Political Reforms, People’s Expectations, and Justice

Abstract

The topic of the present paper derives from Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), and is sometimes labeled as the “paradox of conservative justice”. In The Methods of Ethics (1st edition, 1874) Sidgwick asks whether political reforms that have a morally desirable goal could justifiably be rejected simply on the grounds that realizing them would spoil the life plans of those who believe that the future would be like the past. The paradox is that “ideal justice” demands us to make reforms but “conservative justice” requires respecting people’s reasonable expectations, although making reforms seems to imply that those expectations will not be respected. The question seems to be about a moral dilemma. The government has an obligation to improve society and correct existing injustices, but surely it has also an obligation not to disappoint people’s natural expectations, partly created by the government itself. When the circumstances are such that correcting injustices happens to disappoint people’s reasonable expectations, the government simply cannot comply with both of its obligations.