their isolationist approach, that is to say, their approach to consider these terms as unrelated to one another. My own solution finds the common structure in the reality of revelation and considers life, liberty, and happiness as moments only insufficiently grasped by traditional approaches.

*Keywords:* Life, liberty, happiness, philosophy of revelation, phenomenology, history of ideas, catholicity.

## Introduction

Life, liberty, and happiness are original terms of our human context that are often investigated in isolation from one another. The notion of life is one of the central terms of Christianity, especially important in the Johannine writings.<sup>1</sup> Liberty is again one of the key terms in the theological structure of the

Pauline letters<sup>2</sup> and have often been used with reference to its Biblical origin. Finally, happiness is not only the central term of Aristotelian ethics, but it has a focal role in the New Testament as well – even if *eudaimonia* (happiness) and *makar* (blessedness) may be interpreted as differing in their exact meanings.<sup>3</sup> These terms, therefore, belong to the core of our traditions. No wonder that they have be-

<sup>1</sup> Most importantly: ‘In Him was life, and the life was the light of men.’, John 1:4. Throughout this text I use the Revised Standard Version of the Bible.

<sup>2</sup> Most importantly: ‘... the glorious liberty of the children of God.’, Rom 8:21.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Matthew, Chapter 5.

come influential in the emergence of modernity as well. Yet, in modernity, especially with the rise of the modern natural sciences, the meaning of these terms strongly changed. As a consequence, we often forget the long prehistory of these terms and tend to think that they belong merely to the legacy of modernity. The fact is, however, that the contemporary meanings of these terms cannot be properly established without taking into consideration their respective genealogies.

On the other hand, these terms belong to one another both in their historical context and contemporary meanings. Historically, life was considered to be the context in which happiness, through the means of liberty, can be realized. In other words, life is the matrix, liberty is the means, and happiness is the end. Life, even in the sense of Plato, already contains liberty and happiness; and in Christianity, the life of Christ is that which is embraced in freedom and it results in the eternal happiness of the 'beatific vision'. In modern theories, these connections are not so obvious. The reason of this is that life has become defined in the context of contemporary science where it appears to be merely a physical phenomenon. Liberty, in a similar way, is often deemed to be a subjective illusion or rather part of a unique terminology which may not be understood literally. Happiness is feeling good or, as some psychologists suggest, being in the 'flow'; it has nothing to do either with *eudaimonia* or a 'beatific vision' of the previous ages. In our modern understandings, there is not even one single meaning attached to these terms. Being post-Nietzschean in its core, our age insists at the individualistic pluralism of meanings.

Nevertheless, the situation is not hope-

less inasmuch as we consider the importance our age attributes to freedom as the sum of liberties. Freedom is central, because it is the way in which modern individuals conceive themselves; authority is not only the enemy of freedom but even its shadow which needs to be undone. The shadowless brilliance of freedom shines forth in our contemporary awareness so intensely that it seems to be even more important than life or happiness.

### The Notions of Life, Liberty, and Happiness

The Septuagint normally translates the Hebrew *châyâh* (H2422<sup>4</sup>) with *zoé* (G2222), sometimes *psuché* (G5590). This expresses the richness of the original Hebrew term, a richness, however, lacking the clear and specified articulation of the Greek terms. It may be that the name of the Lord in the Old Testament, JHWH, is etymologically related to *châyâh* through the latter's meaning of quickening, movement, 'life' as is suggested by Ex 3:14.<sup>5</sup> The third Greek term for life, *bios* (G979) is not used as a translation of *châyâh*; but it is applied in a number of times as translating 'days', (*yowm*, H3117), that is, a human life's duration. *Châyâh* is then a synthet-

<sup>4</sup> I add Strong's numbers in brackets to the Greek and Hebrew words.

<sup>5</sup> Here the answer to Moses' question to the Lord – 'What is your name? what shall I say unto them?' – is notoriously '*ehyeh asher ehyeh*', in which the forms of the verb *hayah* (H1961) are used. That is to say, His name is to be expressed by the use of the verb 'being' and thus the name often applied to God – YHWH – may be related to this verb as well.

ic term which reflects the fundamental experience of life as movement.

The three terms for life in Greek are *zoé*, *psuche*, and *bios*. Etymologically, *zoé* and *bios* are of the same root, *BiF*; while *psuche* comes from the root expressing breathing. In philosophical texts, especially in Plato and Aristotle, *zoé* expresses the flow of life, such as in the *Timaeus* where Plato describes the ‘everlasting’ life of the universe (Plato, *Timaeus* 37d). On the other hand, *bios* expresses the way of life or perhaps a phase of a life. Both Aristotle and Plato speak of such forms of life. In the *Laws*, Plato describes four ‘lives’ – the life of self-control, the life of wisdom, the life of courage, and the healthy life. And there are their opposite forms of life, that is, the licentious, the foolish, the cowardly and the diseased forms of life (Plato, *Laws* 733d-734e). Plato maintains that each of the first four forms is more pleasant than its opposite. He concludes from this that the life of excellence with respect to the body or the soul – that is to say, the life that combines the first four lives – is more pleasant than the life of depravity, which combines the four opposite forms of life. At the same time, Plato speaks of the idea of an immortal or indestructible life (Plato, *Phaedo* 106d), which can never perish. This notion of an everlasting life parallels the later notions of an eternal life which I will consider below.

In his discussion of domestic economy in the first book of the *Politics* Aristotle lists five forms of life: the lives of the herdsman, the brigand, the fisherman, the hunter, and the husband-man (Aristotle, *Politics* 1256b). In the *Nicomachian ethics*, Aristotle distinguishes between the pleasurable, the political, and – as the highest form – the contemplative

form of life (Aristotle, *Nicomachian ethics* 1095b; 1178a). Aristotle, nevertheless, uses *bios* to distinguish between the theoretical and the practical life. It is the theoretical life (*bi-os*) the living of which (*zoé*) leads to a kind of divine stature (Aristotle, *Nicomachian ethics* 1095b; 1178a). Human and divine life are thus considered in the same perspective: human life is partial and limited to certain forms of life, while divine life is the life of the master and it has an overarching character; this life is unperishable.

It is important to see that happiness is intrinsic to such an unperishable life in Aristotle’s thought. The Greek *eudaimonia* is usually translated as ‘happiness’ and Aristotle was a sophisticated thinker enough not to deny some level of happiness to any form of life. However, as he makes it explicit at the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, ‘the activity of God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must be most of the nature of happiness’<sup>6</sup> (Aristotle, *Nicomachian ethics* 1178b). God is alive and stays in a permanent activity. This activity is complete in every respect possible and thus divine happiness is perfect. Human happiness may become assimilated to divine happiness inasmuch as a human being follows the theoretical or contemplative life and ‘men become gods by excess of virtue’ (Aristotle, *Nicomachian ethics* 1145a).

<sup>6</sup> The English translation is from *Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19*. Translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934. See at <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Aristot.+Nic.+Eth.+1178b&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0054>.



Liberty, nevertheless, does not appear to belong to the core of happiness. Rather, liberty (*eleutheria*, freedom) belongs to democracy as a political form and as a way of life. The principle of democracy as a political form is equality and the rule of majority. Accordingly, the principle of democracy as a way of life is that ‘a man should live as he likes.’ (Aristotle, *Politics* 1317b). However, either the rule of majority or the freedom to live as one likes is not conducive to happiness, according to Aristotle.

There are important shifts in the meanings of these terms in Christianity. The perspective of reaching ‘eternal life’ (*zoé aionios*) is above everything. Surprisingly, the New Testament is consistent in using the word *zoé* in this context, thus making clear differences between *zoé*, *psuché* and *bios*. *Psuché* as life is the living nature of an individual, and *bios* is the duration of the same life. Theologically, *bios* refers to ‘the pride of life’ (1 John 2:16), ‘life in the world’ (1 John 3:17) or even ‘the riches and pleasures of this life’ that choke the seed fell among the thorns (Luke 8:14). Thus *bios* comes to express worldly life, the life opposed to eternal life (*zoé*). This later, however, can be reached only by getting rid of *bios* or even by the taking down of *psuché*: ‘For whosoever will save his life (*psuche*) shall lose it: and whosoever will lose his life (*psuche*) for my sake shall find it’ (Mark 8:35).

Liberty (*eleutheria*, freedom) is already in the center of the New Testament: The liberty of glory, the liberty of the children of God, the freedom reached by the truth of Christ are all central expressions and point to a massive theological basis here with a strong emphasis on individual, moral, metaphysical and divine freedom. This emphasis becomes even strong-

er in the theological reflections in Latin Christianity, which lead to the modern interpretations of freedom in an individual sense. Without the Biblical notion of *eleutheria*, we cannot properly understand the doctrines of human freedom, not even in Protestantism where we face a doctrine of theological predestination. But even predestination is a means to highlight the point of individual freedom, as is shown by Luther’s work on *The Freedom of a Christian* of 1520. It is in the context of predestination that the free service of the Christian to God may be realized.

The modern trajectory of the notion of freedom may be followed by fleshing out the most influential doctrines emerging from the context I just described. Jesuit spirituality, Protestant pietism, Enlightenment political and moral theories, Kant’s notion of human persons’ coming of age, and also the important contributions of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel – all these influences flew together in the emergence of the notion and practice of radical freedom which culminated in Friedrich Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power.

I do not have space here to show all the important details in this history. Let me refer merely to the important point that the fundamental notion of freedom is not merely the capacity of free option but rather freedom as originally free expression, manifestation, or revelation of something other than what is entailed in freedom itself. All the specific notions of freedom, such as free will, self-mastery, ownership, causation are dependent on the ontological notion of freedom as the originally free expression. Without the ontological notion of freedom, it becomes very difficult to relate the specific notions of freedom to one another (cf. O’Connor, 2010). In



the genealogy of the notion of freedom, we witness not only the emergence of specific notions of freedom, but also a growing understanding of the ontological notion. This latter notion was understood thoroughly by Martin Heidegger (cf. Heidegger, 1993, p. 123).

I want to emphasize that in the modern notion of freedom it is not the usual distinction between negative and positive freedom that is essential, but rather freedom as destruction and freedom as creation, as is beautifully described in Friedrich Schiller's classical poem *The Song of the Bell*.<sup>7</sup> Nietzsche's notion of freedom as creation does not belong, according to his intention, to the destructive, but rather to the creative kind of freedom. In my view, it is this kind of creative freedom that is identified as philosophical courage by John Paul II in his encyclical letter *Faith and Reason*:

'I cannot but *encourage* philosophers - be they Christian or not - to trust in the power of human reason and not to set themselves goals that are too modest in their philosophizing'

(John Paul II, Pope, 2001, § 56).

<sup>7</sup> See especially these lines:

'BENEFCENT is the might of flame,  
When o'er it man doth watch, doth tame,  
And what he buildeth, what he makes,  
For this the heav'nly powers he thanks;  
Yet fright'ning Heaven's pow'r will be,  
When from its chains it doth break free,  
Embarking forth on its own track,  
Nature's daughter, free alack.'

Translated by Marianna Wertz,  
Retrieved from

[https://www.schillerinstitute.org/fidelio\\_archiv\\_e/2005/fidv14n01-02-2005SpSu/fidv14n01-02-2005SpSu\\_036-friedrich\\_schillers\\_the\\_song\\_of.pdf](https://www.schillerinstitute.org/fidelio_archiv_e/2005/fidv14n01-02-2005SpSu/fidv14n01-02-2005SpSu_036-friedrich_schillers_the_song_of.pdf).

## Relationships Among the Terms

The historical development of our terms clearly shows two kinds of change: First, a change in the content of the terms, and second, a change in their relationship.

As to the first, it is important to note that merely on the grounds of Hellenism we cannot speak of 'eternal life' properly speaking. 'Eternal life' was seen by the Hellenistic authors, Plato and Aristotle included, in terms of a *perennial* life, that is a life *co-temporal* with the universe. The philosopher may reach this co-temporality by practicing the virtues or rather by realizing happiness given in the contemplative form of life. It is telling that the New Testament uses *bios*, an important term for the expression 'contemplative life' rather disapprovingly as 'the pride of life'. Instead of *bios*, it is *zoé* that is applied consistently in the New Testament to express the notion of eternal life. But for Christianity, this eternal life is not the life of the universe, but rather the life of the timeless God who stands above the universe as its creator. Thus, eternal life becomes something emphatically otherworldly, metaphysical, or ultimately theological.

Yet the anthropic emphasis of Christianity – given already in the doctrine of the two natures of Christ – led to the emergence of the notion of natural life as opposed to the supernatural life. The 'earthly man' is opposed to the 'heavenly man' (expressions by St. Paul<sup>8</sup>) and similarly, earthly or natural life is opposed to the heavenly or supernatural life. In this opposition there opens up the possibility of

<sup>8</sup> 'The first man is of the earth, earthly: the second man is the Lord from heaven', 1Cor 15:47.

the slow articulation of the notion of a natural life, a notion which leads step by step to the emergence of the study of life in biological nature. In early biology, life is seen as a spontaneous emergence out of basic matter, especially water; and human life is also interpreted as coming from the same source in its physical shape. The biological notion of life, which has been the result of the long development of the early natural sciences, led to the universal notion of life in terms of a biological evolution. Darwinian evolution seems to have given the appropriate answer to the burning question of the relationship among living organisms. Yet it could not answer the question of the origin of life, because it was not its purpose; the origin of life remained and perhaps still remains a mystery in the Darwinian framework. Today, Darwinian theory is sometimes said to be challenged by alternative theories, such as ‘intelligent design’ which – in spite of the strong opposition to its fundamental claims – seems to have a number of points concerning the non-reducibility of well-arranged primitive complexes. Yet it is genetics that poses a more robust danger to Darwinism, because genetic wholes are by definition pre-arranged patterns which direct, and are not directed by, evolutionary processes.<sup>9</sup>

In contemporary biology, the remnants of the ancient notions of life almost fully disappear. Instead of an original life-force – worldly or other-worldly – we are presented with biochemical processes which can be mathematically described and even modelled in such a

way that the production of artificial living organisms seems to be a realistic goal of science. The notion of life today overlaps with the notion of intelligent machines, such as computers, which are capable of producing symptoms similar to the symptoms of living organisms. Reception of and reaction to input in a sophisticated fashion seems to be the most fundamental feature of life and such a feature is reproduced in ever more complex forms in artificial organisms. The general awareness of the similarity between organisms and machines is increasingly present in popular culture (see for instance the movie *Ex machina* of 2015). In scientific circles, however, researchers are more cautious with hasty identifications and are also aware of the problems the fact of life raises in a seemingly lifeless universe. Robert Lanza’s biocentrism may be mentioned here as a contemporary form of a pan-biological theory which can also be found, in an archaic sense, in the works of Hellenistic authors (Lanza & Berman, 2009).

Similar developments can be observed with respect to the meanings of happiness and liberty. The general tenor of these developments is the ever stronger articulation of a sensual understanding of happiness and a progressively individualistic understanding of liberty. Happiness is getting satisfied and getting satisfied is not merely having enough food, but rather having all the various, even secondary desires satisfied, such as for instance the desires to possess some products of a technical civilization. The drive to have bigger cars is still present but not so much essential; it is more essential to want to have the latest technological achievements available on the market, for instance an electric car instead of a car with internal-combustion en-

<sup>9</sup> For a discussion of the logical problems of natural selection, see Fodor & Piattelli-Palmarini, 2010. For a more robust statement of the basic problem with the theory of natural evolution, see Jeanson, 2014.

gine. Happiness has become technological and liberty seems to be identical with satisfying the drive to reach technological happiness. The question if this liberty has anything to do with freedom in a more complete sense may be answered by a diagram of the global disease of internet addictiveness on the basis of ever newer gadgets.

As to the second kind of change, in Hellenism happiness stood in the center; liberty was more or less insignificant and life was merely the matrix of happiness. Christianity inherited the centrality of happiness in the doctrine of the beatific vision, which is clearly a Platonic notion in its original form.<sup>10</sup> The Christian form of this notion speaks of beatitude, because it synthesized in itself the eudemonic doctrines of Hellenistic philosophy and the *makarioi* sayings of Jesus in Matthew, Chapter 5. The beginnings of Christianity, especially Johannine Christianity, saw life as the central notion: life as *zoé*, as eternal life, as the new life in Christ has become central and still dominates many parts of Orthodox Christianity. Latin Christianity, however, has been increasingly defined by the notion of liberty. What was merely an elementary teaching in Greek philosophy becomes now central: ‘Then you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free’ (John 8:32). Augustine, early natural theology, Scholasticism, Jesuit spirituality and Lutheran Protestantism represent the most important phases of the evolution of the notion of liberty which culminates, as I suggested, in Nietzsche’s understanding of freedom in *Zarathustra*: ‘Everything is freedom: thou

canst, for thou willest!’ (Nietzsche, 1998). Martin Heidegger’s formula – ‘The essence of truth is freedom’ – is a corollary to Nietzsche’s dictum (Heidegger, 1993, p. 123). Twentieth century existentialism centered on the notion of unlimited freedom and this notion of freedom exploded the political existence of the Soviet Union: freedom defeated unfreedom.

Yet what we see today as a consequence of this epochal occurrence is rather the unleashing of uncontrolled developments in politics as well as in general culture. This unleashing of freedom threatens the basic structures of our world today.

### The Post-Modern Situation

‘Post-modernity’ is a general term which can be applied to historiography as describing the epoch beginning at the end of the twentieth century, especially with the collapse of the Soviet system. In the sciences, post-modernity refers to the age of computers, the description of the human genome, and the emergence of nanotechnology. With respect to the sources of energy, post-modernity emphasizes the process of transition from fossil-based energy consumption to the use of solar energy. We need to ponder a little on the relevance of post-modernity to the fundamental notions I considered above.

Post-modernity has three possible attitudes with respect to its prehistory:

- a) A return to an earlier paradigm;
- b) The synthesis of earlier and divergent developments; and
- c) The radical surpassing of all previous developments.

The first perspective dictates that our basic notions – happiness, life, liberty – may

<sup>10</sup> Plato emphatically writes in the Symposium that the highest purpose of human beings should be the search for the ‘vision of beauty itself’. Cf. Plato, *Symposium* 211e-212a.

be revised on the basis of an earlier paradigm. Such a paradigm might be the Platonic or the Aristotelian approach to happiness. We indeed find such attempts, for instance the thought of Alasdair MacIntyre, which emphasize the importance of the proper understanding of earlier views (cf. MacIntyre 2007, p. 263). The typical mistake here is a one-sided understanding, for instance the misunderstanding of Aristotle as a proponent of virtue ethics, while Aristotle understood virtue ethics in a limited fashion and only as an alternative to 'eudemonic' ethics, that is, an ethics of divine intervention. Moreover, it is obvious that certain tenets cannot be used today, such as the notion of life as universal *zoé*, a *zoé* permeating the entire cosmos. Even the notion of the heavens – of which we have more or less seven in accordance with the Hellenistic and New Testament authors – may be either incomprehensible or misleading today (cf. Mezei, 2016a).

