The Phenomenological Method in the Ethics and Legal Philosophy of the XX Century


  • Anton DIDIKIN National Research University “Higher School of Economics”
  • Daria KOZHEVNIKOVA LSR Company Group,



phenomenology, ethics, legal philosophy, a priory knowledge, reality, transcendental subject, phenomenological reduction


This paper analyzes the essence of the phenomenological method as it is used in certain theories in ethics and legal philosophy. The purpose of the paper is to provide a full study of phenomenology to determine its place in modern philosophical thought.

The paper used methods of the history of philosophy, especially method of rational reconstruction, and based on interpretation of the classical phenomenological texts (E. Husserl, E. Levinas, A. Reinach).

The main result of the paper is the justification that the unity of logic, ontology and ethics became the ground of application of the phenomenological method in the field of legal and ethical knowledge. Therefore the ideas of E. Levinas’s ethical phenomenology were the basis for understanding ethics as the “first philosophy” in a phenomenological context.

The main conclusion of this paper is that the ethical dimension of responsibility for the actions of the subject and their consequences expands the horizons of phenomenological reduction and allows us to reveal the essence of legal reality in a new way.

The paper was carried out within the framework of the HSE research project “Ethics and Law: correlation and mechanisms of mutual influence”.


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Author Biographies

Anton DIDIKIN, National Research University “Higher School of Economics”

PhD in Law, Doctor of Science in Philosophy, Professor at the Department of Law, National Research University “Higher School of Economics”, Moscow, Russia. His areas of scientific interest include legal philosophy, history of philosophy, and theory of law. Didikin is the author of 5 monographs and more than 200 scientific papers. Recent publications: “On the Connection between Facts and Normativity in the Legal Epistemology”, “Moral Prescriptions and Lawful Actions: The Interpretation of Aristotle arguments in Hare’s Metaethics”.

Daria KOZHEVNIKOVA, LSR Company Group,

Lawyer in LSR Company Group, Moscow, Russia. Her areas of interest include legal philosophy, history of legal thought, private law. Kozhevnikova is the author of 2 scientific papers. Recent publication: “Phenomenological Conceptions in the Legal Philosophy”.


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How to Cite

DIDIKIN, A., & KOZHEVNIKOVA, D. (2021). The Phenomenological Method in the Ethics and Legal Philosophy of the XX Century. WISDOM, 1(1), 50–60.

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