Stoic Logic from the Theory of Mental Models


  • Miguel LÓPEZ-ASTORGA University of Talca



Indemonstrables, Stoic logic, Syllogism, themata, theory of mental models


An essential point about Stoic philosophy is why certain arguments and rules are basic in their logic. That is the case of the indemonstrables and the themata. It has been proposed that assuming the theory of mental models, one can think that the five indemonstrables and two of the themata are easy to understand for the human mind. This can explain why those arguments and rules are essential components in Stoic logic. In addition, it is relevant because, given that the theory of mental models tries to capture the real way people reason, it can show that Stoic logic is closer to the manner individuals naturally make inferences than modern propositional calculus. The present paper is intended to move forward in this direction. It has two aims: one of them is to give an account from the theory of mental models of all of the themata. The other one is to argue that a simple schema that is correct in modern propositional calculus, and which, however, is not deemed as a true syllogism in Stoic logic, is difficult for people according to the theory of mental models. Those are further pieces of evidence that Stoic logic describes the way human beings think to a greater extent than modern logic.


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Author Biography

Miguel LÓPEZ-ASTORGA, University of Talca

PhD from the University of Cádiz, Spain; degree validated as a PhD in Logic and Philosophy of Sciences by the University of Chile, Professor at the Institute of Humanistic Studies “Juan Ignacio Molina”, University of Talca (Chile). He is interested in philosophy of language, philosophy of cognitive science, and epistemology. Currently, he is working on the relations between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics in human cognition. That work is allowing him to find links between that theory and ancient approaches such as that of Stoic logic.


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How to Cite

LÓPEZ-ASTORGA, M. (2022). Stoic Logic from the Theory of Mental Models. WISDOM, 21(1), 27–37.