A different example of a return to earlier ideas is represented by Michel Henry. The French philosopher's emphasis on the notion of life may come from Hegel but in fact it is a notion without a conscious subject. Thus this notion of life is pre-modern rather than post-modern, because it cannot handle rationally the problem of freedom in its framework. Robert Lanza, mentioned above, is more articulate in that biological life is centered on the emergence of consciousness and thus life and consciousness seems to be just two sides of the same coin, the original stuff of the universe. Henry's notion of life seems to be insufficient inasmuch as it does not explain the centrality of consciousness, a centrality which is presupposed above all in the fact of Henry's writings (Henry, 2000).

The second perspective is more promis-

ing, because it is possible to offer a synthetic understanding of the basic terms both on a historical trajectory and in a logical way. Thus, happiness, life and liberty could be understood as a historical sequence – just as I showed it above – and at the same time as moments belonging intrinsically together. Yet it is obvious that in such a synthesis, the whole must surpass the sum, because every genuine whole by definition surpasses its parts (the *holos* transcends the *pan*, as already Plato saw this logical state of affairs, cf. Plato, 1997, 226, Theaetetus 204b). Thus we need to identify the whole in which we situate our basic terms. It seems to me that such a structure can be a notion of reality, or rather reality as such as it is emerging throughout the centuries in a characteristic way in our human awareness. One good example here is the evolution of the notion of divine revelation which began with fairly confused and obscure notions and reached a unique clarity by the nineteenth century. At the same time, revelation proves to be the original self-disclosure of reality. Analogously, when we offer a synthesis of the basic terms, we need to reflect on the emerging new whole in which these terms are defined (cf. Mezei, 2016b).

The third perspective articulates this point in its own, radical way. The entire tradition must be surpassed and transcended and an entirely new notion must be identified as the very goal of human beings. In the history of philosophy, we have had some proposals, such as Hegel's Spirit, the Overman by Nietzsche, the *Event* by Heidegger – or revisions of the divine by A.N. Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, Emmanuel Lévinas, Michel Henry, Jean-Luc Marion or some other contemporary philosophical theologians, such as Charles Taylor. However, in my view, the perspective of sur-

passing is just a strong version of the second perspective, that of a synthesis. The genuine synthesis entails the surpassing of its contents and the offering of a new whole in which those contents may be better understood. Thus I accept the third perspective as the most viable one inasmuch as it is seen as the emphatic articulation of the implications of the second perspective.

It is my understanding that the traditional notions of happiness, life and liberty were one-sided and fragmentary and also unable to develop the logical contents of these terms appropriately. That is the reason why happiness came to be redefined on the basis of sensualism with the rise of modernity as a reaction to the original failure of developing a more complex notion of happiness. And that is the reason why life lost its universal meaning in the same period and became confined to elementary biological forms isolated in a lifeless universe. And that is the reason why liberty was not able to halt its one-sided and destructive energies which broke out at the end of the eighteenth century and ultimately defeated more constructive traditions.

What we need today is a genuinely catholic view, that is, a historical, organic and dynamic understanding of reality – not in terms of a fragmentary empiricism or sensualism, not even as a return to some half-understood earlier idea, but rather as an organic continuation of earlier developments with all its ups and downs, failures and achievements. The most important aspects of contemporary science, such as quantum theory, may help us to understand better the realness of reality in our age. Or, as I suggested above, it is the notion of revelation which gives us the clue to such an understanding – inasmuch as we have the

time and energy to dig deep into the history and contents of this notion.<sup>11</sup> In the notion of revelation, the notions of happiness, life and liberty are synthesized in such a way that it offers more than a personal satisfaction, fulfillment, or freedom. It offers an incomparable whole in which happiness, life and liberty are disclosed as intrinsic moments of the reality of revelation.

One may of course ask if this overall notion of revelation may not represent a simple return to an earlier paradigm. If the notion is understood on the basis of its peculiar historical evolution, my answer is that it does not point to a return but rather to a progress, namely, a progress in which earlier latent or even unknown dimensions of this notion may come to the fore in a fashion which embodies option (c) among the possibilities listed above. To analyze this latter point I have already proposed the systematic study of the notion of revelation under the name of apocalypics (Mezei, 2016b).

### Conclusion

I have offered a catholic view of an important segment of our history of ideas with respect to the notions happiness, life, and liberty. I have pointed out that the meanings of these terms, taken in themselves, changed dramatically throughout the centuries. In this change, happiness and life became naturalized and liberty received an increasingly individualistic emphasis. During the twentieth century, the original meanings of these terms became untenable and there was no successful

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<sup>11</sup> For more details cf. Mezei 2013 and Mezei 2016b.



attempt to revise and further develop either their contents or their relation to one another, or both.

If we recognize that we need to renew the contents of these terms and their internal relations, we have three possibilities: a) a return to an earlier paradigm; b) a synthesis of prehistorically divergent developments; and c) a radical surpassing of all previous developments.

The last two perspectives have proved to be identical, because a 'radical surpassing' by necessity entails a reasonable synthesis. There is no radical break with a pre-history without a rational interpretation of the same history and the offering of a venue to a higher level realization of this history. Thus, I propose that after the dominance of happiness, life, and liberty, we need to develop the proper understanding of *reality* in a new way. I term this way 'catholic' because of its overall, overarching, and universal character. The central term of this approach is – *revelation*. It is in the perspective of a renewed and elaborated notion of revelation that we understand both the importance and the unimportance of such basic terms as happiness, life, and liberty.

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## LANGUAGE AND EXPERIENCE IN THE POST-GENOCIDE SOCIETY

## Abstract

This paper discusses theoretical and methodological issues concerning the relationship between language-history and experience-memory in post-genocide societies. Here an attempt is made to show how it is possible to remember the past and with the same time to avoid the overwhelming influence of foregoing trauma.

*Keywords:* language, experience, pre-linguistic experience, history, memory, genocide, past, presence, otherness.

Societies differ not only in what they do now, in present, but also what they did in the past. More precisely, some events have taken place in the past of societies which are currently the basis for their differences in the present. Among other differences, there is also one – the presence or absence of genocide in the past. Why the genocide becomes an indicator for differences, or why the post-genocide society becomes an object for a study? For it is extremely important not only to recognize the past of society, but also to understand the present and predict the future. This importance is reflected in the fact that it is merely an illusion that people understand what has happened in the past with them. In response to Winston Churchill's characterization that “we are in the presence of a crime without a name”, Raphael Lemkin gave the name ‘genocide’ (Lemkin, 1946, pp. 227-228), and it seems that the issue was resolved by this. However, that only at first glance it might seem: no matter how Lemkin explained the origin of the name; in fact, the problem start-

ed after that name in certain way. “‘Genocide’ is, in the first place, a word. ... The history of words is not, of course, the same as the history of ideas. It may be that ‘genocide’ represents different ideas embedded in different theories. ... Words can be powerful, and powerful words can be confusing. ... We have to seek control over our language if we are to grasp the terrible realities to which they somehow refer” (Freeman, 1991, p. 3). The word is the only way to start an analysis, but unfortunately it is a deadlock way. From the moment when we start to believe the language, it imprisons us, and we deprive ourselves of the experience, the reality of which had or could have in the pre-linguistic period. It means that when we verbalize events taking place about us, our impressions and experience undergo the language through which they manifest themselves. When we talk about our tragedy, we feel relieved. In other words, we express the experience which seemed to us incredible great, and it stops being so great because we can now just point to

it. This means that a linguistic unit reveals relevant experience in the association, and there will no longer need to make the effort to survive for previous experience. One can find an interesting illustration in Leo Tolstoy's "War and Peace"<sup>1</sup>. Similarly, as soon as the evidence is becoming an archive it stops being an experience. In this sense, famous words from Kafka can be the best epigraph or axis to our topic: "We photograph things in order to drive them out of our minds".

The difficulty of the issue is as follows: the first condition to resolve the problems concerning to the past is memory; but is there any memory or experience beyond the language? This question was originally discussed in epistemology and later was transferred from there to the other fields. Since the XVII century the main epistemological issue was the following: from where does come human knowledge and what is the basic tool to distinguish the truth from a false? In response to this question two epistemological systems

were developed – rationalism and empiricism. Rationalists claim that all we know by reason is superior in a philosophical way. And empiricists state that knowledge comes primarily from experience. However, after Kant and Hegel who combined those two systems, the question changed a little bit. There were authors among both analytic and continental philosophers who asserted that the only possible object of philosophy is language. And after that the question was in epistemology raised in the following way: is there any experience beyond the language, or language goes all the way down? Rorty, for instance, from the point of linguistic transcendentalism categorically rejects the possibility of pre-linguistic experience, stating that every experience is given in the language, including the experience of the self. He nevertheless underlines the exception of pain as being pre-linguistic (see Rorty, 1989, p. 94). Because pain is a total phenomenon, it at once subdues the whole system, organism; total pain can even stop the process of thinking and to represent itself as the primary substance. If there is pain, you belong to him, not vice versa. A similar question has also raised Georges Bataille in his famous *Inner Experience*. He argues that it is impossible to define the experience. He rather means the experience in the broadest sense – the experience of the death. And it is connected with our topic. From the viewpoint of our issue, the question is more complicated: is it possible to feel someone else's pain or to have the same consciousness as people who lived in the past? By the way, it is a cornerstone of historicism. This is an issue which originally was discussed in Thomas Nagel's essay with interesting title – "What is it like to be a bat?" The main idea of

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<sup>1</sup> "That's a fine death!" said Napoleon as he gazed at Bolkonski. Prince Andrew understood that this was said of him and that it was Napoleon who said it. He heard the speaker addressed as Sire. But he heard the words as he might have heard the buzzing of a fly. Not only did they not interest him, but he took no notice of them and at once forgot them. His head was burning, he felt himself bleeding to death, and he saw above him the remote, lofty, and everlasting sky. He knew it was Napoleon his hero but at that moment Napoleon seemed to him such a small, insignificant creature compared with what was passing now between himself and that lofty infinite sky with the clouds flying over it." (Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace. Translated by Louise and Aylmer Maude. 2009, p. 532).

this essay is that even if we succeed in this matter we can answer the question ‘what a bat is *for us*’, but we cannot grasp the *inner* life of a bat. “If anyone is inclined to deny that we can believe in the existence of facts like this whose exact nature we cannot possibly conceive, he should reflect that in contemplating the bats we are in much the same position that intelligent bats or Martians would occupy if they tried to form a conception of what it was like to be us. The structure of their own minds might make it impossible for them to succeed, but we know they would be wrong to conclude that there is not anything precise that it is like to be us: that only certain general types of mental state could be ascribed to us” (Nagel, 1974, p. 440). The problem would be solved if there is a psychophysical neutral language, into which the languages of man and bat would be translated. Nevertheless, there is no such language. We cannot get rid of our language. From there, an interesting and obligatory thesis: “Subjectivity is the only way to objectivity, to the world of objects” (Ankersmit, 2005, p. 102).

Now, if we move our reflections on our main topic, i.e. to compare bat with the past, we have to accept that “we can no longer separate the experience from what it is an experience *of*: The past then comes into being only because a certain social and mental world is experienced *as* past. That is to say, there is not, first, a past, and next, an *experience* of this past (in the way that there *is*, first, this chair and, next, my experience of it). The experience of the past and the past itself (as a potential object of historical research) are born at one and the same moment, and in this way experience can be said to be constitutive of the past” (Ankersmit, 2005, p. 102). In this

sense, the problems of the past are always present problems, as they manifest themselves in the present. On the other hand, certain episodes of the past are frequently manifest themselves because they are not a part of us. It is not ours but is very important for us, as it constantly reminds about him. So, to speak of the post-genocide society means to pay attention to the genocide which constantly reminds about itself. And once again formulating our main problem, it would be as follows: how to deal with this terrible episode of the past? Past, especially if it is traumatic, is a barrier that does not allow moving forward, does not allow our knowledge to become a life. How is it possible to get rid of the trauma of the past? You cannot alienate, deny it, because it is yours! On the other hand, forgetting is not the best way to resolve the problem, because “forgetting extermination is part of extermination, because it is also the extermination of memory, of history, of the social, etc.” (Baudrillard, 1981, p. 77). If you didn’t suppress it before, in the past, then now you should recognize it face to face, in other words, narrate it. *Only if a trauma becomes a narrative, then it will lose its terrible power.* By the way, in this regard, an analogy can be drawn between experience and memory, on the one hand, and language and history, on the other hand. First, perhaps, Maurice Halbwachs has talked about the contradiction of history and memory, stating that the history begins where the memory ends. Not only Halbwachs, but other thinkers like him, began to speak on this topic. For instance, Pierre Nora: “Memory and history, far from being synonymous, appear now to be in fundamental opposition. Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. ... History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete,

of what is no longer. Memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present; history is a representation of the past” (Nora, 1989, p. 8). Aleida Assmann continues the theme and notices that the relation between history and memory has itself a history that has evolved over time, passing through three stages: the identity between history and memory, the polarization between history and memory, and the interaction between history and memory (see Assmann, 2008, p. 57). So, in other words, if we say the same by new terminology, we would mention that post-genocide society demands to transform memory into history or to make memory audible, because “the memory evicted from the history is a psychological, individual, museum exponent that is not able to create new communication-information streams” (Hovhannisyan, 2014, p. 89).

However, there is a danger here: the danger is not only in respect with the loss of former identity (i.e. not only is social-psychological), but also is pure cognitive. When you appear in the linguistic field or deal with narratives, you lose the chance of experience. The point is that “‘genocide’ can never be identified purely by ‘value-free’, empirical observation but always requires a normative judgment” (Freeman, 1991, p. 6). Language is a prison that deprives us of the opportunity to see things in a pure manner. Although the language reveals the linguistic dimension of the world, where things are not represented in one aspect only, but as a whole essence, it is more than personal experience, in the sense that no one can see what denote the word ‘genocide’. Moreover, as the Word of God created the world, one may agree that “language is not metaphorical but the world as we know it is

an imperfect metaphor of the real world of the Word” (Vanderjagt, 1996, p. 342).

Thus, there is a possibility of choice which depends on the dreams of post-genocide society.

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## HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

THE INITIAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN ARISTOTLE'S *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS*

## Abstract

In the 'Foreword', I address some aspects of Academician Georg Brutian's philosophy. The Initial Anthropology paper follows.

In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle considers the relation of ethical theory to anthropology in a specific way. He sets out an initial anthropology that describes the human through its common and non-common elements to plants as well as to 'other animals'. The conclusion is that the human animal is the only living being that is endowed with reason and carries out 'practical life'. We may call this difference 'the anthropological difference'. In his ethical theory, Aristotle points to the limits of the anthropological difference. On the one hand, he holds that only practical theory can explain the 'practical life' as well as the 'human Good'. On the other hand, he highlights that the human is higher than the 'other animals', since the human is endowed with the divine element of intellect; nevertheless, there are beings that are 'more divine' than the human. Thus Aristotle corroborates the human and its practical life, without abandoning the Socratic-Platonic view of the Divine. In this aspect, the alleged anthropocentrism of Aristotle's ethics is to be reconsidered.

**Keywords:** Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Ethics, Anthropology, 'other animals', anthropological difference, Anthropocentrism, the Divine.

## Foreword:

In Honour of Academician Georg Brutian

Today we are coming together upon the invitation of the Armenian Pedagogical University after Khachatur Abovyan to participate in the International Conference dedicated to 90<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the late Academician George Brutian, that is the leading philosopher in Armenia in our times. The International Conference is organised by The Armenian State Pedagogical University after Khachatur Abovyan, by the International Academy of Philosophy, and by the Armenian Philosophical Society. In this International Con-

ference we remember and honour the distinguished philosopher Academician Georg Brutian, who was an eminent personality, highly recognised in his homeland Armenia and in the international philosophical community for his important philosophical research, for his initiatives concerning dialogue among persons and cultures, as well as for his contribution to the universal education of humanity. The issue of this International Conference is 'Life and Philosophy' and it expresses in an appropriate way Academician Georg Brutian's commitment to the work of philosophy, being namely to conceive the problems of life, to set out their conceptual analysis, and



to elevate them to the level of reasoned communication and of social consciousness as well.

Therefore, I express my gratitude to the institutions that have organised this Conference. I have to thank especially my distinguished colleague, Chairperson of the Philosophy Department, Professor Hasmik Hovannisyan for her excellent work concerning the organisation of the conference as well as for her kind efforts as regards my academic visit in Yerevan. Since I am a member of the International Academy for Philosophy founded by late Academician Georg Brutian, I have to stress that this Academy under his presidency has contributed through its conferences and its periodical 'News and Views' to widen the philosophical dialogue among philosophers from Armenia and other countries. Furthermore, Academician Georg Brutian encouraged the traditional ties of cultural exchange, of academic collaboration, and of friendship existing for centuries between the Armenian and the Greek people.

Logic, theory of argumentation, and methodology belong to the main issues of Academician George Brutian's philosophy. (Brutian, 1998; Djidjian, 2006, pp. 16-24; Djidjian, 2007, pp. 32-35; Hovhannisyan, 2006; van Eemeren, Garssen, Verheij, Krabbe, Snoeck Henkemans, & Wagemans, 2014, pp. 740-741, 868-869). Their distant roots are in ancient Greek philosophy, especially in Aristotle's philosophy and its tradition, to which Armenian philosophy is connected through the commentator David the Invincible. Academician Georg Brutian has contributed to promoting research on the work of Neo-Platonic Commentator David the Invincible as well as on the further development of Armenian philosophy (Brutian, 1998,

pp. 77-88). As he points out, the theory of argumentation has its distant origins in Socrates' search for the meaning of terms, in Plato's dialogues, as well as in Aristotle's dialectics as a theory of using arguments in a dispute. Aristotle set out his dialectics in his works 'Topics' and 'Sophistical Refutations' (Aristoteles, 1970b; Brutian, 1998, p. 91).

In fact, dialectics is related to the conception of philosophy itself and, in addition, it corresponds to the context of life of ancient Athens. While Plato's dialectics claims metaphysical truth, Aristotle's dialectics enquires the argumentative dealing with concrete opinions without intending the truth of Being. Aristotle, however, preserves dialectics as a philosophical exercise, as it had been performed in Plato's Academy (Ryle, 1968), and he promotes it to the method of his philosophical sciences. As it is known, Aristotle lived in Athens where the cultivation of public speech in poetry, in theater, in courts, in the marketplace or in the principal assembly was highly developed. Aristotle was impressed and inspired by the various aspects of this flourishing city (polis, πόλις), and his philosophy manifests his bond with the city (Solomou-Papanikolaou, 1989, pp. 95-98), even though he was no citizen of Athens.

Academician Georg Brutian sets out his theory of argumentation in a new perspective. First of all, he stresses that Aristotle's account of argumentation should be considered in the whole context of *Organon* as well as in its relation to *Rhetoric*. Further, he argues that, in dialectics, Aristotle pays attention to the topical forms of argumentation rather than to logical forms of thought (Brutian, 1998, p. 99). Moreover, he does not restrain his theory to an interpretation of Aristotle's dialectics. In-



stead, he sets out his theory of argumentation in the context of contemporary logic, methodology, and philosophy of language and connects it with the philosophy of life. In this regard, Academician Georg Brutian retains in his theory of argumentation Aristotle's connection of dialectics and life under new pre-suppositions. Thus, he emphasises the situational character of performed argumentation that is defined through social and historical conditions. In his view, performed argumentation is not only situated in the context of life but it has to promote decisions upon problems of life that are issues of the concrete argumentation (Brutian, 1998, pp. 94, 97, 103). While enquiring into the logical and linguistic aspects of argumentation and retaining their epistemological priority, his theory endorses almost the hermeneutic dimension of argumentation. Academician Georg Brutian's theory of argumentation has been appraised as an important contribution to this issue and makes up the leading research perspective for the Yerevan School of Argumentation (Hovhannisyan, 2006; Hovhannisyan, 2008; van Eemeren, Garssen, Verheij, Krabbe, Snoeck Henkemans, & Wagemans, 2014, pp. 740-741).

It is obvious that the full explication of academician Georg Brutian's philosophy goes beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the short account of his theory of argumentation indicates the broad orientation of his thinking and philosophical research. Considering the Aristotelian component of Academician Georg Brutian's philosophy, it is a good coincidence that this International Conference organised in his honour takes place this year, since 2016 is the 2400<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Aristotle's birth. Consequently, the theme of my paper on 'The Initial Anthropology in Aristotle's

*Nicomachean Ethics*' is in some way justified, since it belongs to this context of life and philosophy.

## Introduction

The question whether ethical theory needs a philosophical conception of the human is still open in contemporary philosophy. If one argues for the separation of ethical theory from a philosophical theory of the human, one is opposed to alleged essentialism, since a philosophical theory of the human sets out the 'essence' of the human. If one maintains that ethical theory should take into account a philosophical conception of the human, one endorses a type of realistic ethical theory that can describe the human as an ethical agent and explain the relation of ethical theory to human reality as well. For the first argument, the essence of the human points to an obsolete metaphysics. For the second argument, ethical theory also needs some essential characteristics of the human; otherwise it remains on a high level of abstraction. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle deals with this problem in a specific way. He sets out an initial anthropology that describes the human in respect to other mortal living beings and serves as the way into his ethical theory. Aristotle, however, avoids the anthropocentric burdens of his ethical theory in terms of Protagoras' conception of the human and he retains the distinction between anthropology and ethical theory.

In what follows, I explore the main aspects of this theme. The first aspect is the relevance of Aristotle's initial anthropology for his ethical theory in terms of the dialectics of negation and affirmation. Subsequently, I consider the elements of this initial anthro-

pology with reference to the anthropological difference that introduces the human animal as the living being that is endowed with reason (logos, λόγος) and carries out 'practical life'. Further, I explain that the anthropological difference has its limits, because it cannot point to the priority of the Divine with respect to the human being. Thus, the alleged anthropocentrism of Aristotle's ethics is questioned. The concluding remarks point to the significance of anthropology for contemporary ethics.

### The Relevance of Initial Anthropology

In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle focuses on the human Good that can be realised through humans' actions within the shared life of family, of friendship, and of the City (polis, πόλις) as well. In this context, the City has priority for humans' life (Solomou-Papanikolaou, 1989; Moutsopoulos, 1994). Aristotle's destructive critique of Plato's idea of the Good as a principle is a decisive step towards his own ethical theory (Aristoteles 1970a, 1096a11-1097a13; cf. Santas, 1989; Pentzopoulou-Valalas, 1998, pp. 25-40). Certainly, critique is a main characteristic of philosophical theory. Nevertheless, Aristotle's initial critique that aims to demarcate the field of the new theory from the field of the theory it refutes does not coincide with the new theory. For, the initial critique is a form of concrete negation, which only opens the new field of theorising. Then it indirectly requires an initial affirmative consideration functioning as the threshold to the new theory. The initial affirmative consideration has a formal character corresponding to the pragmatics of theory. Its content can be positive or negative in respect to concrete re-

ality. In this aspect, the initial affirmative consideration indicates that the philosopher does go beyond the critique of another theory, and he accepts an initial account promoting his own theory. In fact, it is this dialectics of negation and affirmation, which does not let theorising wither at the fringes of critique.

Its impact is also obvious in Aristotle's ethical theory. At the beginning of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle does not only formulate a rigorous critique of Plato's idea of the Good as a principle; he also sets out his elementary anthropology as the initial affirmation promoting the development of his ethical theory. He, however, retains Socrates' and Plato's question of the Good, and dedicates his own ethical theory to investigating this question primarily within the human scale. In this respect, *Nicomachean Ethics* does not only include a rigorous critique of Plato; it also remains a dialogue for and against Socrates' conception of ethics (Burger, 2008). Furthermore, Aristotle proposes the relative autonomy of ethical theory towards anthropology and metaphysics as well.

It is worth mentioning that Aristotle neither uses the term 'anthropology' nor does he explore an independent theory of the human, which could be named 'anthropology'. Nevertheless, he often sets out the essential characteristics of the human in such a systematic way, that his pertinent sentiments could be assumed to amount to a theory of the human being. Thus, it has been accepted that Aristotle's philosophy includes a specific anthropology or philosophical anthropology (Kyrkos, 1971; Scheler, 1976, p. 126; Fleischer, 1976; Apostolopoulou, 1987, pp. 50-52). This view offers a significant interpretative possibility in dealing with Aristotle's consideration of the human and, at the same time, it corre-

sponds to the fact that there is an 'anthropological tradition' in ancient Greece already before Aristotle. This tradition indeed includes an innovation, since the ancient Greeks invented the concept of the human, even though they did not establish a complete universalisation of this concept because of the social conditions of those times. Alongside the distinction between 'free' and 'slave', Aristotle has the insight of this universalisation, when he explains that the master and the slave can be friends, not because the master is the master and the slave is the slave, but because both are humans (Aristoteles 1970a, 1161b5-8; Apostolopoulou, 2006, pp. 111-112). However, he does not eliminate the particularity of his conception, since he argues that slavery is 'by nature'.

### The Elements of Initial Anthropology

While explaining Aristotle's initial anthropology, I take into account one of the main arguments of Helmuth Plessner's philosophical anthropology about the human as a nature-bound and, at the same time, as an ethical being (Plessner, 1981, p. 64). Consequently, the philosophical description of the human as an ethical agent has to consider humans in relation to nature, to plants and animals. Nevertheless, this philosophical description is not sufficient for Aristotle, because Aristotle considers the human that is endowed with reason and with the divine element of intellect as well. These points can serve as a hermeneutic elucidation of what I mean by anthropology in this paper. It is obvious that it cannot be my intention to investigate now the divergence between Plessner's anthropology and that of Aristotle's.

In his initial anthropology, Aristotle describes the specific characteristics of humans'

life with respect to the realisations of life in plants, in 'other animals', and in human animals (Aristoteles, 1970a, 1097b33-1098a4; for the expression 'other animals' see 111a26, 1111b8, 1141a33-34, 1178b27-28 etc.). Thus, Aristotle describes the essential characteristics of the human 'from below', through following the scale of the realisations of life in nature from the lower level up to the higher one that is the level of the human animal. This way of theorising also expresses Aristotle's attempt to pose the problem of the Good in terms of the mundane and of the human scale as well. At the same time, this is contrary to Plato's account of the transcendent Good, which Aristotle has refuted at the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle considers life as the common essential characteristic of plants, of other animals, and of human animals as well, since all of them participate in life and realise different types of it. In fact, life is an active field supported through the appropriate life activity of these living beings. In this aspect, life manifests its actual order as an essential interweaving of realisations.

Aristotle holds that every level includes the types realised in the lower level and, at the same time, it brings to the fore a further type of the realisation of life. Thus, every level is richer than the previous one. In plants, life consists in nutrition and growth. On the level of animals, life is not only nutritive and augmentative, but it is enriched through the sensitive-perceptive life. Then the human animals share with the other animals the nutritive, the augmentative, and the sensitive-perceptive life. Nevertheless, they realise another type of life, since they are the only living beings endowed with reason. Then their 'peculiar' life is the 'practical life' (praktikē zōē, πρακτικῇ

ζωῆ), namely a life of action (Aristoteles, 1970a, 1098a4-5).

Aristotle does not explain how the types of life are realised in every level. He takes them as given and develops an almost phenomenological description of them in terms of a realistic conceptual scheme. Therefore, his phenomenological account is close to what could be considered as a philosophical biology, since it describes animals on the basis of common and - where it is necessary- of differentiated characteristics. In this way, he retains the chain of life and, at the same time, he poses the difference between human animals and other animals as another realisation of life that is connected with the novel element of reason.

At first glance, reason and practical life could be seen as an addition to the other types of life. Nevertheless, Aristotle indicates that this form of life is supported though the common self-understanding of humans. While other animals live together in a place and look for their food, human animals are conscious of being members of their shared life and, at the same time, they support this shared life through their actions and values. However the shared life of humans has its basis in life as a natural reality, it makes up a novel level of life and corresponds to the essential characteristic of the human as a 'political animal' (zōon politikon, ζῷον πολιτικὸν) by nature, in terms of the institutional frame of 'polis' (Aristoteles, 1970a, 1097b11). In his relatively short initial anthropology, Aristotle summarises his affirmative account as that difference of the human animal from other animals, which consists in reason and practical life. For this conception of difference I shall use the expression 'anthropological difference'

that serves only as an interpretative signification for further investigation. Then it is a question whether Aristotle considers the anthropological difference as a sufficient account within the context of his ethical theory.

The conceptual field of reason and of practical life makes up the transition from initial anthropology to ethical theory. Aristotle introduces the crucial concept of the 'work of the human' (ergon anthrōpou, ἔργον ἀνθρώπου) in order to define the 'human Good' (anthrōpinon agathon, ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν) that is the core of his ethical theory (Aristoteles, 1970a, 1097b24-25, 1098a7-16; Dragona-Monachou, 1981, pp. 109-111; Cooper, 1986, especially 144ff.). The translation of Aristotle's term 'ergon' in modern languages is not so easy, and the English rendering 'function' does not solve the problem (Solomou-Papanikolaou 1989, pp. 65-66). In fact, the word 'ergon' exists in the Greek language from Homer's epic poems up to the present in a variety of meanings (Theodorakopoulos, 1981, pp. 72-73). It is obvious that the way from the semantics of everyday Greek language to Aristotle's theoretical elucidation is indispensable, if we wish to find out the meaning of 'ergon' in the context of his philosophy. Anyway, I prefer the English rendering 'work' for Aristotle's term 'ergon'.

Since the life of the human is the practicing of reason, the work of the human is an activity of soul in accordance with reason towards an optimal achievement. Aristotle elevates the work of the human to the peculiar human Good that is 'soul's activity (energeia, ἐνέργεια) in accordance with excellence (aretē, ἀρετή) (Aristoteles, 1970a, 1098a16-17). Since the peculiar life of the human is 'practical life', the human Good is what can be achieved in action (praktōn agathon, πρακτὸν

ἄγαθόν) (Aristoteles, 1970a, 1097a23). In this respect, the work is the activity presupposing potentiality and, at the same time, ability and effort to perform an activity causing an effect. And the work of the human is this activity guided through reason. Then the gradual transition from work to activity and to praxis, from the Good to the human Good, to the Good achieved through and in praxis opens the field of Aristotle's main ethical theory.

### The Anthropological Difference in the Context of Ethical Theory

The initial anthropology in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* points to reason as the crucial difference of the human from non-human animals. It seems human life recapitulates the previous types of life and, at the same time, it transforms their characteristics because of reason. As mentioned above, the main issue of initial anthropology is life as a process and as an activity as well. Aristotle does not abandon the anthropological difference at the threshold of his ethical theory. Instead, he investigates its aspects in order to stress that reason is no gradual distinction but it is a real difference characterising the human in contrast to other animals. So, he argues other animals do not participate either in virtue or in malice because they lack reason (Aristoteles, 1970a, 1145a25-26, 1149b31-32; Steiner, 2005, pp. 61-62). While suggesting that they are not to be ethical agents, Aristotle ascribes them some virtue as regards the elementary care for life. When he considers animals in terms of parent-children relation, he notes that, in this case, the human as well as the animals have a natural kind of mutual friendship (Aristoteles, 1970a, 1155a16-20).

Yet, Aristotle admits that some animals are prudent, because they seem to have the natural ability to provide for their life (Aristoteles, 1970a, 1155a25-28). Whether naturalistic or anthropomorphic, these views indicate Aristotle's broad conception of life. On the one hand, Aristotle excludes animals from practical life; on the other hand, he attributes to them some elements of moral behaviour by arguing that they have some inclination to virtue only 'by nature'. Therefore other animals' behaviour has some glance of virtue, but this glance concerns only some cases and does not cover the whole of their life. In other words, only humans perform activities with reason and on the basis of ethical criteria, only humans communicate about good and just, only humans carry out their life as a whole of life with virtue. Even though Aristotle does not intend to set out an account of animals' ethics, his views foreshadow this version of ethics that has been developed in the twentieth century.

Further, the anthropological difference contributes to the critical self-understanding of the human as an ethical agent. Aristotle considers the difference between the human and the animal on the moral level not as opposition indicating that virtue belongs to the human, while malice characterises the animal, as it was usually maintained in everyday life. Moreover, his argumentation has different levels. First of all, Aristotle formulates a short critique of moral language. As he points out, metaphor is useful, but it does not express truth. Secondly, he denies that the human is good and that the animal is bad. He underlines that virtue and malice are human possibilities connected with reason. Therefore, he insists that malice characterises the human, since mal-



ice indicates the distortion of reason, namely the attitude of the human acting against its essential determination. So, he argues that the nature of animals is less than malice; a bad man is more frightful than an animal (Aristoteles, 1970a, 1150a1-8).

Aristotle admits that the human is sometimes so violent that its behaviour is ferocious. He takes into account disease as a cause (Aristoteles, 1970a, 1149a16-20). Nevertheless, he considers violence and brutality of human behaviour as the degradation of humanity. Since moral language does not have the appropriate term for these cases of human behaviour, Aristotle uses the expression 'the beast' or ferocious as a metaphor indicating a similarity to animals' behaviour. While brutality is a specific characteristic of animals' natural force, in the case of human behaviour brutality indicates the degradation of the human towards inhumanity because of the distortion of reason. It seems that Aristotle attempts to restrain the ethical downgrading of animals that was the consequence of the gradual humanisation of nature.

Anyway, it is a question whether Aristotle considering only the human as the ethical agent sets out an anthropocentric ethics. In fact, anthropocentrism has been introduced in modern times as the other side of secularisation (Chadwick, 1991, pp. 229-234). In this context, one may contend that morality should and could be separated from religion and ethics should and could be set out without theology. Regarding the alleged anthropocentrism of Aristotle's ethics various arguments have been developed. Thus, Martha C. Nussbaum asserts that Aristotle's ethics is anthropocentric, because the human sets normative elements within mundanity and the human scale

and it poses the Good as the Good only for human life and for no other (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 291-294). In this respect, Aristotle sets out his ethics without theological connotations, and he elevates humans' ethical life beyond the life of other mortal animals. In a different way, Gary Steiner considers anthropocentrism as the worldview ascribing to animals an inferior status in the cosmic order compared to humans (Steiner, 2005, p. 2). He assesses that Aristotle's ethics represents rather a moderate anthropocentrism, because Aristotle preserves the continuity between humans and other animals, while excluding animals from the polis. Therefore, there is a tension between Aristotle's 'anthropomorphic language' and his anthropocentrism (Steiner, 2005, p. 72).

In fact, Aristotle sets out his initial anthropology explaining the human through taking into account the characteristics of other animals that are essential for considering the human as a living being among other mortal living beings. Even though Aristotle underlines reason and speech as features of the difference of humans from other animals and he considers only humans as ethical agents, the anthropological prerequisites of his ethical theory indicate a moderate definition of a trace of ethical value for some other animals.

Suggesting that the human is higher than the other animals because the human is endowed with reason and speech, Aristotle's initial anthropology reaches its limit. At the same time, the anthropological difference characterising a determination from bottom up, from animal to human, gives place to the question about a determination from above, from the Divine (Aristoteles, 1970a, 1177b27-31). As Aristotle maintains, everything has a divine element, since it exists within the tel-



eological life interrelation that is connected with the Divine. Moreover, the human is endowed with intellect and has the ability of intellectual activity within the theoretical form of life performed in philosophy as a research of the principles of the order of Being. Since intellect is the most divine element of human existence, it opens a perspective of transcendence within immanence that is realised as rational contemplation (*theoria*, θεωρία) and makes up the highest level of the activity of ethical agents (Aristoteles, 1970a, 1177a13-17, 1178b2-9).

In this respect, Aristotle explores the main activities of ethical agents, and, at the same time, he points to the broad interweaving of life within which humans carry out their specific forms of life. While action as 'praxis' (πρᾶξις) introduces changes in human life, intellectual activity as 'theoria' (θεωρία) is an intrinsic activity (*energeia*, ἐνέργεια) of investigation and contemplation of the whole scale of life without intending some impact upon it. While friendship includes self-relation connected to the relation to other, to friend, intellectual activity as rational contemplation means the self-sufficient self-relation based upon the ontological specification of intellect as the divine element of the human (Aristoteles, 1970a, 1171b32-36, 1178b21-22; Apostolopoulou, 2006, pp. 107-112). Nevertheless, self-relation characterising intellectual activity never becomes absolute, since human intellect exists under conditions of finitude. Therefore, intellectual activity as rational contemplation is only similar to the continuous activity of the Divine (Aristoteles, 1970a, 1178b27; Apostolopoulou, 1999, 31). Thus, Aristotle corroborates the orientation of human life towards flourishing and values

without abandoning the Socratic-Platonic viewpoint that the Divine is the highest reference point of ethical life. In some way, he shares Protagoras' emphasis on the human, but he does not endorse Protagoras' radical anti-ontology. Instead his ethics corroborates the human as ethical agent, but it is not released from his metaphysics.

### Conclusion

The initial anthropology in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* serves to describe the context of Aristotle's ethical theorising after his critique of Plato's comprehensive theory. From an almost meta-theoretical consideration, it has a strategic importance not only for developing a new theory but also for vindicating the place of this theory against another theory. While doing so, it also describes the human as the ethical agent within a life context. Besides, the anthropological difference, namely the difference between the human and the other mortal animals, allows some considerations about other living beings as inhabitants of this earth. Even though Aristotle considers humans as higher over other mortal animals, he does not adopt some aggressive attitude or emotional aversion towards the latter. He underlines the continuity of life that the human and the other mortal animals share, and, at the same time, he explains the difference and the convergence of the human towards them. It is still a question whether ethical theory does need an anthropological account as a prerequisite (Apostolopoulou, 1999; Apostolopoulou, 2008). Aristotle offers a reasonable justification of such a prerequisite that we should take into account nowadays, when the question of the human as a concrete living

being is put under conditions of uncertainty.

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## THE THEORY OF VITAL ENERGY ACCORDING TO WELL-KNOWN MODERN ARMENIAN WRITER

### Abstract

Among all nations representing ancient civilizations, beginning with antic times wise thinkers have examined issues of interrelations between life and death, macrocosm and microcosm, soul and body, and not only from the viewpoint of their own person, but also their nation and even the entire humanity.

Razmik Davoyan has created his own theory, having practical significance, which has a unique goal, i.e. to help the modern human being not only in Armenia, but all over the world to solve more easily difficulties of human life and to make the real life more beautiful by correct use of the vital energy.

*Keywords:* vital energy, Davoyan, philosophy, upbringing, education, work, the Bible, Creator, bad, good.

Among all nations representing ancient civilizations, beginning with antic times wise thinkers examined issues of interrelations between life and death, macrocosm and microcosm, soul and body, and not only from the viewpoint of their person, but also their nation and even the entire humanity.

It suffices to observe the example of Armenian literature. Movses Khorenatsi, Father of the Armenian historiography, discusses this issue in the *Lamentation* which closes his *History of Armenia* (Khorenatsi, 1981, pp. 453-455).

Grigor Narekatsi turns to these issues in his entire genius masterpiece *The Book of Lamentation* and especially in its 56<sup>th</sup> episode (Narekatsi, 2007, pp. 268-271). Hovhannes Tumanian in his *Quatrains* (Tumanian, 1990, pp. 47-57) and Avetik Isahakian in his poem

*Abu-Lala Mahari* (Isahakian, 1974, p. 61) discuss these issues as well. They are strongly tied with the system of ontology and those problems of vital energy which studies Razmik Davoyan in his new and topical book *The Role and Significance of Vital Energy in the System of Ontology*.

Davoyan cites that list of directly used literature which includes the *Book of Genesis* of the Bible Old Testament, the book *The Mythology Worshipping Hellas* by Mikael Bartikian, the work *Zen on The Art of Archery* by Eugen Herrigel, as well as works by Thomas Elliot, Artak Movsisyan, Albert Camus, Boileau and Confucius. This is a small list of authors from many countries. I am sure that his theory of vital energy was formed during long years, after reading different books and, which is the most important, out of his own life expe-

rience. By the way, he gives the enumeration of different philosophers and diverse names of philosopher-writers, from which there is no quotation, but they are surely known to the author (Davoyan, 2016, p. 16).

Razmik Davoyan created his theory of practical importance which goal is only one: to help nowadays people not only in Armenia, but all over the world to make easier the life difficulties and to make real life more beautiful. His theory is ending with the following conclusion: “The Creator is Himself universal love and peace. He is spreading these adamant crystals of love over the world and, growing up they will cover the world with love” (Davoyan, 2016, p. 204).

In all times and in all branches of science there is the reality of hypothesis. They also exist nowadays, sometimes in exaggerated quantities. Razmik Davoyan either has in his quite interesting book a series of hypotheses. He even proposes the following: “It is worth to create now with full right a science, side by side with other sciences, and to call it *hypothesiology*, the activity field of which will have no limits (Davoyan, 2016, p. 19).

A huge literature was created about the contradiction between good and evil, God and the devil. Of course, it is radically discussed in the Bible. Davoyan believes in some facts of the Old Testament which are refuted by the science. According to him, the fact of many hundred years life of first human beings, as mentioned in the *Book of Genesis*, was real. Those long years were reduced because of human sins. In his work Davoyan repeats several times the idea of little Johnny, the unforgettable personage of William Saroyan’s play, saying that somewhere something is wrong... (Davoyan, 2016, p. 27). Here is this passage:

Johnny: Where the hell do we think we’re going, Pa?

Johnny’s Father: Never mind, Johnny.

You just follow me.

Johnny: I’m not mentioning any names,

Pa, something’s wrong somewhere

(Saroyan, 1987, p. 67).

A passage of R. Davoyan’s book concerns globalization and open society. Globalization is a modern notion, but its real father can be considered Alexander of Macedonia, thanks to whom Hellenism made his apparition in the word.

For the sake of the common benefit of the humanity Davoyan refuses globalization which is based on the economic profit and the military domination of a few nations. He also studies the issues of interrelations between society, powerful individuality and crowd.

According to Davoyan, the force of evil can be diminished as far as possible by the means of vital energy. While he remarks about the great Aristotle: “... Aristotle’s doctrine shows that the suffering and the evil cannot entirely disappear from the world where human beings are living and acting, as the ‘substance’ is insurmountable; the human being is mortal, he is condemned to death, and the level of perfection he can reach is always relative. Platonicians and Christian philosophers recognize, as well as Aristotle, the inevitability of sufferings and evil on the earth” (Aristotle, 1984, p. 35). This quotation is made from the foreword written by D. Kessidi for the book *Ethical works* by Aristotle.

David the Invincible, who calls philosophy a science about divine and human realities (David the Invincible, 1980, p. 67), thinks as follows: he considers philosophy according to Plato as similarity to God (David the Invin-



cible, p. 80) according to human capacities.

According to Razmik Davoyan the human being can increase his possibilities if he sets his hopes on vital energy.

He often repeats the words of Leonardo da Vinci addressed to humanity: “Open your eyes”.

The theory of vital energy is discussed from the viewpoint of Jesus Christ’s doctrine, according to which the human life does not end in its known and visible part, but continues after it as well and it is necessary to take care of it. Plato, who confirms the eternity of the soul, writes in his *Phaedo*: “In fact, there is either reanimation or birth of living beings from dead and existence of the souls of dead people” (Plato, 2006, p. 81).

The Pythagoras philosophy, which is older than the doctrine of Plato, warns its adepts that every day when anyone comes home he must check himself for the sake of his future and ask himself: “Have I sin (today)? What have I done? What I had to do and did not?” (Pythagoras, 2004, p. 333).

In the extra-goal of regulating the behavior of human being in visible life according to divine commands, Davoyan gives a great importance to the educational system which must be reconstructed according to his demands, “in order to get a perspective of realizing the human ideal of ‘perfect man’, but not an unrealizable tragedy” (Davoyan, 2016, p. 143).

Davoyan speaks separately about the forms and kinds of manifestation of vital energy, the necessity of its preservation and its means. In general lines he divides vital energy into following kinds:

- a) The vital energy transmitting itself by human communication or human vital energy.
- b) The vital energy transmitting itself by communication between man and nature.
- c) The vital energy transmitting itself by communication between man and animals, or vital energy of the animal world.
- d) The Vital energy of literature and arts.
- e) The energy of thought.
- f) The energy of passion. (Davoyan, 2016, p. 96).

Davoyan notes righteously that there are vampires of vital energy in the human society. In his works he has numerous new commentaries of Biblical commentaries, through which one will make much easier those difficult moments of human life which are created by men themselves, unjustly steeling the vital energy of others.

According to Davoyan, the formula “Life is struggle” coming from old life must be changed into the formula “Life is work and felicity” (Davoyan, 2016, p. 59).

The demand of the author to save man’s time is sounding more than topical. Even today the time of everybody is stolen by ours, days and months and sometimes even by years. They have to wait in the antechambers of bosses and State functionaries.

The real duration of human life is reduced by fear, panic, distressing hours of waiting, dignity humiliations, intrigues made out of personal interest, stolen purse, lost watch or wrong weighing of food.

Such phenomena which take away vital energy may be prevented by reorganizing the activities of the educational system, which

will allow reaching wanted results. This is the main basis of the writer in the development of his theory.

With his practical theory of vital energy Davoyan seems to realize the following demand of the great German philosopher Emmanuel Kant: “We are a priori determined by reason to contribute by all means to the welfare in the world which consists in the union of the greatest welfare of reasonable beings in the world with the highest condition of good in them, i.e. [union] of everybody’s happiness with the most law-governed morality” (Kant, 1999, p. 1335).

The concern of Razmik Davoyan is for healthy humanity, a goal to be reached by the theory he has created, basing himself on progressive thinkers of many centuries and the Bible. Thus, he also, as Solomon the Wise, the author of the Ecclesiastes, can say as epilogue: “The preacher sought to find out acceptable words; and that which was written was upright, even words of truth” (Ecclesiastes, 10).

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## PROBLEMS OF ARGUMENTATION IN MEDIEVAL ARMENIAN PHILOSOPHY

### Abstract

None of the medieval Armenian thinkers left a complete piece on argumentation theory. However, argumentation problems and the practical realization of requirements of the theory of argumentation were enormous part of Armenian philosophers' works. They discussed argumentation problems mostly from object-language rather than meta-language prospective.

This research focuses on the works of three mediaeval thinkers: Yeznik Kogh Macy (IV-V), David Anahat (The Invincible, V), Grigor Tatevatsi (XIV-XV). In their theoretical heritage the examination of argumentation issues and coverage can be regarded as the most significant stages of history of Armenian argumentation theories, the interpretation of which first of all aims to accomplish the following problems:

1. Present the argumentation doctrines of each chosen philosopher as a complete idea of the theory of argumentation.
2. Complete the critical analysis of the theoretical heritage of the examinee philosophers.
3. Clarify the most important stages of history of Armenian argumentation doctrines.
4. Thereby increase the possibility of including history of Armenian argumentation theories in universal history.

The history of each theory can be perceived and properly appreciated from the perspective of that theory's modern level of development. Considering that fact this research reconstructs the models of syntax and semantics of the language of argumentation.

*Keywords:* general history of argumentation theories, history of Armenian argumentation theories, Yeznik Kogh Macy, David Anahat (The Invincible), Grigor Tatevatsi, the syntax of the language of argumentation, semantics of the language of argumentation.

### Introduction

*1. The Importance and Necessity of Analysing the History, Formation and Development of Armenian Argumentation Theories.* International conferences and the publications in international professional journals on the theory of argumentation indicate that argu-

mentation theorists pay attention to the history of argumentation doctrines. The development of theoretical problems of argumentation cannot be comprehensive without re-evaluation of history and without application of the values from the heritage of past to the new theory system. Such studies (see particularly Hovhannisyan, 2005) contribute to the

publication of general monographic works on the history of argumentation. It is extremely important for such research to include the layers and nuances of the rich traditions of philosophical thought, which deal with the argumentation problems. Otherwise, history of argumentation will be in the same condition as history of logic. Father Bochenski in his fundamental research “History of Formal Logic” only slightly alludes the presence of logical research in Medieval Armenia. (Bochenski, 1961, p. 11). However, the recent Armenian studies show that “David The Invincible’s doctorines of the subject of logic and the logic of forms of thought, are one of the important pages of ancient philosophy. The world history of logical doctrines will significantly suffer if David’s theoretical heritage gets ignored.” (Brutian; Arevshatyan (eds.), 1983, p. 191).


David the Invincible’s logical doctrine is the most crucial phase of the history of Armenian philosophy. Similarly, the analysis of argumentation problems registered in his theoretical heritage is the essential component of the history of argumentation.

This research examines the theoretical heritage of Yeznik Koghbaty, David Anahaght (The Invincible), Grigor Tatevatsi from the perspective of argumentation. As a result the works of these philosophers are assessed as vital phases in the history of Armenian argumentation.

2. *Comprehension of Argumentation Language.* Following to the conception of Yerevan School of Argumentation, which is expressed in its founder academician G. Brutians’ and his alumnus’ works (Brutian, 1992; Brutian, 1993; Brutian, 1998; Hovhannisyan, 2006; Hovhannisyan, 2009; Markaryan, 1986)

as well as a basic argumentation model of professors Frans van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst and Tjark Kruiger (Eemeren, Grootendorst & Kruiger, 1987)) in this research the theory of argumentation is regarded as a certain language which has its own semantics (the semantics of argumentation language) and syntax (the rules of linking words in argumentation language). The first one includes two substrates: the range of words characteristic for argumentation (“argumentation”, “foundation”, “proof”, “rejection”, “conviction”, etc.) and the words characteristic for stylistic specifics. The concepts typical to the semantics of argumentation language cannot be observed similarly, since in the process of argumentation they have different meaning and role. The relationship among those concepts can be represented through the following circle scheme:

- The categories of argumentation
- The concepts which are not categories, but still are typical of the process of argumentation
- The concepts typical of a field in epistemology, to which the particular argumentation process refers
- The concepts taken from the field of sound judgment, essential for the particular argumentation process.



These commentaries refer to the explicit level of argumentation language. Correct comprehension of the implicit level and revelation of the hidden premises are also vital in the process of argumentation. At this point, the role of argumentation language syntax is particularly crucial.

In the process of argumentation, syntax of argumentation language is the multitude of rules referring to the methods of linking words, logical, methodological, psychological, rhetorical, ethical and other skills. In other words, syntax of argumentation language includes the skills of proof, rejection, foundation, persuasion and rhetoric, which are more content wise rather than have formal nature and promote emotional perception and digestion of argumentation among listeners.

The specificity of argumentation is that both its conceptual model and methodological system are not excelling with their innovative structure. Argumentation system contains extrapolated concepts, tricks, principles, patterns from other fields of science (logic, methodology, epistemology, ethics, axiology, psychology, rhetoric and etc.). These concepts are being adjusted and reevaluated from the prospective of new theory – argumentation. As a result, those concepts acquire new meaning and features, which are connected with the goals and issues of argumentation and their interconnectedness.

#### Conceptual Apparatus of the Argumentation Language in the Viewpoints of Yeznik Koghbatsi, David Anghaght and Grigor Tatevatsi

The primary and basic concepts of semantics model of argumentation were sepa-

rated in the selected works, which reflect the specificities, aims and usage of argumentation, as well as the whole explicit and implicit conceptual wealth of argumentation was identified. As a result the following concepts were created:

- *field of logical concepts*: reasoning, syllogism, argument, anti-argument, acceptable and non-acceptable argument, obvious argument, apparent argument, thesis, antithesis, postulate, proof, foundation, premise, inference, basis, proposition, veracity, division, definition, demonstration, deduction, induction, analogy, analysis, assertion, rejection, deny, disavowal, protestation, objection and etc.

- *field of psychological concepts*: Conviction, persuasion, conjecture, opinion, authority and etc.

- *field of gnoseological concepts*: truth, true, correct, exactitude, accuracy, precision, truthfulness, enemy of truth, enemy of justice, veracious, fallacy, misbelief, false, pseudo unjust and inequitable, rejection of recognizability of the world, acceptance of the limitless cognition, experience as a result of knowledge, the types of knowledge of cognition, limitations of sensory cognition, theory and practice relationship and etc.

- *field of ethical concepts*: theoretical and practical philosophy, thought and action, goodness and the truth, evil and false, perfect philosopher, goodness, ill, kind, unkind, envy, kind envy, benefit, useless, useful, beneficial, harmful, fit, villain, fair, justice, righteous, worthy, indecorous, will, will and thought, merit, virtue and etc.

- *field of the related concepts*: conversation, argue, quarrel, debate, discussion, recipient, audience, co-participant, opponent, adherent, supporter and etc.

The reconstruction of the conceptual apparatus of argumentation allows to compare conceptual apparatus with modern theories and to identify their historical scientific background through comparative analysis.

Syntactic Methods and Means of Argumentation Language in the Viewpoints of Yeznik Koghbatsi, David Anghaght and Grigor Tatevatsi

In order to reconstruct the syntactic model of argumentation language in the works of chosen philosophers this research analysed and classified the methods of argumentation which were used by Armenian philosophers in their “philosophical conversations”<sup>1</sup>. After classification, their reasoning regarding the methods and means which form the syntax of argumentation were interpreted utilizing contextual approach.

Armenian philosophers value the following components:

- a) *Logical methods and means of argumentation*
- b) *Epistemological components of argumentation*
- c) *Axiological components of argumentation*

<sup>1</sup> Most of the Armenian philosophers’ works are written as a narration, which has very characteristic inner dialogical form. Even the titles of their main writings shows their dialogical character: “Definitions of philosophy by the Trice-Great and Invincible Philosopher David, in Opposition to the Four Propositions of the Sophist Pirrho” (David The Invincible); “The Refutation of Heresies” (Yeznik Koghbatsi); “Book of Questions” (Grigor Tatevatsi) and etc.

- d) *Psychological components of argumentation*
- e) *Rhetorical components of argumentation*
- f) *Ethical components of argumentation*
- g) *Related methods of argumentation*
- h) *Question-answer manifestations.*

a) *Logical methods and means of argumentation.* The research and comparative analysis showcase the prevailing presence of logical concepts in the chosen samples. According to Armenian philosophers the usage of logic, its components, means and principles is the main tool in the process of argumentation.

According to David, a certain discipline and order exists among the logical means. Division precedes definition, definition precedes proof. Analysis is the last one. Proof is the criteria used to differentiate conventional and unconventional sciences. Conventional sciences come from principles that are hungry for proof, but unconventional sciences come from universally accepted principles which do not need proof. Argumentation is an unconventional theory as well from this prospective.

In David’s argumentation system proof is combined with assurance, because the aim of “proof” is to “show and assure” that something is the way it is (Anyaght’ (David the Invincible), 1980, p. 114).

According to David, throughout argumentation process rejection is applied either for preventing the misunderstandings as a way to prevent possible incorrect interpretations or explanations, or as an inevitable factor for denying the present rejection, in other words double rejection or rejection of rejection.

David the Invincible distinguished two ways of rejection: 1. Irreconcilable opponent "challenge" method, which aims to oppose true thought to the opponent’s provision and



stubbornly defend it; 2. Equal argument of the opponent's provisions method, in which the antithesis is initially announced and shown true and the consequences of it are showcased as wrong, which proves that the main thesis of the opponent is wrong (Anyaght' (David the Invincible), 1980, p. 81). Debate has chief role in characterization of rejection methods. This fact, testifies the existing difference between the logical and argumentative use of rejection.

Grigor Tatevatsi tells not to limit for good intentions and doing good in the process of argumentation, but also to resist and deny the evil, since originally God gave man three priorities: bright mind, straightforward action and the ability to counterattack the opponent (Tatevatsi, 1740b, p. 223).

Armenian philosophers also value the issue of confirming true provisions: "The ideal argumentation is the one which not only deals with opponent's uncertainty but also is able to confirm the arguer's viewpoints" (Anyaght' (David the Invincible), 1980, p. 37).

Dutch argumentation theorists F. Eemeren, R. Grootendorst & T. Kruiger claim that rejection and approval of opinions are the primary aims of argumentation. The other aims, such as leaving good impression or gaining the recipients sympathy are secondary, since those can be achieved through other methods as well, whereas rejection and approval can only be realized through argumentation means (Eemeren, Grootendorst & Kruiger, 1987, p. 5).

According to David, syllogism is also one of the logical methods of argumentation. All sciences, arts and philosophy are in need of syllogism. Theoretical philosophy utilizes syllogism to differentiate between truth and

falsehood, whereas practical philosophy uses it to distinguish good and evil.

David the Invincible differentiates 5 types of syllogism: evidentiary, dialectical, rhetorical, dilettante and poetic. Such differentiation highlights the variances between the logical and argumentative usage of syllogism. Logic limits by evidentiary syllogism. The other types of syllogism are typical of argumentation, since rhetoric exists there.

Yeznik Koghbatsi's *Eghts aghandots* (*Refutation of the Sects*) is notable for its wide and various uses of argumentation syntax techniques. It includes nomination and rejection of antithesis (existing or potential), nomination and rejection of counterarguments (existing or potential), demonstration of inconsistency of argumentation, identification of contradictions in opponent's thesis, substantiation based on authoritative opinions, accusation for not considering the authority's (wise) opinion, rejection through referring to authorities, rejection of opinions and viewpoints which are authoritative for the opponent, formulation of thesis at the end of the text (volume) (Koghbatsi, 1994).

*b) Epistemological components of argumentation.* Interpretation of epistemological components of argumentation first of all comes to evaluation of truth in the works of Armenian philosophers. Truth is the most powerful mean for counter-arguing the opponent in the process of argumentation: "Using truth as our weapon we destroyed the absurd claims of those who tried to deny the existence of philosophy." (Anyaght' (David the Invincible), 1980, p. 37).

Evaluation of truth, rejection of world's imperceptibility, experience as a source of knowledge, types of knowledge, restrictions of

sensory knowledge, acceptance of infinit ability of knowledge and relationship between theory and practice are all huge part of Armenian philosophers' works.

The opponents of truth create confusion, since they do not just come up with empty doubts, but bring up strong and hard to solve problems and rejections (Anyaght' (David the Invincible), 1980, p. 138). Truthful things do not find against each other, whereas false things fight both against each other and the truth (Anyaght' (David the Invincible), 1980, p. 332).

According to Grigor Tatevatsi as well, truth is wise man's weapon and knowledge lightens virtue like the sun. Truth is stronger than anything else in the world, it is honorable, eternal, unreachable and exclusive, but lie is nothing, evil and dishonorable, since "one and only truth should not follow to numerous lies." Theoretical wisdom starts with speech, but the aim of speech or argumentation is to realize the truth, but the practical mission starts with will and aims to ensure the implementation of truth (Tatevatsi, 1740b, p. 150; Tatevatsi, 1740a, p. 27-28; Tatevatsi, 2003, p. 20).

Tatevatsi's discipline regarding the differentiation of truth and falsehood is significant from the perspective of objectives and requirements of argumentation theory, since "Wise man are more likely to accept and follow disciplines than the senseless" and "Miserable to those who will go on teaching the good as evil, and evil as good, the light as darkness and darkness as light" (Tatevatsi, 1740b, p. 281).

It is unique feature of all humans to think that "they are righteous and fair" (Tatevatsi, 2003, p. 70) "the human being is inclined to

make mistakes", so Tatevatsi claims "fallacy can only be prevented by wisdom" (Tatevatsi, 1740b, p. 218). The causes of delusion are sins, which cover the mind like a fog and bring forth blindness of mind and evil's advices (anger, wrath, robbery and etc.), which create mental imbalance, seem kind and righteous (Tatevatsi, 2003, p. 54).

In such situations the need for usage of argumentation becomes more significant. Meanwhile, the aim of argumentation is one, but the methods and ways of realization are many (Tatevatsi, 1740b, p. 216; 224; 307-308).

Tatevatsi alerts that the false speech is impure regardless of its size (Tatevatsi, 2000, p. 98). The liar is sentenced and will never be justified, since justification is only possible through confession, and the confession itself is veracity (Tatevatsi, 1740a, p. 27-28). Lie has three ways of expression, through heart, speech and action (Tatevatsi, 1740a, p. 16). Lie can be dangerous, joky, useful (Tatevatsi, 1740a, p. 29).

All manifestations of evil and deception are unacceptable in the process of argumentation. However, in the unjust world it is impossible to avoid evil, fake and wrong speech. The mind is fed both with the good and evil. It is up to the individual which one to choose (Tatevatsi, 2000, p. 136).

The relationship between truth and persuasion is vital in argumentation system. According to the discussed Armenian philosophers, argumentation is a speech directed towards persuasion and truth should be the major tool used in the process of persuasion. From the other hand, they promote type of argumentation which does not limit the recipients' activities and does not impose the truth:

“People should have free will and freedom of action, since it is unacceptable to compulsorily direct people to a right path.”

Argumentation also deals with self-criticism, identification of one's own mistakes as well as discussion and analysis of those through various methods. The recipients will have trust only for that kind of fair speaker. Tatevatsi preaches judges to be fearless, wise and incorruptible, as well as he encourages them to judge and correct their own morals and behaviour and only after that pass on judging others (Tatevatsi, 1740a, p. 53).

According to Grigor Tatevatsi, wisdom is preferable than power: the one who has power but no intelligence will be destroyed, whereas the one who has wisdom but no power will rule the world and subordinate enemies. The king survives or wins not due to “its numerous laws”, but wisdom, thus he commands: “fight with thought and wisdom.” The king should never lie and deceive, since people lie because of weakness and fear, whereas king is powerful and the poor should not strive to be rich but should try to stand out with their wisdom.” (Tatevatsi, 2000, p. 104; 80).

*c) Axiological components of argumentation.* Values, value standards and guidelines, usefulness and the issue of substantiating importance have vital role in the argumentation system of medieval Armenian philosopher. Values are links between psychological and ethical factors and elements of argumentation. They regulate psychological and ethical motives of argumentation process. Importance as an evaluation and measure of value plays crucial role in Armenian authors' perceptions of value systems.

The following means stand out in the works of Armenian philosophers: evaluation

of opponent's behaviour and position, evaluation of antitheses and contrary viewpoints.

*d) Psychological components of argumentation.* Non-logical factors are: the demand for combining usefulness and pleasantness, persuasion, formation of opponent's conviction (or recipient's), inner reliance and self-persuasion, authority's opinion “Virtuous and great people do not need rules, whereas they are “rules” themselves for the followers: “Not Plato needs Aristotle's proofs, but Aristotle needs Plato's proofs; not Homer needs Aristotle's poems, but Aristotle needs Homer's poems; not Demosthenes needs Hermogenes's arguments, but vice versa.” (An-yaght' (David the Invincible), 1980, p. 312). Persuasion is for reasonable, but you do not have to forget about “the ones who are hard to persuade. Do not be lazy and direct persuasion to everyone” (Yeznik Koghbatsi).

Armenian philosophers not only present their attitude towards persuasion but also show that rhetoric and logic work side-by-side in the process of persuasion. Rhetoric cannot persuade and will be useless if it is not based on logical means, logical consistency, noncontradictory of mind, in other words truth.

*e) Rhetorical Components of Argumentation.* Rhetoric is not a part of philosophy, but like grammar, it's a pre-education for it (An-yaght' (David the Invincible), 1980, pp. 34-35; 86). Rhetoric is included in the volume of conviction, but conviction is not rhetoric, since one of the important components of conviction is logical philosophy. Rhetoric cannot convince if it is not grounded on the logic, logical receptions, logical sequence, and logical consistency. David differentiates three types of rhetoric: classical, panegyric and exhortative

(Anyaght' (David the Invincible), 1980, p. 98).

David the Invincible's understanding of «rhetorical syllogism», that equally includes the lie and the truth, is of great interest (Anyaght' (David the Invincible), 1980, p. 304). All types of syllogism, except the proofing syllogism, include lie, and in the structure of «rhetorical syllogism» the lie and the truth are equal.

The works of Armenian philosophers also excel at the broad use of rhetorical means. Especially, it is necessary to mention the rhetorical question, sudden and unexpected introduction, dialogue (the rhetorician formulates the question and answers it himself), flexibility of thought, clarity of passing thoughts, the choice of the right moment for conclusion, the use of exclamations, appeals and interjections, the right choice of the words, skills to link words, the use of comparisons, personal charm, humility, direct refer to the opponent, inspiration of self confidence by referring to the arguments proofing his rightness in the past.

According to the claims of Grigor Tatevatsi the argumentation becomes much audible on the base of four characteristics of speech (kind speech, systemised speech, gentle voice and diplomatic speech). Meanwhile evil, non-accurate, noisy and hurried speech annoys, embarrasses and makes the auditor's thought dogmatic and the argumentation becomes inefficient "the speech remains empty" (Tatevatsi, 1740b, p. 180). The important rhetorical means are also "laconic and charming", courageous, undaunted and true speech (Tatevatsi, 1740b, pp. 211; 309).

#### f) *Ethical Components of Argumentation.*

In the argumentation system of the observed Armenian philosophers is given an important place to the investigations of the ethical princi-

ples and viewpoints. Armenian philosophers analysed in their works Aristotle's ethical doctrine of goodness, "virtuous lifestyle", classification of virtuous, the necessity of the division of philosophy to parts and the issues of the interrelation of theoretical and practical philosophy, goodness and perfect philosopher, goodness and truth, "thought and action", "philosophy and its tool".

David's thoughts on the perfect philosopher are rather remarkable. The perfect philosopher is not the one, who "knows a lot, but the one who has pure lifestyle as givenness and can subdue his passions" (Anyaght' (David the Invincible), 1980, p. 305). The perfect philosopher is characterised by three specific features in the base of which is the demand of ethical upbringing, they are moderate, restrict the passions and desires, not seeking for unachievable things, since unsatisfied yearnings give birth to great sadness (Anyaght' (David the Invincible), 1980, pp. 47; 67).

Discussing the relation between truth and goodness David the Invincible gives privilege to the goodness, that is much more general and comprehensive and in many cases is preferred to the truth. And as the thing that is true is also good, but any good thing is not yet true, sometimes the lie can also be good. In other words, practical philosophy is often preferred to theoretical philosophy (Anyaght' (David the Invincible), 1980, p. 109).

According to Tatevatsi, the theoretical and the practical complement to each other. The practical laws beautify the human thought and soul at the result of which the body becomes beautiful (Tatevatsi, 1740b, p. 280).

Tatevatsi states that the criteria, according to which the goodness and the truth should be differentiated, is the law. There are no small or

big laws. The law of God and commandments are kept by hearing, learning and then remembering and proofing by actions. The one who keeps the law is awarded and the one who breaks it is punished. Those who know and neglect the law, those who don't know and don't keep the law and those who kept it partially or have forgotten the law that knew before, all of them are profane (Tatevatsi, 1740b, pp. 10; 12; 38).

The guarantee of a true word, kind and fair action is wisdom (Tatevatsi, 1740b, pp. 214; 225). God has granted human beings with free will, so the human being himself chooses the direction of his thought and action. It's impossible and also wrong to make a person to choose virtue. Even God does not command or oblige, he encourages, explains and teaches. This edification is useful for those who deal with argumentation. The virtue is the fulfilment of good by refusing from evil. A human being makes good without knowing about the existence of evil and without rejecting evil consciously, then such action won't deserve praise or glorification. The evil is for a human being to have a chance first to know about and then to reject and refuse it. Tatevatsi warns that one should hurry to do goodness, as it's impossible to turn back time, and all the things that seem to be simple and easy today when you are young and lively, will become difficult and impossible tomorrow when you become powerless (Tatevatsi, 1740b, p. 221).

The final aim of argumentation is the fulfilment of certain actions. The neglect of the connection between argumentation and action can lead to a number of extreme conclusions, particularly to the argumentation ending in itself that aims just to convince the recipient. This kind of argumentation is not real and has

nothing to do with action and leads to the use of means and methods unacceptable from the viewpoint of the argumentation theory demands. Besides, it cannot be stated by words and not proofed by actions or vice versa to be proved by actions but not stated by words, not taught to others (Tatevatsi, 1740b, p. 281), and a human being is obliged to grow drop by drop within wisdom and acts of virtue (Tatevatsi, 2000, p. 148).

The Armenian philosophers stress the importance of the examination of the question «What for?» or the concept of aim. According to David, the aim with its nature leads to action and supposes the acquirement of not only the supporters but also colleague, as the final condition of aim is the fulfilment. By this understanding of aim is probably conditioned the form of its Old Armenian version 'realisation' and also 'intention' (Anyaght' (David the Invincible), 1980, p. 30). This approach denies those theoreticians of argumentation, who consider the aim of argumentation to be conviction (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971) or approval and rejection of opinions (Eemeren, Grootendorst & Krugier, 1987).

#### *g) Related Methods of Argumentation.*

The field of concepts related to argumentation include such concepts, referring to the form of argumentation - dialogue, as: conversation, quarrel, debate, discussion, recipient, co-participant, opponent, adherent, etc. If the preferable form of argumentation for David the Invincible is "philosophical conversations" (Anyaght' (David the Invincible), 1980, p. 35), then for Grigor Tatevatsi argumentation is a "proverbial speech", that has three specificities, that is to be pleasant for the recipient, to be spectacular and memorable for human being's thought, to brighten the thought and en-



lighten the commentary of speech (Tatevatsi, 1740b, p. 304). He states, that the doctrinal rules are schoolings that explain the speech (Tatevatsi, 1740a, p. 5). And the concept “logos” in Old Armenian corresponds with its meaning to the concept argumentation that is obvious from the context. So to the two meanings of the concept “logos” – *speech* and *thought*, Tatevatsi adds the third one – argumentation. In case of such approach we can affirm that Tatevatsi differs three types of argumentation: everyday argumentation of a human being (public speech), educational argumentation with the help of proverbs directed to the students (proverbial speech) and opinion (wise speech).

If we assume, that the concepts “speech” and “argumentation” for Tatevatsi are the commensurate concepts and have the same meaning, then it occurs that proverb is an argumentative speech, which according to his demand should refer to the action. Even the criterion to evaluate wisdom is the action: “See how diligent the bee is and learn from him to examine wisdom by labour” (Tatevatsi, 2000, p. 146).

Tatevatsi evaluates proverb as a specific “useful” way to ground the speech, to explain what is said, to fulfil the argumentative act, as because “it is obvious to the favorites and hidden for the foreigners” (Tatevatsi, 2000, p. 14) it is also considered the best way to reveal the implicit ways of thought with the help of the explicit ones, as by hearing the bright and obvious examples and arguments a human being is able to reveal the implicit aspects and shades of thought (Tatevatsi, 2000, p. 14). The speech has two sides - known and hidden, just as the well has a depth and surface. He exhorts not to examine what is hidden, but to

be satisfied with the examination and cognition of what is known, as when we dig the well that has a surface and go down to its bottom, we lose the water, the same way by examining the depths of the theory that has its surface, we threaten thought and condemn it to be lost. By the way, Tatevatsi warns that a human being seeks for what is invisible as the visible things are temporal and variable, meanwhile, the invisible things are eternal and perennial, so wise and reasonable is the one who can see what is hidden (Tatevatsi, 1740a, p. 101; Tatevatsi, 1740b, pp. 211; 281).

The demand to reveal and examine the context and subtext of argumentation is very important to understand the “invisible” or “hidden” thought and speech, as they are surely not understandable in different auditoriums and depend on the recipient’s knowledge, experience, goals, etc. An easily understandable speech or thought can be obtained without any examination, the difficult one - by examination, and the non-understandable one is above speech and thought, so it cannot be examined because of non-comprehensiveness and limitedness of our knowledge, therefore, it should be honoured by silence (Tatevatsi, 1740a, p. 280).

Tatevatsi does not aim to keep the humanity from the knowledge of what is implicit, he form the revelation of subtext and context, he just tries to prevent the possible mixture of the explicit thought *having face*, as the same text can have a number of subtexts, the revelation of wheech is not a primitive action.

Tatevatsi also examines the issue of argumentation form. The proverb is a metrical edification that spreads moral virtue that is directed to the children and youngsters. The latters need education and argumentation can



be used for them as childhood itself is vain and is welcomed that child who listens to the wise man's edification (Tatevatsi, 1740b, pp. 203-204).

The requirements presented to the recipient of the argumentative text, speech are remarkable. The wise speech first of all and amuses the human thought with its beauty. Those who hear wise speech are winners, as they accept and dispose it, and the fools neglect it: "a wise speech that is not followed is a pearl for the laying pigs" (Tatevatsi, 2000, p. 140).

In the works of Armenian philosophers are also used the Related Methods of Argumentation, among which are: to turn to the title of the work, the use of different levels of approach for the discussion of questions, investigation and metainvestigation, explication and presentation with the help of examples, keeping the sequence of the discussion of questions, the importance as a criterion for the differentiation of the discussed issues, etc.

*h) Question-Answer Manifestations.* As the modern theories of argumentation the same way the discussed doctrine of Armenian philosopher's on argumentation become a complete system when questioning and question, question-antiarguments, rhetorical questions find their real place in that system. Logic is one of the most important factors of question and answer, of any discussion and dialogue. Probably, with the connection of questioning and logic is explained the factor that the investigation of the conditions of questions, their structure, correctness of the types, the conditions of regularity is one of the most important issues of the logical component of argumentation, and the interrogative or "question – answer" logic is one of the

most important sections of the same theory.

Yeznik Koghbatsi, David the Invincible and Grigor Tatevatsi discuss such issues as *the sequence of the questions discussed; the differentiation of the most important question from the important one, and the latter from the secondary one; the use of different levels of approach for the discussion of questions.* So David the Invincible explains that Porphyry entitled his work "Introduction", but not "On Introduction", as the first shows the subject of investigation, meanwhile the title "On Introduction" tells some other things about "Introduction" (Anyaght' (David the Invincible), 1980, p. 116). With this explanation he basically reveals the idea of subject investigation (object-language) and meta-investigation (meta-language) that he uses as means of argumentation.

The "Denial of Sects" is significant from the viewpoint of the controversial rules, development and use of methods and means. The dialogue here is very active and is realised by the exceptional method of question-answer.

The Armenian philosophers explain by the link of questioning and logic the circumstance, that the investigation of the questions, their structure, types, truth, rules of regularity are the important issues of the logical theory of argumentation, and that the interrogative logic which deals with the investigation of those issues in one of the most important sections of the logical theory of argumentation.

In their works are reflected manifestations of different types of questions that can generally be classified in the following groups:

- Formulation and rejection of a possible question-counterargument.
- Formulation and rejection of an existing

question-counterargument.

- Range of questions directed straight to the opponent, aiming to reveal the non-sense of the latter's theses.
- Question-thesis that is often formulated at the beginning of the debate over the examined question, and sometimes at the end – as a conclusion.
- Formulation of question and answer that aims just to explain the proposed thesis, the material, containing it.
- Question-foundation directed straight to the reader.
- Question-argument with the help of which the author denies the theses and arguments of the opponent.

During argumentation the level of the recipient's activeness become higher even in the case when the argumentative process is not a dialog in its explicit form, but is fulfilled in the form of monograph. Socrates's questions that need "Yes" or "No" answers, which are shortcomings during an explicit dialog, as they suppose weakening the auditorium's activeness, in case of monograph are not considered as shortcomings as from the viewpoint of a reader-recipient this type of questions is the most acceptable while answering to the questions and thinking about them. In many cases the reader does not notice, or to be more correct, neglect even the fact that the argumentation is directed not only to the authors of the denied viewpoints, but also to him. By the realisation of this circumstance should be explained the often use of this type of questions and the rhetorical questions in the works of the examined Armenian philosophers.

## Conclusions

The reflection of the problems of argumentation in the works of Yeznik Koghbatsi, David the Invincible and Grigor Tatevatsi attest that they have their traditions in the history of Armenian philosophy, and that the selected Armenian philosophers in the Armenian reality had their predecessors and successors from the viewpoint of the problems of argumentation, so the investigation of the history of Armenian doctrines is not expired and is not limited by the investigation of the discussed works, and the interpretation of other well-known philosophers' theoretical heritage from the viewpoint of the problems of argumentation can become a subject for other investigations.

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THE PROBLEM OF ETERNITY OF THE WORLD IN THE  
PHILOSOPHICAL–THEOLOGICAL THEORY OF GRIGOR TATEVATSI

## Abstract

The famous Armenian theologian and philosopher Grigor Tatevatsi (1346-1409) in his teaching tries to compare the biblical truth of creation with the philosophical postulate regarding the eternity of the world. Principally, being a creationist thinker, he criticized the theories that made the Materia co-eternal to God, meanwhile, he proposed the following arguments regarding the eternity of the world: a) before the creation the world existed actually by influence in the providence of God as an immaterial paradigm; b) the world is eternal because it is linked to eternity; c) the God is the eternal and always actual being, therefore the world was created eternal and the eternal is the necessary being which never can become none-being; d) the will of God is unchangeable, He cannot make the created world become non-being otherwise His will would change; e) the God does not make the world become non-being not because He is unable to do so but due to the boundless goodness; f. the world is eternal because the four elements and qualities that are the basis of it, are eternal. Therefore, even though the arguments proposed by Tatevatsi are based on and contain typical ideas of Neoplatonism, one has to take into account that he speaks of the eternity of the created world rather than co-existence of world with the God.

*Keywords:* Grigor Tatevatsi, Creationism, God, Will of God, Creation, Eternity of the World, Actuality, Potentiality, Necessary Being, Time.

The question of the Eternity of the world became an object of the bitter discussion in the XIII century, when European thinkers were acquainted with the teachings of Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd and Aristotle. After lengthy debates new books, with the title «De aeternitate mundi», «The Eternity of the World», (David of Dinant, Siger of Brabant, Thomas Aquinas etc.), appeared; and proposition «the world is eternal», regarded as avveroistic, was condemned by Etienne Tempier, the bishop of Paris, in 1270 and 1277. In the medieval Armenian philosophy this question was thor-

oughly discussed in the XIV century, when Armenian thinkers, particularly the Tatev University representatives Hovhan Vorotnetsy (1315-1388) and Grigor Tatevatsi (1346-1409), enlarged their knowledge on antique philosophy (the first nature philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, stoics) and on teachings of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd due to the translations into Armenian of the works of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and others; and also due to works of based in Armenia catholic missioners, members of the Dominican Order, Bartholomew of Bologna (†1333) and Peter

of Aragon (†1347). If Bartholomew of Bologna, Peter of Aragon and Hovhan Vorotnetsy criticized and rejected the ancient materialistic and dualistic, Aristotelian and Neoplatonian teachings, included the teachings of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd concerning the eternity of the world (the matter), Grigor Tatevatsi admitted the notion of the eternity of the world, using some statements from the criticized theories. In other words, he combined the notion of creation of the world out of nothing with the notion of eternity of the world. But how is it possible to combine incompatible? How could the famous theologian in this principal question agree with the statement that contradicts with biblical, scriptural truth? Such questionings naturally emerge, first of all because Tatevatsi though preferred to follow the negative (apophatic) method of the God cognition, still tried to explain the existence and nature of the God, the essence of the creation, and the relation of the God and the world by means of philosophical (Aristotelian) concepts. He was convinced that by means of rationality one can and must prove the truths of Revelation, particularly the biblical proposition of creation of the world out of nothing.

For Tatevatsi it is an evident and undeniable truth, that the God is the creator, who created the whole universe, the intelligible and sensible existences, *ex nihilo*, out of nothing. He is a creationist thinker indeed, and naturally, does not defend neither the statement of the ancient thinkers (for example, Aristotle) concerning the eternity of the world (in this case, the statement of eternal co-existence of the world with the God), nor the neoplatonic statements about the eternity of the first cause and the results. Arguing against the statement «noting comes from nothing», Tate-

vatsi tries to explain the divine creation out of nothing by means of Aristotelian concepts. He distinguishes two types of noting, a) absolute noting, or possible existence, which is without influence, and b) noting or possible existence with influence. The God is mere reality and eternal influential existence, and the matter is non-existence, but an existence by possibility. The world is created out of such possible existence or noting with the influence. Indeed, the usage of the concepts of two types of the noting or the concepts of «the reality» and «the possibility» can cause other explanations, but it would be erroneous to conclude that Tatevatsi with this theory «factually denies the creation of the world out of nothing» (Arevshatyan, 1957, p. 61) or makes an allusion about co-existence of the matter with the God. Both the time and the matter are the results of divine creation and cannot be co-existent with the God. Answering to the question how the God, having non-material and simple essence, can create material existences, Tatevatsi writes, that the God creates out of nothing non-material essences (formation, quantity, quality, etc.) and collecting them by his power, constitutes bodily substance, and out of this creates material elements and elementary bodies. Based on this and analogical statements we can state that Tatevatsi regardless the fact that he uses Aristotelian concepts and somehow deviates from religious perceptions, however defends the notion of the creation of the world.

The question of the eternity of the world Tatevatsi raises aiming to discuss whether the God can turn into non-existence not created yet and created world. Answering to this question Armenian thinker proposes some metaphysical and moral arguments supporting



the eternity of the world. As follows:

A) *The world is eternal, because it exists in the eternal God as providence.* The world with influence exists before the creation in the God's mind, namely, the world is co-existent with the God not as an autonomic material substance, but as an immaterial and unchangeable paradigm. Like a craftsman (a sculptor) before inscribing an image on the stone firstly paints that image in his mind and then sculpts it, as well as the God firstly in his mind has the image of the world that will be created, particularly, general prototypes of the things that will be created (Tatevatsi, 1746, p. 522). In this sense «the beginning of the existence of the world is twice», firstly, when it exists in the God's mind, as a notion of a temple in the head of an architect, secondly, when it is created, that is the temple is constructed. Tatevatsi uses a method of analogy trying to explain the fact of a double existence of the world by the example of a craftsman (an architect) and a temple, noting indeed that between the original and the copy there are similarities and differences. For example, if the image of a temple can be erased in the mind of an architect, forgotten, then the image of the world in the God's mind never can be erased. The world is eternal, because if in the mind of an architect the temple exists by possibility, then by influence, and then «being of the world by power is by God's influence» (Tatevatsi, 1729, p. 169). Noting can be by possibility in the God as the being by possibility implies a change, while the God is an unchangeable essence, namely is «unmovable by vision and will». The eternity of the world first of all is caused by the eternity of divine providence. The God is eternal, so everything in Him is also eternal. In this sense the God is

unable to turn the world into non-existence. Moreover, according to him the world necessarily will receive its being from adequate immaterial paradigm, because «it is impossible for the beginning of the existence of the world be other than was as a prototype in the vision of the God» (Tatevatsi, 1729, pp. 164-165). At first glance, this is an extremely rationalistic (in this case necessistic) commentary of the God and His action, which in essence does not leave a space for the volitional action of the God. But here the point is not the restriction of the God's will, instead it means that if in God's mind a prototype of a future creation exists, if the God decided to create something, it will be created necessarily, that is the God's will should be realized, as there could not be a contradiction between the God's will and providence. Anyway, in other places Tatevatsi avoids similar expressions, explicating that the creation of the world is a voluntary and not necessary action.

B) *The world is eternal as it is in the communion with the God.* According to Tatevatsi one must differ «eternity» from «always» (everlasting) and from «time» as a) Eternity like the God does not have neither the beginning, nor the end. Eternity is not an endless duration of time, but a realm that exists out of the space-time frame. b) Everlasting has a beginning, but not an end, like the angels and souls, c) the time has a beginning and an end, like herbal and sensory-material beings. The God is eternal and is the cause of the everlasting and the time. The time consists of three parts: past, present, future, but the everlasting and the eternal do not have parts. It is evident that Tatevatsi here considers as an absolute and beginningless only the God, and others as having a beginning, creations. The time has in it

the everlasting and the eternal, and everlasting has in it the eternal. In this sense the created beings and the world are eternal, because they are in communion with the Eternal: «And angels, and souls, and the world are called eternal, as they communicate with the eternal that is beginningless end endless» (Tatevatsi, 1729, p. 116). In this context the statement «the world is eternal» does not contradict with the creationistic position of Tatevatsi. Moreover, being communicated means to see in the world the traces of the eternal (divine) and by means of knowing them to formulate a perception of the divine.

C) *The eternity of the world derives from the eternity of the God.* As a primary cause the God is a necessary and always influential being and thus it differs from others, which sometimes are existences and sometimes are non-existences, sometimes are by influence and sometimes are by possibility, and in which influence and possibility replace each other. The God is a necessary being, as «*has only existence, does not have non-existence, thus He is unchangeable by His essence. He is always by influence, He does not need any beginning and power of perfect, so He is beginningless and endless*» (Tatevatsi, 1729, p. 162). The activities of necessary and eternal Existence also must be necessary and eternal. The God is eternal and always by influence, thus He created the world everlasting, but the everlasting is a necessary existence, which cannot turn into non-existence: «God created the world as a everlasting business, and the everlasting is necessary, and the necessary can exist and cannot perish. For this the world became into existence, sometimes by everlasting existence, but never can turn into non-existence» (Tatevatsi, 1729, p. 162).

In this context Tatevatsi ascribes everlastingness to the world, while, as we saw above he considered as everlasting angels. In these arguments also can be seen the elements of the neoplatonic theory of the eternity of the world. According to the theory of emanation world necessarily is emanated or flew down from the One, and the world is eternal in so far as its eternal creator. This view is defended by Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd from different grounds, and is criticized by Thomas Aquinas.

If the God is eternal, so everything connected to Him should be eternal. According to Tatevatsi the notion of eternity of the world stems from the eternal and immutable nature of the God: «*As the God Self is everlasting, staying and eternal, likewise the world, the result of His glorious Business, will be staying and everlasting. Because though partially it is passing away and destroying, but as a whole it is non-passing, ever-present and everlasting*» (Tatevatsi, 1740, p. 272). Thus, according to Tatevatsi the eternity of the world stems from the eternity of the God.

D) *The next argument concerning the eternity of the world is connected with the immutability, omnipotence and omnikindness of the God.* According to Tatevatsi, God's will is immutable, so if He wants to destroy the world it will mean that His will has been changed, which is impossible. Thus, the world cannot come into non-existence. The God «*has wanted by an immutable will and created to existence the world and He is not able to change his immutable will and lead the being to non-existence*» (Tatevatsi, 1729, p. 165). Unlike the humans whose will and ability are not equal, in God they are equal and reversible. The God is omnipotent. «As

whatever He wills He is able to do and whatever He is able to do He is able to will». But the God «does not will the evil and the sinful, so He is not able to act that way». The last case does not witness about God's inability, in contrary, not doing the evil indicates of superb abilities of God. For example, the sun cannot be dark as it is mainly lightful; similarly the God «is not able to the evil, as mainly He is able to the kind. And He is not able not to be as mainly He is (He is the most being existence), etc. Similarly, the God is not able to lead the world to non-existence because of His kind will» (Tatevatsi, 1729, p. 163). Thus, the God does not lead the world to non-existence not only for metaphysical, but also for ethical reasons.

E) *The world is eternal as material elements making its basis are undestroyable.* The eternity of the world also means the eternity of its elements: earth, water, air and fire. Tatevatsi mentions that philosophers think so and seemingly agrees with them. Separate things are emerging and destroying, but the underlying elements cannot be destroyed. The philosophers consider elements undestroyable: a) because of the movement of heavenly bodies; they are moving uniformly, constantly, without increasing or decreasing, which provides uninterrupted being and existence of things; b) though the elements are contrary by their qualities, nevertheless they are united and maintain the harmony of existence; c) through existence of being and destroying the destruction of things in its turn causes the origination of new things, and the «*elements*

*remain undestroyable in this cyclic process*» (Tatevatsi, 1729, p. 181); d) the part are destructing, but the whole remains; individual beings are born and die, but the genus and the species remain; e) the world is «*not getting old*» as time by time it purifies itself from inner and outer accidents. Concluding, we can state, that Tatevatsi comes from the biblical idea of the world creation and defends only the notion of eternity of the created world. True, though in his argumentation in favor of eternity of the world he uses judgments of neoplatonic and averroistic nature, however they «fit» in the general context of his creationistic theory.

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## CHAIR OF YOUNG SCIENTIST

## ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN THE ARMENIAN NATIONAL EPIC "DAREDEVILS OF SASSOUN" (SASNA DZRER)

### Abstract

The heroic epic reflects the attitude, thoughts, and dreams of each nation. It seems like a peculiar repository, which accumulates values, expectations, and worldview forms of the nation. Being the result of a synthesis of mythological and historical ones, the epic contains not only its traits but also philosophical outlook. Specifically, the philosophical concerns are very important and precious, as they express the main nature of the being and give answers to the question of a fundamental principle of the world, especially the concept of substance. The purpose of this article is to inference ontological notions hidden in layers of Armenian national epic. The investigation of national epic from such aspects opens widespread ranges for discovering its mysteries. In the heroic epic, the Armenians reflect not only their past but also their statements about substantial principles, the mutual relation between the matter and the spiritual. In the Armenian epic "Daredevils of Sassoun" the water is a fundamental substance which gets its property only by the will of supernatural forces (God, angels, etc.). Thereby, the Armenian epic "Daredevils of Sassoun" expresses a peculiar conception which is directly related to ontological issues.

*Keywords:* heroic epic, epic hero, worldview, philosophy, ontology, water, substance, being, God.

### Introduction

Investigation of a heroic epic noticeably assists not only to researchers of national literature but also to disclosure and understanding of moral values and philosophical outlook of the nation. The epic illustrates the attitude, thoughts, and dreams of each nation. An epic may deal with such various subjects as myths, heroic legends, histories, edifying religious tales, animal stories, or philosophical or moral theories. Epic poetry has been and continues to be used by peoples all over the world to transmit their traditions from one generation

to another ("The New Encyclopedia Britannica in 30 Volumes", 1977). It also accumulates national expectations and worldview forms in a peculiar way. Being the result of the synthesis of mythological and historical ones, the epic contains not only those traits but also the archetypes of the national identity and philosophy.

An ambiguous term, "epic" is used most often to designate a long narrative poem recounting heroic deeds. In literary usage, the term encompasses both oral and written compositions. These traditions often include legendary narratives about the notable deeds of

their national heroes ("The New Encyclopedia Britannica in 30 Volumes", 1977). Though the braveness and heroism are the main characteristics of the epic hero, there are some peculiar features, which differ heroes from each other. In this regard, the exploration of the epic becomes more important and contributes to revealing the main traits of national consciousness and philosophical concepts. The epic is a vital past of the people in the framework of heroic idealization. From here the epic acquires its scientific, historical value and at the same time its great public, cultural and educational value (Zhirmunsky, 1962, p. 196). The investigation of national epic from such aspects opens widespread ranges for discovering its mysteries. Specifically, an epic contains philosophical concerns, that is very important and precious, as they express the main nature of the being and gives answers to the question of a fundamental principle of the world, especially the concept of substance. The article will focus on such problems in the Armenian national epic "Daredevils of Sassoun".

\* \* \*

The Armenian heroic epic "Daredevils of Sassoun" is an outstanding poetic work reasonably associated with the very spirit of the Armenian people and its historical destiny. On 5 Dec 2012 the epic poem Daredevils of Sassoun was included on UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage list. The epic was orally delivered over the centuries (approximately from IX centuries), and it was only recorded for the first time in 1873 by Bishop G. Srvandzatsyan. Despite the act of its recording in a relatively late period, immediately after its recognition

the poem had a great influence on the Armenian mind, literature and ideological patterns (Zolyan, 2014, pp. 55-56). The Armenian national epic *Daredevils of Sassoun*, also known as *David of Sassoun* ("Sasountsi Davit" or "Tavit" in Armenian), among other titles. It is a long poem in four cycles (parts), following four generations of a family, of which David is the third, being preceded by Sanasar and Baghdasar, then the Great Mher ("Mets" or "Medz Mher", also known as "Lion Mher"), ending with Little Mher ("Pokr Mher"). In keeping with epics all over the world, the story involves fantastic exploits and incredible adventures, within an overarching theme of good versus evil and fighting for justice.

Although the epic itself is dated to the 8th-10th centuries – especially as the struggle against Arab rule of that era is a clear detail – many elements of the *Sassoun* cycles involve far more ancient aspects, including relics of pagan Armenian culture. Popular memories of competitions and battles between Armenian and Mesopotamian rulers a millennium before Christ may have been transformed in medieval times using the Caliph of Baghdad or the King of Egypt as the target instead<sup>1</sup>. In addition the historical events, that had great impact on the formation of the epic, the epic contains mythological elements. Thought, there are "vagrant plots" in various epics, which mainly repeat the plot, each national epic highlights the main characteristics of national worldview points. It frequently reflects the cosmogonic notions and outlook of the nation.

<sup>1</sup> <http://100years100facts.com/facts/armenian-epic-daredevils-sassoun-first-put-paper-1873/>



In the Armenian national epic "Daredevils of Sassoun" (Sasna Dzerer<sup>2</sup>) it is possible to find such notions of the ancient Armenians. In the heroic poetry, the greatest heroes are thought to be so wonderful that they cannot be wholly human but must have something divine about them. Whatever a hero's birth may be, and of course it is mainly natural enough, he is known from the start as an uncommon being whose evolution and characteristics are not those of other men. There is about him something predetermines, and presage of glory accompany his birth (Bowra, 1952, pp. 94-95). The Armenian epic heroes Sanasar and Baghdasar have an extraordinary birth as well. The twins' mother Dzovinar, whose name connects her with water, drank one-and-a-half handfuls of the water and became pregnant:

"Dzovinar then invoked:  
 – Raise a spring here, O God,  
 And guide me through Your light.  
 By God's will the lake parted then,  
 A spring of sweet water appeared.  
 In the pool near the bank she saw  
     a big rock.  
 Water surrounded the rock,  
 No one, without disrobing,  
 Could reach the spring to drink its  
     water,  
 Dzovinar took off her garments, swam  
     to the spring.  
 She cupped her hands and drank a  
     cupped handful  
 And half-a-cupped handful of water  
 From the life-giving (anmahagan)  
     spring,  
 The spring then went dry.

<sup>2</sup> See: David of Sassoun Armenian National Epic, Yerevan, 1961.

She conceived from the water  
 That she drank at the spring"  
 (Shalian, 1964, pp. 12-13).

So Sanasar and Baghdasar were born from a spring water of Katnaghbyur. The motif of the wonderful birth of the hero is one of the very widespread plots of folklore and, in particular, a fairy tale. But it is known not only for fairy tales. Immaculate conception is available as it is possible to judge, in all world religions - from the earliest and primitive ones, including Christianity (Propp, 2001, p. 65). Certainly, such motif is widespread in many ancient myths, tales, and epics, nevertheless, there are differences in the development of this motif in the different narrative and epic tradition, and these differences reflect the main peculiarities of the temper of the nation. For example in the Armenian national epic the epic heroes were born from the "special water"- the water, which appeared in the sea by the will of God. The difference between the "usual water" and "special, substantial water" in the epic is seen very distinctly. The water which gives birth differs from the "other water", it appears in the sea and the heroes in the epic are able to distinguish it. This is not a simple mythological belief of ancient Armenians. It is similar to Thales' water. According to Thales Miletus, the water is an active substance and source of life. In the heroic epic "Daredevils of Sassoun", the theme of the creating water is developing in further episodes of the first cycle of the epic:

"Sanasar said to Baghdasar:  
 – Brother let us go into the lake  
 And see if we will sink.

Baghdasar replied:

– Brother, life is sweet; I will not go  
into the lake.

Sanasar said to his brother:

– You stay here, I will go alone,  
If I do not sink, you come,  
But if I sink and drown, do not come,  
You stay here and stay alive..."  
(Propp, 2001, pp. 44-45).

Sanasar subconsciously plunged himself into the water. Such behavior seems very strange but it has weighty reasons. Carl Jung in his famous book "Archetypes and Collective Unconscious" provided an explanation for that: "Water is the commonest symbol for the unconscious. Water is the "valley spirit"... Psychologically, therefore, water means the spirit that has become unconscious..." (Jung, 1969, pp. 18-19). Unconsciously Sanasar tried to find his real identity and his natural existence.

"Going into the lake,

Sanasar walked as if he were on dry  
land.

He reached a garden at the bottom of  
the lake,

Where he saw a palace and pavilion,  
And a pool [in the garden].

... There he also saw a chapel.

As he entered the chapel, he looked  
around.

He fell asleep and had a dream.

The Mother of God appeared to him in  
his dream

And said: \_ Arise, Sanasar,

... You will bathe in the palace pool,  
And you will grow, gather strength and  
courage..."

(Shalian, 1964, pp. 44-46).

Then Sanasar awoke, came out of the chapel, went to the pool and bathed, drank the water of the fountain and fell asleep:

"He slept for a while, attained the grace  
of God,

He grew, gathered strength, courage

And become a fiery being..."

(Shalian, 1964, p. 47).

Then Sanasar took the wonderful armor of weapon and a fiery horse intended to him. Bagdasar couldn't recognize his brother after his alteration, as he became very strong and giant. As it was obvious, the epic sent the same message: there was water in the water (pool in the garden in the sea), and again we faced with the "special", forming water that gave power and chivalry. The epic prompts that there is a "special" water which gives birth and power.

The theme of the "special", forming water continues in another episode of the epic "Dare-devils of Sassoun": the twin brothers got to one river and noticed something very strange and magnificent; there was a small stream in the river which was dividing the river into two parts. The brothers wondered:

"– how powerful that tiny stream must  
be!

It cleaves the big river

And reaches the opposite bank.

... Bagdasar said to Sanasar:

– That water is aznantzordy water.

The man who drinks it at its source

Will become invincible,

No one will be able to down

[overpower] him.

Sanasar then said to Bagdasar:

– Whoever finds the source of that tiny  
stream  
And builds his home at its site,  
He will sire sons  
As powerful as the water of that  
stream..."  
(Shalian, 1964, pp. 28-29).

Finally, they decided to find the spring and built their castle there. As it was mentioned previously, the same plot repeated in the epic several times: "water in the water", "special water", "life giving water", "anmahagan water", "aznantzordi water"- a message that helps to evaluate the importance of the substantial quality of the water. Consequently the epic shows the great importance of that "special" water and suggests the notion of its substantial quality.

Similar notions were declared in the theocentric cosmology of famous Armenian philosopher Anania Shirakatsi where God was uncreated, immobile and non-material. God, first of all, created 4 elements- water, air, fire, and earth. The elements create all other things (Arevshatyan, 2012, p. 69). The same ontological issue, as it is presented in the paper, exists in the Armenian national epic in which clearly underlines the dominating role of the idealistic outlook: water is substantial quality, but it gets its activity only from divine forces.

Generalizing, it is possible to note that all these "water-linked" notions include not only the traces of the mythological outlook of ancient Armenians and the water cult, but also philosophical essential concerns. The philosophical interpretations of natural phenomenon are illustrated in the Armenian national epic. These issues are the concerns that can be identified with a substance problem in the philosophy. The paradigm, presented in the epic, pre-

requisites a development of the idealistic worldview that linked with water as something substantial and obtains its power only from divine plan. Such philosophical interpretation of discussed problem is mentioned in Rene Descartes' philosophy. According to him "the term substance is not applicable to God and the creatures in the same sense. But with regard to what we consider as things or the modes of things, it is worthwhile to examine each of them by itself. By substance, we can conceive nothing else than a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence. And, in truth, there can be conceived but one substance which is absolutely independent, and that is God. We perceive that all other things can exist only by the help of the concurrence of God"<sup>3</sup>. Though we call Descartes dualistic philosopher, however, he accepted only unique, perfect substance - God, who is a creator of material and spiritual substances. Summarizing the results of the paper it is possible to declare that in above-mentioned episodes of the epic "Daredevils of Sassoun" (Sasna Džrer) outline the ontological notions of the ancient Armenians, where water performs as a foundation of the all things, it is also mentioned as a substantial quality, which gives birth to heroes and endows them with invincible force. The "special water" is considered to be sacred and the heroes of Sassoun founded their castle on its sources. Though water gives strength, birth, power and luck and is considered as a substantial quality, there is an important fact that is outlined in the epic: all these come true only

<sup>3</sup> See: Descartes, R. *Principles of philosophy*. Retrieved from <http://www.fullbooks.com/The-Principles-of-Philosophy1.html>

with the will of God. Thus, in the Armenian national epic water get its substantial quality only with the help of divine forces, which allow to supposing that water isn't perceived as self-dependent material substance. Such philosophical notions have been developed during the history of philosophy through the centuries.

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## PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION AND ARGUMENTATION

## Abstract

This paper presents the basic issues of Philosophy of Education that have been under concern throughout the history, stressing the Janus-faced nature of philosophy of education. Discussing the role, urgency and necessity of argumentation in philosophy of education, the paper presents the understanding of argumentation according to the viewpoint of Yerevan School of Argumentation. It offers the investigation of the argumentation language, its conceptual apparatus in philosophy of education and the study of the components' functioning specificities.

*Keywords:* philosophy of education, Janus-faced nature, “Socratic method” of questioning, reasoning, search for reasons, argumentation, homo argumenticus, logic, language of argumentation.

## Introduction

Philosophy of education is a philosophical reflection on the nature, aims, and problems of education. The Philosophy of Education is considered to be Janus-faced, and the reason for that is that it looks both inward to the parent discipline of philosophy and outward to educational practice. Because of its dual focus philosophy of education deals with both sides of the traditional divide between theory and practice, so its subject matters are both basic philosophical issues and more specific issues arising from educational practice. The practical issues arising from the educational practice have implications for a variety of long-standing philosophical problems in epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and political philosophy (Siegel, “Philosophy of Education”; see also Noddings, 2016).

It is known that the Western philosophical tradition began in Ancient Greece from

which, consequently, as a derivative began philosophy of education. Long before, there were professional philosophers of education, philosophers and educators debated questions familiar to contemporary studies in that field. The philosophical views of education were developed by the major historical figures and were reflected in their different theories, particularly in metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, and political ones. By the introduction of Socrates's “Socratic method” of questioning began the tradition according to which reasoning and the search for reasons, due to which can be justified beliefs, judgments, and actions, was and will always remain fundamental, he also insisted that self-knowledge is basic to all knowledge and that education should encourage in everyone the pursuit of the life of reason. Most of the major figures in the history of philosophy of education have been sharing this view of the central place of reason in education, despite other substantial

differences in their philosophical views (Siegel, “Philosophy of Education”; see also Noddings, 2016).

Socrates’ student Plato endorsed this view and assumed that the fundamental task of education is to help students to value reason and to be reasonable, which for him involved valuing wisdom above everything. In his dialogue *Republic* he set out a vision of providing different sorts of education for different groups of students, depending on their abilities, interests, and stations in life. His utopian vision was considered to be a precursor of what was later called educational “sorting”. Millennia later, John Dewey argued that education should be tailored to the individual child rejecting Plato’s hierarchical sorting of students into categories. Plato’s student Aristotle also took the highest aim of education to be the fostering of good judgment or wisdom, but he was more optimistic than Plato about the ability of the typical student to achieve it, he also emphasized the fostering of moral virtue and the development of character that reflected in contemporary interest in “virtue theory” in ethics and “communitarianism” in political philosophy (Siegel, “Philosophy of Education”, see also Noddings, 2016, pp. 7-11).

Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that education should enable the “natural” and “free” development of children. This view eventually led to the modern movement known as “open education”. These ideas are in some ways reflected in 20th-century “progressivism,” a movement often associated with Dewey. Raising issues concerning gender and its place in education, Rousseau also prescribed fundamentally distinct educations for boys and girls. Giving central place in education to

the role of experience, Dewey held that experience is genuinely educational only when it leads to “growth,” though this idea has proved to be a problematic and controversial one. Dewey is usually seen as a proponent of “child-centered” education. He emphasizes the importance of student’s own interests in determining appropriate educational activities that in modern terms can be called self-consciousness and motivation. For Dewey education is of central importance for the health of democratic social and political institutions, and he developed his educational and political views from a foundation of systematic metaphysics and epistemology (Siegel, “Philosophy of Education”).

The history of philosophy of education includes many more figures than Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and Dewey, in particular, such outstanding philosophers as Thomas Aquinas, Augustine, Thomas Hobbes, René Descartes, John Locke, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Bertrand Russell, etc., but unfortunately within the frames of this work it is not possible to refer to them one by one. It is important to stress the fact that despite many differences in their viewpoints concerning the issues of philosophy of education, all these figures took the fundamental aim of education to be the fostering of rationality.

The separation of philosophy of education and the tendency of its formation as a unique branch of philosophical thought can be dated from the second half of XX century. It was influenced by the general tendency of the development of philosophical thought and the possibility and necessity to find constructive solutions to the current issues of education (see Avetisyan, 2007).



The basic philosophical problems and tasks that have been considered and discussed throughout the history of the subject are the issues concerning:

- the aims of education;
- clarification of educational concepts;
- rights, power, and authority;
- critical thinking or indoctrination;
- the individual and society;
- educational approach to morality;
- teaching, learning, and curriculum;
- educational research.

The most basic problem of philosophy of education is that concerning its aims. Many aims have been proposed by philosophers and other educational theorists that include *the cultivation of curiosity and disposition to inquire; fostering of creativity; production of knowledge and of knowledgeable students; enhancement of understanding; promotion of moral thinking, feeling, and action; enlargement of imagination; fostering of growth, development, and self-realization; fulfillment of potential; cultivation of “liberally educated” persons; overcoming close-mindedness; development of sound judgment; maximization of freedom, happiness, or self-esteem; fostering of feelings of community, social solidarity, citizenship, and civic-mindedness; production of good citizens; “civilizing” of students; fostering of ideological purity; cultivation of political awareness and action; fostering of skills and dispositions constitutive of rationality or critical thinking, etc.* (Siegel, “Philosophy of Education”). From this perspective, many schools and educational institutions, following their own priorities concerning the aims of education, have special policies and specific orientation on this or that issue, particularly on religious, military, civil, political or other ones.

Both contemporary and historical philosophers of education referred in their works to the issues concerning the aim of education, defending a particular conception or criticizing the conceptions of others. The great range of aims leads to the necessity of appealing to other areas of philosophy, to other disciplines and to educational practice as well. Unfortunately the contemporary discussions of educational policy rarely address the matter (Siegel, “Philosophy of Education”).

One of the tasks of the philosophy of education is the clarification of concepts, particularly of key educational concepts, including both the concept of education itself, and related concepts (teaching, learning, schooling, child rearing, indoctrination, etc.) from the point of view of the identification of not only the particular meanings of the concepts, but also their alternative meanings, rendering of explicit ambiguities, revelation of hidden metaphysical, normative, or cultural assumptions, illumination of the consequences of alternative interpretations, exploration of the semantic connections between related concepts, etc. (Siegel, “Philosophy of Education”).

There are also a number of issues of philosophy of education concerning the rights of students, parents, teachers; power and authority of institutions and organizations that are being faced during everyday activity and life referring to completely different spheres of education starting from curriculum details and composition, its obligatory or mandatory character, up to the problems of discrimination and injustice. Though these issues are mainly studied by ethics and political philosophy, they also need attention from metaphysics, philosophy of science, psychology, and other areas of philosophy, social science, and law.

Many educators and educational scholars have championed the educational aim of critical thinking. It has emerged as a major aim of today's education all over the world. Responding to the question "*What critical thinking is?*" philosophers of education have developed accounts of critical thinking attempting to state what it is and why it is valuable or why educational systems should give the central place to critical thinking cultivating it in students. These accounts generally agree that critical thinkers share at least the following two characteristics: (1) they are able to reason well; (2) they are disposed or inclined to be guided by reasons so evaluated -i.e., actually to believe, judge, and act in accordance with the results of such reasoned evaluations. But beyond this level of agreement lie a range of contentious issues: one cluster of issues is epistemological in nature and the other concerns, whether the skills, abilities, and dispositions constitutive of critical thinking are general or subject-specific (Siegel, "Philosophy of Education"; see also Noddings, 2016).

The question of indoctrination is also under the concern of philosophers of education, particularly from the point whether and how education differs from indoctrination. The theorists are divided into two main camps concerning this issue. One of them assumes that both education and indoctrination are distinct and that indoctrination is undesirable, but others have argued that there is no difference in principle and that indoctrination is not intrinsically bad.

Indoctrination generally is defined in terms of aim, method, or doctrine, so it's either: (1) any form of teaching aimed at getting students to adopt beliefs independent of the evidential support those beliefs may have (or

lack); (2) any form of teaching based on methods that instill beliefs in students in such a way that they are unwilling or unable to question or evaluate those beliefs independently; (3) any form of teaching that causes students to embrace a specific set of beliefs -e.g., a certain political ideology or a religious doctrine. According to these characteristics of indoctrination, there can be faced a "confrontation" between critical thinking and indoctrination (Siegel, "Philosophy of Education").

The roots of a number of interrelated problems and issues also start from the *society - individual* interrelation. All that interrelated problems and issues are conditioned by the question: *Should the education serve for the needs of the individual, or for that of the society?*

Philosophy of education deals with the problems of moral education as well, or in other words, the educational approach to morality. The question is whether education should strive to instill particular moral beliefs and values in students, or it should aim to enhance students' ability to think through moral issues for themselves. The question is that moral beliefs and values are in some sense relative to culture or community; therefore, attempts to teach morality at least presuppose an indefensible moral absolutism and may even constitute a kind of moral "imperialism" (Siegel, "Philosophy of Education"). This is especially problematic, when the education process takes place in a multinational and multicultural society when the moral values of the representatives of one nation contradict to those of the representatives of other nations.

A number of problems of educational practice starting from the issues concerning teaching, learning, and curriculum raise many

philosophical issues. The philosophers of education discuss such questions that mainly deal with the choice of the subjects and constitution of their knowledge; the choice of a common curriculum for all students, or differentiation of subjects for different students, depending on their needs and interests; the organization of less-able students education - vocational or non-vocational; students' grouping depending on their age, abilities, gender, race, culture, socioeconomic status, etc.; the way how students should be taught and referred to; the necessity of any sort of grading or evaluation; and the questions concerning the aims of particular curriculum areas.

A large amount of research in education that drives much educational policy and practice is being published every year. But educational research raises also many philosophical issues that are largely philosophical, involving philosophy of science (both natural and social) and epistemology. The questions raised by the philosophy of education concerning educational research refer to the way and methods of its realization, interpretation and translation of its results' into policy, revelation of the possible differences of the competent research in the social and natural sciences, the possibility of educational research to be objective, producing objective results (Siegel, "Philosophy of Education").

One answer to these issues and their sensible objections is that *every society must answer them, not once and for all time but as well and conscientiously as it can for the benefit of its people and the future of the earth* (Noddings, 2016, p. 1).

## On the Urgency and Necessity of Argumentation from the Viewpoint of Philosophy of Education

In the process of investigation and search for the answers to the aforementioned and many other issues and problems with which the philosophers of education deal with; in their attempts to state, defend their ideas, points of view and convince others to assume and share them, argumentation plays very significant role and is of central importance.

As the founder of Yerevan School of Argumentation academician Georg Brutian states in the third chapter<sup>1</sup> of his book "Logic, Language, and Argumentation in Projection of Philosophical Knowledge": "argumentation is a kind of reasoning which means a kind of discursive of logical thought where the arguer tries to realise his main aim by means of logical, psychological, rhetorical, axiological, and other component, that is, he tries to convince the recipient to become a coparticipant of the realisation of his project" (Brutian, 1998, p. 90).

Brutian claims "Homo Sapiens is homo argumenticus". He explains this claim first from the perspective, that "argumentation has a

<sup>1</sup> The chapter is entitled "Argumentation". In the chapter are presented Brutian's reflections and research results on the following issues: 1. The Architectonic of Argumentation, 2. An Explication of the Main Concepts of Argumentation, 3. Logic of Argumentation, 4. The Language of Argumentation, 5. The Problem of Translatability in Argumentation, 6. Philosophical argumentation, which are presented under corresponding titles in the chapter. In this paper are mainly presented Brutian's approach to the issues on the architectonic of argumentation and the language of argumentation.

universal character”, and second - that “there can be different interpretations of argumentation, but argumentation itself is the same for all people and differs only according to peoples’ intellectual or logical abilities”. He also specifies that though the argumentation has universal character, it is not absolutely the same in each sphere of peoples’ intellectual contacts and it can be modified under the influence of the main characteristics of any particular field in which the argumentation takes place (Brutian, 1998, p. 90).

Brutian formulates the abstract scheme of argumentation as follows “... we argue when we formulate a proposition (the thesis of argumentation), consider all the necessary arguments for and against the thesis, demonstrate the truth of the thesis and the falseness of the antithesis, value the thesis as being the most acceptable among the other true propositions, convince the recipient of all our decisions with the intention of making him think in a similar manner in order to be able to participate in the realisation of the aim of argumentation” (Brutian, 1998, p. 90). He draws parallels between the difference of this argumentation model, its real process and the difference between language and speech.

Referring to the role of logic in argumentation Brutian stresses its importance and centrality. Explaining the viewpoint of the experts, who neglect the role of logic in argumentation by the reduction of all kinds of logic to symbolic logic, based on artificial language, he states that “Argumentation is universal mode of reasoning and logic is, in principle, one of the main components of argumentation, its very essence. The kind of logic we use, logic of common, natural language or logic of artificial language, formal or informal

logic, formalised or contentual, etc. or the combination of two or more kinds of logic depends on the concrete field, sphere of application of argumentation” (Brutian, 1998, p. 91). Brutian insists on the statement that “valid and effective argumentation presupposes the alliance of logic and rhetoric” (Brutian, 1998, p. 92), that is contradicting to the view of other experts in the field of argumentation, according to the viewpoint of which argumentation is a branch of psychology.

Referring to the form of argumentation, differentiating its internal and external forms, Brutian defines its internal form to be a combination of different kinds of influences and the typical external form - a dialogue<sup>2</sup>. He mentions, “the thinkers of the Ancient World were masters of dialogue-conversation, the best representative of which was Socrates” (Brutian, 1998, p. 94). The famous “Socratic method” of questioning – the method of “Socratic dialogue” is wildly used in educational practice. The movement *Philosophy for Children* that started at the end of the 60s of 20<sup>th</sup> century in USA by the efforts of philosopher Matthew Lipman the founder of the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children was aimed to teach reasoning and argumentation skills to children. Though the pedagogy of philosophy for children is diverse, many practitioners emphasize the use of a community of inquiry (method that has roots in the works of John Dewey) and the Socratic method of questioning (for more details see

<sup>2</sup> Considering dialog as the typical external form of argumentation Brutian means not only the typical formal manifestation of dialog, but also its hidden implicit form that can be reflected in the narrative as well.

Lipman, 2003; Bleazby, 2013; Hovhannisyan, 2014; Kuzanyan, 2015).

### Remarks on the Language of Argumentation in Philosophy of Education

Investigating the language of argumentation Brutian states that the combination of the words “the language of argumentation” expresses different concepts and there should be differentiated at least two main concepts: “the language of argumentation” in a linguistic sense and in a conceptual sense. “Linguistically speaking, “the language of argumentation” includes any word from everyday language combined with the syntactical rules of that language by which we express our thoughts” (Brutian, 1998, p. 109). The investigations on the issues of argumentation and particularly on language of argumentation are also reflected in G. Brutian’s other works (Brutian, 1992) and in the works of other representatives of Yerevan School of Argumentation, particularly in the studies of H. H. Hovhannisyan (Hovhannisyan, 2006; 2009), M. Avagyan (Avagyan, 1998), E. Atayan (Atayan, 1998), etc.

The basis of argumentation language, in its linguistic sense, is everyday language with which everyday communication is realized. Everyday language is transformed to the language of argumentation in its linguistic sense, when to the everyday language base are added certain specific language layers - “the argumentative language-layers”. As is stated by Brutian, the argumentation language, just as any other language, from the linguistic point of view has its semantics and syntax. (Brutian, 1998, p. 109)

The semantics of argumentation language consists of two sublayers:

- the sum of words characteristic for argumentation,
- the words of rhetorical language<sup>3</sup> (Brutian, 1998, p. 109-110).

“Language argumentation syntax consists of the rules dealing with the combination of the rhetoric of the words of the rhetorical language from the syntactic structure of everyday language as well as from its style” (Brutian, 1998, p. 110). The syntax of argumentation language can be distinguished from the syntax of other languages according to this factor, other specific features that determine certain features of the syntax of the language of argumentation are foundation, conviction, refutation, etc. (Brutian, 1998, p. 110).

From the linguistic point of view “the language of argumentation” has a nationalistic colouring as it depends on the specificities of the concrete national languages (English, Armenian, Dutch, Russian, etc.) (Brutian, 1998, p. 110). The language in which the argumentative act takes place is very important, as it is constructed according to the grammatical and syntactic rules of the language, taking into consideration the specificities of the language, its vocabulary, etc.<sup>4</sup>

The semantics of the language of argumentation consists of all the concepts which

<sup>3</sup> The rhetorical component is considered to be one of the characteristic features of the language of argumentation as it varies in different fields of argumentation.

<sup>4</sup> The specificities of the influence of linguistic-cultural environment on thinking mechanisms of children have been investigated by the author in her *Linguocultural Environment and the “Philosophizing” Child* article (see Kuzanyan, 2015).



are characteristic for argumentation, particularly:

- the categories of argumentation,
- concepts, typical for an argumentative act,
- concepts, typical for that field of knowledge which the argumentative act is dealing with,
- concepts taken from common sense and necessary for the concrete field of argumentation.

These groups of the concepts can be presented in the form of concentric circles starting from the centre in accordance, but this will be done in a very abstract manner, as sometimes it is particularly difficult or even impossible to define to which circle this or that concept of argumentation language belongs. Referring to the implicit level of the language of argumentation, that is no less valuable from the point of view of understanding the real argumentative act, it is very important to distinguish between the explicit and implicit levels of argumentation language semantics. There are many hidden premises of argumentation which are included in the implicit level of argumentation language and it is necessary to transfer every implicit element into an explicit one in argumentation in order to gain an adequate picture of an argumentative act (Brutian, 1998, p. 110-111).

In the conceptual sense the syntax of argumentation language consists of all possible logical and methodological means with the help of which is realised argumentation on the basis of the semantics of the language of argumentation. The everyday language has its specific syntax which is used during argumentation when it is employed in this or that language. Sometimes in an argumentative act contradictions between linguistic and conceptual syntaxes can be observed, particularly

when changing the standard arrangement of words in the sentence to emphasise a particular concept. Though the logical construction of inferences can sometimes be artificial, it is necessary to transform implicit, hidden premises into explicit ones that as was already mentioned is very important in an argumentative act. "Argumentation, in a certain sense is the art of transformation of implicit thought into explicit one. ... there are situations where the power of argumentation is to keep some premises as sub-contextual means and demonstrate them in necessary and suitable cases" (Brutian, 1998, p. 113).

Brutian states "the concepts taken from other spheres of knowledge in their original sense can also be used in other relations with the components of the new theory" (Brutian, 1998, p. 101), so from this perspective can be examined the language of argumentation in philosophy of education, its conceptual apparatus, the specifics of its use and functioning in philosophy of education. The investigation of the aforementioned issues is the subject of the author's main research work and will be presented to the scientific community in her future publications.

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## CHESS AND THINKING

## Abstract

This article defines the chess impact on the formulation and development of thinking. Children's thinking development is taken into consideration through the chess tasks and resolution of the problems with one and two moves. We consider the understanding scheme of problem solving through the simple chess tasks' discussion.

We consider the mate creation by the Queen and Knight, in order to solve the problem. The possible move of the piece is pointed to show the mate. The task's solution is simplified through the analysis.

To understand the solution of the mate problem in two moves, once again we applied schematic thinking.

*Keywords:* chess, field, chessboard, horizontal, vertical, diagonal, king, queen, pawn, move, stalemate, checkmate.

Chess is the very game that can be taught at any age. It stands out among the sports as it may give a chance to a 10-year old player to win over an experienced opponent. There are plenty of studies evidencing that chess is not only interesting but also rather useful: it improves a number of qualities which are necessary for further achievements in both studies and work. The following mental qualities ap-

pear to boost through chess: memory, concentration, critical thinking, logic, imagination, creative thinking, etc. The chess assignments introduced below are to illustrate the ways that thinking functions at a chess game.

In this example, it's whites' turn to move; mate in three steps (Tumanyan, 2015b, p. 31).



Diagram 1.

In their attempt to solve a chess problem, children begin to concentrate which helps them to visualise the assignment more vividly, thus, gaining the picture of possible solutions in mind. In order to solve this problem, the player might think this way: if we remove h4 pawn from the board, the whites will not be able to win, eventually, resulting in a “dead-heat”. Consequently, the whites win over the blacks with the help of h4 pawn, i.e. the whites

will be obliged to give the black a chance as in case the blacks take a step, the play would result in stalemate. If the white queen is able to appear on c1 field, the game would result in checkmate, but the queen would be enabled to move onto the square c1 in two moves which subsequently might assume that the white king is obliged to give a chance to the black pawn on h4 square to move. And this is possible to realise through 1.K3-g4 move (see Diagram 2).



Diagram 2.

The blacks' move 1....h4-h3 is followed by 2.Qb3-c2 h3-h2 3.Qc2-c1#.

The analysis of the task makes us infer that the chess assignment boosts children's concentration. According to some experts, thanks to chess, the children's brain activity gets certain stimulation. As it has been proven, chess improves children's analytical and critical thinking, sight, particularly, at the second and third grades which contributes to the speed of children's mental development. Chess stimulates the intellectual capacity. As claimed by the results of some researches carried out in Venezuela, the

improvement of intellectual capacity of children who dedicated to chess in the course of 4 months is obvious. In 2003, Dr. Murray Thompson arrived at similar conclusion. During his research, those participants who played chess showed an obviously higher level of intellect. Thompson attributed this to the respective degree of concentration and logical thinking fomented via chess.

In the game introduced below, it's white's turn: checkmate in one move (see Diagram 3) (Tumanyan, 2015a, p 73):



Diagram 3.

If we remove from the board the white queen, and grant the blacks with the right to move, the black king might take the respective moves onto d4, d2, e4, f3, and f2 squares. Consequently, the white queen must

move onto a field from where it would be possible to set a control over the squares mentioned above. The field under search might be found on diagonals d, f and on the crossing with the 4 horizontal line (see Diagram 4).



Diagram 4.

Chess develops also the mathematical abilities.

In 1998, James Smith and Robert Cage carried out a research titled “The Effects of Chess Instruction on the Mathematics Achievement”. The researchers showed that chess might contribute to the development of mathematical capacities among children. The participants of the experiment were the school-children of African-American origin who were

taught chess during 120 hours. After the chess course, the results of the math tests taken were particularly high among those children in comparison with those who had not covered the course of chess. Dr. Erik Gotieb thinks that the ability to anticipate several moves ahead is the major guarantee for the success in math among chess players.

In the position given (see Diagram 5) it’s whites turn to move: checkmate in two moves.



Diagram 5.

This chess problem may have three solutions. In order to find at least one of the solutions it is necessary to imagine the checkmate position, after observing the blacks moves. For example, if the blacks' king move onto d8 square, the white queen may cause checkmate from b8 or d7squares, and if the king move onto f8 square, it might result in checkmate from h8 or f7 squares. However, the white queen cannot move onto the 7<sup>th</sup> horizontal,

consequently, we are not going to observe checkmate from d7 and f7squares. We'll observe the checkmates from b8 and h8 squares, namely, our task is to move the queen from e1 square onto the field from where we might simultaneously control b8 and h8 squares, while the square required is possible through the crossing among e diagonal, b8 and h8 line which, in fact, is e5square (see Diagram 6).




Diagram 6.

The solution found can be considered as the basic one with the help of which we may find the other two solutions. Let's make the black king move from b8 or h8 fields in one direction. Thus, what is the field that we must move our queen onto so that the black king appears in a position with only one possible direction to move? At the same time, the

queen must also keep the control over squares b8 and h8. The fields under search might also be found through the line crossing, the lines going through the fields h8, d8 and e1 will cross on square h4, whilst, the lines through squares b8, f8 and e1 cross on b4 square. This is more vividly shown on diagrams 7 and 8 below.



Diagram 7.




Diagram 8.

The judgements detailed above are based on imaginative and logical thinking. Therefore, if these kinds of thinking appear less developed among children, the respective chess assignments might contribute to their development creating the relevant bases for imaginative and logical thinking.

Chess might also contribute to the development of verbal capacity.

Wechsler's intelligence scale is one of the IQ test designed to measure intelligence and cognitive ability in adults and older adolescents.

Wechsler's intelligence scale comprises the respective verbal and non-verbal performance scale tests. The verbal performance scale test is designed to reveal the following intelligence components (indexes):

- General information,
- Comprehension,
- Perceptual organization,
- Working memory,
- Ability to trace similarities and that of contrasting,
- Digit span,
- Ability to classify,
- Matrix reasoning.

In the years 1973 and 1974, Dr. Albert Frank, a school headmaster in Zaire, conducted

a study on the impact of chess on the children who had two-hour per week chess course. Later the results of the research were published in the book "Chess and Aptitude" that evidenced unique results. After the chess course, he came to the conclusion that the children who had been involved in chess lessons, had improved their verbal and arithmetic abilities. How can chess boost the verbal skills? Frank claims that while playing chess, under no actual verbal interaction, chess, however, foments the deep individual potential of verbal intercourse.

### Conclusion

The facts introduced above may infer that chess plays a great role in the process of developing child's mentality. Chess, in particular, improves concentration, imagination, logic, creative thinking, memory, critical thinking and planning. Certainly it is a great means to improve volitional qualities of children, particularly, the ones of objective evaluation, the ability to lose with dignity, righteous judgment, philanthropy and the ability to orientate.

Finally, it should be noted that learning to play the game of chess is useful regardless of age; however, it becomes more productive when learned at an early age.



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1(8), 2017

Լրատվական գործունեություն իրականացնող՝ Խաչատուր Աբովյանի անվան  
հայկական պետական մանկավարժական համալսարանի հիմնադրամ  
Վկայական՝ № 03Ա1056715, տրված՝ 19.04.2016 թ.

Հասցե՝ Երևան 010, Տիգրան Մեծի 17

Համարի թողարկման պատասխանատու՝

գիտական պարբերականի գլխավոր խմբագիր Հասմիկ ՀՈՎՀԱՆՆԻՍՅԱՆ

Տպաքանակը՝ 200

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Mesrop Mashtots –  
The Creation of Armenian  
Alphabet. Image size: 460 × 571



The statue of  
Mesrop Mashtots in  
front of Matenadaran, Yerevan




Sahak Partev and Mesrop Mashtots,  
founders of Armenian scripture.  
Sculptor A. Sargsyan, architect R.  
Juhakyan, bronze, 1943.



Mesrop Mashtots creating the  
Armenian alphabet,  
by Francesco Maggiotto (1750-1805)



"Armenian Alphabet" 1981  
by Grigor Khanjyan  
Image size: 223 × 170



Mesrop Mashtots, by the Venetian  
painter Giovanni Battista Tiepolo  
(1696-1770). Fresco at Würzburg  
Residence in Bavaria

Mesrop MASHTOTS (362 – February 17, 440) was an early medieval Armenian linguist, theologian, statesman and hymnologist. He is best known for having restored or invented the Armenian alphabet c. 405 AD, which was a fundamental step in strengthening Armenian statehood and the bond between the Armenian Kingdom and Armenians living in the Byzantine Empire and the Persian Empire. He was also, according to a number of scholars and contemporaneous Armenian sources, the creator of the Caucasian Albanian and Georgian alphabets. The first sentence in Armenian written down by St. Mesrop after he invented the letters is said to be the opening line of Solomon's Book of Proverbs: Ծանաչել զիմաստութիւն եւ զկրօստ, իմանալ զբանս հաւնճարոյ: Čanač'el zimaštut'iwn ew zxrāt, imanal zbars hančaroy. «To know wisdom and instruction; to perceive the words of understanding.»

The realizer of the publication activity is Khachatur Abovyan Armenian State  
Pedagogical University Foundation; Certificate № 03A1056715, issued 19.04.2016  
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Responsible for the publication of the issue: Editor-in-Chief of the periodical Hasmik HOVHANNISYAN